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This work considers how it is that company structures,
based on hierarchy, are able to persist over time. This
question, though simple, is basic to industrial society,
since although business organizations do in general operate
with sufficient cohesion to produce their goods~services
for sale, the traditional hierarchical structure has on
occasions come under attack • Our aim will be to establish
and understand the conditions under which hierarchy is able
to persist - or conversely, under what conditions we might
expect it to come apart. Our consideration does not
however, preclude the possibility that the attack on
hierarchy is more apparent than real - that any attack is
at the level of limited ideology rather than social praxis.
Hence it will be our position that we shall suspend belief
in the persistence of the hierarchical structure and in
this way be able to consider the conditions both for its
persistence, and also for any challenge to be made to it.
By pursuing the initial problem in this way we do not
preclude the possibility of either .
1) the permanence of hierarchy, or
2) the inevitability of its replacement with
more/less democratic structures.
Our . aim is to understand the conditions for the
persistence of hierarchical structures, and by implication
the cond~tions under which they may be challenged by more
democrat~c structures.
Given this aim we must now consider the manner in
which we shall attempt to resolve the problems we have set.
We have stated our argument that we must suspend belief in
the hierarchical basis of organization, but not ourselves
posing any particular alternative 3. Thus we must treat as
problematic what our sUbjects treat as obvious, and
investigate the structure of their thought to establish the
hold of hierarchy.
Our 'starting point shall be the Lifeworld 4 of
employees by which they interpret their working lives and
therefore of the company for which they work, and its
actions - for instance the expectations which they make of
the firm in all kinds of areas from job methods and wages,
to the determination of strategy. We shall begin from the
Lifeworld since it seems to us that its structure can
sustain belief in the hierarchical structure of the firm.
We cannot, however, accomplish this without a proper
theoretical perspective or a methodological view. This
chapter shall be concerned with the former, while the
latter is considered in the following chapter.
Our perspective is illustrgted by our initial, but
provisional, model (fig. 1.1) which is based on two
distinct, but inter-dependent, assertions:
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Green Boxes - Subjective Experience1) that employees make expectations of their
firm, which they structure at a cognitive level using
the knowledge available to them.
2) that the social situation in which these
expectations are made is asymmetrical in two respects
a) the chances of successfully making an
expectation - getting what one wants from the
firm - may be unevenly distributed (ie that there
may be inequality of power so that some are
consistently successful and others unsuccessful).
b) expectations are not pressed in such a
way as to subvert the organizational structure
and expectations which would subvert the
organizational structure are either not pressed
effectively or conclusively or not made at all.
Hence there are two important features to our
theoretical perspective:
A) the process of knowledge selection to produce
and structure expectations,
B) a theory of power to structure the situation
in which these expectations are made.
In respect of the former we shall rely heavily on the
work of Schutz 6, Habermas 7, and of Laing and Esterson 8 ,
while for the latter we shall consider Lukes' three
dimensional theory of power 9 , developed from the
perspective of Habermas, and in particular his Ideal Speech
Thesis 10. This will result in a theory of the Lifeworld,
which while substantially consistent with Schutz continues
to establish in what respects the. Lifeworld creates but
conceals the possibility of the exercise of power.
The importance of Schutz for us is that he provides a
theoretical basis for knowledge creation for the individual
social actor, and the structuring of knowledge into
categories 11, which is consistent with our own view. We
shall argue, however, that the view presented by Schutz
does not take adequate account of the "restricting" or
"limiting" aspects of the Lifeworld and the taken-for-
grantedness (or uncritical attitude) which it sets up -
that as Morgan's "Images" suggests the Lifeworld (as our
"subjective stock of knowledge" 12) can be a "Psychic
Prison,,13. This argument in turn leads on to possible
exercises· of power of Which the participants (ie power
holder and sUbject) are not conscious. This will be
developed by reference to Habermas's work 14 •The importance of Lukes is his prOV1S10n of an
analytical framework for power, which recognises that power
is a concept of greater variation than has been realised.
Lukes, however, does not make sUfficiently clear the
meaning - particularly at the empirical level - of his
third ("radical") dimension of power. For this reason we
shall introduce the thesis of ideal speech, put forward by
Habermas, to clarify and extend Lukes' work in a manner
which is theoretically and empirically stronger, and
methodologically more practical. We shall use a synthesis
of Lukes and Habermas as a basis for our analysis of the
social situation in which expectations are
a) structured
b) developed as a project in a social situation.
By bringing together these two elements (ie the
Habermasian adaption of Schutz and LUkes) we shall argue
that individuals make expectations on their company which
they develop from their Lifeworld and its subjective stock
of knowledge. This process of knowledge selection and
development of expectations, analytically sets a number of
issues which shall be important to us in considering
whether there is the social aSYmmetry we suggested exists
as a support to existing organizational structures 15 :
1) the knowledge selected may be so structured as
to forestall the development of particular
expectations, or so constrain behaviour that, in
either situation, the structure of the organization
goes unchallenged.
2) expectations can only be satisfied in
competition with others - hence interaction with
other employees will be important and particularly the
Lifeworld definition of these employees (for instance
competition between Management and Hourly paid may be
influenced by the definition which the latter make of
the former).
3) expectations shall be arbitrated upon by the
company decision-making system (ie by the individual/
group who have the authority to make the decision in
question). At a relatively superficial level we must
consider the values of this individual/group - but we
have to go still deeper to understand the conditions
under which this authority is regarded as legitimate
or conversely regarded as illegitimate 16 •
These issues are closely connected since the
legitimacy and illegitimacy or the decision-making system
are largely determined - in our model - by the selection of
knowledge, part of which is constituted by one's experience
and/or interaction with other employees, as well as wider
social knowledge which is employed by defining and
interpreting the behaviour of others to develop
expectations.
3Our perspective on this process is composed of two
parts:
1) Employees make expectations of their company.
2) These expectations are generated in a process
of experience and learning.
We see no causal implications in this, but instead
take the view that employees select from the knowledge
available to them, in order to structure, guide and justify
their behaviour. For instance this may be to
A) justify the expectation of having more
influence in their company I s decision-making, and to
indicate what would be appropriate behaviour to this
end. Or alternatively
B) indicate that this is not a reasonable
expectation, and not a reasonable form of behaviour.
similarly the knowledge which is accessible can be
employed to define and interpret the behaviour of relevant
others in their own group, and throughout the work
situation - to account for, and explain what is happening,
to foretell how to behave/not behave in the future. The
process can, in'other words, encourage or discourage the
taking up of particular projects. Our particular interest
is the dominance of hierarchy is maintained, restraining
the development of more democratic organizational forms.
Schutz
We have indicated, in a general sense, the existence
of certain types of knowledge, but before going on to
consider the particular form in which these are defined, we
must re-emphasise and expand upon our initial theoretical
statement. In particular, as well as the particular
definitions of knowledge, we must examine the constitution
of knowledge to a point where it serves as a meaning
structure by which we define the action we are concerned
with, and guide our subsequent behaviour toward that
action.
Schutz makes clear that these two moments cannot be
separated, since he argues that an external object 'is
constituted out of appearances as we encounter them in our
stream of consciousness. such appearances "hang together"
in a context of meaning.
As they follow one another up in
regular sequence, our experience of the
object is built up. We can by means of
a monothetic qlance look upon the whole
sequence as a unity in itself - the
object of outer experience, the thinq
of the external world. 17
4-Our experience, therefore, is added. to stratum by
stratum 18 to create a meaning structure or Lifeworld - a
process Schutz saw as on-going. Thus the stock of
knowledge, and the Lifeworld are not in any sense "once and
for all" - we do not have a Lifeworld and that is that for
all time. Rather by our continued behaviour we reinforce it
by fulfilling our expectations, or we weaken it by
experiencing frustration of our expectations. For example,
in a mundane sense, we use the Lifeworld when we cross the
road. Thus it informs us that cars drive on the left (at
least in the UK) and keep to 30 mph (at least in built up
areas). We continue to take this for granted - at least
until we get knocked down by a car travelling at 60 mph, or
driving on the right in a one way street. Such an event may
lead to reassessment of the Lifeworld and the knowledge
which it contains and structures 19 .. What, therefore does
Schutz mean by the Lifeworld?
The Lifeworld is exactly what it seems to be 20 - it
is the world we occupy and take for granted in our ordinary
everyday life 21. In this Schutz was influenced by Husserl
who argues that to understand the objective world we must
first of all suspend (or "bracket") our belief in its
existence so that we can establish how it is formed by our
sUbjects. What Husserl encourages us to is
A phenomenological understanding of the
world, one that aims at elucidating the
essential structures of this life-
world, structures which are themselves
constituted by intentional
consciousness.22
This lays down the cardinal problem for Husserl,
a) that the essential structures of the life-
world (or the natural attitude, the constructs of
common sense) cannot, and should not, be taken for
granted, but are instead important sUbjects of study,
and thus
b) to establish how the Life-world, in this sense
is formed.
Therefore we then have to ask, how, as individuals, we
come to acquire knowledge of the Lifeworld and how it is
that the Lifeworld comes to be formed - to develop what
Schutz describes as "the sUbjective stock of knowledge" ~3.
Put at its very simplest our knowledge of the
Lifeworld is formed by our experience, and what we are
taught about it by "parents and teachers". As we grow
older, and encounter a wider range of experiences, so our
stock of knowledge of the Lifeworld grows and develops 24.
Thus the knowledge we have of the Lifeworld - that
which we take for granted - will depend on,a) previous experiences (either of our own, or of
others, which we have learned, heard of etc.) - for
instance, we learn as children that to talk in class
will result in some sort of punishment, and that it is
"wrong".
b) current experiences, interpreted by the
existing stock of knowledge and the rules by which it
is structured 25 •
Hence an experience which goes against this system of
rules will either
i) be rejected as somehow wrong, or
ii) lead to a change in the system of rules.
Hence as well as enabling us to interpret what goes on
around us, the Lifeworld also acts in such a way as to
restrict our understanding 26, since it predisposes us to
understand reality in a particular way 27 • But, moreover, we
assume that others with whom we are in interaction occupy
the same Lifeworld 28 •
While much of our learning may be at 2nd or 3rd (or
more) hand, we cannot separate what we know from our
experience - the stock of knOWledge which we employ in the
Lifeworld is a summation of those experiences 29. Our
understanding of the Lifeworld is to enable us to "act in
it and operate upon it" 30. In other words through our
Lifeworld we understand the Social World and can act within
it.
So, what is the stock of knowledge of the Lifeworld
composed of in Schutz's theory? Schutz suggests that there
are three categories of knOWledge relevant to the
Lifeworld. These are
Basic or Fundamental elements or structures 31 ,
Routine or Habitual elements 32 ,
Specific Component contents 33 •
There are therefore three categories of knOWledge in
Schutz. There is the type of knOWledge we are all aware of
having - what to do when driving and coming to a police
officer with his arm raised, indicating that we should stop
~. In addition there are two other elements to the stock of
knowledge we use in the Lifeworld - at the deepest level
there is knOWledge which is used (unconsciously) to
categorise and structure this conscious knowledge - and at
an intermediate level certain skills or knOWledge which we
use without even thinking or being conscious or aware of
using 35 •
The issues Which remain to be clarified in Schutz's
theory are that having acquired this knOWledge,a) what is its structure?
b) how does this, essentially individual, stock
of knowledge relate to the stock of knowledge in
society generally?
The acquisition of knowledge in Schutz's theory is
through our experience in other words we acquire
knowledge through learning 36, as we have already made clear
above. When we have experienced a situation, our knowledge
of it is "filed away" in our existing structure of
knowledge.
The stock of knowledge is then ~iven form by the
system of "relevances and typicality" 7, which are its
fundamental structures (see above). Experience therefore,
enters into our stock of knOWledge, and is given structure,
according to
1) our system of typicality what kind of
experience it is 38 ( consequently there are what
Schutz describes as "provinces of reality" ).
2) our system of relevances - which indicate to
us how important each of the elements of the situation
are. This system of relevances determines why we are
interested in one thing rather than another 39."
If an experience fits in with our basic organizing
system then it is likely to be sedimented (added to our
existing knOWledge) without being questioned 40. Other
experiences which do not satisfy this condition, however,
will require further explanation. This may result in such
experiences being reinterpreted to fit in with the
structure of relevances or that relevances are restructured
to allow for this experience 41 •
Thus, we have established the structure of the stock
of knowledge in Schutz I s theory. Our sUbjective stock of
knOWledge, which we acquire through experience is composed
of three categories -
Basic or Fundamental elements or structures
(themes and types),
Routine or Habitual elements, and
Specific Component contents.
The sUbjective stock knowledge (its routine elements
and specific contents ) is given structure and is organized
by a system of themes (thematic relevances) and
typifications - the basic or fundamental structures. As the
knOWledge which we employ is used over time, and proves to
be successful, its use becomes increasingly unconscious
and thus uncritical 42 'We can therefore, consider Schutz's view of how this
structure of knowledge of the individual is related to the
social structure of knowledge. While the preponderance of
Schutz's theory is at· the level of the individual, the
social fits well, and in an obvious way.
For schutz, the individual does not make his own
history freely, does not form relevances etc. on his own.
Rather the individual is "delimited and determined by
social givens" 43 The sedimentation of SUbjective
knowledge, which we have discussed above, takes place
within the context of society 44, so in the construction of
reality, the individual cannot be imagined to be acting
autonomously. Rather the individual acts within the context
of society. Indeed in the language we employ in our social
lives, we express the structures of meaning of the everyday
life world of the society of which we are part 45 •
So how does this work? It works, in Schutz I s view,
because when we enter into a situation (eg a "We relation")
we are not free to act as we will, but rather the situation
forces certain facets on us. For instance, when we enter
into a situation we will draw on certain SUbjective
relevances (eg when I last met with this person, he
appeared to be a j oIly type of person). In so doing,
however, we do not just select any old relevance structure
- we do not work at random. Rather we use data gathered
from the situation to determine which relevance structure
is appropriate (thus the previous example would depend on
the two contexts being the same - hence it is possible for
a boss and subordinate to have different relationships at
work and in the golf club of which both are members). In
other words, while as individuals we select the relevance
structure, the basis for doing so is the reality of the
situation (ie it is social).
Moreover, the individual will have been socialized
into interpretive and motivational relevances during the
course of his life. Were it otherwise he would not be able
to master the situation he would misinterpret the
situation, and/or act for the wrong reasons. Thus the
relevances we select will
a) have been used for social reasons
b) have been acquired socially also.
It would, however, be wrong to suggest that society merely
imprints itself on the individual, in the way we might
expect a "Parsonian" sociology to suggest. In SchutzIS
theory, however, the individual is never fUlly determined.
This is because when the individual enters a situation he
brings with him his own sUbjective s~stem of relevances,
which will have a "social prehistory" 6. The prehistory of
different individuals will differ, so when two individuals
enter a situation, they are likely to interpret it
differently for this reason 47 •
gHence while there may be a "community of relevance
structures" 48, the individual's biography will determine
a) which relevance structures he uses,
b) what he understands by each of them.
The individual is not, therefore fully determined by
society in Schutz I s theory - but equally he is not fully
free to act either 49 •
The subjective system is composed of independent,
empathic and socialized relevances 50, but the largest role
is played by the empathic and socialized relevances, since
they operate in the most comprehensive sectors of the life
of the individual. These include skills which, as Schutz
points out
the other•••considers to be obvious to
any educated person 51
Thus the two key dimensions we considered above in the
context of the individual relevance systems, and
typicality - are both socially derived 52. Of particular
importance in this process are the relationships within
Which we construct our lives. These are categorised by
Schutz as depending on:
a) "we orientation 53 " or
b) "thou orientation 54 " or
c) "they orientation 55 ".
Relations based on these orientations vary in their
degree of intimacy for the individual - thus the "we" is
more intimate than the "thou", which in turn is more
intimate than the "they" relation 56. It is, however,
through these relationships that we acquire and practice
our SUbjective stock of knowledge 51. Through "thou" and
"we" relations we can
a) acquire SUbjective knowledge (eg that a
particular type of person, in these circumstances
behaves in these ways)
b) use our SUbjective stock of knowledge (eg that
we expect this t¥pe of person to behave/react in
particular ways) 5But, how does social knowledge emerge? Is it simply
the agglomeration of individual sUbjective knowledge?
Schutz argues that we can consider the sUbjective level
without the social, but not vice versa. In other words the
sUbjective stock of knowledge, while being restricted by
the social stock (what Schutz calls "social givens" 59),
contains its origins._The sUbjective, in other words, has
priority 60, though only in theory, as Schutz himself points
out 61. The reasons for this are that:
a) the volume of sUbjective knowledge which
enters into the social stock is relatively small, and
often adapted during its absorption into the social
stock,
b) the social stock is greater than the sum of
its parts (the sUbjective stocks of individuals). In
other words we cannot merely sum all of the sUbjective
stocks 62 •
For sUbjective knOWledge to enter into the social
stock requires that the sUbjective knowledge of individuals
feeds into the collective social stock of knowledge. This
occurs as result of a process referred to by Schutz as
"objectivation" 63. By this process, human, sUbjective
processes come to take on for us the appearance of
objective reality 64. Objectivations can take the form of
products, recipes, explicit elements of knowledge, skills,
models of behaviour to be followed 65 - all of which are
critical elements of the social stock of knowledge on which
we all draw for our sUbjective stocks of knOWledge.
We do, however, have to ask why it is that some
objectivations become part of the social stock, while
others do not? For objectivated knowledge to become part of
the social stock requires that two conditions are
satisfied:
1) there is a similarity of sUbjective relevance
structures for all parties. This requires that the
problem for the person who originally solved it, is
the same as for the person who accepts this solution
66
. 2) knOWledge is transferred across the
generations, and thus does not die with those who
"know it" 67 •
J 0The social stock of knowledge, therefore, requires
that this stock must never d~e, and as such the stock is
capable of protecting itself 8. Thus in society, issues of
typical problems, transmission of solutions, to whom the
solutions are to be transmitted are not matters left to
chance. ~Rather the answers to such questions are themselves
components of the social stock of knowledge (eg the role of
teacher is an example of a specialist role for the
transmission of the stock of knowledge, but even i~re
basic, as Schutz points out is the role of the family).
Consequently the transmission of the stock of knowledge, by
being built into the social structure, becomes independent
of sUbject~~e relevance structures and thus of the
individual ,to the extent that he can simply take up
solutions and apply them directly.
This 1s supported by the likelih~~d that if the use of
certain solutions become rigid better, impro¥~d
solutions will not be considered for use by individuals •
A motivation for this is that by using pre-established
solutions time can be released for the solution of other
problems. This creates the possibility of an inter-
generational division of labour (eg one generation invented
electricity, so another has the time to work on
electronics) 73.
In parallel to this, there is a social division of
labour. This means that the social stock of knowledge will
be, broadly speaking, categorised as
a) general and available, to all, and
b) specialised and thus not relevant for all, but
restricted to a specialised groups.
Thus the stock of knowledge is socially distributed -
some of it is in general use, while some of it is known and
used only by specific office-holders (eg usually only
doctors have detailed medical knowledge). For Schutz this
appears to be purely a functional necessity, so th~t when
we need specialist knowledge we turn to a specialist 74.
We can now turn to the second question of the
structure of the social stock - in distinction to the
structure of the sUbjective stock of individuals. The
latter, it will be recalled emerges - is sedimented from -
experiences of individuals. While it draws on the
sUbjective stock, the social stock
a) depends on an inter-subjective process of
objectivation and social relevances.
b) is
transmission
across time.
institutionalized by processes for the
of knowledge, both interpersonally and
I ,Consequently the structure of the social stock is
different from the structure of the sUbjective stock. The
sUbjective stock's structure in anyone case will depend on
the individual's biography. The structure of the social
stock on the other hand depends on its accumulation over
the years/centuries, which will depend on its
institutionalized processes for the collection and transfer
of knowledge ~. Thus while the social stock may derive from
the sUbjective stock, their methods of accumulation differ
and therefore their structures.
There are a number of features to the structure of the
social stock which Schutz draws attention to:
1) the social stock of knowledge cannot be distributed
uniformly 76.. Thus my access to the stock of knowledge will
not be that same as yours. On the other hand
a) the more similar our biographies are,
b) the more our interpretive relevances are
alike, arid
c) the more the problems we face are related,
the more it will be true to say that our access to the
stock of knowledge will be similar. Hence the more a group
has corresponding problems, biographies and interpretive
relevance systems, the more alike their access to the
social stock will be. For similar reasons their Lifeworlds
will be similar also. Schutz's argument is similar to that
of Esterson n, namely that behaviour is a function of our
experience.
If we apply this idea to our research site, where
Hourly-Paid and Staff have experience only of
a) hierarchy,
b) managers telling them, without dialogue, what
is viable and what is not,
then hierarchy will be all the employees will have to
behave toward since it is all of their experience.
Alternatives to hierarchy have not been matters of
experience, and thus they know nothing of them. This gives
rise to Schutz's second observation.
12.2) the stock of knowledge will be socially
distributed. This relates back to a point we have made
already - that the social stock is composed, broadly of two
categories n. The first and most prevalent is that part of
the stock which is general, and as such available to all ~.
The second and more restricted is special knowledge which
is role specific 80. There are therefore deep and very real
differences in the stock of knowledge available to the
members of a society. The stock of knowledge has become
unequally distributed 81. For Schutz there are a number of
consequences of this:
a) the social stock of knowledge, in its
entirety, cannot be surveyed by anyone person.
b) that there can be no comprehensive view is a
feature of our society 82 - though some may be able to
take a wider view than others ~ •
Consequently there are, in effect discrete areas of
meaning set up in set up in society M, both because of the
differentiations which exist in general knowledge, but also
because of the different specialised areas of knowledge.
The final area of Schutz's theory to be considered
here concerns how the social stock operates within the
SUbjective stock - "how the social stock of knowledge
present(s) in subjective experience" 85. There are two
important points here:
a) the social stock of knowledge does not appear
as such to the individual. The individual is not aware
of drawing on the social stock, rather they are, for
him, just another part of his SUbjective stock. The
social stock simply blends seamlessly into the overall
knowledge base of the individual. The elements of the
social stock are, therefore, taken-for-granted by the
individual 86, and thus, we would argue, have power
implications.
b) we have identified above, the existence of
special knowledge, which is restrictedly available.
Schutz points to a further dimension of this when he
argues that specialist knowledge is not only not known
by the population in general, but may also appear to
be out of their reach, either for individual reasons 87
or for institutional reasons M. Thus not only is
specialised knowledge restricted to a (often small)
proportion of the population, but also the population
who are without it may feel that it is out of their
reach - it is not for them. This again is a matter we
would argue has important power implications.
Schutz points to the tendency for this to develop. As
the specialty, whatever it may be, evolves over time the
complexity of the meaning structure becomes all the
greater. This has the following consequences
I~a) that the specialty becomes all t~e more
impenetrable for those who do not share in it 8 •
b) it becomes increasingly difficult for
individuals to take a view of society wider than the
view from their specialty 90.
The increasing importance of specialist knowledge is
related to the increasing development of the social
division of labour, each section having its own specialist
knowledge, which is increasingly restricted to their area
of specialization 91. Each area of eXPiitise, therefore,
has its place, having been classified ,and that this
system of classification is part of our system of
typifications. Hence when we encounter a specialist called
"manager" we accord him a certain level of prestige on
account of the specialist knowledge he possesses. 93
Hence our Lifeworld - in the form of the SUbjective
stock of knowledge - cannot be separated from the social
stock of knowledge, which is in turn suppor~ed by the
institutionalized practices of the society. The social
stock and its institutionalized practices are matters of
which we are not fUlly aware in our subjective stock.
Through these vehicles power can operate in ways of which
we are unaware. This goes much of the way to giving our
theory of power the foundation it requires.
There is, therefore, a research problem in as much as
such a routine process passes by largely unnoticed within
the social context. It is, as our example of crossing the
road shows, only problematic when our expectations
(crossing the road safely) are frustrated that we question
the knowledge in the Lifeworld, or even the very structures
of the Lifeworld. Normally they remain in the background,
uncriticised. Hence the very routineness of social
interaction may be regarded as a breach of Habermas's Ideal
Speech Thesis, as thus potentially as a source of power -
but one which by virtue of its ordinariness, goes unnoticed
(ie is unconscious). For instance, while shop floor workers
may regard a particular management decision as wrong - for
instance buying what they see as the wrong machine - their
Lifeworlds may be such that they do not challenge the right
of Management to take this decision (in other words while
they may challenge the substantive outcome, they do not
challenge the process if the Lifeworld defines Management
as the decision-making group).
Much behaviour is structured in this way, and
consequently is lacking in full consciousness, but this
does not rule out the possibility of bringing out the basis
of such behaviour in terms of the actor's Lifeworld. Tiis
is already done from the perspectiye of ethnomethodology ,
and could be done from a Schutz~an perspective, but the
difficulty is that much of this is descriptive, in that it
does not consider
f+a) what is taken for granted, and in particular
b) the social implications of this.
Thus, while we have learned through Schutz's work that
we have to attend to the manner in which reality" is formed,
we must also consider the role that power plays in this. It
is to this that we now turn.
The 3-D Theory of Power and an Amendment
The 3-D theory of ~ower is put forward by Lukes in
"Power- a Radical View" 5, in which he advances the case
for 3 dimensions of power. The first two dimensions are
directly visible, conscious exercises of power, but the
third (Which Lukes describes as "radical") is unobservable
directly and unconscious.
There are, however, certain problems with Lukes' view
of unobservable and unconscious power, as it is not
entirely clear what he means here, particularly at the
empirical and methodological levels. This is further
confused by his reference to Crenson's "Un-politics of Air
Pollution" 96 as an example of 3rd Dimension power. It
would, in contrast appear to us that Crenson is more
typical of the 2nd dimension. This is why this section is
described as "The 3-D Theory of Power and an Amendment",
since we shall introduce Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis
which is theoretically and empirically clearer than Lukes
and methodologically more practical.
Our discussion will start out from the conscious/
observable dimensions, moving on to the unconscious/
unobservable dimensions revealing that
a) we can only fully comprehend the former and
their implications by recognition of the latter,
b) we cannot fully understand the structuring of
behaviour and our perception of the behaviour of
others unless we undertake to conceptualise of power
in all its guises and not merely its conventional form
as a visible, conscious social phenomenon.
In particular we shall further our view that the
Lifeworld is restrictive and, as a function of its use,
acts to restrict our behaviour within certain parameters
, acceptable to the form of organization, by limiting our
view of acceptable alternative forms of behaviour/
organizations.
The first dimension of power considered by Lukes is
based on Dahl's definition that
A has power over B to the extent he can
get B to do something he would· not
otherwise do. 97
/~This is a ~escription of a restricted form of
behaviour, which, ~n analytical terms, excludes from its
sphere of competence, much social action:
a) it puts power and conflict in a contingent
relationship - in other words it does not consider the
possibility that power may actually be used to prevent
conflict.
b) since it can only consider decisions which
have actually been taken it cannot accommodate the
situation where B is made to do something because A
will not take a formal decision. An illustration of
this is the black community in the US who were forced
to accept second-class citizenship to a considerable
extent because the legislature would not put forward
appropriate legislation. It is this difficulty which
leads Lukes to the second dimension.
The second dimension involves a "qualified critique of
the behavioural focus of the first view" (qualified because
it is still assumed that non-decision-making is a form of
decision-making), which does, however, allow consideration
of situations where decisions are prevented from being
taken on potential issues over which there is observable
Conflict of (subjective) interests as embodied in express
policy preferences and SUb-political grievances ~ •
For this Lukes relies heavily on Bachrach and Baratz's
theory of power 99. The main feature of this is that one
party (A) can exert power over other rarties (B) by
preventing a decision from being taken 10 • Evidence of
management protection of what they regard as their
prerogatives could be considered as examples of this second
dimension. On the other hand this could only be in a
situation where
been actually had prerogatives a) these
challenged and
b) Management had resisted by simply refusing to
negotiate, since Bachrach and Baratz, like Dahl,
require the presence of conflict for the' exercise of
power.
This is the basis of Lukes' critique of Bachrach and
Baratz and the development of his own third dimension of
power. Essentially Lukes criticises Dahl and Bachrach and
Baratz for
1) being too individualistic,
2) preventing consideration of the many ways in
which issues can be kept out of politics through
i) the operation of social forces,
ii) institutional practices,iii) individual decisions.
Moreover, in Lukes' view the exercise of power by no
means necessarily involves the presence of conflict. This
is not to say that there may not be the potential for
conflict in the situation, but it is not necessary for the
conflict to be realised. As we shall see, in Lukes' view it
is a particularly effective use of power to exercise it to
prevent conflict. It is, therefore, possible that the
conflict is only latent, in that there is a contradiction
between the interests of those exercising the power and the
real interests of those over whom they exercise the power
(the less powerful) •.The less powerful may not express, or
even be conscious of their own interests but
the identification of those interests
always rests on empiricall! supportable
and refutable hypotheses 10 ,
In this view the exercise of power is not necessarily
a conscious process - the third dimension does not require
us to look for Machiavellian smoke-filled rooms to prove
our view. 102
The relevance of this to industry is in so far as
power is employed to
prevent people from havinq qrievances
by shapinq their perceptions,
coqnitions and preferences in such a
way that they accept their role in the
existinq order of thinqs either because
they can see or imaqine no alternative
to it, or because they see it as
natural and unchanqeable or because
they value it as divinely ordained and
beneficial 103
Thus power can be used not merely to sustain
hierarchy, but also to diminish the perceptual viability of
any alternative to it as a form of organization. Thus if we
are concerned with either the maintenance of existing
structures, their modification or replacement, we must
first understand what supports existing arrangements. Such
supports may indeed be highly visible but those hinted at
by Lukes, at the subconscious level, may be the most
effective.
There are, however, not inconsiderable problems with
Lukes' position - problems which will lead us to amend his
theory with Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis. There are, for
us, two main problems with the position which Lukes
sketches out:
a) his empirical example - Crenson's "Unpolitics
of Air Pollution". We would argue that it is not at
all clear whether Crenson's work is 2nd or 3rd
Dimension 104 •
ITb) Lukes is unclear about the empirical meaning
of the Jrd dimension, as well as failing to give clear
indications about its methodological practicality.
Crenson's work concerns the failure of anti-pollution
activists to introduce clean air proposals in Gary,
Indiana. In contrast such proposals had been successfully
proposed in nearby East Chicago. The difference between the
two areas, Crenson explains by reference to the absence of
alternative emploYment in Gary, which was dominated by US
Steel - pollution laws would have closed the plant and lost
all the jobs. In East Chicago, on the other hand, there was
alternative work. There are, however, two problems with
Lukes' position here:
1) the whole radical dimension is rooted in
establishing the real interests - or as Lukes puts it
"the relevant counterfactual" - of the people in Gary.
This comes very close to what could be regarded as an
unacceptable level of value jUdgement. Lukes makes
much of it being in the interests of people to avoid
pollution - but would they do so at the cost of their
jobs 105? Establishing real interests poses problems
which are particularly contentious and should be
avoided if at all possible.
2) As Bradshaw points out 106, the fact that
Crenson can find no evidence of a decision does not
prove that no decision was taken. For instance Crenson
cannot show that the people of Gary did not take a
decision that polluted air was acceptable if it meant
they could keep their jobs. Lukes in reply argues that
Bradshaw would have to show that such a decision was
taken by the inhabitants of Gary 101. This easily
degenerates into trading assertions, and should be
avoided. In any case having to prove that something
has not happened poses very real methodological
problems. In our case we would have to show that
employees have never considered replacing hierarchy.
In our view a more productive way forward - rather
than showing whether or not the people of Gary have or have
not taken the decision to have/or not have clean air - is
to establish why they put up with polluted air (as we know
at the time that Crenson wrote that it was polluted) or,
for our purposes - why it is that hierarchy is accepted
(since, as we pointed out already, in the sense that goods
and services are produced hierarchy does work). This means
that we do not have to prove a negative - instead we have
to show how there is operational consent to polluted air
(hierarchy). Nor do we have to attribute real interests,
but rather can consider the Lifeworld obstacles to
introducing an alternative to hierarchy.
We shall do this by employing Habermas's Ideal Speech
thesis. There are several advantages in Habermas's positiona) it allows the respondents to speak for
themselves, and thus avoids the problems of what real
interests are,
b) it has methodological advantages, which we
will discuss in the next chapter,
c) it is possible to distinguish more clearly
between the 2nd and 3rd dimensions of power, both
theoretically and empirically,
d) it provides clear and usable guide-lines for
the identification of 3rd dimension situations.
It is central to Habermas that for a rational decision
to be taken we must suppose the outcome of the discussion
leading to the decision to be the result of simply the best
argument, and not due to any systematic or accidental
constraint (whether conscious or not) on the discussion. A
structure can only be free of constraint when for all the
participants there is a sYmmetrical distribution of
chances to select and employ speech acts and assume
dialogue roles.
We can devel?p a theory of power from Habermas's Ideal
Speech Thesis, ~n the following way. The Ideal Speech
Thesis is a consensus of theory of truth 108, which argues
that speech is oriented to the achievement of consensus,
but that a genuine, or rational consensus can only emerge
if its conditions are satisfied in the dialogue: that
a) that all the participants to the discourse should have
the same chance to speak,
b) that all participants should have the same chance to put
forward, or call into question, or ground, or refute
statements and explanations etc., such that no assertion is
exempt from critical consideration,
C) that all speakers should be able to demonstrate ,to the
others in the discourse their "good intent" (This is
described by Habermas in the original German text as
Wahrhaftigkeit.See D. Held supra , pg 340.) - that all
Speakers will have the same chance to express their
attitudes, feelings etc. so as to show that they are being
truthful to themselves and to the others in the dialogue,
d) all speakers will have the same chance to employ
regulative speech acts(ie to command, oppose, permit,
forbid etc) such that one-sided norms and privileges are
ruled out, and formal equality can be practiced. 1~9
110 This Thesis sets out an strong definition of equality
which ensures, if satisfied, the four validity claims
on which a consensus can be based ~11. What is its use for
Us?
Its use for us is that, as McCarthy points out,
I'}if the
on this
humanity
if the aqreement achieved in critical
discussion is to provide a warrant for
truth claims, there must be some way of
distinquishinq a rational consensus
from a merely de facto consensus. 112
Hence we would have to ask whether the degree of
consensus we find in the firm concerning the distribution
of power over decision-making and communication, was
rational or not? In other words whether it is a genuine or
distorted consensus, in that it could have been
different113 •
Habermas points out that in normal discourse we have
to assume that the conditions of the ideal speech thesis
are satisfied that we cannot avoid treating our
discussions other than that these conditions are true in
fact (eg that we usually assume that the other party is not
lying). That we
counterfactually proceed as
model were really the case -
unavoidable fiction rests the
of intercourse amonq men. 114
Thus we behave as if the Thesis were true, though in
practice it very seldom (if ever) will be, in its strict
sense.
Hence we treat the result of communicative action 115
as if it were· a rational consensus, when in fact it will
usually be a de facto or strategic (non rational and
partial) consensus, and the result of domination. This will
either be open strategic action 116 - conscious domination,
Where both A and B are aware of the exercise of power - or
the result of concealed strategic action 117 , where either
only the powerful party is aware of the use of his power or
neither party is aware.
In other words the agreement between the parties
reflects either,
a) Open strategic Action where power is
consciously used by one or more of the parties (ie
both parties are aware of the exercise of power - or
at least no secret is made of it), but which may be
i) inclusive, in which case both parties use
their power within the decision-making system or
ii) exclusive in which case the powerful
party uses his power to keep the powerless out118 ,
or there may be
b) Concealed strategic Action where the use of
power is either
20i) covert, on the part of the more powerful
party (for instance Manipulation through
propaganda) 119 , or is
ii) unconscious for both parties -
systematically distorted communication 120, which
is distinguished from the rest, in that where
power is conscious the dominant party at least
is aware of the exercise of his power, but in
this case the dominant party too is unaware of
the exercise of' power 121 •
However, as McCarthy points out, Habermas's
thesis is that the structure is free
from constraint only when for all
participants there is symmetrical
distribution of chances to select and
employ speech acts, when there is an
effective equality of opportunitJ for
the assumption of dialogue roles.1
If this is not satisfied then the consensus we have
found in the firm is non-rational in Habermas's sense 123
and power must be operating in at least one of the four
senses implied by Habermas's theory.
The connection between Habermas and Lukes becomes
clearer if instead of defining communicative action in the
restricted sense of people talking to each other, or
corresponding in a newspaper, we accept that Habermas's
linguistic theory as a paradigm for social behaviour and
interaction~ We have argued above that the structure and,
by implication, the use of knowledge is normally such that
a discussion cannot satisfy the conditions set out by
Habermas in the Ideal Speech Thesis. This is all the more
true in a hierarchical system, based on division of labour,
in which there are unique technical skills (accountant,
engineer, or simply decision-maker- and thus in a parochial
sense, a social stock of knowledge unevenly distributed),
which creates a means for events to be shaped, influenced
and determined in a non-arbitrary way.
In this way the problem of recognition of the 3rd
dimension (the unconscious exercise) of power can be
resolved by Habermas's 4 conditions for Ideal Speech 124 •
To the extent that one, or more, of the conditions are
not satisfied then it can be claimed that there has been an
exercise of power.
Thus our view of power permits us to identify three
different contexts of power -
1) a decision the 1st dimension.
expectation is introduced and dealt with
involving a trial of strength on the part
involved.
2.1
Where an
possibly
of those2) an expectation defined as being inadmissible -
the 2nd dimension. Where an expectation is developed
by a group, but is defined by relevant others as
inadmissible to the decision-making options for
instance for shop-floor workers to obtain staff
status.
3) the 3rd dimension, or radical dimension. This
is recognisable only through the breach of anyone of
Habermas's four conditions, such that no participant
is aware of the exercise of power.
The Lifeworld and the exercise of power
How then, can we bring these two views together?
Putting Schutz (very) simply, it appears to us that he
argues that the individual acquires a sUbjective stock of
knowledge from the social stock and in interaction with
others ("we" and "thou" relations), and that this stock is
then employed to interpret the behaviour of others and to
structure our own behaviour. The problem we have is that we
Would argue that the construction of reality cannot be
considered adequately, isolated from
a) the use of power as a component in the
definition of reality,
b) and that while the social stock of knowledge
may appear to be neutral, this is illusory, and that
we must attend to a wider social reality than Schutz's
"Ego and other".
By discussing further, Habermas' s work and in
particular his views on how reality comes to be defined-
what he describes as "communicative action" 125 - we shall
begin to resolve these difficulties. Considering
"communicative action" requires attention to two facets of
a situation for the actor:
a) what Habermas describes as the "teleological
aspect" 126 - the realization of our aims in the
situation 127
b) the "communicative aspect" 128 - to interpret a
situation, and achieve agreement 129
In contrast to Schutz's model~ which is developed as a
Philosophy of consciousness 10, Habermas develops
communicative action on the basis of language 131. It is
not, however, a study of the syntax and grammatical forms
Used by speakers, but rather a study of "language-in-use" -
in other words of speech 132 • In Habermas's theory, language
is the means through which social action is conducted,
through its role in the achievement of understanding 133 • To
engage in social action, however, requires that a speaker
should possess communicative competence 134 to be able to
take part in communicative interaction 135. 'The purpose of communicative interaction, for Habermas
is not only that the participants will be able to reach
agreement on what is "going on" but that they will also be
fible to reach a rational, and thus sustainable, agreement
6. This is fundamental, as the concept of communicative
action requires agreements are not based on power and/or
one-sided norms, but rather on the best argument and thus
on truth 137 • For Habermas it is a primary requirement that
agreements should be capable of being sustained and
justified in a rational discourse 1~ •
The conditions required for this to happen have been
set out in the Ideal Speech Thesis 139 • It will, however, be
readily apparent that the Ideal Speech Thesis is unlikely
to exist, in reality 140, but as Habermas points out, these
assumptions are made by us in communication in practice 141 •
Thus,
No matter how the intersubjectivity of
mutual understanding may be deformed,
the design of an ideal speech situation
is necessarily implied in the structure
of potential speech, since all speech,
even of intentional deception, is
oriented toward the idea of truth. 142
It is therefore, perfectly possible - or even very
likely - that an empirical situation will not correspond to
the Ideal Speech Thesis. This will happen (indeed it is
true by definition) where the participants are aware that
they are not oriented to understanding, but rather are
oriented to success. For instance
a) in situations of Open Strategic Action the two
parties .are aware of the power Which they are using
against each other. This would clearly not be an Ideal
Speech situation.
b) again in Concealed strategic Action, at least
one party - the powerful - will be aware of their
exercise of power, and their orientation to success.
c) On the other hand in a situation of
Systematically Distorted Communication, at least one
party may perceive themselves to be oriented to
understanding, but in fact are oriented to success - a
fact which goes unnoticed by the participants.
By contrasting the empirical situation to the Ideal
Speech Thesis we can identify a configuration which does
not correspond to its requirements. We can identify power,
even where there is systematically distorted communication,
and the participants are unconscious of its operation.
13This, however, still leaves us to consider how
systematically distorted communication works in situations
Where tha participants are unconscious of the operation of
power? This ~lsblem (of identifying this "replrssion of
rationality" ) is given to Psychoanalysis , and in
particular the psychology of Freud 145.
Habermas sees a number of advantages from using
Freudian psychoanalysis at least as an analogy for the
analysis of social situations 146. Es~entiallY its
advantage is its emphasis on reflection 14 and through
reflection to understanding how we can move to the
emancipation of the individual by freeing him from his
repressions 148, and in particular from meaning structures
Which are not consciously intended 149. It is, however
apparent that his use of Freudian ~sychoanalysis has been a
source of criticism for Habermas 1 0.
That much of the criticism of the use of
psychoanalysis fails to consider that Habermas is drawing
an analogy, does not however disguise the fact that
Freudian psychoanalysis represents in our view a weakness
in Habermas's theory. We do not wish to criticise the use
of psychoanalysis as an analogy which can guide attempts to
reveal repressions of rationality and unconscious
deviations from the Ideal Speech Thesis and pure
communicative Action. The problem does not lie -with
~~1choanalysis, but with the use of Freudian psychoanalysis
Intersubjectivity has been axiomatic in Habermas's
theory since it is, after all based on language. Yet if we
examine the image of the individual which underlies Freud's
work, we have goni fack to the solitary individual we found
in Schutz's work 5. In Freud, as we have seen, there must
be something "wrong" with the individual 153 - there must
be something to treat in the individual. This creates the
problems we identified above.
What we require is a model of psychoanalysis which
analyses beyond the patient himself. We shall do this by
stepping out of Habermas for a moment to consider the work
of R. D Laing, and others associated with him. We shall
then return to Habermas to consider the sources of
repression in the Lifeworld, and how in this way the
Lifeworld does not only (as in Schutz for instance) enable
us to interpret and act in the social world, but also
achieves integration and control within organizations.Laing 154
Laing's work has mainly been with schizophrenics 155,
and in particular to seek to show that in some cases the
mental illness and the apparently bizarre behaviour can be
understood in the wider context of theii circumstances and
family circumstances in particular 6. Thi~ work is
reported in such studies as "The Divided Self" 7, "Sanity
Madness and the Family" 158 and in "The Leaves of Spring"
159 which deals at more length with the case of the Danzigs
160, who were one of the families in "Sanity Madness and
the Family" •
In these studies
Not the individual ~'ti the family is
the unit of illness.
Hence his analysis in the case of Sarah Danzig focuses
~R her condition only as a starting point for the analysis
2. Her understanding of events around her, and her
behaviour are then analysed in the context of her family 163
•
Laing's form of psycho-analysis involves, .
a) the diagnosis of mental illness being
suspended since
the jUdgement that the diagnosed
patient is behaving in a biologically
dysfunctional (hence pathological) way
is, we believe, premature, and one we
shall hold in parenthesis. 164
The parallel between this, and the emphasis on
"bracketing" (or epoche) , following Husserl and
Schutz, is very evident - ie that we suspend belief in
the "obvious" explanation that this is a schizophrenic
who requires medical treatment, and instead tries to
understand how the patient's situation and behaviour
in this situation. In the same way by questioning the
existence of hierarchy we have questioned something
which is treated as "obvious", and sought to
understand. its foundations in a business organization.
b) a focus on the relations which exist within
the family rather than only on the patient 165. This
has the important implications that it becomes
essential to understand not only the perspective each
takes of the o~her, but also how these perspectives
mesh together 1 6. This is significant since it echoes
an idea which is basic to our work - that we can only
understand Hourly-Paid workers in relation to
Management and Staff, and likewise for the other
groups·1~7groupcannot be understood in isolation from
others •c) using the concepts "praxis" and "process", he
shows the possibility of enabling the patient to
understand that the former may be in fact the latter.
By praxis, Laing means action which can be traced back
to the motivated action of others, and by "process"
is meant events which appear to just happen and can be
traced back to no particular person 168 •
The purpose of this for Laing is to show to the
patient under treatment, and indeed the family, that
what appears to them to be "process" - the illness -
may in fact be "praxis" - in other words it can be
understood in the context of motivated behaviours of
members of the family. In this way it can be shown
that the illness is not an accident 169, but that it
can be understood by considering the behaviour of the
patient as a function'of their group situation.
By analogy, in the context that we have analysed
the areas which may appear to Hourly-Paid workers to
be process 170 (Investment decisions, for instance) can
be seen to be praxis, in the Laingian sense (ie that
such decisions are not in fact out of control, but can
be traced back to the motivated actions of particular
persons). Thus what appears to be process, may in fact
be the operation of unconscious power 171 •
d) a different concept of the unconscious which
is more satisfactory than that of Freud (at least for
our purposes). Freud's concept of the unconscious is
that
the most thorough and honest self-
examination possible fails to make it
conscious, conspicuously misses it,
avoids and circles around it. It is
this conspicuous avoidance by which the
analyst can locate the resistance to'
the re~ressed idea becoming
conscious. 2
Laing's concept of the unconscious, however, is
somewhat different from this, since as we have seen
the patient is subject to contradictions in their
family relationship, which they are unable to
recognize as such. Thus Laing's concept of the
unconscious is closer to areas of which we are less
than fUlly aware. There is therefore a distinction
between the unconscious in Laing and Freud 1n •The role of psychoanalysis for Laing is to reveal
unseen contradictions in the life of the patient 1n •
Since the source of the contradictions is identified
through the dialogue of the patient and his/her
family, we can therefore· locate the origins of the
unconscious in the language of the group. The analyst
by assisting the reflection of the patient to become
aware of the contradictions in his/her relationships
and the repressions and contradictions with which
these are associated, assists the individual to become
free of them 1~ • This is a process much closer to the
Habermasian project, as we pointed out above, since
the emphasis is on communication 176 and the ways in
which it is distorted.
e) the study of situations which contravene the
requirements of the Ideal Speech Thesis 1n • The extent
to which there are breaches of the Ideal Speech Thesis
indicates the operation of power 178. The situations
which are the data for analysis in Laing's work -
relations and communications within families - are
therefore typically situations where power will
operate, and not always in ways which are apparent.
Hence Laing provides a theory of psychoanalysis which,
by considering not only individual consciousness of the
patient but also their social context, and in particular
those aspects of it of which they may be unconscious, is
more consistent than Freud with the social project with
Which we are involved 179 •
Laing's theory, therefore, provides us with two
specific advantages:
a) it is intersubjective in its nature, unlike
Freud's theory
b) through its emphasis on both the communicative
and teleological aspects of action it is consistent
with Habermas's concept of communicative action 180 •
However even if we accept Laing as an analogy for
social repression 181 , then it would still be necessary to
establish why it is that the members of a hierarchy
acquiesce in this system of repression 182. To do so, we
have to return to Habermas.
A Habermasian Lifeworld
The concept of the Lifeworld which we have developed
is one which understands it as
a) shared by social actors and which they take
for granted,b) acquired through our social experience, either
at first hand, or acquired through other forms of
learning (eg education, from parents etc.), and as
such is developed over time as we acquire and/or
modify the content knowledge.
c) having
categories
knowledge organized into three
i) Basic
structures,
or Fundamental elements or
Basic or Fundamental elements or
is responsible for organizing our
our use of knowledge. Habermas in
analysis of narrative. statements,
ii) Routine or Habitual elements ,
Iii) Specific Component contents.
but with category three being the only one we are
routinely conscious of.
The first
structures
knowledge and
discussing the
suggests that
In adoptinq the narrative form, we are
choosinq a perspective that
"qrammatically" forces us to base our
descriptions on an everyday concept of
the Lifeworld as a cognitive reference
system. 183
Thus when we question our respondents about
perceived control - how do you think control is/should
be distributed? - or quality of communication - how
well are you informed about (whatever) and how much do
you trust the information you receive? - they will
respond to this by drawing on the basic and
fundamental elements of their Lifeworlds 184. It is
important to appreciate, therefore, that it is not our
respondent's knowledge or the specific component
contents - alone which is important. Rather it is
these basic or fundamental elements or structures
which are of even greater significance for the
exercise of power, given their organizing role in the
Lifeworld.
category two involves skills which we have used
so often, and are so familiar with we may not even be
aware of using them - they may be "obvious". This
creates the possibility of the very organizing
categories which we use, being a source of unconscious
power, since it may create, for instance one-sided
norms which cannot be redeemed in communicative action
185d) as using knowledge determined by' a system of
relevances and typicalities, which indicate to us what
type of situation we are in and the relative
importance of its elements
e) where the knowledge which we employ is
sUbstantially drawn from a social stock of knowledge,
and our use of it is limited by "social givens".
Action takes place within social context in a series
of relationships which can be categorised as "we" or
"thou" (ie other social actors, differentiated
according to the degree of intimacy). This (and
especially the former relationship) is particularly
important in Laing I s work, as we have seen. It too
creates the possibility of power, since
1) the social givens may explicitly involve
power (eg the power of a policeman)
2) the social givens may create unconscious
power, since, for instance, they may limit the
right of some to speak in discourse.
f) where the social stock of knowledge will not
be evenly distributed - there will for instance be
specialised knowledge, which is not open to those
outwith the specialty in question. This too creates
the possibility of unconscious power since it will be
difficult for others to question specialist knowledge
to which they have no, or only limited access. To the
extent that these are accepted in an uncritical way
(which they normally will be) they create the
possibility of unconscious power. An example of a
typicality would be "a manager", and to the extent it
accords that type of person certain powers, these may'
simply blend into the social horizon and appear to
disappear.
Likewise the sUbjective stock of knowledge of
individuals will vary inter-personally, since being
drawn from our biographies (which will vary), the
sUbjective stocks will differ. Hence we will each
bring to a social situation, stocks of knowledge which
to some extent will be inter-personally different.
This too creates the possibility of unconscious power
since it will be difficult for others to question
specialist knowledge to which they have no, or only
limited access.
q) where the Lifeworld, in aggregate defines our
social horizons
29communicative action takes place within
a lifeworld that remains at the backs
of participants in communication. It is
present to them only in the
prereflective form of taken-for-granted
background assumptions and naively
mastered skills1~ •
This, almost by definition, creates power, since
it keeps our thinking within the defined parameters.
Alternative organizational structures which fall
outwith those parameters are unlikely to be seen as
realistic187 •
h) where the social meanings to be applied are
negotiated between the parties, and in this way power
may be employed, either in a conscious way, or in a
way of which the parties may be unaware. When the
Ideal Speech Thesis is broken it creates the
possibility that agreements reached (successful
negotiation) has been the result not of the force of
the better argument and rationality, but of the use of
power - either conscious or unconscious (eg one sided
rules operating during the negotiation to the
advantage of one side, but not perceived as power by
the other, or perhaps by either side).
i) that the Lifeworld is "held together" in a
social sense through power, and in particular that the
Lifeworld does create horizons for us, which we are
unaware of, but which define out of consideration
other forms of social arrangements which may be seen
as non-viable.
The Lifeworld is, therefore, not only a stock of ideas
by which we make sense of our surroundings, and are enabled
to act. The Lifeworld is also, in an important way, about
control 188. In Morgan's "Images", the Lifeworld is a
"Psychic Prison" 189 •
The Model and its Component Parts.
We contend that the manner in which we behave toward
our' fellows depends on the structure of power, but also
structure of the Lifeworld, and the power to which this
gives rise. Our model is a representation of such
behaviour. What we shall now do is to consider each of its
component parts (see above, 1). The view we have developed
of the Lifeworld is one where knowledge is organized by
i) Basic
structures,
or Fundamental elements or
ii) Routine or Habitual elements ,
Iii) Specific Component contents.but with category three being the only one we are
~outinely conscious of. The first is responsible for
organizing our knowledge and our use of knowledge, and thus
~tructures the remaining two levels:
a) while the second concerns knowledge and skills
which we could be conscious, but are not because we
are so familiar with it (using a knife and fork would
be an example).
b) only in the third level is there full
consciousness.
What we have done in the model has been to take a
nUmber of areas of knowledge and highlighted them in the
model - singled them out for special attention - trade
union influence would be an example of this. others,
however, are much more general - past experience, needs and
identity. Thus the model "unpacks" certain variables which
seem likely a priori to be important categories of the
Lifeworld. At the same time there are a number of ,variables
Which are of sufficient generality to bring in any other
Lifeworld variable which influences the maintenance of
hierarchy. We shall consider first of all those which are
closer to the social stock of knowledge in the model.
~olitical Ideology
It should be kept clearly in mind that we do not have
in mind anything as restricted as party label, but rather
the general image of society. The model indicates that this
is predicated upon personal experience. The experience of
Jimmy Reid and his adoption of Socialism, as a reaction to
his early childhood experiences in Govan would seem to
illustrate nicely 190, as his earliest images of society
Were of an exploitative society.
This variable is related to the media and the
influence of trade unions, in that one's political ideology
can crucially affect one's use of the media and of the
trade union movement. For instance a social image like that
of Jimmy Reid (c. 1972) may be associated with a critical
View of the media but an acceptance of the trade union
lnOvement 191 • There is, however, no good reason why we must
be logical in the sense of a logical spectrum from left to
right. Indeed it may well be that we embrace elements of
left and right wing ideology at the same time. As Blackburn
and Mann point out, this is
an accurate reflection of the reality
which confronts them (employees). What
are they to make of normal affluence
and sensible industrial relations on
one hand, and intermittent redundancy
and authoritarianism on the other. 192In other words the ideologies which we find may be no
less confused than the realities from which they have been
formed. Political ideology may, therefore, be driven less
l'Y logic and more by a confused and illogical pragmatic
experience.
~rade union Influence
This too should not be regarded in an overly specific
way. Rather we have in mind the pragmatic use values which
trade unions may have for the respondent. This probably
appears in its most obvious way for the shop floor worker,
for whom by custom the trade union has played an important
rOle - though it is certainly true that more recentll white
collar unions have become increasingly significant 19 •
In the spirit of pragmatism of our discussion of
Political ideology , we must leave open the level of the
trade union, and accept that there may be influence from
the domestic union (ie intra-firm) and/or from the union
organization (ie the union as a national organization). Nor
need attitudes toward these two things be consistent - for
instance a union member may have a positive attitude toward
the former, but be negative toward the latter. This may be,
for instance, because the member perceives the stewards as
acting in his interests, but not the national officials.
Or it may be the other way round!
The area where the research has been carried out -
C1Ydeside - has a long tradition of trade unionism and this
traditional aspect will be shown to be important, but only
in a bounded sense, such that the attitude toward trade
unionism is not wholly uncritical. This attitude, in terms
of the particular form it takes, is contingent on the
particular position in the company of the respondent in
question•
.The Media
By this we have in mind the content and structured
presentation of the media(television and newspapers). As we
have already argued, such knowledge is not received tabula
rasa, but is defined and interpreted by the recipient. The
mOdel indicates, for instance, that the influence of the
media associated with political ideology. An individual of
left wing views may regard the output of the media as
biased toward the status quo.
These factors are element of what is described in the
model as social knowledge, which is closely connected with
the sUbjective knowledge of the individual. As we argued
above, the individual draws on the stock of social
knowledge, and in this respect our sUbjective experience is
mOulded by social power in that the stock of social
knowledge is determined by, and an expression of, the
Particular social structure.While our subjective knowledge is influenced ~y
social knowledge, this is not to say that our experience ~s
wholly bounded - as Schutz suggests social experience can
lead to contradiction of social knowledge, and thus social
knowledge can be added to and modified with the passage of
time.
We shall now consider the variables which can be
considered as closer to the individual's subjective stock
of knowledge.
Personal SUbjective Experience.
Through various forms of experience (eg education) we
acquire both sUbjective and social knowledge which
structure the expectations which we may realistically make
of our firm. Hence if our experience of management has been
bad in the past, one may in future distrust all managers,
irrespective of current behaviour. 194
similarly, the model shows as the company makes
decisions, these have a continuous effect upon perception
of the firm - for instance in respect of what one may hold
as a realistic expectation of the firm, in that it is
likely to be granted ( anything of which it could be said,
"well we'll get away with that").
We cannot, however, restrict ourselves to the
experience of the world at work, since to do so would be
artificial, since out-work experience may be just as
important, perhaps more so.
There are a number examples of what we have in mind.
For instance as we pointed out above, Jimmy Reid explains
his adoption of Socialism as a reaction to the poverty of
his childhood in Govan in the 1940's and 1950's (see above,
(?». In a similar way, Fryer and Martin explain the
respect of workers in Casterton to the Millowners by
reference to their socialisation as childre~into deference
to the family who owned the mills locally 19 •
These two examples show how experience from our first
days is relevant as the "we relation" is forced upon the
child from the outset, and it is in this relation that we
first experience the social world. First of all in the
acquisition of language and then by the knowledge which
that acquisition permits us to acquire. This is then used
by the individual to define or interpret this social world
to which he has been granted access.
Personal sUbjective experience, therefore, has two key
concepts for us:
1) its relation to
stock of knowledge, and
are imposed upon us
structure.
and dependence on the social
the meaning structures which
by the particular social2) its continuous nature, such that what is
happening to us now will become our past experience.
This will feed back into these meaning structure,
reinforcing and/or modifying.
As McHugh puts it
Actors assume before the fact that a
pattern of meaning will be discovered
in the events they observe. They are
future oriented, in that they take it
for granted that they will be able to
make something of what is yet to occur.
They are past oriented in that they
take for granted that what has already'
occurred will inform the future. 196
Our past experience, therefore, depends upon our
acquisition of social knowledge, for its definition and
interpretation in the future - but as Schutz and Luckmann
point out the definitions and interpretations to which the
social stock of knowledge gives rise will vary from one
individual to another given the uniqueness of our
individual experiences (see above, 8).
In principle, therefore, since our lives are unique
sets of experience, the definitions and interpretations of
social action will not be exactly the same for any two
individuals. While this point is recognised, we shall go on
to consider another problem of less generality the
problems posed by holding a particular position in the
firm.
~osition in the Company.
For us there are two particular areas of importance in
this:
a) it provides the individual respondent with a
conceptual basis in assessing expectations of what can
be realistically made of the firm 197. There are for
instance, several stereotypes of what a manager ought
to receive from his company in the way of
remuneration, perks authority, etc. which are summed
up in expressions like "the going rate"and "market
rate"•b) By providing empirical grounding to consider
the problem of the social distribution of knowledge,
and' therefore to move toward consideration of the
establishment of an operable reality for diverse
individuals distributed in space but not in time. As
we have already indicated the knowledge available to
us will appear differently to us, depending on our
biography. An important aspect of this is the position
the individual occupies in the firm, and in particular
the knowledge he possesses. This leads on to "special
knowledge" and "role specific knowledge" the
knowledge that one possesses by virtue of one's
position in the firm. This may be technical or it may
be privileged - but acquiring particular knowledge
makes possible the acquisition of particular
definitions and interpretations. Thus it makes
possible acquiring a particular perspective on
reality, which therefore is an expression of one's
relation to the means of production.
Our argument in this section is, therefore that
individuals select items of knowledge - both social and
SUbjective - in order to structure their behaviour, which
for. our analytical purposes will be the pursuit of'
expectations. This action is power-influenced in two
respects:
1) our behaviour
knowledge, which is an
social structure.
is guided
expression
by the
of the
use of
existing
2) this behaviour takes place within the
constraints of the existing social structure.
,These expectations are in turn an expression of two
Closely connected concepts:
1) Identity,
2) Work Needs.
I..dentity.
This is defined by Esterson as
the pattern of experience and beinq by
Which a person is recoqnised by himself
and/or others in his relation with
others ie who he is recoqnised or
defined to be. 198
. The use of this definition grounds identity in one's
~nteraction with others 199, and is therefore consistent
With our previous discussion of knowledge selection within
a social context.It is moreover, an extension of our discussion of
"Personal Position in the Company", being the means by
which those who define themselves as broadly the same (eg
managers) define themselves and by implication set
themselves apart from others who have different identities.
It is, however, important that this identity be defended in
the face of challenge from other groups. For instance the
identity of managers as decision-makers may undei-go
challenge from any imposition of industrial democracy o.
Another instance would be the role of foreman which it has
been argued was severely damaged by the imposition of
labour laws 201 and by the development of management
services - for instance by laws on unfair dismissal and
production control.
The definition of self, which Esterson refers to , we
regard as an expression of the particular work needs which
the group will manifest in its expectations. The identity
is unlikely to be a constant, but rather to change by
virtue of the acquisition of knowledge over time.
Hork Needs
The implication of the model is that these are not
"God-given" in the sense of being universal or
immutable202 , but rather are developed from a social
process of learning and experience by which, in pursuit and
defence of their identity, these needs may be held constant
or may be modified. Clearly needs and identity are
inextricably linked since the concept of identity to a
considerable extent determines what one's needs shall be,
While one's needs impose parameters on the identity one
maintains, or seeks to maintain. It should be kept in mind
that this involves social action on the part of the
particular individual, which will take place within a
constraining social context and be guided by constraining
knowledge.
The conclusion of this is that for stability,
behaviour must be kept within certain parameters, a
function we have argued is carried out by the Lifeworld.
This does not, however, lead us into a bounded Parsonian-
type model, but rather one which treats this stability as
problematic and requiring explanation. Indeed, given our
insistence on the variability of experience and the social
distribution of knowledge (with specialized areas
partitioned off to many, restricted to a segment of
society), we should expect that there will be differing
Lifeworlds, differing perspectives on· reality. Hence
difference should be regarded as normal rather than
deviant. What needs to be explained is how, in spite of
this variability of Lifeworld, the hierarchical firm
continues to function, continues to produce goods,
continues to persist.It has been our argument that while Lifeworld and
behaviour can differ, this is limited to the point where
continuation of the hierarchy remains unthreatened - in
other words this variability is permitted only within
certain parameters, which are contained within the
Lifeworld. Hence in what follows we shall consider the
expectations of employees in respect of
1) their jobs and the rewards they bring, both in
respect of others in the company ind in what
respondents define as being an "ideal" 20 •
2) the
communication,
this204 •
perceived quality of company
and the degree to which they trust
3) the perceived distribution of control, both
within the current situation, and what respondents
define as being an "ideal" 205.
Our results will reveal areas of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction. In respect of both of these we shall be
concerned to consider what this means for the persistence
of hierarchy.
A) Where there is a source of dissatisfaction
(frustrated expectations) then we might expect this to
undermine hierarchy on its own - but on the other hand
it may be that this frustration is regarded as normal.
The particular source of dissatisfaction may be
perceived as something which just has to be accepted
as natural. In other words where there is
dissatisfaction we can ask why it has not led - as it
apparently has not - to a challenge to hierarchy
B) Areas of satisfaction too will be informative
in that the nature of the satisfaction may be
illuminating about the persistence of hierarchy. For
instance if employees outwith management say that they
are satisfied with subordinate status to management in
company decision-making, then we can ask why it is
that they hold this view. What is it about their
Lifeworlds which justifies this view? In other words
sources of satisfaction can be considered from the
perspective of what the mean for the persistence of
hierarchy.
What we have presented in this Chapter is an
explication of the problem in theoretical terms - of how
the Lifeworld structures behaviour and the role played by
power in this process in the sense of
1) conscious power - power which is perceived as
a social force and is a guide to the likely success of
particular activities, and
2) unconscious power contained within the
structure of the LifeworldThe process of the use of knowledge from the Lifeworld
is shown in the above model (see 1) - that in structuring
expectations we make use of items of knowledge, which in
our theory of power could be so structured as to make
inequality acceptable, at least in the sense that the
inequality is not challenged. The model is applied to the
hierarchy of the firm to show how the hierarchy persists
OVer time despite Lifeworld variability. The model as we
pointed out above is only provisional (see above
l),indicating only categories which seem theoretically
likely to be influential. This will have to be considered
in the light of our empirical findings. The model will be
adapted as necessary leading to a final model presented in
the concluding chapter. We shall now proceed to Chapter 2
which will deal with some methodological considerations.chapter 2CHAPTER 2
The theoretical perspective, which was described in
the previous chapter, set certain empirical problems, and
it shall be the purpose of this chapter to consider the
methods used to investigate these problems.
Our aim is to consider the phenomenon of hierarchical
persistence. Our theoretical model reflects on the
expectations which employees make of their firm. These
expectations originate in the sUbjective and social
knowledge of the Lifeworld, which organizes this knowledge
according to Basic or Fundamental elements or structures.
This organization of knowledge represents a system of logic
Which, we argued, sustains hierarchy'.
The argument developed in the previous chapter has
been therefore that we are constrained not only by the
knowledge we think with but also by its structure. within
the context of the practical problems of persistence of
hierarchy, this gives us three areas to consider -
1) the expectations which our respondents hold of
the company
2) the knowledge they employ and its underlying
logic
3) the manner and intensity in which expectations
are lut forward, and the manner in which they are
deal •
Much of this chapter will refer back to the previous
chapter as it is important to us that our methodology
should not only be clearly set out but at the same time be
seen to clearly relate to our theoretical concerns.
Quantitative and Qualitative Methods. 3
The questions posed by our theoretical perspective
raises questions of what we describe as social statics 4
and social dynamics 5.
Through using social statics we can consider the
structure of the system of logic, and the particular
knowledge which is used. We cannot, however fully
understand the full complexity of reality in this way. In
addition we have to look into the future. The current
position can be understood by the use of social statics.
If, however, we want to understand how we got there, or the
possibilities for moving away from here, then we have to
move on to a dynamic approach 6.Methods of social statics are mainly quantitative, and
these are used by us to obtain an image, at one particular
point in time, of the current image of the firm and the
organization of working life for instance what the
current expectations made of the firm are. This will not,
however, reveal to us the process by which the system of
logic actually operates, only the situation which it has
led to. It does not reveal how knowledge is used, which is
a dynamic process, nor the Lifeworld system of logic, nor
why the sUbjective and social knowledge of the Lifeworld
has been used in a particular way.
These projects can only be achieved by the use of
methods of social dynamics, which for our purposes shall
be:
1) semi-structured interviews, tape recorded for
data provision,
2) data analysis, subordinated to theoretical
purpose.
In this way we shall assess the experience of our
respondents in its essential form - as a process in which
knowledge is used as a guide to future behaviour. Important
to us in this respect will be the image and structure of
particular experience and especially the manner in which
this is built up (sedimented). Our purpose will be to
establish the system of logic which has been employed by
our respondents, and its behavioural consequences. In other
words our aim must be to grasp the subjective and social
knowledge employed which is passive to and consequently
sUbordinate to the Lifeworld's system of logic.
Through using social dynamics we can therefore
consider the manner in which knowledge is used, rather than
how it has been used which is a matter for social statics.
The important distinction therein is that by using social
dynamics we can move directly to the system of logic,
Whereas by using only statics we can move only to the
system of logic as a matter of theoretical inference. It
may be that our theoretical perspective would permit us to
do so, but to employ the methodological philosophy we have
developed here is an advance on this position, meaning that
We can demonstrate our perspective directly rather than
simply by inference.
The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with
the methods which we shall employ sequentially over the
period of research.
40Quantitative Methods
In the previous section we specified that our
methodological practice has to be subordinate to our
theoretical perspective. Thus, in considering the
quantitative methods to be employed we shall primarily be
concerned with the measurement of as many dimensions of our
theoretical perspective as we can, in a meaningful sense
but only in so far as we do not do violence to the
theoretical perspective. It is clearly wrong to allow
methodological considerations to interfere with theorising,
or to allow these to dictate a research area. Methodology
is a research tool, and as such must be subordinate and
capable of fitting in with the requirements of the research
to be conducted.
The data for our quantitative measures was gathered
using a structured, fixed choice questionnaire, which was
used to interview a stratified sample of the firm which was
our research site. The sample totalled 175 - about 10% of
the firm. 7
Measuring Expectations
A central dimension of the theoretical perspective was
that employees have expectations of their firm. This
section will be concerned with a discussion of the
measurement of these expectations.
At this stage we shall restrict expectations to the
day-to-day (job) expectations which an employee has
traditionally been held to have of his working life (at
least for research purposes). sUbsequently this shall be
widened to consider perceived quality of communication and
decision-making. These will be considered subsequent, and
in more detail, given their theoretical relevance. For this
section, however, we shall be concerned with a set of the
traditional (in the research sense) expectations 8.
Our perspective indicates that job expectations are
made of the company, but that these shall not be of equal
intensity for every individual. Some job expectations will
be held more intensely than others, and consequently it
will be possible for respondents to order them (ie indicate
that which is most important, second, third and so on).
There are, however, other aspects to job expectations which
are concerned not with the importance of one expectation as
against another. We shall, therefore, be concerned with
the adequacy of provision by the firm for each job
expectation in two additional respects:
a) adequacy of provision in relation to other
groups in the firm - management, staff, hourly paid -
in order to measure the adequacy of provision in
relation to the internal political reference system of
the company. 9b) adequacy of provision in relation to the
respondent's ideal job. 10
Each expectational dimension was subjected to testing
from both perspectives. The specific expectations tested
were:
1) control of work environment; 2) job security;
3) job variety and interest; 4) promotion prospects;
5) supervision; 6) trade union; 7) wages/salary; 8)
working conditions.
The procedure for measuring each dimension in the
respects described above was as follows:
a) respondents were asked to rank the above list
in the order of importance to them. Ties were not
encouraged, but if it was the sincere belief the
respondent that two (or more) were1 of equal
importance, then they would be accepted. 1
b). The second stage in measuring job expectations
was to consider the adequacy of provision in relation
to relevant others - within and outwith the firm, as
described above. Each respondent was asked to assess
each job expectation in the manner discussed above
(see above, page 41). 12 .
The relevance of these measures of employee
expectations is that their frustration may - as with the
others we shall discuss below lead to criticism,
rejection, and modification of the Lifeworld which sustains
the hierarchical organization of industry, through doubt
being raised as to its adequacy as a behavioural guide and
means of conceptualising reality.
We shall subsequently go on to consider more "radical"
expectations in respect of perceived quality of information
and distribution of control over decision-making, but as a
connection between these and the traditional expectations
which we have looked at already, we shall consider the
micro-organization of the direct work experience of the
individual. In other words we shall consider the experience
of anyone individual of the specific part of the firm in
which he operates - his immediate world of work as a day-
to-day experience of hierarchical authority at a mundane
level. We shall explore this in two inter-connected
respects:
1} the quality of the relationship which the
respondent has with his immediate superior. Research
has emphasised the "technical quality of
supervision"1 - how good the supervisor is at the job
being done by his sUbordinates, how well he organizes
their work, resolves any work problems they may have,
and sO on. In addition we consider the "man
management" qualities of the supervisor. 14
4L2) the freedom the individual has in choosing the
task which he does - in other words the discretion
which the employee has in work 15. Our concern with
direct work experience has concentrated, therefore, on
two different aspects of this experience:
A) the technical and social qualities of
one's superior,
B) . the perceived and desired discretion in
work.
Given these twin concerns, suitable questions were
employed to measure
1) the perceived technical quality of one's
superior (is your superior a good superior? does he
give you enough discretion in doing your job? is he a
good source of guidance when you need it?)
2) the social qualities of one's superior (does
he appreciate the problems you have with your work?
does he consider you as a person, as well as how you
do your job?)
In addition, given our reservations about Fox's thesis
(see previous footnote), we approached the problem of
discretion by allowing the respondent to speak for himself
- by asking how much discretion he had in his work, and how
much he would ideally have? By comparison of these we can
measure the extent to which existing structures concur with
ideal work structures.
Discussion of challenges to hierarchy. has emphasised
the wider aspects of control in a company ~6, but for many
employees this is not directly relevant to their
experience. Then again for employees the relationship with
one's superior will be directly relevant. Clearly we cannot
adequately consider the organization of the firm and
experience of it as a total institution without considering
the wider (organizational) aspects, but the direct
relationships we have discussed at this point represent
their day-to-day application. The company may not,
therefore, in our view be adequately considered without
dealing with the wider aspects of control we shall go on to
discuss below as well as the more mundane, day-to-day
aspects we have considered already.
Measuring Company Decision-making Systems.
These systems have, for our methodological purposes,
two important aspects: .
a) the possession of information necessary to be
able to participate in making a decision,
b) the influence necessary for one's views to
play a meaningful role in the taking of a decision.Both of these are necessary conditions for
participating in company decision-making systems.
A) One must have both the information necessary
to form a view, pose counter-arguments, or enter into
a dialogue.
B) Moreover one must have the power (either
formal by virtue of hierarchical position - or
informally through internal company politics or
other means like industrial action) to enter into the
decision process. -
Our model suggests a competitive decision-making
system of aSYmmetrical power relations. We do not mean to
imply by this that one party has all the power, and the
others none at all. Our characterisation of the decision-
making system is instead that one party has relatively more
power than the others. However, we would argue that this is
magnified by the hierarchical system, which is
systematically maintained by the operation of unconscious
power - of which neither party is conscious.
Access to information and influence in decision-making
can in themselves be regar~ed as expectations, as we
suggested above. They can 1n addition be regarded as
factors which establish the parameters within which the
traditional expectations , we have considered above, are
dealt with (for instance wage negotiations may crucially
influenced by information on the profitability of the firm
and its future prospects).
The degree of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with such
expectations can be measured quantitatively in the manner
we shall discuss below.
Measuring information
The function of information, from our point of view,
is its use value for those who receive it and/or feel they
should receive it - in other words information is not
valued in itself, but as a means to other purposes. For
instance if a manager is deficient in the information
available to him he will be that much less able to take
decisions similarly if hourly-paid employees are
deficient in the information they receive they will, in the
same way, be less able to make decisions, or influence
decisions relevant to them, but made by others.
Consequently they will only be able to react to decision
which are made, and at best can only be imperfectly
understood by them.
Hence information, unlike wages, conditions and other
traditional job expectations is not valued in itself, but
as a means to some other end. The degree to which
expectations concerning the provision of information were
satisfied was measured by a relatively simple process.
44Respondents were asked how well informed they were
kept by the company about a particular aspect of the
company. Various aspects were employed for this purpose,
the list being a modification of the aspects used by
Bow~ • Any modification to this list was based on
preliminary interviews, carried out to gain insight into
areas of particular relevance in the company not included
in our original research programme 18. This gave a final
list of the following items:
i)amount of work expected of an individual:
ii)company financial policy: iii)company order
situation: iv)company profitability: v)cost reduction:
vi) investment: vii) overtime available: viii) pay'
rates and bonus payments: ix)promotion: x)recruitment:
xi)redundancies: xii)safety; xiv)transfer of employees
between departments/jobs: xv)work study.
It seems to us unsafe to assume congruity o'f
perception of volume of information and the accuracy of
information - for instance a firm could invest a great deal
in a sophisticated communication procedure which is
perceived cynically by the employees who regard it as a
source of highly distorted, and as such, devalued
information. Hence our questions in this area were in two
parts:
1) how well informed does the firm keep you about
(one of the above)?
2) how far do you trust that information?
If a respondent answered the former by saying he did
not receive any information, the latter was coded
appropriately, since in those circumstances the question
became meaningless.
Measuring Control.
A well developed and straightforwardly simple means of
measurin~perceived control is the Tannenbaum control graph
method • This method employs averaged jUdgements by
employees to questions on the amount of influence exercised
respectively by (for our purpose)
1) management
2) non-supervisory staff
3) supervisors
4) hourly-paid.
By using this method the respondent is able to speak
for himself, at least as far as the pre-established
categories of response pennit. This contrasts, for
instance, with the type of external jUdgement made in using
time-span of discretion 20 •In addition the control graph method
a) allows aggregation of individual responses to
yield a group view.
b) gives a solution
respondent has an opinion
of other group members,
presented in a way which
total.
to the problem that if one
widely at variance with that
this deviant view is not
is out of proportion to the
Each respondent was asked how much influence each
group, specified as above, actually had over each of a
number of decision-making item, and how much influence the
respondent thought each group ought to have. The decision-
making item used were:
i)cost reduction; ii)decisions affecting the
ability of the firm to win orders; iii)decisions
affecting the firm's profitability; iv) discipline;
v)financial policy; vi)fixing work standards;
vii)investment; viii)pay rates and bonus paYments;
ix)promotion; x)recruitment; xi)redundancies;
xii)safety; xiv)transfer of employees between
departments/jobs; xv)work pace.
This, as with the previous list, is adapted from Bowen
21 in the manner described above.
Each respondent was asked in relation to each of these
item, whether each group~
A) had
1) A great deal of influence, or 2) Some
influence, or 3) Very little influence, or 4) No
influence.
and
B) how much influence they felt each group ought
to have on the particular item.
Satisfaction/dissatisfaction with existing structures
could be measured by an item by item comparison of (A) _.
actual and (B) ideal perceptions of control. The
greater the desirability of change, and by implication at
least the latent desire for change, the greater the gap
between (A) and (B) will be.
It may be objected here that if employees do want
change then surely they would do something about it -
agitate in some way like taking strike action. We would
argue (and will go on to show), however, that this is not a
problem of method but rather a theoretical-empirical
problem sinceacceptable, or 3)
or 5) totally
a) if there is a gap between what is and what
ought to be, but
b) no action to close that gap
the solution in our view lies not necessarily in an
examination of method, but perhaps in consideration of the
nature of social reality.
By making use of a list of different decision-making
areas we are able to recognize the possibility that
influence in a firm is not uni-dimensional - for instance
it would seem likely that hourly-paid workers would have
more influence on a decision about redundancy, than on a
decision about financial policy, given existing structures
of decision-making, and in ,particular the limited
negotiable areas in collective bargaining which is the
normal avenue for employees to express influence 22 •
Method of Ordered Alternatives
This method 23 involves putting to respondents possible
scenarios in the future, and questioning their degree of
acceptablility/unacceptability. Its usefulness to us is in
resolving the problem that, having made considerable use of
the potential in lack of satisfaction with access to
information and decision-making in the company, we have not
considered in detail the direction which the employees
would like to see their firm go. This technique involves
putting a number of ordered alternatives to each respondent
and asking whether each alternative is for them:
1) totally acceptable, or 2)
neutral,' or 4) unacceptable,
unacceptable.
These alternatives were grouped in three sets:
1) Access to company information
A) all information to be available to all
employees, B) all information to be available to all
employees, sUbject to a management veto, C) only
information directly related to an employee's job to
be available to him, D) no information to be
available, 'except what management decide to make
pUblic.
4=;-2) Policy making
A) Policy in the company to be decided by the
shopfloor and unionised staff alone,B) Policy in the
company to be decided 50-50 by management and
unionised employees, C) Policy in the company to be
decided 50-50 by management and all employees whether
unionised or not, D) Policy in the company to be
decided by management' in consultation with their
employees, E) Policy in the company to be decided by
management in consultation with staff alone, F) Policy
in the company to be decided by management alone
3) Profit Distribution
A) Company profits to go to the parent company,
B) Company profits to go to the parent company but
with a bonus for the management, C) Company profits to
go to the parent company but with a bonus for all
employees whose size will be determined by Management,
D) Company profits to go to the parent company but
with a bonus for all employees whose size will be
negotiated with the unions, E) Company profits to be
shared 50-50 between the parent company and the
employees of this firm, F) Company profits to go to
employees alone.
It appeared to us at the outset, that using this
method posed two possible problems:
1) a problem of unreality, since respondents were
being asked to answer questions on items which at the
time did not exist. In practice this certainly did not
pose any practical interview problems, and can be
discounted.
2) it specified situations which respondents may
or may not have been aware of (for instance industrial
democracy is mainly concerned with the rights of
employees, but it has never been seriously questioned
whether a majority, or even a sizeable minority have
thought about it, or even know very much about it 24).
This is'a much more difficult problem than the former,
and required an additional open-ended question before
the set of question we are discussing at the moment.
This question took the form of
Are there any alternative methods of
decision-making you would like to see
introduced, or changes in existing
onesiSThis is in any case largely an academic's problem,
since in any survey this problem exists - we as academics
freely make the assumption that non-academic respondents
share the same concerns as we do. On the other hand given
the Bullock Report, the Vredeling proposals, the European
Social Charter, the organizational form of hierarchy is
important and consequently in need of research.
Recognising this, our questions on decision-making
were terminated with a series of questions oriented
specifically to industrial democracy viz. whether the
respondent would have as much confidence in the company if
there were workers on the board. Respondents were asked to
order the following:
1) protecting workers' rights, 2) encouraging
participation in company affairs, 3) keeping workers
informed of company affairs, 4) working to improve
relations in the company, 5) helping the firm to be
more efficient
We asked this first of all in the context of the
existing board (in what order of importance did the present
board put these matters), and then for a board with worker
directors (in what order of importance would a board with
worker directors put these matters).
Respondents were also asked
a) which quality would be most important in a
worker director - integrity, a good negotiator, or an
interest in making the firm more efficient and
competitive than it already is?
b) whether a worker director would be valuable,
or be a liability to the firm?
c) whether, if there were worker participation,
employees would take a greater interest in the affairs
of the company?
d) how the existing board would order the
following:
1) p~oviding good, well paid
emploYment: 2) making as many sales as
possible: 3) being as efficient as possible:
4) making profits: 5) keeping employees
informed about how the company is doing,
The next question was how they thought a board
with worker directors would order them? 26Measuring Knowledge.
In the previous chapter, the importance of knowledge
was not in itself, but rather in its use value - as part of
a Lifeworld process. We have already elaborated our view
that quantitative methods cannot adequately contend with a
social process and that for that reason we must make use of
qualitative methods. At this stage, however, we wish to
make use of quantitative methods in their must useful form
- measurement of frequency. We shall not consider the use-
value of knowledge, but instead the frequency of one I s
exposure to particular sources/forms of knowledge. 27
The model in Chapter 1 itemises a number of forms of
knowledge which were categorised as SUbjective or Social
Forms of Knowledge.
~ubjective Knowledge.
(A) Personal Position in the Company. The relevance of
this in theory is that it is a basis to establish what one
could expect from the firm, as a particular position in the
hierarchy compared to similarly placed others either in the
firm or in other similar firms. For the moment its purpose
if purely classificatory. Each respondent was classified
for analysis as
1) Management, or 2) Staff, or 3) Hourly paid, or
4) Shop Steward, or 5) Staff Union Representative.
(B) Past Experience. This is, in fact, the most
difficult of all the sources of knowledge discussed owing
to its almost infinite dimensionality. There are, however,
two forms of experience which appeared to us to be
relevant a priori
1) the number of times one has been made
redundant
2) the proportion of one I s working life during
which one has been unemployed.
Frequency of these experiences was calculated for each
respondent, but even if we find, for instance, that those
made redundant most often were most critical of existing
social relations, we would not then have an adequate
explanation, since
1) we
statistical
relationship
meanings
must be able to develop not only a
relationship, but also a meaningful
- ie to show how these relate in terms of
2) the relationship would exist as a small part
within a more complex Lifeworld.(C) Interaction 'with other groups, as sources of
knowledge, measured, at this stage by frequency of contact
- for instance how often do hourly-paid interact with
foremen, staff with management and so on.
Social Knowledge
(A) Political Ideology. We described this in the
previous chapter as "one's stance toward society at lar~e,
and not a party label". This led us to pose two questions 8 :
1) whether the respondent saw the firm in terms
of
i) managers, staff and skilled groups on the
shop floor: or
ii) just as people with
contributions to make to the company.
2) whether the respondent saw society
different
i) composed of social classes: or
ii) just by people doing various jobs
In each of these questions, the former response takes
a class-based perspective, while the latter takes a view of
greater equality. In each case we can only establish a
statistical relationship rather than one based on social
reality - nevertheless such data is at least indicative of
Political consciousness.
(B) Trade unions. This again can be measured only for
frequency, and only to a very limited extent, giving it at
best restricted meaning. We began by measuring the
frequency of membership (except among the hourly-paid,
which operates a closed shop). We then went on to develop
an indication of the meaning of trade unions for those in
the firm. Respondents who were unionised were asked as
guide to their active participation in their union, how
often
1) they attended union meetings, and
2) they discussed union matters with colleagues.
Those who were not union members were asked if they
had any objection to belonging to a trade union and
a) if not, why they had not already joined?
b) if they had an objection, what it was?
All respondents were asked in addition
51aims they' believed the
to have, and whether
a) what functions and
unions in the firm ought
management respected this?
b) how united the unions in the firm are, which
was an issue which had proved important from our
preliminary interviews?
This data does not, however, directly give a sense of
What it is to be in a union - we can only make reasoned
guesses on the basis of theoretical conjecture. since this
again is a social process it can only be sUbject to
qualitative methods.
(C) The media. In measuring this we considered
1) how often a particular newspaper was read, or
TV current affairs programme watched, and
2) whether any political bias was present.
The list included all major daily newspapers, TV news
and current affairs programmes. In this form of knowledge
We are clearly most sUbject to the caveat expressed above
that frequency of exposure does not inevitably lead to
acceptance - for instance TV News has been portrayed 29 as
presenting information in a way which is biased toward
sustaining the status quo. But high frequency of exposure
will only produce this bias if watched uncritically - if
watched critically it may only confirm a radical view of
Society.
(D) The Clydeside Culture. This is discussed more
fUlly in the next chapter, but is included here since we
found from conducting the preliminary interviews, a
significant emphasis - particularly from managers - on the
traditions of "Red Clydeside". The aim of these questions
was to measure
i) how long the respondent had lived on Clydeside
ii) whether he saw anything distinctive about the
area.
The questions were structured in such a way as to
llleasure
1)· the length of exposure to the local culture,
and
2) awareness of any local culture, to check
whether there was any distinctive form of knowledge
present.From quantitative to qualitative methods.
Our questionnaire covered, as can be implied from what
has gone before, a very considerable number of areas - too
many for a semi-structured interview. Thus in advance of
commencing on the programme of semi-structured interviews
means had to be found to reduce, in as rigourous way as
Possible, the number of areas to be covered to a
manageable number since the sheer volume would have forced
us into either of the following situations:
1) by allowing the respondent to find his own
direction, but at the same time introducing each area,
as appropriate, the length of interview would have
been much extended, risking boredom and tiredness on
the part of the respondent, and it is clearly
desirable to avoid this. In addition we would have
generated a volume of only semi-structured data of
vast size - probably too large to be handled in any
way properly: or
2) by the interviewer bringing in every aspect,
the interview would have been constrained to such a
degree as'to be fully structured.
In terms of our theoretical structure, we are
considering the issue of the acceptability of hierarchy as
a company structure. A clear manifestation of this is the
existence of the management group, a staff group, and an
hourly-paid group. These constitute the clearest
hierarchical distinctions in a firm. Given our initial
consideration is the acceptability of hierarchy it was
decided, given the central position of these groups, that a
theoretically meaningful procedure would be to select those
areas which
a) constituted the greatest divergence between
these groups, and
b) constituted the least divergence between these
groups.
In terms of theory, -therefore, we would then have the
areas in which the operation of the firm I s hierarchical
structure appeared to be least agreed, and those areas on
which there appeared to most consensus. By considering the
process by which these SUbjective positions have been
reached, and in particular why the former does not defeat
the operation of the latter, we shall be able to increase
OUr understanding of the persistence of hierarchy.
In a methodological sense this procedure is at least
equally acceptable, since by its adoption we are able to
make use of the comparison in two different ways:
1) within the firm we have the existence of
three, for our purpose, distinct groups (management,
staff, hourly pa~d) for the purpose of comparison,
5,32) within the areas we cover we have two groups
(conflict and consensus) one (where there was
conflict) which may constitute the basis of rejection
of hierarchy, the other (where there was consensus)
constituting the basis of its acceptance.
The problem which remains is to find a method by which
we can draw out these two sets of areas (conflict and
consensus). One method would be the relatively simple
method of inspection of cross-tabulated results. A stronger
method than this was used, however - "Discriminant", which
is a programme in SPSS 30. The objective of the programme is
to
statistically distinguish between two
or more groups or cases 31
Using the programme requires:
1) that two or more groups or cases be specified.
For our purpose we specified three groups
Management, Staff and Hourly paid.
2) that no more than 53 variables be introduced
in anyone run. since we had no fewer than 359
variables, the data had to be divided into 6 separate
runs which were within the following "themes"
a) traditional work variables - questions 6-
31: b) information variables - questions 32-63:
c) control variables in two runs. First
questions 65-112, followed by 113-176: d) future
options variables questions 178-193, with
industrial democracy variables - questions 194-
200: e) a combination of union function variables
(questions 243-247), social and firm image
variables (questions 252-253) , with the
interaction variables (questions 295 to the end),
and semantic differential data (questions 201-
236).
certain variables were omitted from this procedure, as
they seemed unlikely to be useful to us:
a) biographical data - age, length of service,
etc.
b) media exposure data, since on· inspection it
could be seen that Hourly. paid read "the Daily
Record", while Staff and Management read "the Glasgow
Herald"• In any case our interest was in ~ the
information from the media is actually ygQ" rather
than with exposure to it.
From each set of 6 results we selected
1) those 5 variables which contributed most to
the obtained discriminatory function, and
542) those 5 variables which contributed least (or
not at all) to the obtained discriminatory function.
It may be objected that by employing this selection
procedure we were casting aside valuable data, since on one
run 8 or 9 variables may have considerable discriminatory
power, whereas on another run most of the discriminatory
power may be from only 2 or 3 variables. Hence we reject 2
or 3 variables from the first run, which have an apparently
high level of discrimination, but in the second run include
2 or 3 with an apparently lower level of discrimination.
This, however, is a feature of the programme, and can only
be accepted. In any case by dividing the questionnaire into
these (albeit arbitrary) 6 groups, we are able to ensure
that each distinct area - work expectations, communication,
control, etc. - are adequately represented in the semi-
structured interview. Thus no particular area is emphasised
to the exclusion of others, and our inquiry is not reduced
in width.
As a check on the adequacy of the procedure
especially since the management group only had 32
respondents we requested that option 6 of the
Discriminant programme be run. This gave us univariate F-
ratios - a one way analysis of variance which tested the
equality of the group means on each variable. From the
printed coefficients we selected the largest 5 and the
lowest 5 for each of the 6 runs. This provided a second
list of 60 variables (2xS variables @ 6 runs). Only 12
variables were selected by the two methods. Hence to be as
accurate as possible both lists were used - giving a total
of 108 variables (2x60 minus the 12 "doublers"). This still
reduced the total areas to be covered to a manageable
number since with the 108 variables there were a number of
questions which covered the same area. For instance it was
found that the question
how much influence do you think.
management have on financial policy?
was selected on Discriminant, but analysis of variance
selected
how much influence do you think foremen
have on financial policy? and
how much influence do you think shop-
floor workers have on financial policy?
This was reduced to a question about the distribution
Of control over financial policy, with out specifying any
particular group.
The reduced list of variables was then re-constructed
to create an interview "check list", used to re-interview a
total of 53 respondents. We shall discuss these interviews
in the next section
55Qualitative Methods.
The purpose of this section is to describe the
collection of qualitative data. The qualitative data was
largely collected on cassette tapes of the semi-structured
interviews described above. The interviews were entirely
carried out with respondents individually, each respondent
having been interviewed at least 9 months previously using
our standard questionnaire: some had indeed already been
encountered in the preliminary interviews, so in these
cases this was our third meeting.
other qualitative data was collected with tried, true
social science methods dropping in, hanging around,
looking at things and listening to conversations which were
wholly private and had nothing to do with us, listening to
gossip, reading graffiti on toilet walls, picking up odds
and ends wherever we could. Such data (the value of which
is well illustrated by Dalton 32) will be referred to
whenever valuable or instructive, but cannot be regarded as
proof in any sense. The manner of its collection was so
diverse as to make discussion altogether impractical, and
has probably been forgotten in many cases, or is too
confidential in others. We shall therefore confine
ourselves to the more formal interview situation.
All the interviews were carried out in private, as
were those with the questionnaire. The site differed from
time to time, owing to pressure on space in the firm, but
in all cases privacy was assured. For the interviews a
cassette tape-recorder was used, where possible, to record
what was said. This was onl~ done with the knOWledge and
permission of the respondent • .
Where permission to record the interview on tape was
denied, we carried out the interview as normally as taking
notes at the same time would allow. Where the tape recorder
was used the interview was carried out as near as possible
to a normal conversation rather than a formal interview.
The respondent would be started off with a few general
remarks about trade unions, and then the interview was
allowed to find its own direction through the matters we
had to discuss.The phrase Ifallowed to find its own directionlf then
raises the issue of just how far our tape-recorded
interviews were in fact semi-structured. Our aim was to
initially stimulate the respondent with initial inquiries,
but omit further probing (other than interested grunts,
nods, etc.) as far as possible in order that the
respondent be able to speak for himself. This, however,
encountered the problem that the respondent was not always
clear of his role in the process. No matter how often it
was explained or even how well it was understood there was
in many cases (especially among staff and Hourly paid) a
severe status problem in that some respondents felt Ifhere's
this clever person (from the Uni., therefore he is clever)
who wants to ask us questions". This created the problem
that once the initial stimulus had been talked out, as far
as they were concerned, they waited for the next question.
This was something which we had to learn to live with -
having considered the constraints of the Lifeworld in the
context of hierarchy, we may consider its constraints for
the average Scot in relation to what he sees as the
educated person.
The best solution to this was pragmatic - to go
through each area, one by one like a check list. Of course
this did not happen in every case - there were those who
treated us with equality, where the interviews flowed as
the research strategy had hoped. The data quality was
probably unaffected by this problem - which was largely one
of conceptual compartmentalisation (the use of relevances),
and the data from both types of respondent should be
treated as having equal value.
In both cases the flow was allowed to continue as
uninterrupted as possible, the aim being to get the
respondent to talk rather than give the researcher what he
Wanted. only in this way could the respondent be expected
to talk about his life, and not think he was expected to
provide answers to questions for which there are no
answers, only opinions and experiences. It is this which we
are after, not formal answers to formal questions, but
rather the sUbjective experience of a particular form of
organization. This experience is infinitely dimensional,
but defined and interpreted in particular ways dictated by
the Lifeworld. Only by getting the respondent to talk about
this experience can we hope to assess the Lifeworld and its
system of logic.
That is how the qualitative data was collected. The
tapes (where used) were transcribed by ourselves or by an
aUdio-typist who was instructed to leave out anything she
was unsure of - inaudible, both speaking at once and so on.
These transcripts were then analysed for' evidence to
confirm or modify the provisional model presented in
chapter 1. What we sou~ht to do with the data has been well
described by Esterson 3 :
nbe
of
examine and define the 'event to
for our purpose the persistence
a) to
understood
hierarchy.
b) to clarify the pattern of inter-group action -
for our purpose to consider the perception of each
group of the other groups in the firm. In this was we
moved toward a deeper understanding of their praxis.
In respect of hierarchy - how Hourly paid behave
toward Management for instance how they were
understood and acted toward, which is a process guided
and constrained by the Lifeworld and its system of
logic.
c) to elucidate the pattern of experience - to
establish how one group experiences the other and in
consequence defines the other.
d) to relate the pattern of experience (eg the
pattern of experience of Hourly paid of Management) to
their interaction in other words what does the
experience of one group mean for the way in which they
interact with each other 35 •
Hence what we shall consider is why it is that
hierarchy remains acceptable, but at the same time look for
whatever elements of critical attitude toward hierarchy
which there may be on the part of our respondents. These
sources of acceptance and rejection of hierarchy are to be
located in the Lifeworld - hence our analysis will focus on
doing this.chapter 3CHAPTER 3
The identity of the firm used as our research site,
will not be revealed since it was agreed between ourselves,
the Management and the workers that their identity would
remain confidential.
In this chapter we will sketch out the relevant
features of the firm as well as the locality as a
background to the presentation of our findings. We shall
first of all consider the firm as an entity - a brief
consideration of its history, its business and market
performance as well as its organization. We shall then
consider the locality in which the firm operates - the west
of Scotland - and in particular its socio-economic position
and social traditions. The final part of this chapter will
be concerned with the negotiations for our entry to the
firm.
The Firm
The firm is a heavy electro-mechanical engineering
firm which produces its product under licence to an
American company. This in certain respects subordinates it
to the American company since, by the terms of the licence,
it cannot sell into certain parts of the world, nor produce
the latest design of the product. There is, however, no
relationship by virtue of ownership - neither firm has a
financial interest in the other. The firm is part of a
larger UK group which has its HQ in London 1 •
The firm is old and well established in the locality,
though in its present form it is relatively new. This
apparent paradox is explained by our firm having, in the
past, produced a part of a larger product. From the early
1960's, however, there was a progressive disengagement of
the two parts, with our firm making its initial entry into
its new market while still producing for the original firm.
In 1967, however, our firm "went solo", severing all day-
to-day links with the larger entity.
This picture is made all the more complex by the fact
that our firm is itself composed of two companies. As well
as a production company there is a sales and marketing
company, which is controlled commercially and financially
by the production company. The reasons for this, and its
implications, will be discussed below, and will be referred
to, where appropriate, in the chapters which follow. The
two companies, however, though legally separate, are in
practice inextricably linked, and in recognition of this we
shall refer to them collectively as "the firm".since 1967 the business interests of the firm have
gradually built up. Its peak was in 1976 when it received a
large number of orders from overseas (it has not until
recently sold into the UK) which represented a significant
increase on any previous year. The primary effect was to
give much greater security of emploYment to its employees,
who at that time numbered 1700. Prior to these orders being
received the threat of redundancy had been made if orders
did not pick up. This did not come about, ensuring security
of emploYment until 1979, at a greater annual level of
output. By 1980, however, the orders received by the firm
fell back and 500 employees were made redundant. Since
then the workforce has been approximately stable.
The firm is in most respects a traditional west of
Scotland engineering firm - both in its similarity to those
operating at present, and in continuing the traditions of
the past. This tradition has not, however, been untouched
by time and is no longer identical to the "Red Clyde" myth
firm of imagination - if indeed such an entity did ever
exist.
Location and Tradition
The firm is located near Glasgow in a town of 57,000
inhabitants. Its organizational structure is discussed in
footnote 2. It is the major private sector employer. In the
original form of the firm, it is the feature that the town
developed around.
Given its location near Glasgow it is in an area of
multiple social deprivation 3. The area is, of course also
historically associated with the "Red Clyde", and following
on from our discussion of the area's socio-economic
background and culture, we shall seek to locate the
behaviour which appears to fulfil the Red Clyde tradition,
as a reaction to its socio-economic experience, arguing
that this can only be understood as part of a much more
complex tradition.
There can be little argument that historically
clydeside is not in good socio-economic health 4. Given
this, the area's social history, and in particular its more
or less traditional relative deprivation, then the militant
behaviour held to be typical of "Red Clyde" becomes less
surprising and more understandable. It is, however, easy to
romanticise and exaggerate the "Red Clyde" 5.
The tradition of the area is, however, one which is
critical of existing social arrangements which are
perceived to be responsible for the deprivation described
above, not such as to seek to over-throw the capitalist
system but rather to seek "a better deal"• The area's
tradition is expressed in solidarity and loyalty to one's
work-mates as well as a keen eye for victimisation. It can
hardly be denied that workers on Clydeside have a keen
criticism for management but this hardly makes them
unusual.It can be argued that much of the blame for the
economic decline of the area can be attributed to a failure
by management to see the decline of heavy industry after
1918, and that this is a direct cause of the unemploYment
rates quoted above. The behaviour of management cannot be
said to have always been enlightened for instance
discrimination on political and/or religious grounds was
not uncommon 6.
There are however not insignificant positive qualities
of the area and its people - their self reliance, common
industry, pride in their area, determination to overcome
any set-back or adversity, their originality. In spite of
the many critical observations he makes of the area,
Checkland describes Glasgow as providing
a legend of vigour and barbarity, but
accompanied by a sense of warmth,
shared hospitality, together with a
powerful native wit. 7
The west of Scotland can, therefore, accurately be
described as socio-economically depressed. We would argue,
however that the "Red Clyde" associated with this, is more
true in belief than in action - and that what truth there
is in it is a not unreasonable reaction to a hostile and
not always very pleasant environment ( for instance without
the Work-in, which appears to confirm the Red Clyde, the
Collapse in emploYment which would have ensued would have
been horrifying to imagine). This experience has created a
sense of solidarity and loyalty to each other, but not to
the constant revolution or even militancy of the Red Clyde.
Regotiating Entry.
The firm was selected as our research site for two
reasons:
a) it is located in the west of Scotland. Besides
convenience, this was important since our theoretical
perspective is concerned with' the persistence of
hierarchical organization and the possibility of
challenge to such organization. The tradition of
criticism of management made it appear to be a
fruitful area for such research.
b) it is a firm using traditional methods of
engineering so that conflict was less likely to be a
function of technology (less likely than in a car
plant 8.)The possibility of entry was first mooted in 1975,
while we were putting together the very earliest stages of
the theoretical perspective. This initial approach was not
altogether welcomed, as the Manufacturing Director had
recently been "rebuffed" by the unions, as well as some
managers, when he had attempted to bring in "one of the
better known commercial exponents of attitude survey" 9.
Undaunted by this, when we were ready to commence field-
work approximately one year later, we made another
approach, and this time received an invitation to come down
for discussions.
Despite the initial problems the year before, entry at
this point in time posed few problems - at least with the
Manufacturing Director. This was largely because:
a) after the initial attempt to introduce
"commercial exponents of attitude survey", things had
been allowed to cool off.
b) I was an academic, and as such independent of
the company, and thus perhaps more acceptable to the
unions - or so we thought.
The initial discussions with the Manufacturing
Director and the Personnel Manager 'in June 1976 were
followed in August by a meeting with the Joint Works
Committee (hourly paid employees) and the Joint staff
Committee (salaried employees). The latter group at no time
put any obstacles or opposition in the way of the proposed
research, so the remainder of this section will focus on
our, not always straightforward, negotiations with the
Joint Works Committee.
The concern of the Joint Works Committee was mainly on
the possible consequences -of our research for their
members. Their doubt focused on the possibility of our
producing at the end a "these-guys-spend-all-day-in-the-
toilet-reading-dirty-books-and-smoking" kind of report, or
an ultra right wing report which would only be critical of
the unions. Eventually a majority of the committee - a
quite substantial one, we believe were sUfficiently
convinced of our good intentions to vote to co-operate as
much as they could. Indeed despite the initial suspicion of
the Works Committee, compared to the Staff Committee, the
former were much more helpful than the latter - giving
directions and advice.This agreement, however, only resolved our problems in
the Engine works. The Fabrication works were dominated by
the Amalgamated society of Boilermakers who played a
skilful game of cat-and-mouse with us. This· eventually
involved our bringing in as support the then General Secy.,
John Chalmers. The negotiation with the Boilermakers ended
with a flat refusal from the membership of the ASB in our
firm - despite the acceptance of the project, and the
reassurances supplied by John Chalmers. The origins of our
problems lay with a view held by a majority of ASB stewards
that if management thought we were OK, then there must be
something wrong. The refusal of the Boilermakers to co-.
operate meant we had to omit a majority of hourly paid
workers in the Fabrication works.
The labourers in the Fabrication works (member of the
GMWu) did, however, agree to be interviewed, and the staff
section of the ASB also agreed to co-operate.
The next stage of the project was to carry out
initial, exploratory interviews with what we perceived to
be "key figures" in the firm - shop stewards, staff union
reps. and managers. The aim of this, basically informal,
interview was
1) to obtain a "feel" for the firm. The
information which was obtained was used to extend and
to develop the questionnaire into areas which appeared
likely to be fruitful.
2) to create a situation in which we could meet,
for the first time in a basically social
conversational atmosphere, individuals who could be
important for the future conduct of our research. In
addition it provided an opportunity for us to explain
more fully our research, answer any questions, and
generally to make ourselves and our project better
known.
We have alluded already to the co-operation given by
shop-floor workers, but we should extend this to staff and
management who were equally co-operative. Much of this
originated from the atmosphere of the firm, as well as a
conunon social identity of our respondents and ourselves.
The part played in exploiting this by our initial
interviews and "putting ourselves about a bit", generally
answering any questions on the research as fully and openly
as possible, was considerable.
nThe information gained from the initial interviews was
used to put some empirical "flesh" on our theoretical
"bones" and guide the sUbsequent design of the
questionnaire, which was used to interview 175 employees
between March and May 1977. There were 6 refusals/non-
contacts. The results of this questionnaire and the
sUbsequent semi-structured interview conducted between
October 1977 and March 1980 (about six months prior to the
redundancy (see above, 2) provides the substance for what
follows.
Biographical details of the sample
The total number of respondents who agreed to be
interviewed in the first phase when we employed the
questionnaire to obtain quantitative data was 175, which
was a 10% sample of the firm's employees of approx. 1700.
Table 3.1
Management
Staff
Hourly paid
Number
36
79
65
Interviewed
32
78
65
The number of Staff and Hourly-paid were 10% of each
category in the Firm, selected at random (every tenth name)
from a list of wage records, set out by department,
sUpplied by Personnel. To do this with Management, we felt,
would have given too few management respondents to be
Useful, so we employed a 100% management sample. This
reflects:
1) the key role of management in the firm
2) the wider range of areas in which Management
were concerned. Using a 100% sample of Management was
intended to reflect that width of experience, and
possible variation of Lifeworld.
The firm employed its own definition of "manager",
which was generally reflected in being able to use the
Management Dining Room, as opposed to the Senior staff
Dining Room. This definition, it seemed to. us, lacked
rigour, and instead we included as managers:
a) all those members of the Board who worked for
the firm on a full-time basis,
b) those who were
1) defined by the firm as managers, AND
2) had control of a particUlar function (eg
Works Manager, Production Test Manager Chief
Inspector, Engineering Tendering Manager
Financial Accountant, etc.). '
-Our definition is therefore, more restrictive than
that used by the firm - see figs 3.1 and 3.2.
staff, we defined as, anyone who was
1) salaried,
2) not a Manager according to our definition.
The age distribution of each category is shown in
Table 3.2
Table 3.2 Ages of Sample
Years Management Staff Hourly-paid
<25 0 10(13%) 5(8%)
26-35 2(6%) 25(32%) 18(28%)
36-45 20(62%) 15(19%) 16(25%)
46-55 7(22%) 17(22%) 12(19%)
56-65 3(9%) 11(14%) 14(22%)
Total 32 78 65
Amongst management it can be seen that there is middle
age bias, with 84% being 36-55. The Staff distribution, on
the other hand peaks twice at 26-35 and 46-55, with the
larger peak being the former. The Hourly-paid distribution
is mainly between 26-45, but with a slight turn-up at the
older end of the distribution, 22% being aged 56-65.
From this it would appear that there is a middle-aged
Management, youngish Hourly-paid (though with an "older"
group") and Staff divided between those aged less than 35
and those aged over 46.
Length of Service is dealt with in table 3.3
Table 3.3
< 5 years
6-10 years
11-20 years
20 years +
Total
Length of Service
Management Staff
7 (22%) 44(56%)
15 (47%) 23(30%)
7 (22%) 5( 6%)
3 ( 9%) 6( 8%)
32 78
Hourly-paid
22(34%)
25(39%)
9(14%)
9(14%)
65
The modal length of service of Management and Hourly-
Paid is 6-10 years, whereas for Staff it is less than 5
years, which becomes particularly pronounced when it is
observed that only 14% of Staff have more than 11 years
service, whereas for Management the same figure is 31% and
28% for Hourly paid.
We have previously referred to the fact that the Firm
had previously been an integrated part of a larger firm.
Respondents were asked if they had ever worked for the firm
at that time. The results are set out below in table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Did you ever work for the firm when it was
~rt of (the larger firm)?
•Yes
No
Management
18 (56%)
14 (44%)
staff
23 (30%)
55 (70%)
Hourly-paid
39 (60%)
26 (40%)
Typically around 60% worked for the firm in its
previous form and were, therefore, acquainted with its
traditional customs. The deviant case is clearly Staff, 70%
of whom had not done so. This allows us to explain the
relatively shorter modal service of Staff shown in table
3.3. As we pointed out above, in 1967 the firm changed the
product which it manufactured. The change did not require
significantly different skills on the part of Hourly-paid
employees or of Management (Which would be an important
consideration in its choice), but did require different
and/or additional Staff skills. Indeed if we break the
Staff group down into their constituent departments, it can
be seen that in fact all the foremen in the sample had
worked for the firm in its previous form. Different skills
requirements (eg selling, design and so on) meant that many
of the Staff
1) had not worked for the firm in its previous
form, and
2) typically had less experience with the firm
than other categories of employee.
An important feature of the firm, which became
apparent in our initial interviews was the extent to which
the firm was like a family, in that many of the employees
Were following a family tradition by working there ("my
father worked [works] here, and his father worked here too,
and his father," and so on), and that many joined the firm
through family or social connection. This can be seen in
Table 3.5
Centres/Trade
o
40(62%)
newspapers/Job
35(45%)
2 ( 3%)
in
10(31%)
8(25%)
adverts
on.
Table 3.5 How did you come to join the firm?
Management Staff Hourly-paid
14(44%) 41(53%) 25(38%) 1) Reading an
Advert *
2) Through
Friend/Relative
3) Approached
by the Firm
*This included
Magazines and so
In the sample as a whole 48% joined via a relative or
friend, and 46% through an advert or Job Centre, or some
other official channel. Yet far and away the largest
category for the former are Hourly paid, some 62% of whom
joined through a friend or relative. For Staff and
Management, on the other hand, adverts were a more
important vehicle. Indeed if we decompose the sample into
its departmental elements (ie horizontal as opposed to
Vertical decomposition) we can see that the closer a
category is to the shop floor the more important joining
through a relative or friend becomes.
nTable 3.6 Proportion joining through an advert.
Finance 67%
Quality Control 50%
Sales & Marketing 48%
Production Control 44%
Foremen 40%
Works Staff 36%
Skilled Hourly-paid 36%
Unskilled Hourly paid 44%
It would appear to be the case, therefore that those
closest to the Shop-floor - Labourers, Skilled Hourly paid,
Works Staff, Foremen - have a greater tendency to join the
firm by the relatively unofficial, essentially social
channels, and that by implication the sense of community is
strongest in these group, since around 60% of them joined
the firm through a friend or relative in the firm 10 •
The additional category - approached by the firm - was
necessary, mainly for management, to include those who had
not themselves approached the firm for emploYment, but
instead they were approached by the firm, or by an
intermediary. Amongst Management 25% were accounted in this
way - 3 board members, 3 in Sales and Marketing. 2 in
Quality Control, and one each in Shipping and Personnel.
Only 2 cases were detected in Staff.
Hence the sample appears to be biased toward the
middle aged, broadly defined as those between 26 and 55.
There is also a high degree of stability, since in every
category except Staff more than 50% had been with the firm
for at least 6 years. Indeed this stability was a noted
feature of the firm, with talk of three generations having
worked there being not uncommon, and as we shall see in
Chapter 5 when we consider Redundancy, the firm was
perceived as one which attempted to hold on to its
employees whenever possible.
Part of the stability was, as a matter of pOlicy, due
to the firm's wages being high relative to the area (they
paid in the upper quartile of the wage rates in the
locality for their kin~s of labour). Hence among Management
and Hourly-paid, the apparent stability of the work force
can be explained by social and wage factors. Staff are
rather different, in that a higher proportion of them have
lower periods of service. This does not, however, reflect a
higher level of turnover among staff, but rather that with
the change in product in 1967 the labour needs of the firm
changed, and this was much more pronounced among Staff than
other categories.
The firm, therefore, eXhibits a high degree of
stability with respect to its employees. This is due to its
high wage policy, but also due to the critical loyalty
which it engendered in its employees, as we shall see in
the two chapter which follow.In both chapters 4 and 5, we refer to a number of
excerpts - for instance excerpt 5.2, or excerpt 4.7. All
such excerpts - which are relevant excerpts from semi
structured interviews with respondents - can be found in
Appendix 4 (for the excerpts referred to in chapter 4,
beginning 4.) or in Appendix 5 (for the excerpts referred
to in chapter 5, beginning 5.).chapter 4CHAPTER 4
"Telling the shop stewards is a
courtesy" - senior Board Member.
This chapter will be concerned with the information
given by the firm to its employees. It will be our argument
that the practices of the firm in this respect reveals
certain major dissatisfactions on ,the part of the employees
ann that the improvements they would like to see, represent
an initial break with hierarchical organization in that
information would be less completely controlled by the
elite ill it~ head, and would be more wid~ly distributed
than in the past. This, it should be understood, is not a
break with hierarchy and does not in itself lead to an
alternative of a more democratic nature, but is probably a
necessary condition for this to happen.
Satisfaction with company communication of information.
of our
certain
Trade
period
to
the
Legislation which 'over the
research has required statutory access
information about a company's activIties (eg
Union and Labour Rclation~ Act 1974) indlcat~s a measure
of secrecy in British industry with respect to the
communication of information to employees. Our inItialimpression of the Firm was that this was no bad thing either, as, for
instance, early on in our field work, the Firm won a large foreign
order which alone was expected to provide secure employment for up to
3 years. However, while Management were informed, the Staff and
Hourly-Paid only found out from the Glasgow evening paper or on T.V.
news. Compounded to this was the dominant Management attitude that
this really was not important, and in any case it was the fault of their
P.R. Consultants who released the news to the media. This rationalisation . .
was advanced by at least 3 Managers, usually during informal meetings.
Subsequently our attitude was modified slightly on uncovering a communic-
ations network, which could really only be described as 'secret', by
which senior Shop Stewards were kept informed on matters of interest to
them, on an informal basis by a Manager who, on describing this to us
said, "Christ, if (Board Member D) knew what we told the Unions he'd
go ruddy bananas and then have me sacked". This 'secret' operation,
in our view, performed the function of keeping the employees informed
to a level which could at best be described as a holding operation in
so far as it prevented communications becoming a much wider issue than
it already was, in that any ,information communicated was at the
initiative of the Shop Stewards.
We should not, however, wish to give the impression that Management
took the view that all information was to be restricted - most wished
to see the situation in this respect improved. Many managers provided
their subordinates with as much information as they felt they safely
could - as our example shows - but as a development of the existing
situation what information was to be provided will be a major issue in
this chapter.
There are two major problems facing this Firm in its communication _(1) what information should be communicated to its employees - or
conversely what should not be communicated on the grounds of secretary,
confidentiality, or just because they should not know? (2) how should
this communication be achieved, and by implication what rights to
information do employees have?
These problems shall be discussed subsequently, but for the moment we
shall concern ourselves with satisfaction with the existing system.
This was considered in 2 steps:
(1) general questions on the communications system as a whole, and
the motivations implied to its failures;
(2) (a) questions specific to particular aspects of the Firm and
its activities.
(b) At this stage, respondents were also asked how far they
felt they could trust the information they received, since
it seemed important to us to open up the possibility that even
if this Firm did provide adequate quantities of information,
it could be perceived as a leoni, and that the information was
not perceived as accurate and as a deliberate distortion either
to throw employees off the right track, or as a means to secure
other Management aims.
We first of all asked respondents if they felt they were kept as well
informed about matters affecting them,'or if they felt they could be
kept better informed. This produced the following responses:
~ITable 4.1
Do you feel you are kept as informed as possible by the Company about
matters which affect you, or do you feel you could be kept better
informed than you are at the moment?
Union Shop
Management Staff Reps. Hourly-Paid Stewards
Well Informed 15 (47%) 22 (32%) 0 18 (38%) 5 (29%)
Could be Better
Informed 17 (53%) 49 (69%) 7(100%) 30 (62%) 12 (71%)
Hence there is no one group which could be described as really well
informed. Even amo~stManagement there is a majority (53%) who say
they could be kept better informed. Only slightly worse than"this are
the Hourly-Paid (62%) and their Shop-Stewards (71%). Worst informed
of all are the Staff (69%) and their Union Reps. (100%), perhaps
because, given the relatively recent introduction of Staff Unions into
the Firm outside the point of production, there has not been time to
develop the sort of unofficial system which operates for the Hour1y-
Paid. The Staff Unions (T.A.S.S. in particular) were described as
being less reliable than the Hourly-Paid Unions, and less in control
of themselves. (Recounted by 3 Senior Managers with an important daily
role with the unions). Managers suggested that if they negotiated
With an Hourly-Paid Shop Steward he could be more confident of the
agreement being honoured than if he was dealing with a Staff Union Rep.
The domiant attitude appeared to be that the Staff Unions had not been
socialised into the system of collective bargaining which existed in
the Firm. By implication, therefore, they could not be trusted with
the information, unofficially and secretly, imparted to the Hourly-Paid.
There was no evidence that the Staff Unions showed the same on-goingrelationship with the Management as did the Hourly-Paid. This,
however, is not inconsistent with the axioms of our model since
the introduction of Staff Unions represented a fairly basic break
of traditional expectations - as, for instance, the highly personal
way in which our Firm reached to the initial unionisation of non-
unionised Staff (e.g. Foremen about 10 years ago. This breach
required a re-negotiation, and re-1earning of expectations by both
Management and Staff. This is certainly happening, since the Board
member who described the place of the unions to us as "absolutely vital",
10 years ago reacted with what was almost violence to the prospect of
Foremen joining A.S.T.M.S•.; talking about "betrayal" and "breach of trust".
Recounted by an·A.S.T.M.S. foreman who was.among the first to join A.S.T.M.S• .
His 'position as a foreman .made the situation eveU.JIIOre delicate.)
This break with expectations, and consequent exclusion from the
unofficial system we described above, is largely responsible, in our
view, for the results shown. At the same time we shall go on to show
that in looking at specific types of information, Staff were on the
whole better informed than Hourly-Paid, but that this was due to their
position in the Firm, by virtue of which particular types of information
are more readily available. It is, however, important that this is on
an individual and not a collective basis. One staff respondent, who
had 'served his time' before being promoted, on being 'asked whether he
had changes in any way since becoming Staff makes it clear that he has,
in Excerpt 4.1 (See APpendi4) •
On certain specific items of information, however, Staff are badly
informed, but usually less so than Hourly-Paid.We then went'on to ask of those who said they could be better informed.
why they felt this was. The results of this are shown below in tab1e4.:
Table 4.2
Why do you think this is?
Union Shop
Management Staff Reps. Hourly-Paid Stewards
Deliberate
Management 1 (3%) 10 (14%) 1 (14%) 8 (17%) 3 (18%)
Policy
Regarded as
2 (29%) 10 (21 %) 1 (6%) Unimportant by 8 (25%) 13 (18%)
Management
Carelessness 8 (25%) 22 (31%) 2 (29%) 7 (15%) 8 (47%) by Management
Management Believe
5 (10%) 0 Those Below Not 0 4 (6%) 2 (29%)
Interested
Well Informed 15 (47%) 22 (31%) 0 18 (38%) 5 (29%)
The dominant attitude is that Management are careless. or. less strongly
supported. that Communications are not perceived as being sufficiently
important to the Management. Even less strongly supported are the views
of Management as having a deliberate policy (though amongst Hourly-Paid
this is just more popular than that they are careless). or that they
believe their subordinates are not interested in being kept informed.
There is. however. no particularly strong view which would be conclusive
at this stage. but the reasoning used to explain poor communication will
become clearer later in the chapter. involving recognition that failure
to cOl1ll1unicate may be jUdged differently on each aspect. 'depending on
its content and relevance to the individual.Given that 63% of all respondents felt they could be kept better informed
than at present a problem does appear to exist. Arather simplistic
and naive method is to ask all those amongst Management and Staff
how they kept their subordinates or Hourly-Paid with whom they came into
contact. informed. This question drew the following responses.
Table 4.3
In dealing with those subordinate to you which of the following comes
closest to your views of how you keep them informed?
Manager Staff, Union Rep.
You Keep Them as Well Informed 32 (100%) 69 (97%) .7 (100%) as Possible
Corrmunication is Not 0 1 (1 %) 0 Important
You Want to Tell Them But 0 1 (1 %) 0 Don't Get Round to it
Those Below You Aren't 0 0 0 Interested in Being Kept Informed
The question this immediately brings out is that if everyone is keeping
his/her subordinates lias well informed as possible" then why do 63% of
our respondents feel that they could be kept better informed. Who
then is screwing up communications in the Firm? It seems to us there
are two principal reasons for this.(1) The question itself is naive, as it asks the respondent either
to endorse his own action, or by implication condemn it. To do
the latter is extremely difficult for the respondent.
(2) Each respondent may sincerely believe that he is indeed keeping
his subordinates as well informed as he possibly can. He may in
fact be doing so. This, however, is a separate issue for his
suao..tl_\e. who are receiving less information than they feel
they ought to be. The problem then becomes what is a reasonable
allocation of time to communicating with others, and by implication
what place in the multitude of tasks a manager in particular must
fulfill will communications take. There is no possibility that
we can a priori guarantee that the relative importance given to
communication by a manager will yield a result whereby his
subordinates feel well informed - yet the manager may honestly
feel he is keeping them as well informed as possible. The
constraints on his time imposed by his work-load may mean his
output of information does not match the input expectations of
his subordinates.
These results represent some combination of these two factors, but to
have posed the question throws into relief a problem of communication
more subtle than the lito communicate or not to cOlTlTlunicate?" question
we started out from, and has introduced what transpired to be the more
subtle problem of how important communication is. The former, less
subtle issue, we shall show was relevant in certain specific items ofinformation, but the more subtle latter issue was relevant
as theme in communication in the firm as a whole.
The results for the questions on specific types of
information fall into 3 categories:
1) Those specific types of information in which
there was a majority in each of the 3 main categories
Management, Staff and Hourly paid who were
satisfied with the quantity of information they
received - Safety: overtime: Work Expected of the
Individual by the firm: Pay: Order situation:
Redundancy: Recruitment: Promotion.
2) Those specific types of information in which
one main category was dissatisfied with the
information received - Cost Reduction: Profitability:
Financial Policy: Transfer of Employees between
jobs/depts.
3) Those specific types of information in which
two main categories were dissatisfied with the
information received - Investment: Work study.
For reasons of economy we are unable to present all
the data collected here. What we have done is to take
particular issues which are representative, the remainder
being presented in Appendix 3. In this section we deal with
Pay: Cost Reduction: Financial Policy: Profitability:
Investment. While only these issues are considered in this
the main part of the thesis, those which are contained in
the Appendix, while dealing with different specific issues,
follows the same structure of argument, and the same logic
in the thinking of our respondents.
First of all let us consider communication about pay.Information on Pay. In the previous examples those least well
informed have been the Hourly-Paid. In this example, however, the
roles are reversed, since here we find the least weJl informed are
the Staff and the Management.
TaD1e 4.+:
How well informed does the Company keep you about Pay? .
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 14 (44%) 13 (18%) 2 (29%) 14 (29%) 4 (24~)
Quite Well 8 (25%) 25 (35%) 2 (29%) 25 (52%) 10 (59~)
Quite Badly 9 (28%) l~ (25%) '2 (29%) 5 (10%) 2 (12%)
Very Badly 1 (3%) 15 (21%) 1 (14%) 4 (8%) 1 (6~)
The table shows 31% of Management, 46% of Staff, 43% of Union Reps. to
. ..: .
."be badly informed about Pay in the Firm, in contras~ to 18% for Hour1y-
Paid and their Shop Stewards. The reason for this was the
almost obsessive secrecy about salaries paid in the Firm, and it was
not unusual to find 2 Staff/Management working together, with no idea of
what the other was earning. This was in contrast to the openness created on
the Shop-Floor by all the skilled men working for a common rate, and
the unskilled working for their rate. Even though bonus was paid for
production the Hourly-Paid had a much clearer idea of where they stood
in this respect.
This obsessive secrecy appeared in the early days of our field work, as
to take our sample we required to know who and how many were in each
department. We were told the best means to do this was to obtain copies
of pension records. The Hourly-Paid details were simply handed to us,
but, since pension contributions were a fixed proportion of income, we
were told we could not use the Staff and Management details, as knowing
their pension contributions we could work out their incomes and "incomes
are completely confidential in this Firm". Well, some more than others
perhaps:
The problem with information on this item, therefore, related very
much to actually obtaining the information. Once this hurdle is
"resolved the level of trust appears to be high.lable 4.5'
How far do you trust the information you receive on Pay?
Management Staff Union , Shop
Reps. Hourly-Pald -.Stewards
Completely 19 (59%) 24 (34%) 3 (43%) 17 (35%) 8 (47%)
Quite a Lot 9 (28%) 22 (31 %) 2 (29%) 22 (46%) 6 (35%)
Not a Lot 2 (6%) 10 (14%) 1 (14%) 6 (13%) 3 (18%)
Not a Lot 1 (3%) 4 (6%) 0 1 (2%) 0
No Info. 1 (3%) 11 (16%) 1 (14%) 2 (4%) 0 Received
This table reinforces our earlier argument on obsessive secrecy about
'Who gets what', as 16% of Staff and 1 of the 7 Union Reps.· say they
receive no information on which to make a judgment, In contrast tp
these 2 categories, the other 3 have in excess of 80% expressing at
least 'Quite a lot' of trust in the information which they receive on
Pay. Amongst Management - in contrast to Staff - there does appear to
be an ability to get the information required, though from the previous
table, and our own experience, it is hard to come by.
Cost Reduction. When w~ initially began our field-work the Firm
had a small t' h' sec lon w lch designed and sold another similar, but
smaller, product, which was produced in the f t 1 ' ' ac ory, a ongSlde the
main, much larger, product. B th' y 1S time, however, this smaller
prOduct constituted only a tiny fraction of the ~l'rm's
r production,
and as sales of the main product were developl'ng rapidly to a point
:where available production capacity was under sever~ pressure.
It was decided to put all capacity over to production of
the main product. The small section which designed and sold this
minor product was, therefore, without a function. Most of it was
easily absorbed into the Firm e.g. to assist in a hard-pressed
drawing office. The solution for the senior levels of the section was
to create a Cost Reduction section in the Firm, to look for ways by
which the Firm's costs could be reduced and/or held down by using more
efficient methods, cheaper raw material and parts (of equal quality)
etc. It may be that to portray this as a means to give employees
something to do is rather cynical, especially as the Firm was aspiring
to being one of the major world firms in its market. The timing and
manner of its establishment, however, suggested that the two
events (closing one section, establishing an~ther) were not wholly
separate, and could hardly be said to be opportune. Given this, our
own view of the Cost Reduction section was that the Firm was not being
entirely serious about the aims of the new section of its operation.
Its 'activities' to some extent confirmed this view, (although lack of
activity may be a more apt description) since its main function
appeared to be a most impressive production of reports, rumours etc.
among Management but very little action, as the following tables show.
Table 4."
How well informed does the Company keep you about Cost Reduction?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 17 (53%) 14 (20%) 1 (14%) 2 (4%) 0
Qui te Well 9 (28%) 27 (38%) 2 (29%) 15 (31%) 3 (18%)
Quite Badly 5 (16%) 20 (28%) 2 (29%) 19 (40%) 5 (29%)
Very Badly 1 (3%) 10 (14%) 2 (29%) 12 (25%) 8 (47%)From this table it can be seen that 65% of Hourly-Paid. 76% of Shop
Stewards. 58% of Union Reps. say they are Quite/Very Badly informed
about Cost Reduction. Even among Staff this figure is 42%. If we
look at this figure more closely we find it to be unevenly distributed
among the departments in the Firm i.e. in Finance 44% are Quite/Very
Badly informed. in Sales it is 34%. in Production Control 44%. in
Quantity Control it is 50%. and in Works 36%. It seems to be. there-
fore. that while the Management are kept well informed about this.
Staff are less well informed (even in departments where such activity
may be important e.g. Quantity Control). and Hourly-Paid are even less
well informed (65% of Skilled respondents and 74% of Labourers are
Quite/Very Badly informed about this). One may. however. have reason
to expect that the Hourly-Paid would be kept informed. in order to
make use of the expertise which they have gained. as Excerpt 4. ;2-
from a Staff respondent indicates.
..
This informant reports the system to operate as far as him - for
Managers to look to their section leaders (as he is) - but that he
himself has never been asked. He also makes a case. which was repeated
by certain Managers. for keeping the Hourly-Paid involved - by telling
them what was happening. asking for their advice. etc•• because of the
position which they occupy. The data presented in the previous table
indicates. however. that communication in this respect is inadequate
among Staff and Hourly-Paid. and in particular the latter for whom it
often was a blank. as Excerpt .4.~. from an Hourly-Paid Informant
reveals.Frequently this was the response to such questions - "no we never
hear anything about_that" - or that they are aware something is going
on. but they never know what. This failure to communicate both down-
wardly to employees, and to facilitate their upward communication is
a major problem for the Firm, since solutions to it, in the eyes of
the Management may compromise.their position. We shall discuss this
problem at greater length below.
The question of how this information is trusted by employees is shown
in the following table.
Table 4 =i
How far do you trust the information you receive on Cost Reduction?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 12 (38%) 21 (30%) 0 4 (8%) 1 (6%)
Quite a Lot 10 (31%) 18 (25%) 2 (29%) 16 (33%) 3 (18%)
Not a Lot 7 (22%) 19 (27%) 3 (43%) 14 (29%) 3 (18%)
Not at All 3 (9%) 1 (1 %) 0 4 (8%) 2 (12%)
No Info. 0 12 (17%) 2 (29%) 10 (21%) 7 (4%) Received
From what has been said by the Staff respondent the system of operation
of the Cost Reduction section is not clearly understood. The effect ofthis table is to show
(1) the members who report knowi ng nothi ng about it - 17%-'of Sta.ff, 29%
of Union Reps., 21% of Hourly-Paid, and 41% of Shop Stewards.
(2) that when information is received it is not always regarded as
altogether trustworthy i.e. 31% of Management have INot a Loti of
trust in it/INone at All l: 28% of Staff; 37% of Hourly-Paid; 30% of
Shop Stewards; while 43% of Union Reps. have INot a Loti of trust in
the information they receive on cost reduction. The other way to look
at this is,.that only amongst Management does there seem to be solid
trust expressed - 69% trust it CompletelY/Quite a Lot - but among
Staff it is 55%, 41% for Hourly-Paid, 29% for Union Reps., and 24% for
Shop Stewards. This initially indicates a point we shall make at
greater length at the end - namely that the better one is kept informed
the more one will trust that information, and conversely the less well
one is informed the less one will trust what is received.
; I ., Information on the Firmls Financial Policy.
Respondents were asked how well informed the Firm kept them about the
Financial Policy it pursued. The results are shown in the following
table.
Table 4.~
How well informed does the Firm keep you about its Financial Policy?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 13 (41%) 10 (14%) 1 (14%) 7 (15%) 1 (6%)
Quite Well 12 (38%) 28 (39%) 1 (14%) 14 (29%) 8 (47%)
Quite Badly 7 (22%) 21 (30%) 2 (29%) 17 (35%) 4 (24%)
Very Badly 0 12 (17%) 3 (43%) 10 (21%) 4 (24%)
84The failure to keep employees'informed on this is made clear by the
table i.e. 56% of Hourly-Paid, 48% of Shop Stewards, 47% of Staff and
72% of Union Reps. say they are Quite/Very Badly informed. This
confirms the trend we have seen up till now i.e. that Management are
informed best, then Staff and finally the Hourly-Paid. If we look at
the data in more detail, however, we can see that certain departments
are better informed than others e.g. no Director describes himself as
badly informed to any degree, but 34% of Sales and Finance are Quite/
Very Badly informed, 40% of Foremen, 50% of Quality Control, 54% of
Works, 56% of Production Control. Hence the dissatisfaction on this
item is not evenly spread through all departments, but becomes worse
the closer we are to the point of production~
Why should the Firm perform so badly in this respect? Excerpt 4.4
from a senior Manager in Finance makes clear that commercial secrecy
is one rationalisation of this.
It is important to observe that refusal to provide information is not
explicitly based on some idea of managerial prerogative, but instead
is based on "how far they want the information and what they are going
to use it for". On the surface these may appear rational reasons.
They, however, also represent a justification oftotal Management control
of this information and controlled access to it by others"in the
9 5interests of the Company". It is, in the light of this, all the more
interesting, to observe the concern with communicating this information
to other Managers - or members of the 'same club'. This, on our
experience of this man, is completely genuine, but it is interesting
to observe the free access to information for Managers - the impression
is almost of open house - to the restricted access offered to Staff
and Hourly-Paid, which though in principle open, is hedged with
conditions and required justifications.
As in the previous case we find that those who are least well informed
place least trust in what they do receive.
Table 4·09-
How far do you trust the information you receive on Financial Policy?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 20 (63%) 20 (28%) 0 7 (15%) 1 (6%)
Quite a Lot 9 (28%) 21 (30%) 2 (29%) 14 (29%) 7 (41%)
Not a Lot 2 (6%) 17 (24%) 3 (43%) 16 (33%) 3 (18%)
Not at All 0 1 (1 %) 0 2 (4%) 1 (6%)
No Info. 1 (3%) 12 (17%) 2 (29%) 9 (19%) 5 (29%) Received
It can be seen that only amongst the Management is there a foundation".
of trust for this information, where 91% trust it either 'Completely',
'Quite a Lot', but amongst Staff this is 58%, 29% among Union Reps.
Among the Hourly-Paid 44% trust this information either 'Completely'
or 'Quite a Lot', and 47% of Shop Stewards. In every othe~ case .th~
respondent either receives no, information, or has little or no trust
in it. We found Management best informed, t~n Staff, then Hourly-
Paid - a similar ordering clearly holds for this trust put in the
information.
Information on the Firm's Profitability.
Responses to questions on how well the Firm kept them about its,
• "0......
Profitability brough~~imi1arresponses, for reasons very similar to
those for failure to keep employees informed about the Financial
Policy, as the Manager in Finance made clear in the previous section.
Table 4. 10
How well informed does the Firm keep you about its Profitability?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 19 (59%) 15 (21%) 0 6 (13%) 1 (6%)
Quite Well 6 (19%) 28 (39%) 3 (43%) 17 (35%) 3 (18%)
Quite Badly 6 (19%) 18 (25%) 2 (29%) .10 (21%) 6 (35%)
Very Badly 1 (3%) 10 (14%) 2 (29%) 15 (33%) 7 (41%)
While the Staff and Union Reps. appear to be slightly less badly
informed than on Financial Policy, the Hourly-Paid response is very
similar (25 as opposed to 27 being Quite/Very Badly informed), but the
Shop Stewards level of satisfaction is much worse.
g..:;,.
The reasoning for the Management not providing this information was
revealed by the Manager in Finance in the previous section i.e. for
reasons of ~ommercial security. This argument is, however, challenged
in ~~erpt 4.5,: from Shop Steward who argues that for him or his
members to do anything to harm the Firm would only harm them, and that
Directors are at most no more trustworthy than a Shop Steward's
Committee.
The argument of commercial secrecy is, therefore, one which is not
impregnable in the minds of the Hourly-Paid and the Shop Stewards. The
idea that they were not as trustworthy as the Board or the Management
was an offence to their pride in themselves•. As a result of the
failure of the Firm to keep their employees informed we have the figures
of the previous table which reveal a considerable dissatisfaction with
communication of information on the profits made by the Firm;
particularly among the Shop Stewards.
The data collected on the trust put in this information is presented
in the following table.Table 4. i1_
How far do you trust the information you receive from the Company on
its Profitability?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 23 (72%) 23 (32%) 1 (14%) 9 (19%) 2 (12%)
Quite a Lot 7 (22%) 22 (31%) 0 19 (40%) 3 (18%)
Not a Lot 1 (3%) 13 (18%) 5 (71%) 9 (19%) 2 (12%)
Not at All 0 3 (4%) 0 3 (6%) 2 (12%)
No Info. 1 (3%) 10 (14%) 1 (14%) 8 (17%) 8 (47%) Received
This information appears to have a firm foundation among the Managers.
Among the Staff and the Hourly-Paid this trust is less pronounced
(63% of the former, and 59% of the latter trusting the information
CompletelY/Quite a Lot), but among the trade union officials the data
is less complementary to the Firm, as 71% of Union Reps. say they do
not trust this information a lot, and among Shop Stewards, while 24%
say they either do 'not trust the information at all' or 'not a lot',
47% say they get no information on this. This result is in part due
,
to the effect of the observation expresseD by a Snop Steward
in Excer.pt -i.b.
The argument of this Shop Steward is that they are badly informed, not
because the Firm does not tell them anything, but because they cannot
understand what they are being told, i.e. they lack the skills to
interpret the information. For this respondant the solution is to let
them see the action that lies behind it, which is an important point
for the next Chapter, but for the moment the social arrangements inwhich information is passed on is relevant, especially where the
employee lacks the innate expertise to grasp the information e.g. as
we shall show an Hourly-Paid worker would give valuable advice on
purchasing a particular machine, but is lost in the technicalities of
a balance sheet, whose meaning, of necessity, would have to be spelled
out to him - as it may have to be to a professional Management engineer.
At the same time there remains the problem of who provides that
interpretation. The respondant said they would go to the legal
services of their Union, but for Shop Stewards/Union Reps. in every
Firm to do this is hardly practical for the Union, and few Shop Stewards/
Union Reps. are as highly trained as they should be in this respect.
Hence we return to the problem of interpretation of information, which
will be taken up again at the end of the Chapter.
The problem of trust is, however, deeper rooted than this - than the
fact the employees do not fully understand a profit and loss account.
It is not logically necessary that there.should be such distrust -
what, therefore, is the origin? Excerpt 4."1 from an Hourly-Paid
informant indicates why this should be.
The implication of this is fairly straightforward - the Management say
one thing and then do another in the experience of this employee. This,
however, as we can see from the Table is not a dominant view, as most
Hourly-Paid feel they can trust the information they receive. The
principle view is that the Shop Stewards say they do not receive the, ..
information. This problem is rooted in the general problem of communi-
cation which we shall discuss below - namely that it is not merely
necessary to inform employees (e.g. to give them a bit of paper with
writing on it), but that how they are told is equally important - at
least equally important. The response of the employees has been either
to say they do not trust the often less than adequate information they
receive, or to deny having received it at all, on the grounds it is
not information at all.
The last two items of information are those in which at least two
major categories are dissatisfied with communications. This schema
was drawn up prior to the field-work, as we believed there would be
areas where there was no dissatisfied majority, areas where the Hourly-
Paid would be dissatisfied, and areas where Hourly-Paid and Staff would
both be dissatisfied. We did not foresee that on any item all sections
would be dissatisfied. The firm, however, on the last item we shall
consider - Work Study - nearly proved us wrong on that. First of all,
however, we shall consider the data on Investment.
9 Il- .
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Table 4.J2.
• How well informed does the Company keep you about Investment?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 12 (38%) 6 (9%) 0 4 (8%) 1 (6%)
Quite Well 11 (34%) 18 (25%) 2 (29%) 15 (31%) 4 (24%)
Quite Badly 7 (22%) 22 (31%) 0 10 (21%) 3 (18%)
Very Badly 2 (6%) 20 (28%) 5 (71%) 19 (40%) 9 (53%)
On this item we find that both Staff (59%) and Hourly-Paid (61%) had
majorities who said they were either Quite/Very Badly informed about
investment. as well as the 71% of both Union Reps. and Shop Stewards
who were likewise dissatisfied. The major complaint was not, however.
based on job protection i.e. that employees ought to be told because
the Management might bring in equipment which would reduce employment
in the Firm. The complaint was ,based on the fact that since they
(Staff/Hourly-Paid) did not know the Management had a new investment
in mind. they could not make their views known and inadequate decisions
were carried out. Excerpt 4.~: from an Hourly-Paid informant is
typical.
The complaint of this Hourly-Paid employee is that he and his work
group were not consulted. and could not employ their experience
because they were not provided with the relevant information.
Asimilar story is told by a Staff employee in Excerpt 4.~ •
Once again the problem which the Firm faces is one of failure to
communicate with its employees. and to make use of the full range
of skills which they have. causing frustration.This is reflected in the large numbers who say they receive no inform-
ation about Investment.
Table 4.13
How well informed does the Firm keep you about Investment?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 19 (60%) 15 (21%) 0 8 (17%) 1 (6%)
Quite a Lot 7 (22%) 18 (25%) 1 (14%) 13 (27%) 4 (24%)
Not a Lot 4 (13%) 10 (14%) 1 (14%) 12 (25%) 3 (18%)
Not at All 1 (3%) 3 (4%) 1 (14%) 0 1 (6%)
No Info. 1 (3%) 20 (28%) 4 (57%) 15 (31%) 8 (57%) Received
Hence in all categories, except Ma~agement, the largest single response
category is 'No Information Received'. If we look at this in more
detail we find 39% of Labourers and 33% of Skilled (both largest
response categories) say they receive no information. Among the depts.,
however, the picture is less clear e.g. 44% of Production Control say
they get no information, 34% of Sales say likewise, as do 25% of
Quality Control, though in the first two that is the largest response.
Among Works, on the other hand, no one says he gets no information and
72% say they trust what they get 'Completely' or 'Quite a Lot'.
Management do not consistently ignore their employees like this. A
Financial Director puts his policy forward in Excerpt 4.10.'. 0-
.The"response pa~tern in Finance was as follows:-
Table 4.. ./4
How well informed does the Firm keep you about Investment?
Very Well
4
Quite Well
5
Quite Badly
6
Very Badly
2
How far do you trust the information you receive on Investments?
Completely Quite a Lot Not a Lot Not at All No Info. Received
7 5 3 1 1
While the data could show a more satisfied department the figures are
much better than other departments/areas of the Firm, and indicate the
communication we have discussed will be effective. The problem which
the Firm faces is, therefore, that its employees seek to
add their expertise to that of Management in running the Firm. To that
extent, we shall show, hierarchy as a form of organisation is challenged,
~ ~ ~
but, as we shall also show, this challenge is restricted to an extent •
that a radical move away from it would be extremely difficult.Company Communications
Examining all this data simultaneously can be accomplished by using
statistical techniques of varying sophistication. Even the simplest,
however, can be of great interest.
We, first of all took the mean ranking of
(l) all information judgments, within each category, and associated
standard deviation
(2) all trust judgments, within each category, and associated standard
deviation.
Table 4....15·
Information Trust
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Management 1.75 0.79 1.6 0.98
Staff 2.28 0.94 2.7 2.25
Union Reps. 2.63 1.04 3.38 2.44
Hourly-Paid 2.38 0.94 2.79 2.09
Shop Stewards 2.4 0.85 3.22 2.3
From this table a number of points should be noted(1) the order of rankings which is the same for both information
and judgments - Management
Staff
Hourly-Paid
Shop Stewards
Staff Union Reps.
From this it can be seen that. with the exception of union
officials. the hierarchical ranking is followed. It can also
be seen that the union officials are more critical of the Firm
than are their members.
(2) that the average ranking on information is higher than that for
trust. for all categories except Management. for whom it is
reversed i.e. the judgment on the acceptability of the volume
of information is slightly more favourable than that on the
acceptability of its content.
(3) the degree of consensus. measured by the size of standard
deviation. is greater on the information judgment than for the
trust judgment. and is at least ,5 '% larger on the latter. except
amongst f-1anagement whose standard·cieviation is less than one for
both sets of figures.
Most importantly these. relatively simple. statistics again indicate
the declining satisfaction with communications in the Firm as we move
down the hierarchy from Management. This point is made all the more
strongly by the following table. which summarises an Analysis of
Variance on each item discussed. As the table shows only on 4 items -
Overtime. Work Expected. Promotion and Work Study - was the information
judgment not significant at 0.05 or better and on the Trust judgment
data only in in 2 cases was there an insignificant result. This is
reflected in the previous table in which the'mean level of trust was
lower than the mean information judgment.Analysis of Variance of Information and Trust Data
Tab1e4.f6J
Item
Safety
Overtime
Work Expected
Pay
Cost Reduction
Profits
Orders
Financial Policy
Transfers
Redundancy
Recruitment
Promotion
Investment
Work Study
Information
Level of Significance
0.001
0.05
0.001
0.001
0.01
0.001
0.001
0.01
0.001
0.001
Trust
Level of Significance
0.001
0.05
0.05
0.001
0.001
0.05
0.01
0.001
0.05
0.05
0.01
0.001
If we consider the data which was discussed in the previous section it
would be clear which category would be most likely to be causing the
significant results which are shown in this table. That category
will be Management. This is again shown in the following table which
shows the Pearson Correlation Coefficients between each item of
information, and its associated trust.Table 4.'~ Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Information and Trust
Safety Overtime Work Expected ~
Coefficient 0.556 0.947 0.698 0.662
Significance 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Cost Red'n Profitability .Orders Financial Policy
Coefficient 0.694 0.658 0.544 0.699
Significance 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Transfers Redundancies Recruitment Promotion
Coefficient 0.684 0.783 0.652 0.672
Significance 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Investment Work Study
Coefficient 0.702 0.811
Significance 0.001 0.001
These coefficients - which consistently are significant at 0.001 -
indicate that the better one is informed the more the information is trusted.
This has two implications.
(1) Management, as we have seen, are consistently the best informed
category, and consistently the category with the highest level of
trust. The findings only "add greater weight to the inspection of that
data. We have also seen that Staff are next best informed, then Hourly-
Paid. The argument that the better one is informed the more one trusts
the information must be understood in the context that Management, given
their position in the hierarchy are in a position to be well informed,
and that the trust associated with how well informed they are, may
reflect that position in the hierarchy and their attachment to it.
Conversely Hourly-Paid are not well informed because of their position
in the hierarchy, and their associated level of trust expresses the
nature of their attachment to the hierarchy. In brief, therefore,
these coefficients reflect not only the association of trust andvolume of information, but also different positions in the hierarchy,
and these results are an expression of these positions and their
attachment to hierarchy as a sys~em of organisation.
(2) On all items there was a distribution of responses within each
category (e.g. 8% of Hourly-Paid were Very Well Informed on Investment,
31% Quite Well Informed, 21% Quite Badly Informed, and 40% Very Badly
Informed) and the indication of these coefficients is that the better
informed an Hourly-Paid respondent feels he is about Investment the
more he will trust that information.
Hence these coefficients can be seen in two ways at the same time i.e.
as showing a simple relationship that the better informed one is, the
more one will trust that information, and as an expression of the system
of hierarchy - the higher one is in the hierarchy the better informed
one is, and the more one. trusts the information received. The question
then must be posed whether we can talk of information as a generic term,
or consider it only item by item. Our data shows, by using McQuitty
~ Linkage Analysis on it, that one can consider information as a
generic term.'
In carrying out this analysis the first time we found that by putting
information and trust judgments in together we could never break out
of the link of item and associated trust. We, therefore, separated
information and trust. This brought about a considerable improvement
in our results as the followi.ng table makes clear.Table 4./~ Information Clusters
Cluster
One
Cluster
Two
Cluster
Three
Cluster
Four
Management
Work Expected
Cost Reduction
Transfers
Redundancies
Recruitment
Investment
Work Study
Safety
Overtime
Promotion
Pay
Orders
Profitability
Financial Policy
Staff
Safety
Overtime
Work Expected
Pay
Cost Reduction
Profitability
Orders
Financial Policy
Transfers
Redundancies
Recruitment
Promotion
Investment
Work Study
Hourly-Paid
Safety
Pay
Cost Reduction
Financial Policy
Recruitment
Promotion
Investment
Work Study
Overtime
Profitability
Orders
Transfers
Work Expected
Redundancy
To a very large extent we can see that within categories we can indeed
consider information as a generic term as Management and Hourly-Paid
have 7 and 8 items respectively in their largest cluster. while for
Staff we can put all items into one large cluster. On Trust. the
situation is similar. except that Management can put all items into one
cluster. while Staff and Hourly-Paid can put 10 and 6 items in their
largest clusters. These tables do indicate. in view of the fact that
the largest cluster. in each category has more than 50% of the items.
that information can be regarded as a generic term without doing much
harm to the data. and that the level of trust associated therein can
equally be so regarded.
100Cluster
One
Cluster
Two
Cluster
Three
Cluster
Four
Management
Safety
Overtime
Work Expected
Pay
Cost Reduction
Profitability
Orders
Financial Policy
Transfers
Redundancies ,
Recruitment
Promotion
Investment
Work Study
Staff
Pay
Cost Reduction
Profitability
Financial Policy
Recruitment
Promotion
Investment
Work Study
Cost Reduction
Orders
Overtime
Work Expected
Transfers
Redundancies
Safety
Hourly-Paid
Pay
Cost Reduction
Profits
Financial Policy
Investment
Work Study
Overtime
Work Expected
Orders
Redundancies
Safety
Transfers
Recruitment
Promotion
Hence these statistical methods show
(1) Overall Management, then Staff, then Hourly-Paid
(a) report greatest satisfaction with the information communicated
to them by the Firm
(b) report greatest trust in the information communicated to them
by the Firm.
We ~ust emphasise that this follows the hierarchical arrangement in
the Firm, and that, in addition, we find the union officials to be more
critical than their members •. This latter point is especially true of
the Staff Union Reps.
to IVery Well
Quite Well
(2) Analysis of Variance reveals that,on 10 of the 14 items there is
a significant'difference, which on the basis of what has been reported
up till now is most likely to be due to Management deviating from the
view of Staff and Hourly-Paid, even on those items which all major
categories report in excess of 50% Quite/Very Well informed, it is
frequently the case that Management's largest category is 'Very Well
Informed' or 'Trust the Information Completely', whereas among Staff
and Hourly-Paid it is the next response down on the scale which is
modal 'i.e. 'Quite Well Informed' or 'Trust the Information Quite a Lot'.
Amore subtle movement is apparent between Staff and Hourly-Paid,
with the former's position often being between that of Management and
Hourly-Paid. The data presented on information about orders shows
this.
Table 4.2.0
How well informed does the Firm keep you about Orders?
Management Staff Hourly-Paid
24 (75%) 33 (47%) 18 (38%)
5 (16%) 31 (44%) 25 (52%)
This portion of a previous table illustrates this argument since it is
apparent that while Staff have an approximately equal distribution
between Very Well and Quite Well Informed, Management's modal category
is 'Very Well' informed, while for Hourly-Paid it is 'Quite Well'
informed. This pattern can frequently be observed on other items of
information. This leads to the third statistical presentation.
(3) The better one was informed the greater the level of trust one had
in the information, but we have seen that the better informed are thosefurther up the hierarchy, and that the Pearson Correlations which
showed consistently high levels of association between how well one
perceived oneself to be informed, and how far this information was
trusted does not only indicate a relatively simple association of
volume and trust in information, but that the data we have presented
in this Chapter, including the Pearson Correlation, express one's
position in the hierarchy i.e. that one is well informed and trusts
information because one is a Manager and conversely one is less well
informed and less trusting because one is Staff, and even less well
informed and trusting because one is Hourly-Paid. Given this, merely
to step up the volume of information is not in itself adequate, as it
will not alone lead to higher levels of trust. The context of
communication is, as we shall show, relevant in this.
There are arguments which put forward the idea that employees have a
right to be informed of what is happening in their Firm, and that this
right is inalienable by virtue of their employment in the Firm. This
view was not challenged from any side - there was an acceptance that
information was not being passed on, and that the Firm was not really
adequate in this respect. Excerpt 4.,,. from a Staff informant, was
typical of this criticism.
The attitude of this respondent is that the system of communication is
not adequate because Management are not aware of the problem - a view
expressed in the table on why respondents felt they were not as well
informed as they may be. This much would have fairly universal acceptance
in the Firm, even amongst Management, many of whom are aware that the
10 3Firm's employees are not as well informed as they ought to be. His
view that Hourly-Paid would. however. be better informed if they asked
for information is not. however. consistent with the total experience
of many Hourly-Paid. and accepts the unspoken assumption that Management
have an overall right to control the system of communication in the
Firm. Historically this has been the case (i.e. that Management have
certain rights to be informed. and to decide whom they should
subsequently inform). but there are indications that this situation is
being challenged from below. We have already seen this in respect of
certain items of information. in which the expectations of the Hourly-
Paid are clearly less well satisfied. than those of the Staff and of
the Management in particular. This situation. as the data we have
presented already. and -Excerpt 4."2., from a Shop Steward makes clear.
The respondent makes clear that formal communications are not adequate
- either because the foreman does not have the information. or lack of
motivation on his part~ The strategy around this is to go to a
Manager. in Works. to get the information. or the Head Foreman. Time
and experience has taught that this is a successful strategy. and the
means to resolve the inadequacies of the system.
This Shop Steward also goes on to make clear that he (and by implication
his membership) is concerned with more than lithe price of industrial
boots" as the previous Staff respondent stated. This is not to sayan
10 4,.Hourly-Paid worker is not interested in the price of boots. but he is.
on the basis of our data interested in more than this - as the Shop
Steward says he wants "everything appertaining to the work". because
ultimately each thing that happens affects everybody in the Company.
and information of a complex nature (e.g. financial data) may be of
interest to him if it indicates the Firm is going to be bankrupt.
Certainly the Management may inform them of this. but. as the Shop
Steward's statements make clear. as does our data. they cannot rely on
the Management to do this as quickly as they may like. Instead the
relevant information should come to them "as second nature". At the
same time the difficulties in getting to this are recognised - "it
would need to come down to a government decree first of all" - and that
their inequality of power in respect of Management is recognised. This
puts into relief the major perceptual shift b~tween Hourly-Paid and
certain Staff and Management.
We quoted earlier a Manager who said if he was asked for information
by a Shop Steward for reasons 'a. b. and c. and they were valid reasons'.
he would give it. Both that, Manager and the Staff respondent imply
that Management wish control over information to reside with them. but
as the Shop Steward makes clear this is not the aim of the Hourly-Paid.
Instead their aim is to generate the information which they want and
not take simply what Management will give them. when they are prepared
to give them it. Their aim is a fundamental shift in power in this
respect.
The position with Staff is rather more complex than this. since ,Staff
by virtue of their interaction with Management have greater access to
the information which they require. though perhaps on an unDfficial basis. In
addition they appear to have a greater appreciation of the problem in
to 5'communication posed by confidentiality and other problems. as Excerpt
4.11. from a Staff informant. makes clear.
This contrasts with the attitude of mind. expressed by a previous
Staff informant on the 'Newsletter' which aims at bringing employees
together with the Firm. The Management aim is to bring the Firm
together as a unity - but at the same time control access to information
i.e. to create a sense of 'togetherness' • but at the same time preserve
the I separateness I of access to information. The Hourly-Paid in
particular are in a fundamentally different position than either
Management. or even to a lesser extent than Staff. One can perceive
this from what Staff respondent Bsaid when he was asked he would assess
information for its trust value - "Well if it looks reasonable and you
(
can follow a pattern. and doesn't deviate too much from the norm. then
that information is reasonable. Don't forget you don't get one piece
of information - you get lots.of pieces of information which you can
link one with each other. If you'v~ got something which is way out,
you've got to check it." This means of developing trust is less
available the further down the hierarchy one goes. The further down
the hierarchy one goes the less clear the picture which is available of
the company and one's part in it becomes. because of (i) lack of
information and/or (ii) the uncertainty of what information is received.
as the less one receives of a particular item of information the less
one is able to assess its accuracy. and trust becomes largely an article
of faith - or absence of faith. Hence the less well informed one is,
the more Management expect, or rely on. their employees to make an act
of faith in them. In fact our evidence shows that they are in fact
prepared to do this within boundaries. as we can see. returning to what
the previous Staff respondent has to say. in Excerpt 4.1~Hence he is prepared to trust the Board, because they are the Board,
and as such they have a special competence. It is, therefore,
acceptable that information be held back, because the Board decide
this must be the case, and this is right because of the competence
which they have. This acceptance, whilst generalisable to other
categories in the Firm, is bounded by the need for a guarantee i.e.
the trust which they invest the Firm with is increasingly less
absolute the further down the hierarchy we go - because one is less
well informed, as we have seen, and, therefore, can be that much less
certain of the little which is heard. There is an expectation, there-
fore, that some guarantee will be provided if certain items of
information care not to be completely available, or may not be grasped
by the respondent. The need for this is shown in Shop Steward CIS
call for regular meetings of Shop Stewards with the Management. There
would, however, it is clear from this, be more than Management telling
Shop Stewards how it was - rather Management could be questioned by
Shop Stewards, and by Union Reps. In other words it would be necessary
that this system be two-way, and in so-doing the latter part of Staff
respondent R's requirement for Management being able to contribute, and
inform the Board, is satisfied - as is that of the Staff and Hourly-
Paid's requirement to be able to exercise their professionalism and
expertise, albeit of a more limited scope.
By such a system of meetings of Directors, Managers, Union Reps. and
Shop Stewards, the employees can be fully briefed of the position of
10-7-the Firm, in a controlled atmosphere if confidential information is
to be discussed. At the same time the view advanced by the Firm can
. .
be challenged by those present, and subject to scrutiny in order that
its veracity can be assessed (a) by comparison with previous information
(b) personally by questioning. This point is, however, of lesser
importance than that the meetings take place, as by introducing such a
procedural change in communication, the satisfaction with communication
being an expression of one's hierarchical position is removed as all
levels should be equally well informed, and the level of trust will
correspondingly increase.
Meetings of this kind, by enabling employees to pass on their information
(e.g. on the projected purchase of new machines) in the light ofa new-
founded well-informed view of the Firm, would remove the frustration we
observed over many items of information.
The. employee does not seek to be as well informed as his Shop Steward
or Union Rep. - that is an insurance - but he does seek to be informed
by his Shop Steward/Union Rep., as well as by the Firm. By a system
of keeping union officials informed all employees can be kept informed
about their Firm, and in this way resolve the greatest problem each
employee faces - job security. As we pointed out in the previous
Chapter, and on the section on Information about Orders, employees
'know' about the order situation if large numbers of A.O.s begin to
appear in production schedules. Among all categories there was
frequent reference to the need to know about the Firm in order that
they should be as sure as possible that they have a job to come back
to the next day. Confirmation of this can be seen very clearly in the
reference to a possible take-over by Vickers-Armstrong. If information
I0 ~is provided in a way acceptable to the employees such that they are
informed as fully as they wish to be then the problem of assessing
security becomes that much less difficult, and the reliance on rumour
is at least reduced.
The implications of this for hierarchy as a form of organisation are
important. In this Chapter, however, we cannot go into this as fully
as possible, because as we shall show in the next Chapter, communication
and decision-making are intrinsically linked in the minds of our
respondents. For this Chapter, however, the contradiction of the
operation of hierarchy whereby information gathers at the top, and those
at the top control access to this information, is clear, as access
must, in the view of Hourly-Paid Staff, be opened up, and additional
information passed up for consideration to above. Frustration in the
way the Firm is operated at present leads employees to develop a critique
of the existing structure, and to posit alternatives - though as we
shall see this is limited.chapter 5CHAPTER V-'Control and'Hierarchy ,;. "The'boss may'not'a1ways be
'~ight~ but'he iS"a1ways the'boss"
Introduction
We finished the previous Chapter by pointing to the firm's
fro~Jim> in conmlUnicating with its employees. People, very often,<"(Q,·Med
t'tot 1:0 kt'\~wl\Clt was happening. This, as we saw, led to a great deal
of frustration and latent resentment. TJhe important point, however, is p f2r&e;u 6(.1 be
not that the firm's communications ar~poor - but that, with effort,
they could be put right (1). We saw in the last Chapter not only that
there was frustration because information was not being passed down,
but also that there was frustration expressed because communication
was blocked. The lower order participants were not able to express
their views on their work - they were unable to tell management how they
felt about their work in the Firm. Excerpts 4.14 and 4.15 are a good
example of this, where the employees points to new machines which have
been brought in, but have never worked efficiently. This kind of
upward communication is infrequent in the Firm - just as downward
communication is infrequent. But it creates problems for the Firm -
'J
and indirectly costs. This, as we said, could be resolved
, . with some difficulty.
This would, however, ignore a crucial issue about information - what
do you do with it, once you have it? From the previous Chapter it is
clear people do not want information purely for its own sake. They
dont want to be told something just so as they can say they have been
told. Information, rather, is a resource. It is something people
want, in order to do something with. For instance Excerpt~?..' shows
this. In this Excerpt the Respondant talks about information concerning
110orders which the Company receives. Now this is information which may
be valuable simply in itself - employees may simply like to know that
their Firm is doing well and winning orders, as the respondant does.
But, there is clearly another dimension to this - jobsecuri~y•. Orders
mean jobs - no orders =no jobs. Hence while the information may have
a value in itself, it has a further value.
Similarly with upward communication - employees do not wish merely to
comm~ni~ate with their managers merely for the sake of it. They wish
to communicate with their managers in order to influence them - that
by informing managers, this will alter their decisions. Information.
therefore. is a resource - it is something to be used. Given this,
there are implications for hierarchy.
(1) Upward Communication. As we have said employees seek to inform
managers in order to influence their thinking and decision-making.
Hence communication of this kind has a close, and meaningful attach-
ment to the issue of decision-making. As we shall see, as this
Chapter progresses. this attachment is much closer and much more
important than may initially seem the case. This is because'
effective communication (including effective influence)are seen.
as we shall show, as a more effective and desirable alternative
to direct participation in decision-making.
(2) Downward Communication. We have argued that employees do not wish
to be informed only so that they can say they have been informed -
information is a resource.· So how does that lead to an issue in
respect of control in the Firm and of hierarchy? It leads to
these issues when we appreciate that the fact that employees are
IIInot kept well informed :is not always accidental. "'Excerpt
4.10 with a Finance 'Manager 'is an :illustration of this. when we
discuss security. In that part of the Excerpt. communications
with lower order employees is clearly conditional -'"It'depends
. .. ..
"how far'they'want'the'information'and'what'they'are'going't0 use
it'for
U!.
This can usefully be contrasted with Excerpt'4.ll. wit.h a Shop Steward.
whose policies on communication are clearly in conflict with those of
the Finance Manager. in respect of conditional information - '!Well O.K.
then. we work in'the'factory. 'What'sin'the factory isto:our interest".
Communication. therefore. is not only about information. its adequacy.
and the trust which one places in it. It is also about control. and
about hierarchy. It is a reflection of one's position in the Company
structure - we showed in Table 4.33 that adequacy of information and
trust placed in it•. declined as we moved down the hierarchy. Communication.
therefore. could be said to be organisationally systematic i.e. that how
well/badly one was informed was a function of one's position in the
hierarchy. Hence to challenge the system or the principle of communication
is to challenge the hierarchy. It is not merely to criticise the
hierarchy - to call it inadequate. or inefficient or whatever. It
goes rather further than this - it is to seek at least a measure of
change in the organisation of the Firm. To insist that the previously
uninformed should be better informed (downward communication) and that
the previously silent and ineffective should be heard and made more
effective (upward communication).
This Chapter. therefore. is q development of the previous areq- it is
looking at. among other issues which become clear. information as a
" s...resource and not just information for its·own sake. We shall show that
the views expressed on ·decision-making as practiced, and as ·desired, are
quite consistant with this, and lend·substantial support.
In particular, in this Chapter, we shall show:
(1) on a wide range of issues, the Hourly-Paid sample see themselves
as being relatively powerless, as do Staff though on a narrower
range of issues.
(2) both Hourly-Paid and Staff samples believe they should exert
greater influence on decision-making in the Firm.
(3) neither Staff nor Hourly-Paid want decision-making power equal to
that of Management - we will see there is a widespread view that
"it is Management who take the decisions" - indeed that taking
decisions in the managerial role.
We shall see, as ~e have said already, that the desired change is in
the direction of Management continuing to take the decisions, but on
the basis of information, views and opinions of Staff and Hourly-Paid.
In other words the Management's right to take decisions is not being
challenged, nor is the idea of hierarchy. It is the idea of "all-knowing,
all-seing Managers whose decisions are in the interests of us all", that
is subject to challenge.
The ideal Management role expressed is one in which
(a) the Management's professional ability to take decisions, would
remain, but
(b) these decisions would, at least partly, be taken on the basis of
information passed upwardly in. the Firm.
II .,In addition Management would 'be carried 'out more publicly - there would
be more downward communication, 'as we saw in the previous Chapter.
The hierarchy, therefore, persists. What
conditions for this persistance~
Data'Sources
The data is from a number of sources:
. would be the
(1) questions dealing with expressed satisfaction with existing degrees
of influence on a number of issues.
(2) questions dealing with the desired level of influence on these
issues.
(3) the desirability of possible future situations which vary from full
worker's control to full managerial control.
The first 2 data sources and the Tanntnbaum control-graph method (2)
Questions took the following form
'How much influence do you think (Management/Staff/Foremen/Hourly Paid)
have on decisions about (particular issue)?"
(1) AGreat Deal (2) Some (3) Very Little (4) None.
"How much influence do you thinl~ (Management/Staff/Foremen/Hourly-Paid)
ought to have on (particular issue)?"
(1) AGreat Deal (2) Some (3) Very Little (4) None.
The issues respondents were questionaJon were - Safety: Pace and Hours
of Work: Pay Rates and Bonuses: Cost Reduction: Transfer of Employees
114to say whether they found each
immediate
financial
, Between Jobs/Depts. : Setting Work Methods and Standards:
, Redund<lncy: Recruitment: Promotion: Discipline: Investment in
I new equipment: Financial policy; Decisions which affect the
: order situation: Decisions which affect the profitability of
, the company.
By comparing the results of the two sets of questions:
A) how much influence doe~ (a particular group) have
on (a particular issue)?
B) how much influence ought (the particular group)
to have on (the particular issue)?
the desired degree of change can be established.
The third data source presented reopondents with possible
future situations for
a) decision-making on company policy:
b) distribution of company profits:
c) access to company information.
Respondents were asked
specified situation,
1) Totally acceptable, or (2) acceptable, or (3)
neither acceptable nor unacceptable, or (4) unacceptable,
or (5) totally unacceptable.
This data will indicate the feasibility of alternatives
to, and the future existence of hierarchy as an organizing
principle.
Finally we consider the possibilities and problems
perceived in a system of worker directors
It is clear'from this that this chapter covers a great
deal of ground and the issues in each area will vary greatly.
We consider, for instance,
1) pay and job security which have an obvious
immediate relevance to the individual.
2) We also cover areas of much less
relevance (though no less relevant) like
decision-making, and investment policy.
Consequently the details and content of our findings in
the chapter vary greatly.What we shall demonstrate, in particular, in each case is
the operation of the third ("radical") dimensi on of power.
Consequently, while the details of the argument is obviously
crucial, what is primary for our purpose is not so much the
particulars of the speech of our respondents, but rather the
structure of their argument, as it is through thif:i that we
shall be able to access the rules of the Lifeworld (its basic
and fundamental elements and types, by which knOWledge - the
particulars of the speech - are organized).
What we shall seek to do, is
A) 'to ghow that that structure is consistent with
the hypothesized operation of third dimensional power,
and that
B) hierarchy is sustained by this.
While the content of each section will be different,
since we a~e dealing with different areas of working life, our
analysi~ of the :::tructure will not, since the issue is the
structure of the argument. In light of this (and also given
the substantive results) we have decided that some of the
material can be safely append icised~::.~I.n~,'.thls.-Q!.lap.ter we
consider perceptions of decision-making on
1) Pay
2) Cost Reduction
3) Discipline
4) Investment and Financial Policy
These four areas are typical of our results in the other
areas, shOWing the importance of on the one hand,
1) the direct experience of employees, but' on the
other hand
2) their perception of the importance of the
expertise of management in the maintenance of management
control, and thus of hierarchy.
The remaining areas considered in relation to perceived
control of decision-making can be found in appendix 5.
The remainder of this chapter is taken up with further
statistical analysis of all the data of perceived control, and
consideration of perceptions of how industrial democracy might
work.
1/(,Control of Decisions on Pay.
This has probably been one of the most explicitly
contentious issues in industry, and no less so today than at
any time before. When this data was collected, however, we
were toward the end of the last period of incomes policy
(1975-1978) and this is likely to have distorted perceptions -
but by how much is difficult to say.
The data is shown in 5 tables - tables 5.1-5.5. There
will be a discussion for each main category (Management: Staff
and Staff Union Reps: Hourly paid and Shop Stewards), and then
conclusions will be drawn.
a) Management. The view expressed here (table ~.1 ) 1R
that they see themselves as having only "some" influence. The
same assessment is made of Staff and Foremen. The dominant
group as far as Management are concerned are the Hourly paid.
Indeed quite considerable resentment was expressed by managers
ubout the influence of the unions on wage bargaining. This
took two forms:
1) resentment against the perceived influence of the
trade unions on the (then) Labour government, and in
particular on its incomes policy.
2) resentment concerning the efficiency of trade
unions in winning their members pay rises, which they, as
Managers, did not get, and/or which reduced what managers
saw as the appropriate differential between management
and other employees. Indeed one Director privately told
us that he had advised his managers that they ought to
join a union, or else "they would be left behlnd~,
poin~Jng to developments over Mltbestlmmung in Germany.
The former point is well illustrated by Excerpt 5.1 in
which a manager expresses his perceived case of being treated
unfairly, becaunc of the efforts of an incomes policy, which
he sees as inspired by the unions.
The latter point i5 made in Excerpt 5.2. At the outset
the power of trade unions is identified, but perhaps,Table'5.1
.... " ..
Management ' ,Actual/Ought
, , .. . .,
Management Staff. 'Foremen Hourly';'Paid
AGreat 7/21 6/9 2 /11 19/11 Deal 22%/66% 19%/28% 6%/34% 59%/34%
Some 16/11 19/21 15/20 9/20
50%/34% 59%/66% 47%63% 28%/63%
Very 7/0 4/1 12/1 2/1 Little 22%/0% 13%/3% 38%/3% 6%/3%
None 2/0 3/1 3/0 2/0
6%/0% 9%/3% 9%/0% 6%/0%
Table 5.2
Staff Actual/Ought
Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
AGreat 46/51 5/21 4/20 22/19 Deal 65%/72% 7%/30% 6%/28% 31%/27%
Some 17/19 36/46 34/46 25/47 24%/27% 51%/65% 48%/65% 35%/66%
Very 5/1 24/4 26/5 19/4 Little 7%/1% 34%/6% 37%/7% 27%/6%
None 3/0 6/0 7/0 5/1 4%/0% 9%/0% 10%/0% 7%/1%
Table 5.3
Staff Union Reps. Actual/Ought
Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
AGreat 7/0 1/2 1/2 3/3 Deal 100%/57% 14%/29% 14%/29% 43%/43%
Some 0/3 4/4 3/3 2/3 0%/43% 57%/57% 43%/43% 29%/43%
Very 0/0 1/0 2/1 1/0 Little 0%/0% 14%/0% 29%/14% 14%
None 0/0 1/1 1/1 1/1 0%/0% 14%/14% 14%/14% 14%/14%. '
Tab1e"5.4
.. .. . . . .. ..
,.Hour1y';'Paid ..': Actual/Ought
Management Staff 'Foremen Hour1Y':'Paid
AGreat 37/32 9/14 7/13 15/29
Deal 77%/67%, 19%29% 15%/27% 31%/60%
Some 7/12 23/23 23/22 21/17
15%/25% 48%/48% 48%/46% 44~/35%
Very 3/2 10/9 11/10 7/0
Little 6%/4% 21%/19% 23%/21% 15%/0%
None 1/2 6/2 7/3 5/2
2%/4% 13%/4% 15%/6% 10%/4%
Table 5.5
Shop Stewards Actual/Ought
'Management Staff .Foremen Hourly-Paid
AGreat 14/10 3/4 3/5 8/10
Deal 82%/59% 18%/24% 18%/29% 47%/59%
Some 3/7 5/7 8/7 5/6
18%/41% 29%/41% 47%/41% 29%/35%
Very 0/0 5/3 3/4 3/1
Little 0%/0% 29%/18% 18%/24% 18%/6%
None 0/0 4/3 3/1 1/0
0%/0% 24%/18% 18%/6% 6%/0%more interesting is the latter Pc.l't of the Excerpt where he talks
about the alternative which 'he would like to see introduced. The
idea of the union claiming 20% is introduced without explanation or
rationale - but the alternative system is directly linked to the ability
of the Company to pay as well as the cost of living. This indicates
a certain type of understanding or knowledge of union thinking -
wage claims are just shots in the dark without rationality. What
is needed is a rational system (based on ability to pay) which would
benefit all (based on the cost of living). This is indicative of the
desired direction of change for Management.
Fairly clearly, though, the Managers regarded the Hourly-Paid as the
most influential group in this respect.
If we look at the contrasting figures for how things ought to be we can
see the change desired quite clearly - that Management should be in
control. This desired situation would give them the most influence,
and Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid more or less the same., but with
less influence than Management - which is consistent with the
presentation in Excerpt 5.2.
(b) Staff and Staff Union Reps. Staff respondents themselves clearly
dissent from the Management view. For Staff in table 5.2 it is
Management who have the greatest influence in the Company - more
than any other grouping, though it would appear from the
distribution of responses that the Hourly-Paid employees are
differentiated from Staff and Foremen, as Hourly-Paid are perceived
as having more influence than Staff add Foremen. If we look at
Table 5.3 we 'see the same thing 'among these union reps. - only
probably in an even more pronounced way. The ranking amongst
II gStaff, therefore is (1) Management (2) Hourly-Paid (3) Staff and
Foremen.
In talking to Staff respondents the dominance of Management was very
clear as Excerpts·5.3 and·5.4 make clear.
Excerpt 5.3 makes clear the role of negotiation - lithe union goes in
and shouts for as much as possible and management shouts for as little
as possible" - and the role of the union in this. in Excerpt 5.4, on
the other hand, the role of the union, while endorsed, is rather more
circumscribed - "Well they would start to demand too much and put your
job in jeopardy".
There is, however, an interesting common theme running through both
of these views - objectivity and fairness. Excerpt 5.3 refers to
the unions as pretty level-headed and not being extortionate. The
objection he expresses relates to Management's pay, and in particular
the fact (for the respondent) that Management can set their own pay -
though he suggests that putting this right would be very difficult.
Nevertheless the need for objectivity and fairness is made clear in
this Excerpt.
In Excerpt 5.4 objectivity and fairness are made clear in an even more
direct way - "Well they could sit down and analyse the payroll. and they
will be able to say "How come this bloke's getting so much and this
other whose.doing the same or more is getting less?" - what is needed
is systematic study of every job he almost appears to be saying.
It is. however. clear from both that the Management role as decision-
maker is endorsed. What is required, however. is a greater input from
fiGtheir employees to ensure that this role is actually carried through.
This is made clear from examining table 5.2. as the desired direction
of change for Staff is. if anything to give Management slightly more
influence over Pay - but to give everyone else rather more influence as
well (i.e. a positive sum game). though with Hourly-Paid employees having
slightly less influence. by being reduced to the same influence as Staff
and Foremen.
Staff Union Reps are slightly more confusing, as
(1) they wish to reduce Management influence
(2) they seek to increase Staff influence, and of Foreman - though
the change in distribution is marginal
(3) they seek to increase Hourly-Paid influence -,once again.
however, the change in distribution is marginal
It does however, indicate a gap between Staff and their Union Reps. -
something we have seen happen in the previous Chapter, and which will
be seen again.
More interesting, however, is ,the desired direction of change among
Staff, to a situation where Management take the deci~ion - but influenced
by the employees. This is something we shall see throughout the
Chapter - and which will also be seen amongst Hourly-Paid. The
rationalisation for this will be more clearly seen in other issues.
Afeature we have already seen amongst Management is resentment about
incomes policy. This was also expressed amongst Staff, but, as
Excerpt 5.5 shows, in a more muted form - perhaps as recognition of
the weakness of white collar workers and unions, in relation to some
/10of the manual unions (eg the NUM which he implicitly refers to).
This is clearly somewhat more ambivalent than Excerpt '5.1 , where
incomes policy is criticised for the anomalies which are created -
but 5.5 is rather more sophisticated as while the anomalies are
recognised, there is abelief expressed that within a norm (eg 5%)
this could be distributed in a dept. in such a way as to resolve
anomalies, and therefore is rather less individualistic than Management
views.
Incomes policy has been, up to now, a transitory and temporary phenomenon -
the most important findings are
(1) the role of management as decision-makers
(2) the role of employees as suppliers of information, sources of
influence and assessors of management objectivity and fairness.
This section has only shown this in a rather peripheral, and
way - but both will be developed to become the main theme of this
Chapter.
And not only for Staff. - but for Hourly-Paid as well!
(c) Hourly-Paid. Examining tables 5.4 and 5.5 indicates the direction
of attitudes among Hourly-Paid employees and this Shop Stewards.
For these groups there is little doubt that it is Management who
exort the greatest degree of influence over Pay. This can be
seen in Excerpt 5.6 - S "Who controls Pay?" R "management".
Nevertheless a degree of influence for themselves is indicated
. in this excerpt later on - "Its up to the man,whether they accept
it or don't accept it". This can also be seen in table 5.4, and
I ~Ieven more strongly in tab1e'S;5. In tab1e"S.4 the perceived influence
of Hourly-Paid employees, which being less than that of Management, is
seen as greater than for either Staff or Foremen - this is seen all th~
more clearly in table 5.5 among the Shop Stewards. This was not
investigated directly, but an important reason - as can be -seen-4.n..,.; ...
Appen~ix 6 when we look at the role of trade unions - is the
relatively recent unionisation of white collar employees in the Firm
(about 1967-1970, it advanced rapidly, and was still doing so to
the extent that during our research period about 80% of employees were
unionised). Clearly the perceived least influential groups were
Staff and Foremen.
In wage negotiation, of course, the role of the Shop Steward is
crucial - its him who does the negotiating on behalf of his numbers!
This is recognised in Excerpt 5.6 - but rather more explicitly in
Excerpt 5.7. Both of these Excerpts show 3 things
(1) the dominance of Management
(2) the subordinate - but still influential role of Hourly-Paid
(3) the role of the Shop Steward
The role of the Shop Steward, therefore, is one which is seen by their
numbers as important. The 2 Excerpts we have just referenced both,
essentially, perceive the system as fair - not necessarily as perfect,
but at least as basically a fair system. The views of Shop Stewards
do not, however, always appear to be consistant with this - rather
they appear to take a much more critical line. This is very clear from
Excerpt 5.8.
Once again the role of Management's dominance is apparent (though thistime includinu the parent Company), 'but of greater interest .is the
development of the critique of the distribution of income within the
Company. It is not simply that he is under-paid it is that certain
highly-paid people make no contribution to the Company - "I see some
guys in here that just waddle about". The basis of this critique is
the secretiveness of Management - differentials on the Shop-Floor
(foreman, skilled, semi-skilled etc) are respected because it is
apparent what they do. On the other hand - taking the roles of the
Director and the Labourer as his models - he points to the gap between
the two, but that (i) he and his members are ignorant of the size of
the gap, because they, don't know what the Director is paid, and (ii)
they don't know what the Director does. The implication from this is
that more details should be supplied - people on the Shop-Floor have
the right, therefore, to know as much about this Director as he knows
about them. Once again we are involved with fairness, and offence
against this.
Toward the end, objectivity enters in - that salaries and wages should
be determined throughout the Company by Management and Unions, on the
,
basis of what people do for the Company - not just for "waddling about".
In Excerpt 5.9 we see a similar view put forward - only this time
applied to the Shop-Floor, by an Hourly-Paid respondant.
At the outset the role of the Shop Steward is emphasised - as in 5.6
and 5.7 - but when we go on to consider the fairness of the system
directly, objectivity is raised again. The respondant speaks of his
sense of perceived unfairness tha t 2 men should be paid the same,
irrespective of the size of crane they operate (in his example,>, as thedegree of responsibility varies between the two. This is an identical
line to the one expressed,in Excerpt 5.8 - that people should be paid
according to what they do - because this is fair!.
Interestingly enough, if we look at tables 5.4 and'S.S we find that,
as we would expect, the direction of desired change is toward more
equality of influence between Hourly-Paid and Management. This - in
the light of what we have seen already - is hardly surprising. What is
perhaps surprising is that Staff and Foremen maintain - for both Hourly-
Paid respondants and their Shop Stewards - a lesser degree of,influence
compared to the other two.
The increase in influence for Hourly-Paid is similar to the Staff
situation - Staff too wanted more influence. The distinction lies in
the fact that staff wanted equal influence for all other groups except
Management, who would have greatest influence. The dominance of
Management was sustained for Hourly-Paid - but Hourly-Paid wanted to
have greater influence than Staff. This clearly is a puzzle. Why
should Hourly-Paid wish to keep Staff in a subordinate position? This
is a generalised problem, rooted in Hourly-Paid resentment at Staff
attempts to maintain their better conditions e.g. holidays, sick-pay
etc. The sense of Hourly-Paid resentment is an issue which arises
frequently, and which '~J-n·be discussed in the next Chapter when we
discuss the role of Unions in the Firm, as it is most clearly and
directly exposed there.
For now, however, the Hourly-Paid view is a function of their ~~)te,..d:ic.C(/~ cllt{~/l.
p,trc,;pf,·tN\'l".lt~r"JtrranyStaff employees - in particular the white collar
Staff who work away from the Shop-Floor.
114-'Conclusions
The major distinction between the 3 main categories has concerned the
distribution of influence on Pay -
(1) Management who take the view that their influence should be
increased - particularly by the removal of incomes policy which
has created anomalies in Management salaries.
(2) Staff and Hourly-Paid, who both take the view that Management
should not be'so dominant. Both groups accept Management
dominance, but seek to qualify this with their influence, as
we have seen.
All categories, however, seek objectivity and fairness in settling
wages. There is a constant emphasis on paying people what they are
worth. At the moment a number of obstacles stand in the .way of this
(1) Management salaries aloe unknown to anybody outwith Management
(2) other salaries and wages are set by negotiating strength ~ which
may not be,the same as an objective process would produce.
Clearly there is a strong utopian element in all this - few would
disagree that one should be paid what one is worth. The problem is
how this can be done. We do not present solutions to this. The
point which emerges, however, is that influence over pay would ideally,
(a) be established with the consent of all i.e. there would be an
openness and fairness which was seen as lacking (again a communication
problem) •
(b) reflect more than bargaining strength - objectivity, would be more
transparent in the Company wage structures. ,Nevertheless the inter-connectedness of. these cannot .be ..i,gnsred i.e.
to what extent would objectivity be .assessed by (subjective) ,standards
of fairness. This would, obviously, be a significant problem in any
attempt to provide a solution to the present inadequacies of the system
of wage bargaining.
It is, however, clear that
(i) there is a significant change desired in the system of wage
bargaining, and
(ii) the motivation for this change, amongst Staff and Hourly-Paid,
is to implement their idea of how the system should be organised;
but (iii) the fundamental aspect of the system - hierarchy, and
ultimate Management control - is not fundamentally challenged.
Cost' Reduction
Over much of the period of our research , the Firm was involved in a
Cost Reduction exercise, as we explained in the previous Chapter. To
this end a special unit had been established with a general function
of looking for ways in which the costs of the Firm could profitably be
reduced. To this end, the unit performed 2 main functions
(1) examin~ng the firm's costs and searching for ways to reduce them
(eg by looking for alternative suppliers of parts, or for an
alternative for a particular part) - basically monitoring a
significant aspect of the firm's commercial, external environment.
(2) acting as a central 'clearing-house' for suggestions put forward
by employees, and examining and researching their viability.
The former, obviously, is largely internal, and subject to little
outside control. The latter, however~ would obviously'be open to suchCost Reduction
Table 5.6 Management
., ,
,'Management 'Staff Foremen 'Hour1y~Paid
AGreat 19/28 3/17 6/19 3/17
Deal 59%/88% '9%/53% 19%/59% 9%/53%
Some 12/4 23/14 23/13 21/14
38%/13% 72%/44% 72%/41% 66%/44%
Very 1/0 6/1 3/0 8/1
Little 36%/0% 19%/3% 9%/0% 25%/3%
None 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
0%/0% 0%/0% (%/0% 0%/0%
Table 5.7 ' 'Staff
Management ' 'Staff Foremen Hourly~Paid .
AGreat 51/59 6/25 8/27 7/22
Deal 72%/83% 8%/35% 11%/38% 10%/31%
Some 18/11 41/43 46/43 29/43
25%/10% 58%/61% 65%/61% 41%/61%
Very 2/1 22/2 16/0 27/5
Little 3%/1% 31%/3% 23%/0% 38%/7%
None 0/0 2/1 1/1 8/1
0%/0% 3%/1% 1%/1% 11%/1%
Table 5.8 Staff Union Reps
Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
AGreat 4/3 1/2 1/2 1/1
Deal 57%/43% 14%/29% 14%/29% 14%/14%
Some 3/4 3/5 4/5 1/5
43%/57% 43%/71% 57%/71% 14%/71%
Very 0/0 3/0 2/0 4/0
Little 0%/0% 43%/0% 29%/0% 57%/0%
None 0/0 0/0 0/0 1/1
0%/0% 0%/0% 0%/0% 14%/14%Table 5.9 Hourly-Paid
.', ... " ,
Management Staff Foremen Hour1Y-Paid
AGreat 37/40 , 13/19 13/18 9/19
Deal 77%/83% '27%/40% ' '27%/38% 19%/40%
Some 8/7 22/22 22/19 17/22
17%/15% 46%/46% ' 46%/40% ,35%/46%
Very 3/1 9/4 8/8 8/2
Little 6%/2% 19%/8% 17%/17% 17%/4%
None 0/0 4/3 5/3 14t5
0%/0% '8%/6% 10%/0% 29%/10%
Table 5.10 Shop'Stewards
Management ' .Staff 'Foremen 'Hour1y':'Paid ._-
AGreat 13/10 2/5 2t6 3/10
Deal 77%/59% 12%t29% 24%/35% 18%/59%
Some 4/7 8/10 11/10 5/7
24%/41% 47%/59% 65%/59% 29%/41%
Very 0/0 4/1 2/1 5/0
Little 0%/0% 24%/6% 24%/6% 29%/0%
None 0/0 3/1 2/0 4/0
0%/0% 18%/6% 24%/0% 24%/0%influence - indeed, 'by definition, this 'aspect of the units activity
was dependant on outside influence, 'by putting forward 'suggestions etc.
Hence we may be able to expect rather more widespread influence than
we saw on Pay.
On the other hand, as we argued when we looked at information on
Cost Reduction, the 'creation' of this Cost Reduction unit was
coincidental with the closure of part of the Firm and the need to
find these people somethinJ to do. The general impression we obtained
was, as we said, that the Firm was less than'100% serious about Cost
~eduction - perhaps 60-75% serious, but definate1y not 100%.
Yet in the competitive commercial environment in which the Firm
operated, cutting costs to gain competitive advantage was of significant
importance. Hence - despite the establishment of the unit at an
opportune moment - one may have expected significant influence from all
areas of the Firm, in order that costs could be universally reduced.
As we shall see, this did not prove to be correct.
Management
Table 5.6 shows fairly clearly 2 situations
(1) that Management have most control over Cost Reduction, and that they
believe this situation should persist.
(2) that no grouping is heavily involved (even amongst Management only
59% are said to have "A Great Deal of Influence") - but that, subject
to (1) there should be greater involvement.
The system operated for reducing costs is illustrated in Excerpt 4.~
i.e. that a Manager can initiate action 'by the Cost Reduction unit~The emphasis on this Excerpt 'is nearly all on Management - that it is
a Management function to reduce costs. The implication of table'S.6
is that this is the case. On the other hand the direction of the
desired change is toward spreading influence on this around somewhat,
but with Management still in control i~e. for Staff and Hourly-Paid to
put forward ideas, but for Management to take the decision. There is
however one point, which militates against such a change,
namely the 'ignorance among Hourly-Paid and Staff about Cost Reduction
decisions in the Company. Table 4. 7 shows that 17% of the Staff
sample and 21% of the Hourly-Paid sample knew nothing about Cost
Reduction in the Firm. This takes us back to the communication
problems we looked at in the previous Chapter. To obtain this type
of change will thus require they be resolved, which as we saw in that
Chapter is unlikely to be either easy or straigthfoward. Nevertheless,
in the absence of such change, relative ignorance is likely, and
little external influence other than from Managers is likely.
Staff and Union Reps
The responses of Staff are fairly similar to these of Management -
Staff perceive Management as having the greatest influence by far, over
Cost Reduction, though to a greater extent than Management do, but the
direction of desired change, like the Managers, is to sustain this
Managerial control, though with more influence from Staff, Foreman and
Hourly-Paid (for whom the respective distribution of responses are
very similar), as can be seen from table 5.7
Their Union Reps., however, take a rather different view shown in
table 5.8. Once again management are seen as being the dominant
influence, but this time the desired direction, while not showing,equality, is at least in that direction.
Clearly, therefore, there is a difference of view between Staff and
their Union Reps - the former fairly clearly endorsing continued
Management dominance, but the latter while not showing a desire for
equality, do show an inclination in that direction, and certainly for
rather less Management dominance.
As we shall see this is repeated among Hourly-Paid.
Hourly-Paid
Table 5.9 shows very similar ideas to those of Staff i.e. Management
are dominant, and this this dominance should remain. The major
difference is in the influence which Staff are perceived to have -
Hourly-Paid perceive this as much gr~ater than Staff do.
Like Staff Union Reps., the Shop Stewards perceive the Management as
being the dominant category, but unlike their numbers they are less
willing to allow this to continue. Like the Staff Union Reps. their
desired direction of change is toward rather less Management dominance,
and a more equal distribution of influence.
Conclusions
It is clear from the data that Management are seen as the dominant
category on this issue. It is also clear that therefs a desire to
spread this influen~e around a bit more - to allow more influence
for Staff and Hourly-Paid. For Management, and indeed for these 2'.
"
categorie,s, howeve,r, .Management WQuld still 'retain ·control. 'Against
this, however,
(1) the relative 1a~k of jnf~rmation 'among Staff and Hourly-Pai~ .~ ; ~
see Tab1es·4~.~ and'4;~" Without the relevant information it
is hard to see how either Staff or Hourly-Paid could exert influence.
This being remedied would therefore be a condition of change of this
type.
(2) the desired change among Union Reps and Shop Stewards is less
strongly in this direction, and towards more equality. Their influence
on Staff and Hourly-Paid·could be seen as a counter-weight against
. ..~.
Management, and thus that the Management view i~ not tenable. ·On
the other hand it is the Management view which is endorsed by their
numbers at the moment.Discipline
Since 1971 - and thepassa«eof the ill-fated Industrial Relations Act -
dismissed workers have had the legal right to claim' their dismissal was
unfair. in terms of the legislation. This has meant that management
wishing to dismiss a worker are restricted - to some extent - in th~
power to do so. Prior to 1971. add the legal right ·to ciaim unfair
dismissal. therefore. workers had to rely on collective strength to
resist a dismissal of one of their number. Given the ieve1 of union
organisation in the company (100% union membership among hour1y-pafd
&orkersm and approximately 80% among Staff) the a priori power ofTable 50U - Discipline - Management
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 15(47%) 2(6%) 7(22%) 4(13%)
Deal 22(69%) 7(22%) 17(53%) 6(19%)
Some 14(44%) 19(59%) 22(69%) 17(53%)
10(31%) 24(75%) 15(47%) 24(75%)
Very 3(9%) 9(28%) 3{9%) 8{25%)
little O{O%) 1{3%) O{O%) 1(3%)
None O{O%) 2{6%) O{O%) 3{9%)
O{O%) 0(0%) O{O%) 1(3%)
Table 5oI~ - Staff
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 38(54%) 8(11%) 18(25%) 9(13%)
Deal 56(79%) 21{29%) 35(49%) 18(25%)
Some 18{25%) 32{45%) 4l{58%) 21{30%)
15{21%) 35{49%) 33{47%) 35{49%)
Very 15{21%) 26(37%) 12(17%) 30{42%)
little 0(0%) 14{20%) 3{4%) 14{20%)
None O{O%) 5{7%) O{O%) 10{14%)
O{O%) 1{1%) O{O%) 4(6%)
Table 5oJ, - Union Reps
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 2{2%) O{O%) 2{29%) l{14%)
Deal 3{43%) 2{29%) 3{43%) O{O%)
Some 3{43%) 3(43%) 2{29%) 3(43%)
3{43%) 5{71%) 3{43%) 6(86%)
Very 2{29%) 4{57%) 2{29%) 2{29%)
Little 1(14%) O{O%) O{O%) O{O%)
None 0(0%) O{O%) 1{14%) 1{14%)
0(0%) 0(0%) 1(l4%) 1(14%)Table 5 14 - Hourly-Paid
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 35(73%) 14(29%) 22(46%) 9(19%)
Deal 38(79%) 18(38%) 22(46%) 18(38%)
Some 12(25%) 24(50%) 21(44%) 17(35%)
8(17%) 20(42%) 22(46%) 22(46%)
Very 1(2%) 6(13%) 3(6%) 12(25%)
Little 2(4%) 4(8%) 4(8%) 3(6%)
None 0(0%) 3(6%) 2(4%) 10(21%)
0(0%) 5(10%) 0(0%) 5(10%)
Table 5./, - Shop Stewards
Management Staff Foreman . Hourly-Paid
AGreat 11(65%) 3(18%) 7(41%) 3(18%)
Deal 7(41%) 2(12%) 5(30%) 3(18%)
Some 5(30%) 8(47%) 8(47%) 8(47%)
10(59%) 11(65%) 11(65%) 13(77%)
Very 1(5%) 4(24%) 2(12%) 4(24%)
Little 0(0%) 3(18%) 0(0%) 1(6%)
None 0(0%) 2(12%) 0(0%) 2(12%)
0(0%) 1(6%) 1(6%) 0(0%)...
workers to resist dismissal should be quite considerable - and, therefore,
by implication (since dismissal is the logical end of any disciplinary
procedure) on discipline.
An examination of table 5 ;1' - Management attitudes on the perceived
distribution of power on discipline - indicates that for Management
(1) they exercise more power than any other group, and (2) they seek
ideally to exercise more power over discipline - increasing the
differential over all groups, except Foremen. At the same time
Management themselves wish to see all groups exercise more influence.
than they do at the moment - but it is clear that, for Management, the
dominant influence should reside with themselves, and to a slightly,
lesser extent, 'with Foremen.
The Management attitude is fairly well summed up in Excerpt 5.)~,
from a Manager in a white collar area of the Company. As far as this
Respondent is concerned the interests of employees are fairly well
looked after in this respect. In fact he suggests that if anything
Management are fairly lax in respect of discipline in the Company, in
that "certain things are allowed to go too far" - a conclusion which
(perhaps surprisingly) is shared by other employees. The reason for this
slackness is indicated in:Excerpt5.11- from a Manager in a Blue Collar
area. This Manager indicates that problems arise because of lack of
support for line Management in understanding and working with the
legislation (This is 1978 - 7 years after the Industrial Relations Act,
and 4 years after the rather stronger legislation in TULRA 1974, and
the Employment Protection Act 1975). The responsibility for this is
put with Personnel, with whom their communications are difficult
. because the Personnel specialist ts "too theoretical rather than
practical". Line Managers are, therefore, in some cases unclear
about their duties and responsibilities in respect of discipline I., <)... •From personal observation in the Company of a particularly visible
disciplinary issue - wearing safety glasses - it was evident that there
was a degree of laxity in company disciplinary practices. It was not
uncommon to see workers on the shop-floor without wearing safety
glasses, which was a breach of company discipline. Disciplinary rules
stated that whenever anyone (Management and Staff or Hourly-Paid)
stepped on to the shop-floor they had to be wearing safety glasses.
While protection was worn in obviously dangerous situations (e.g.
welding), it was not uncommon to see people without safety glasses, on
the shop-floor. This situation persisted throughout over time in the
Firm, and seemed normal. Occasionally a Manager, or a Foreman, would
Suggest that the situation was terrible, and something should be done.
Nothing ever was done, to our knowledge. This observation is confirmed
by Excerpt S.f.2, from a Staff Union Rep.
Examination of Table s.li shows a view amongst Staff, which is very
similar to that of Management i.e. that Management have most influence,
and that this should remain so - with the same exlusion for Foremen which
we referred to above in discussing Management views. If anything the
Staff view emphasises Management influence - both in actual and ideal
perceptions - even more than Management themselves do.
Table S.'~shows that among Staff Union Reps there are certain
similarities in their views to those held by their members. Management-
with Foremen - would have most influence on discipline, with an
increase for Staff and Hourly-Paid workers. The dominant role,'though
shared with Foremen, would still belong to Management. This may perhaps
be surprising in view of the importance of discipline, related as it is
to dismissal in the way suggested above. In Excerpt 5.10, a
Management respondent suggested that the system which the Company
operated was one where "we treat people like adults" - though "sometimes
1,3things are allowed to go too far
ll by some managers, As we shall see
these 'qualities' ar.e emphasised by Staff as well.
The Staff Respondent in Excerpt'S.13 emphasises for us the perceived
fairness of the system, and in particular that while the final
decision on a disciplinary issue lies with Management, the Management
still seek to make out a case as to why any individual should be
disciplined - as well as consulting with unions. Thus, for this
respondent, while Management take the decision, they do so in
consultation with their other employees, and make out a case for taking
a decision, which the employees see as fair and reasonable.
The idea of fairness can be seen to be important for the
Responde.lt in Excerpt S.{4. Clearly in this Respondent's ideas,
fairness means that a superior will treat, as he puts it, 2 sections
in the same way, not be soft on one and hard on the other. It is
clear, however, from what is said in this Excerpt that this does not
always happen in the Company. It is also clear from Excerpt S.14
that a Manager, in exercising his disciplinary power, should be
reasonable. This clearly does not mean that the Manager should
be soft - III wouldn,' t care if he was strict, as long as he 'was fair",
In other words, for this Respondent a superior can be strict, as long
as he is consistently strict. Where discipline seems to be going
wrong - in this Company at least - is inconsistency on the part 'of
Management. We shall see below that this point is largely shared
by Hourly-Paid, employees as well~
At the same time employees do not just 'lie down' to Managerial
discipline. This point is made clear in Excerpt 5.'~, in which
the Staff Respondent makes clear his )oss is strict - as he has to
134be to get the work out - but that he has stood up for 'his rights'.
The important dimensions of discipline for Staff appear to be (1) the
work has got to be done
(2) Management should act reasonabJy- this will be assessed by
Staff against this need for work to be done, and their 'rights'
(3) Management must act fairly (i.e. be reasonable and consistent)
All of this is consistent with what we have seen in Table 5.'2-
and with the analysis of this Chapter as a whole i.e. that Management
take the decision, but subject to the influence of this subordinate
employees.
This, we can see is also true of Hourly-Paid workers. From Table
5.14 we can see that any desire for changes in the direction of
equality by comparing actual to ideal perceptions, is fairly small.
The decision to be taken on discipline should - Hourly-Paid workers
make clear - be taken by Management, though as before, subject to
the influence of their subordinate employees. The exception for
Hourly-Paid workers, is that, unlike Management and Staff they
perceive Foremen as having significant influence, probably due
to their greater proximity, and the difference in the authority
relationship.
The most important point as that, as we~ve seen, the dominant role
is played by ~anagement, subject to the influence of Staff and
Hourly-Paid, and to a lightly greater extent by Foremen. This may
appear to ,fly in the face of recent record, in so far as a dismissed
person will be represented by their union representative. In
relation to this Excerpt'S.15 - from a Shop Steward - is quite
revealing. This Excerpt makes clear that the events leading up to
13~a dismissal will go through a procedure, but at the end he may be
dismissed. Perhaps most surprising, however are the following 2
points.
(a) under appropriate circumstances a Shop Steward will positively
approve of a dismissal, but
(b) even in such a case would still represent that person, and
'plead that he should get his job'.
The role of the union, therefore, is not mainly one of power -
but rather one of representation. The union - as a case proceeds
through procedure - will plead for a man, seek to ensure that no one
is dismissed "for some wee stupid job••••••••used as an excuse
bag the man". The union, therefore, seeks to maintain norms of
fairness and reasonable action - but, as the Respondent himself
agrees, at the end of the day its up to Management to decide whether
or not more should be dismissed.
This, we would argue, makes clear again a dominant theme of this
Chapter - Namely, that decision-making is a Management matter - that
Managers are the people who take decisions. This, however, is
subject to this decision-making being carried out keeping in mind
the views and interests of their employees. Management take
decisions, therefore, as decision-makers subject to the influence
of their employees - but Management take decisions.
WE shall see this arise again subsequently in this Chapter - and
in particular in the next 2 sections, where deal with areas which
are a particular Management monopoly - (a) Investment and Financial
Policy, and (b) Decisions affecting the Company's ability to win
Orders, and its Profitability. These, clearly are areas which are
of crucial importance to employees below Management level (e.g. no
,.,fforders,obvious1y'means no jobs), but we shall see that, disp'te this,
these are seen as Management prerogativ'es ·because" :on1y t1anagement have the
training etc. to take the appropriate decisions.
Investment and Financial 'Po1icy
These areas, probably more than any other, represent the inner ,sanctum .,.
of managerial prerogative, except perhaps the decision to open/wind-up
a company. The financial policy, and the decision to invest company
resources in particular ways are stra~eg.ic decisions for .any
organisation. Indeed it can be argued that such decisions are not the
prerogative of management generally - but are the prerogative of
a restricted group of managers, usually at the level of the Board
of Directors, and perhaps just below this level. Furthermore
such decisions require particular skills. If we contrast these
areas with other decisions we have considered up to now - discipline,
for instance, - these, while not without the need for skills, are
imbued with issues of right or wrong in a moral, as well as a technical
sense. The technical element of these areas we are considering now
is, however, much stronger, requiring the knowledge and use of financial
techniques - a quality possessed of few outwith the financial specialists
in the company. Though this is not to deny the reality of a moral
element e.g. keeping a factory open as an obligation to long serving
workers.
At the same time while these areas, by their very essence, are largely
opaque to the majority of company employees, they are not without great
relevance. Following the wrong financial policy - investing in the
wrong equipment - could be disastrous for the Company, and for
employment. Hence these are areas in which the knowledge of many
I ?>:remployees varies from the scanty, to the totally non-existant. This
is, as we have argued, because of the nature of the subject. It is,
however, also because of the inadqauate communication of such information
by the Company, as we saw in the previous Chapter. Table 4.8 shows
that 56% of the Hourly-Paid sample felt they were quite/very badly
informed about the Company's financial policy - and 19% said they
received no information at all (Table 4.~). Similarly 61% said
they were quite/very badly informed about Investment in the Company
(Table 4.1~), and 31% that they received no information on this at
all (Table 4.1;).
Hence before the discussion of our findings in these areas, we should
like to emphasise 2 points
a) these are areas of decision-making which, for technical reasons,
are (at the moment anyway) impenetrable to many employees
b) the above is compounded by the fact that the Company doesn't
tell them all that much anyway
As we shall see, however, these are areas of Management prerogative
for reasons other than these, as well.
Management
Responses by Management to questions on Investment and Financial
Policy are shown in Tables'S." (Investment), and S~I (Financial
Policy). One result which is perhaps surprising is in Table S.~t -
the low degree of control Managers perceive themselves as having
over Financial Policy, as only S3% believe they have 'A Great Deal'
of control in this area. Furthermore this figures rises to only
69% when they are asked how much control they believe they ought
to have. While it is true that 53% and 69% are not, in themselves, ,,8Table 5.1~- Management-Investment
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 28(88%) 2(6%) 1(3%) 1(3%)
Deal 30(94%) 3(9%) 7(22%) 3(9%)
Some 4(12%) 13(41%) 21(66%) 2(6%)
2(6%) 18(57%) 20(63%) 14(44%)
Very 0 14(44%) 9(28%) 23(7%)
Little 0 9(28%) 5(16%) 13(41%)
None 0 3(9%) 1(3%) 6(19%)
0 2(6%) 0 2(6%)
Table 5.1'1- - Staff
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 60(85%) 1(1%) 2(3%) 2(3%)
Deal 64(90%) 8(11%) 18(25%) 5(7%)
Some 9(13%) 25(35%) 39(55%) 14(20%)
7(10%) 49(69%) 47(66%) 44(62%)
Very 2(3%) 31(44%) 23(32%) 27(38%)
Little 0 10(14%) 5(7%) 15(21%)
None 0 14(20%) 7(10%) 27(38%)
0 4(6%) 1(1%) 7(10%)
Table 5. I ~- Staff Union Reps
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 7(100%) 0 0 1(14%)
Deal 6(86%) 0 0 1(14%)
Some 0 2(29%) 5(71%) 1(14%)
1(14%) 7(100%) 7(100%) 5(71%)
Little 0 4(57%) 1(14%) 4(57%)
0 0 0 1(14%)
None 0 1(14%) 1(14%) 1(14%)
0 0 0 0..
Table 5.li - Hourly-Paid
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 43(90%) 6(13%) 8(17%) 4(8%)
Deal 44(92%) 10(21%) 16(33%) 11(23%)
Some 4(8%) 24(50%) 23(48%) 11(23%)
4(8%) 30(63%) 26(54%) 28(58%)
Little 1(2%) 13(27%) 13(27%) 13(27%)
0 5(10%) 3(6%) 5(10%)
None 0 4(8%) 4(8%) 20(42%)
0 2(4%) 3(6%) 4(8%)
Table 5.2£'- Shop Stewards
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 14(82%) 2(12%) 4(24%) 2(12%)
Deal 13(94%) 5(29%) 6(35%) 5(29%)
Some 2(12%) 5(29%) 6(35%) 2(12%)
4(6%) 8(47%) 11(65%) 10(59%)
Little 1(6%) 6(35%) 4(24%) 5(29%)
0 3(18%) 0 1(6%)
None 0 4(24%) 3(18%) 8(47%)
0 1(6%) 0 1(6%)Table 5.2,,( - Financial Policy - Management
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 17(53%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
Deal 22(69%) 1(3%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
Some 10(31%) 9(28%) 9(28%) 6(19%)
9(28%) 19(59%) 21(66%) 18(56%)
Very 4(13%) 18(56%) 15(47%) 16(50%)
Little 1(3%) 9(28%) 8(25%) 10(31%)
None 1(3%) 5(16%) 8(25%) 10(31%)
0(0%) 3(9%) 3(9%) 4(13%)
Table 5.2jL- Staff
Management Staff Foreman Hour1y':'Paid ._- ---
AGreat 49(69%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(1%)
Deal 60(85%) 8(ll%) 10(14%) 7(10%)
Some 16(23%) 19(27%) 18(25%) 8(ll%)
11(16%) 47(66%) 48(68%) 35(49%)
Very 4(6%) 30(42%) 35(49%) 27(38%)
Little 0(0%) 13(18%) 9(13%) 19(27%)
None 2(3%) 22(31%) 18(25%) 35(49%)
0(0%) 3(4%) 4(6%) 10(14%)
Table 5.:U- Union Reps
Management Staff Foreman Hour1y':'Paid
AGreat 6(86%) 0(0%) 0(0%) O{O%)
Deal 5{71%) 1(14%) 1(14%) 1{14%)
Some 1{14%) O{O%) 1{14%) O{O%)
2{29%) 5{71%) 5(71%) 5(71%)
Very 0(0%) 5(71%) 4{57%) 4{57%)
Little 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) O{O%)
None O{O%) 2{29%) 2{29%) 3(43%) O{O%) 1(14%) 1(l4%) 1(14%)Table 5.~1- Hourly-Paid
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 44{92%) 5{l0%) 4{8%) 3{6%)
Deal 44{92%) l4{29%) l2{25%) l2{25%)
Some 3{6%) 22{46%) l4{29%) 7{15%)
4{8%) 26{54%) 26{54%) 26{54%)
Very O{O%) l3{27%) l8{38%) 10{2l%)
Little O{O%) 6{l3%) 7{l5%) 5{l0%)
None 1{2%) 7{l5%) l2{25%) 28{58%)
O{O%) 1{2%) 3{6%) 5{l0%)
Table 5.~5""- Shop Stewards
Management Staff Foreman HourlY';'Paid
AGreat 1l{65%) 1{6%) O{O%) 1{6%)
Deal l2{7l%) 3{18%) 3{l8%) 4{24%)
Some 5{29%) 5{29%) 6{35%) 2{l2%)
5{29%) 10{59%) l2{7l%) 10{59%)
Very 1{6%) 5{29%) 5{29%) 2{12%)
Little O{O%) 2{l2%) 1{6%) 1{6%)
None O{O%) 6{35%) 6{35%) l2{70%)
O{O%) 2{l2%) 1{6%) 2{12%)'small' figures. they are· less relative to the control 'perceived in
other areas e.g. Investment (Table 5.16W. the corresponding figures
are 88% and 94%. Arelated point which can usefully be made here. is
to observe that this view of Management having relatively less control
over Financial Policy is not shared by other groups e.g. Staff
(Table 5.47) 69% say Management have a great deal of control. and
85% say they should have a great deal of control. Even more so for
Hourly-Paid workers. as 92% of them believe that Management do have -
and should have - a great deal of control over the Company's
Financial Policy.
Why should this be? There are 2 reasons
1) Management are conscious of the Firm being only one part of a
group of companies (this was pointed out in Chapter III) - the
implication of this for them is that the Financial Policy of the
Company is to some extent subordinate to the needs of the group.
Decisions which affect or apertain mainly to their firm e.g. discipline.
even Investment are decisions over which they can exercise more control
than in Financial Policy where authorizAtion is required from
the group.
2) this area of decision-making-is one which - as we said of the
.beginning of this section - is particularly opaque to others outwith
Management. Hence the problem of 'group considerations' is one of
which Staff and Hourly Paid workers are much less aware of. than are
Management - if indeed they are aware of them at all. It is. therefore.
hardly surprising that Management on one hand. and Staff and Hour1y-
Paid on the other. should take such different views on this area - they
do in fact see the Financial decision-making process in different terms.
Parent Company considerations playa much larger role in the Management
perspective than in that of Staff and Hourly-Paid.The above notwithstanding, it is clear that Management - taking only
those within the Firm into account - see themselves as the group of
within the firm in control of both Financial, and in particular of
Investment decisions. There is, however, also a clear indication
on the part of Management that - as with other decision areas we
have looked at - Staff and Hourly-Paid workers should exercise a
greater degree of control than they are perceived to have at the
moment. At the same time, Management will retain control. As we
have seen before, the intention appears to be to allow others in the
Company to exercise more control - to have more influence, to have
more say, more of an input - when decisions on Financial Policy, or
to invest in one way or another, but that the final decision is one for
Management to take, but with the views of their Staff and Hourly-Paid
workers in mind.
Perhaps the million dollar question is how this would happen? It is
one thing to say this - another.to do it. We saw in the previous
chapter that 98% of Managers and·Staff said that they felt that they
wanted to keep their subordinates well informed, but just did not seem
to have the time to do this. This showed up very clearly in the
reports on how well informed people in the Firm felt they were -
perhaps badly informed would be a more apt description.
The development of Financial Policy - and of consultation - is
clearly illustrated in Excerpt 5.":" from a Manager. This Excerpt makes
clear
1) that the objective of Financial Policy for the Firm is to
improve the rate of return on the capital which it employs.
2) the only way in which that can be done is by ensuring the
involvement of all department in the Firm,
;40This much is fairly obvious - it could be taken from almost any
Financial Management text. Adeeper point is reached where the
input of non-Management personnel in raised. This Manager makes
clear that he cannot talk for Manufacturing as that is not his area.
There is, however, a very clear division of responsibilities in this
area,
1) "computation of figures, calculation of forms, filling in pieces
of paper which the work-force, the shop-floor isn't qualified or
employed to do that". This is the technical area which we drew
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the reader's attention to at the beginning of this section -
the accounting conventions and knowledge inwhich certainly most
non-Managers, and indeed many non-accountant Managers are not
trained .• To expect an Hourly-Paid worker to understand the
be
meaning of a cash-flow projection would/like expecting a graduate
Personnel Manager to understand a complex technical drawing. To
work in the area of Financial Policy and Investment decisions
required certain skills which are only seldom found outwith the
realm of Management. Full participation in these areas would,
therefore, be contingent on possession of this knowledge. It
would certainly be true to say that this is not an insurmountable
problem (e.g. through a training programme) - it is, however,
equally true to say that current reality is that such solutions are
not being put into effect with any great vigour, if at all. This
however, is not to say that non-Managers have no contribution to
make. This is the substance of the second part of this division
of responsibility
2) this applies largely to what we could call Investment Decisions.
Not, though, at the level of the decision to invest, but rather
that once that decision has been taken - to buy new machines
for instance - that the views of Staff and Hourly-Paid are taken
into account. The example given in Excerpt S.t7concerns the
14 Ipurchase of a photo-copier. Once the decision to make the purchase
has been made. consultation should take place on exactly what type
of machine to buy. As we pointed out the example concerns the purchase
of a photo-copier - once it was decided to buy a phot,Ocopier. there
were consultations with Staff (there are no Hourly-Paid in this part
. ;
of the firm) on what type of machine to buy - hence the Rank Xerox
was purchased as a result of informal consultations with Staff. and
taking their views into account. It is. however. interesting to
note the respondent's observation that "I dont know how far (their
views would be taken into account) in that situation".
Thus while in this latter area non_management personnel do have a
role to play. we have in considering this Excerpt'S.ll identified so
far 2 problems with this role.
a) the extent of their role - just how far would their views be
taken into account? Would it be to much a small or limited
extent that Staff and Hocrly-Paid would simply not see such
consultation as in any way being worth-while.
b) the procedure to be adopted is extremely informal. This is
given a very real justification by the Respondent - "Formality
put everybody under pressure. puts everybody in a situation where
they are reluctant to express his views" - a very real problem.
On the other hand lack of formality may lead to no consultation
taking place at all. For instance while there has been
consultation in this department. it is by no means universal.
Excerpt s.:li from a Staff Respondent in ManUfacturing illustrates
this point quite succinctly. While the Firm has been spending a
great deal on new machines. the Respondent reports that they have
frequently purchased the wrong machines in his view. These machines
have been purchased because Management did not consult with their
14- ~work-force who "have experience of the type of mach.ines". The
solution discussed with this Respondent is to have a formal mechanism -
"2 or 3 people from the Union each going on a Board meeting". The
purpose of this would be to make the views of their numbers known to
the Board - the intention of this being lito help everyone". and not
just their own partisan interests. Something very similar to this
arises in Excerpt 5.17 where the Management respondent discussed the
contribution that he - as a non-Engineer - can make to an Engineering
problem. While he puts his idea from a "conunon-sense" (or non-
Engineering) view. he suggests that his contribution is worth while.
because it gives another perspective on the problem. The same argument
could be put for non-Management personnel involvement in financial or
investment decisions. They may - as we pointed out above - lack the
financial skills required. but their contribution may still be worth-
while.
There is. however. one more obstacle to extended participation in
financial or investment decisions - financial interest. This enters
into Excerpt 5.17 in 2 senses
1) possession of financial information - the view in Excerpt'S.I7
is clearly that it is not advisable for more people than is
necessary to have access to private (financial information as it
could be to the detriment of the Firm. Once again though there
is an exclusion clause - namely that if. for instance. a Shop
Steward was to ask to know the profits of the Company for particular
valid reasons than he would be given that information. It is.
however. clear that judgement of the validity of the Shop
Stewards reasons would lie with M?nagement. Thus (i) it would
remain a system subject to Management control. and (ii) by
implication Management are more trusted with this information than
others in the company.
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Neither would be acceptable to the Shop Steward interviewed in Excerpt
5.19. Astrong justification for the Manager in Excerpt 5./7 is that
confidentiality is in fact in the interests of everyone in the Firm -
that keeping financial information within a restricted group of
Managers is in the interests of all the Firm. and not just Management.
The views of the Shop Steward in Excerpt 5.'9 in fact run counter to
this for 2 reasons
i) if he and his members were taken into the confidence of Management
and given not only the information but the reasons behind following
one policy rather than another. they could structure their
expectations (e.g. a wage claim) in an appropriate way
ii) the confidentiality argument - which is probably widely held among
Managers - may be. from the point of view of non-Managers implicitly
offensive. Confidentiality within a restricted group after all
could be regarded as suggesting that these outwith this group (or
at best some of them) are not to be trusted. As the Shop Stewards
says in Excerpt 5.19 "All 1
1msaying is that a Board of 10 or 12
directors. or 20 or 30 directors are more honest than 20 or 30
shop stewards or more liable to keep quiet. Well I think it would
be the other way about".
Hence while there is a measure of agreement between the Managers in
Excerpt 5.t7 and the Shop Steward in 5.~', on this point - both agree
that there should be communication about financial information - there
is a clear disagreement on t~e d~gr=e to which this should be done.
There is. however. a more clear-cut disagreement between them on the
second sense of financial interest.
2) toward the end of Excerpt 5.17 we raise the question of the
relative power of shareholder and employee interest. In particular
we encouraged this Manager to consider, the possibility of reducing
profits (shareholder interest) or preventing a redundancy (Employee
f~'4interest). It is clear from his answer that the redundancy would
be very much the 1ast act - lithe 1ast thing anybody would want to do
is to deprive another human being of his livelihood". Aredundancy
would only take place lithe morning the Banks wont give you any more
money" - in other words only if all else has failed only then would
there be redundancy.
The view put forward by the Shop Steward in Excerpt 5.19 does, however,
at least treat such a view with caution as it is his opinion - basically -
that Directors are only out for a profit viz. "There's2 Directors,
they're wanting to keep the shares (in S.U.I.T.S.) and there's
another 20 or 10 Directors they're wanting a profit out of it, they're
wanting to sell it. ,Whatever suits them moves down to England and
goes out of Scotland altogether, of no moment to them".
While we have no proof that what is said by the Manager about
financial interest in Excerpt 5.'7 is untrue, the perception of
Managers held by the Shop Steward in Excerpt 5.f9 clearly runs
counter to this. The importance of that is that it is that view
on which the Shop Steward will act.
Thus if we accept that the Manager is being basically truthful,
the problem at this level (or at least, much of it) is one of lack
of mutual comprehension, and consequential lack of trust.
We have seen so far in this section
1) that this is an area where technical expertise in financial
matters is important, which gives Management significant control
as they are trained in appropriate techniques in this area
2) that non Management can playa role in decision-making - but
at the level of wha~ to buy rather than the higher level of to
I~ '5invest or not.
3) that Management are in principle willing to provide financial
information to, for instance, Shop Stewards.
We have however, also identified a number of problems
a) the degree to which Management would take the views of non-
Management personnel into account, as Management would still
take decisions on what equipment to buy.
b) whether or not such consultations would in fact take place (see
Excerpt 5.f8).
c) Management would have control of financial information, causing
2 problems (i) employees may structure expectations on the
basis of inadquate information (e.g. profits for a wage claim) or
rumour, (ii) the implication that only Managers are fully trust-
worthy - or that non-Managers (e.g. Shop Stewards) are not to
be trusted.
d) that Managers are perceived by others as being more strongly
motivated by profit than they see themselves.
While we have made these difficulties clear, there is one point which
has run through all of this discussion of control over financial and
investment decisions - that Management perceive themselves as being
in control and that this should continue subject to consultation with
non-Management employees and listening to their views. The
difficulties we have drawn the reader's attention to are all subject
to that general finding within Management.
We shall now proceed to discuss the views of first of all Staff
respondents, and subsequently Hourly-Paid respondants.
As we shall see the general finding in each of these 2 groups is
If~remarkably similar.
Staff'and'Union'Reps
One point we have already drawn attention to is that Staff perceive
more actual as well as desired control for Managment than Management
perceive themselves to have, where Financial Policy is concerned.
The reason for this, we have suggested above, is that the pressures of
group ownership are more apparent among Management than among Staff.
It is apparent from Tables S.iland s: 1~(Staff responses on Investment
and Financial Policy) and S.'JS and 5•.2.) (their Union Reps views on the
same areas) that for both these groups it is (1) Management who ,do
control decisions in both these areas, and (2) this· situation ought to
persist. On the latter question - how control ought to be
distributed, - it is, however, clear that there is a desire that Staff
and Foremen and Hourly-Paid ought to be more involved in these decisions.
It is, however, still the case - as with the other decision areas we
have looked at - that their involvement would still' be subordinate to'
that of Management. It would seem from the figures in these tables
that non-Management personnel should advise and be consulted - should
playa role in the decision~making process - but that the final decision
was' one for Management to take. This interpretation is confirmed by
the Staff respondent in Excerpt S~O. For this respondent decisions
of this type are to be taken by the Board of Directors - "I don't see any
way in what that~ ••••••cou1d be changed really". On the other hand
there is - as we suggested - a role for what this respondent describes
as 'representation' to the Board of Directors which in his view "wou1d
make for a more profitable firm". This simply echoes the point we
made from Excerpt 5.18 - from another Staff respondent. It was his
conclusion that the firm had made a poor purchase in buying particular
14=r...
machines, and that by sending up "2 or 3 people from the Union side",
that better decisions could be taken by Management with the views, advice
and guidance of their non-Management employees.
One final point about these Staff views - are which has appeared in
other decision areas - is that there is rather less strength in the
view of greater participation for Hourly-Paid than for Staff and
Foremen. This does, as we have pointed out before, indicate a very
real tension among the employees of the Firm - though not one which is
reproduced among Union Reps or indeed among the Hourly-Paid sample.
Hourly~Paid'and Shop Stewards
Like Management and Staff both Hourly-Paid and their Shop Stewards
(1) perceive Management as the dominant group, and (2) perceive
that this ought to remain so, but with a greater degree of control
going to Staff and Foremen as well as themselves.
As we suggested for the Staff sample, and for Union Reps. Management
as seen as being the group who take this type of decision, a point
well made by an Hourly-Paid Respondant in Excerpt 5.21. He justifies
their control by reference to "they've got the brains•••••••••they're
qualified people".
This Excerpt extends this point rather more - it is not just that
Management takes these decisions because they are Managers - they
take these decisions because that is what they have been trained
in. In other words the legitimacy of Management resides not just
in the fact that they are Management (a sort of 'traditional legitimacy
see for instance Stewart Clegg's Power, Rules and Domination). it
resides further in their technical expertise (a rather more technical/
14 ~administrative legitimacy). The role of a Manager is' in this
respect rather like that of a welder say - it is right that a welder
should weld because that is his skill; so similarly it is right that
a Manager should take decisions, because that is his skill. We shall
return to this argument and develop it at much greater length in at the
end of this Chapter~ 'but the point we wish to make for now is that the
dominant role of Management, even in judgements of how control ought
to be distributed, is not simply contingent on the fact that they
are Management, but on a claim by Management, and its acceptance by
Staff and Hourly-Paid employees, to a technical expertise which is
special in that only Managers can make such a claim to this expertise
(by virtue of training, or even 'brains', as well as the fact that they
are Managers). It is, in other words, two-interdependant claims to '.
legitimacy -
i) authority is legitimised by virtue of the fact that he is a
manager
ii) a manager's authority is also legitimate because he has the
training, or expertise etc. to take decisions
These 2 points can be clearly seen in Excerpt 5.2~. In this
Excerpt the Hourly-Paid respondent first of all accedes to the first
claim - managers take decisions on Financial/Policy and Investment
because they are managers. Later on he accedes to the second
claim - "Well its just a Management decision I think. I mean
personally I wouldn't know anything about that all".
Nevertheless, even if this double-claim by Management is accepted,
this does not rule out a demand by Hourly-Paid workers that they
should be heard This point comes out clearly in
Excerpt 5.~3. In this Excerpt another Hourly-Paid respondant
clearly accedes to the claim by Management to have control over
14qFinancial Policy, and Investment decisions. As we suggested
earlier, though, on the basis of Tables 5.;q and 5.~4,while Hourly-
Paid workers may accede to the legitimacy claim made by Management
in this area, they still demand to be heard. The respondent in
Excerpt 5.~makes very much the same argument as the Staff respondent
in Excerpt 5.1~ -indeed they are both talking about the same
machines. While each accedes to the Management right to take
decisions, the view is put forward that in so doing they should listen
to and take into account the views of non-Management personnel.
Thus in this section we have found yet again
1) that while Management are and should be - in the view of all
groups - in control of decisions in the area, but
2) that in taking these decisions Management should be influenced
by the views of non-Management personnel.
The direction of any developments that such views would suggest would
not be toward any type of radical change in decision-making structures.
Any change which has been suggested up to now has been in the direction
of greater consultation by Management of their Staff and Hourly-Paid
employees. This would be a development consistent with the double
claim we discussed above, and indeed would be consitent with the
strong demand for greater communication of company information we
considered in the previous Chapter.
~.
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The picture of the actual and ideal distribution of influence Ind
decision-making we have presented up td now has emphasised the role of
"..hierarchy both in actual and ideal perceptions. It is clelr that the
Management of this f1nm see themselves as being in control of decisions
taken, and that this ought to continue. Perhaps ~re surprisingly this
seems to be the dominant view of Staff and Hourly-Paid employees. Any
change as we moved our consideration from whit actually happens to
how things ought to be, has been in the way of increasing the influence
" ." of Staff,:. of. foremen. and of Ho~rly .Paid employees - but not to the
extent to an ~uality with Management, fir less deposing Hanagecent.
The change has been to look for greater consultation by Management with
their other employees, and to consider their views, before a decision
is taken. It is, however, clear that it is Management who shall take
the decision.
What we shall do in this section is to consider further statistical
tests on all of the control data split into two sections for each group
(1) perceptions of how influence is distributed, and (2) perceptions
of how influence should be distributed. The statistical tests we shall
_ use ~re. - .f
'I' (A) ~f'c. Q~~ t'"t~nkage Analysis (used on the information data provided
in the previous chapter), and
(B) Factor'Analysis
I5/
i·
. '~.. '\The findings on each test will indicate a conceptual ~istinction
between them, on the one hand Management influence, and the influence
of other groups (though there are also distinctions between Staff,
Foremen and Hourly-Paid), as indeed we have shown already.
We shall consider both of these tests, group by group, taking Actual
and Desired Influence in turn.
Management
The results of the Linkage Analysis are shown as Table 5.64 for
perceptions of the actual distribution of influence within the firm.
There are, altogether, 15 Clusters to account for the 56 variables.
Within these 15 Clusters there are 2 which are concerned with
Management influence exclusively - Cluster 1 - on Safety, Pay, Orders
and Profitability, and Cluster 15 on Work Standards and Recruitment.
There are 7 Clusters where Management influence is absent - 4, 6, 7,
9, 11, 12, 13 - which are made up of Staff, Foremen's and Hourly-Paid
influence. The decision areas in this latter group of Clusters are
(a) Work-Pace (Hourly-Paid only) (b) Work Standards (c) Discipline
(Hourly-Paid and Staff) (d) Pay (e) Recruitment (f) Cost Reduction (Hour1y-
Paid and Foremen) (g) Decisions Affecting Profitability (h) Financial
Policy (i) Decisions Affecting the Order Situation (j) Redundancy. (Note
Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid unless specified to be contrary beside
the decision area).
In the remaining Clusters - 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 14 - there are decision areas
which include Management with one or more of the 3 other groups. For
instance Cluster 8 is solely concurred with Decisions on Transferring
Employees from one Dept/Job to another; but it specifies Management,Table 5.Jl' McQuitty Linkage Analysis Clusters of Management Perceptions
of Actual Influence
Cluster 1
Management
II
II
II
Cluster 2
Influence on Safety Decision
II II Pay II
II II Decisions Affecting the Order Situation
II II II II Company Profitabi1ity
Staff
Management Influence on Work Pace Decisions
Foremen II II II II II
Management II II Promotion II
II II II Discipline II
Cluster 3
Staff Influence on Safety Decisions
Foremen's II II II II
Shop-Floor II II II II
Management II II Redundancy II
Cluster 4
Shop-Floor Influence on Work-Pace Decisions
II II II II Work-Standards Decisions
II II II II Discipl ine II
II II II II
Cluster 5
Staff Control of Work-Pace Decisions
Foremen II II Discipline II
Management II II Financial Policy Decisions
Cluster 6
Staff Influence on Pay Decisions
Foremen's II II II II
Shop-Floor II II II II
Foremen's II II Recruitment Decisions
Shop-Floor II II II II
Cluster 7
Foremen's Influence on Cost Reduction Decisions
Shop-Floor II II II II II
Foremen's II " Work Standard II
Staff II II Recruitment IICluster 8
Influence on Transfer Decisions
II II II II
II
II
II
II II
II
II
II
Management
Staff
Foremen's
Shop-Floor
Cluster 9
Staff Influence on Work Standards Decisions
II II II Decisions Affecting Profitability
II II II II II II
Foremen's II
Shop-Floor II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
Cluster 10
Staff Influence
Foremen's
Shop-floor
Management
Staff
Foremen's
Shop-floor
on Promotion Decisions
II
II
Investment
II
II
II
Cluster 11
Staff Influence on Financial Policy Decisions
Foremen's II II \I II II
Shop-floor II II II II . II
Cluster 12
Staff Influence on Decisions Affecting the Order Situation
Foremen's II II II \I II II II
Shop-floor II II II II II II II
Cluster 13
Staff Influence on Redundancy Decisions
Foremen's II II II II
Shop-floor II II II II
Cluster 14
Management Influence on Cost Reduction Decisions
Staff II II II II II
Cluster 15
Management Influence on Work Standards Decisions
II II II Recruitment IIStaff, Supervisors and Hourly-Paid, indicating a consistency of view over
this decision area as a whole for each group - in other words on trans··
ferring employees within the firm the issue or decision area was stat-
istically more powerful than the group. Whereas in the Clusters specified
in the immediately previous paragraph the distinctiveness of the Management
group from the other 3 groups was more powerful. Only Cluster 10 has a
form similar to Cluster 8. There, Promotion (all groups but Management)
and Investment (all groups) appear in the Cluster.
In Cluster 2 and Cluster 14 only one group interrupts the Management group
monopoly of each Cluster. This is especially true of Cluster 2, where
only Supervisors influence on Work-Pace intrudes. Tab1eA3.~··,
draws attention to the desired increase in Supervisors influence expressed
by Management on Work Pace. In Cluster 14 the only 2 variables are
Management and Staff influence on Cost Reduction - as small a 'cluster'
as there could be, and one, which remembering the discussion of this
decision area above, does not appear particularly meaningful. Similarly,
Cluster 5 does not appear to be more than a statistical association
which lacks meaning. Cluster 3 concerns mainly the influence of Staff,
Supervisors and Hourly-Paid on safety decisions - with Management influence
on Redundancy decision~ inte~vening.
Thus in considering these Clusters we can see that on 6 decision areas
Management see their influence as being totally distinct - Work Standards,
Pay, Recruitment, Profitability, Orders and Safety (Clusters 1 and 15),
and on 4 more almost totally distinct from the influence of others - Work
Pace, Promotion, Discipline and Cost Reduction (Clusters 2 and 14). Only
on Redundancy and Financial Policy (where there are statistical associations
in apparently meaningless Clusters) and on Investment and Transfers (where
the decision areas seem more important than the groups) does this
distinctiveness of Management influence break down.
15"3The results of the Factor Analysis of Management Perceptions of Actual
Influence are shown in Table 5.~. Those variables whose loadings on
each factor core marked with an asterisk are significant for inclusion
using the Bur -Banks formula. This is a statistical test, requiring
a certain factor loading for a variable to be considered in interpreting
a particular factor. The level .of significance required was 1%. We
have, therefore, erred on the side of excluding variables which on a weaker
test may have been included.
Table 5.28 gives a.more accessible view of those variables which were
significant in each factor.
Those first 8 factors whose significant variable loadings are highlighted
in Table 5.28 explain between them 65% of the variances within the data
on which the analysis was done. No factor alone explains an amount of
variance significantly larger than any of the others. Factor 1 explains
12.9%, while Factor 8 explains 4.4%, with a smooth decline in variance
explained, in between ,these 2 factors.
Factor 1 gives a measure of support for the argument we have put forward
throughout this chapter - namely that Management influence cis meaning-
fully and statistically distinct from that of the other 3 groups in the
analysis. In Factor 1, there is no significant loading for any Management
variable - all significant loadings are Staff (4 variables) or Supervisors
or Hourly Paid (6 .variab1es each).
Factor 2 does, however, include significant Management variables, as
well as significant variables for the other 3 groups. This is especially
so on 3 decision areas - Work Pace, Transfers and Profitability. In
the cases of decisions on Work Pace, and decisions affecting Profitability
it has to be remembered that relative to other areas these were decisions
154on which Management saw themselves are being less powerful - these were
areas in which other groups were seen as having more influence than
elsewhere. When we considered Transfers we saw - especially among the
hourly-Paid - that while Management took the decision on whether or not
an employee would be transferred to another Dept/job. an employee could
ask for a transfer. and would usually get it. Thus the mixture of Manage-
ment variables with other groups does in this case reflect reality. Just
as in Factor 1. the fact that Hourly-Paid and Management are not significant
on their 'influence on Pay' variables - reflecting the higher degree of
influence perceived for Hourly-Paid on that issue.
In Factor 3 the only Management variable which is signfiicant concerns
Investment decisions. It also should be noted that a number of the
significant loadings on other variables for the other groups are negative
(i.e. Factor 3 is a bipolar factor). Thus it would seem that in Factor
3 it is being said that while Management have more influence on Investment.
and Staff on Cost Reductions. Promotion and Investment. the Hourly-Paid
have less on Safety and Profitability, Foremen on Safety. and Staff on
Safety and Redundancy. It has to be recalled in Trying to understand
this that on Safety and Profitability, Management saw influence on these
issues as relatively dispersed (i.e. that it was not only Management
for whom there was 'A Great Deal of Influenc~' - especially on Safety:
see Table A3.5&·
Factor 4 largely recalls Cluster 8 in Table 5.1~ where decisions on
Transfers for all groups were included. We suggested in relation to this
that this issue may have a high degree of unique variance. This factor
analysis would seem to confirm this. Management influence on Promotion
is also significant in Factor 4. but it has a positive sign. while
decisions on Transfers all have a negative sign. We would suggest that
this points to a contrast between these 2 decisions - with Promotion beingTable 5OC8
Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.27-1
Factor 1 Management Staff Supervisors Hourly-Paid
Pay
Redundancy
Recruitment
Promotion
Investment
Financial Policy
Profitability
Factor 2
Work Pace
Pay
Transfers
Work Standards
Discipl ine
Orders
Profitability
Factor 3
Safety
Reduction
Redundancy
Promotion
Investment
Profitability
Factor 4
Transfers
Promotion
Factor 5
Safety
Cost Reduction
Financial Policy
Factor 6
Work Pace
Work Standards
Discipline
Factor 7
Work Standards
Recruitment
Discipline
Factor 8
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
x
o
X
o
X
X
X
o
o
o
o
X
o
X(-)
X
X(-)
o
o
o
o
o
'X
X
o
x
X
o
o
o
X
X
X
o
o
X
o
o
X
X(-)
X
X(-)
X
X
o
X(-)
o
o
o
X
o
o
X(-)
o
o
o
X
X
X
X
o
X
X
X
X
X
o
X
o
X
X(-)
o
o
o
o
o
X(-)
o
X(-)
X
X(-)
o
o
o
o
o
X
o
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
o
X
o
o
o
o
X(-)
o
o
o
o
X(-)
X(-)
o
o
o
o
X(-)
X(-)
X(-)
o
o
o
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Safety X 0 0 0
Cost Reduction 0 0 0 X
Investment X 0 0 0
X- Sig~if~c~nt Loadin~ x(-) - Significant Loading Negative Sign o- Inslgnlflcant Loadlng. 'a Management decision like the decision to Transfer employees, but
in the former decision without the influence of other groups as we have
seen is true in the latter.
The remaining factors which had significant loadings on more than one
variables do not seem to indicate a great deal individually. Indeed
Table 5.18 does not indicate as clear and incisive a view on the part of
Management as we would ideally have liked
Nor is a much clearer picture produced by a 'Varimax' rotation of the
original factor matrix. This procedure will simplify the columns of
the factor matrix, and should thus draw out distinctions between the
constituent groups of our sample which define the columns (i.e. Management,
Staff, Foremen, Hourly-Paid). Tables 5.2~ and 5.~()do not, however, present
a much clearer picture than we have presented in Tables 5~~and 5.28.
< The loadings required for significance (and thus for consideration) are
the same as in Table 5.19 (the original factor matrix).
Table 5.30makes clear the variables whose loadings are significant in
each factor. As with the original factor matrix, there does not seem to
be a consistent image in all - or even most - of the factors. Any factor
which is of interest tends to be of an isolated meaning. For instance
factor 3 in Table 5.30indicates a dimension relating to 'Transfers'
for all the groups in the sample. Factor 5 suggests the same thing for
'Cost Reduction' (though it is muddied by the presence of Staff influence
on Recruitment. Factor 10 indicates a similar dimension on Safety -
though smaller by the absence of Management, suggesting a distinction
between the influence of Management and the influence of other groups on
this issue. Management influence on Safety appears in Factor 7, with
the influence of Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid on Redundancy - though withTable 5.30
Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5. '.L
Factor 1 Management Staff' Foremen Hourly Paid
Work Pace 0 X 0 0
Promotion 0 X 0 X
Investment X 0 0 0
Financial Policy X 0 0 0
Factor 2
Work Pace 0 0 X(-) 0
Work Standards 0 X(-) 0 0
Financial Policy 0 X X X
Factor 3
Transfers X x X X
Factor 4
Orders 0 X X X
Factor 5
Cost Reduction X X X X
Recruitment 0 X 0 0
Factor 6
Work Pace 0 0 0 X
Work Discip1Jne X X 0 X
Factor 7
Safety X(-) 0 0 0
Redundancy 0 X X X
Factor 8
Work Standards 0 X 0 0
Profitability 0 X X X
Factor 9
Work Pace 0 X 0 X
Work Standards X 0 0 0
Recruitment X 0 0 0
Factor 10
Safety 0 X X X
Factor 11
Work Standards 0 0 0 X Promotion 0 0 X X Discipline X 0 0 0a negative sign. We suggested above that Management saw themselves
as having more influence than the other groups on both Safety and
Redundancy. Factor 7 and 10 -.and in particular the reverse signs -
would seem to emphasise this.
Despite the fact that the Varimax Rotation should have emphasised the
aegument within groups (i.e. emphasised, for instance, those issues on
which there was a Management influence dimension), this has not happened.
Nor is this situation, as we shall see, much improved when we look at
the analysis of their perceptions of how they think influence should be
distributed. This lack of precision will, however, be seen to be interest-
ing in relation to the results of Staff and Hourly-Paid whose view is
much more clearly brought out by Linkage Analysis and Factor Analysis.
We shall, however, discuss this later. First of all we shall consider
the results of our analysis of Management perceptions of how influence
ought to be distributed.
Table 5.1t gives the results of the Linkage Analysis on Management
perceptions of how influence ought to be distributed. This resulted in
15 Clusters. Within these·15 there is only one which is composed only of
Management variables. This is Cluster 11 which contains Management
influence on Investment, Financial Policy and Profitability. Cluster 3
is also of interest on Cost Reduction, Recruitment, and Decisions
Affecting Orders, as well ~s Transfers (on which Supervisors are also
mentioned) and Work Standards (on which Staff are also mentioned). In
the case of Transfers, as we pointed out in the section above which was
concerned with the Transfer of Employees between Departments/Jobs,
supervisors did occupy a significant position as work requirements could
mean employees being transferred on the authority of a supervisor (e.g.
to do a specific job) as well as on the authority of a Management.
The influence of Management on the standard to which work was to be donewould not be direct - it would take the form of instructions passed to
employees via Supervisors. In this respect both Management and Staff
would occupy non-direct roles. The active roles on standards of work
would be occupied by Supervisors and Hourly-Paid employees. The presence
of non-Management groups on these 2 issues is thus explicable in relation
to the role which these groups played.
Thus on 8 of the 14 issues Management influence is seen as tota11y- or
almost totally in Cluster 3 - distinct from the influence of other groups.
On 3 of the remaining 6, however, there is an important contrast. Cluster
1 deals only with Safety - but includes all 4 groups. This, as we suggested
above on how influence is seen as actually distributed on Transfer
decisions, indicates unique variance on the issue of safety (i.e. that
the issue is more powerful than the groups). Cluster 2 has a strong
similarity, though is a little less clear. It includes Work Pace, and
Pay decisions for all 4 groups, as well as Management influence on
Promotion and Discipline, and suparvisors influence on Investment. It
would seem, therefore, there is a marked degree of unique variance on Pay
decisions, and Work-Pace decisions - though given the greater number of
variables in Cluster 2, less than is true for Safety decisions.
The remaining Clusters are composed of varying combinations of Staff,
Supervisors and Hourly-Paid influence on various decision areas e.g.
Cluster 8 (all 3 on Redundancy), Cluster 13 (all 3 on Financial Policy),
Cluster 14 (all 3 on Decisions Affecting Orders), Cluster 15 (all 3 on
Decisions Affecting Profitability). The exception is Cluster 7 which
includes only Hourly-Paid on Work Method decisions, and Management on
Redundancy decisions. The correlation in this Cluster is negative, so
the relationship must be inverse (e.g. high Management influence on
Redundancy, low Hourly-Paid influence on Work Method decisions or vice-Table 5~1 Perce tions
Cluster 1
Influence on Safety Decisions
II II II II Management
Staff
Foremen's
Shop-Floor
Cluster 2
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
Influence on Work Pace Decisions
II II II II
Promotion Decisions
Discipline II
Investment II
II II
II II <
Pay Decisions
II II
II
II
II
II II
II II
Supervisors
Cluster 3
Management
Staff
Supervisors
Shop-Floor
Management
Staff
Supervisors
Shop-Floor
Management
II
II
II Work Standards
II II
Recruitment II
Decisions affecting Orders
Management Influence on Cost Reduction Decisions
II Transfer II
.. II Supervisors
Management
Staff
Management
II
Cluster 4
Staff Influence on Cost Reduction Decisions
supervisors II II II II II
Shop Floor II II II II II
Supervisors II II Discipline II
Cluster 5
Staff Influence on Transfers
Shop Floor II II II
Cluster 6
Supervisors Influence on Work Methods Decisions
II II II Promotion II
Staff II II Disipline II
Shop Floor II II II II
Cluster 7
Shop Floor Influence on Work Method Decisions
Management II II Redundancy II
(Note Pearson Correlation was Negative)Cluster 8
Staff Influence on Redundancy Decisions
Supervisors II II II II
Shop Floor II II II II
Supervisors Influence on Recruitment
Cluster 9
Staff Influence on Recruitment Decision
Shop Floor II II II II
Cluster 10
Staff Influence on Promotion Decisions
Shop Floor II II II II
Cluster 11
Management Influence on Investment Decisions
II II II Financial Policy Decisions
II II II Profitability II
Cluster 12
Staff Influence on Investment Decisions
Shop Floor II II II II
Cluster 13
Staff Influence on Financial Policy Decisions
Supervisors II II II II II
Shop Floor II II II II II
Cluster 14
Staff Influence on Decisions Affecting Orders
supervisors II II II II II
Shop Floor II II II \I II
Cluster 15
.Staff Influence on Profitability Decisions
Supervisors II \I II II
Shop Floor \I \I \I IIversa). It is, however, difficult to find any explanation for this
association.
The results of the Linkage Analysis are, as we suggested above, perhaps
less clear than we may have liked. It is, however, clear that whatever
direction there is in this analysis does tend to support the idea that
Management influence ought to be seen as conceptually distinct from the
influence of other groups. On these issues where this appears to break
down a pragmatic explanation appears to be satisfactory.
The Factor Analysis of this data is given in Table 5.32. and as before
those variables whose loading is significant are marked with an asterisk.
Table 5·33 gives a more accessible view of those variables where the
loading is significant by the Burt-Banks formula.
This Analysis suggests the existence of 2 Management sub groups:
(a) a group which sees Management influence as relatively less
distinct from that of other employees~ This is represented by Factor 1
where the influence of all 4 groups appears over a number of decision
areas. This factor explains 18.5% of total variance, suggesting this
'liberal' (at least relative to the other grouping) is the larger
of the 2 groups whose existence we are suggesting. The issues on which
sharing of influence appears are Work Pace, Pay, Cost Reduction and
Transfer of Employees - none of which are strategic decision areas.
Strategic decision areas - like Investment, Financial Policy etc.
always appear to be quite distinct, even for this sub-group.
(b) There is, however, a second sub group indicated by Factor 2. For
this sub group Management influence on Pay, Cost Reduction and Transfer
of Emplgyees (and on Recruitment as well) is distinct. This view is
reinforced by the negative signs for the significant variables of otherTable 5.~'73 Significant Variables in each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.: ,)
Factor 1 Management Staff Supervisors Hourly-Paid
Work Pace X 0 X X
Pay X X X X
Cost Reduction X X X X
Transfers X X X X
Work Standards 0 X 0 0
Redundancy 0 X X X
Recruitment 0 0 0 X
Discipline 0 X X X
Orders x 0 X 0
Profitability X 0 0 0
Factor 2
Pay X 0 0 0
Cost Reduction X 0 0 0
Transfers X 0 X 0
Recrui tment X 0 0 X(-)
Promotion 0 0 0 X{-)
Financial Policy 0 X(-) X(-) X(-)
Orders 0 0 X(-) X(-)
Factor 3
Work Pace 0 X(-) 0 0
Recruitment 0 X X 0
Promotion X(-) X 0 0
Investment X 0 0 0
Financial Policy X 0 0 0
Orders 0 0 0 X
Factor 4
Safety 0 X X 0
Transfers X X X X
Work Standards 0 0 X{-) 0
Recruitment X 0 0 0
Investment X(-) 0 0 0
Factor 5
Safety 0 X 0 0
Redundancy 0 X{-) X{-) X{-)
Investment 0 0 X X
Profitability 0 X X X
Factor 6
Safety X 0 0 0 Work Standards X 0 X 0 Profitability 0 X{-) X(-) X(-)Table 5.33 I(contd)
Factor 7 Management Staff Supervisors Hourly-Paid
Work Pace X 0 0 0
Work Standards 0 0 0 X(-)
Redundancy X 0 0 0
Discipline 0 X(-) 0 0
Financial Policy 0 0 X 0
Factor 8
Redundancy X 0 0 0
Investment 0 X 0 X
X Loading Significant
X{-) Loading Significant Sign Negative
0 Loading Not Significantgroups which enter this factor as significant later on (e.g. Financial
Policy).
The remaining factors do not appear to have the same degree of clarity,
and any interpretation would be, to that extent, confused. Tables ~.34
and 5:,5 give the resul.ts of a Varimax Rotation of the original matrix.
We suggested from the results of the factor analysis of this matrix, that
2 Management groups could be distinguished - (i) a relatively 'liberal',
prepared to share influence with other groups on a restricted range of
directly job related issues; and (ii) a group who sees Management influence
as something which ought to be distinct on all issues - and not just on
the more strategic issues (e.g. Financial Policy) which the. former Manage-
ment group also saw as distinct.
The rotated matrix does provide further confirmation of the existence of
these 2 sub-groups (a) Factor 1 in Tables 5.34 and 5.~~indicates confirma-
tion of the more liberal groups, as does Factor 4 and Factors 9 and 11,
(b) the existence of a relatively less liberal group is confirmed by
Factors 2, 5 and 6.
The factors specified in group (a) i.e. 1, 4, 9 and 11 all combine Manage-
ment influence on various issues, with the influence·of other groups.
It is, however, interesting to note that these include what we have
described as 'strategic issues' Financial Policy (Factor 4), and Orders
(Factor 9). With respect to the former, however, the only Management
influence in that Factor is on Safety decisions.
The factors specified in group (b) - 2, 5 and 6 - either exclude 'Management
influence completely, being composed of the influence of other groups
(Factors 2 and 5), or are composed almost entirely of Management influence
(Factor 6 where only Hourly-Paid influence on Promotion appears with the
influence of Management on a range of issues).The remaining factors in Tables 5,34 and 5.~5"do not appear to be
particularly clear. The analysis has, however, provided some further
support for the exstence of 2 Management sub-groups, one relatively more
liberal than the others. This liberali s~ however, extends only as
far as work-related issues. There is little evidence that there is
strong support for sharing influence on strategic issues like Financial
Policy. Any support for a dilution of Management dominance is purely
related to job issues (e.g. Pay, Work Pace etc. - and as we have seen is
not a view held by all Managers, with the existence of another group who
would reject this view (the relatively less liberal) wishing ~o use
Management influence dominant over all the issues we have considered.
It is, however, still true to say that Management perceptions (as a group)
are less clear than those of Staff and Hourly-Paid. It may however be
that to expect greater clarity from Management is unreasonable. What, in
effect, we have done is to ask a group of insiders about what they do
(i.e. Managers who take decisions). We have already said that the analyses
of Staff and Hourly-Paid are clearer than we have seen among Management.
These are in this senSe outsiders. We may expect them to take a less
complicated view of decision making. Management precisely because of their
involvement are likely to take a more complicated view of decision-making.
This explanation does show why the Linkage Analysis and Factor Analysis
of Management Perceptions of Actual and Desired Influence was so complex~
Despite this complexity, however, we have been able ,to point to Management
influence being seen as distinctive from that of other groups (especially
on strategic issues like Financial Policy, though slightly less so on
routine decisions like Work Pace). It has, therefore, provided further
support for the main thrust of our findings presented in this Chapter.Table 5.3S Significant Variables in Each Factor . -
Factor 1 Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
Work Pace X 0 X 0
Pay X X X X
Cost Reduction 0 X X X
Work Standards 0 X 0 0
Discipl ine 0 0 X 0
Factor 2
Pay 0 X X X
Redundancy 0 X X X
Recruitment 0 0 0 X
Promotion 0 0 0 X
Factor 3
Cost Reduction X 0 0 0
Transfers X X X X
Recruitment X 0 0 0
Factor 4
Safety X 0 0 0
Discipline 0 0 X 0
Financial Policy 0 X X X
Factor 5
Profitabi1ity 0 X X X
Factor 6
Cost Reduction X 0 0 0
Work Standards X 0 0 0
Promotion 0 0 0 X
Investment X 0 0 0
Financial Policy X 0 0 0
Orders X 0 0 0
Profitability X 0 0 0
Factor 7
Work Standards 0 X X X
Redundancy X{- ) 0 0 0
Factor 8
Promotion X 0 0 0
Orders 0 X X X
Factor 9
Work Pace 0 X X X
Pay X 0 0 0 Investment 0 0 X 0 Orders X 0 0 0Table 5.?,,;- (contd) Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
Factor 10
Investment 0 X 0 X
Factor 11
Safety X X X X
Factor 12
Recruitment X(-) X 0 X
Promotion 0 X 0 0
Factor 13
Discipline 0 0: 0 X
Factor 14
Recruitment 0 0 X 0
Promotion 0 0 X 0Staff
The results of the Linkage Analysis of Staff perceptions of how influence
is distributed, is presented in Table 5.36.
This Table indicates further support for the special nature of management
influence. This is especially obvious in Cluster 1 which includes
Management influence on 8 of the 14 decision areas which we are concerned
with. This Cluster contains the influence of no other group except Manage-
ment~ It is, furthermore, interesting to note that issues like Pay,
Promotion and Redundancy should appear in the same cluster as more
'strategic' issues like Investment and Financial Policy etc. We suggested
already that those were perceived as decisions requiring special skills
possessed only by Management and thus subject to a specially high degree of
Management influence. The association of those job-related issues (like
Pay and Promotion or Redundancy) with the strategic issues may indicate
that among Staff, Management are seen as exercising a high degree of
influence on their personal fortunes, which may explain the relatively
recent and developing unionisation of Staff (at the time the research was
actually carried out). Unionisation could well be seen as a means for Staff
to protect themselves against what they perceive as a lack of inf~uence
on those 'personal' issues~ Examination of Table 5.2 supports this
argument in respect of Pay, as it can be seen from this that Staff see
themselves as .being' at a disadvantage to the (already unionised) Hourly-
Paid.
The remaining 6 Management variables appear in other clusters. Some appear
to do so with little real meaning. Not all however can be' said to be like
this. For instance Cluster 5 is solely concerned with Work Standards. We
found in looking at Management, that a similar view was taken by them about
the Transfer of employees between Depts/Jobs. In that case we said that
the issue had proved to be more important 'than any of the groups. Applyingthat explanation here means that there is a feature of Work Standards
which is quite unique. That may be what is discussed in Excerpt 5.15,
where the Staff Respondent suggests that work has to be done to "such
and such a standard, and that's it". In other words that the technical/
engineering requirements of the job/product remove effective influence from
any particular group. The standard of work is, in other words, simply
a ~i.l~n.
In Cluster 8 Management influence on Discipline appears with the influence
of Staff and Supervisors on Discipline. Within this Cluster as well is
the influence of Staff, Supervisors and Hourly-Paid on Investment and
Financial Policy. It may well be that this is simply a statistical
association. It could be suggested, however, that the association of
Discipline, with Investment and Financial Policy is indicative of a Staff
view about the exercise of Discipline within the Firm. It has to be
remembered that Investment and Financial Policy were decisions of little
influence from any group but Management. The association of that with
Management, Staff and Supervisors influence on D~dpline could suggest
a perception of lack of Discipline within the Firm. This would give further
weight to, for instance, Excerpt 5.'4 (from a Staff Respondent) and
Excerpt 5.16 (from an Hourly-Paid respondent) both of which suggest
precisely this (i.e. a lack of discipline). This point was further
developed by our own observation if failure to wear safety glasses, despite
regulations. Why, however, do Hourly-Paid not appear here? Their unioni-
isation - and its effectiveness in representing them - may be the reason
for this. This is given some force by the fact that Hourly-Paid influence
on Discipline appears in Cluster 2 with Management influence on 2 areas of
decision-making.
The remaining clusters are largely composed of non-Management influence
on particular areas i.e. Cluster 4 on Work Pace, Cluster 9 on Orders,Table 5.2W McQuilty Linkage Analysis. Clusters of Staff Perceptions
of Actual Distribution of Influence .
Cluster 1
Management Influence on Pay
Redundancy
Promotion
Investment
Financial Policy
Decisions Affecting Order Situation
Company Profitability
Cost Reduction
Cluster 2
II Promotion
II Discipline
II
II
II II
Management Influence on Safety
II II II Transfers
Hourly-Paid II II II
II II
Cluster 3
Staff Influence on Safety
supervisors II II II
Hourly-Paid II II II
Management II II Work Pace
Cluster 4
Staff Influence on Work Pace
supervisors II II II II
Hourly Paid II II II II
Cluster 5
II
II
II
II
II
II
Management Influence on Work Standards
staff II II II II
supervisors II
Hourly-Paid II
Cluster 6
Influence on Recruitment
II II Profitability
II .. II
II II II
Management
Staff
supervisors
Hourly-Paid
Cluster 7
Staff Influence on Recruitment
supervisors II II ..
Staff II II Promotion
supervisors II II IITable 5,3'(contd}
Cluster 8
II II
Investment
II
Financial Policy
II II
Influence on Discipline
II
II
II
Management
Staff
Supefvisors
Staff
Supervisors
Hourly-Paid
Staff
Supervisors
Hourly-Paid
Cluster 9
Staff Influence on Decisions Affecting Order Situation
Supervisors II II II II II II
Hourly-Paid II II II II II II
Cluster 10
Staff Influence on Transfers
Supervisors II II II
Hourly-Paid II II II
Cluster 11
Staff Influence on Cost Reduction
supervisors II II II II
Hour1y-Paid II II II II
Cluster 12
Staff Influence on Pay
Supervisors II II II
Cluster 13
Staff Influence on Redundancy
Supervisors II II II
Cluster 14
Hourly Paid Influence on Pay
II II II II RedundancyCluster 10 on Transfers, Cluster 11 on Cost Reduction and Cluster 3 on
Safety (though Management influence on Work Place also appears here).
All of this again supports our contention of the 'special' nature of
management influence - which is repeated in the Factor Analysis. Before
going on to that, however, Clusters 12-14 are worthy of mention as they
indicate a differentiation of on the one hand Hourly-Paid influence on
Bay and Redundancy, and on the other hand Staff and Supervisory influence
on these 2 areas. This is a further indication of the significance of
unionisation for Staff. We have suggested this in relation to 2 other
matters in this Section, and in this contect it would seem clear that
Staff differentiate between their influence on Pay and Redundancy, and
that of Hourly-Paid employees. The role of unions in those 2 issues
does of course require no elaboration. We shall see in the next Chapter
the protective role of unions seen by Staff as the reason for becoming
union members - and in particular the need for protection not from Manage-
ment, but frmn the already unionised Hourly-Paid employees.
Table 5.3~gives the results of the Factor Analysis of Staff perceptions
of the distribution of influence. Table 5.38 highlights the variables
whose loading in each factor was significant (again by the Burt-Banks
formula) •
Unlike our findings for Management, this time there is one factor which
explains a relatively large amount of variance (Factor 1 which explains
20.1%) while the remainder never explains any more than half of that (e.g.
Factor 2 explains 7.8%).
Factor 1 in Table 5.3=1 and 5.3& is mainly concerned with the influence
of non Management groups. Management only appear in Safety, Work Standards,
Redundancy and (surprisingly:) Financial Policy. This factor specifiesTable 5.39 Significant Variables on Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.3~i
Factor 1 Management Staff Supervisors Hourly-Paid
Safety X 0 X 0
Work Pace 0 0 X 0
Pay 0 0 X 0
Cost Reduction 0 X X X
Transfers 0 X X X
Work Standards X X X X
Redundancy X X X X
Recruitment 0 X X X
Promotion 0 X X X
Discipline 0 X X X
Investment 0 X X X
Financial Policy X X X X
Orders 0 X X X
Profitability 0 X X X
Factor 2
Safety 0 X X X
Work Pace 0 X X 0
Pay 0 X(-) X(-) 0
Cost Reduction 0 X X X
Transfers 0 0 0 X(-)
Work Standards X X 0 0
Promotion 0 0 0 X(-)
Discipline 0 0 0
~~:~ Financial Policy 0 0 0
Orders X 0 X(-) X(-)
Profitability 0 X X X
Factor 3
Safety 0 X 0 X
Work Pace 0 0 0 X
Pay X(-) 0 0 X
Cost Reduction 0 0 X X
Transfers 0 0 0 X
Redundancy X(-) 0 0 X
Recruitment 0 0 0 X
Promotion 0 0 0 X
Discipline 0 0 0 X
Investment X(-) 0 0 X
Policy Policy X(-) 0 0 X
Orders X~-) 0 0 0 Profitability X -) 0 0 0
Factor 4
Work Pace 0 X 0 0 Cost Reduction X 0 0 0 Work Standards X(-) X(-) X(-) X(-) Discipline 0 0 0 X Orders X X X X Profitability X 0 0 0Table 5.38(contd)
Factor 5 Management Staff Supervisors Hourly-Paid
Work Pace 0 0 0 X
Pay X 0 0 X
Work Standards 0 X 0 0
Recruitment 0 X 0 0
Promotion X 0 0 0
Investment X 0 0 0
Profitability X 0 0 0
Factor 6
Safety X 0 0 0
Work Pace 0 0 X(-) 0
Pay 0 X 0 0
Transfers 0 X 0 0
Promotion X 0 0 0
Investment 0 0 X(-) 0
Factor 7
Redundancy 0 0 0 X(-)
Recruitment X 0 0 0
Discipline 0 X 0 0
Profitability 0 0 0 X(-)
Factor 8
Transfers X 0 0 0
Promotion X(-) 0 0 0
Discip1 ine X 0 X 0
Factor 9
Safety X(-) 0 0 0
Work Pace 0 X 0 0
Transfers 0 0 X 0
Redundancy X(-) 0 0 0
Discipline 0 0 0 X(-)
Factor 10
Transfers 0 X(-) 0 0
Discip1 ine X 0 0 0
Investment 0 0 0 X(-)
Factor 11
Work Pace X 0 0 0 Cost Reduction X 0 0 0
Factor 12
Transfers 0 0 X 0 Redundancy o. X 0 0all 14 decision areas we are concerned with - and on 10 of them Management
influence can be seen to be conceptually different for Staff. Similarly,
in Factor 2, which contains 11 decision areas Management only appear twice -
Work Standards and Orders. This, however, is a bi-po1ar factor. It
suggests a continuum of influence e.g. if Staff have a high degree of
influence on Safety or Work-Pace, their influence on Pay is relatively
low. Similarly while Hourly-Paid have have a higher degree of influence
on Safety, Cost Reduction and Profitability, their influence on Transfers,
Promotion, Discipline, Financial Policy and Orders is relatively low.
In Factor 3, if we reverse all the signs, this can be interpreted as saying
that if Management influence is high on Pay, Redundancy, Investment, Fin-
ancial Policy, Orders and Profitability, the influence of Hourly-Paid on
Safety, Work Pace, Pay, Cost Reductions, Transfers, Redundancy, Receruit1-
ment, Promotion, Discipline, Investment and Financial Policy is relatively
low (compared to that of Management).
It does, however, have to be remembered that in terms of explanatory
power this 3rd factor has only about 30% of the power of the first
factor. This, of course, becomes increasingly true as we move down through
the factors - that they come to have increasingly less explanatory power.
We shall, therefore, draw the attention of the reader also to factors of
some particular interest.
Factor 4 repeats a ~..~&l·~~ shown in Table 5.3', Cluster 5 - namely the
close association on perceptions of influence on Work Standards. The
influence of all groups on Work Standards is significant in Factor 4,
as is the influence of all groups on Decisions affecting Orders, though
the signs are different, indicating a continuum with these 2 issues at
either end. It is~ however, difficult to see a meaning to this. It is
more interesting to consider the fact that on these 2 issues - WorkStandards and Orders - the issue proved more powerful than paerception
of group influence. Indeed in Factor 1 Work Standards behaved in the same
way - and in the linkage analysis. It would seem, therefore, that there
is a very high degree of unique variance within Staff perceptions of Work
Standards and that, therefore, perceptions of influence in Work Standards
are rather different from perceptions of other issues. We suggested above,
for instance, that it may be the view that Work Standards are exogeneous
i.e. that they are set by the demands of the product and in that sense
there is no decision to be made and no influence exerted,
The remaining factors after factor 6 explain 4% or less of variance each,
and have only 4 or fewer significant variables each. As such they are of
little interpretive value. Similarly while factors 4 and 5 do more in the
way of explaining variance - about 5% each - and have a greater number of
significant variables, their interpretation would be by no means clear.
We would thus direct the attention of the reader back to the first 3
factors which again indicate the conceptual distinctions of Management
influence. This point is clarified further by a Variance rotation of the
matrix. The results of the factor analysis of the rotated matrix is
presented in Tables 5.,"( and 5.40. Anumber of the factors in this
factor analysis are worthy of note, though for different reasons:
1) there is a clear 'Management factor' - factor 4 specifies only Manage-
ment influence on 7 of the 14 areas which we examined, including the 4
'strategic' issues we defined already (Investment, Financial Policy,
Orders and Profitability) as well as Pay, Redundancy and Promotion,
2) there is a clear 'Hourly-Paid' factor - factor 9 - with the inclusion
only of Staff on Dis~ipline decisions. Factor 5 is also largely Hour1y-
Paid - though Staff and Foremen are also included on Pay decisions;
3) there are a number of Staff/Foremen factors -Table 5.4.9 Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.~ )
Factor 1 Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
Safety X X X X
Cost Reduction 0 X X X
Profitability 0 X 0 0
Factor 2
Promotion 0 X 0 0
Discipline 0 X X 0
Investment 0 X X 0
Financial Policy 0 X Q 0
Orders 0 X X 0
Profitability 0 X 0 0
Factor 3
Work Standards X X X X
Recruitment 0 0 X 0
Promotion 0 0 X 0
Investment 0 0 X 0
Factor 4
X 0 • Pay 0 0
Redundancy X 0 0 0
Promotion X 0 0 0
Investment X 0 0 0
Financial Policy X 0 0 0
Orders X 0 0 0
Profitability X 0 0 0
Factor 5
Pay 0 X X X Redundancy 0 0 0 X
Investment 0 0 0 X Financial Policy 0 0 0 X
Factor 6
Cost Reduction 0 0 X 0 Transfers 0 X X 0 Recruitment 0 0 X X Promotion 0 0 X 0 Discipline 0 0 X 0
Factor 7
Pay 0 X(-) 0 0 Investment 0 0 0 X Profitability 0 X X X
Factor 8
Pay 0 0 X 0 Discipline X 0 X 0 Financial Policy X 0 X 0 Orders 0 0 X 0(i) Factor 2 - both Staff and Foremen
(ii) Factor 14 - both Staff and Foremen
(iii) Factor 6 - Foremen, with Staff and Hourly-Paid signficant on one
variable each,
(iv) Factor 8 - Foremen with Management also significant on Discipline
and Financial Policy decisions,
(v) Factor 3 - Foremen, on 3 issues significant alone, and with all
other groups on Work Standards.
Thus on 8 of the 15 factors produced by the Varimax Rotation, one group
appears exclusively, or is at least dominant. Thus provides further support
for -
(1) the main hypothesis of the role of Management decision-making in
hierarchy - especially Factor 4,
(2) the view we have presented at various points in this Chapter, that
Staff Distinguish between themselves, and Hourly-Paid employees, and
between themselves and Management to a greater degree than either of the
other 2 groups. We are not suggesting that Management, for instance,
see Staff and Hourly-Paid as a single group. It has been made clear
that Management do see distinctions between Staff and Hourly-Paid. These
distinctions are, however, more pronounced in Staff perceptions. This is
consistent with what we have established already i.e. that Staff watch
their relative position to Hourly-Paid employees very carefully indeed.
It is, furthermore, interesting to note a feature which has not been
apparent in other groups - namely a percept~on of a 'special' influence
for Foremen (who are, of course, part of the Staff group). In Factors 3,
6 and 8, for instance, the significant backings are on variables concerned
with the influence of Foremen. It is widely accepted that the role of the
Foreman has undergone such significant change over the last 20·30 yearsthat the role is now in difficulty (see, for instance, John Child and
Bruce Partridge "The Lost Supervisors", or David'Dlmkerly "The Foreman").
This result is, however, some indication of the continual existence
of a special role for Foremen. This is not to say that their old role
will re-appear at some future point - indeed when we deal with Supervision
in the next Chapter we shall see -
(i) an overall satisfaction with Supervision expressed by those being
supervised,
(ii) the role of the Foreman, on the Shop Floor, was seen as essentially
an enabling role - of ensuring work was done by giving advice, having
materials etc. available - but with little or none of the disciplinary
element which has been traditional to the role.
We shall argue in Appendix 6 that, at least as far as the supervised
are concerned, it is this enabling role which ought to be developed among
Foremen. It is, however, interesting that in Factors 6 and 8 the Foreman's
influence on Discipline is significant in each of Factor 6 and Factor 8.
Two points have to be understood in relation to this -
(a) that these are views expressed by Staff alone, and not, for instance,
by Hourly-Paid, and
(b) the criticism of the disciplinary role was mainly aimed at arbitrary
discipline once exercised by Foremen. Adegree of discipline was clearly
felt to be required, but within prescribed limits.
Table 5.41 shows the clusters which emerged from a McQuitty Linkage Analysis
of the data from questions to Staff on how they considered Influence ought
to be distributed. These 16 clusters altogether each containing from 2
to 5 variables. With the exception of Cluster 1 (which largely deals with
Influence on Decisions about Safety) the clusters are either _Table 5.41 'McQuitty LinkaSe Analysis Clusters of Staff Perceptions of
Desired Distri ution of Influence
Cluster 1
Influence on Safety Decisions
II II II II
II Transfers
Management
Staff
Foremerfs
Shop Floor
II II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
Cluster 2
Management Influence on Work Pace
II II II Transfers
II II II Financial Policy
Cluster 3
Staff Influence on Work Pace
Foremen1s II II II II
Shop Floor II II II II
Cluster 4
Management
II
II
II
Influence on Pay
II II Work Standards
II II Discipline
II II Orders
Cluster 5
Staff Influence on Pay
Forements II II II
Shop Floor II II II
Cluster 6
Management Influence on Cost Reduction
II II II Redundancy
II II II Investment
II II II Profitability.
Cluster 7
Staff Influence on Cost Reduction
Foremen I s II II II II
Influence on Cost Reduction
II II Transfers
II II II
II II
II Work Standards
II II II
II
II
II
II
Cluster 8
Shop Floor
Staff
Forements
Staff
Foremen1s
Shop Floor
Cluster 9
Staff Influence on Redundancy
Forements II II II
Shop Floor II II IICluster 10
Management Influence on Recruitment
II II II Promotion
Cluster 11
Staff Influence
Foremen's II
Shop Floor II
Staff II
Shop Floor II
on Recruitment
II II
II II
II Promotion
II II
Cluster 12
Foremen's Influence on
Staff II II
Foremen's II II
Shop Floor II II
Promotion
Profitability
II
II
Cluster 13
Staff Influence on Discipline
Foremen's II II II
Shop Floor II II II
Cluster 14
Staff Influence on Investment
Foremen's II II II
Influence on Investment
II II Financial Policy
II II II II
II II II II
Cluster 15
Shop Floor
Staff
Foremen's
Shop Floor
Cluster 16
Staff Influence on Orders
Foremen ts II II II
Shop Floor n II II(a) entirely concerned with Management influence on various issues (i.e.
Clusters 2, 4, 6 and 10l, or
(b) concerned with the influence of the 3 groups other than Management
on the decision areas dealt with.
We suggested in analysis of the Staff data on the actual distribution
of influence, that it offered support to our theories of Management
influence being perceived as 'specia1'. It would appear from the results
of Table 5. ~lto have an even more special quality in relation to the
desired distribution of influence, as only in one Cluster (number 1)
does the influence of Management appear with the influence of any other
group. In 5 clusters (3, 5, 9, 13, 16) there is the influence of Staff,
and Foremen, and Hourly Paid on a single decision area. The remaining
'non-Management' clusters (1, 7,8, 11, 12, 14) are each composed of the
influence of Staff, Foremen and Hourly Paid on more than one decision
area. Clusters 2, 4, 6 and 10 are solely composed of Management influence.
There is, however,' no clear meaning to the .grouping of decision areas in
each cluster - except perhaps cluster 10 which deals with Promotion and
Recruitment. The remaining 3 are composed of decisions which are directly
related to particular jobs (e.g. Work Pace and Transfers) while others
are related to strategic decisions (e.g. Financial Policy) - taking Cluster
2 as our example. The same thing can, however, be seen in clusters 4 and 6.
We are unable to conjecture as to why this may be. It has already been
seen in this chapter that on strategic decisions, like Financial Policy,
the influence of Management is at its height. Quite why it should be
associated with these non-strategic issues (e.g. Work Pace) is unknown.
It is, however, clear that the special quality of Management influence
has remained. It is perhaps expecting a little too much to have all types
of Management influence in one cluster, or in two - Strategic and'Non-
strategic.Tables 5.42 and 5.~ deal with the Factor Analysis of this data. The
results of this analysis again point to the same argument as for the
Linkage Analysis and the preceding Control Analysis - namely that the
influence of Management has a special quality. Table 5.q3 makes this point
particularly clear. Nearly all the Factors are either exclusively Manage-
ment or non-Management - Factor 1 has no significant Management variable -
or are predominantly a Management Factor, while the others are again
predominantly non-Management, except Factors 7 and 8 (which are unclear)
and Factor 12 (which is entirely Management, but of unclear meaning).
The Factor Analysis has, therefore, once again incisively pointed to a
clear distinction in the perceptions of the Staff sample between Management
influence, and the influence of other groups.
Tables 5.44 and 5.~.~give the results of a Varimax Rotated Factor Analysis.
This shows our argument even more clearly. Even considering how they
would like influence on decisions to be distributed, there is a clear
distinction between Management and non-Management influence. Factors 1,
6, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 14 are all composed of non-Management influence.
Only in Factors 2 (which concerns Safety only) 3 and 5 does a Management
variable appear with a non-Management influence variable.
It is interesting to note that in Factor 4 all 3 of the 4 strategic
influence variables (Financial Policy, Orders and Profitability - but not
Investment) appear together.
This section on Staff perceptions of Influence - both how it is actually
distributed, and how they would it to be distributed - provide further
support for the argument that we have made throughout this chapter. Namely
that the influence of Management has a special quality which differentiates
it from that of other non-Management influence. We have shown, usingTable 5.~3Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analy.sis in Table 5~
Factor 1 Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
Safety 0 X X X
Work Pace 0 X X X
Pay 0 X 0 0
Cost Reduction 0 X 0 0
Transfers 0 X 0 X
Work Standards 0 X X X
Redundancy 0 X X X
Recruitment 0 X X X
Promotion 0 X X X
Discipline 0 X X X
Investment 0 X X X
Financial Policy 0 X X X
Orders 0 X X X
Profitability 0 X X X
Factor 2
Work Pace X 0 0 0
Pay X 0 0 0
Cost Reduction X X X X
Transfers X 0 X 0
Work Standards X 0 0 0
Redundancy X 0 0 0
Recruitment X 0 0
~~:~ Promotion X 0 0
Discipline X X X 0
Investment X 0 0 0
Financial Policy X 0 0 X(-)
Orders X 0 0 0
Profitability X 0 0 0
Factor 3
Safety 0 X X X
Pay 0 X X 0 Cost Reduction 0 X X X Work Standards 0 X 0 0 Promotion 0 0 X(-) 0 Profitability X(-) 0 0 0
Factor 4
Safety X X 0 0 Pay 0 0 0 X Cost Reduction 0 0 0 X Recruitment 0 0 0
~!:l Discipline 0 0 0 Investment 0 0 0 X-) Profitability X 0 0 0
Factor 5
Work Pace 0 X(-) ·0 X(-) Pay 0 0 0 X(-) Transfers 0 0 X Work Standards 0 0 0
X 0 Redundancy X 0 0 X Promotion 0 X(-) 0 0Table 5..~3(contd)
Factor 6 Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
Safety 0 0 0 X(-)
Redundancy 0 0 0 X
Recruitment-:: 0 0 0 X
Investment 0 0 0 X
Orders X 0 0 X
Factor 7
Safety 0 0 X 0
Work Standards 0 X(-) 0 0
Recruitment X~-) 0 0 0
Promotion X-) 0 0 0
Financial Policy X 0 0 0
Profitability 0 0 0 X
Factor 8
Work Pace 0 0 X~-) 0
Redundancy 0 0 X-) 0
Discipline X 0 0 0
Orders X 0 0 0
Factor 9
Safety 0 0 X(-) 0
Pay 0 X X X
Transfers 0 X 0 0
Recruitment X 0 0 0
Factor 10
Transfers X 0 0 X
Work Standards X 0 0 0
Factor 11
Redundancy 0 X 0 0
Recruitment 0 X 0 0
Orderss 0 0 0 X(-)
Factor 12
Work Pace X 0 0 0 Financial Policy X(-) 0 0 0Table 5.45 Significant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.44)
Factor 1 Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
Redundancy 0 X X 0
Recruitment 0 X X 0
Promotion 0 X X 0
Discipline 0 0 X 0
Investment 0 X X X
Financial Policy 0 X X X
Orders 0 X X 0
Profitability 0 X X X
Factor 2
Safety X X X X
Factor 3
Cost Reduction X X X X
Work Standards 0 X 0 0
Discipline X 0 0 0
Orders 0 X X 0
Factor 4
Cost Reduction X 0 0 0
Transfers X 0 0 0
Redundancy X 0 0 0
Promotion X 0 0 0
Discipline X 0 0 0
Financial Policy X 0 0 0
Orders X 0 0 0
Profitability X 0 0 0
Factor 5
Redundancy 0 X X X
Discipl ine X(-) 0 0 0 Financial Policy 0 0 0 X
Factor 6
Work Pace 0 X X X
Promotion 0 0 X 0
Discipl ine 0 X 0 0
Factor 7
Work Pace X 0 0 0 Pay X 0 0 0 Work Standards X .0 0 0 Orders X 0 0 0
Factor 8
Pay 0 X X X Orders 0 0 X 0• - 'I .
Factor 9 Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
Transfers 0 X X, 0
Discipline 0 0 X 0
Factor 10
Redundancy 0 0 0 X
Recruitment 0 0 0 X
Discipline 0 0 X X
Investment 0 0 0 X
Profitability 0 0 0 X
Factor 11
Work Pace X 0 0 0
Transfers X 0 0 0
Recruitment X 0 0 0
Promotion X 0 0 0
Factor 12
Recruitment 0 X 0 0
Promotion 0 X 0 X
Factor 13
Orders 0 X X X
Transfers 0 0 0 X
Work Standards X 0 0 0
Profitability 0 0 0 X
Factor 14
Work Standards 0 X X X Recruitment 0 0 X 0Tannenbaurr. Control methods, 'that (i) Management are perceived as dominant
in every decision area, and (ii) Staff perceive that this dominance should
continue - though subject to greater non-Management influence. The
McQuitty Linkage Analysis and Factor Analysis provide results which yield
further support to this.
We shall now move on to consider the results of the same analysis of Hourly-
Paid data.
Hourly-Paid
We have seen in the earli~r parts of this chapter that, like Staff,
Hourly-Paid respondents have a perception of Management influence as being
imbued with a special quality. That finding is given further support
by the following McQuitty Linkage Analysis and Factor Analysis. Perhaps
equally interesting, we shall see an indication of Staff influence (distinct
from that of Foremen) is also perceived as qualitatively different from
that of Management, and of Hourly-Paid employees, i.e. that unlike the view
we have suggested exists for Management and Staff, whereby Management
influence is on one level, and the influence of Staff, Foremen and Hourly-
Paid exist on another level, for Hourly-Paid workers there is not just a
distinctiveness about Management influence, but also about Staff influence.
This latter point can be seen immediately in Table 5.~hwhich shows the results
of the McQuitty Linkage Analysis of Hourly-Paid perceptions of the Actual
Distribution of Influence. Cluster 1 is clearly dominated by Staff
variables (9 of the 14 available), with only Hourly-Paid influence on
Pay intervening. Of the 5 Staff variables outstanding (a) in 2 of them -
Pay and Cost Reduction (clusters 12 and 13) - they appear with Foremen,
and (b) 2 of the other 3 - Safety (cluster 2) - and Transfers (cluster 6) _
they appear with all 3 of the other groups. Work Pace in cluster 7 is
I "=rtTable 5.1~ Paid Perce tions
Cluster 1
Staff Influence on Redundancy
Recruitment
Discipline
Work Standards
Promotion
Financial Policy
Investment
Orders
Profitability
Hourly Paid Influence on Pay
Cluster 2
Influence on Recruitment
II Promotion
II Discipline
II Safety
.11 II
Management
II
II
II
Staff
Foremen's
Hourly Paid
Cluster 3
II
II
II
II
Management Influence on Work Standards
Hourly Paid Redundancy
II Recruitment
II Promotion
II Financial Pol icy
II Orders
Foremen's II
Cluster 4
II Work Standards
II II II
Hourly Paid II
Foremen's II
Hourly Paid II
Foremen's Influence on Promotion
II II II Investment
II II
Cluster 5
Management
II
II
II
Foremen's
Influence on Investment
II II Profitability
II II Orders
II II Work Pace
II . II II II
Cluster 6
Influence on Transfers
II II II Management
Staff
Foremen's
Hourly Paid
II
II
II
II
II
IITable 5.~ (contd)
Cluster 7
Staff Influence on Work Pace
Foremen's II II Redundancy
Hourly Paid II II Work Pace
Cluster 8
Foremen's Influence on Recruitment
II II II Discip1 ine
Hourly Paid II II II
Cluster 9
Management Influence on Pay
II II II Financial Policy
Cluster 10
Management Influence on Cost Reduction
II II II Redundancy
Cluster 11
Foremen's Influence on Profitability
Hourly Paid II II II
Cluster 12
Staff Influence on Pay
Foremen's II II II
Cluster 13
Staff Influence on Cost Reduction
Foremen's II II II II
Cluster 14
Hourly Paid Influence on Cost Reduction
Foremen's II II Financial Policy
•the outstanding variable. It is clear, therefore, that on the basis of the
McQuftty Analysis) Staff influence is largely regarded as conceptually
distinct from that of other groups.
The findings in Cluster 2 and Cluster 6 are much as one would expect,
given the discussion of Hourly-Paid perceptions of Safety and Transfers
as largely consensual matters (in particular the former). Cluster 12 is
also not surprising as the annual salary negotiations for Staff and
Foremen were in the main carried on in the same bargaining unit. The
finding on Cost Reduction (Cluster 13) is more surprising, as i~ the position
of Staff influence on Work Pace in Cluster 7.
The fact that Hourly Paid see Staff influence in this way leaves the Foremen
in an uncertain position. Is the influence of Foremen also seen as
distinctive? Is it seen in the same terms as that of Management (i.e.
as the direct representatives of Management on the Shop Floor)? Is it
seen in the same terms as that of Hourly Paid themselves? Examining the
location of Foremen variables we find them to be distributed as follows:
(i) Seven of them appear in clusters only with Hourly-Paid variables
(Clusters 4,8, 11, 14 being the Foremen variables on influence on Promotion
Investment, Work Standards: Recruitment, Disipline: Profitability:
Financial Policy).
(ii) One of them with Management and Hourly Paid Variables (Cluster 3 -
mainly an Hourly-Paid Cluster)
(iii) One of them with a Staff and Hourly Paid Variable (Cluster 7)
(iv) Two of them with Management, Staff and Hourly Paid Variables (Cluster
2 and Cluster 6 which include Foremen influence on Safety, and Transfers _
both of which we have suggested already are consensual matters).
(v) Two of them with a Staff variable (Clusters 12 and 13 which deal with
Pay and Cost Reduction).(vi) One of them with Management variables (Cluster 5) - Foremen's
influence on Work Pace.
Thus if we take cases (i) - (iv) 11 of the 14 Foremen variables appear
in a cluster which also specifies one or more Hourly Paid variables.
Indeed 7 of these 11 variables appear in clusters which are composed only
of Foremen and Hourly Paid variables. It would, therefore, seem to be
the case that Foremen are perceived by Hourly Paid - at least in terms of
influence - to be largely 'one of us'. Two Foremen variables (Pay and
Cost Reduction) enter into 2 clusters with Staff variables (influence on
Pay and Cost Reduction) and one Foremen variable (Work Pace) into a
Cluster with Management variables (on Investment, Profitability, Orders and
Work Pace). The remaining 4 Foremen variables appear in clusters in which
there are at least 2 other groups besides Foremen.
Only on influence on Work Pace is there a clear identification with Manage-
ment, and on Pay and Cost Reduction with Staff - the remaining types of
influence appear mainly with Hourly Paid alone, or in 4 cases with a
co~bination of other groups. That Foremen should be identified with Manage-
ment where Work Pace is' concerned is perhaps not altogether a surprise -
but what about the associated variable, Discipline, or Standard of
Work - in both of these cases the relevant variable appears in a cluster
with Hourly Paid alone (Clusters 8 and 4 respectively)~ The dominant
association of Foremen for Hourly-Paid would, therefore, appear to be
with them.
Management influence is, as we suggested above, also regarded as distinct.
In two clusters (9 and 10) there is only Management influence present (Pay
and Financial Policy: Cost Reductton and Redundancy). The remaining 10
Management variables do appear in clusters containing variables of other
groups. This, however, does less harm to the idea of a special qualityforManagement influence than it may appear.
There are 4 such clusters where Management influence is combined with the
influence of other groups.
(a) Cluster 2. This is clearly a 'Management' cluster, including as it
does 4 Management influence variables, as well as the influence of the other
3 groups on Safety which is, we have argued already, largely a consensual
matter.
(b) Cluster 3. This is largely an 'Hourly Paid' cluster, with 5 Hourly
Paid variables, and are Management and one Foremen variable entering in.
(c) Cluster 5. This again is clearly a Management cluster, including 4
Management variables, with a single Foremen variable.
(d) Cluster 6. This clearly concerns the issue of Transfers rather than
demarcating the groups. Like Safety we have suggested that this is largely
a matter of consensus.
Thus of these 4 clusters we would suggest that 2 of them - Clusters 2 and
Cluster 5 - can be regarded as Management Clusters. This would account for
a further 8 Management variables. The remaining 2 Management variables
would then be attributed to (i) statistical chance - Cluster 3 and (ii)
an issue in Transfers which dominated the distinctiveness of the influence
of Management.
The perceptions of the distribution of influence among the Hourly Paid
would, therefore, seem to be based on 3 'types of influence' _
(a) that of Management,
(b) that of Staff,
(c) that of Hourly Paid, and of Foremen (though as we have suggested there
are certain distinctions between the 2 groups).
1=1-+The question which now arises is whether the Factor Analysis gives support
to this? The data is presented, in the usual way, in'Tables 5~ and 5.~B,
and would appear not to yield a great deal of support, particularly to
the perceived distinction of Staff and Foreman.
If, for instance, we look at Factor 1, which explains 21.7% 'of the
variance, it could be described as a 'non-Management' factor as the 3 non-
Management groups (Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid) are all heavily sus-
pended (ll significant variables, 11 significant variables and 13
significant variables respectively). There are no significant Management
variables and the only decision-area not included is Safety (Safety is
'dealt with' in Factor 3, where the variables of all the groups on lafety
are significant. Given its 'consensus' basis, this is as we would have
expected).
Factor 2 does provide some limited support for a distinctive Staff influence
as of the 11 decision areas in this Factor Staff variables are significant
in 10 cases (in 9 the sign is negative), while Management have 34, Foremen
2, and Hourly Paid 3 significant variables. Influence on Work Pace yields
significant variables for all 4 groups.
Factor 4 would appear to be a Management Factor, with their variables
being significant in 6 of the 7 decision areas in the Factor. The non-
.
significance of Hourly Paid on Pay is a notably interesting feature of
this Factor.
Factors 6 and 7 would also seem to be minor Management factors. There does
not seem to be any clear meaning to the other factors produced here (5, 8
and 9).
The results of this Principal Factor Analysis would seem to provide limitedTable s.4!6 Signficant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table sAil
Factor 1 Management Staff Foremen Hourly Paid
Work Pace 0 0 0 X
Pay 0 X X X
Cost Reduction 0 X X X
Transfers 0 0 X X
Work Standards 0 X X X
Redundancy 0 X X X
Recruitment 0 X 0 X
Promotion 0 X X X
Discipline 0 X X X
Investment 0 X X X
Financial Policy 0 X X X
Orders 0 X X X
Profitability 0 X X X
Factor 2
Work Pace X X X X
Transfers 0 0 0 X
Work Standards X X(-) 0 0
Redundancy 0 X(-) X 0
Recruitment 0 X(-) 0 X
Promotion X X(-) 0 0
Discipline X X(-) 0 0
Investment 0 X(-) 0 0
Financial Policy 0 X(-) 0 0
Orders 0 X(-) 0 0
Profitability 0 X(-) 0 0
Factor 3
Safety X X X X Cost Reduction X 0 0 0
Transfers 0 0 0 X(-)
Recruitment 0 0 X 0 Discipline 0 0 X X Financial Policy 0 X(-) 0 X(-) Profitability X 0 0 0
Factor 4
Work Pace X 0 0 0
Pay X X X 0 Cost Reduction 0 X X 0 Recru itment X 0 X 0 Investment X 0 0 0 Financial Policy X 0 0 0 Orders X 0 0 0
Factor S
Safety 0 X(-) X(-) 0 Work Pace 0 0 X 0 Transfers 0 X X X Redundancy X 0 0 0Table 5.~~(contd)
Factor 6 Management Staff 'Foremen Hourly Paid
Safety 0 X 0 0
Work Pace X(-) 0 0 0
Pay X 0 X 0
Discipline X(-) 0 0 0
Factor 7
Pay 0 X(-) X(-) 0
Transfers X X 0 0
Recruitment X 0 0 0
Promotion X 0 0 0
Factor 8
Work Standards 0 0 0 X
Discipline 0 0 X 0
Factor 9
Cost Reduction 0 0 X(-) 0
Redundancy X 0 0 0support to the 2 arguments being advanced here i.e. that Management
influence is seen as distinct, and to a lesser extent, that Staff influence
also is regarded as distinct.
The results of a Varimax rotation provide much stronger support. The
results of this rotation of the factor matrix appears in Tables 5.~and
5.5'0.
On this basis Factor 1 is clearly a Staff factor, giving support to the
idea of a distinctive Staff influence. Factor 2 gives some further support
as while it is clearly an Hourly Paid factor, Foremen are well represented,
certainly much more so than Staff. Factor 3 would seem to be a Management
factor, as does Factor 6, 9 and 13 (though these are of minor importance).
Factors 4 and 5 would appear to be 'decision-area' factors rather than
groups factors (Safety and Transfers respectively - the 2 consensual
factors). The remaining factors do not appear to have any clear meaning.
Thus, if we concentrate on the first 3 factors, they provide further, and
more distinctive support for what we found in the Mcquitty Linkage Analysis
(Table 5.~) - namely -
(a) a distinctive Management influence - Factor 3
(b) a distinctive Staff influence - Factor 1
(c) a distinctive' Hourly Paid and Foreman influence - Factor 2.
We have, therefore, been able to establish further support for our view of
the power of hierarchical groups being distinctively and qualitatively
different. So far - in looking at Management and Staff - the image which
has emerged has been of Management influence being distinguished from that
of the other 3 groups, within whom there is no distinction. In this
section, however, we nave been able to refine that latter point in the
case of Hourly Paid perceptions. Hourly Paid share with Management andTable 5.?9Significant Variable in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.J1ql
Factor 1 Management Staff .Foremen Hourly Paid
Cost Reduction 0 X X 0
Work Standards 0 X 0 0
Redundancy 0 X 0 0
Recruitment 0 X 0 0
Promotion 0 X X 0
Discipline 0 X 0 0
Investment 0 X 0 0
Financial Policy 0 X 0 0
Orders 0 X 0 0
Profitability 0 X 0 0
Factor 2
Cost Reduction 0 0 0 X
Transfers 0 0 0 X
Work Standards 0 0 X X
Redundancy 0 0 0 X
Recruitment 0 0 0 X
Promotion 0 0 0 X
Investment 0 0 X X
Financial Policy 0 X X X
Orders 0 0 X X
Profitability 0 0 X X
Factor 3
Work Pace X 0 X 0
Cost Reduction 0 X 'X 0 Work Standards X 0 0 0 Recruitment X 0 0 0 Promotion X 0 0 0 Discipline X 0 0 0 Investment X 0 0 0 Orders X 0 0 0
Factor 4
Safety X X X X Work Standards 0 0 0 X(-)
Factor 5
Transfers X X X X
Factor 6
Pay X 0 0 0 Promotion X 0 0 0 Financial Policy X 0 0 0
Factor 7
Safety X 0 0 0 Cost Reduction 0 0 0 X Hark Standards 0 0 X X "Discipl ine 0 0 X X Investment 0 0 X 0Table 5.~(contd)
Factor 8 Management Staff .Foremen Hourly Paid
Work Pace 0 0 0 X
Pay 0 X X 0
Promotion X(-) f 0 0 0
Factor 9
Cost Reduction X 0 X(-) 0
Redundancy X 0 0 0
Factor 10
Work Pace 0 X 0 0
Redundancy 0 0 X 0
Profitability 0 0 X 0
Factor 11
Work Pace 0 0 X 0
Work Standards X 0 O. 0
Redundancy 0 0 0 X
Factor 12
Pay 0 0 0 X
Recruitment 0 0 X(-) 0
Factor 13
Orders X 0 0 0
Profitability X 0 0 0Staff a perception of a distinctive Management influence, but unlike
Management and Staff they do not see the non-Management groups as amorphous,
rather they distinguish between (i) Staff and (ii) themselves and their
Foremen. This, however, is in the context of how they perceive the present
(how influence is actually distributed), what we want to move onto now is
how the Hourly Paid would wish to see influence distributed.
Table 5.,1 presents the results of the McQuitty Linkage Analysis of Hourly
Paid Perceptions of their Desired Distribution of Influence. Aparticularly
striking cluster is cluster 3, which is solely composed of Management.
In fact 7 of the 14 Management variables appear in this Cluster, which
provides further support for our claim of a special quality being attached
to Management influence. ,The remaining 7 Management variables appear in
2 other clusters -
(a) Cluster 1 - Management influence on Safety, Pay, Redundancy and
Recruitment.
(b) Cluster 7 - Management influence on Transfers, Promotion and Orders.
The distinction between Cluster 3 on the one hand, and Clusters 1 and 7
on the other, may be that the issues of Cluster 3 may be seen as peculiarly
Management - these are the issues on which Management influence should be
most special. The issues in Clusters 1 and 7 may, therefore, be concerned
with a Management influence which is less special - but special nonetheless.
For instance in Cluster 1 while other groups enter into this Cluster, with
the exception of Recruitment only Management has influence on Safety, Pay
and Redundancy. This is unlike C1uster.7 where as well as Management
influence on Transfers there is also Staff, Foremen's and Hourly Paid
influence on Transfers.
This may suggest a very fine grading of Management influence _
(i) those issues specified tn Cluster 3 may be associated with the highestTable 5.5"1' Mcquitty Linkage Analysis of Hourly Paid Perceptions of Desired
Distribution of Influence
ClOster 1
Work Pace
II
II
Promotion
Discipline
II Hourly Paid
Cluster 2
Staff Influence on Safety
Foremen II II II
Hourly Paid II II II
Management Influence on Safety
" II Pay
II II Redundancy
II II Recruitment
ForemenIS" II
Staff
Foremen's
Hourly Paid
Foremen's
II
Cluster 3
Management Influence on Work Pace
Cost Reduction
Work Standards
Discipline
Investment
Financial Policy
Profitability
Cluster 4
Staff Influence on Pay
Foremen's II "II
II II II Redundancy
Cluster 5
Hourly Paid Influence on Pay
II II II Redundancy
II "II Recruitment
Cluster 6
staff Influence on Cost Reduction
Foremen's II " " "
Hourly Paid II " II "
Cluster 7 -
Influence on Transfers
II " II
II Promotion
II Orders
Management
staff
Foremen's
Hourly Paid
Management
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
IITable 5.£1 (contd)
Cluster 8
Staff
II
II
II
Influence on Work Standards
II II Investment
II II Orders
II II Profits
Cluster 9
foremen's Influence on Work Standards
Hourly Paid II II II II
Cluster 10
Staff
II
II
II
II
Inf1 uence on Redundancy·
" II Recruitment
II II Promotion
" II Discipline
II II Financial Policy
Influence on Promotion
II II Financial Policy
II "" II
Cluster 11
Hourly Paid
foremen's
Hourly Paid
.foremen's
Hourly Paid
Cluster 12
II
II
II Orders
II "
Foremen's Influence on Profits
Hourly Paid II " II
Cluster 13
Foremen's Influence on Investment
Hourly Paid II II IIlevel of special Management influence,
(2) the special quality of the influence of ~nagement on those issues in
Cluster 1 is slightly less
(3) the special quality of Management influence in Cluster 3 is slightly
less again.
This, however, is only a tentative suggestion, as this method is not
nearly significantly powerful to make such a claim. The suggestion is
based purely on the degree of'~anagement exclusivity in each of these
3 Clusters.
It is, however, clear that Management influence is still seen as distinct
for Hourly Paid employees, even when they are asked how they would ideally
like influence to be distributed. It is evident that even on that basis
Management are still dominant, and to that extent hierarchy also.
We did, however, show above in looking at 'Actual Influence' that for the
Hourly Paid Staff influence was distinct as well - and distinct from that
of Foremen, who were mainly (but not exclusively) associated with the
Hourly Paid. Table 5.~1 shows clearly that that situation still exists,
even now in dealing with DesiredJDistribution of Influence.
If we take Staff first, 9 of their 14 variables appear in 2 clusters -
clusters 8 and 10 - where no other groups appear. Clusters 8 and 10 are
exclu~iv~lyStaff. Of the 9 variables in Clusters 8 and 10, 5 of them are
issues which appeared in the exclusively Management Cluster 3 - Work
standards, Investments, Profit, Discipline and Financial Policy. Further
examination· of the table shows that on these issues Foremen and Hourly
paid appear together in other clusters (Clusters 9, 13, 12, 1, and 11
respectively). Thus on those issues there is an Hourly Paid perception
of (i) Management influence (ii) Staff influence, and (iii) Foremenand Hourly Paid influence, as 3 conceptually distinct matters.
The 4 issues in Clusters 8 and 10 which did not also appear in Cluster 3
were Orders, Redundancy and Promotion and Recruitment. In the case of
influence on Orders, the Management influence appears in Cluster 7 and that
of Foremen and Hourly Paid in Cluster 11, which may allow for a similar,
but weaker, claim for a corresponding perception of 3 distinct influence
groups as discussed above. In the case of Redundancy and Promotion,
however, there would appear to be 4 influence groups. In the case of
Redundancy, Management appears in Cluster 1, Staff in Cluster 10, Foremen
in Cluster 4, and Hourly Paid in Cluster 5. In the case of Promotion,
Management appear in Cluster 7, Staff in Cluster 10, Foremen in Cluster 1,
and Hourly Paid in Cluster 11.
The ninth issue - Recruitment - is slightly different, as while Staff and
Hourly Paid influence appear to be regarded as distinct (appearing in
Clusters 10 and 5 respectively) the influence of Management and Foremen ,
appears. together in Cluster 1. Thus on decisions about Recruitment there
are, once again, 3 distinct groups of influence, but not as before (i.e.
Management/Staff/Foremen and Hourly Paid), but rather Management and
Foremen/Staff/Hourly Paid).
The remai~ing 4 issues - Work Pace, Cost Reduction, Safety and Transfers -
appear in Clusters 1, 6, 2, and 7 respectively. The first 3 indicate
that the influence of Staff, Foremen and Hourly Paid are regarded as
identical, with only Management not appearing. In the case of Transfers,
however, there is a clear perceived consensus as all 4 groups appear.
Thus the Hourly Paid perception of Staff in relation .to the Desired Dis-
tribution of Influence, is similar to that in relation to the ActualDistributor - namely that like Management they constitute a distinct
group. This is clearly true of the 9 variables which appear in Clusters
8 and 10. Of the remaining 5 variables 2 of them appear in Clusters 1
and' 7 with all 3 other groups, 2 with Foremen and Hourly Paid in Clusters
2 and 6, and 1 with Foremen above in Cluster 4. The distinction, therefore,
cannot be described as one which is as clear as that of Management. It is,
however, a conceptual distinction evident only amongst Hourly Paid.
We saw in discussing the perceived influence of Foremen in relation to
the distribution of Actual Variance, that they tended to be associated
with Hourly Paid. Table 5.)1 shows this association to be present in
relation to Desired Influence, though to a slighly lower degree.
(a) 5 Foremen variables appear only with Hourly Paid (in Table sJ4b the
corresponding number was 7) - Work Standards (Cluster 9). Financial
Policy and Orders (Cluster 11): Profitability (Cluster 12): Investment
(Cluster 13). Of those 5 only Orders did not appear in this group in Table
5.4' and Promotion, Recruitment and Discipline' have disappeared from this
group. These 3 issues now appear on Cluster 1 - Foremen'.s influence on
Recruitment with that of Management; Foremen's influence on Discipline
with that of Hourly Paid; and Foremen's influence 'on Promotion on its own.
The strength of association between Foremen and Hourly Paid is, therefore,
slightly less - but still apparent, and clearly stronger than the associa-
tion of Foremen and Staff.
(b) Foremen and Staff only appear together, with no· other groups, in
Cluster 4, where there are Staff and Foremen's influence on Pay {both
belong to the same bargaining unit {and Foremen's influence on Redundancy.
Thus only 2 Foremen variables have a clear Staff association.
(c) Afurther 2 Foremen variables appear in Clusters 2 and 6 - but
Hourly Paid also appear. Those clusters deal with Safety and Cost
ISOReduction, and as we have suggested before those Clusters indicate a
dichotomy of Management influence on one hand, and that of the other 3
groups on the other~.
(d) The remaining 5 Foremen variables appear in clusters where Management,
Staff and Hourly Paid also appear. Foremen influence on Transfers appear
in Cluster 7. As we suggested above this Cluster suggests a desired
consensus on Transfers as the influence of all 4 groups appear in this
Cluster. The remaining 4 variables appear in ·C1uster 1, where all 4 groups
again appear - Foremen's influence on Discipline appears with that of
Hourly Paid; foremen's influence on Recruitment appears with Management;
Foremen's influence on Work Pace appears with Staff and Hourly Paid.
There is, therefore, certainly a much less clear association of Staff
with Foremen, in the perceptions of Hourly Paid than there was in the
perceptions of Management or Staff. There is, furthermore, a stronger
tendency to associate Foremen with Hourly Paid than with Staff - as we
described already in considering Actual Influence.
Hourly Paid variables fall into 4 categories in Table 5.S1 •
(1) Cluster 5 which contains only 3 variables, but all of which are
Hourly Paid - viz, Pay, Redundancy and Recruitment. This may reflect
their 'trade union attachment', as all 3 were areas on which there were
strong negotiating rights - especially Pay and Recruitment (there was a
Closed Shop among Hourly Paid workers). We can be less clear about
Redundancy as at the time of our research there had not been a redundancy
of any size for at least 15 years.
(2) Hourly Paid variables in clusters wtth Foremen variables. This accounts
for a further 6 variables. Five of these appear in a cluster with the same
Foremen variable - Work Standards (Cluster 9); Financial Policy and
Orders (Cluster 11); Profitability (Cluster 12); Investment (Cluster 13).
In all of these issues tne Foremen and Hourly Paid variables appear together
I ~Iin the same cluster. The 6th variable is Promotion as the Hourly Paid
variable appears in .C1uster 11· and the Foremen variab1e in C1uster l.
(3) Two further variables which appear in clusters with Staff and Foremen
but contain only a single issue - Cluster 2 on Safety. and Cluster 6 on
Cost Reduction.
(4) The remaining 3 variables which appear in clusters with Management.
Staff and Foremen - Cluster 7 where Hourly Paid influence on Transfers
appears with that of the other 3 groups. We have suggested already
that this indicates a desired consensus on Transferring employees from
one job to another (i.e. that all concerned should agree with a particular
employee should be put to work). Two Management variables (in addition
to that on Transfers) appear in this Cluster. The final 2 variables appear
in the 1arged and more complex Cluster 1 - Hourly Paid influence on Work
Pace appears with that of Staff and Foremen (like a category 3 variable in
this section). and Hourly Paid influence on Discipline appears with that
of Foremen (like a-category 2 variable).
Thus 9 or 10 of Hourly Paid variables emphasise a distinc-dnf1uence of
Hourly Paid and t~ ies~cr. exterrt Foremen (the categorisation of Discipline
is not clear). In the remaining 4 or 5 Hourly Paid and Foremen associated
with Staff and Management - but more often with the former than the latter.
Table 5.~' has. therefore. suggested a development of our case so far.
as did Table 5.46. In considering the data prior to Table 5.46. it had
been clear that Management influence had a distinctive quality. The
influence of the remaining 3 groups had. however. not been seen as being
distinct from each other. In considering Hourly Paid data. however • it
has become clear that there are 3 groups -
(1) Management (2) Staff (3) Hourly Paid arid (frequently) Foremen. The
role of the Foreman is not. however. as clear as for the remaining 3 groups.as Foremen as well as being perceived by Hourly Paid to be associated
with them are perceived also to be associated with Management and with
staff. This perhaps reflects on the one hand the traditional Shop Floor
(Hourly Paid and Foremen): Office (Management and Staff) dichotomy
on one hand, and the confusion about the role of Foremen in industry
generally.
Tables 5.~and 5.S3show the Factor Analysis of the Hourly Paid data on
Desired Distribution of Influence. These tables do show once again the
distinctiveness of Management influence. Factors 4, 5 and 8 are clearly
Management factors. Factor 4 is largely a repeat of Cluster 3 - Work Pace
is omitted from Cluster 3, and Recruitment and Promotion appear in Factor
4 having been absent from Cluster 3. Factor 5 repeats largely Cluster 7 -
repeating the associations around Transferring employees and Promotion.
Factor 8 contains only 2 significant loadings -. Management influence on
safety and Work Pace.
Factor 3 appears to be mainly a Staff factor - containing 7 Staff
variables, but 4 Management variables and 3 each of Foremen and Hourly Paid.
It is, however, far from clear that this confirms - or even supports the
argument of Staff as a distinct influence group. Any support provided by
this Factor is certainly fairly small.
Factor 2 can also be considered a Factor which gives some sm~ll confirma-
tion of the view of Staff as a distinctive group. This factor does have
significant loadings on variables of Staff, Foremen and Hourly Paid (also
one Management variable) - but it has to be observed that the signs of
7 of the 8 Staff loadings are the reverse of the Foremen and Hourly Paid
loadings.
The support for the vie~ of Staff as a distinct group from Foremen andHourly Paid, rather than as an amorphous single group composed of 3 sub
groups, is not clear cut. The view of Management as a distinct group is,
however, given further support by Factors 4, 5 and 8 which are either
exclusively or dominantly Management. It is given additional support by
Factor 1 which contains all 14 issues and in which all 3 other groups
have significant loadings on nearly all issues.
Thus Tables 5.52.and 5.53 provide further support for the main view of
Management influence being distinct from that of the 3 other groups. The
Development of this, that Staff influ~nce is distinct from that of Foremen
and Hourly Paid is, however, less well supported by the principal Factor
Analysis. How do these 2 views fare in a Varimax Rotation? The results
are given in Tables 5.;4and 5. ~s:
The main view of Management as a distinct group isconfirmed again by Factors
4, 8, 9 and 14 which are exclusively or mainly (in the case only of Factor
9) Management. The combination of issues in these factors is, however,
very different from that of the McQuitty Linkage Analysis on Table 5.511
and the principal Factor Analysis of Tables 5.52 and 5.~. This though ;)
explained by the difference in method as the original matrix, on which
Tables 5.51-'~'lare based, has been rotated for Tables 5.45""and 5.;~5".
The argument that Staff are perceived as distinct from Foremen and Hourly
Paid in terms of influence, is given greater support by the Varimax rotated
matrix than by the original matrix. Table 5.~shows this point very
clearly in the first 2 factors. Factor 1 has significant loadings on 10
staff variables, no other group having a significant variable. Factor 2
has significant loadings on 9 Hourly Paid variables and 4 Foremen loadings.
These 2 factors point clearly to a perceived separation of influence of
Staff on one hand, and Hourly Paid on the other, with the role of ForemenTable 5.~Si9n;ficant Variables in Each Factor (Analysis in Table 5.51)
Factor 1 Management Staff' Foremen Hourly Paid
Cost Reduction 0 X 0 0
Transfers 0 X 0 0
Work Standards 0 X 0 0
Redundancy 0 X 0 0
Recruitment 0 X 0 0
Promotion 0 X 0 0
Discipline 0 X 0 0
Investment 0 X 0 0
Financial Policy 0 X 0 0
Profitability 0 X 0 0
Factor 2
Pay 0 0 0 X
Transfers 0 0 0 X
Redundancy O· 0 0 X
Recruitment:, 0 0 0 X
Promotion 0 0 0 X
Investment 0 0 X X
Financial Policy 0 0 X X
Orders 0 0 X X
Profitability 0 0 X X
Factot 3
Work Pace 0 X X X
Pay X 0 0 0
Cost Reduction 0 X X X
Work Standards 0 X X X
Redundancy X 0 0 0
Factor 4
Cost Reduction X 0 0 0
Discipline X 0 0 0 Financial Policy X 0 0 0 Profitability X 0 0 0
Factor 5
Transfers X X X X Discipline 0 0 X 0
Orders X 0 0 0
Factor 6
Pay 0 X X 0 Cost Reduction 0 X X 0 Redundancy 0 X X 0
Factor 7
Safety 0 X X X Work Pace 0 X X X Pay 0 0 0 XTable 5.S-~(contd)
Factor 8 Management Staff .Foremen Hourly Paid
Safety X 0 0 0
Transfers X 0 0 0
Work Standards X 0 0 0
Redundancy X 0 0 0
Promotion X 0 0 0
Discipline X 0 0 0
Factor 9
Work Pace X X 0 0
Pay X 0 0 0
Investment X 0 0 0
Factor 10
Recruitment 0 0 0 X
Discipline 0 0 0 X
Factor 11
Recruitment X 0 0 0
Discipline 0 0 X(-) 0
Financial Policy 0 0 0 X(-)
Factor 12
Redundancy 0 0 X 0
Factor 13
Work Standards X 0 0 0
Promotion 0 0 X 0
Factor 14
Orders X 0 0 0
Profitability X 0 0 0
Factor 15
Discipline 0 0 X 0being less clear cutt as we pointed out above.
Factor 10 is another 'single group' factor - containing only 2 Hourly Paid
variables - Recruitment and Discipline These are issues on which their
trade unions had strong negotiating rights - the the same could be said
of Pay and RedundancYt which are not present. Thus precise interpretation
of this factor is confirmed by what is absent rather than what is there.
Other mixed facto~s confirm findings of earlier analyses -
(i) Stafft Foremen and Hourly Paid influence on Work Pace being perceived
as identical - this appears in Factors 3 and 7 in Table 5.~and in Cluster
1 in Table 5.~1.
(ii) Stafft Foremen and Hourly Paid influence on Safety being perceived
as identical - this appears inFactor 7 in Table 5.~and Cluster 2 in
Table 5.5:" .
(iii) Staff, Foremen and Hourly Paid influence on Cost Reduction being
perceived as identical - this appears in Factors 3 and 6 in Table 5.SS
and Cluster 6 in Table 5.~1.
(iv) The influence of all 4 groups on Transfer ing employees being
perceived as identical - this appears in Factor 5 in Table 5.f;and in
Cluster 7 in Table 5.51.
Tbusthe main argument of this chapter - that Management influence is
perceived as having a special quality has been confirmed in all groups -
Management, Staff and Hourly Paid. It has been confirmed in 2 distinct
types of analyses -
(1) by inspection of the Tannenbaum control tables of the first part of
this chaptert and by the excerpts from the semi-structured interviews.
As we moved from one issue to another therewereconsistently 2 main
findings (i) that the non-Management groups should ideally have morethan they have now (ii) that Management even in the desired position should
remain the dominant group. The degree of change varied from one issue to
another and from the perceptions of one group t9 another. The general
findings have, however, remained'constant throughout this Chapter - greater
influence for non-Management groups, less hierarchy, but maintenance of
Management control and therefore a maintenance of hierarchy.
The reason for this, which is clear from the excerpts from semi-structured
interviews is that Management occupya special role - they take decisions,
in the same way a pipe-fitter fits pipes, an electrician does electrical
work, a salesman sells, and a clerk does clerical work. In taking these,
decisions, however,' they should ideally be subject to a greater degree of
influence from non-Management groups than now - a point which generally
Management themselves agreed with, as well as non-Management groups.
Management influence, therefore, has a special quality in that their role -
their competence - is in taking decisions.
The special quality of Management influence has been re-confirmed by the
McQuitt~ Linkage Analyses and Factor Analyses in this section. Time and
again we have seen Clusters or Factors composed only or mainly of Manage-
ment, or composed of any group(s) except Management. These more powerful
statistical methods have served to confirm the argument developed from the
original basic analysis of the data, issue by issue.
In addition to that, the McQuitty Analyses and Factor Analyses have
revealed that Management and Staff on one hand, and Hourly Paid on the
other, appear to perceive hierarchy and the distribution of influence in
different ways. The former see influence as being distributed between
(a) Management, and (b) the 3 other groups largely as an amorphous
mass. The latter see distribution of influence in a more elaborate way _
(a) Management, (b) Staff, (c) Hourly Paid, with foremen mainly beingidentified in this third category. This, however, is less
pronounced than the distinctiveness of Management
influence.
We shall now move on to consider data which confirms
our argument in a third way. This next set of data deal
with alternative organizational structures - in particular
the possibility of employee representatives on the Board of
Directors. As we shall see, faced with the possibility of
an alternative organization, the role of management and
hierarchy is not fundamentally challenged.
Representation on the Board?
This section deals with perceptions of alternative
form of organizational structure. For reasons of economy,
however we are unable to present all the data collected
here. What we have done is to take particular issues which
are representative, the remainder being presented in
Appendix 3• In this section we deal with the perceived
acceptability of various alternative forms of o~ganization
- various formats for determining policy issues: different
forms of control of access to company information for
employees: different forms of profit sharing. Other issues
concerning the role and objectives of employee directors,
as well as the perceived differences they might make in
board decision-making are considered in Appendix 3.
While only these issues are considered in this the
main part of the thesis, those which are contained in the
APpendix, while dealing with different specific issues,
follows the same structure of argument, and the same logic
in the thinking of our respondents.
I'The first table in this section is Table 5.r~which deals with Management
responses to whether they found the 6 alternatives in determining policy,
acceptable or not. Perhaps nor surprisingly, they did not find the first
option' acceptable - it is perhaps surprising that as many as 25% only found
the idea of 'policy being decided by the Shop Floor and Unionised Staff
alone' only acceptable. The sec ond option - of Management and Unionised
Employees have equal influence on policy - found more support, but was
still clearly unacceptable. The third option - the same as the second, but
this time allowing for all employees, whether unionised or not - found still
more support, but was still found unacceptable/totally unacceptable by
just over 50%. It is perhaps noteworthy that 32% of Managers found the
second option acceptable/were neutral, and nearly 50% found the third
option acceptable or were neutral, since these are in certain respects
quite radical transformations - from a situation where there is no employee
representatives at Board level, to one where the employees would have a
50% share in Board representation. There is, therfore, clearly a 'radical'
(relatively) minority group in Management who do not find greater voice
for their employees, unappealing.
It is, however, the 4th optionlwhich attracts far and away the greatest
degree of support among Management, and as can be seen is the only option
where more than 50% find the option Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable.
This option is the one clearly most consistent with the argument we have
developed in this chapter - namely that Management should take the decisions,
but··subject to the influence of their employees."Table 5.,6.
"Totally Totally
Management Acceptable Acceptable Neutral Unacceptable Unacceptable
Policy Decided
1) Shop Floor &Unionised 0 0 0 8 24
.'; Staff Alone 0% 0% 0% 25% 75%
2) 50/50 by Management and 0 4 6 15 6
Unionised Employees 0% 13% 19% 47% 19%
3) 50/50 by Management and 1 7 7 12 4
all Employees, Unionised or Not 3% 22% 22% ·38% 13%
4) By Management in 8 20 1 3 0
Consultation with all Employees 25% 63% 3% 9% 0%
5) By Management in 0 6 3 21 2
Consultation with Staff 0% 19% 9% 60% 6%
6) By Management Alone 5 9 1 14 3
16% 28% 3% 44% 9%
Table 5.5+-
Staff
Policy Decided
l} Shop Floor and Unionised 1 8 7 31 24
Staff Alone 1% 11% 10% 44% 34%
2) 50/50 by Management 5 35 14 10 7
and Unionised Employees 7% 49% 20% 14% 10%
3) 50/50 by Management 9 28 7 22 5
and all Employees, Unionised or Not 13% 39% 10% 31% 7%
4) By Management in Consultation 15 48 2 5 1
with all Employees 21% 68% 3% 7% 1%
5) By Management in 1 12 9 39 10
Consultation with Staff 1% 17% 13% 55% 14%
6) By Management Alone 1 9 7 34 20
1% 13% 10% 48% 28%Table 5.~
Totally Totally
Hourly Paid Acceptable Acceptable Neutral Unacceptable Unacceptable
Policy Decided
1) Shop Floor and Unionised 10 21 5 11 1
Staff Alone 21% 44% 10% 23% 2%
2) SO/50 by Management and 10 29 5 4 0
Unionised Employees 21% 60% 10% 8% 0%
3) 50/50 by Management 4 15 7 19 3
and all Employees Unionised or Not 8% 31% 15% 40% 6%
4) By Management in Consultation 12 29 4 3 0
with all Employees 25% 60% 8% 6% 0%
5) By Management in Consultation 3 6 8 24 7
with Staff 6% 13% 17% 50% 15%
6) By Management Alone 3 5 1 31 8
6% 10% 2% 65% 17%The final 2 options attract much less support than the 4th option. Indeed
it is interesting to note that the 5th option (which would give a privileged
position to Sta.ff over other non-Management employees) is less acceptable
than the 6th option (which would have policy decided by Management
alone). - This clearly reflects perceived reality i.e. that special
access to Management for Staff, would not be workable, and would have to
be extended to Hourly Paid employees as well.
It may be suggested that Option 6 in fact describes the status quo -
that it is Management who take policy decisions now without consultation
etc. with anyone else. It should, however, be understood that this Option
implies that policy decisions would be taken by Management without regard
for anyone else in the Company. The presence of trade unions, and an
extensive closed shop, renders that Option about as radical a change as
option 1. In terms of operating procedure, however, there is no direct
consultation on many matters i.e. there may be negotiation on wages,
consultation on working practices etc., but on many decisions (e.g.
financial policy, investment decisions etc.) there is little/no even
informal consultation. This is true even for Managers in their dealings
with their Board of Directors, as is made clear in the first part of
Excerpt 514. It is this Manager's view that there is a strict division
of labour "they come up with the ideas and we're told what is required
and on that basis they make the decisions.'
i.e. Directors develop ideas and take decisions, while Managers do the
research etc. to establish the information which will make the decision
to be taken.
It is his view, which he develops as this Excerpt progresses, that Managers
should be able to consult with their Director for an effective exchange
of information and views. This system of consultations should progress
down the hierarchy with each Manager/Foreman meeting with his work groupto exchange views and information. It is, however, clear in Excerpt
5.t4 that the respondent does not go along with the ide~ of employee
representation on the Board. For this respondent participation is really
a matter of communication - it is a means for information and views to
be exchanged in a meaningful and effective way, but it should not change
the hierarchy. Decisions are still to be taken by the Managers/Board.
The influence which could be exerted by Hourly Paid/Staff employees
would be solely in terms of the correctness of their view, not in terms
of any formal rights of participation or representation. Furthermore
that correctness (or otherwise) would be for Management to decided.
Thus the dominant Management view on Employee Representation would seem
to be against formal representation, but in favour of greater communication
within the Company to enable better decisions to be taken.
A similar view is implicit in the end of Excerpt 5.~ This is taken from
an interview with a Director. Toward the middle of this Excerpt he
describes the method of decision making in the Board as one of consensus,
and avoiding taking votes. If there were employee r~presentatives on the
Board he makes clear that he would wish that to continue. Clearly worker
directors are not, for him, a means to develop negotiating at Board level -
faced even with a difficult decision (a redundancy) the expectation is that
they would accept the majority (Management) view. Their role, for him,
would mainly be to present employees' views.
The views in Excerpt 5·~5do represent a development on those of Excerpt
5.~~ but they are not inconsistent with each other. Both regard employee
participations as a vehicle to improve communication. For the manager in
Excerpt 5.~I~communication and participation mean effectively the same
thing - for the Director in Excerpt 5.25the latter is a formal mechanism
to enhance the former. In botn cases,nowever, the whole of what theysay is under-written by a kind ofSartrian 'good-faith' - that all
views will be considered equally. This brings us directly up against
Habences's thesis of ideal speech, and especially the first two conditions
, .' " , which we considered in the first Chapter -
(a) that all participants have an equal chance to put forward their
views, and
(b) that all views can potentially be criticised effectively.
Clearly the two respondents in Excerpts 5.14 and 5.2tibelieve that the
participative systems which they describe would fulfil these 2 criteria.
As we shall see this view is not shared by Staff, or Hourly Paid. We
shall, however, subsequently see that while there is an expressed
consciousness of this among Staff and Hourly Paid, there is little sense
that this contravention of the first 2 conditions of ideal speech is
located in the contravention of the last 2 conditions which apply to
structure - and indeed we shall see a limited awareness of breach of the
2nd condition by an unconsciousness of inability to subject Management
views to the same degree of criticism as those of Staff and Hourly Paid.
The views expressed by Staff respondents are shown in Table 5.~
Like Management, Staff were not attracted to Option 1. The view that
Company policy would be determined by Unionised Staff and Shop Floor was
found Acceptable/Totally Acceptable by only 12% of Respondents, while 78%
found it Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable. Certainly, relative to Manage-
ment, it is more highly supported, but it is clear that for Staff this
radical option is not supported.
Management did not find the second option acceptable either, but in the
case of Staff 56% find the option of policy being determined equally by
J~ IManagement and Unionised Employees, to be Acceptab1e1Jota11y Acceptable.
There are, however, 24% of the Staff sample who. find this option Unacceptab1e/
Totally Unacceptable. While this second option is, therefore, on the basis
of a crude theory of democracy by majority, acceptable, there remains a
not insignificant minority who find it to be unacceptable. It is, however,
absolutely clear that Staff views toward the option of equal representation
in deciding on policy, are more favourable than those of Management.
It is particularly interesting to contrast the results for options 2 and 3.
The difference Between them is that the former refers only to unionised
employees being represented in deciding policy, while the latter refers to
all employees "unionised or not". This 3rd option is found Acceptab1e/
Totally Acceptable by 52% - 56% found option 2 Acceptable/Totally Acceptable.
While 38% found option 3 Unacpeptable/Tota1ly Unacceptable - that figure for
option 2 was 24%. Clearly, therefore, while the degree of support for
option 3 is just about the same as for option 2, more respondents opposed it.
option 3, therefore, clearly polarises Staff views.
The relevant factor in this is clearly the question of union membership.
We shall deal ~ith union memBership more fully in the next chapter, but
at the moment it may be relevant to point to certain facts about Staff
Union Membership in this Company -
(a) not all Staff, below Management level, were union members - 14 of our
81 Staff were not union members,
(b) certain depts/areas of work operated a closed, shop amongst Staff e.g.
most of the grades in Production Control operated a closed shop, and even
in areas like Finance, away from the Shop Floor and thus less tradition
of unionisation, the level of unionisation was markedly increased during the
time of our research,
(e) a Staff Association had until recently remained in existence, to which
roost non-unionised Staff did belong. In the late 1960s, the great majorityof Staff belonged to this association, but over the last 10-15 years this
was gradually nibbled away at by the unions till the roles were reversed.
Unionisation, as we shall see, was not for Staff an act of faith as it is
for Hourly Paid employees - even for Staff who are union members.
The polarisation around option 3 really reflects a continued ambivalence
on the part of Staff about union membership. For those who found this
option acceptable, union membership was clearly seen as less important
than the right of representation - on the other hand some of those who found
it unacceptable/totally unacceptable union membership was more important
than the right of representation.
The 4th option - Policy to be decided by Management in consultation with
all Employees - was strongly supported by Management.
Table 5.~makes clear an equally strong support by Staff, as 89% find it
Acceptable/Totally Acceptable. Once again the idea of Management as the
decision-makers, and others as providers of information, is supported by
the data.
It is, however, interesting to observe that Staff do not support the 5th
option - that Management would set policy in consultation with Staff.
Only 18% support this option by finding it,Acceptable/Totally Acceptable,
despite the fact that this would clearly put them in an advantageous position
in relation to Hourly Paid employees. The reason for this is the same as
we put forward for Management - it is obviously not a feasible option. It
simply could not be perceived as something which was going to work.
Not unsurprisingly Option 6 was not supported, indeed 74% found it
Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable, for reasons similar to those discussed
in relation to Management, above.
193How, therefore, did Staff regard participation? One view is expressed in
Excerpt 5.~. For this Staff respondent the major policy decisions are
taken by the Board of Directors (a view expressed by the Manager in Excerpt
5.~). This, he made clear, is a situation which could not really be changed.
It is just something which is: This is not to say, however, that there is
no role for participation, but, again like the respondent in Excerpt 5~4,
the function of this would be communication. The main distinction between
the respondents in Excerpts 5.l4 and 5.~is that for the former the
participative structure would be less formal than the latter would care
to see.
Another type of Staff view is expressed in Excerpt 5.~~. The initial view
of this respondent is that participation and decision-making are devalued
by the company being part of a group, and because of the nature of the
product. For these reasons decision-making 'in the firm can only operate
within significant constraints. As we progress through the Excerpt, however.
we find a key point of this respondent's view i.e. the role of expertise.
For this respondent an important quality in the right to participate in
decision-making is that one should possess the necessary qualities to
contribute effectively.
The right to participation is not, therefore, a natural or inalienable
right, it is contingent on your ability to make a contribution to coming
up with the right answer. From this view, therefore, decision-making is
a purely functional activity with no power qualities. From what follows
in this Excerpt it is quite clear that the group which has the expertise
is the M~nagement. The fundamental restriction for Hourly Paid - and
logically also for Staff- is that they lack the necessary expertise.
Access to decision-making means possession of expertise. If someone among
Hourly Paid or Staff has the necessary expertise/ability, they will make
progress and get on to the Board anyhow.In considering the views of this respondent, however, it becomes clear that
what he has to say is internally consistent. The role 'of managers is to sell
the product, organise its production etc. and to make the decisions necessary
to achieve that in so doing they do not exercise their own choice, or at
least not entirely. In taking decisions they must be aware of their masters
at the group HQ and of the demands of customers. Management can only take
decisions within these constraints - their qualification to do so is their
expertise. The expertise of Staff and Hourly Paid lies in what they do -
making the product, typing, writing reports etc. The expertise of Management
is dealing with the Group, with customers etc. Thus each group has its
own expertise, with appropriate decision-making requirements for each.
Access to decision-making is, therefore, not an issue about power (at ~cst
that is an effect of more fundamental conditions) or about natural rights.
Decision-making is carried on in a way not unlike the demarcation lines of
the Clydeside shipyards Of50 years ago. It is all a matter of expertise.
It may seem that Excerpt 5.~? is an anomolous view, and not one which would
be commonly found among our respondents. It is certainly true it is not,
as it stands,t:a common view, but as we have already seen, and shall see
subsequently in this chapter, the possession of expertise is an important
justification for having decision-making power.
Adifferent Staff view is presented in Excerpt 5.28. In this Excerpt the
respondent clearly regards major decisions as a managerial prerogative _
indeed he actually uses these words in the Excerpt. Unlike the previous
respondent, however, he does perceive a role for others besides Management _
in particular that there should be consultation. The emphasis on consultation
is the main feature running through this Excerpt. When a decision is to be
taken it is clear from this respondent that participation would mainly be
a matter of communication - that Staff and Hourly Paid would know what washappening, and Management would be made aware of their views and would
take them into account.
"
At the same time the expertise to take those decisions lies with Management,
the same view as was expressed forcibly in Excerpt 5.2~. Obviously this rules
out any question of a majority of employee representatives. The number
required would clearly only have to be sufficient (a) to establish what
was happening (b) make Staff and Hourly Paid views clear.
Asimilar view is expressed in Excerpt 5.2~. For this Staff respondent this
is primarily a question of communication - or IIrepresentationll as he puts it.
The role is purely to 1isten and to put for~,ard Staff views! Indeed about
1/3 of the way into this Excerpt, the respondent explicitly rejects the notion
that employee representatives should be a majority on the Board, and affirms
the view that the role of representation on the Board 'should be purely to
"watch and 1istenll i.e. communicate '. Why should it be only a matter
of communication? The function of representation would be lito stop
"
rumours going around ll• Thus the views of this respondent go back logically
and directly to the issues of the previous chapter, and the failure of the
firm to communicate effectively with its employees.
The views of Staff on policy decisions, we saw in Table 5.tf~ were not
altogether clear. Most support was for Option 4 - where Management would
, ,
consult with all their employees - there was, however, significant support
expressed for Options 2 and 3, where decisions would be taken equally by
Management and unionised employees, or with all employees unionised or not
(56% and 52% respectively found this Acceptable/Totally Acceptable). Option
1, in contrast, is hardly supported at all - only 12% find it Acceptab1el
Totally Acceptable. Thus from Table 5.~it seems clear that among Staff
the right of Management to manage is, on the whole acceptable. There is
no apparent motivation to usurp Management decision-making power. Thisfinding is 'fleshed. out' by Excerpts 5.2.{7 - 5.1'(, wh.i.ch all make clear that
employee representation. is a communication function - ~oth upwardly (in
the sense of employees putting their views to Management) and downwardly
(in the sense of employees finding out what is going o~. The perceptual
basis for this is the differing expertise of Staff and Management.
Individual Staff have their respective abilities. but the expertise of
Management is to take decisions. This view came out very strongly in
Excerpt 5.~. but was present also in the other Excerpts.
The views of Staff are. therefore. not so very different from those of
Management. Management we saw also believed they should take decisions
in consultation with other people who work for the company. The main
difference is. as we have seen. one of degree - in particular how formal
only such mechanism would be. Staff prefer a more formal mechanism. Manage-
ment seek the flexibility which informality allows for.
Moving on to Table 5.~we can see that the views of Hourly Paid workers
are rather different. Option 1 was supported by only 12% of Staff. and
was not supported at all by Management. Among Hourly Paid workers. in
contrast. it is Acceptable/Totally Acceptable for 65%. Thus among Hourly
Paid there is a majority who would find the 'radical' option of. effectively.
workers control acceptable to them. This. however. is not to say that they
do not recognise the difficulties ofsuch a development. Toward the end of
Excerpt 5.~ we introduce with this Hourly Paid respondent the question
of Workers Control of the Company. The respondent suggests that while this
may be workable in "a very small firm" for one this size (about 1,700)
there was too much involved - in particular no decision would be taken _
"a 1ot of talkII •
Earlier on in the same Excerpt we discuss other forms of representation.The respondent makes clear that employees should be lnyolved - "know what's
going on". In this respect this respondent (and the other Hourly Paid
respondents wetll look at) have a similar concern to that of Staff and
Management - they want to know what is happening i.e. for Hourly Paid, Staff
and Management, the debate about worker participation is about communica-
tion, at least in part. The distinction between Hourly Paid and the other
2 groups, is that for Hourly Paid they actually want a vote at Board level.
The Staff view was that, at Board level, they would simply take in the
Management view, and respond with theirs. Hourly Paid actually want to
'record' their view - they want to participate fully.
In the case of the respondent in Excerpt 5.30, he clearly states the
employees on the Board should have a vote. It is, however, significant
that he believes that employee representatives should be a minority on the
Board. This view - that employees should be a minority on the Board - is
repeated in Excerpts 5.31. and 5.,2., who opt for 3 and 2 respectively.
Why do they find minority representation acceptable? The reason is that
the main issue in Board level representation is not influence - it is, as
with Staff, communication. In other words even if they lose out in a vote,
they have at least seen and heard what is happening, which, in all the
Hourly Paid Excerpts we have considered up to now, is an important issue.
Thus the apparently 'radical ' Hourly Paid view is in fact rather less
radical than a consideration of Table 5. ~might have suggested. The
primary objective is communication - to know what is going on, and as the
respondent in Excerpt 5.}i. says II you would get information and you could
a1ways, as I said, make your point there".
Why are they less radical than may have seemed the case? Areason comes
out in Excerpt 5.3~, from a Shop Steward. Like the Hourly Paid respondentswe have considered so far, he believes in representatton at Board level.
The initial discussion centres on, once again, the communication aspect.
Clearly, for this respondent, the opportunity to know what is going on is
the most important aspect. Toward the end of the Excerpt however, it comes
out that 'I don't think we should have a say at this stage". There are 2
important implications of this statement, (1) he is clearly saying that,
because of their 'ignorance of how the Company is run' worker representatives
should have no vote - they don't know enough to deal with this, (2) in the
future this may change - presumably when their 'ignorance' is remedied, in
respect of how the Company is run.
Excerpt 5.33, we would argue, makes a significant point - one which is
consistent with the control graph data presented earlier - that in the
present mode of organisation the role of Management is dominant - and that
this dominance originates in the special knowledge of Management (or the
relative ignorance of others, following the logic of Excerpt 5.33). Hence,
in Table 5.~S it is quite logical (and not merely 'conservative') that
Option 2 should be more popular (policy equally decided by Management and
Unionised Employees) and Option 4 most popular of all (policy decided
by Management in consultation with all employees). It is not entirely,
therefore, only whether an Option is acceptable or not - but also whether
it is realistic. From the structure of Hourly Paid perceptions the role
of Management is such as to make the less radical option 4, more realistic
than the more radical option 1. Nevertheless, 65% do support option 1.
The detail from Excerpts 5.;0 and 5.33 do make clear the awareness of the
problems of making Option 1 (workers control) work.
It is, however, important to make clear that this is not necessarily a
wholly stable attitude. As we said above in discussing Excerpt 5.33 the
deference to Management owes much to, in effect, the Managerial experienceof Management which the other groups lack. The structure of their
attitude toward Management may change if that experience was not the monopoly
of Management.
This 'dynamic' possibility is clear in Excerpt 5,~. The Shop Steward
in this Excerpt makes clear his belief that as the experience of employee
representatives at Board level develops, there will be a move toward an
~uality of voting numbers for employees at Board level. In this Excerpt
we also discuss 2 further problems of employee participation.
A) The possibility of ,employee representatives growing away from their
members (discussed in 'P. Brannen et al in Worker Directors Speak' in
relation to BSe), or put another way, that as employee representatives.
develop the experience of Management necessary to operate at that level,
that they will themselves become Managers. The respondent makes clear
that his union is concerned about this problem but that he feels that an
employee representative could not operate effectively without the support
of his members/those he represents - if he was absorbed into Management this
would presumably evaporate.
B) The potential difficulties of securing support in the event of disagree-
ment between employee representatives and the rest of the Board. While
the trust between Shop Stewards and their members is important, the respon-
dent does make clear his awareness that it will be more difficult to gain
support in relation to Board policy than for a wage rise, because the latter
is "in front of their faces and its easily arguable". The relevance of
Board policy decisions may be less obvious to members - who will still
lack Management experience.
A final important issue from Excerpt 5.~is to re-emphasise that the move
to employee representation is, as it is put right at the end "years ahead".
~ooThus in considering Hourly Paid views on taking policy decisions we have
identified a number of points:
(i) unlike Staff and Management, Hourly Paid find Option 1 (the Workers
Control option) acceptable - but, it appears, not realistic at the moment,
(ii) that the communication function is important for Hourly Paid workers,
as it was for Staff and Management,
(iii) the role of Management is still seen as being dominant, because of
their experience of managing, and in particular of taking decisions.
These points are all repeated in Excerpt 5.3) which is again from an
Hourly Paid respondent. In the middle of this discussion we raise the
question of effective workers' control with him. While it is interesting
that he foresees benefits like making people work harder if they get the
profits, it is significant that he perceives an important role for Manage-
ment, even in a worker managed enterprise. Even in such an organisation
there would still be a need for Management to take decisions.
In the first half of the Excerpt the issue of communication arises, and it
is significant that he should say in relation to employee representation
at Board level "I think it would be their decision really but they could let
us know what they are doing". The importance ascribed to conmunication
is consistent with the acceptance of a minority representation at Board
level "You'd be able to express the workers' opinion on the Board".
The dominance of Management is made perfectly clear toward the end of the
Excerpt, where we close the discussion on workers' control, by discussing
,
(perhaps paradoxically) those decisions which Managers should be able to
make on their own. Management, be believes, should be able to take
decisions on "the running of the Company because they are the Management,
we are the workers
ll
• This is certainly a more minutable view than in
~o IExcerpts 5.;3 and 5.~. It almost has a 'forever and ever. Amen' quality
to it. It does, however, illustrate the problems of changi.ng away from
hierarchy that were hinted at in Excerpts 5.10 and 5.:1-1. Aclear
reference point in Excerpt 5.3;is that there are Managers and there are
Workers. While the respondent in Excerpt 5#;~ may accord them more import-
ance than the respondents in Excerpts 5.33 and 5. ~ all of the Excerpts
from Hourly Paid workers are predicated on the existence of there being
Managers and Workers (or Management, Staff and Hourly Paid). The issue
has been negotiating the relationship between the group. The issue in
many respects has not been whether or not there should be hierarchy,
but not on negotiating the conditions under which it will operate in
the future.
Finally, on this point, it will be interesting to contrast the views
of the 3 groups on the question of which of the options was acceptable
or not. This is done in Table 5.~ From this we can see Options 5 and
6 are not acceptable to any group. Option 1 is acceptable only to
Hourly Paid. Option 3 is acceptable to Staff, but not Management, while
Hourly Paid.are unclear. Option 2 is acceptable to Staff and Hourly Paid.
Option 4, however, is supported by more than 50% of each group - 88%
of Managers/89% of Staff/85% of Hourly Paid.
Thus while there are clear perceptual differences between the 3 groups
there is one option which they agree is acceptable - that Management take
decisions in consultation with all their employees. This, however, has
to be understood against the background that -
(1) the effect of introducing a measure of participatton may alter the
perceptions - indeed it seems likely that among Hourly Paid at least the
development of experience of participation may raise their ambition.
(2) given the existing perceptual differences on employee representation
between the 3 groups, while there is agreement on option 4, there may beimportant negotiation to be done at the margins - indeed the margin may
have very sharp edges.
Table 5.~
Management Staff Hourly Paid
Policy Decided
1. Shop Floor Unionised Staff
Alone
2. 50/50 by Management and
Unionised Employees
3. 50/50 by Management and
all Employees, Unionised
or not
4. Management in Consultation
with all Employees
5. Management in Consultation
with Staff
6. Management alone
+
+
+
+
+
+
o
+
At least 50% find the Option Totally Acceptable/Acceptable
II II II II II II II Unacceptable/Unacceptable
Less than 50% II II II II II II
+
o
or
II Acceptable/Acceptable
control of Information
One of the 'sharpest edges' we have encountered so far, concerns the
effectiveness of the Company's communications. In the previous chapter
we saw very clearly that those below the level of Management felt they
were not at all well informed by the Company. The possession of
information is crucial to take part in decision-making effectively.
One cannot participate in decision-making in ignorance of the appropriate
facts. At the moment company information is restricted to Management -
other than those among Staff responsible for its preparation (e.g. clerks
in Finance and Accounting}. To enable others to participate in decision-
making would, therefore, require access to information to be widened. We,
therefore, put to ..respondents 4 options which ranged from complete
accessabi1ity to complete Management control over information. The views
9...03of management are shown in Table 5..IIO
Table 5,~
Totally Totally
Management Acceptable Acceptable Neutral Unacceptable Unacceptable
option
1. All Information
1 available to all 1 3 20 7
Employees (3%) (9%) (3%) (63%) (22%)
2. All information
18 4 available to all employees 1 8 1
subject to Management veto(3%) (56%) (13%) (25%) (3%)
3. Only information
directly related to an
0 6 7 17 2 employee's job to be
available to him (0%) (19%) (22%) (53%) (6%)
4. No information to be
available to employees
except what Management 0 2 2 17 11
decide to make public (0%) (6%) (6%) (53%) (34%)
This Table makes clear that Management do not find complete freedom of
information to be acceptable - only 12% .find it Acceptable/Totally
Acceptable, while 85% find it Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable, while
85% find it Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable. Option 2, which gives
Management a vetpon any information required by others, is acceptable -
59% find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, while 28% find it Unacceptable/
Totally Unacceptable. The other 2 options, which enhance Management control
still further receive little support and can be regarded as being
unacceptable, possibly because they are perceived as being unrealistic.
Thus Management are prepared to give any information to their employees
as long as they are able to retain a veto on this.
Table 5.tiI gives the views of Staff. Similar to Management, Options 3
and 4 are regarded as UnacceptablelTotally Unacceptable by more than 50%
of the sample. Unlike Management, however, Staff find Option 1 to be
acceptable in that 55% find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable. Thus,
unlike Management, there is a significant view among Staff that there oughtTable 5.6L
Totally Totally
Staff Acceptable Acceptable Neutral Unacceptable Unacceptable
Uptl0n
1. All information 8 3 7 22 3
available to all (11%) (44%) (10%) (31%) (4%)
employees
2. All information
available to all employees 1 35 14 19 2
subject to Management veto (1%) (49%) (20%) (27%) (3%)
3. Only information
directly related to an
1 19 11 36 employee's job to be 4
available to him (1 %) (27%) (16%) (51%) (6%)
4. No information to be
available to employees except
what Management decide to .0 0 6 43 22
make public (0%) (0%) (9%) (61 %) (31%)
to be free access to information. Management support was for Option 2 -
and this is supported by 50% of the Staff sample as well. It is clear,
therefore, that Staff do not have an unambiguous attitude toward control
over information. Some would support a Management veto on access, while
as many oppose a veto and wish complete freedom of information.
The views of Hourly Paid are much more 'straight-forward in that 94% find
Option 1 Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, while for Option 2 the same
figure is only 29%, as can be seen in Table 5.~1 Once again Options
3 and 4 are not regarded as being acceptable.
Thus, if we take the 3 groups together there is an agreement across the
groupS that any information should be available to any employee. The issue
which arises concerns the conditions on which that information should be
made available, and in particular the possibility of Management control
over access. The Management view is that they must have control, Hourly
Paid view is that this is unnecessary. Staff are not really sure. This
is made clear by Table 5"~3.•
Table 5.'~
Totally . Totally
Hourly Paid Acceptable Acceptable Neutral Unacceptable Unacceptable
All information to be
available to all 11 34 1 2 0
employees (23%) (71%) (2%) (4%) (0%)
All information to be
available to all
employees subject to 2 12 5 24 5
Management veto (4%) (25%) (10%) (50%) (10%)
Only information directly
14 related to an employee's 5 2 25 2
job to be available to him(10%) (29%) (4%) (52%) (4%)
No information to be
available to employees
except what Management 0 3 5 27 13
make pub1 ic (0%) (6%) (10%) (56%) (27%)
Table 5."1
Management Staff Hourly Paid
+(50%) +
All Information Available to
all employees + +
All information available to
all employees subject to
Management veto
Only information directly
related to an employee's job
to be available to him
No information to be available
to employees except what
management make public
_ Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable to 50% or more
+ Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 50% or more.Two Excerpts discussed earlier illustrate this problem, In Excerpt·
5.f7 the Manager makes clear several reasons he sees as important in
respect of security of company information • in particular the effect
on the Stock Market valuation of the Firm if information was to become
puolic. Excerpt 5.•9. however, from a Shop Steward makes clear their
awareness that if the type of situations described in Excerpt 5.17 was to
come about that it would be bad news for everyone in the Company. From
the Hourly Paid point of view access to information is about 'knowing
what's going on'.
The results shown in Tables 5~-5.1I~ produce an interesting contrast
which emphasises the role of Management control. Asummary is presented
in Table 5.v3 I which like Table 5.98 adopts as the criterion of accept-
ability whether or not 50% or more find the option either Totally
Acceptable/Acceptable, or Totally Unacceptable/Unacceptable. It can be
seen in Table 5.'3 that only Option 2 is acceptable to Management, but
that only Option 1 is acceptable to Hourly Paid Staff find both Options
1 and 2 acceptable, but Option 2 is absolutely marginal and clearly
option 1 is more strongly supported.
This leads us to 2 conclusions on the views expressed -
{a} that there should be access to information for employees - this is
supported by all 3 groups,
(b) the issue concerns the degree of control which Management should exercise
over access to this information. Management clearly take the view that they
~st retain control, at least on some matters. The rationale for this is
made clear in Excerpt 5.'7, Acounter to that argument 1s put in Excerpt
5.'9.
It is, however, important to note that the principle of access is conceded _the issue on which there is disagreement is procedural rather than sub-
stantive. Furthermore we would argue that, in view of our own perception
of the Company's existing communications bei~glmuch closer to Option 4,
embracing Option 2 does represent a shift for Management.
Profit Distribution
Respondents were also asked about the distribution of Company profits.
As with the great majority of companies, this Company did not operate a
profit distribution scheme. Any such scheme would be complicated by the
Company being part of a group of Companies under common ownership, so that
profit distribution would have to take into account not only employees,
and shareholders of the parent Company but also the financial needs of the
parent Company itself.
Thus as with the similar questions we have asked about decision-making and
access to information, there are questions about a-largely hypothetical
situation. There was, at the time of research, a productivity bonus - which
is monitored in some of the excerpts - but it was not explicitly profit
sharing, and in certain respects was a means through the prices and
incomes legislation of the time (1978).
The views of Management on how profits should be shared are shown in Table
5.'~ Options 1 (profits go entirely to the Parent Company), 5 (profits
equally shared between Parent Company and Employees), and 6 (profits to go
to Employees alone) were all clearly held to be unacceptable - specially
option 6, though that is hardly surprising. It is also true that Options 2
(profits to go to Parent Company but with a bonus for Management) and 4
(profits to go to Parent Company but with a bonus for all employees
negotiated with the trade unions) were also not acceptable (though less so
than 1, 5 or 6}. There are, however, aspects to be noted of Options 2 and 4.Table 5.GA
Totally Totally
Management Acceptable Acceptable Neutral Unacceptable Unacceptable
Company Profits
2 6 0 19 5
1. All go to Parent Co. (6%) (19%) (0%) (59%) (16%)
2. Go to Parent Co.; but
with a bonus for 6 7 3 16 0
Management (19%) (22%) (9%) (50%) (0%)
3. Go to Parent CO. t but
with a bonus for all
emp10yees t whose size
3 22 2 5 0 will be decided by
Management (9%) (69%) (6%) (16%) (OX)
4. Go to Parent Co. t but
with a bonus for all
12 4 emp10yees t negotiated 0 15 1
with Unions (O%) (38%) (13%) (47%) (3%)
5. Shared 50/50 between 0 6 5 15 6
Parent Co. and Employees (0%) (19%) (16%) (47%) (19%)
6. Go to employees alone 0 1 1 18 12
(O%) (3%) (3%) ( 3%) (38%)
First of all Option 2. We have observed already that Management found
options t in respect of decision-making t which favoured them)to be unacceptable.
For instance t in Table 5.~~near1y the same percentage find Option 6
(policy to be decided by Management alone) acceptable as find Option 2 in
Table 5.·~4acceptab1e. Indeed the distribution of responses is very similar
across the range of these 2 questions. It would seem however that ther~ is a
5; gtificant group of tvimagers '!nth rel~tively clear image of Managemen~
interest t in the sens that -
(a) this group finds options t which particularly favour Management, to be
acceptable,
(b) the other group do not find those options acceptable - perhaps on the
basis of moral principle (it could not be seen as 'right') - or on
strictly pragmatic grounds.Option 4 concerns the role of the unions, as while it allows for a system
of profit sharing, there would have to be negotiation with the unions on
this. Only 38% found this Acceptable, while 50% found it Unacceptable/
Totally Unacceptable. In contrast 78% found Option 3 (where the bonus
would be decided by Management) Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, and 16%
found it Unacceptable. The difference between the Options 3 and 4 is purely
that in the former the bonus is set by Management - while in the latter it
is negotiated with the unions, and this is clearly less acceptable. The
importance of this is that it is quite clearly consistent with our dis-
cussions of access to information (see Table 5.hO above and discussion).
Once again, therefore, while a principle is conceded, the need of Management
to retain control appears apparent.
The concession of the principle of profit sharing comes out very clearly
in Excerpt 5.~, with a Management respondent. This is a simple, straight-
forward argument that employees should share in the company's prosperity -
but, while it does not come out in this Excerpt,with the need for Management
control.
Amore thoroughgoing view is put in Excerpt 5,37 where another Management
respondent puts forward the view that the original shareholders should
be bought out by the employees so that eventually it becomes 'the employees'
Company'. Toward the end the underlying rationale of this view becomes
apparent - it is motivational - that if you work for yourself you work
harder. Asimilar view, but more strictly within the context of the present
arrangements is Excerpt 5.38, this time from a Company Director. In this
Excerpt there is a less direct relationship between profit sharing and
effort. In excerpt 5.,ithe Director is really looking for 2 ways _
(i) a way through the wage restrictions of the then government,
(ii) another means (as part of the 'bigger picture') of getting their
~IOemployees to equate their well-being with that of the .Company.
In Excerpts 5.~ and 5.~1 both put forward different views of profit
sharing. The former involves more or less a new form of ownership, while
the -latter is very clearly within the existing structure. At the same
time, they both have the same problem underlying them - employee motivation.
In the former how to get employees to work harder, in the latter more
co-operatively. In either case there are clear views for control of the
firm.
We saw in discussing each of the decision-making areas in the control-graph
data (Tables 5.l-5.~) that while Management consistently supported more
influence for other groups, they, equally consistently, made clear that they
as Management should be dominant. What we have seen from Management in
discussing those Options (Tables 5.~, 5.60 and 5.h4), is essentially
a restatement of that view. Management are prepared to concede more
decision-making influence, more access to company information and to
distribute (at least some) profits to employees. Always, however, there is
the condition that they, as Management retain control of the situation.
In summary it could be said that what we have is a readiness to adjust the
dominance of Management over the Company, but not to remove that dominance.
Views of Staff are shown in Table 5"~£ Like Management, they also find
option 1 to be unacceptable - indeed the distribution on this option is
very similar in Tables 5. ST.- and 5. bl.. They also find Option 6 unacceptable,
as Management did, though very marginally less so. The similarities between
Management and Staff do, however, end there.
option 2 is even less acceptable to Staff than it was to Management. Among
Managers 41% found this Option Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, the corresponding
11,figure for Staff is only 7%. Correspondingly, if we look at Option 5
among Staff 54% find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable, while the figure
for Management is only 19%. Taking those 2 Options together (2 and 5)
indicates 2 features to Staff views:
(i) that special treatment in favour of one group (Management) is n9t
acceptable to the great majority of Staff - Option 2 shows that clearly.
(ii) that Staff are less concerned than Management about the potential loss
of Management dominance implied by Option 5.
Neither of these things is, we would suggest, surprising in itself.
Furthermore it is not surprising in view of what we have discovered of
Staff views up to now. Staff have shown less concern about Management dom-
inance than Management itself has done - see for instance Table 5.h.I:, where
55% of Staff find Acceptable/Totally Acceptable that there should be free
access to Company information. At the same time the views of Staff -
while certainly less orthodox than those of Management, in that they would
reduce the dominance of Management to a greater degree than Management
themselves would - they do display a degree of ambivalence. This could be
seen again in Table 5.61 as while 55% supported option 1 (which mentioned
no Management veto) 50% supported Option 2, which did allow for a Management
veto. This ambivalence can be seen again in Table 5.h,5 in respect of
Options 3 and 4. Both of these require a bonus to be paid, but in the
former the size of bonus is decided by Management, while in the latter it
is negotiated with the Unions Option 3 is Acceptable/Totally Acceptable
to 68% while Option 4 is Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 63%. Thus while
there is a significant procedural change between these 2 options the degree
of acceptance among Staff (and indeed the distribution of responses) is
very similar from Option 3 to Option 4. The divergence in these views is
clearly seen in Excerpts 5.3Q and 5.4()Table 5~5'.
Totally Totally
staff Acceptable Acceptable Neutral Unacceptable Unacceptable
Company Profits
1. All go to Parent 2 15 8 38 8
Company (3%) . (21%) (11%) (54%) (11%)
2. Go to Parent Co.,but
"..
with a bonus for 0 5 11 40 15
Management (O%) (7%) (16%) (56%) (21%)
3. Go to Parent Co., but
with a bonus for all
43 7 employees, whose size is 5 13 3
decided by Management (7%) (61%) (10%) (18%) (4%)
4. Go to Parent Co., but
with a bonus for all
6 38 11 14 employees, negotiated 2
with union (9%) (54%) (16%) (20%') (3%)
5. Shared 50/50 between 4 34 10 19 4
Parent Company &employees (6%) (48%) (14%) (27%) (6%)
6. Go to Employees alone 1 8 13 31 18
(1%) (11%) (18%) (44%) (25%)
In the former the deference to Management is quite clear, from this Staff
respondent. There are 2 important issues raised by Excerpt 5.3q:
(1) the explicit rejection of union involvement in negotiating a bonus, on
that Management should be left to decided how to distribute compamy profits,
(2) the issue of what happens if the Company was to make a loss. Would
they be asked, he suggests, to make that up?
Excerpt 5.4C>is a clear contrast to this. In the first place the idea that
employeeocou1d be asked to make up a loss is explicitly rejected. This
staff respondent's view is quite clearly in relation to a share of the
company's prosperity. The ups and downs of commercial life are clearly
a feature he finds difficult to accept.
In relation to the role of the union, the respondent in Excerpt 5.40 makes
~, 3clear that for him their participation is essential - if Management
produced a figure of their own ('hush-hush') this would clearly not be
acceptable to him.
Thus in these 2 Excerpts we have been able to illustrate the uncertainty
among Staff taken'as a group about the dominance of Management. Among
some Staff this is perceived as a situation to be continued - but for others
one which should be changed (i.e. the dominance of Management should be
at least reduced). This uncertainty has been observed before among Staff -
reflecti~ perhaps their intermediate status in the original hierarchy.
Further elaboration of Staff views on profit-sharing - in particular the
fact that the productivity bonus was based on a percentage of salary/wages -
as given in Excerpts S.-41 and sA2-
As we pointed out already, the Company operated a productivity bonus - in
part at least as a way through the then operative prices-incomes l~gislation
This gave employees an incentive in the form of a bonus of 8% of the
salary/wages if a production target was achieved. Both the Staff respondents
in Excerpts s.41 and S.~Jlargue that this is not an appropriate way of
paying the bonus. In particular they call into operation the relationship
between the effort expanded and the reward received.
In the former Excerpt, the Staff respondent draws attention to what he
calls 'bottlenecks' - what might also be called areas of particular stress,
where a great deal of effort has to be expended by employees. In the latter
Excerpt the argument is more generalised but of the same type. In Excerpt
s.4~the argument is the direct one, that the reward and effort are not
necessarily equal. He does, however, develop this later on in the Excerpt
where he argues tnat Shop Floor tradesmen are more valuable than many Staffbecause they 'are ·the ones that are actually producing'. He does, however,
state this as a personal view, acknowledging that that would not be a widely
held view among Staff. (This respondent is, however, a-typical in his Shop
Floor working experience).
In terms of profit sharing, therefore, the idea of a bonus as a proportion
of wages/salary does seem to encounter the problem of relating to effort -
an across-the-board payment seems to be more acceptable. As we shall see
this view is also held by Hourly Paid. It is~ furthermore, equally clear
that profit-sharing is regarded as a share in the success of the Company.
This sense of profit-sharing being a share of the company's success, echoes
to some extent what was said by the Director in Excerpt 5.38 about securing
an identity of employee and company well-being. What we have said does not
rule out such a development - it does, however, indicate 2 obstacles -
(a) the fact the existing bonus is paid as a proportion of wages and salary -
this may generate resentment in that the bonus paid to each individual may
not reflect contribution to the profit figure,
(b) the determination of the size of the bonus is not, in the view of a
significant proportion of the Staff, a matter which can be left wholly to
the discretion of·Ma.nagement. Arole for unions is clearly in their minds
to represent their interests - Management, in this view cannot be allowed
total discretion. Rather more, however, took the view that Management could
be allowed discretion.
Thus the views of Staff on this matter are -
(il ambivalent toward Management - almost equal proportions support Manage-
ment being allowed discretion in determining bonus, and at the same time
that the unions should be involved,
(it) their attitude toward Management dominance of Company affairs is lesspronounced than the view taken by Management. While Management are prepared
to make certain concesstons, as we have seen from the beginning of this
chapter Staff tend to look for rather more than Management are prepared to
offer.
(iii) Staff do, however, clearly regard Mana~ment as the dominant group,
and that this should continue. The differences.revolve around the conditions
for that continued dominance (will Unions be allowed to negotiate profit
bonuses, will there be free access to company information, will policy be
decided equally - or will Management take these decisions alone, perhaps
taking employees· views into account).
The views of Hourly Paid are shown in Table 5.6~. As with Management and
Staffmost Hourly Paid too find Option 1 Unacceptable - some 37%, however,
find it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable. In other words more Hourly Paid
find this Option acceptable than among either Staff or Managements. Like
Staff and Management they also find Option 2 unacceptable - only 19% find
it Acceptable/Totally Acceptable. That, however, is nearly 3 times the
proportion of Staff who found that Option acceptable.
The views of Hourly Paid, therefore, on Options 1 and 2 are similar to those
of Staff, but perhaps surprisingly relatively more conservative than the
Staff views.
If we look at Options 5 and 6, on the other end of the scale, we see that
Hourly Paid views are less conservative than those of Staff. Among Hourly
Paid the option of sharing profits equally between the Parent Company and
the Employees (Option 5) is Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 71% - 54%
was the corresponding figure for Staff. Option 6, which gave all the profits
to the employees was only AcceptaBle/Totally Acceptable to 20% - for Staff
the correspondi~g!figurewas 12%. Thus while Hourly Paid are relatively
more conservative than Staff on Options 1 and 2, they are relatively less
conservative on Options 5 and 6.
~f~'"
Table 5."~
Totally Totally
Hourly Paid Acceptable Acceptable Neutral Unacceptable Unacceptable
Company Profits
1. All go to Parent 3 15 4 19 6
Company (6%) (31 %) (8%) (40%) (13%)
2. Go to Parent Company
2 7 5 24 9 but with a bonus for
Management (4%) (15%) (10%) (50%) (19%)
3. Go to Parent Company
but with a bonus for all
23 3 12 1 employees, whose size will 8
be decided by Management (17%) (48%) (6%) (25%) (2%)
4. Go to Parent Company,
but with bonus for all
15 28 2 3 0 employees, negotiated
with Unions (31 %) (58%) (4%) (6%) (0%)
5. Shared 50/50 between
8 26 5 7 2 ' Parent Company and
Employees (17%) (54%) (10%) (15%) (4%)
. "
6. Go to employees 5 5 8 24 6
alone (10%) (10%) (17%) (50%) (13%)
Why should this be? In relation to Options 5 and 6, given our preceding
argument about Staff, and our earlier findings about Hourly Paid views, we
should not be surprised that Hourly Paid are less conservative than Staff
on Options 5 and 6 (though Hourly Paid do find Option 6 unacceptable).
The real questions, therefore, revolves around Options 1 and 2.
If we take Option 1 first, in many respects this option describes what
happens now. The Company is, as we have pointed out, a wholly.owned
subsidiary of a parent Company. Thus ',',the profits made by the Company
already go to the Parent Company. The lower degree of acceptance by Manage-
ment and Staff may reflect a frustratton that the Company profits may go
elsewhere, The greater distance of Hourly Paid from the scene of that
action may produce a greater pre-disposition to accept 'Option 1 (though like
Staff and Management, they do find it unacceptable).Option 2 does seem more of a paradox. It is not surprising that fewer
Hourly Paid find this Acceptable/Totally Acceptable than Management (19%
to 41% respectively), but the Hourly Paid figure is larger than that for
Staff (7%). Why, therefore, do rather Hourly Paid find this Option - which
clearly favours Management - more acceptable than do Staff. Areason is
apparent in Excerpt 5.43. This Hourly Paid respondent makes clear in the
second half of this Excerpt that in his view Management have special
responsibllities - "Well a worker earns it but they're supervisory •••
But they show good prospects of chasing jobs and that and getting them
done. II Thus for this respondent the Management role - organising, getting
orders - justified a better deal for Management - though he does make clear
that there should be a bonus all round. He would, however, accept a
relatively larger bonus for Management, justified in his perception by
their role. Thus the large acceptance of Option 2 (relative to Staff) may
reflect the perceived importance for Hourly Paid of the Management role.
This though does have to be understood as very much a minority position among
Hourly Paid. Some 69% find Option 2 Unacceptable/Totally Unacceptable. It
does, however, indicate yet again the importance of how the Management role
is perceived ror determining the attitude of other groups toward Management.
It is, therefore, of interest that the group which is physically closer to
Management (the Staff) are relatively less willing in this case to accord
Management a special status, than Hourly Paid who are physically more distant
from Management.
An alternative to the view in Excerpt 5·~3is given by Excerpt 5.~ This
Hourly Paid respondent consistently argues that any profit bonus should be
paid equally, on the grounds that everyone in the firm makes a contribution.
In other words if-following the excerpt - the guy who sweeps the floors
didn't do that there would be "that amount of dirt" - just as if the Management
:~ ,didn't chase orders etc. there would be no business. Everyone contributes
in their own way - thus everyone should share equally 'in the profits.
The contrast in Table 5.~, between Options 3 and 4 once again takes us
back to the issue of how much discretion Management ought to have in
decision-making. Option 3 - which allows Management discretion - is
Acceptable/Totally Acceptable to 65% of the Hourly Paid sample. Thus nearly
2/3rds are prepared to allow Management to set their bonus from the Company's
profits, without any intervention by the union. The possibility of negotia-
tion with the union is put forward by Option 4. This is Acceptable/Totally
Acceptable to 89%. Thus a much larger proportion - nearly half as much
again - prefer negotiations between Management and Unions in determining
the level of bonus to be paid from profits. At the same time Option 5 -
where profits would automatically be equally divided - is Acceptable/Totally
Acceptable to 71%. Thus the most acceptable Option is 4, which allows for
negotiation between Management and Unions, rather than acting unilaterally
(3) or control wholly being removed from Management (5). Thus Management
dominance is not rejected - but a guarantee of influence through union
participation is seem to be desirable.
This point is endorsed in the middle section of Excerpt 5.4~ For this
Hourly Paid respondent the union should negotiate - or as he puts it "discuss"
(which is an even 'softer' approach) - with the Company on this issue. A
particularly interesting aspect of this Excerpt is that explicitly these
negotiations/discussions should be fundamentally in the light of the
company's profits/prosperity,' Furthermore that profits should be retained
and re-invested in the Company, if this is what Management want to do - but
subject to the condition that this 'is actually done, which illustrates
yet again that Management decisions can be wholly acceptable if done in
consultation with their employees, so that 'they know what is going on'.
~19Another interesting point in Excerpt 5.4S-is the question of how bonuses
would be paid from profits. We put 2 possibilities - cash or shares. The
respondent in Excerpt 5045' makes clear he prefers cash, as shares would
cause him to be 'worried out of (hts) blooming wits'. Another view is,
however, put in Excerpt s.4u. This Hourly Paid respondent, while still
stating a preference for cash, would be prepared to hold on to shares "to
see how they were going
ll
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The two respondents do, however, argue that everyone should receive the
same .. from the company profits. For instance in Excerpt 5.4" justifies
this view by pointing out that if everyone in the Company was working
together responsibilities would be shared, so profits should be equally
shared. This causes us to return to an issue raised in Excerpt 5.38 where
we discuss with a Director the role of profit distribution in running the
Company. For the Director part of this concerns getting employees
"equating their well-being with the Company well-being". Excerpts 5.4.5and
5.~ suggest that while profit distribution may not get employees to work
harder it would make for a "better relationship" (Excerpt 5.~;. Thus the
Management objectives with respect ot motivation from profit distribution
would seem practicable.
This, however, is not to say that Hourly Paid employees are unaware of the
motivational aspect to profit distribution, and are not critical of it.
The Shop Steward in Excerpt 5~~ is clearly aware of this, and critical of
it. His 'alternative' is very different from the existing concept of the
Company, as thisinvolves running the Company for need rather than profit.
The concept of profit distri5utton for this respondent is simply another
means of Management exercising control - "a more relaxed, democratic way,
if you 1ike. Just another meth.od". In that sense the Shop Steward and the
Manager agree - though clearly tney would disagree about the implication
of that control. On the other hand, those Hourly Paid respondents wediscussed this issue with do not have the same perception of profit
distribution. For them - indeed for most respondents in any group - profit
distribution is a means of employees sharing" in the prosperity of the
Company, which is something they have contributed to.
There does, however, remain the issue of how this distribution should be
determined. Table 5.~~ presents a summary of these views for the 3 groups.
Clearly Options 1, 2 and 6.wou1d not be acceptable. Concentrating on Options
3-5 illustrates the nature of the problem. On the one hand both Staff and
Hourly Paid find Options 4 and 5 acceptable. Both of these would severely
restrict the discretion of Management in the issue - indeed Option 5 would
more or less remove it altogether. Neither Option 4 nor 5 is acceptable to
Management. All 3 groups are, however, prepared to accept Option 3, which
gives Management discretion on the size of the profits to be distributed.
This table illustrates 2 important abouts about this section in particular and
most of our findings in general.
(a) Management perceive that they must retain control. We have seen in
many respects that Management are prepared to concede greater influence
to Staff and Hourly Paid - but that they as Management must retain ultimate
control.
(b) Staff and Hourly Paid, while seeking greater influence, have been
prepared to grant to Management to status of the dominant group, but that
should be-subject ·to a guarantee of their influence i.e. that while Management
may be dominant, that dominance should not be unrestricted. Hence we saw
in Tables 5.~·~ and 5.~b that Option 4 was more acceptable than Option 3.
This raises directly how Staff and Hourly Paid influence would be used in
a participative system. This issue is considered in the next section which
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poses questions about the possible role of ~~rker directors.' Of particular
" relevance is that Management perceptions of how worker directors would
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operate (their objectives br(tart1cular) are rather different fran those
of Staff and Hourly Paid. Management concern about the participation of
other employees at board level may be reduced by an awareness that Staff
and Hourly Paid perceptions of what worker directors should be going ar~
0'
very similar to those bf.::Management.Empirical Conclusion
This section completes our work on perceptions of the organisation's
: ~ ,decision-making, and (in the previous chapter)
its communication of information to employees. The following have been
the most important findings
1 From chapter 4 it is clear that employees
informed in this company (though we would 'not suggest that the company,
relative to others, is particularly bad), and that the further down
the hierarchy one goes the more the more pronounced this becomes.
2 In most of the 14 decision-making areas we looked at the perceived
level of participation/control exercised by this labour for~~ outwith mnnnr-emc1
was very low. We do, however, have to distinguish between those issues
which had an immediate and directly perceived relevance for the
individual, and those issues where relevance for the individual i~ more
difficult to perceiv~. An example of the former would, fairly
obviously be pay. Tables 5.1 - 5.5 show perceptions of a high degree
of influence, especially for the hour1y,paid. An example of the latter
would, be Financial Policy, where the influence perceived as exercised
by those below the level of management was very low indeed (eg 79% of
hourly-paid said they exercised 'little influence' or 'no influence' -
, ,"- .. ~ ..... , :. ;'see Table 5.14: 73% of staff gave the same responses to this question
see Table 5.~). This type of finding is the same as that of
Heller et al in 'What do the British want from industrial democracy'.
They conclude lithe total amount of involvement in decision-making
at work is astonishingly low (Pg.20). Similarly, Rathkey concludes
"there was little support for the view that a large degree of worker
participations had already been acheived at shopfloor level (as put
forward by Bullock). From a very broad definition of participations,
the findings pointed clearly to aswong sense of lack of influence
over shop-floor issues" - Participation and Industrial Democracy: the
Shop-Floor View, pp138-l39). Our findings are very much in the same
direction as these. There is a low degree of influence exercised
over-all by those below the level of management. We do, however, have
one reservation in relation to Rathkey. We have found in this study
that the more direct and obvious relevance an issue has for the
individual, -the greater the perceived influence.Conversely the less
direct and more opaque the relevance of an issue, the less the
perceived influence. So on shop-floor issues we found a greater
degree of influence than on issues away from the shop-floor. Therefore
while agreeing with the first part of Rathkey's conclusion (that
little worker participations has been acheived) we do have reservations
about the extent to which influence is exercised on shop-floor issues.
3 Heller et al conclude further that "there is little evidence that
workers (or any other level of organisation) want to have a radically
different degree of influence or control over decisions "(what do we
British want from Industrial Democracy Pg.20). This was not what
we found in this study. We found that consistently employees below
the level of Managment, and indeed Management, wanted to exercise a
greater degree of influence than at present. Out findings are much
closer to those of Rathkey who says lithe study demonstrated a clear
desire on the part of the shop-floor workers to have more say;nin decisions which affected their work and working conditions
U(Participation and Industrial Democracy: the Shop-Floor View, Pg 138.)
For instance, if we take up influence on Financial Policy decisions,
we Sll-W then that 79% of Hourly-Paid perceived themselves
as having little or no influence. Similarly, 73% of Staff perceived
themselves to have little or influence. If we ask them. how much
influence they would 1deally have, however, we found 12% of Hour1y-
Paid say 'A Good Deal' and 54% say they should have 'some' (Table
5.l4). The figures for Staff are 11% and 66% (Table 5.~. This
is simply one example of what happened as we moved from what respondents
thought did happen to what would happen in an ideal situation - the
influence of Staff and Hourly-Paid would increase.
4 - Despite the fact that Staff and Hourly-Paid did desire a greater
degree of influence for themselves, it was consistently shown that
they would, even in an ideal situation continue to defer to Management.
Even in respect of Pay it is true that Management would continue to
be dominant - though it is admittedly marginal in the case of Hourly-
Paid (Table 5.4). On other issues - though still clearly work-related -
deference to Management is apparent (eg Work':'Pace-Tab1es 4l:J..5:~(J3/)..=l/
Transfers from one part of the factory to another - Tables '13.:,4·.:-
fl3~'/1-/promotions - Tables A3.3q-,R3.-1~,'Discip1ine - Tables 5.-12. -
5./~). Given these obviously and directly relevant issues to an
individual, even in an ideal situation there continued to be reported
a structure of influence in which Management would continue to be
dominant. This is supported by the data which follows on after the
control graph data.
5 The Mcquitty Linkage Analysis and Factor Analysis (Table 5. ~
to Table 5.5s) have a pronounced tendency to separate out Management
influence from that of other groups (This is what Gunde1ach and
Tetzs ';hner found in Acta Sociologica 1976). In other words Management
influence - either actual or ideal influence - is perceived to bedifferent from that of the other groups. It is interesting that this
is particularly pronounced among Staff and Hourly-paid ie they in
particular perceive Management influence to have a special quality,
more so than Management themselves, whose own view is more disparate.
6 The data on possible future structures (Tables 5.~ to 5.u.~) all
emphasise the role of Managment once more. We have seen that Staff
and Hourly-Paid, in the control graph data, even in an ideal situation
perceive Management as being the dominant group. Tables 5.~'-5.u·~
clarify this situation somewhat. While more 'radical alternatives
(eg equality of Management with others in decision-making) are accept-
able, Management taking decisions in consultation with their employees
is the most acceptable option for every group. This, we believe,
illustrates a very important point - namely that while Staff and.
Hourly-Paid are prepared to accept. a continued domination by Management,
that acceptance is not unconditional. In particular, Staff and
Hourly-Paid, as we saw, 'want to know what is going on'. This was
quite clear when we d1scussedaccess to information. Table 5.101
shows that Hourly-Paid are not prepared to accept a system of access
whereby Management have a veto. Staff can be seen in Table 5.100 to
prefer a system of free access to one with a Management veto (though
50% do say it is acceptable). Management, on the other hand, are not
prepared to accept any system of free access. Table 5.99 shows
clearly they believe they must retain control of company information.
In relation to distribution of profits, if a bonus was to be paid,
Hourly-Paid would look to the union to negotiate this with Management
(Table 5.~bJ): Management would prefer to set this themselves (Table
5.64):Staff are pretty well indifferent between the 2 options (Table
5.U~). What all this shows, we would argue, is that (1) Management
think they should remain dominant (~~ this is acceptable, but subject
to conditions on the part of Staff and Hourly-paid. What, therefore
could these conditions be? We can sum this up as follows. Staffand Hourly-Paid are prepared - indeed see as ideal - that Management
should continue to take decisions (that, as we have pointed out already
in this Chapter is the management funct~on), but in taking decisions
Management should be subject to the influence of Staff and Hourly-Paid.
In other words, Management in taking decisions should take into account
the interests, views and information of Staff and Hourly-Paid. This
involves some kind of system whereby there can be 2-way communications
between Management and, Staff and Hourly-Paid.
7 One type of system we considered was participations at Board Level
(Tables ~.3.63 -~.~. The views of Management about how this would
work were fairly pessemistic - their confidence in the company would
decline (Table43.63), they believed that a Board with worker
directors would run the company with fundamentally different objectives
(TableA)"S).. We pointed out, however, that this represented a
misunderstanding by Management, as the data from Staff and Hourly-Paid
indicated not only that their confidence in the Company could increase,
but that they saw the role of worker directors in a way that was not
so very different from the way Management thought the Company should be
run. This is particularly clear in Table A3.41.
Thus, in conclusion, hierarchy is alive and well in this company.
Management are dominant, and for Staff and Hourly-Paid this is a
situation they think"ought to continue. The continuation of Management.
is, however, subject to the conditions we referred to above ie, that
while Management take decisions they do so with the views and interests
of Staff and Hourly-Paid in mind. Even if there was to be worker
participation of this type suggested by Bullock/Vredeling, the Staff
and Hourly-Paid take the view that the purpose of this would be first
of all to help make the Company more efficient before keeping them
informed, or even protecting their rights.Thus hierarchy can, subject to negotiation persist. We
have shown that there is a bazic attitudinal consensus on
that. The negotiation of an operational consensus for the
continuation of hierarchy is unlikely to be done without
conflict - for instance there is a fundamental problem
concerning access to company information, as we showed in
the previous chapter, and again in tables 5.99 - 5.102.
There may be exercises of power in the first two
dimensions, as well as in the third dimension through the
Lifeworld. There may be sharp edges and disagreements. Our
fundamental point is, however, that there is a basic
consensus about hierarchy's persistence - the conflicts, it
appears to us are at the edges. The existence of hierarchy
is guarantied by the Lifeworld, which we shall go on to
establish in the next chapter.
The purpose of this chapter has been to explore
perceptions of hierarchy in an organization (in ,this case
an engineering firm in Scotland). In particular we have
been concerned with the role played by management in the
hierarchy, and the apparent acceptance of this role by
those subordinate to them in the hierarchical structure.
Our urgument this far has required that we use
hierarchy in a wide ranging sense - thus
1) as a structure of an organization. For instance in the
classical Weberian bureaucracy, the officials were ranked
at successively higher levels, with successively greater
degr.ees of power for each level. In this sense hierarchy is
simply a feature of structure.
2) as perceived by those within the organization. It would
In principle have been possible for us to have described in
detail the organization of the firm, and in particular jt~
hierarchy. Thi8, however, would have been of limited value,
zlnce what was relevant for us was to gain access to, and
to understand, the perception of those within the
organization. It is also important to appreciate that their
perception of hierarchy may not be the same 'as our own. Who
15 to say who is correct? Equally perceptions of the
hierarchy may vary between groups (for instance Management
and Hourly paid) and indeed within groups (for instance
different respondents among the staff). What we have tried
to do in this chapter is to show these perceptions.
3) as a mental construct against which employees determine
their behaviour and assess others. It has been our
contention that the perceived hierarchy is an important
context in which employees decide how to behave, and what
to do. Thus, the role of hierarchy is that its differential
power structure is a consideration for employees in
structuring their behaviour.The question we have posed of hierarchy is why it is
that this differential power structure is accepted by the
employees of the company, at least in the sense that they
do not challenge it. In other words we do not require that
the employees do not actually have to positively endorse
hierarchy. It is enough that the "acceptance" is not to
challenge hierarchy. In fact, as we have seen, their
acceptance does appear to have many positive qualities to
it.
Our hypothesized answer to the acceptance of hierarchy
- and thus to systematically different levels of power·· -
has been through the power which operates through the
structure of the r.1fp.world. Hierarchy is itself, of course,
a form of power, and to that extent it can be considered to
be self supporting, since any challenge to the hierarchy's
dominant group would not only have to overcome
a) the restrictions imposed by the Lifeworld, but
also
b) the (conscious) power of that group.
These matters will be considered further in the next
chapter.chapter 6CHAPTER 6
The purpose of this chapter will be
(i) to bring together and summarize the empirical
results reported in the previous chapters,
(Ii) to synthesize these results in order to
devIlop the theoretical model presented in chapter
(1) • Our purpose in doing so will be to develop this
to the level of an empirically derived model which has
relevance both empirically and theoretically.
(Iii) to contrast our findings with other theory
and empirical work, and in so doing to put our results
firmly within the context of debate.
We shall therefore refer frequently to literature
relevant to our sUbject. This is perhaps rather unusual, to
have what could be seen as a literature review at the end,
rather than at the beginning. It is however our view,that
it is more appropriate to review our resuits in the
context of relevant literature. We hope the reader will
bear with us on this matter.
SUMMARY OF EARLIER FINDINGS
First of all let us briefly review the findings we
have already reported in earlier chapters. These fell into
4 categories.
2.30(A) COMMUNICATION BY THE COMPANY TO ITS EMPLOYEES.
This was discussed in chapter 4, where we showed that
the perceived quality of communication was related to the
hierarchical position of the respondent. Put very simply,
the closer one is to the top the company the more likely
one is to assess the quality of communication favourably,
whereas the lower one is in the hierarchy the less
favourable is the assessment of the quality of
communication. Basically those who were closer to the top
were more likely to say that they were well informed,
whereas those closer to the bottom were more likely to say
they were badly informed - indeed on some issues, to say
they were not informed at all.
We related this to the perceived trust people placed
in the information they received from the company. These
correlations showed quite clearly that the trust placed in
information is related directly and significantly to the
hoW well informed the respondent felt himself to be ie
those who were best informed would place most trust in the
information they received, while those least well informed
- if informed at all - would put very little trust in what
they were told, if indeed they trusted it at all 2
It should, however, be clear that this situation could
be rationalised - for instance in excerpt 4.4 we present a
discussion with a senior manager, who suggests that in
relation to information on the firm's financial policy, the
reason for secrecy was sUbstantially commercial. This is a
difficult argument to contradict, but on the other hand it
can be maintained simply by virtue of confidentiality
itself - it is difficult to be critical of something from
which you are systematically excluded and kept in
ignorance.
The Lifeworld can therefore provide meaningful
rationalisations for perceived failure to communicate. In
the above example commercial secrecy is defined as more
importan~ t~an c~ndour. This is not to say that such
rational1sat1ons w111 not be challenged - excerpt 4.5 from
a Shop Steward indicates this, as he argues that he and his
members are just as trustworthy as managers. In other words
that in his Lifeworld at least candour and commercial
secrecy are not problematic, since he and his members (as
employees of the firm) can be trusted with information of
this type. Given the lack of movement on this, however it
is clear that the Lifeworld of employees outwith manage~ent
accept this situation in practical terms at least.
'1.31This appears to be so, even in cases such as
illustrated by excerpt 4.7, where an hourly paid employee
suggests that management in the firm are capable of saying
one thing and then doing another, and thus not just that he
is badly informed, but actually misinformed. Or if we
consider Excerpts 4.8 and 4.9 we can see the frustration
caused by management not allowing upward communication,
allowing employees to make their experience relevant in
decisions about investing in new machinery. Even in such
situations the hierarchy dominated Lifeworld continues to
define such a situation as operationally acceptable, if not
entirely so in value terms.
Hence we found in Chapter 4 a communication system
which is perceived to be systematically biased, a
communication system which systematically excludes
employees as we descend the hierarchy, a communication
system which is justified by hierarchy. The responses of
our Hourly paid and Staff respondents suggests that on the
one hand
a) they are not satisfied with the system of
communication which operates, but
b) operationally it works - their dissatisfaction
is not such as to do anything about it.
B) DECISION - MAKING.
We dealt with this in chapter 5. The perceived
distribution of control over various types of decision was
considered, and we also asked our respondents to indicate
hoW they would, ideally like influence to be distributed
over the types of decision specified. We found the
following results:
(1) That over most types of decision Management
are perceived to be the dominant group. Obviously we
would expect this to vary from one decision type to
another and this was the case in our work. We found
that over those decisions which had the most obviously
direct influence over a respondent's working life that
the perceived degree of Management dominance was less
than over issues where this influence was rather less
obvious 3
(2) That when asked how they would like influence
to be distributed ideally, we found that while there
is a marked tendency for respondents to say that Staff
and Hourly-Paid ought to exercise more influence it
is still the case that Management were seen as' the
dominant group. This finding is very clear as well as
significant. What we have found is that for our
respondents, even in an ideal situation Management
would rem~in the ultimate decision-maker, though there
is a des~re for those lower down the hierarchy to
exercise more influence than now.(3) This view that Management are· the dominant
decision-makers is confirmed for us by further
statistical analysis. using Factor Analysis 4 and
McQuitty Linkage Analysis for supplementary analysis,
we showed that for our respondents, Management
influence is conceptually distinct. This could be seen
in that clusters, and factors consistently contained
either only Management variables, or only Staff and
Hourly Paid variables. This indicates that Management
are not only perceived as a distinct group (in a way
that neither Staff nor Hourly Paid are), but also that
this is quite systematic (ie that Management influence
is not sometimes distinct, but is always seen in this
way).
Where there is a mixture of variables they tended
to be around the former group of variables of directly
perceived influence 5. Thus the ideal situation,as
things are at present, has Management perceived as the
dominant group.
It is, we would contend, significant that there should
be this degree of separation in the thinking our
respondents - to some extent a kind of conceptual apartheid
contained within the Lifeworld, not only of Hourly-paid OR
staff OR Management but rather of all three
simultaneously, creating a conceptual system within the
firm. It appears to us that the Lifeworld defines the
influence of Management on decision-making as a distinct,
organizing relevance. This could be seen too in considering
the acceptability of representation of employees at board
level. This kind of consideration extends into the data on
representation at board level. For management this is not
the issue. Rather the issue is to enhance communications
within the company - the perceptions of which we indicated
above are not wholly favourable.
The conceptual apartheid we refer to can be seen in
excerpt 5.27, from a Staff respondent who considers the
right to participate being contingent on having the skills
to make a technical contribution. Given that Management
have the appropriate skills, but that by and large Staff
and Hourly paid do not, it is logical given the structure
of this Lifeworld that Management should take pOlicy
decisions.
Among Hourly paid too there is an emphasis on the
importance of communication - one respondent (excerpt 5.30)
refers to "knowing what's going on". Like Staff there is a
high level of ~ignifican~e of expertise - that until other
employees outw~th the f~rm knew how the firm works they
cannot operate on an equal basis with Management 6Hierarchy gives those at the top certain privileges
which we showed to be justified by the Lifeworld definition
of Management being perceived to possess particular forms
of expertise. Even when we open up the possibility of
changing hierarchy the same considerations loom large - the
role of worker directors would be to make the company more
efficient (table A3.64); a board with worker directors
would be as concerned with making as many sales as possible
as with providing good well paid employment (tables A3.65-
A3.67); the most important role of worker director would be
to make the company more efficient (table A3.69). Technical
rationality clearly looms large in the Lifeworlds of ALL
our respondents.
(C) JOB SATISFACTION.
This is dealt with in Appendix 6. We investigated this
primarily as a possible explanatory variable (ie if job
satisfaction is low this might explain,in a classical
Marxist way criticism of Management, existing ways of
taking decisions). But in fact, as we showed in this
chapter, satisfaction is on the whole quite high, even
though respondents were asked to assess their satisfaction
against how they perceived the rewards of others (eg how
satisfied are you with your working conditions compared to
other staff), and also to their ideal situation.
(D) THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA AND OTHER OUT - \JORK EXPERIENCES.
These were dealt with in Appendix 7. Here we looked
for 'other possible explanations for our findings (eg is it
because of media influence that hierarchy is able to
persist?). Our view was the media did not play a causal
role, though it is probably supportive.
In this resume of our findings we have referred
frequently to the role of our respondents' perceptions. We
have indicated a thought system for our respondents - their
Lifeworld composed of typicalities and relevances etc. We
have shown that they think "this" rather than think "that".
NoW at this stage it may be acceptable for us to stop and
say this is what we think - that their Lifeworld has a
particular form. I~ has been our argument all along,
however, that that' 1S not good enough. We have argued that
we have to press on to try to explain why they hold this
set of perceptions rather than some other set I.e. why they
think "this" rather than "that", why their Lifeworld ,is of
this form and .what implications this may have. A major
explanatory var1able we have employed to do this has been
power.Hierarchy is in 'itself an inherently power-laden
structure - basically it is highly formalized power 7 and
our respondents live with the reality of this every day.
Thus it is not surprising that they should tell us that
they see themselves as significantly of lesser power than
Management or that our Management respondents should
perceive themselves as being 'the dominant group. What may
be surprising, however, is that this situation not only
works, but that in an ideal situation with no prescribed
constraints that our respondents should wish it to 'continue
with only a few relatively minor amendments 8.
It has been our contention that this dominance is a
function not only of conscious power 9, but also of an
unconscious dimension of power. The significance of such
unconscious power, on which the majority of our respondents
operate, is that it does not allow the usurping of
Management dominance. This is because it underlies a view
(or Lifeworld as we shall go on to describe it) which
defines, decision-making as a Management task in the same
way as fitting two pieces of pipe together is a fitter's
task, doing electrical wiring is an electrician's, and
selling is a salesman's job.
The power of Management is thus in an important way a
reflected in the division of labour 10, but is then endorsed
by the unconscious dimension of power operating through the
Lifeworld.
The 'power of Management is therefore critical for us
in the analysis of our findings, but there is more to it
than the mere possession of power. Power is of no value
unless it is exercised, but as we shall see it is
conceivable that neither side is aware of its exercise.
The role of power" we have argued is especially
critical in the negotiation of reality within the company.
power is used not just to define what is going on - for
instance for Management to define certain events as good or
bad - but to conceive that definition in a context which is
favourable to them. For instance if Management take a
decision not to invest in new equipment,even if their
employees disagree with this, Management still retain the
advantage of the division of labour 11 • In this they are
h d ' 12 supported by t e me l.a •
Thus,the perceived quality of communication/perceived
distribution of actual and ideal control/the levels of job
satisfaction do not develop in a social vacuum but instead
are constrained by the e~istence of hierarchy.'But not only
in its directly experl.enced form,but also in a more
important sense,by virtue of its unconsciously experienced
constraints.
This argument'has led us to the development of the
empirically derived model which we shall present and
explain in the next section.EMPIRICAL MODEL.
The mode~~is built around 5 propositions which we
have drawn from our empirical results. The 5 propositions
are as follows -
(I) that Management occupy a special/privileged role
in the organizational hierarchy 13. Now this may seem like a
fairly unremarkable proposal, because by virtue of the
definition of hierarchy, (synonyms for which include caste,
class, as well as the more obvious position and status), we
would be surprised to find otherwise. But our point is
rather more than this. We shall argue that Management
occupy this position not merely by organizational
arrangement, but by virtue of their own Lifeworlds and
those of their employees. Management in other words occupy
a special position by social definition, in this company at
least.
Our research has, however, explored the parameters of
this definition ie why is hierarchy accepted? Our findings
indicate that the fundamental basis of hierarchy is their
claim to technical legitimacy and furthermore that
technical legitimacy is ascribed to them by those below
them in the hierarchy 14
Thus the role of Management is not only a matter of
fairness/values directly, because as Habermas argues, it is
the logic of technology which drives the value system on 15 •
Nor is it even a matter of material reward. If for
instance, the company was to hit hard times and conditions
were to become significantly worse (redundancies, cuts in
wages etc) it would not be this directly Which would lead
to any questioning of the managerial role, rather it would
be the fact that hard times may lead to questioning of
their technical competence 16 •
(Ii) The conscious and unconscious powers of
Management. Again it is hardly remarkable to have found
that the most powerful group in the company are Management.
As we suggested in the previous section they are powerful
by definition of their position in the hierarchy. Thus
Management have formal control of the critical decisions
taken in the company and to the extent Which others
participate in this process this is formally the decision
of Management eg to allow discussions on redundancy. Of
course it is clear that in the la~ter half of the present
century Management have found the1r power beginning to be
subject to const!aints an? that th~ statutory law has
interceded to d1lute the1r power 1n various respects
relative to the "contractU position which existed under
pure common law 17 (eg ~h~ la~ on unfair dismissal 18 ) but
the formal legal pos1t10n 1S that Management are the
ultimate guardians of the property of the company, on
behalf of shareholders.Fig. 6.1
I MANAGEMENT ROLE IN HIERARCHY .. •
~ t
(Ii) CONSCIOUS POWER ~SUPPORTS
I
(Iii) (REFLECTED IN) SUPPORTS
(Ii) UNCJNCIOUS POWER BY t
CREATING HORIZONS ON
(Iv) (a) COMPANYCOMMUNICATION
(b) CONTROL OF DECISION-MAKING
(c) JOB EXPECTATIONSWhat is, however, more significant is not the visible
power (to move employees from one job to another, to
invest millions of pounds etc.) but the power which is less
visible or disguised in other forms. Thus to be allowed to
define situations in certain ways, to be able to interpret
information in particular ways largely without competition,
to be seen as the monopoly authority on decision-making for
the company - all of these are much more effective forms of
power, than the power to refuse admission to decision-
making (eg to refuse to discuss a decision to invest in new
equipment) because the exercise of this hidden (and as we
have seen in earlier chapters, unconscious for both sides)
power means that refusal is not necessary, because either
no request is made, or Management's power to define leads
relentlessly to a particular decision (eg to the extent
that technological rationality is dominant, it renders more
overtly social values more difficult to sustain in
practice) •
If we recall the ideal speech thesis of Habermas
discussed in Chapter 1, then we can see that technical
rationality is another source of power inequality as it
provides Management with' an inherent advantage in
discourse19 • In particular it means that there is a breach
of the requirement for all to be equally able
lito put forward or to call into
question, to ground or refute
statements, explanations and so on, so
that in the long run no assertion is
exempted from critical examination"20 •
The force of technical rationality is such that it is
quite clear that this cannot hold good, and as Lukes points
out the real advantage of unconscious/hidden power (his
third dimension) is that '
"it can be used to prevent people from
having grievances by shaping their
perceptions, cognition and preferences
in such a way that they accept their
role in the existing order of things,
either because they can see or imagine
no alternative to it, or because they
see it as natural and unchangeable, or
because they see it as divinely
ordained and beneficialll21 •
This, we would concur with Lukes is the most
significant use of power, and we would point out that his
description above corresponds in an almost identical way
with our empirical findings. In other words it is a
particularly effective use of power to conceal the degree
to which power is unequally distributed.(Iii) The Lifeworld and < Negotiating .Reality. Our
research has shown how the reality of our sUbjects is a
function of power - we have argued this point again in this
chapter. We have argued that this is not a reality
determined by equals, but rather that one side has
advantages not open to the other - we might almost say the
"dice are loaded" 22.
The power advantages of Management means this
reality, of advantage to them, can be sustained from a
position of strength. Now that Management are in this
position of power, this unconscious power serves to
maintain their power. But as we have argued before, it is
power which cannot be directly observed which is the most
significant because through this unconscious power,
Management I s role appears to be natural/normal - even to
Management (ie that even Management themselves are not
fully aware of the extent of their own power, far less
those below them in the hierarchy) 23 •
The situation we have in mind· is very like the one
described by' Morgan in his chapter entitled "Exploring
Plato I s Cave". He describes the metaphor in the following
terms -
"organizations are psychic phenomena,
in the sense that they are ultimately
created and sustained by conscious and
unconscious processes, with the notion
that people can actually become
imprisoned or .confined by the images,
ideas, thoughts and actioff to which
these processes give rise" •
There is, therefore, in our view a process of
"confinement" - to use MorganIS metaphor- which works in
such a way as to ensure the persistence of hierarchy and of
the Management role by concealing from not only Staff and
Hourly Paid, but also from Management, a significant and
vital sign of their power.
If we look back into our research then we can explore
this idea a little further. One of the most striking things
about the semi-structured interviews was the apparently
natural acceptance of the position of Management - to
question their role in any fundamental way just did not
seem pertinent.This experience is also described by stewart Clegg in
"power, Rule and Domination", as the process of reaching
what he describes as "bed-rock" 25. Now, it has become clear
to us in conducting the research, and indeed in writing
this , that we were questioning what, for our respondents,
was completely taken for granted. But rather than ask them
why they took this reality for granted - something they
probably could not explain, and indeed something we could
not explain if asked - what we did was to take another
approach and explore the logic of this reality, which we
have argued is based on technical rationality and the power
which this creates for the Management of the company, both
conscious and unconscious power.
It is, however, critical to appreciate that we do not
seek to argue that our sUbjects played out some
predetermined role in a play, with words written by
somebody else elsewhere.
What we are putting forward is that our sUbjects can
be seen as being entrapped in a system of rules which are
such that they allow a degree of discretion for those
involved,- while the ending of the play is predetermined
(to continue the theatrical metaphor), the actors get to
use their own words, and can to some extent determine how
they get to the predetermined end. operating according to a
system of rules does not rule out the possibility of widely
differing forms of behaviour
For instance if we look at the world of football,
Inter Milan and Celtic both' played football of very
different forms in the 1967 European Cup Final - one very
defensive while the other was attacking. The critical
factor was that both played within the rules of the game.
Rules do not necessarily create uniformity of behaviour -
it is only when different forms of behaviour begin to
contradict each other that there are real difficulties 26 •
Social life is often of such complexity that rules
cannot be totally determining. In certain situations the
reality may be so complex that rules cannot indicate to us
with absolute certainty what we should do. We therefore
have discretion or indecision about how to be behave - but
not total discretion, rather we are invested with a
constrained discretion. within these limits, however, we
can determine our behaviour.
~3'iThus for instance 'it would have been no more
acceptable for Jimmy Johnstone to play the ball with his
hand than it would be than it would be for shop stewards to
criticize Management proposals on the grounds that
Management are incompetent. On the other hand, it would not
be unacceptable for a steward to criticize a Management
proposal because it was to the disadvantage of his members.
The latter is possible because it is consistent with the
general rules which operate (ie that unions are there to
represent the interests of their members, which was a view
expressed by managers in our sample). Indeed such criticism
is central to his role - it lies within the constraints we
referred to above. The difficulty of the former example is
that it goes outwith these constraints, and would be akin
to a footballer playing the ball with his hand (unless he
was the goalkeeper), or to put this within a Management
context, he was a fellow manager. There are in other words
certain behaviours which are legitimate for some, but not
for others.
within these constraints there can be conflict 27 - but
this is a constrained conflict as the form is a matter of
tacit agreement between the parties 28. For instance the
role of football referee would be (more?) untenable if the
two teams were not willing to play within the rules of the
game. Likewise in social life there can be conflict, but it
must be constrained otherwise we face the risk of
undermining the entire relationship.
As we -have argued above the Management role is
supported by their claim to competence being acceded to by
their employees. A challenge to this claim, and conflict
around it would represent a significant change to the
nature of the relationship between the two parties.
There can therefore be conflict, but it is of a
constrained form, not posing a fundamental attack on
Management. In such conflict Management are not even
required to employ all of the power available to them-the
power of which both sides are conscious will be employed as
in any industrial dispute. What is missed, however, is that
they will also use their unconscious power for instance to
create certain definitions of the dispute and to preclude
others.
It is, nonetheless, more efficient for Management to
exercise their power in such a way that, as Lukes reminded
us they do not even have to use their power 29. To the
extent that technical rationality dominates, Management's
role will be much more simple - more so than if for
instance, fairness played a more pronounced role. 'Thus through a negotiation of reality the members of
the organization can operate a working agreement of what is
happening/to happen. This is not to say that they agree on
every single thing - nor that they will necessarily all
behave in the same way. Some degree of difference is quite
possible. What is critical, however, is that how each of
them behaves is not inconsistent with the
behaviour/expectations of others.
Nor is the negotiation between equals one side
(Management) has several advantages over the others, not
least of which is the fact that the others'
expect(know?)that they will come out on top. Thus while
there may be differences and there may be conflict, these
differences and conflicts are limited by the system of
rules which operates to sustain hierarchy and the role of
Management therein.
To call ita negotiation is perhaps to concede more
freedom to the participants than is perhaps merited - but
it would be too limiting to argue that they are merely
actors in a play, as they have more discretion than that.
perhaps it would be more apt to describe it as a
constrained negotiation, for instance in the sense that
there is no negotiation about who plays the lead roles and
the "bit" parts, as well as how the play will end.
Nonetheless, as we shall see in the last part of this
section it is a process which has important implications 30 •
(IV) The final 'part of our empirical model relates to
the specific content of our research, namely the
perceptions held by our respondents of communication by the
company and the distribution of control in decision
making. What we have argued consistently is that this is a
part of their constrained reality - thus Management are the
dominant decision-makers/Hourly Paid workers can declare
themselves satisfied with conditions clearly less good than
those enjoyed by Management/communication is clearly on a
hierarchical basis.
Yet while the fundamental point is the acceptance of
the Management role in the hierarchy, there are still
clearly conflicts at the margins 31 - complaints about the
system of communication which can leave employees not
knowing information that they should have known(eg about
orders won);acceptance of Management as decision-makers
but a desire to share more influence over Management whe~
they take decisions;and a clear desire to move toward Staff
conditions of work by the Hourly Paid workers. Trade Unions
would have little role if this was not the case.
All of this, however, takes place within a bounded
reality. which endorses the Management role in the
hierarchy a~d t~e power, both conscious and unconscious
which goes w~th ~t.These variables have, been assembled. to construct a
model which is shown as fig. 6.1. The model is premised on
the view that there are (to use Clegg's terminology) two
circuits of power.
The first circuit reflects the power which Management
possess by virtue of their hierarchical position. Hence
their role in the hierarchy determines their conscious
power. This is the power which ,is reflected in the answers
to, for instance questions on how control is distributed.
The second circuit begins in the Lifeworld, which
defines such Management's, position in the hierarchy, and
the conscious power it brings, as "correct" 3~. This
a) reflects the existence of such conscious power
- we are born into it,
b) simultaneously supports such conscious power
through the interpretations it creates.
Hence the Management role in the hierarchy, and
hierarchy itself is sustained not only by conscious power,
but also by the existence of unconscious power originating
in the Lifeworld.
We shall next go on to consider our discussion in the
light of other pUblished theories and research.
As we have argued above that our findings indicate the
model which appears in the diagram over, logically we shall
proceed through in the order it is structured. Thus we
shall deal first of all with the role of Management, and in
particular their role in the hierarchy.
24~ROLE OF MANAGEMENT
First of all let us consider who managers are. In
Chapter 3 we presented brief biographical data on the
managers in our sample. Looking more widely, however, who
are the managers? It is suggested by Melrose-Woodman, in
his sample of BIM members, that the average manager is
"a married man, somewhere between
46 and 55 years old. •••attended
qrammar school•••••may have attended a
technical colleqe on a part-time or
full time basis and qained an HND or
HNC••••by· the time he was 17, he had
entered into full time emploYment in a
technical or clerical capacity and will
have taken up his first manaqerial
position between the aqes of 25 and
35••• (he) is currently employed in
manufacturinq in the private sector
(and will) have between 1 and 10 people
reportinq to him directly•••at the time
the data was collected [mid 1970s] he
was earninq somewhere between £5000 and
£10, 000••••typically he has been with
his present orqanization b!~Ween 6 and
10 years or over 20 years" •
We can see in this description, certain similarities
to our own Management sample, though as Melrose-Woodman
Points out later on "it is very hard to generalize about
managers" 34 •
This diversity of managers is a finding replicated in
other studies Eg
" Hanaqers as a qroup, were found to be
Deither homoqeneous, nor in their
principle ~haracteristics, chanqinq
over time.,,3
or
" 'Perhaps the most strikinq conClusion
about today's manaqers suqqested by the
foreqoinq reviews is their very
considerable heteroqeneity.,,36
The concept of the average manager is, therefore one
which we should treat with caution. Management seem to be
most typified by their differences.
That, however, concerns only the biographical aspects
of managers 37. What they actually do may point to
similarities.Mintzberg points out that managers spend more time in
informal and verbal communication than in formal and
written communication 38. What, therefore, do they talk
about?
Golding argues that underlying a' great deal of
Management talk is the
.. control of workers by managers" 39.
In his "analysis of Management talk, Golding argues,
that there is
.. a basic underlying assumption ( by
managers ) concerned with the control
of workers by Management .., and that ..
domination is thus at the heart of the
structure of organizations
••••superiority of those in control is
manifested as representing a hierarchy
of knowledge and expertise. ..40
The similarity between Golding's argument and our own
is striking. The logic of what the managers in our own
sample, however goes further than in Golding's research.
our own sample did recognize the control they exercised,
but this was always underwritten by technical necessity. In
other words, while managers may see themselves as
controllers within the business, the control they exercise
is not an end in itself, but rather the means toward
technical or business necessity. The control they exercise
is not their control, but rather is always justified by
technological necessity (for instance we quote a senior
manager, in excerpt 5.17, who argues that it is not he - or
other managers - who would make employees redundant, rather
it is lithe day the bank's wont give you any more money).
Most important, however, is the extent to which
subordinates acquiesce in, even if they do not share, the
assumptions of Management control.
This issue fs considered further by MacDonald 41, who
quotes Edwards,
"The interests of workers and those of
employers collide, and what is good for
one is frequently costly for the other.
control is rendered problematical
because unlike other commodities
involved in production, labour power is
always embodied in people, who have
their own interests and needs and who
retain their power to resist being
treated like a commodity..42.
Thus from this p~rspective the significance of control
in Management talk l.S not mere chance, but rather is
central to the Manage~ent role. This issue too is
considered by MacDonald, l.n the two following points:
1.441) that given the ability of employees to resist,
Management must consider how to secure their consent,
2) he quotes HYman 43 in suggesting that
"consent and cooperation are important
in situations such as prisons and
mental hospitals how essential they are
in work organizations where a manager
or supervisor cannot rely on the same
enforced and unquestioned discipline
which is normal in a prison or in the
army" 44.
It is, however, important to acknowledge that
considerations of this type - while clearly strategically
significant - are not necessarily at the forefront of the
mind of many managers, far less discussing them with each
other (never mind researchers). These issues are without
doubt critical, but our research suggests are largely taken
for granted by managers - in other words they are part of
the Lifeworlds of Managers. This is not to say that they
treat labour relations as unimportant, but that consent was
not questioned.
A view more similar to that found in our own research
is given by Lawrence 45. His data is composed of
organization charts, different types of managers, meetings,
reporting, discussion, touring the works, desk work, using
the phone, etc. This, almost diarist approach, may appear
to us to be rather superficial, but it is the aspect of the
managerial role with which managers themselves are most
familiar.
Nor it should be clear do Management recognize
themselves as " Machiavelli- like ", exercising their power
over their subordinates. For managers, Management is work -
it is a job. studies like those of Mintzberg 46, Glover 47
or Lawrence 48, all examine what managers do. But how d~
they think about their jobs?
This is taken up by Marshall and stewart 49 who examine
" the everyday practical reasoning of
managers about certain aspects of their
jobs ". 50 .
This study, which also commented on the biographical
diversity of Management, revealed 3 perceptions of their
role held by some managers - Job Analysis 51, Focused52 or
Holistic ~ ,
The significance, from our point of view of these
findings is that for managers, their job is pre~iselY that
_ a job. For the managers in our sample we have seen that
thei:- pr~me focu,s was .on IIgetting things done".
cons1derat1on of 1ssues l1ke power and authority ar
secondary to the purely technical Management role. e
~45Management for managers is, therefore, perceived as a
technical not a political function. To question them about
power is, given their perception, beside the point. It is
his job " to get things done " - to get output produced, to
sell output, to manage the finances of the company or
whatever. He does not see himself principally, or even
mainly as a "politician".
similar findings are reported by Spybey 54, who reports
the presence of two types of manager in the woollen mills
he researched.
These he described as traditionals and proliterians.
The former saw themselves as managers specifically in the
woollen industry, while the latter saw themselves as
II the key specialization in the running
of organizations, especially in terms
of monitoring of financial investment"55
Spybey shows that to whatever extent power is used by
managers of either type, it is as a means rather than an
end in itself 56, and argues, with Kerr, that there is
evidence of
II Management movinq from a paternal or
political orientation to a professional
one sn
While not wishing to disagree with Kerr or with any of
the rest of the above, that this is how managers do
perceive their role, we would argue that what Kerr
describes as a "professional orientation" is only overtly
lesS political and that its emphasis on technical
objectives ( Eg financial targets ) is simply a gloss over
what may be an even more political orientation than it may
b 58 appear to e •
During our own interviews with managers, we would
occasionally get minor protests, based essentially on the
view "why are you asking us about this? " - "are there not
more interesting things to talk about/this is not an
important part of my job/we ( managers ) are not powerful,
we are only workers etc." • As we have already accepted
above, we can only fully accept that this was a sincerely
held view on the part of our respondents. Yet the
literature on organizational decision-making points quite
clearly to Management being a political process 59 •Power in the practice of Management is obvious in this
aspect of managerial life - in their decision-making. We
have explored in this in the reputational tradition 60, but
the literature on the involvement of Management using power
in decisions is extensive, to say the least 61 • On the basis
of published research it would be difficult to portray
Management as a purely technical process. Taking
pettigrew's work as an example, we can consider Kenny
(pseudonym for the Head of Management Services) as an
example of the apparently technical manager, using his
position to the advantage of his favoured contractor in a
way which could only be described as a political manager62 •
A different example of this is given by Wilson and
Kenny63 , who point for instance to the way in which
Management. will use their managerial expertise as sources
of power in both interdepartmental and intradepartmental
decision-making. Their sample is however, composed solely
of managers and how they perceive manifest decision-making
and thus is not entirely like our own. They do, however,
conclude quite clearly that power is a factor managers
themselves perceive in decision-making, and that managerial
expertise is seen by them to be the primary power factor~ •
power and Management cannot, therefore, be separated for
the purposes of analysis.
We shall discuss power in more detail in the next
section of our review but what we wish to argue here is
that to the extent Management define their jobs in purely
technical terms - even to themselves - attention is turned
away from the power implications of the technical
objectives which are set for them. Furthermore, since Staff
and Hourly-Paid likewise define their jobs in technical
termS, they collude in this dominance of technical
rationality. Hence by defining work in technical terms and
by emphasizing the technical objectives, our attention may
be drawn from the power qualities and implications of the
Management role.
Even on the basis of their apparently non-political
technical activities, however, we can still pose th~
question to what extent the ,Management role is inherently
political? Lowe and Shaw 65 define bias as,
" the extent to which a forecaster
adjusts his forecast due to personal
interests and perceptions and
independently of factors Which might
influence the actual result"
ThUS through the exercise of bias, even technical
objectives may incorporate elements of power (Eg Lowe and
Shaw demonstrate that managers have an interest in biasing
the annual sales target ,downwardly ,because aChievement of
sales forecasts we~e 1mportant 1n determining salary
increments and promot10ns).Even if we put what they do on a technical basis,
Management cannot easily be. divorced from the exercise of
power. There are, moreover, a variety of ways in which the
Management role disguises the exercise of power.
One respect in which this has become apparent is in
the unionization of senior staff employees ( ie those just
below the level of Management). There are sectors of
companies which have become unionized since the late
1960's, where it would have previously have been
unthinkable for the majority (or even any) of the employees
to be union members. For instance, at an early stage in our
research, the events leading up to and during the
unionization of the supervisors in the company during the
late 1960's was described to us by a long serving
supervisor. The Management reaction at that time was to see
it as a massive betrayal of trust in the company 66. Since
then, things have changed in two respects.
First of all, the directors and managers who saw
unionization as a betrayal, have apparently come to accept
a role for unions in the company (we have discussed this at
several points above) 67 •
Secondly the density of' unionization of the company
since the late 1960's has grown, such that during the time
of our research, - all the employees in the finance dept.
(with the exception of those whom we described as managers)
became union members. The role of white collar unions in
the company is quite extensive. It is, furthermore,
important to keep in mind that this development of union
density has spread beyond the shop floor/production areas
of the company. It is not only supervisors, inspectors and
draughtsmen who are union members, but Staff in areas
beyond direct production (Eg finance, computing, sales,
design etc.).
This has been commented on by a number of authors in
the past 68. Let us consider briefly the main findings of
this type of research, and what they mean for us.
Fros~9 points to no fewer than 5 possible forms of
managerial unionization - .
1> professional associations: 2> integral or in-
house associations: 3> separate professional or
managerial unions: 4> 'white collar unions: 5> blue
collar unions.
9.4f1For our purposes." the relevant· forms of
collectivization in the company are forms 2> and 4>. As we
pointed out in Chapter 6 many Staff had previously been
members of an in-house Staff association (Frost's 2», but
over the years various parts of the white collar emploYment
had left to join a white collar union (Frost's 4». The
prominent unions were ASTMS, TASS (then part of the AUEW),
and APEX. In addition there were white collar sections of
blue collar unions (Eg MATSA which is part of the GMBATU).
It was, however, clear to us that these sections of blue-
collar unions were run quite separately from the main blue-
collar part of the union, and indeed were this to have
changed there may have been a transfer of members into the
..independent sector", as white collar employees in this
company were very aware (and very jealous) of their status
relative to Hourly Paid workers. Hence we shall focus on
types 2 and 4.
The objectives of Staff associations are described by
Frost as
to foster a spirit of goodwill, mutual
dependence and trust.70
The interviews we conducted with Staff association
members convinced us that this describes their view of its
role - to promote goodwill and trust within the company,
but more importantly, they believed that this was a
function which the trade unions could not perform. In their
view the unions were an external force, with interests
which did not always conform to the interests of the
company. We have of course seen that this was not the view
of the trade union members, but for the Staff association
members this was an important reason for staying out of the
unions.
As we saw in Appendix 6, managers who had stayed out
of unions as a whole gave other reasons for not joining. In
Table A 6.29 we can see that far and away the most
important reason given by managers (44%) for not joining a
union was that they saw no need. for ·them to join. More
significant, however, is tables A 6.26-6.27, where we can
see that for about 90% of managers union protection was not
something that they felt that they needed 71. Yet as we
found~ white collar ~orkers had become increasingly
union~zed. why had th~s happened? For these workers
. t ' unionizat~on was a response 0
being outflanked insofar as manual
workers now have more direct and
comprehensive access to top Management
than they have themselves 72 •
~49Bamber I s view of managerial unionization brings many
echoes of the reasons given by white collar workers in our
company as well. For those who joined unions, therefore,
while there may have been the sort of concern which the
remaining staff association members felt about unions being
external to the company, this was subordinate. The sense of
threat from manual unions was enough to convince them into
trade unionism.
Even managers complained about the developing power of
Hourly Paid workers and their unions. For instance they
would complain that shop stewards were better informed than
they themselves, and that if they wanted confidential
Management information they would ask a shop steward ~ •
Bamber gives additional reasons for unionization - but
the most important of all for us must be the sense of
relative deprivation of white collar workers. Faced with
seeing their pay and condition differentials disappearing,
joining a union was seen as one way to at least slow down
the process of losing out to Hourly Paid workers.
For instance Bamber quotes a study done by the Royal
Institute of Chemistry, which showed that between 1971 and
1974 the real differential between managers and manual
workers had declined at a greater rate than before 74. In an
interview we carried out with a senior manager, when we
discussed his views about how well/badly he was paid, he
insisted on bringing in a similar study in the engineering
industry so that we could see for ourselves how badly he
was treated. Even among managers, therefore, there was a
growing sense of insecurity, but not one which had
developed to the stage where they felt they had to become
unionized.
Unionization can therefore be seen as a response to a
sense of deprivation - to the perception of losing out
relatively to ~thers who are alreadr unionized 75. This,
however, as W?1r, Frost and Bamber 7 (among others) have
pointed out, 1S not an easy step for Staff and Management
in particular to .take since, as our own sample pointed out
joining a union may just not be appropriate.
One way out of this, as Weir suggests, is for unions
to develop with a specifically managerial outlook - what he
describes as radical managerialism - and indeed this may
satisfy the obstacles pointed to in table A 6.29. It is
however, salutary to observe that since the article was
published there has been limited success by the unions in
that direction.
Further, we would argue that our sample of Staff
employees continued to identify mainly with managers - it
should be easily recalled that attitudinally Staff were
nearly al~ays ~loser to Ma~agement than Hourly Paid workers
wer*-;. ~he1r. u.n10n.'me~bersh1p had not fundamentally altered
the1r 1dent1f1cat10n •One final point we wish to consider here, is what it
is that Management and white collar workers wish to protect
by joining trade unions. It is quite clear from our
research that white collar workers were trying to protect
their relative position to Hourly Paid workers - a position
they saw as being under threat. The most obvious reward
they tried to protect was their relative financial
position, as well as other contractual rewards 78. Yet at
the same time we should not seek to see this as purely a
defensive tactic by white collar workers. Another way to
view this is to see it as a positive act on their part
which has the objective of enhancing the position of white
collar union members.
Joining a trade union is at least in part about
enhancing one's power position. Even then, however, white
collar unionization differs from blue collar, since as
Frost points out that protest by managerial unions differs
the depth of Management's anti-strike
feelings can frequently be seen in
their willingness to agree to "no
strike clauses" being written into
collective agreements N •
At the time of our research however, while many of the
staff had begun to join trade unions, Management had not
yet done so, though the sYmptoms were beginning to make
themselves felt. Both groups, however, would have fitted
within the general picture of being under threat. For many
of the Staff this was the cause of their break with the
staff association and a different relationship with the
company, but Management had not yet reached this stage 80 •
At the same time we have to recognize that white collar
workers, and managers in particular, are not natural union
members, especially because, as both Weir and Frost point
out 81, of their individualism. It could be argued that
white collar unionism is a collective attempt to secure
individual ends.
Unionization. we would argue for our sample, was at
the same time a reaction (or in the case of Management a
potential reaction) to a perceived loss of power, and an
attempt to maintain that power. We do, however, have to
observe that for Management, in our company, joining a
union was not a step they had felt required to make. Their
role as managers afforded them sUfficient protection. As
Frost points out,
having once decided on the nature of
the goals to be achieved the form(s) of
representation to be adopted will
depend on the individual manager's
perceptions of the most appropriate
form(s) by which to achieve that
particular goal or set of goals.82
"SIHence we would suggest that for our sample of
managers, given the goals they wished to secure, that union
membership was not a strategy they saw as appropriate at
the moment - though as we have pointed out, the seeds to do
otherwise were present.
In particular, however, the movement of white collar
staff into unions cannot be disengaged from the exercise of
power 83. For Staff, -as we suggested above, their union
membership is a strategy to protect their position in the
company, an important part of which is of course power M •
Let us move on now to consider another element of the
practice of Management in organizations which has become
increasingly significant in the literature over' the last 10
years - culture 85. This has been sUbject to a great many
definitions 86 , which have been well summarized as
the way things are done around here·87
Thus culture, as a store of attitudes, rUles, beliefs
etc. indicate' to members of the organization what they
ought to do and why. But as Ray points out
what is important is the articulation
and channelling of the culture in
directions which supply employees with
guide-lines and which promote a system
of strongly-held, . shared
beliefs•••••• (which) are perceived as
helpful in achieving the goals of the
corporate leaders.M
culture is, therefore not entirely, as Deal and
Kennedy suggest - how things are done here - culture is
also as Ray points out, another form of control, which she
Suggests strongly resembles Etzioni's "moral involvement"89
in that the members of the company share a sense of
mission.
Now, as she subsequent suggests, the image of culture
which she puts forward in this article, based on Durkheim's
ideas of morality, the sacred and the profane 90, is a
strong one for which there
is no persuasive evidence that the
manipulation of (the) corporations'
cultures really functions as a form of
control 91
Or at least not at the moment. Ray does,
point to other, less strong, forms of cultural
These are described as
however,
control.1) Bureaucratic control where control is secured
through the manipulation of reward, leading to loyalty on
the part of the workforce, and (most important) to higher
productivity. with the emphasis on techniques like Work
study, and Production Control , it is clear,
impressionistically that this played a role in the Firm of
our research.
2) Humanistic control where control is secured by
providing workers with a "satisfying" task or work group
life, leading to a sense of loyalty on their part, again
leading to higher productivity. While not so pronounced as
was bureaucratic control, there was also a sense of this in
the Firm, that workers should have a satisfying job, and as
we saw in Appendix 6 perceptions were consistent with this.
The critical factor is, however, that culture is more
than in Deal and Kennedy's view - that this is how we do
things here. The nature of culture can have significant
implications for the Management and the control of the
company 92. Culture is not a neutral concept, rather it is
one which can influence the degree of authority possessed
by Management.
The problem seems to be that the (largely American)
writings on culture 93 tend to treat culture as if it were a
consciously conceived part of the firm, when if we treat it
in a more informal way, as the way things are done here
involving fewer strategic considerations - then we can see
that every organization will have its own culture. This
indeed is inevitable if we take Kirkbride's definition that
it is the atmosphere of the company 94 •
writers on corporate strategy, like Mintzberg and
Quinn, have argued that strategy may not be a consciously
worked out product of the Management of the company. It may
instead be something which emerges from the activities of
the company 95. In a similar way the culture of the company
may emerge in a less formal way than many of the writers
have treated it.
In any case what the corporate culture writers have
argued is that
the effects of culture should not be
left to chance. 96
what we, therefore, wish to suggest is that culture
1) can significantly affect the course of events in a
97 company •
2) can develop in a less formal way than much of the
recent writing in this are may suggest,3) 'is thus a source of power in the company for
Management in the way described by Ray, but that it can
operate qua power not only consciously, but also
unconsciously. Let us look at two examples of this.
First of all Paul Kirkbride 98 who considers the role
of the personnel specialist in the context of corporate
culture. One of the functions of personnel which he
considers is their role in maintaining effective employee
relations 99. Kirkbride quotes Schuler 100 in suggesting
that bargaining with employees and settling their
grievances are central to the personnel/human resource
Management function, but the most important point for our
purposes is that
culture affects the degree of conflict
which is acceptable between the
employer and employee and the methods
of representation and resolution which
are sanctioned.__The corporate cUlture
thus sets the ground rules and limits
of permissible employee activity .'01
In this way, therefore, culture represents a
significant source of power, in the way we have described
above, but in particular in relation to the thesis of ideal
speech, since it is quite clear from this that culture
represents a very real source of restriction on "employee
activity"•
Likewise if we consider the formation of the
employment contract, and its relation to CUlture, Kirkbride
points to a very similar phenomenon. He quotes Torrington
and Chapman
the contract for employment that is
made between (employee) and the
organization is individual but is
reached within a framework for
collective consent. There may be one or
more collective agreements reached
. between representatives of the
employees and representatives of the
organization. These agreements give
consent to a general framework of rules
and guide-lines for the employment
contract. 102
Thus, the behaviour of employees is not only
constrained within a set of rules whose implications are
not fully clear, but the establishment of those rules takes
place i? a context ,whose, power imp~ications are not fUlly
clear e1ther (espec1ally 1f we cons1der the previous quote
which. points ~o the role of cUlt';1re as a limitation o~
employee behav1our). Indeed we saw 1n our own research that
the role ~f the union o~fici~l is limited by what he can
persuade h1S members to g1ve h1m support on.Hence the employees in negotiating their·contract with
Management and in their daily working lives are sUbject to
the limitations of the same cuIture. culture, therefore,
not only is a factor in establishing the formal rUles, but
also is a factor in controlling the day to day behaviour
within the company.
A further example is given by Gunz and Whitley 103 , who
consider the role of culture in relation to the development
of strategy in UK companies. They argue that the dominant
practices for assessing and rewarding managers which
determine whether they are appointed to senior posts in
their company, influence how they view changes in the
environment and react to them (ie whether a change is a
threat or an opportunity depends on whether it brings
promotion closer or further away). Of more significance,
however, is as Gunz and Whitley conclude,
Once it matters what top Management
groups do, then it matters how they
think and make sense of the world.
Their rationalizes become important
factors in business-unit behaviour,
market processes and macro-economic
resource allocation and use.1~
Thus the types of decision we identified earlier as
being virtual managerial monopolies - investment, financial
etc. - are also influenced by the culture of the firm,
since the information which was salient for the Management
in taking the decision isfJ at least partly determined by
the culture of the company 05 •
This emphasizes a point we have already made - namely
that Management, like others in the company are trapped in
a structure of power 106. In their strategic decision-
making, Management behaviour is limited by the culture of
the company in the same way as the behaviour of their
employees is limited by its culture 107 •
We have considered Management and Managers from a
number of points of view in this section. We have
considered
a) who Managers are, and discovered that they are
a diverse group in this sense our sample are
typical.b) what they do - and argued that the exercise of
control is central to their jobs, but that they do not
necessarily think about their job in these terms, far
less talk about the exercise of control, and indeed
when they do they tend to do so from a technical
perspective 108. Indeed in their terms they are just
doing a job, and acquiescence of others is generally
assumed109 • This is not to say, however that they are
not aware of their position and their need to protect
it - that is what their unionisation (discussed in
Appendix 6).
Hence we have a group within the Company who on the
one hand are very much about control, yet do not appear to
consciously recognize it - or at least do not think about
it in power terms. What we require here is a concept which
can bridge this fissure.
be done with
Position,,110, by
this can
Mandator
We would suggest that
Abrahamsson I s concept of "The
which he means positions,
"strategic for decision-making on for
instance distributional issues within
the organization" (pg 39)
Abrahamsson contends in this article that it is not
hierarchy per Se (ie it is not necessarily the structure of
hierarchy which is the problem) but rather the undemocratic
character of hierarchical' organizations which is the nature
of the problem. Non-hierarchical structures, he points out,
are for practical reasons non-feasible for large
organizations,
"the restrictions for moderately-sized
and large organizations (ie a few dozen
or more) are such that if the principle
of equality is observed, almost no one
will be able to convey his message to
the others, due to lack of time" (pg
46) •
The implication of what Abrahamsson has to say,
therefore, is that what we should be trying to do is to
devise organizational forms which are democratic, and that
the issue of whether or not they are non-hierarchical is
secondary 111 •This .it should be observed is not inconsistent with
the views of the managers we researched. Their focus was on
getting their jobs done, on technical issues. More
tellingly, however, Abrahamsson's view is also consistent
with the views of the non-managers in our sample. Their
view has been that the role of Management is a technical
one, with specialist expertise, and indeed as we have shown
this is the basis of Management legitimacy. The concern of
those outwith Management is with the outcome of the use of
that expertise with what Abrahamsson calls
"distributional" issues 112 •
Our sample would very likely concur with Abrahamsson's
conclusion,
"schemes for re-designing organizations
should be evaluated with regard to
their allowance for majority control of
mandator positions - since it is here
that issues of distribution have to be
resolved - rather than the reduction of
hierarchy per Se". (pg 51)
To place a focus on what managers do can therefore be
enlightening, but our· research would tend to suggest that
ultimately it is the consequences of what Management do
which is important for people in the firm 113 • Hence dissent
is more likely to centre on the consequences of Management
action, rather than on the action itself (for instance that
someone has been moved from one bay to another, rather than
on why this happened).
Likewise the focus of desired change may well fall, as
Abrahamsson argues, on the issue of controlling the
mandator positions and on democratising hierarchy, rather
than on doing away with the hierarchy itself. Hierarchy may
well be technically necessary 114 • As presently constituted
however, in most organizations (and certainly where we did
our research) it is undemocratic, and could be challenged
for that reason.
Thus while much research has focused on what managers
do, our research has tended to suggest that for those
outwith the Management, what Management do is not at issue
(ie the practice of Management as another job in the
company). Indeed, as we have argued, what they do is the
source of their legitimacy. We have found that what may be
at issue are the consequences of what Managers do As we
have suggested before, there is little evidence f~om our
work that Staff or Hour~y Paid want to be managers, or
think they should be dOl.ng Man~ge~ent's job, or telling
Management how they should do thel.r Job.At the same time however, our research· does support
the ideas put forward by Abrahamsson since there was a
strong emphasis on, for instance, Management taking the
interests of Staff and Hourly Paid into account when they
were taking decisions. Management would (and did) suggest
that they already do this. The problem was that Staff and
Hourly Paid did not see it this way. Abrahamsson's argument
of democratising control of mandator positions is therefore
supported by our data.
From this it is, therefore clear, that while much of
the focus of research on the Management role has focused on
what they do, we would argue,
a) that this ignores sUbstantially the issue of
the implications of what they do,
b) while their legitimacy may stem from what they
do, a challenge to their position may come from the
implications of what they do.
Either way however, whether we are concerned with
doing away with hierarchy, or democratising the control of
the mandator positions, we are still clearly talking about
power115 • In our preceding discussion much of what we
discussed we would contend appeared on the surface to be
power-free utterances or events, but are in fact highly
relevant to the consideration of the existence, structure
and use of power in organizations 116 • We shall, therefore,
now consider the role of power.POWER
We discussed the nature of power in Chapter 1, and
this review will to some extent mirror that earlier
discussion. We shall first of all consider (or reconsider)
some definitions of power, before reaching again what is
for us the major distinction in theories of power, namely
whether
a) there is a recognition only of power where
all, or at least one party, is aware of its exercise,
and
b) there is a recognition that power may be
exercised without any party being aware of this.
Thus as well as considering power in general terms we
shall argue that recognition of the latter position is
necessary to fully understand the role of power in
hierarchy, since there are sources and forms of power of
which even Management are unaware. In other words the power
which Management exercise is greater than they are aware,
and as we shall show, their, power can not only be used in
the event of a challenge to their hierarchical position,
but that their power is such that a challenge - and a
change to another form of organization - is not considered
feasible by other groups in the organization. Hence moving
to more democratic structures - and thus reducing the power
of Management - is made more difficult by the power which
Management already have.
Nature of Power
Let us begin this discussion with a few definitions of
the phenomenon we have been dealing with. We set out our
own definition in Chapter 1 117 , where the view we take of
power is to set up as our standard of equality Habermas's
Ideal Speech Thesis. Power, however, as Dahl notes
is as ancient and ubiquitous as any
that social theory can boast. 118
There are many definitions of power available to us.
For instance,
The power of actor A over Actor B is
the amount of resistance on the part of
B which can potentially be overcome by
A. (R. Emmerson 119 .)
The probability that one actor within a
social relationship will be in a
position to carry out his will despite
resistance, regardless of the basis on
,which the probability rests. (M.
WebsfD )the ability of persons or groups to
impose their will on others despite
resistance through deterrence either in
the form of withholding regularly
supplied rewards or in the form of
punishment, in as much as the former,
as well as the latter, constitute in
effect, a negative sanction. (P.
Blau121 )
the capacity of A to prevail over B
both in resolution of manifest conflict
an through affecting B's actions and
conceptions about conflict or potential
conflict. (J. Gaventa 122 )
A exercises power over B by putting B
in a position of getting him to do
something that increases B's burdens.
(w. connolly 1n )
The ability of those who possess power
to bring about the outcomes they desire
(G. Salancik and J. Pfeffer 1~ )
The production of intended effects (B.
Russell 125 )
subsets of relations among social units
such that the behaviour of one or more
units (the responsive units) depend in
some circumstances on the behaviour of
other units (the controlling units).
(R. Dahl 126 )
In these eight different definitions the common
quality among them, that we wish to draw to the attention
of the reader, is that in everyone of them, at least one
of the parties (either the power holder or target) or both
parties are aware of the exercise of power 127 •
For instance if we consider Emmerson's definition, it
is quite clear that A (as the power holder) must be aware
of what he is doing - using his power to get B to do
something, in spite of the ,resistance of B (who will
likewise be aware of the exerC1se of power). If we consider
Weber - that A can achieve his ends despite the resistance
of B - then the situation is the identical 128 •
These two definitions of power both mean that power
holders and target~ must be aware of the exercise of power.
The same can be sa1d for Blau, Gaventa and Connolly.
The remai~ing 7hree defi~it~ons do, however, differ in
this sense, S1nce 1n those 1t 1S not necessary that both
parties should be aware of the exercise of power. In these
cases it is enough that one should be aware.For instance if we consider Salancik and'Pfeffer - who
consider power to be the ability of those who have power to
bring about their desired outcomes - it is possible here
that the powerful will use their power in such a way that
they achieve the result they want without the powerless
being aware of the exercise of power. A similar argument
could be put for Russell's definition.
In contrast if,we take Dahl formulation it is possible
that the relatively powerless could 'be trying to "second
guess" the powerful as to what they really want in order to
provide it to them. For instance in a promotion, candidates
in advance of the decision may "suck up" to the boss. In
this case the power holder may be unaware of the exercise
of power - but the powerless are !
Thus of the eight definitions, we have suggested that
in five of them both parties must be aware, and in the
other three it is enough for at least one party to be aware
of the exercise of power.
Now while much of this may be adequate for analysis of
much of the data we have collected, it is not so for all of
it. For instance the Emmerson definition is adequate for
the analysis of perceived control over wages, since in the
case of negotiating over wages both sides are conscious of
the power they are trying to use against each other.
On the other hand this could not be said for control
over investment or financial policy. In such cases, as far
as both Management and non-Management are concerned this is
only Management doing their job, and has no implications
for the exercise of power. Nor could we use Emmerson's
definition to explain that while Management decisions may
be challenged, the right of Management to take those
decisions is not challenged. The reason for this, we have
argued already is Management's job rather than an exercise
of power. In other words not only are non-Management
unaware of the exercise of power (in the sense implied by
Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis) but neither are Management
themselves.
We need to look for another more appropriate
definition which allows for the possibility that neither
party is aware of the exercise of power.
In Chapter 1 we considered the definition used by
Luke62
9
,
A exercises power over B when A affects
. B in a manner contrary to B's interests
The difficulty with this, as ,Bradshaw points out in
his critique of L~kes, concerns specifying what B's
interests are. Who ~s to s~y? c,,:n th~ theorist make a
jUdgem7n;? Can B do so, espec~ally ~f A ~s exercising power
over h~m.Moreover, as we pointed out in Chapter 1, Lukes is
somewhat ambivalent about what he describes as the "third
dimension of power". Consider the following
A may exercise power over B by qettinq
him to do what he does not want to
do.130
How can power be exercised without < •the
exerciser beinq aware of what he (it)
is doinq? •• One may be unaware of what
is held to be the "real" motive or
meaninq of one's actions. Or second one
may be unaware of how others interpret
one's action. Or, third, one may be
unaware of the consequences of one's
actions. 131
Our dissent is not so much from the latter as from the
former, since in this quote (taken from the Chapter where
he defines his third dimension of power) it is difficult to
see how both sides can be anything other than conscious of
the power being exercised by A. Lukes' position is
therefore too unclear to be useful. We need to look
elsewhere.
Power is defined by Parsons in the following way,
Power is the qeneralized capacity to
secure the performance of bindinq
obliqations by units in a system of
collective orqanizations when the
obliqations are leqitimised with
reference to their bearinq on
collective qoals. 1~
It may seem surprising, given the position we have
adopted so far, but this is a more satisfactory definition
of power than any we have considered so far. Our main
• 133 • th . h . h reservat10n 1S e manner 1n w 1C Parsons glosses over
the process by which this legitimacy is secured, as it has
been precisely how this happens which has been central to
our study. Nonetheless unlike the definitions we have
considered up to now, Parsons does allow for the
possibility of power to be exercised without either party
being aware of th~S. I:t w~uld be .conceiya~le that each
considers what he 1S d01ng 1S what 1S leg1t1mate or right
in the circumstances.
A definition which is similar' in this sense is given
bY Mintzberg
Power is defined in this book simply as
the ability to effect (or affect)
orqanizational outcomes 134This definition while allowing for either party to be
aware of the exercise of power, does not require either to
be so, since as with the Parson's definition, it is
conceivable that each is doing what they see as, for
instance, technically correct in the circumstances.
Arendt provides the following definition of power:
Power corresponds to the human ability
not just to act, but to act in
concert135
The advantage of Arendt's position, as with Parsons
and Mintzberg is that it allows for the possibility that
neither party need be aware of the exercise of power since
they may act in concert without being aware of its exercise
over them. There are, however, difficulties with this,
since as Habermas points out we can characterise Arendt's
position as being
the ability to agree upon a common
course of action in unconstrained
communication 13
The problem here, as Habermas suggests, is that there
is little possibility of unconstrained communication in
capitalist society. One reason for this, he suggests is
that what he describes as "structural violence" is built
into our institutions
"structural violence does not manifest
itself as force; rather unperceived, it
blocks those communications in which
convictions effective for legitimation
are formed and passed on. such an
hypothesis about inconspicuously
working communication blocks can
explain, perhaps, the formation of
ideologies; with it one can give a
plausible account of how convictions
are formed in which sUbjects deceive
themselves about themselves and their
situation•••in systematically
restricted communications, those
involved form convictions sUbjectively
free from constraint, convictions which
are however illusory. They thereby
communicatively generate a power which,
as soon as it is institutionalized, can
also be used against them." 13;In other words the problem with Arendt's view is that
it ignores the structural impediments to unconstrained
communication and fails, unlike the Ideal Speech Thesis, to
direct to us identifying these. Thus returning to Arendt's
own definition of power, we could never be sure whether
agreeing to a common course of action is the result of
genuine consensus freely entered into, or through
manipulation by the exercise of power.
Hence the problem with the definitions we have
considered - Arendt, Mintzberg and Parsons - is that while
they allow for the possibility that neither party is aware
of the exercise of power, they do not direct our attention
to the process through which power has so blended into the
background that we treat is as "bed-rock" 138. It fails to
direct us to consider why
sUbordinates obey, not because the
supervisor has the power to compel them
to; rather they follow the reasonable
instructions related to the control of
their work behaviour because they
expect that such work, directions will
be given and followed. In this way
power becomes transformed into
authority, and control can be exercised
almost regardless of the balance ot
(conscious) power possessed by the
interacting groups. 1~
We need therefore to be directed to the process
through which power can be exercised without either party
being aware of its exercise, which is what Habermas's Ideal
speech Thesis does. We have to be directed to consider how
"power comes to be transformed to authority and control can
be exercised almost regardless" • We need, to be able to
identify power which has become "bed-rock", but we also
need to be able to explain how and why this operates 140 •
None of this, however, should be taken to mean that
conscious power is of no consequence - for instance Burawoy
for one presents evidence showing that workers will react
to Management action which goes beyond the limits of their
consent 141 • But in certain respects the fact of power and
its exercise is almost secondary to the development of the
conditions of power being exercised unconsciously since
this constrains the exercise of conscious power 142 which
is an issue we shall take up sUbsequent when we c~nsider
the negotiation of reality and the development of "Plato's
caveeV+3
What we ,shall g~ on to consider now are some examples
of research ~n the f~rst of the two traditions of power _
where it is exercised consciously by at least one party.Knowing Theories of Power
We suggested in our discussion of the various ways in
which power has been defined that the common quality of,
what we have described as, "knowing theories" is that at
least one, and perhaps both parties are aware of its
exercise. The work we shall consider in this section has
this quality.
outwith organizations' there are numerous studies by
political Scientists of the exercise of power. This is the
tradition of Dahl and Hunter, whose theories we considered
in Chapter 1.
An instance of such work is William Gamson's "The
strategy of Social Protest" 144 , which is a study of various
"voluntary groufs" (protest movements) in the US between
1800 and 1945 14 • He considers that strategies used by the
54 groups he studies, and why some succeeded while others
failed. This is clearly a study where power is consciously
and openly used by both parties. His analysis leads him to
be critical of
a) [what he describes as]
behaviour explanation of protest
movements 146
the collective
politics and
b) pluralist theories of power.
He criticises the collective behaviour explanation for
putting an artificial distinction between
the politics of social movements and
the politics of conventional groups and
organizations mainstream political
partiesL lobbyists and interest
groups147
and suggests
In place of the old duality of
extremist politics and pluralist
politics, there is simply politics. The
American Medical Association, and
students for a Democratic Society are
nor different species but members of
the same species faced with different
political environments 148
Putting this into the context of our own work we can
see that the dominant perspective held in the fi~ often
reflected the view of the collective behaviour thesis. It
can be argued that,
a) while if we consider an issue like pay there
is only politics, but on the other handb) if we consider other issues - like investment
- then we can see the kind of exclusion which Gamson
refers to. For instance for employees to seek to
influence decisions like Investment or Finance, would
be portrayed as irrational by Management 149 • Moreover
it is not unusual for wage claims to be described by
Management as IIirrational", or in terms suggesting
this.
This illustrates one of the problems with the
collective Behaviour view since we have to consider not
only the facts of exclusion or inclusion, but also the
conditions on which groups are admitted to (What he calls)
the "pressure system"150 • This is taken up in his critique
of Pluralism.
pluralism, as an alternative to Collective Behaviour,
is portrayed by Gamson as suggesting
A more or less orderly contest carried
out by the classic pluralist·rules of
bargaining, lobbying, logrolling,
coalition formation, negotiation and
compromise. The issue of how one gets
into the pressure system is not treated
as a central problem. 151
Pluralism thus considers only the insiders to the
"pressure system", and how they manage their affairs 152.
How some groups gain admission, while others fail to do so
is not an issue for Pluralists 153. Hence the excluded get
short shrift in Pluralism as in the Collective Behaviour
• -'154
v~ew • '
"Resource Management" is counterpoised by Gamson as an
alternativeto "Collective Behaviour" and'Pluralism. This
Suggests essentially that
Group conflict in its dynamic aspects
can be conceptualized from the point of
view of Resource Management.
Mobilization refers to the processes by
which a discontented group assembles
, and invests resources for the pursuit
of group goals.155
Thus the discontented those engaged in social
protest - from this perspective are not irrational' (as
collective behaviour theorists may suggest), or ignored (as
in pluralism) but are simply using their resources as best
they can, just as those within the system will do.From the perspective of our own research, this is an
interesting point of view. In any conflict it is clear that
the participants must acquire resources - public support,
money, etc. From Gamson's point of view we would expect the
successful group in any conflict to have been that which
was most successful in acquiring resources. This analysis
is fine as far as it goes. There is, however, a similar
problem to that discussed above - namely that it fails to
take into account the conditions under which support is
obtained (in other words that it will be easier for some
groupS to obtain resources than it will be for others, and
to use them effectively). An example of this is given by
Foster and Woo1fson, that one of the problems of the
stewards during the UCS work-in was that
the government
carried, though
distortion by the
press. 156
line was generally
not without . some
BBC and the popular
resources is
to two further
What we are suggesting here is that while analysing
resources used by groups may be an interesting approach to
group conflict, it does not direct our attention to the
ability of the group to obtain these resources in the first
place and then to the degree 'to which they have the skills
to use them. For instance if we go back to wages, it could
be argued that there are two parties of more or less equal
footing. But if we look a little closer then we can see
that the structure is of one group (employees) seeking to
enforce their demands on another group (Management), who
have the capacity to decide whether or not/to what extent
to accede to these demands. The situation is thus not so
simple as whether groups are admitted, but depends also on
the conditions under which this takes place.
The latter point the use of
particularly important, since it points
implications for our argument
1) the role of the manager is to manage resources
- or to appear to do so, as Pfeffer and Salancik argue
157 but the role of other groups is more disparate.
Management occupy a role in which the use of resources
is central 158. For other groups - outwith Management
the idea of managing resources is not easily absorbed
159
2) the normative structure may prevent groups
from using their resources in particular ways. For
instance the UCS work-in can be seen as a watershed
insofar as it pointed to the work-in and sit-in as
t t 160 forms of pro es , as a way for workers to exercise
their power 161
put briefly, therefore the problem we have with Gamson
is that his theory does not direct us SUfficiently clearly
to the possibility that "the game is rigged".Another approach is taken by Maddison et al. 162 who
take an overtly political view of organizations. It may be
objected here that it is obvious that they deal with
conscious power, since they have set to consider, in effect
the JRs found in many organizations. What we wish to deal
with is whether, or to what extent they have asked all the
questions which need to be asked of power.
Maddison et al. set out to consider the perceptions by
(What we described) as staff and Management on Power and
organizational Politics 1~ • They distinguish between these
two conceptually related phenomena with the following
analogy:
power may be thought of as similar to
wealth, while influence processes (such
as organizational politics) are similar
to cash flows by which the wealth is
accumulated or dispersed. 1M
Their results, like those of Gamson, are c.onsistent
with our own in many respects. This is most so when they
report that
when each manager was asked to define
the term power, in nearly every case
the manager said the term was
synonYmous with hierarchical level 165
That is a view which has come through very clearly in
our own results -
a) when we considered communication it was
apparent that the quality of this depended on one's
hierarchical position (ie the higher one is in the
hierarchy, the better informed one would feel oneself
to be),
b) when we considered actual control, it was
apparent that the powerful were generally those at the
top of the organization. Even considering issues
separately, in nearly every case it is clear that the
higher one is in the hierarchy, the more powerful one
would be perceived to be. (The obvious exception on
this is wages, where Hourly-paid were perceived to be
more powerful than Staff - which is related to the
superior and longer term unionisation of the former.)
Reward too 'is hierarchically distributed (See appendix
6) - but most critically this is accepted, and it is on
such issues that we begin to part company with Maddison et
al., since their approach does not go far enough in our
view.If communication, control and reward are distributed
on a hierarchical basis (ie the further up the hierarchy
you are, the better you do on all of these), to put the
question as bluntly as we can, why do those lower down the
hierarchy accept this? Why is it that Managers can be
better informed than Hourly-paid workers? There are of
course numerous justifications which could be provided for
this - needing to know (functional necessity) is the most
obvious - but this does not explain why it is that this
actually does work, and why such justifications are
accepted.
Likewise, why should the majority of people working
for a firm accept that a minority will be systematically
better rewarded for their labour? These are issues which
Maddison et ale do not take on board at all.
For instance we are told
it seems clear not only that the
relationship between power and
organizational politics described in
the results of this study are
consistent with the literature, but in
addition that the particular form of
power implied in these reports is
consistent with "legitimatell power or
authority as defined by French and
Raven 166 • 167
The problem here is why is this power legitimate? What
has led to it begin defined as legitimate, and how does it
continue to be so defined?
It is useful to identify power as legitimate in the
way of French and Raven, but this cannot be the last step -
this only creates the issue, as we have said, of how and
why this is perceived as such?
Likewise with Maddison et al., it is useful to
identify the perceptions of organizational politics, but to
do so is only the beginning not the end. For instance they
quote Patchen
168 with approval. He shows that salience is
related to the influence process, and to the amount of
influence over a decision. Madison et ale develop this to
contend that
In these (salient) areas, political
activity are consistently high. 1~
The issue which this leaves out, is why are these
issues are salient? What is that makes some issues salient
rather than others? There may well be explanations as to
hOW and why, but we need to pose the question. Maddison et
ale fail to do so.A wide ranging
Mintzberg in "Power
Following crozier111 ,
power:
review of power is· provided by
in and Around Organizations,,11o.
Mintzberg suggests four bases of
1) control of a resource
2) control of a technical skill
3) control of a body of knowledge
4) legal prerogatives.
Clearly all or even one of these would provide any
group or individual who possessed such qualities with
power. Mintzberg's list does, however, beg a number of
questions:
1') why is it that Management are accorded the
right to make virtually unchallenged decisions over
resources? For, instance when we considered control
over Investment decisions in Chapter 5, even
considering "ideal control" this would remain a
Management monopoly.
2') everyone in the organization has technical
skills or some sort - no matter how humble - and on
the shop floor, especially among the skilled men,
there is a great awareness of levels of skill. Yet as
we have shown, the skills of Management, even though
they are not well understood are accorded special
status by Staff and Hourly-paid 1n. Why should this
be?
3') as with 2' we can argue that everyone has
power in this sense so what is it that is
distinctive about the body of knowledge of
Management113 •
4') it is certainly true that Management (through
company law) exercise power in this way. But this begs
the question of why it is that the law is obeyed at
all? For instance the UCS work-in was against the law,
but even in this case the intention was to use the
work-in as a device to enter into the same (legal)
relationship with another employer and Management.
Hence while we would agree that Mintzberg's four bases
of power lead to its possession, we would contend that they
do not lead us to all the appropriate questions - for
instance that it is all very well to point to law as a
source of power for Management, Which, clearly is true.
That, however, does not lead us to cons1der Why it is that
their employees obey this.
The explanation for this form of argument, we would
suggest, becomes apparent later ,on ,in his bOOk. In
discussing the creat10n of the organ1zat10n, Mintzberg saysBut how can one person (the chief
executive officer) convert policy into
action? The whole game of power in and
around the organization is played over
one thing: the actions that the
organization takes - the products it
markets, the clients it serves, the
equipment it bUys, the people it
promotes, the surpluses it distributes,
the air it pollutes and the air
pollution it reduces ••••• Organization
means that all of this is beyond the
capacity of one person. So the CEO must
engage other people to take care of
different parts of the process; in
other words he must design an
organization. 1n
Mintzberg goes on to explain that various types of
employees will be hired operators (to produce the
product/service): middle line managers who form the chain
of authority between the CEO and the operators:
technostructure staff who will coordinate the activities of
the organization (eg work study): Support Staff who will
advise on specialist decisions and provide certain support
functions (eg company lawyers, personnel staff etc.).
Authority will be delegated to employees as required by the
activities of the organization, which will be controlled by
a) personal control by the CEO and middle line
managers
b) bureaucratic control job descriptions,
rules, regulations, standards of work output, etc.
The problem with this form of analysis is that it
considers the organization purely from the perspective of
the superior in the superior:subordinate relationship. The
central issue in such analysis is how to maintain control
of the organization, or one's subordinates. From such a
perspective we tend to focus on areas of conflict, since it
is in those areas that we are most conscious that control
is at risk.
If, however, we turn the whole thing round, and
instead of focusing on the superior and his perspective
and consider the subordinate then we begin to pose verY
different questions. Instead of lack of control being the
issue, we begin to ask "Why do I allow myself to be
controlled?" or "Why do I give my consent?", following
Burawoy whose work we shall discuss below. If the
subordinate is being controlled then it is not only issues
of conflict which are important, but also issues where
there is no conflict, since it is in these latter issues
that the individual is being controlled and is giving
consent.Thus the problem with Mintzberg's analysis is that he
concentrates on a particular side of the
superior:subordinate power relationship. As Stt~ he
considers only the issues of why conflict arises and
how it can be controlled or prevented, rather than
explaining its absence. Yet this is not a problem for
Mintzberg alone.
If for < instance, we, consider Braverman 176, and his
analysis of the de-skilling of work, the structure there is
similar difficulty. It is an analysis of how and why
Management have introduced techniques of work study etc.,
what their objectives have been, and the consequences for
workers of this process. The structure of this analysis is
basically the same as Mintzberg's - the initiating point is
with Management, and how they have sought to make their
strategies succeed. It is less clear in Braverman's work
why workers have (as by and large they have) acquiesced in
job degradation and de-skilling. Braverman does not,
however, consider this since it is not an issue for his
analysis.
This, let us be clear is not to dispute Braverman's
analysis, as far as it goes. The difficulty is that the
analysis does not proceed far enough, and in particular
does not treat as problematic the limits of the reaction of
workers to de-skilling. Mintzberg assumes that subordinates
will go along with the organizational arrangements.
Likewise Braverman assumes they will be so demotivated and
resentful of de-skilling that they will eventually be
driven to take action against this. It would be our
contention that we must treat these as assumptions to be
proved. Our own research suggests that neither Braverman
nor Mintzberg are entirely correct.
Thus the difficulty with the form of analysis used by
Braverman, Mintzberg and Gamson is that by beginning the
analysis from the position of the superior in the
relationship we tend to focus on conflict and thus only on
the conscious exercise of power 177, omitting consideration
of the absence of conflict (other than to point to the
success of the techniques which they have discussed in
their work) •
If, however, we take into account the perceptions of
the sUbordinate then other data becomes relevant, and in
particular the possibility that power is exercised not to
resolve conflict, but to prevent it arising at all. This
comes about because by considering why a subordinate goes
along with the instructions of the manager, we are dealing
with situations where the sUbordinate allows himself to be
controlled for instance that he acquiesces with the
personal or bureaucrati~ control s¥stems discussed by
Mintzberg. This may not ~nvolve confl~ct - but as we have
argue~ alrf~gY, that does not mean that power has not been
exerc~sed •other examples of the conscious exercise of power are
given by Nichols and Beynon 179 , who unlike the above, base
their analysis on the position of the subordinate. In
"Living with Capitalism", however, the focus remains on the
issue of conscious power - in that the main focus of their
research is on how the chemical process technology of the
plant represents,
an immense waste of human potential•••
locked up within capitalist factory
production. This experience
strengthened our central political
conviction that the . need for a
fundamental restructuring of British
society is both a desirable and urgent
one.180
In "Living with Capitalism", the authors' views of
conditions in the plant is extremely critical 181, which
raises the issue of why, if things are this bad, the
workers continue to operate under such conditions? It is
made comprehensively clear that the workers have deep
grievances 182. Nichols and Beynon also give evidence of
worker resistance:
a) sabotage for instance one case where a
worker followed the instructions of a mana~er, knowing
that it would lead to production problems 1 ,
b) resistance - trying to make the manager of
foreman's job more difficult, or actively resisting
(even in a small way, like telling a foreman to "fuck
off"),
c) using the union or threatening to do so - for
instance in one case threatening to walk off the job
over a manning dispute. The threat of involving the
union was sUfficient to get the foreman in question to
back down.
We found no specific evidence of (a) in our work -
though this is not to say that it did not happen - but
examples of (b) and (c) were in evidence 1M. For instance
if a man was threatened with transfer, he might try to
influence his foreman by threatening to bring in his shop
steward 185
How did Management hold things together at Chem-Co?
Nichols and Beynon report two main strategies:
1) recruiting "good shop stewards". For instance
they report one foreman as saying,A good shop steward is my friend. He's
a good man to have on the plant. You
see he knows the procedure; he knows
just how far he can go and how far :I
can go. Oh yes, a good Sh~ steward is
my friend. He's an asset. 1
Many of the managers and foremen whom we
interviewed would have agreed with this, and indeed
some came very close to saying more or less exactly
that. One point of difference is, however that in our
firm, not being a green field site but having well
established unions especially among the Hourly-paid
workers, there is not the same scope for Management to
influence who became stewards or Staff Union Reps.
Nonetheless the notion of the good shop steward being
central to industrial peace is one which our
interviewees would share. Indeed if we consider Table
A 6.34 (a) we can see that in every category from
Management to Shop Stewards the view is expressed that
the role of a good Shop Steward/Union Rep. is to make
Management's job easier rather than more difficult.
Indeed the strongest support for that (100%) comes
from the Stewards themselves - and in no category is
it ever less than 78% (Staff).
b) Management style - which at its height is
about getting workers to comply without having to use
force, or to even appear to be using their power.
Nichols and Beynon give as an example of this a
manager whom they call Edward Blunsen, who regarded
himself as being like Edward Heath (at the time still
PM, and still "Selsdon Man"). One of his favourite
phrases, we are told was
its a hard world 1~
Nichols and Beynon suggest that in fact Blunsen
played the wrong pOlitician and that rather than "hard
man" Ted Heath, the more appropriate management at
Chem-Co was "crafty" Harold Wilson. Nichols and Beynon
suggest that Management at Chem-Co
know the value of the empty phrase, the
nod and the wink, the pat on the back,
and the occasional kick in the balls.
188Now while this has echoes of Management in our
firm, the style is not developed to anything like the
same degree that Nichols and Beynon report in Chem-Co.
Of course there were all kinds of arrangements, empty
phrases, nods and winks and certainly kicks in the
balls- but not to the same degree in Chem-co, nor with
the same degree of centrality it seemed to play there
in Nichols and Beynon's view. Moreover nods and winks
etc. were not limited to Management. This is a two way
game which anyone could play - often for instance the
kicks in the balls were between Staff and Hourly-paid.
Our differences with Nichols and Beynon are therefore
matters of degree. There are, however, other problems which
we have with their analysis:
a) it is apparent that disagreeable though things
may be in Chem-Co, the thing still works, in the sense
that in general workers do what Management tell them
to do, Management remaining the dominant group.
"Living with Capitalism" gives us no insight into the
process whereby this happens and persists - or how or
why the conflict does not escalate, or how and why
events do not even develop to conflict more often.
This originates in their focus being on the use of
conscious power. The analysis followed by Nichols and
Beynon emphasises issues where the Management and
workers have consciously divergent interests, and thus
where there is conflict (even if only at a cognitive
level). Areas where there is no conflict or it is at a
minimum are not regarded as significant 189. In this
way the role of conflict in the everyday life of the
plant can be exaggerated.
2) the idea that the management function could be
rotated 190. The problem we would find with this idea
is that if it was put to our sample of Hourly-paid and
Staff employees - never mind the Managers! - it would
be unlikely to find favour with them. This is so
because of the "division of labour" which applies in
their perceptions of work in the firm. Put most
simply, this says "I join up pipes/ fill out forms
(whichever), but he (the manager) takes decisions _
that is what we are each trained for" 191 • It may be
objected that this reflects false or fragmented
consciousness, but it is how it is (at least in our
firm). Furthermore it does not, as we have, as we have
shown, prevent our sample from being critical of
Management, and expressing a preference for things to
be different to how they are now - but this does not
go so far as rotating the management function.The more important of our reservations is the stress
on areas of conflict, since by emphasising these we are led
directly into conscious power. It is in areas of conflict
that individuals and groups are aware of their power. This
is by no means an unimportant stage in the analysis -
indeed it will often be necessary. However, as we have
suggested of Gamson, Mintzberg and Braverman, we have to go
further than this. We have to consider why it is for
instance, that conflict is fought out in this way - by way
of illustration, following our point (1), why do workers
not do more about their situation? we have contended that
we can only begin to progress into such situations by
considering not only areas of conflict (since we could say
that workers put up with these conditions because they feel
they lack the power), but also through considering areas
without conflict, to begin to understand why workers allow
themselves to be dominated in this way.
Hence the problem with the analysis of "Living with
capitalism" is not that it focuses on conflict - that as
we have argued is necessary, but it is not sUfficient. We
have to go on to consider why the conflict is fought out in
the way it is, why there is not more conflict, etc. Only by
asking such questions can we begin to understand the basis
of the persistence of Managerial hierarchy. Hence just as
analytically important as areas of conflict are areas where
employees allow themselves to be dominated without
conflict.
Another piece of research similar to Nichols and
Beynon, even if only in that it researched the same
chemical works, is by Harris - "Power and Powerlessness in
Industry" 192 • In this book, Harris
gives an anthropological account of
technology and "culture" in two
ammonia-making plants. 193
As such she employs the techniques of the
anthropologist "to an industrial situation in order to, as
she puts it,
demonstrate the kind of insights that
might be gained by studying an
industrial situation to acquire data of
an anthropological type and in their
light examining theories about
industrial relations. 194
using anthropological techniques she concludes thatthe restrictions placed on managerial
power by the unions' rights led to
authority being negotiated directly
between those exercising it and the
men. Although a constant thesis of this
essay will be that these negotiations
sometimes included hostility to
individual superiors, I finally argue
that this did not constitute a
rejection of managerial authority:
rather its "legitimacy" was linked to
this negotiation process. 1~
There is little we could find to argue with in this -
indeed much of our own evidence is quite consistent with
it. For instance, inevitably there is evidence of
hostility toward particular managers or supervisors. We
observed and were told informally of cases where lower
management reached accommodations with the sho~ stewards as
part of an on-going relationship between them 6. This much
we readily accept - the problem is that we find that Harris
does not go far enough, omitting important question.
What is it, for instance, about this negotiation
process which keeps the organization together? Why does it
work? Her explanation emerges from a change in policy on
"shift-fitters" which had been badly managed and led to
conflict. The change had led to the plant losing its best
fitter, but in particular led to, ,
a lot of people who were not normally
ill-disposed to Management to question
its wisdom and in part its legitimacy.
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In this course of events, and indeed generally, she
goes on to tell us that
one vital ingredient to manaierial
success was still this good will 1
and
It would after all not be so surprising
if management overlooked the extent to
which goodwill or consent affects
productivity: with the exception of the
recent work of Burawoy and those
associated with him, it has often been
underplayed in studies of industrial
relations 199B
On the one hand this does begin to· address the
problems which we have identified in Nichols and Beynon's
approach in that it does allow for the analysis of
situations where conflict is absent. The problem with
Harris is that having identified good will or consent as
being resources for the avoidance or resolution of
conflict, we would have thought that these were then
variables to be explained. In our own study, we have found
many examples of just this, indeed Management - even higher
Management 200 - were just fully aware of the importance of
good will and consent. What we have to do is to go on try
to understand the source of this good will. Why should
there be good will? Why do employees consent? Surely we
cannot just take this for granted.
The problem with Harris's analysis is that While she
points to a phenomenon which could make the place work - in
contrast to Nichols and Beynon who are looking for the
factors which should stop it working - is that there is no
attempt to explain why workers give their good will and
consent. For Harris it appears to be enough that they do.
An example of this is her data on the fitters in
"ChemCo" 201 is consistent with the "Joiner's Tale" in
"power, Rule and Domination" 202 • In both cases what we have
are examples of workers critical of their Managers, and how
the Managers have exercised their function. How can we
explain this? Clegg, as we shall see, suggests that power
operates in such a way as to provide us with particular
understandings 203, while Harris simply takes these
understandings for granted. The distinction we would draw
between Clegg and Harris is that the latter uses concepts
like good will and consent to understand the relative
absence of conflict in the plant, and treats them as
explanations in themselves. Clegg, as we have done, treats
good will and consent as factors Which also requiring
explanation.
Another approach to consent and Why it is given, is
developed from Hunter's reputational model 204, by Stone
205 • Following the "two faces of power" paradigm as set up
:bY Bachrach and Baratz 206 , which has led as we have seen to
the paradigm of non-decision-making. stone argues that the
problem with this is that Ultimately it is tied to a theory
of power which deals only with
a) securing or resisting compliance
b) situations where A is against B
c) situations where A is testing his will against
d) situations of actors bargaining from their
positions of strength.
An alternative to this, Stone argues is to considercompeting capacities to occupy
strategic position ~what I am calling
pre-emptive power) 20
pre-emptive power, stone makes clear, differs from
command power. Command power, he tells us
is illustrated by the kind of control
which corporate executives have over
resources in their firms 208
Hence command power is about A (a manager for
instance) getting B (an employee) to do as he wants,
overcoming Bls resistance if necessary. Thus the
relationship in command power is a simple, dyadic
relationship which is context free, concentrating on the
ability of one actor to get another to do his will.
What stone describes as pre-emptive power depends on
the need for the community (organization) to have a policy
setting function in order that it can make adjustments in
the light of changing conditions. The group which is able
to supply this function will be able to exercise pre-
emptive power, since by performing this function the group
will be able to
a) secure a fee for the provision of this
service,
b) set the terms' for transactions between the
group and the remainder of the community
c) make some transaction forms more likely than
others
d) by selective withholding or giving of rewards
exercise a divide and rule strategy.
stone considers in his argument the possibility that a
"dissatisfied pUblic" will revolt, because of discontent
with the policy setting group. As he points out, however
those organizing the revolt will have to face up to th~
question of how it can replace the existing pOlicy setting
groUp with another. So having organized your revolt you
have to be able to produce another policy setting group,
and as stone goes on,
at this level there are few contenders
and even fewer viable alternatives 209
The role of policy maker, therefore, is one of
strategic power (as stone says "it is like being able to
name trumps and: play the ~ame on your terms" - pg. 90), but
at the same t1me there 1S a need to possess the skills
required to ~lay the ~ole (following his analogy, you need
to be a sk~l~ed br1dge player as well as being in a
powerful pos1t10n).If we bring his theory directly into organizations,
then clearly the group exercising pre-emptive power would
be Management - they make policy and claim the skills to be
able to do so. Why, therefore, is it Management who occupy
the policy making position? stone says this is because they
can be displaced only by a coalition
itself capable of brinqinq toqether
enouqh interrelated and complementary
positions of strenqth and mastery of
resources to be able to exercise
leadership authority 210 •
It is here that we begin to dissent from Stone's
argument, because of the degree of emphasis that it begins
to place on conscious power. We said above that one of the
sources of pre-emptive power for Management is their claim
to possess the skills necessary to fulfil the policy making
role. We do have to go further· than this, however and
recognize that
a) ·those below Management in the hierarchy
concede this claim - indeed being perceived to possess
these skills is an indication of Management,
b) those outwith Management also consider that
they do not have the skills - so no challenge (of the
type considered by stone) could be mounted.
We would suggest, therefore, that the difficulty with
stone's view is that it does not consider the possibility
that pre-emptive power (coming from the tradition of
Hunter) has an unconscious dimension in the same way that
the Dahl tradition does. This leads stone to neglect, to an
extent, what Habermas describes as "Structural Violence,,211
_ that there are unperceived blockages in communication.
stone's view of Pre-emptive power is also resonant of
another idea which we shall consider sUbsequent. Stone has
argued that those in control of the pOlicy making function
will be able to exercise pre-emptive power, partly because
of the difficulty of creating a substitute group to fulfil
this function. There are certainly practical problems with
doing this212 • An advantage which they possess is, suggested
by Gaventa's argument that
continual defeat qives rise not only to
the conscious deferral of action but
also to a sense of powerlessness that
may affect the consciousness of
potential challenqers about qrievances,
strateqies or possibilities of cbanqe.
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We would argue that the learning process implied in
this has two important aspects:a) were workers" to successfully challenge the
Management role unsuccessfully then that failure would
be an impediment to further challenges 214
b) more importantly, through their experience of
hierarchical organizations, staff and Hourly-paid
learn not only the dominance of Management, but also
the "appropriateness" of Management's position. This
too will militate against challenge being made to
their role.
Finally stone's argument is suggestive of
Abrahamsson's concept of the mandator position, which is
strategic for decision-making on for
instance distributional issues within
the organization. 215
Abrahamsson argues that the problem is not with
hierarchy - indeed consistent with stone's argument, he
Suggests that hierarchy in most large, complex
organizations (and some - not least leI - will be larger
than many communities) is functionally necessary - but that
we need to devise mechanisms to democratically control
those in mandator' positions. Thus we have the possibility
of a twist to stone's argument. stone contends that we can
only consider rotation of pOlicy making groups 216.
Abrahamsson on the other hand takes the view that it is as
question of the conditions under which Policy making takes
place and ensuring that these are democratic.
stone's view,· we would suggest is a most interesting
development of Hunter's reputational model, but like other
theories we have considered in this section, it is
restricted by its failure to take into account the
possibilities inherent in unconscious power.
Hence in this section on consciously exercised power _
"Knowing Theories of Power" - we have considered a wide
range of theories and investigations. We have found them
wanting in several respects:
a) the tendency to focus on conflict and omit
areas of little or no conflict. By emphasising
conflict to this degree, we lose sight of how the
organization is able to function, as indeed usually
they do.
b) that there is a failure to ask all the
questions of power which should be asked _. for
instance Mintzberg points to company law as a support
for the power of Management. However, while this may
be so, as w~ ~~k above, how do employees come to
consent to th1s ?also suggested that Management as a function,
activity (in other words Management being
is even more powerful than may have been
c) that by taking the perspective of the superior
in the superior:subordinate relationship, the
perspective of the subordinate is diminished (or
omitted).
We need to go on to consider theories which allow for
power to be exercised unconsciously. The mechanism which
makes this possible, we will argue is the reality that has
been negotiated by the participants, and we shall consider
theories of reality before proceeding to consider
unconscious power itself.
THE LIFEWORLD AND NEGOTIATING REALITY 218
Our discussion so far has shown not only the obvious
points, that
a) the role of Management is one which is
extremely powerful and that
b) for Management power is a critical cur,rency,
but has
and as an
Managers) ,
imagined.
For instance, it is quite clear that Management have
the (conscious) power to take and seek to enforce a
decision (to buy new machines/to seek new markets/to move
employees around from one job to another). It is likewise
clear that employees may seek to resist these decisions
using whatever means they can (their own conscious power)'
for whatever reasons. Through their trade unions, they may
seek to resist the introduction of new machines if, for
instance, they believe t~a~ this may lead ,to redundancies.
or they may use less off~c~al means - 'for ~nstance sabotage
to "demonstrate" that the machines are no good 219 •
The point we have tried to make, however, is that what
is not challenged is the right of Management to make such
decisions. The objective of whatever form the industrial
action took would always be to influence Management to take
another decision - to get them to do something else. As We
ointed out above, in considering Abrahamsson 220 the
~hallenge to Management is most likely come fro~ the
consequences of what they ,do, ra~h7r than from what they do
_ not from the act o~ ~ak~ng dec~s~ons, but rather from the
consequences of dec~s~ons. Management are the decision-
makers, and that quality yields them power which
unconsciously sustains the power they derive from their
hierarchical position, of which all are conscious.What we propose to go on to consider now is how these
beliefs, which yield Management the degree of (unconscious)
power we have suggested they possess, comes about and can
routinely be exercised 221 • We shall do this by considering
the negotiation of reality, but in particular the power
which emerges in this process.
We shall do this through a consideration of the
theorists we considered in Chapter 1. We shall start from
schutz for whom power was not, at least explicitly, a
significant variable. We shall then move on to consider the
work of Habermas.
The issues to be considered are well defined by
Thompson,
organizational structures and order are
not unproblematical realities that
exist independently of members'
constructive interpretation and
constant reformulation. The social
construction of reality in
organizations involves making shared
and binding a "reality" made up of
entities such as goals, rules and
roles. 222
In other words what we shall consider here are the
ways in which the members of the Firm are able to reach
sufficient agreement about what is/ought to be happening
for it to function as an operative System. If there is no
such agreement then, as Mc Hugh tells us
failure of definition will
failure of interaction. 223
cause
Hence a successful negotiation of reality is essential
for the on-going operation of the firm 224 • First of all let
us consider how Schutz describes this process.
SCHUTZ
In considering Schutz 225 , we can return to the source
of much of his inspiration - Husserl for whom the essntial
problem was
a) that the essential structures of the life-
world (or the natural attitude, the constructs of
common sense) cannot, and should not, be taken for
granted, but are instead important SUbjects of study,
b) to establish how the life-world, in this sense
is formed.
therefore, we-then have to ask, how as individual
come to acquire knowledge of the Lifeworld and how i ~ i e
that the Lifeworld comes to be formed - to develop wh ~
schutz describes as "the SUbjective stock of knOWledge" 226a•These issues as we have seen in Chapter 1 227 loom
large in Schutz's thinking, and have been influentical in
our analysis. Nonetheless there is a need to critically
assess Schutz's theory to assess its limitations 228.
First of all let us consider the positive aspects of
his theory. We would suggest that the following are worthy
of note:
a) his emphasis on "bracketing" accepted reality,
which is taken from Husserl, and on questioning the
natural attitude. This emphasises the importance of
considering and taking into account not merely the
attitudes of our subjects, but to consider the
structures which underpin these attitudes. In other
words we treat as problematic what our sUbj~~is treat
as obvious, and investigate their structure • As we
have argued before, it would be trivial to simply
identify the attitudes towards hierarchy of our
respondents, since what we want to know is HhY it is
accepted. Only by treating it as non-obvious - which
our respondents do not - can we begin to move toward
understanding its basis, rather than just
rationalisations for its existence.
b) the emphasis on social learning. We shall
subsequent take issue with Schutz on his failure to
give sufficient emphasis to intersubjectivity, since
we would subscribe to Habermjr~s view that his theory
is ultimately monodological • On the other hand it
is important to obserre the social origins of the
knowledge employed 2 , and the processes through
which it is acquired.
c) the analysis of the structure of the
Lifeworld, and the process by which it is formed. Thus
the emphasis on the different types of knowledge -
Basic or Fundamental elements or structures
(themes and types),
Routine or Habitual elements, and
Specific Component contents
is important for the conceptual categories they
provide, but more importantly for pointing to the
pri~acy of deeper le,,:els of knowledge of which our
sUbJects are not conSC10US.of
d) the role which the Lifewor1d plays in
structuring our behaviour. The system of types and
relevances allow us to interpret and behave within our
social world. As we have pointed out, in schutz's
theory, relevances and typifications etc. only
continue to be used to the extent that they prove to
be successful. Hence if a type proves to be
unsuccessful we would be likely to change or adapt it.
Correspondingly, if it continues to be successful it
is likely to continue to be used. Behaviour thus is
grounded in a cognitive process, rather than just
written off as "socialized" n2 •
e) the emphasis on the role of social givens.
This makes the point that there are elements in the
lives of individuals which "just are", they are simply
accepted. For individuals in society this is how the
1ifewor1d appears,
the Lifeworld is the unquestioned
ground of everything given in my
experience, and the unquestionable
frame in which all the problems I have
to deal with are located.233
Corresponding to this Schutz emphasises the
taken-for-grantedness of knowledge in the Lifeworld.
We can draw attention here to the systems of relevance
and types described by Schutz, and which we considered
above, but the sum total is to create a "psychic
prison" 234 , from which escape is difficu1t 235 •
f) that the knowledge and its transmission become
institutionalized. In other words it is not only that
knowledge comes to be taken for granted, but this
knowledge is moreover able to persist because the
methods for its transmission become institutionalized
in society. The consequence is that this knowledge _
the social stock - can continue to dominate over
generations.
g) there is a social distribution of knowledge
through the differentiation of general knowledge and
specialised knowledge. There are three important
points which come from this:
1) it points to the fact that we do not all
have the same stock of knowledge, but that
certain knowledge - specialised knowledge - is
restricted to certain groups. Thus each specialty
will have. its ?wn, more or less elaborated
(though 1ncreas1ng1y the former) stock of
knowledge.
2) there is an increasing dominance
specialised stocks of knowledge3) it points to power prov.ided by the
possession of specialised knowledge - but which
through being a component of the Lifeworld will
be largely unconscious.
h) the emphasis on taken-for-grantedness
emphasises the value of Habermas's Idea Speech Thesis.
At the same time there are certain defects and
shortcomings with Schutz's theory, and it is to these that
we will now turn.
1) We entitled this section "Negotiation of
Reality and the Lifeworld", and this points to one of
our concerns with Schutz, since rather than a
negotiation of reality, the emphasis in Schutz is more
on acquiring a sense of reality. There is,
consequently, little sense of negotiation, since even
where there is consideration of "we relations" and
"thou relations" the emphasis remains with the
individual, rather than on the dyad (or greater) 236 •
Moreover, Schutz treats the parties to a relationship
as if they were equals, which is by no means apparent
237. Thus to the extent this is not so, we have to
introduce to the analysis the effects of any imbalance
of power there may be between them ~8
2) there is we would argue a problem with the
degree of homogeneity of consciousness implied in
Schutz's theory. It would certainly not be true to say
that Schutz's theory assumes that two people, with
different biographies would necessarily adopt the same
perspectives, or interpretations on a situation.
Indeed as we pointed out in Chapter 1, Schutz would
take the very opposite view 239. On the other hand if
we are free to take our own individual view which may
be different, what is it that holds society together -
what is the glue, so to speak? This is not a trivial
matter, since as Bernstein asks, what
influences the emergence, reproduction
and decline 10f the structures of the
Lifeworld) ? 2 0If we adopt a Laingian perspective on this _
which would argue for the uniqueness of the individual
Lifeworld 241 - then we are obliged to develop theory
to explain cohesion in society. This in turn requires
recognition that the Lifeworld may act as a means of
securing social cohesion and integration. Thus, while
Schutz recognizes differences exist in the social
distribution of knowledge, what this means can go much
further than he allows for. Really his analysis stops
at the point where it is apparent that different
people know different things, and that this different
knowledge can lead us to inte;-pret the same fact in
interpersonally different ways242 • In particular Schutz
does not allow for the possibility that the social
distribution is more than chance, or even a functional
necessity. His analysis does not consider the
possibility that the distribution of knowledge is a
matter of social control 243 •
3) for Schutz the knowledge which we have is the
result of sedimentation of experience, filtered
through the systems of relevance and typification
which we have acquired at least partly from the social
stock of knowledge. This much is fine, but as
Bernstein argues,
the more one emphasises the role of
history and the sedimentation of past
experiences in shaping how an
individual constitutes his social
world, and the more one is aware of the
mediation of groups and classes in
these processes of constitution, then
the more one requires a detailed
analysis of the processes and
determinants involved in the
construction of different forms of
social and political reality 244 •
Really there is no attempt in Schutz's work to
deal with issues of how it is that certain experiences
sediment into our sUbjective stock of knOWledge 245
while others do not 246 • In Schutz's theory the proces~
is one which is sUbstantially at the level of
psychology, but which never gets beyond that to
consider the social issues 247 • This is a problem which
we can trace back to the essentially individual basis
of the theory.
4) Schutz's theory is sUbstantially descriptive
This is by no means a fatal criticism, but it doe;
indicate the limitations of his position and is a
further source of the points we have made already 248 •5) Associated with the' foregoing, it has to be
recognized that schutz's theory makes little attempt
to deal with social and political reality. The
processes which Schutz describes take these into
account in only a very marginal way. It is certainly
true to say that there is a discussion of the social
stock of knowledge, but
a) the emphasis is ultimately on dealing
with the problem that the individual really
cannot be the source of all the knOWledge he
possesses. Even at the social level therefore the
ultimate objective is Husserl's solus ipse.
b) the process by which the social stock
forms SUbstantially through a process of
objectivation, and that social knOWledge becomes
institutionalized. We are not, however, told how
these processes work, nor is there any reference
to social institutions involved in making this
work.
6) the emphasis on description, and on the level
of the individual eventually has fundamental
consequences for Schutz, in that his view of adequate
explanation (the postulate of adequacy) can be argued
to be deficient. For Schutz, an explanation must be
understandable to the actor who has performed the act.
This omits the possibility that the actor may not want
to own up to'the motivations for his act '249. other
mechanisms which may undermine Schutz's view are false
consciousness, ideology, or even Habermas's (and the
Frankfurt School) use of psychoanalysis for
identifying repression 250 •
7) finally there is no attempt in Schutz to
develop a theory of power. Now, to some extent this is
an unfair criticism to make, since it may be argued
that he never set out to do this - that he set out to
describe how we acquire our understanding of the
world. This much may be true, but
a) the implications of working in the way he
did have, as we have seen, had other detrimental
consequences (Eg the postulate of adequacy, the
implication that description is an end in itself
etc.),
b) it does point to important limitations in
his theory, and indicate to us that we have to
look els~where for the problems which remain. It
is to th~s that we now turn.HABERHAS
We saw in Chapter 1 that we can develop, from a
Habermasian perspective a Lifeworld which is not only a
stock of ideas by which we make sense of our surroundings,
and are enabled to act but is also, in an important way,
about control 251. As we pointed out there ~ in Morgan's
"Images" the Lifeworld is a "Psychic Prison" 2 2 •
What we have now to consider is how it is that the
cell door gets kept locked. Habermas, like Marx, sees
capitalism as dominated by contradictions. The problem
which Habermas sees continuing to exist for contemporary
capitalism is, as McCarthy puts it,
how to distribute socially produced
wealth ine~itablY and yet
legitimately. 2
To understand how he sees this as being accomplished
we need to keep in mind that for Habermas any explanation
which is "one-sided" will be inevitably inadequate. What is
meant by this is that if we
a) over-emphasize the Lifeworld then we exclude
from adequate consideration issues of the Social
system, and its maintenance and control - as Held puts
it
investigations stay at
commonsense or everyday
social procedures 254
the level
knowledge
of
of
This is the very problem which we have identified
in Schutz, as well as in Laing (though for the latter
the level of his analysis, being at the level of th~
individual/family would not expect to move to level of
society) and have tried to correct in our SUbsequent
analysis through introducing power to the Lifeworld.
b) on the other hand if we do not pay enough
attention to the Lifeworld 255, and instead focus only
on the Social System and its needs, then we forget
that society, its rules and control procedures are
accomplished through its individual members and their
consciousness - the Social System is a human artefact.
What is needed, Habermas argues is an approach which
.ntegrates both the Social System and the Lifeworld to
~>,plain the maintenance of capitalism in general 256, and
which we shall. use to complete our explanation of the
persistence of h1erarchy.
It is clear that for Habermas
a) the Social System is important for the
continued material existence of society, butb) there has to be a balance. between Social
system and Lifeworld, since the latter is responsible
for the cultural maintenance and reproduction needed
for the continuation of the Social System.
The difficulty which he ~\\ects is that the Social
system has come to dominate , and the Lifeworld is
subordinate to the "systemic constraints of material
reproduction" 258.
This comes about as a consequence of the following:
a) while rationality, as we have suggested above,
can be, and has been, a pos\tive force in the
development of modern societies 2 9, it can also have
disfunctional elements. One such fact is that with the
development of rationality it becomes more possible
for the parties to disagree and come into conflict. In
traditional societies, where decisions were taken to
be consistent with tradition CEg the rules of the
Church), rationality requires the selection of the
objectively "best" means:ends relationship. In such
circumstances while conflict is by no means
inevitable, it is more likely than in traditional
societies. Thus, Habermas argues, mechanisms are put
igo place to reduce the likelihood of such conflict.
b) the mechanisms which are put in place to
reduce the possibility of such conflict are what
Habermas describes as "delinguistified steering
media"261. Their role is to direct behaviour without
the need for communicative action, without the need
for validity claims, and thus in such a way that the
, likelihood of conflict is reduced 262~ The mechanisms
which Habermas describes as delinguistified steering
media, are money and power. Through the entry of money
and power to the Lifeworld as guides to behaviour
appropriate for the needs of the Social System, the
Lifeworld is, in effect, avoided. Behaviour then
becomes, strategic and oriented to the achievement of
success, rather than communicative and oriented to the
achievement of rational understanding. The ability of
steering media to guide behaviour is such that they
can develop increasingly complex structures, so that
no one is able to take a comprehensive view of them
or to take responsibility for them 263. '
c) while money is considered to be a form of
steering media, the other which he refers to is power
This is developed in his discussion of Parsons 264·
Here it is argued by Habermas that while power lik~
money, may be a steering medium it differs in that it
does not circulate in society. Rather power
9-90i) is attached to particular' positions in
organizations (the role of Management is a very
general example) indeed to use power at a
social level requires organization 265
ii) requires on-going legitimation in
other words, it is routinely obeyed if perceived
to be legitimate 2~ •
Power, like money, is independent of (or "de-
coupled from") the Lifeworld, and thus its use is
increasingly not sUbject to the norms of the
Lifeworld, which has been replaced by Social System
imperatives, now dominating the Lifeworld. Thus, the
use of power can be justified by reference to Social
system imperatives.
Such developments lead on to the colonization of the
Lifeworld by the Social System. This comes about when
Social system media of power and money begin to actually
displace communicative forms of coordination. In other
words, rather than action being determined by communicative
rationality, it is determined by the needs of the Social
system 267 , and by strategic rationality. This is where the
Social system colonizes the Lifeworld by, giving rise to
structural Violence2~ •
Why, however, does the Social System begin to invade
the Lifeworld in this way? The ultimate source for Habermas
is class conflict, and the contradictions within the Social
system. For instance if the economy is in crisis - or at
least performing below its aspiration level - action is
taken to remedy this and these remedies have impact on the
Lifeworld.
The Lifeworld and the Social System are seen by
Habermas as having an interchange relation to each other269 •
For instance, as employee the individual supplies labour to
the social System, in return for which he receives a
certain level of reward, which will be jUd~ed as fair, or
otherwise in the context of his Lifeworld 20. So when the
social system is in crisis, it may be that the employee is
required to accept lower rewards, and/or be required to put
in more labour. Thus the Lifeworld, to the extent that
colonization has proceeded, no longer reflects only
communicative action, but rather strategic action motivated
by Social system imperatives.
An example of this in Habermas's own work would be the
development of technocratic consciousness 271. Habermas
begins from Weber, who saw rationality as a developmental
force in modern capitalism - extending the areas of life to
which rational (as opposed to traditional) criteria of
decision-making would apply. Habermas sees rationality as
"Janus faced" (Habermas supra pg. 83), in thatIt is no longer only a critical
standard for the developmental level of
the forces of production in relation to
which the objectively, superfluous,
repressive character of historically
obsolete relations of production can be
exposed. It is also an apologetic
standard through which these same
relations of production can be
justified as a functional institutional
framework. Indeed in relation to its
apologetic serviceability "rationality"
is weakened as a critical standard and
degraded to a corrective within the
Social system••• (thus) the true motive,
the perpetuation of objectively
obsolete domination is concealed
through the invocation of purposive
rational imperatives. 272
Thus rationality can be distorted in Habermas's view
(indeed the Ideal Speech Thesis describes the conditions
for achieving a genuinely rational consensus), by the
dominance of technology and science, such that decisions
come to be made not on the basis of freely determined goals
(Ie within the Ideal Speech Thesis) and thus, other than on
the basis of the interests of mankind. Rather these
decisions are taken on the basis of the interests of
science and the development of technology - in other words
the interests of technology and science appear to be of
greater significance than the interests of mankind 2n • Thus
Habermas argues:
The immanent law of this progress seems
to produce objective exigencies which
must be obeyed by any politics oriented
towards functional needs••••••it can
also become a background ideology that
penetrates into the consciousness of
the depoliticized mass of the
population, where it can take on
legitamizing power. 2~
Hence the role of technocratic consciousness can be to
render unproblematic, decisions in the firm. For instance
through its connection to economic growth, technocratic
consciousness supports Social System needs by rendering
such decisions unproblematic 275. Thus to the extent that
the Lifeworld endorses technocratic consciousness it has
been successfully colonized by the Social System and
contributes to its effective operation. 'Let us take as an example of this, what would happen
in our firm, if we developed and introduced a system of
collective decision-making (we might even call it
industrial democracy), whereby decisions were no longer
taken my Management, but were taken by all the employees
(or their representatives) 276. What would be the
consequence of this?
We would contend that while there may be improvements
in the performance of the business 2n - for instance by
improving communication both upwardly and downwardly
(though on the basis of our evidence - Chapter 4 - there
would be some doubt about the latter. We can however, let
that pass, since it is not central to our argument at the
moment). The problem for this experiment would be that at
some point it would be brought up against the "realities"
of contemporary capitalism - that the business has got to
sell at the market price, that it has to show a certain
return on capital and so on. Such realities might mean that
even as a democracy the firm might be driven to take
decisions based on Social System imperatives. We have
already seen evidence of this in an interview with a
Director, who arguing that redundancy was the last thing he
would want to do, agreed that it would be necessary
the day the banks wont give you any
more money. 278 .
Thus the Lifeworld becomes infiltrated with systems
media, such. that the operation of communicative action
becomes increasingly difficult since individuals are no
longer motivated to aChieving understanding, but are
motivated to achieving success 279. The Lifeworld thus
becomes increasingly irrational, in Habermas's sense.
Evidence of this cited by Habermas is the tendency
toward "juridification" 280 • The examples which he tends to
give of this mainly concern the increasing volume of
legislation which applies to social security claimants. We
can, however, discern a similar process in UK industrial
relations, over broadly the last 25 years 281 •
We can see in the context of the exchange relations
between Social System needs and Lifeworld needs that a
purpose of the development of legislation since 1971 has
been to motivate the employee to supply a greater aggregate
of labour through increasing his/her non-pecuniary reward
in this way 282
Extending this further, we may even see in demands for
participation, a ,similar line of argument, since to the
extent that .the employee•s non-pecuniary reward is
increased by participation (Eg feeling more closely
associated with his company, more political power producing
a greater d?gree of ~oyalty), the purpose may be to secure
a further J.ncrease J.n labou,r power - or more effective
labour power" throu~h securJ.~g ~greement to new workin
practices, or 1mprov1ng commun1catJ.on 283 • gIn such ways the steering problems. in the Social
system can be diminished through such intrusions into the
Lifewor1d. On the other hand such an alteration to the
exchange relationship may cause the Social System to be
perceived as no longer legitimate in the eyes of the
employee, and t~~s he may be no longer motivated to conform
to its needs 2 • It is through the possibility of this
that Habermas does not take the essentially pessemistic
view of Weber ("The Iron cage"), or Marx (reification and
alienation).
If Social System and Lifewor1d were to be put into a
more appropriate balance then the problems identified by
Habermas, Weber and Marx could begin to be addressed. Hence
the colonization of the Lifewor1d by the Social System may
begin to be reversed, and society reclaim control over its
affairs through allowing for the full development of
rationality, rather than the attenuated version which
operates at the moment due to certain arrangements, rules
etc. being placed beyond justifiction by the colonization
of the Lifewor1d.
An example of this, given by Habermas, concerns the
role of labour in modern capitalism. From a Lifewor1d
perspective, Habermas argues, labour belongs to the
producer (the labourer). From a Social System perspective,
on the other hand, how the labour is used is determined not
by the labourer, but by the imperatives of the Social
system and its needs. The consequence of this is that while
the worker does the work, he does so not according to his
own needs or motivations, but according to the needs of the
system. Labour, in this way becomes a commodity like any
other to be used by the Social System. This is then
institutionalized by the wage-labour system and the
"normalization of occupational roles 285, which
sUbstantially neutralize any impact of the Lifewor1d (Ie
the process is guided by money and power, 2iiher than
rational consensus arrived at through dialogue) •
The second process which Habermas distinguishes is
what he terms "cultural impoverishment", which in essence
is a loss of meanin9 by. social actors: This was a process
which Weber saw as ~nev~tab1e, but wh~ch Habermas believes
can be reversed through the removal of Social system
imperatives from communicative action and development
toward full rationality. In other words the loss of meaning
for social actors is caused by the restrictions placed on
rationality by the Social System and its invasion of the
Lifewor1d.
central to this is the differentiation of kno~ledge
which Habermas sees takini place in modern society 2 i as
did Weber and Schutz 28 • Weber saw this as inevit~blY
threatening to meaning, but in Habermas's view this is not
necessarily so.Habermas arg~es that it is not dif£erentiation of
knowledge which ~s the problem (Ie the possession of
specialized knowledge which I have but others, not in my
specialty, lack). The difficulty, rather is located in
that specialists develop their own forms of argumentation
from which others are excluded. In other words the way in
which specialisms and their exclusive forms of
argumentation develop, breaches in the Ideal Speech Thesis
289. Thus the full operation of rationality and the use of
specialised knowledge for the benefit of all, is prevented.
In turn this introduces distortions to the Lifeworld.
We can see this taking place in our own data, since a
major support of the management role in hierarchy is their
claim to special knowledge and skills to which others do
not have access 290. Moreover (and at least as important)
we have to have regard to the fact that this claim is
endorsed by the Staff and Hourly-Paid, to the extent that
even in what they see as an ideal decision-making system,
Management would continue to take decisions, though SUbject
to the influence of others (Ie in a situation closer to the
Ideal Speech Thesis, and thus to rationality).
The problem is not, therefore, one of a f~~!e
consciousness, but rather a fragmented consciousness ,
since the Hourly-Paid and Staff cannot fully comprehend
Management (as an activity) and thus cannot be critical of
Management and what they do. This in turn opens up the
possibility of the Lifeworlds of our SUbjects being
internally inconsistent. These issues are taken up by
Blackburn and Mann 292 and by Billig et ale 293
Thus we can explain the inability to challenge
hierarchy by recognizing that we occupy a Lifeworld,
a) of which we are ~ot fUlly conscious and thus
not able to criticise 29 • As we pointed out above
employees have no experience of organizational form~
other than hierarchy, and thus have no point of
reference to criticise it from the perspective of a
workable alternative. Any move away from hierarchy
must be, in a Lifeworld sense, a "leap in the dark".
b) which has been invaded by Social System
imperatives which direct our behaviour according to
money and power, rather than rationality, and so
according to communicative Action. Thus to the extent
that hierarchy is associated with concepts like
efficiency and profit, it is, in a Lifeworld sense
endorsed, ,
c) which has been culturally impoverished by the
insulation of ~xper~ise,. creat~ng a fragmented
~iysciousness, wh~ch ~s f~lled w~th lfionsistencies
. We have already quoted Purcell who argues
that,a) management will seek to develop a facade
of cooperation and partnership, which portrays
conflict as unnecessary and indeed as irrational.
(pg. 38)
b) to develop an image of managerial power
based not on (legal) property and property
rights, but rather on an authority located in
their (claimed) technical expertise.
Thus, the fragmentation of the Lifeworld can be
seen in management being able to claim concurrently
partnership and authority.
The concept of the Lifeworld can, therefore, be seen
to be central in explaining our empirical data. It is not,
however, the Lifeworld as proposed by Schutz, in the
tradition of Husserl. That is a Lifeworld for which
description can be considered to be adequate - thus for
instance we could have described the Lifeworld which our
sUbjects occupied and left it at that.
We have, however, had to go further than this. What
type of Lifeworld is it that our sUbjects occupy and how
does it sustain itself? That it sustains itself is clear
from the analysis of our data in the earlier chapters. The
exact mechanisms have been clarified by our theoretical
discussion. This has identified a number of mechanisms
through which hierarchy is sustained:
a) The Lifeworld, as Schutz makes clear, sets
horizons for social actors through its organization of
knowledge into types and by setting themes, which we
simply take for granted. The Lifeworld establishes a
body of knowledge which as social actors we treat as
"obvious", inclUding past and present experience -
which we have either learned at first hand, and/or
through others (Eg teachers and parents). Future
experience will confirm this knowledge, or to the
extent that it fails to do so, may lead to adaption of
the Lifeworld 2g7.
It it through the very obviousness of this
knowledge that we can begin to see the implications of
the Lifeworld beyond its description. The fact that
knowledge is treated as obvious means that it is much
less likely to be subjected to scrutiny, or
questioned. It just "is", and to this extent the
~milications it has for power may not be identified
9 • Hence the category of "manager" is learned for
instance in many cases in our firm, from parent~ who
also worked for the same firm (See Chapter 3).b) we can categorise its knowledge- as basic, or
routine or specific to a situation. The critical
elements here are the basic and routine elements,
since the former, organizing our knowledge, is
prereflective, so that even if we do reflect on our
knowledge we do so within the constraints of these
basic, organizing elements. Routine structures, as we
saw above, are elements of knowledge with which we are
so familiar that we may not even be aware of using it
at all. To the extent that these "organizing
structures of the Lifeworld" act unconsciously, then
again they are beyond criticism.
It is only by suspending belief in hierarchy
(epoche) and treating it as non-obvious that we can
begin to understand these foundations. Thus the
category "manager" brings forward certain thematic
relevances that they are professional decision-
makers 299 •
c) the Lifeworld is colonized by Social System
imperatives, which means that increasingly our actions
are not governed by communicative action (and thus by
rationality) but by the Social System steering media
of power and money. Again because of the privileged
position Which the Lifeworld occupies, we are
unconscious of this happening. Indeed, as we point out
above, it is not only those outwith Management whose
Lifeworlds are dominated by Social System imperatives,
the Lifeworlds of Managers too are likewise dominated,
and it may even be that their Lifeworlds have been
even more extensively colonized than others outwith
Management. Thus, when our Managers tell us that they
are' "only doing a job", and that it has nothing to do
with power, this need not be explained away as false
consciousness, or unwillingness to "tell the truth".
It can instead be explained as part of their
Lifeworld300
d) our Lifeworld becomes "culturally
impoverished" in the sense that there are certain
areas of social life to which we do not have access.
These are areas marked off as being areas of
specialised knowledge 301. As a consequence of this
others outwith Management in the hierarchy cannot hav~
access to the knowledge for being a manager, and thus
have no basis for being critical of it, other than the
consequences of :the application of this knowledge 302 •e) as a consequence of the colonization and
cultural impoverishment of the Lifeworld, Habermas
predicts that it will start to show signs ~f the
development of crisis-inducing pathologies 30 • For
instance social actors will show signs of anomie
(rather than legitimately ordered interpersonal
relations) and loss of meaning (rather than
interpretive schemes which are fit for consensus) 304.
So as a result of colonization and cultural
impoverishment, the Lifeworld may cease to be able to
support hierarchy in the future.
f) the impact of cultural impoverishment also has
implications for our consideration of ideology. In our
assessment of the role of ideology we were critical of
work like that of Armstrong et al., or of Abecrombie
et ale since it appeared to us that they were
searching for more consistency on the part of their
sUbjects than could in our view be reasonably
expected30S • The work of Blackburn and Mann on the
other hand pointed to the incon~b~tencies in the
ideologies of a sample of workers • Billig et ale
see such inconsistencies as the very stuff of social
life 307-.
cultural impoverishment explains why we should
expect inconsistency - because the Lifew~~\d is so
patchy, with so many areas being mystified , and to
the extent that this process of impoverishment has
developed, we should probably expect "fragmented
consciousness". Thus rather than being seen as
politically biased we would expect TV news to be seen
as neutral by social actors whose Lifeworld has been
impoverished 309, since they have little to base
criticism on, especially when the material in the news
is socially at a distance from them (Eg TV news
stories about industrial disputes in other industries
of which they have no experience).
g) the Lifeworld, conceived in this way, also
supports the view of power which we have presented.
Since the Lifeworld is something of which we are
substantially unaware, we can see that it is throuah
the Lifeworld that unconscious power operates 310.
Thus as we have argued above, social actors the
category "manager" appears to call forth the thematic
relevance that they are professional decision-makers
Thus the power to take decisions does not have to b~
constantly re-won by managers, but is conceded to them
by the Lifeworlds of those outwith Management- indeed
taking decisi,ons is expected of them, just as the
managerial 1L1feworlds expect to be able to take
decisions 3 1.The Lifeworld however, plays another role in
power. We have seen clearly that Managers and
employees get involved in disputes. During these
disputes they will apply their power to each other -
or threaten to do so. The role of the Lifeworld is to
indicate ways in which it is legitimate to use your
power. For instance during a strike it is a normal
expectation that the emploYment relationship is
effectively in "cold storage" and that as soon as the
dispute is ended the relationship will be taken up
again much as before. Hence during a strike it is
unusual for either side to take any action which will
threaten this relationship. For instance during the
time of the Industrial Relations Act (1971) many
companies did not take advantage of the relative
weakness of the unions312 • Likewise unions seldom take
action which will have a long term effect on their
relationship with the employers.
Power can be usefully considered as a "multi-
layered" concept, with conscious elements (where we
all know that power is being used - a strike for
instance), but also with unconscious elements (which
indicate to us ways in which we should/should not
behave, or how to use our conscious power). These
latter elements stem from our Lifeworld, identified
through Habermas I s Ideal Speech Thesis, being norms,
rules etc. which are not potentially sUbject to the
type of criticism pre-supposed in communicative
Action.
h) Finally the Lifeworld we have conceived of
supports the view which we developed of Managers. This
suggested that Managers see themselves as "doing a
job" in which control was important, but is purely a
technical matter 313. Our research suggests that the
exercise of control is taken-for-granted by our
Managers, who did not see themselves as concerned with
power far less as "politicians", but simply as people
doing a job 314. Our analysis indicates, however that
we cannot divorce their role from the exercise of
power. It is imperative to appreciate that we are not
arguing that they are lying or being misleading
rather the explanation for this paradox lies in thei~
Lifeworlds. Their Lifeworlds define their work in the
way they have described it to us 315. The Manager I s
Lifeworld on the basis of our data defines his work as
purely technical and not political. This is
substantially consented to by their employees who
again on the basis of our data do not appear t~ wish
to share the work of Management - but on the other
hand they are concerned with the implications of their
decisions. Thus the concept of the Mandator
't' 316 d ' , t POS1 10n , an exerc1s1ng con rol Over this appears
to be consistent.What we shall now go on to consider is how this view
of the Lifeworld can be brought in to develop a more
adequate theory of power, by allowing for consideration of
the unconscious operation of power.
UNCONSCIOUS THEORIES OF POWER
Unconscious power is critical for our analysis of the
data, since we have argued that Management power is, in an
important way, sustained by power which not only their
staff and Hourly Paid are not aware of, but which
Management themselves are not conscious of 317 , residing as
it does in their Lifeworlds and entering into their social
action, as Habermas puts it a tergo 318 • What we shall go on
to do is to consider theories of unconscious power which
may give us support in this.
The seminal view of unconscious power for us, as we
pointed out, is Lukes 319 , and we will start this section by
considering the use of his theory by Gaventa 320 • This is a
study of, as he puts it, the "hidden faces of power" in an
APpalachean mining valley, questioning why the miners do
not challenge the mine owners despite the degree of
inequality between them.
Gaventa, at the start of the book, sets out very
carefully and precisely his view of power, which as he says
is derived from Lukes. He considers each of the 3
dimensions of power, giving empirical examples 321
There are, however, problems which Gaventa's work
poses for us:
1) the reference to the interests of the weaker
party (B). We considered the objections to this raised
by Bradshaw 322 on the grounds of having to show that
the weaker-party has considered a course of action but
has decided against it. Gaventa contends that this is
not necessary, and that the interest of the weaker
party imputed by the observer is only a methodological
tool
"for discovering whether power_
relationships are such as to have
precluded the active and conscious
choice by B about such interests,
regardless of what the outcome of that
choice would actually be" 323 •The difficulty we' see in this is establishing
what becomes of the role of interests. If we take
Gaventa at his word, we might imply that it is B's
interest to become a millionaire - if he does not
behave in a way consistent with this, do we then go on
to argue that this is caused by A and his power?
Besides, as for instance March has argued 324
individuals may not be all that clear themselves about
what their goals are, far less what is in their
interest. Concepts like goals and interests, as
debates on this matter have tended to show 325,
involve significant degrees of ambiguity. This
ambiguity, to the extent it exists in the social world
of our sUbjects, has to be dealt with in analysis, but
we would suggest they are better not to become central
assumptions.
A further difficulty with interests is that
different observers may impute different interests to
the same group. There are of course many examples of
this, but a good example is the difference in
interests imputed to the workers at the Riverside
plant by Nichols and Beynon in "Living with
Capitalism" on the one hand, and by Harris in "Power
and Powerlessness" on the other hand. Given that it is
possible to avoid implying interests for the purposes
of anal~sis, we would suggest we shoUld, if
possible3 6 •
2) if conflict can be absent in the exercise of
power - indeed power is used for the avoidance of
conflict - on what criterion can we establish that
power has been exercised. Gaventa, in discussing the
distinction between "real" and "false" consciousness"
says:
"Real" consensus implies a prior
process of agreement or choice, which
in a situation of apparent consensus
mayor may not have been the case. 327
Thus for there to be a real consensus there has
to be a prior process of agreement or choice, which he
goes on to tell us, has not been shaped or
manipulated, has not been due to the exercise of
power. But, how can we know this? How can we say this
is a consensus arrived at with or without
manipulation? Gaventa gives us no real criteria for
establishing this 328 •
3) It is not at all apparent from Gaventa whether
A (the relatively more powerful) has to be ignorant of
all this. For instance, he writes,the development and maintenance of a
generalized pattern of quiescence of B
by A in situations of latent conflict
will always be in Als interests. A will
act to thwart challenges by B... 329
The problem with Gaventa, and also with LUkes, is
that the 3rd dimension, we suggest, actually tries to
deal with two types of power.
1) One type of power is where A uses his
power (consciously) to shape the perceptions of B
(subliminal advertising is one example, another
propaganda as practiced, for instance by
Goebbels.)
2) The other type of power is where it is so
deeply embedded that neither A nor B are aware of
it (ie power is unconscious for both parties).
We would contend that in fact the former would
more appropriately belong as a particularly successful
exercise of 2nd dimension power (in Lukes'
categorisation), and that the latter is a different
form of power (another dimension).
A further problem, even with the former is that
proving its existence is not going to be
straightforward in many cases. In some cases, as with
Gaventa there will be pUblic records etc to produce as
evidence that it has been used. What do we do,
however, is there is no such evidence? Do we expect
the powerholders to "own up"? What do we do if they do
not? Trade assertions? This is very unsatisfactory as
a way forward 330 •
What we have done is to treat all parties as being
unconscious of the full extent of power in the hierarchy
and then used criteria for the existence of power 331 to
demonstrate that power has been/is being exercised. In the
event that Management were to deny our findings, then the
dispute would be based on the application of specified
analytical criteria, not on jUdgement. Hence, we have
found in our research that Management are not fUlly aware
of their power - that they treat their decision-making as
art of their job, just as Hourly-Paid and Staff do. It has
been our contention that power can be exercised with both A
and B unaware of the exercise of power.
There are, therefore, real difficulties with Gaventals
.r~eW of power, based on Lukes' original formUlation of the
v~ •• 332 third d1mens10n •
Another possible place to look for a more satisfactory
view is in Michael Burawoy's "Manufacturing Consent" 333
aurawoyls view appears similar to our own. •1) He does not focus exclusively on ,the conflicts
in the Management:Worker relationship, but shows as we
have done that by analysis of points of consent that
we can learn much of the Management:Worker
relationship 334 •
2) He argues that workers become enmeshed in a
system of rules, and that this system of rules secures
the continuation of the hierarchical system (or making
out game, in his study).
3) That the system of rules depends largely on
events within the firm, and is little influenced by
external consciousness.
This much is in common with what we have found. There
are, however, certain differences between us:
a) Burawoy canvasses a much narrower range of
matters (making out) than we do, but to a much greater
depth. Burawoy poses the question of why it is that
workers 'give their consent to work under the
exploitative conditions set by Management. The
question we pose is rather more wide-ranging - why
there is consent within the firm, for its affairs to
be run on a hierarchical basis? We are, therefore
operating on different levels of analysis, as well as
with different methods (survey and interview, rather
than participant observer). These differences of
method and analysis have to a large extent produced
our different results. These difference have, however,
cut Burawoy off from what we have found to be a rich
source of data - namely the perceptions by Staff and
Hourly Paid of the Management role "in the round"
rather than the restricted portion which Burawoy
focuses on.
b) more critically, as with LUkes, we do not
think it is made at all clear by Burawoy whether the
Management (the dominant partner in the relationship)
is fully aware of the power they possess 335 • We have
contended that not only workers, but managers as well
are unaware of the full extent of the exercise of
power, in particular unconscious power •
c) there are no criteria of what power is. As we
suggested of Gaventa, what do we do if there is no
tangible evidence (records for instance)? Do we expect
the powerholders to "own up"? What do we do if they do
not? Trade assertions? This is very unsatisfactory as
a way forward.
We have, however, progressed through this
consideration of Burawoy in that we have found support for
ur idea of workers being enmeshed in a system of rules
~lthOU9h Burawoy does not in our.view make clear to what
e~tent Management are aware of the~r power.The significance of rules, however, directs us on to
another lead. This is Clegg's "Power, Rule and Domination"
336. Like Burawoy, Clegg presents a view of workers
ensnared in an system of rules which makes the organization
work. The system of rules amounts to what is described,
following Wittgenstein, as a form of life Which is:
what human beings say is true and
false: and they agree in the language
they use. This is not agreement in
opinions, but in forms of life 337
Clegg means by this, ,
Behaviour glossed over by the phrase
"form of life" indicates that it is
behaviour which may be seen as the
embodiment of actions oriented towards
a standard or measure of activity,
where activity may be taken to stand
for any manifestation of beings in the
world who can be constituted as
theoretic actors (one Who is
responsible for one's acts, to be one
who could have been held to have done
otherwise). 338
Thus, with the concept of form of life what we are
concerned with is not only what is done ("the mere surface
display of behaviour", pg 36), but also with Why that was
done when there was the possibility of doing something
else.
This, Clegg suggests,
through raising the problem of "why" by
relating language to life, by stressing
the interconnections of language games
and form of life that a way out from
the nihilism that has attached to our
investigationsg of power••will be
discovered. 33
ThUS, relating this to what we have found, we could
say that the form of life which exists for our sUbjects is
one which says what is not challenged is the right of
Management to make decisions. The Objective would always be
to influence Management to take another decision. Thus the
form of life of hierarchy says that Management take
decisions, ruling out other forms of life which may allow
other arrangements to develop. Where, in all of this does
power enter in, since what we have now is a particular view
of hoW individuals rationalise what they do?
From the perspective adopted.by Clegg, power enters in
through an ana~ogy between power ~n the rules of chess and
power in organ~zations, '
30 4," ~ ..
Now if power is not something that
condenses in a relationship and
evaporates on its termination, what is
it? To stay with the example of chess,
one might say that it is a function of
the relationship of pieces (units) to
rules, in that rules invest a certain
power in a piece, indeEendently of its
position on the board. 40
Hence in Clegg's view of things we cannot consider
power adequately without considering the rules Which
operate. The rules, therefore become an important source of
data and understanding, since the rules are themselves a
form of power.
So, for instance, while people may interpret the
meaning of a particular order in different ways, they will
pehave toward it in the same way,
because their individual enactments are
guided by collectively recognized and
pUblicly available rules: 341
Weber gives as an example that economic activity is
oriented toward scarcity of resources, but that in addition
the individual will also orient himself toward
"conventional and legal rules" 342 • In other words While the
economic individual is aware of self interest, that is
subordinated by him to the conventional and social rules to
lNhich Weber refers. The order created 'by these rules, Clegg
points out becomes a system of domination 343 • Power resides
1n the fact that individuals settle their behaviour
relative to these rules.
There are, therefore, in Clegg's view two dimensions
of power:
1) the first face of power is on those issues
where decisions are to be made, such that the parties
may employ their power against each other. For
instance when a group of workers go on strike for
higher wages, or to take an example from Burawoy, when
workers find their area of discretion being eroded by
Management. In these cases the parties - Workers and
Managers - are using their power against each other
2) the second face of power deals with situations
where the, decis~ons have already been taken, or were
never ra1sed S1nce they were seen as taken-for-
granted. Rules in an orga~ization are, in' this sense,
a form of power, S1nce the members of the
organization obey an order because it is consistent
with the rules ,Which apply in that situation. Hence
the person who 1ssues the order is, as with the Queen
in chess, powerful.If this is power. then the next question we have to
ask is how do we identify it? It is fairly clear from Clegg
that power is to be identified from what people say - his
is a study where linguistics play a prominent role. In his
discussion of this ~4, he is extremely critical of
cicourel. The analysis proposed by Cicourel involves moving
from the surface (what people actually say) to deep
structure (the rules which speakers apply to give a meaning
to what is said) 345. The problem with this is, as Clegg
says,
In cicourel's model speakers are free
on the conversational market to
exchange talk as formally equal
members, because the focus in on the
formal aspect of talk, rather than on
the occasions that generate the
necessity for any particular account,
or the relation of the concepts of that
account to particular forms of life 346 •
Our reading of this suggests to us that Clegg means:
1) that the assumption of Cicourel that the
market for speech is analogous to the economist's
perfect market is not valid. We would agree with this
fully, indeed we have made a similar argument already
through Habermas's critique of Arendt's theory of
power on the· grounds that it ignores, what he calls
"structural violence,,347. cicourel's view, likewise
treats speakers as if they are equal in the discourse.
As the Ideal Speech Thesis suggests, however, this is
a matter we must treat as problematic.
2) we must seek to penetrate the inner logic of
the rules which move us from surface to deep
structure. In particular, having established what
these rules are, we cannot just stop there. In Clegg's
terminology we must relate them to "particular forms
of life" - in this case we must seek to understand
utterances as theorizing about domination as a "good
sensible and intelligible practice,,348. In short w~
have to analyse talk, looking for evidence of' the
legitimation of domination.
This analysis is carried out by Clegg on his data (eg
the Joiner's Tale, Cooking the Books, Al the ideal Typist
etc.). So for instance he argues in the section on the
Joiner's Tale,
This hierarchical structuring, as the
structure of power in the organization,
is self-evidently axiomatic. without
this bed-rock assumption, one could
hardly function as a normal, competent
member of such an organization.349
There is much we have in common with Clegg:1) as Habermas suggests we should do, he locates
his data in talk and in language,
2l rules are considered as an important source of
power j50 ,
3) the analysis of the rules used, located
through the talk of his sUbjects, enables him to get
beneath the surface of behaviour, to try to consider
what ultimately supports it,
4) his analysis allows for the possibility in
behaviour that it is theoretically possible for actors
to have behaved otherwise, and to question why they
did not do so,
5) finally, consistent with Habermas, he is
critical of cicourel's ethnomethodology, which treats
speech as a free and equal market.
There are, however, certain problems with Clegg:
a) First of all, there are no criteria of what
power is. We have suggested it is to be identified in
language - but what language? How do we distinguish
IIpower' languageII from "non-power language"? How are we
to know that power is being exercised? As we suggested
of Gaventa, .what do we do if there is no tangible
evidence (records for instance)? Do we expect the
powerholders to "own Up"? What do we do if they do
not? Trade assertions? This is very unsatisfactory as
a way forward.
b) Clegg follows Weber in allowing conscious and
unconscious power to fall within the same category.
Thus:
Authority is the probability that a
command with a given specific content
will be obeyed by a given group of
persons. 351
The difficulty this creates - and we have argued
this in relation to Lukes and Gaventa - is that this
"order" may be obeyed because,
i) the actor SUbject to the command knows
he will (or expects to) be coerced if he does not
obey the command,
or
ii) the actor issuing the command knows he
can impose punishments on the other party if they
fail to obey
30:;'or
iii) the actor sUbject 'to the command, as
does the actor issuing it, regards the order as
legitimate and thus obeys it.
The distinguishing property of (iii) is that only
power in this sense would be unconscious. Yet all
three would be consistent with Weber's original
formulation 352
c) Clegg argues that positions are not important-
one might say it (power) is a function
of the relationship of pieces (units)
to rules, in that rules invest a
certain power in a piece, inde~endentlY
of its position on the board. 3
The difficulty with this is instanced on the very
next page of Clegg's book, where he points out that if
a policeman disguised as a bystander, attempted to
direct the traffic, that motorists would mock his
attempts to do so. In other words the motorists would
ignore him because, without his uniform, they would be
unaware of his position. This is not to say that the
rules are not important, indeed they are critical. The
point we wish to make is that, following the analogy
of 'chess, even a powerful piece like the Queen can be
put in such an impossible position that even the rules
cannot save her. It is not satisfactory to tightly
couple rules and positions to this degree. An example
of this is given by Nichols and Beynon in the case of
John Baird, who was a plant manager at Chem-Co.
I said "Well let's all get down to
this. Let's all pUll together" sort of
thing •••• I think it was going really
well but then I saw what an experienced
shop steward could do. He said "Why
haven't you negotiated with me on this?
It's in the agreement. You must
negotiate before you introduce any
changes•••"And I was saying there were
a number of reasons why I hadn't
negotiated, and I was listing the
reasons. But I was trying to be
reasonable. And the more reasonable I
became the worse it got. And oh, he had
a field day really. I really just
didn't know how to cope with it. And I
coped with it very badly. 354The analogy we would draw here .is between John
Baird's experience with the steward, and a badly
played Queen. In both cases despite the rules, they
find themselves in positions of very little power. (In
fact Baird had to get another manager to get him out
of this spot) 355.
d) We have already approvingly quoted Clegg's
chess analogy 356, but we would suggest that there are
limits to it. It is useful to demonstrate the power of
rules - but if we consider it further we can see it
raises further questions. Most important is, why is it
that the Pawns don't object to the advantages of the
pieces behind them (ie Bishop, Queen etc)? Why should
they be sacrificed so readily as part of the game? Why
should they be so restricted in their movement
compared to the other, more privileged pieces behind
them? Obviously (I hope) this raises the issue of why
staff and Hourly-Paid accept their subordinate
positions in the hierarchy. Clegg's analysis of this
stops when he reaches (what he describes as) bed-rock
- the form of life. He explains (on pg. 84) that to
question hierarchy was to
risk censure of oneself••A self
indistinguishable from that of the fool
- one who labours the obvious. 357
We can sympathise with this as a practical
problem of doing research - indeed sometimes, as we
said above, we too had similar feelings. As the end of
an analysis, however, this is not satisfactory. It is
not satisfactory to conclude by saying hierarchy is
accepted because it is the form of life, or the
fundamental assumption. What Clegg does is to explore
the operation of this form of life - how it
functions358 - but fails to consider adequately Why it
is effective, and Why alternativeJ; to hierarchy are
neither considered nor pursued 359 • It is apparent
that hierarchy has a hold of the minds of workers -
the question we need to cOl1sider is how this occurs.
Clegg stops short of this 3 0 • .
e) It is suggested by Clegg that,
power is about the outcomes of issues
enabled by the rule of sUbstantive
rationality which is temporally and
institutionally 10cated.361
Our objection to this is that to use the concept
of "substantive" rationality is too general and too
vague. We have argued that the mo~~ve force behind the
hierarchy is unconscious power 2 - for instance
that the logic of technological advance can be used a~
an argument for almost any change in the social world.Hence, Clegg's work has provided further advances for
us but in certain respects is still not adequate for what
we'require. Before going on to consider what we consider to
be a more definitive position, let us briefly look back on
the main conclusions of our discussion of power so far.
In discussing these theories of power, we have raised
several questions. What we propose here is to summarise
these as a number of, what we see as, the more significant
issues.
1) we have to ask to what extent a situation is
penetrated by power 3-63as we asked of Gaventa, how far
is the game rigged ? We have argued that the game
may be more rigged than some theories of power may be
able to identify.
2) a comprehensive theory of power has to be
capable of directing us toward both conscious and
unconscious theories of power. Many (eg Mintzberg and
Braverman) only deal with the former.
3) many of the theories we have dealt with have a
tendency to deal with dyadic situations (or situations
which can be reduced to this) in a one-sided
methodology by analysing from the perspective of the
more powerful element of the relationship. For
instance by posing questions like, how A (the
relatively powerful) can control the organization? By
structuring the question in this way there is a
tendency to focus on conflict, since where control is
problematic conflict is often present. Another
perspective which could be adopted, however, is that
of B (the relatively powerless) and ask why it is that
they consent - since in fact they usually do, at least
to an extent for most organizations to work most of
the time? If we focused on consent to a greater degree
then we would begin to be able to consider the issue
of why it is that hierarchy act~gllY works, rather
than on why it does not fall down • A more adequate
theory of power WOUl~65clearlY direct our attention
down both these paths •
4) We have associated hierarchy with power, but
why is it that hierarchy works? We have identified,
from our own research and from the works we have
examined~ several (to some extent overlapping)
explanat~ons:
a) the normative structure and rules of the
organization sanction hierarchy
b) the good will there is for the hierarchy
and the consent which there is to it
c) its legitimacy
3/0there are two
d) its structural violence, which stands in
the way of its exposure
e) the power of hierarchy just blends into
the background, and becomes unnoticed as power.
The problem with each of these is that we are
still left with the question of how and why each of
them works. For instance what is it about the
normative structure which supports hierarchy? why is
there consent and good will? why is there legitimacy?
what is it about the structural violence which
protects hierarchy? why does the power of hierarchy
blend into the background?
In other words, for each of these "explanations",
we need to be able to provide an explanation as to why
they are successful. It is obvious we could point to
perceived legitimacy of the hierarchy to explain its
persistence - but how did this legitimacy arise? what
is it about the structure of hierarchy's legitimacy
which allows it to continue to be accepted?
A more adequate theory of power would direct our
attention to matters such as these.
5) we have seen in the work of Lukes, Gaventa,
Burawoy, and Clegg an ambivalence about unconscious
power. We have shown that they are not entirely clear
about whether A is aware of the exercise of power 3M •
This point needs to be clarified.
6) finally, and following on from (5), we need to
lay down criteria which will enable us to identify
power specifically in analysis.
In Chapter 1 we presented as the basis of a theory of
power, Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis 367 • What we shall do
here, is to consider some of implications of this theory,
and to what extent it satisfies the conditions we have set
out above.
From our discussion,· therefore,
questions we have to ask -
1) what indications are there that power in this
sense has operated, and in what ways?
2) to what extent does Habermas's ideal speech
thesis satisfy the 6 requirements previously
considered?
3 JIthe
qualified
It will not, we imagine, astonish the. reader to learn
that our answer to both of these questions is positive. We
would contend that our evidence in the previous Chapters
has proved both of these points several times already. What
we propose to do is to select from this a number of
examples where power can be shown to have operated in a way
of which all parties are unconscious as evidence of the
former. We will then go on to consider to what extent
Habermas's thesis does satisfy our requirements.
Let us take the first question first. We would contend
that our findings in general are a clear indication that
the answer to this must be affirmative. We have devoted the
analysis in Chapter 5 (and its associated appendix) to the
proposition that power operates in this firm in such a way
that while there is awareness of the operation of power (ie
Open strategic Action) it also operates in such a way that
neither party is aware of it (ie Concealed strategic
Action). Hence we have argued that there are areas where,
a) both sides are fully aware of their power, and
that it has limits. Pay is only one example of this.
b) the operation of power is not perceived to
operate by one or both sides. Investment and Financial
Policies are instances 3 wJQere neither side is aware of
power being exercised.
Concealed strategic Action is apparent in Excerpt
5.21, where the view of the Hourly-paid respondent is
that decisions on Financial Policy are the province of
top Management, because,
they've got
brains••• (and) •••theY're
people.
It is, however, important to understand that
unconscious power does not operate only on Hourly-paid
employees, or on staff. It operates just as effectively on
Management as well. An important implication of this is
that Management can define otherwise an actionlevent we
would classify as an· exercise of power. Consider for
instance Excerpt 5.17, which is from an interview with a
senior manager. Toward the end of this Excerpt we move on
to the question of Redundancy. This quite clearly is not an
action to the taste of this particular manager. Thus,
the last thing you want to do is to
deprive another human being of his
livelihood.
The more important point, however, comes a few lines
further on, where he is asked under what circumstances
there would be redundancies. He replies
3/2.Where in fact the company can· no
longer afford to keep them (those made
redundant) employed•••The morning the
Banks won't give you any more money.
In other words this exercise of power - declaring a
redundancy - is not an exercise of power at all from this
perspective. Rather, it is the manager just doing his job -
it is a technical function. The manager is no more powerful
than the person who is made redundant.
Following our analysis we would argue that, like the
Hourly-Paid respondent we quoted above, this manager is
operating under unconscious power - strategic action, which
in this case is concealed even from the person exercising
the power.
From our discussion of unconscious power, defined in
relation to the Ideal Speech Thesis, it is required that
there should be a formal equality through each side having
symmetrical opportunities to speak, and no constraints in
the structure operating on either side.
For the Hourly-paid worker it is clear that he does
not want to take decisions ,- Financial Policy, he
perceives, is not an issue on which he can contribute.
Hence the Ideal Speech conditions are not met because the
Hourly-paid worker concedes his opportunity to enter into
an equal dialogue about Financial Policies etc. - because
he is constrained by his own values about how the
organization and its hierarchy ought to work 369 •
Likewise for the Manager, the decision about
Redundancy is not about power at all, it is question of
when the banks cut off the money. We would suggest that
this is a clear example of the operation of what Habermas
calls technical rationality 370. Thus the redundancy - and
the arguments which might be put forward to defend it - are
not arguments about the rightness of this exercise of
power, but rather that the decision is required for reasons
of technical rationality.
Both Manager and Hourly-paid respondent are dominated
by this rationality. The Hourly-paid respondent says:
they've got the brains
so his deference is to Management as an implication of
a technical imperative - that Management have the skills to
take such decisions. In the same way the manager is
dominated in determining when redundancy becomes
~.371 • neCeSSaLy •
when the banks wont give you any more
money.To answer the first question, therefore, we would
argue that indications of unconscious power can be seen in
the utterances of the two subjects discussed here, since
there is no symmetrical distribution of chances to select
and employ speech acts, and no effective equality of
opportunity for the assumption of dialogue roles, as
required by Habermas. The exercise of power is therefore
hidden, but nonetheless real for all that.
We can now go on to consider the 6 questions we posed
above. The first question required a more adequate theory
of power to establish to what extent S9wer has penetrated
the situ~1~on. The critique of Dahl 2 by Bachrach and
Baratz was on the basis that his theory, by
concentrating on who wins.in a decision situation, was not
adequate since it did not allow for the possibility of
power being used to keep interests/parties OQt of the
decision situation. This is developed by stone 374 through
pointing out that a difficulty facing a group competing to
replace a dominant group is that it must be able to supply
the necessary policy making skills, which stone argues, are
in short supply. The struggle over power is not a simple
conflict, but requires the aspiring group to possess the
skills to be able to replace the currently dominant group.
The difficulty with these theories
operate only on the basis of conscious
situations where the parties are aware of
1) their own power,
is that they
power - ie in
2) the power of the other party, and
3) the conflict between them.
The snag with this, as we observed of stone, is that
it does not allow for the possibility that
a) that those below Management in the hierarchy
concede their claim to pre-emptive power, and
b) that those outwith Management also consider
that they do not have the skills - so no challenge can
be mounted.
The essential problem is that this view of power does
not allow for what Habermas describes as structural
violence 375.
We therefore require a theory which enables us to
consider power as an unconscious phenomenon. An example
which has been appropriate in this discussion has been by
steven Lukes - "Power: a Radical View".
3/4We have considered Lukes' theory at length, both in
this Chapter and in Chapter 1, as well as a number of its
empirical uses (eg Gaventa). The main difficulty we find
with Lukes is that it is not clear whether only the less
powerful are unaware of the exercise of power, or whether
it is both the powerful and the powerless who are unaware
of power being used. We have concluded in this Chapter that
in Lukes' theory it is probably the former, and to that
extent it is not adequate for the purpose of the present
issue, because it does not suggest all the possible usages
of power. Further it gives no indication of how we can
identify the presence of unconscious power, even in this
partial sense.
If this too is not SUfficient, to what can we turn? We
suggest that the answer is to be found in Habermas. He
distinguishes between two types of social action:
a) communicative Action 376
b) strategic Action 3n. There are two SUb-types
of this:
i) Open strategic Action 378 ,
ii) Concealed strategic Action 3N
has two sub-types:
This too
A) Manipulation
Deception) 380 ,
(or conscious
therefore, that Habermas's
a theory of power which can
the depth to which - power
B) systematically Distorted
communication (or Unconscious Deception) 381 •
It is our argument,
categories provide us with
indicate to what extent -
operates.
At its most superficial, power will be at the level of
open strategic action, where both parties are aware of
their exercise of power, through their action being
oriented to success rather than to aChieving understanding
382 .
At a deeper level, power takes the form of conscious
deception, involving one of the parties exercising their
power in such a way that, while they are aware of its
exercise, the other party is not (ie that while the
powerful party is aware his action is oriented toward
success, it is perceived by the less powerful to be
oriented toward understanding communicative action) 3M •
At its deepest level power takes the form of
systematically distorted communication, wherebyat least one of the parties· is
deceiving himself about the fact that
he is acting with an attitude oriented
to success and is only keeping up the
appearance of communicative action. 3M
Thus the parties may think they are acting in a way
oriented toward understanding for a rational consensus - or
co-operative coordination 385 - but in fact for one of them
at least, their action is oriented toward their own
interests, rather than of the group as a whole, but he is
unaware of this 3M
To put this into the context of a firm, Management and
the other employees may see their behaviour as being
oriented' toward the good of the firm. But, even though
neither Management nor other employees are aware of this,
the Management action is oriented toward partial objectives
rather than generalisable interests 387 , supported by power
of which neither side is fully aware 3M •
So if we take decisions about Investment as an
example, the image which both Management and other
employees have taken is that this is purely a technical
matter 389, for which only Management have the necessary
skills 390 • Thus Management are able, by definition, to take
such decisions oriented toward only their own (partial)
objectives. For there to be a fully rational consensus,
which would be oriented toward generalisable interests,
decisions on Investment would have to be,
a) open to the influence of all outwith
Management as well 391 , and
b) subordinated to generalisable interests
(including not only shareholders, but also employees)
and thus no longer as a purely technical matter 39, •
I f we take another issue, however, we can see how
power has a structure which can be seen as "layeredII. Let
us take decisions on Pay, which is an area which can
certainly be described as Open Strategic Action, since the
parties are quite consciously using their power against
each other. This takes the form of,
a) a negotiating relationship, where each side is
fully aware of the differences in their respective
goals,
b) threats and intimidation - "if you don't give
us this we'll go on strike" etc.
c) the use of power through the realisation of
threats - eg industrial action.
31~This, therefore, is certainly an area where power is
consciously used. Can we find any indication of the
operation of other forms of power? We would argue that this
is certainly possible if we consider the ways in which a
dispute about pay would normally be conducted.
First of all there may be what Habermas describes as
conscious Deception - for instance the Union side may try
to convince Management of the depth of feeling there is
among their members on their wage claim. correspondingly
Management will try to convince the Union side of their
inability to meet these demands.
Moreover there may be Unconscious Deception (or what
Habermas calls Systematically Distorted Communication
where the distortion can be seen as originating in the
system itself rather than with the participants). For
instance,
1) seldom during a dispute about pay will the
structure of the relationship between employer and
employee 'be challenged. In other words the same
relationship as operates in Investment decisions
operates on Pay decisions. The distinguishing
characteristic is that the employees recognize their
own interests - but the relationship within which this
is carried through remains the same.
2) the types of struggle used in Pay disputes
seldom challenge the role of Management. Even in a
strike it is fair to say, that on its completion both
sides expect the old relationship to be restored -
perhaps somewhat tarnished and torn but, nonetheless,
structurally the same.
We would argue therefore that the manner in which Pay
disputes are fought out reflects a form of power of which
neither side is conscious, but which operates within the
accustomed constraints of hierarchical power 393. In other
words as well as Open Strategic Action, there may also be,
but at a deeper level, Concealed Strategic Action.
Furthermore there may be Unconscious
Deception(Systematically Distorted communication).
Power therefore can be seen to operate at a number of
different levels. These levels ma~ be linked - as the
example about Pay makes clear 4. However, for the
avoidance of doubt the linkages are, we would argue, by no
means necessary. The example of Investment makes this
clear, since in that case there was neither Open Strategic
Action nor Concealed Deception, but only Systematically
Distorted Communication 395 •
Habermas can, therefore, indicate to us the depth the
extent to which, power has penetrated the situation to be
analysed. It therefore satisfies our first condition.our second question - that a theory of power needs to
direct our attention to indications of both conscious and
unconscious power - can be dealt with rather more briefly.
We have argued in relation to the previous question that
one of the features of using Habermas's theory is precisely
that it allows us to anal~se power to the degree its
exercise is unconscious 6. The theory, therefore,
satisfies this condition as well.
Our third question dwelt on the proposition that many
theories of power tend to deal only with conflict - indeed
conflict is a condition for the exercise of power in Dahl's
theory. We have argued, in common for instance with LUkes,
that conflict is not necessary as power can be used most
effectively, precisely to avoid conflict 397 •
Once again we would suggest that this matter can be
dealt with briefly, by reference to the argument put for
the first question. It is quite likely that in situations
of Concealed strategic Action that there will be no
conflict. If, for instance, there is conscious Deception
which is successful there will be no conflict - it may only
be if/when the deception is discovered that conflict
begins. For instance Goffman's work on fraudsters and "con-
men" shows that it is only when their deception is
discovered that conflict develops 398. Similarly with
Unconscious Deception, as both parties perceive themselves
as operating in Communicative Action, being oriented toward
understanding - given this, conflict may well not be
present there either 399. Hence Habermas's theory is well
able to identify power in situations where conflict is
absent, as well as present, and to demonstrate, even where
there is conflict, that power can operate in deeper and
unperceived ways.
Our fourth question contends that conscious power is
not an adequate theoretical variable - ie that it is not
good enough to say that this or that happens because of the
power of which we are all aware. For instance, it is not
really adequate to point to the power of the legitimacy of
hierarchy and say that is why hierarchy persists - we need
to explain what it is about its legitimacy that enables it
to persist/continue. Likewise that we cannot just point to
the good will it has - we have to ask how that came about
We can point to the structural violence of hierarchy t~
explain its continuation - but we have to ask why it is it
is not seen through.Let us take, for instance, consent and,good will as
examples of what we mean. These are central to the
explanation put forward by Harris 400 , but we have pointed
out that she really treats these as self explanatory. One
does not, however, have to be a Marxist to treat these as
matters which must be explained. Likewise we cannot simply
fall back on the normative structures and say that they are
the cause of the phenomenon being studied - in our case why
hierarchy is able to persist. If we stop our analysis at
the stage where we argue that it is the normative structure
which allows hierarchy to persist then we would fail to
consider that:
a) the normative structure positively endorses
the hierarchy,
b) the normative structure includes rules which
define and endorse the role of managers as the
decision-makers 401, and that the Managers appear to
work under the very same power (See above, Page 70).
The legitimacy of the hierarchy can be explained in
similar terms.
Hence we would argue that the role of Habermas is to
force us, through the Ideal Speech Thesis, to focus on:
a) not just the reasoning of individuals within
particular groups, but also
b) how the reasoning between groups meshes
together 402 (eg the Management reasoning of their
right to take decisions, is consistent with the
reasoning of Staff and Hourly Paid on this matter). In
other words it forces us to consider the situation we
are analysing as a system rather than to consider
groups individually (eg Management distinct from
Hourly Paid). And additionally,
c) the "structure" of this reasoning. For
instance, why do Hourly Paid not challenge the role of
Management. The answer is to be found in the structure
of their reasoning. How can they do so, as long as
Management are seen as the people who have,
got the brains.
In this way, Habermas's theory addresses itself to our
fourth question.
Our fifth ~estion requ,ires consideration of what we
mean by unconSC10US power, S1nce we have argued that there
is ambivalence about it elsewhere (eg i~ Lukes), and argued
that the Habermas ,theory of power 1S a more adequate
approach to unconSC10US power. We have pointed out already
that Habermas's concepts of
structural ViolenceManipulation, but especially
Systematically Distorted Communication
direct us towards consideration and identification of
unconscious power.
For the avoidance of doubt, we would argue that Lukes'
theory appears to stop with Manipulation (ie where the less
powerful party is unaware of the exercise of power over
him, but the more powerful party is aware of exercising
power). Gaventa's study of mining in the Appalachean
Mountains is an instance of this and, as we have pointed
out, his study draws extensively on the Lukes' theory.
The difficulty with Lukes will always be the
possibility that not only the powerless, but also the
powerful will be unaware of the exercise of power. As we
pointed out above in considering the discussion of
redundancy, the function of managers may be considered to
be technical, by one or both parties. Habermas's theory
directs our attention towards situations where the parties
may not be aware of the exercise of power. If in such
cases, the structure of the situation, and conduct within
it, contravenes one of the conditions of the Ideal Speech
Thesis, this would be taken to indicate the exercise of
power, whether or not the parties are aware of it.
This' really begins to answer the final question - the
need for criteria to identify the existence of power. We
have argued, immediately above, that the Ideal Speech
Thesis gives us a "bench-mark" for absence of power - thus
to the extent it is infringed we know that power operates.
Habermas's theory, however, goes further than this, since
Open strategic Action,
Manipulation,
systematically Distorted Communication,
provide us with a set of categories of power. Certainly
within each one there will be a variety of types of power
(eg French and Raven's theory gives 5 instances of Open
strategic Action) - but each category is significantly
different 403. In the first, each party is aware of the
exercise of power, while in Manipulation it is only one
party (the Manipulator) who is aware. In systematically
Distorted communi~ation, in contrast, neither party is
aware of the exerC1se of-power.In this discussion of Power we have considered many
theories, and examples of research where Power, as a
variable, has played a significant role. Some have been
found more wanting than others. What we have shown,
however, is that to exploit the explanatory potential of
power to its fullest, we have to consider the exercise of
power not only in its conscious, but also in its
unconscious form.
While the conscious exercise of power is reflected in
the structure of the hierarchy, we have to go on to
consider why it is that the hierarchy (and thus the
conscious exercise of power) is perceived to be legitimate,
and thus how it is that conscious power is able to operate
404 • We do not think it is enough to say that the exercise
of power is legitimate because it is exercised by Managers
who occupy that role and thus possess that power. We have
to go deeper to consider what it is about management as a
function which causes it to appear to be legitimate.
It has been our argument, which has been sustained by
our own analysis as well as the six questions we have just
considered, that this can be done through the use of
Habermas I s theory of power. This enables us not only to
identify the conscious exercise of power (for instance, it
is trivial but true to say that applying the Ideal Speech
thesis to wage negotiations points to the exercise of power
through "Open Strategic Action"). It also, as we have
shown, gives us grounds for the identification of
unconscious power 405 - for instance the division of labour
between Hourly-Paid and Management means that the former
will, for instance, always defer to the latter in decisions
about investment in a way they would not if it was a
decision about wages.
What does this mean for the persistence of hierarchy?
We would argue that it means,
1) that the persistence of hierarchy is located
in a Lifeworld which is colonized and CUlturally
impoverished, and which acts as an unseen, but
critical form of power.
2) that the demand for participation in company
affairs by its employees generally is restricted by
the Lifeworld.
3) that the practices of hierarchy are
substantially seen as legitimate by employees though
this does not exclude. de~ands for change, but' without
threatening the organ1zat1onal principles of hierarchy
406
3~1This may appear to be a .fairly pessimistic view to
have come to, but that would be the wrong conclusion. If
some form of participation were to be introduced, then it
may lead to a· reduction in the mystification of Management
which other (non-Managers) experience, and to that extent
it takes us closer to communicative action, and fully
rational decision-making. Thus even a small step toward
participation would be positive in this sense.
How far have we moved toward participation already? We
shall complete our review by considering work which deals
with this, in particular the problems which have been
encountered, and which may be encountered in the event of
any change toward greater participation.
INFORMATION AND CONTROLl
In this section we shall consider empirical material
on perceptions of hierarchy, and in particular
a) how employees have perceived the ~ality of
information which they receive from their employees,
and
b) how they perceive, and their reactions to
experiencing participation, and possible problems with
creating a system of participation in their companies.
First of all, however, we shall briefly review our own
empirical findings.
We have found that employees perceive themselves to be
on the whole not well informed. More importantly, however,
we have shown that
a) perceptions are hierarchically ordered - in
other words Management perceptions are most approving,
then staff, and Hourly-paid have the least favourable
perceptions - on any of the twelve areas of
information which we examined. We can see, using
McQuitty Linkage analysis that for Hourly-paid there
was a single cluster, and for Staff, three clusters.
This orientation extended to Hourly-paid taking a
unidimensional orientation toward information such
that for Hourly-paid, information would appear to be
information more or less irrespective of its content.
staff vary in this only slightly - Management on the
other hand appear to take a (statistically at least)
more differentiated attitude toward information.
b) we could consistently relate the perceived
quality of information ("how well are you informed
about ------1") to the level of trust that employees
would place in the information (how far do you trust
information on -----1). In other words if an employee
perceives, himse~f to be badly informed on a matter,
then he ,~s unl~kely to ,place much trust on Whatever
informat~on he does rece~ve.It is important to consider why it is that employees
appear to accept a situation where they often see
themselves as badly informed about their place of work,
particularly since this is a reality that they are prepared
to work in.
Moving on to consider their perception of the exercise
of control, and how it would ideally be exercised, we found
the following:
1) in respect of how control is exercised, that
perceptions were once again structured by hierarchy,
in that Management were perceived by each group
(Management, staff, Hourly paid) as being the dominant
group, then staff, and then Hourly paid (though on
certain issues this last finding did not hold
consistently - for instance on control over the pace
of work, Hourly paid saw themselves as having more
control than Staff, though the Staff did not endorse
this).
2) factor analysis indicated that control
exercised by management was perceived by each group to
be qualitatively different, in that factors which
contained a Management control variable would contain
only Management control variables. Similar Staff and
Hourly paid variables did not have such monopoly in
the factors in which they were significant. Management
control would therefore, on this statistical basis,
appear to be perceived as different. Moreover, the
data obtained from subsequent semi-structured
interviews confirmed this.
3) when we considered how control would ideally
be distributed, we found similar results to those
indicated in points (2) and (3) - in other words that
even when control was ideally distributed
i) while Staff and Hourly paid would have
more control than they have now, Management would
continue to be the dominant group.
ii) Management control continues to possess
a distinctive quality relative to other
employees, as indicated by factor analysis.
Once again we would argue that we have to question why
it is that Management control operates successfully and
indeed that it continues to do so even when the possibility
of distributing control in an ideal way is raised 401 It
has been our argument in the previous section that we· can
begin to understand and explain this by reference to the
Lifeworld that is occupied by our SUbjects, and in
particular the unconscious power implications that this
creates.The Lifeworld operates in such a way that it enables
interpretation of reality, but it also sets horizons, and
thus creates limits on understanding of reality, and other
possibilities of reality. The structure of knowledge in our
Lifeworld is, as we have seen composed of three levels -
situational, routine and basic. The most important are
routine and basic, since they are both prereflective and
thus not usually amenable to conscious thought. Moreover
the basic level organizes our knowledge into particular
categories. Thus our expectations of a Manager are built
into the manner in which we organize our social knowledge -
in other words it is a matter of social knowledge (or
common sense) that managers take decisions, and that taking
decisions on matters such as investment or finance and so
on, are matters for managers alone. This then becomes a
matter of routine - it enters into our routine level of
knowledge and thus becomes a matter which we
prereflectively accept without criticism 408. It would be
only by becoming aware of such cardinal assumptions
subjecting them to reflective criticism that the
possibility of breaking with hierarchy would become a real
prospect.
The Lifeworld is, however, not so easily fractured,
since as we have seen through our consideration of
Habermas, the Lifeworld is colonized by the Social System,
so that not only is our experience of a dominant
Management, it is reinforced by the justifications
introduced into the Lifeworld by Social System imperatives,
and by the fragmentation of consciousness. In other words,
it is not just that hierarchy is sustained by the fact that
no other alternative can be imagined, but also that the
(colonized) Lifeworld gives positive justification for it
indeed makes hierarchy appear to be inevitable 409 •
Thus, through considering the Lifeworld in this way we
can understand that while
a) differences in power can be - and are -
perceived, and
b) there may be conflict between the
different groups in the firm,
this is contained within, and restricted by
fundamental assumptions made about hierarchy, which are
basic to the Lifeworld which our subjects occupy.
In this way the nature and the basic structure of the
relationship be~ween Managers and their Staff and Hourly
paid employees 1.S not challenged even in circumstances as
at present where there is a perceived imbalance in power
between them, or when they are in conflict with each other
This occurs because t~e conscious rights and powers of
Management are underwr1.tten by the definition of the role
of Manager and its contiguous relation to other grades of
employment 410What we shall go. on to consider now ,is the means by
which this has been considered in earlier research.
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
Much of the rese:ffh on how companies do communicate
with their employees has fcoused on the disclosure of
information in relation to the If9uirements of the
Employment Protection Act 1975 2, which requ1iis
disclosure for the purposes of collective bargaining •
with the exception of Health & Safety at Work Act, this is
the only area where theri is a statutory duty to disclose
information to employees 1.
On the whole, research tends to suggest that this
development has not been as successful as was anticipated.
There lEr several reasons for this which are considered
below , but it appears to us that a central factor for
this is the structure (or sometimes the absence) of the
dialogue. At the moment communication is not generally
structured to accommodate employees -
1) it is subject to the absolute control of one
party - management 416
2) the form of information in which communication
is conducted is not suitable for them.
3) it is carried on in a "language" they do not
understand 417
Hence the problem of communication is not simply
whether or not employees get told things 418. The
difficulty is that communication in the form of disclosure
is about allowing employees access to a system of
communication which is built around the needs and
objectives of Management 419. Communication in the form of
disclosure, therefore is not about management and employees
talking to each other. They may talk, i~6 not understand.
Additionally the talk is not a dialogue •
Essentially this amounts to two problems:
a) the system of communication is controlled by
Management 421. What employees obtain from a system of
disclosure would be determined by Management. This as
we showed in Tabli~2 5.99 - 5.102, is a matter' of
potential conflict •
b) the information obtained from disclosure is
not only in a form which other employees may not be
ab!e to understand (most obviously the Hourly paid
42 ), but is in a form which is underpined by the
needs and objectives of Management and Shareholders 424
324This moreover undermines other reasons besides
statutory pressures - why companies communicate with their
employees. For instance Hussey and Marsh 425 report that
among firms who provide their employees with some kind of
company report that the main reasons included "involving
employees more deeply in company affairs", "encouraging
more employee responsibility", "enable employees to
understand the market situation better" 426. These will be
frustrated to the extent that our argument concerning
differences in Lifeworld holds good, since, at least some
of, the information provided may not be interpreted at all,
or not as management intended.
We have already indicated the difficulty which
employees have in interpreting and understanding the
information supplied to them. Thus even where firms are
addressing themselves to ,the problems of communicating with
their employees that the types of difficulties we have
argued for cannot be easily resolved. Even where firms are
seeking to communicate with their employees, we find that
hierarchy intrudes perceptions appear to be
hierarchically ordered. The mechanism involved in this, we
would argue, is the Lifeworld, and specifically the
differences between those of different hierarchical levels,
such that communication between the levels becomes
problematic.
As well as research which has been done, this is an
area in which there is a good deal of advice available,
with a variety of organizations making known their views on
how communication ought to be managed, what information
ought to be disclosed, how, to whom and with what
frequency. For instance the CBI in 1980 in "Guide-lines for
Action on Employee Involvement" 427 •
surveying the literature on Communication shows it as
an area on which there is a good deal of advice
available428 , but equally one with practical problems which
suggest that it goes beyond finding the most suitable
device. In particular we would argue, on the basis of our
findings, for
a) putting a level of priority on communication
which is appropriate to the expectations of the
'manager's employees, but also,
b) structuring the message in a form Which can be
understood by the recipient.
It is certainly true that our firm did not conform on
either of these criteria, but even if they bad done so
these by themselves would not have ensured a system of
communication whic~ w~s equal and power free. Rather
satisfying these cr1ter1a would only have granted employees
access to a system of communication predicated on hierarchy
and the needs of Management and shareholders. This would
only h~ve .fur~~ered the level of systematically distorted
commun1cat10nopening up communication would not, therefore, create
equality - though it may create more equality (ie moving in
that direction) 430. Equality can only be secured through
dealing with the constraints of hierarchy 431 • We shall do
this through considering work on control and participation,
which considers the possibilities of modifying hierarchy.
CONTROL , PARTICIPATION.
This discussion will be in two parts.
a) First of all we shall consider our results in
relation to the results of others conducting similar
research
b) Secondly we shall consider literature
considering more conceptual issues of participation
and control in organizations.
Basically we shall argue in relation to the former
that our research has produced broadly similar findings,
though the analytical implications we shall draw are rather
different. This will be developed in the latter part of
this section, where we shall argue that many theories (and
meta-theories) of participation embody conceptual problems.
We shall argue that there is insufficient
consideration given to the problems ofintroducing
industrial democracy, created by the Lifeworlds of
employees. Specifically it appears to us that there is
often insufficient attention given to
i) the problems of the unconscious power Which
Management possess
Ii) the problems created by the structure of the
Lifeworld -
a) the typified role of Manager
b) the fragmentation of consciousness.
Following this discussion we shall finish by
considering the difficulties created for the introduction
of industrial democracy by such problems. Howeover it
appears to us that this is made all the more difficult in
that there appears to be no clear view of what is meant by
industrial democracy~ participation, or control, and that
views on this vary 42. Thus for instance, in a review of
this area Marchington 433 quotes several definitions some
which focus on the process of decision-making oth~rs on
proces~~s by which the p~rticipating parties influence each
other • He also consl.ders some relevant research but
concludes by quoting Walker 'participation has' no maqic, but· is
rather an alternative form of
enterprise orqanization which has its
own problems of human interaction and
relationships, as well as of operatinq
efficiency. Participation does not
remove problems, it changes their
character. 435
It appears to us that Walker I s conclusion is fine
within its own limits, but we would argue that it begs as
many questions as it answers. We would contend that
introducing similar systems into different organizations
appears to have produced differing results. The response to
this appears to have been to develop greater conceptual
clarity and purity in respect of introducing systems of
participation. Looking elsewhere for the answer does not
appear to have been a serious item on the agenda.
We would argue that to understand the confusion which
Walker, Marchington, and others, attempt to deal can be
udenrstood through the vehicle of the Lifeworld. We have in
fact referred to this problem earlier in this Chapter, with
our analogy of Celtic and Inter Milan in the 1967 European
cup Final. The point we made there was that playing in the
same system of rules (in this case, the rules of football),
the two teams behaved differently. On the one hand Milan
defended, while Celtic attacked. It appears to us that this
analogy can be extended very easily into the participation
debate.
Participation is a system, and as with all systems
there are rules. The difficulty is of course that rules do
not speak for themselves, but must be interpreted 436. So,
even if the same system of participative rules were
introduced into two different firms, the behaviour in each
could be very different. Understanding the differences in
behaviour will not necessarily be understood by seeking to
develop greater conceptual clarity, but perhaps through
appreciation of the differing interpretations of the rUles,
which is of course a matter for the Lifeworld. And as we
have shown, the Lifeworld creates power advantages for
Management,
a) some are formal advantages of hierarchy and
the parties will be conscious of these
b) other power advantages, however, are
unconscious, deriving from the Lifeworld.
Thus, while we would allow that the same system of
participation may result in different forms of behaviour
the unconscious power, which is an implication of th~
Lifeworld, means t~at a fundamental challenge to Management
will not result, w~~hout. changes to the Lifeworld. What we
shall g~ ~n t? cons1der 1S how this happens, in the context
of part1c1pat10n and control.In our own research into perceived control we have
used the "Tannenbaum Control Graph" method, so it would
seem legitimate to begin our review by considering other
results which have used this method. An example of this is
Bowen's study of steel plants in the UK 437. This is
consistent with our own findings in three respects 438
a) the dominant group in terms of the control
which they exercise are perceived to be Management, at
whatever level 439
b) in (what Bowen refers to as) a "preferred
situation" 440 the perceived control of groups outwith
Management would rise, but most importantly
c) despite this, local Ironhill Management would
remain the dominant group. 441
Moreover, if we compare the different issues from
which Bowen obtained his data 442 , then we can see443
a) that the areas on which the ("shop floorll )
respondents have ("actual mode"), and wished to have
most influence in a preferred situation ("preferred
mode"), were those closest to their own working
situation 444 and correspondingly, that
b) those areas on which they wished least
influence were those furthest from their own working
situation 445 •
ThUS, Bowen's findings are broadly similar to our
own446 , in that the dominant group are perceived to be
Management, but that in an ideal situation there would be a
move toward (but stopping short of) equality. Bowen goes on
to observe that this indicates a need for changes in the
existing arrangement of organizations. He argues that the
kind of evidence he presents indicates the need for
formidable changes in the outlooks and
strategies of both management and trade
unions. These will include those
aspects of industrial relations
practices which merely allow management
to propose and organised labour to
oppose change. The overriding role of
ordered industrial relations must be
some acceptance of mutual
responsibility and joint decision-
making at board level and below. 447The problem with this as a proposal - no matter the
rational evidence and arguments produced in its support -
is that it takes no account of the problems of moving in
the direction Bowen argues for. The reason why no attention
is paid to this problem is that there is no questioning of
why - despite its flaws - the existing system continues to
work. It is attractive to argue for "some acceptance of
mutual responsibility and joint decision-making at board
level and below", as Bowen does, but the difficulty remains
as to how we move to this from the structures within which
we operate at the moment 448 •
We have shown in our own research the horizons which
our respondents work within the implications for
decision-making of the role of manager for instance - and
have given that theoretical underpining in the sections
immediately preceding this - through the role of the
Lifeworld and its consequences for the operation of
unconscious power. Using this we have shown the difficulty
for employees of visualising a meaningful alternative to
hierarchy 449. In other words the problem goes further than
just that employees lack the authority/power to enforce an
alternative to hierarchy. There is. a further (and we would
argue more potent) obstacle in that employees cannot
readily imagine themselves participating in management.
Management, and in particular management as a set of
activities including decision-making, is perceived as an
activity which requires expertise which other employees
lack but which Management are perceived to possess.
consequently decision-making is left to Management as a
monopoly, ceded to them in recognition of their special
expertise. What is left to employees is then to seek to
influence Managers in the options considered in their
decision-making - to influence them toward some, but away
from others depending on the perceived interests of
450 employees •
Hence participation, and the demand for more
influence, we would argue on the basis of our empirical
evidence and the preceding theoretical discussion, is not
about securing any sort of entry to management for other
groupS below them in the hierarchy. Rather it is about
seeking to secure greater influence over Management in
their practice of management - about influencing Management
in the decisions they take, rather than seeking to
participate in the decision-making process. It is the
failure to examine the perceptions of his sUbjects in
sUfficient depth which causes Bowen this inadequacy. For
instance Bowen observes
paradoxically the practice of
participative management will increase
the instability of industrial relations
if there remains fundamental
disagreement of the roles of management
and labour in this process. 451
3c2.9We would go some way to agreeing with Bowen that
participative management may at least vary the problems of
Management, though not because of "fundamental
disagreements concerning the role of management and
labour". At the moment - with conventional hierarchy - in
our firm there may be disagreements about the respective
roles, but we would contend these are not fundamental.
Rather we would argue that disagreements concern the
margins of these roles (Eg a a manager being perceived to
overstep his powers to discipline, rather than a dispute
about whether or not he has the authority to exercise
discipline). It has been shown in our evidence that the
right of Management to manage is not fundamentally
challenged - any challenge is at the margins.
We would further argue that even if the kind of
changes Bowen argues for were to be introduced that it
would not be those changes in themselves which would cause
problems to Management. Rather the development of any
problems would be contingent upon changes to employee
experience, and thus contingent to changes to their
Lifeworlds. Thus, it would be our view, that it would not
be structural alterations which would cause the kind of
problems referred to by Bowen, but rather the changes to
employee experience which this would allow. These
experiential changes would affect the structures of the
Lifeworld, and it is this which may lead to the problems
Bowen refers to. For instance permitting employees to
participate in Management - even if only at the margins -
may begin to modify the view of employees that it is only
Management who have the skills necessary to manage 452 •
On the other hand it is this very perception of
Management as the sole possessors of such skills which may
endow Management with more stability than Bowen indicates.
The consequence of structure for behaviour is not direct
but rather is through the medium of the Lifeworld. This is
not made clear in Bowen's research.
Such considerations are, however, apparent from the
work of Tannenbaum. It is argued that
the mere existence of participative
procedures in an organization is no
guarantee that the procedures will in
fact provide a means for workers to·
exercise control. Participative schemes
in other words may not be effective in
achieving real participation. For
example members may not have the
skills, consciousness or will that they
need . to participate effectively;
managers may resist and therefore
prevent participation by employees 453
33 (JThis proceeds in the same direction as· our own. The
problem is that the point having been made by Tannenbaum et
al. (1), they are content to leave it at that. We would
have thought that questions of why members lack the
"skills, consciousness or will" to participate were matters
worthy of further research. While the matter of skills is
essentially a practical issue, whether or not one seeks to
acquire the appropriate skills is related to consciousness
and will - which may in turn be related to managerial
resistance, even if in the form of arguments reasserting
the Management monopoly of decision-making which would be
contrary to employee participation. In turn such argument
may influence employee consciousness. What we have sought
to show here is precisely why - in our firm at least - the
consciousness and will are lacking, as well as the
necessary skills. In other words, it appears to us that the
analysis in this case is deficient in that it stops short
of seeking to understand (rather than simply to establish)
the perceptions of workers toward participation.
On the other hand in this article there is further
evidence consistent with our own. First of all Tannenbaum
et al. (1), show that participation increases the total
amount of perceived control in an organization 454 • This is
consistent with our own findings in Chapter 5, where we
show that in an ideal situation, while those below
Management would exercise a greater degree of influence
there is no indication that Management would exercise less
influence - indeed perhaps slightly more.
Secondly, Tannenbaum et al. (1), find as we have done,
that while there is a demand for more equality in the
organization this stops short of full equality, and that
while the role of Management may need to be modified, it is
not subject to fundamental challenge. 455 It is concluded
The preference stops short of complete
equality with all groups indicating
that managers should have more control
than workers 456
(2) ale et Tannenbaum
457 In another article
distinguish between
1) Indirect participation 458, where employees
participate in their firm through a representative _
worker directors would be an example of this. Through
structures like Works Councils, Union-Management
steering Committees, Safety Committees, which are
required of firms of varying sizes by Swedish law a
system of varying types of indirect participation
exists in Swedish firms 459 •
33 I2) Direct participation 460, where each employee
individually is able to participate personally in
certain aspects of decision-making by the firm. This
is not required by Swedish law, and thus is less
common. For instance in some firms there are
decision-making groups composed of all t~e members of
a work group with their supervisor 61. This is
clearly a forum where issues of particularly direct
significance to the employee and his work can be
discussed - for instance trar.r:fers from one job to
another, methods of work, etc. 2.
We would argue that this distinction is aPftrent in
our own evidence presented in our Chapter 5 • This
showed that employees were more anxious to participate in
such "direct" issues, but less desirous of participating in
more the strategic issues, which wO~(d be more likely to be
matters of indirect participation 4 •
Additionally Tannenbaum et ale (2) find that it is
direct participation which is most closely associated with
em'Dloyee commitment to the company and job s'atisfaction
465. The explanation which Tannenbaum et ale (2) give for
this is related to distance - the closer the issue is on
which the employee can participate, the more likely it is
that there will the be positive effects predicted. We would
argue that this explanation is not adequate.
certainly distance is relevant, but not by itself.
Distance is relevant only through the Lifeworld. Our
discussion of the Lifeworld suggests that direct experience
is critical in determining the structures of the Lifeworld
- a "we" rather than "thou" relation for instance. Hence we
would explain Tannenbaum et ale (2)'s finding in that
issues "at hand" (as Schutz would put it) are issues on
which it is possible for employees to generally develop a
sense of competence, ani66thus a sense that they can
participate meaningfully • Then again, issues which are
at a distance - strategic issues for instance - possess
less of this quality for employees.
Thus as we move away from "issues at hand", employees
have progressively less opportunity to develop such
expertise, and thus less opportunity to develop a sense of
competence, and the opportunity to ~~rticipate in a manner
which they regard as meaningful 4 • Moreover, they are
moving into an area which our evidence shows Management
claim as their own, a claim which employees accede to 468
Thus the satisfaction to be derived from participation i~
strategic issues is diminished by
a) the effect of distance through the Lifeworld
b) the claims of Management to special expertise
in this area to the exclusion of others.Hence we would argue that the finding of greater
satisfaction being yielded by participation in ..\\mediate
issues is more adequately explained by our thesis •
Hierarchy cannot achieve this degree of power in
itself - it is after all only an organization structure,
which is not an inevitable feature of organizational life
470. What we have attempted to show, through the use of the
Lifeworld and its associated structures, is the m~~l},er in
which hierarchy has come to achieve this dominance and,
as Thurley and Wirdenius point out,
If legitimacy can be assumed by
managers, then their power is greatly
enhanced. It will be possible to move
quickly in emergencies and to plan
decisive strategies of product
development to gu~rantee survival
against competition. .. 2
Hence we would argue7}hat it is not just a matter that
hierarchy is dominant" but that this dominance is a
consequence of the structure of the Lifeworld which defines
h~irarchY thus, such that it is perceived as legit\~ite
4 , and indeed as the only generally viable structure •
We have argued that moving toward more democratic
structures is restricted by not only
a} the limitations imposed on employees by the
horizons created by the Lifeworld, but also
b} the desire of Management to remain in a
dominant position.
Our evidence in Chapter 5 indicates that not only are:
a} employees willing to continue to allow
Management to continue to be dominant - though less so
than now -
b} but also that Management wish to continue to
be dominant.
This for sure is hardly a great surprise, since in the
case of Management, if they were to be asked "do you want
to want to continue to be dominant?",'it would hardly be
surprising when the answer is affirmative. This does
however, raise important issues for anl company
developme~ts towa~d ~ore democratic stru~tures 76, as can
be seen l.n our fl.ndl.ngs on the perceptl.ons of industrial
democracy.
~f we c;onsider table 5:59, which summarises various
decisl.on-makl.ng structures, l.t can be seen that the only
structure f0';lnd "acceptable" or better by at least 50% of
re~pondents l.n all three groups (Management, Staff, Hourly
pal.d), was"Management to decide policy' in
consultation with all employees"
On the other hand 50%+ of Staff and Hourly-paid found
acceptable of better
"policy being decided equally by
Management and Unionised employees"
On the other hand only 13% of Management found this
acceptable (none found it totally acce~table) but 66% found
it unacceptable/totally unacceptable 77. Our evidence in
this respect suggests that the path toward more democratic
structures may not be entirely smooth, in that there are
these real perceptual differences. At the same time,
however, we have shown at least one structure
consultation - is acceptable to at least 50% of all groups.
At the same time there are clear perceptual
differences between Management and their employees. This
becomes all the more clear when we considered perceptions
of what might happen if worker directors were to be
introduced to the company.
Our conclusion was that Management took a fairly
gloomy view on this matter 478, in particular that
introducing worker directors would fundamentally alter the
objectives of the firm - that the provision of good, well
paid employment would become more important than making
profits, and making sales become much less important (See
table A3.65). We did, however, go on to show that this was
not the view of Staff and Hourly Paid. Their perception was
that sales and efficiency would continue to be important to
a Board with worker directors (See tables A3.66 and
A3 •67), though the provision of good well paid emploYment
would become more i~ortant than with the Board as
presently constituted 4 •
Yet the role of employee directors does not appear to
be perceived negatively in other respects. For instance
a) it was widely agreed that the experience of
employees would be valuable in company decision-making
(Table A3.68),
b)' that employees would take more interest in
company affairs beside their own immediate work
situation (Table A3.69), and that
c) the most important quality of a worker
director would be to make the firm more efficient than
at present (Table A3.70).
ThUS in at least these three respects there is
considerable agreement between the groups on the role of
worker direct?rs. What, therefore, would be the problem
with introduc~ng at least more democratic structures if
not going as far as worker directors 480 ? '
334We have already hinted at a source of this, in showing
that Management are concerned about the possible changes in
company objectives which would result from the introduction
of worker directors, and would be expected to resist for
this reason if for no other 481 • There are, however, deeper
problems on both sides.
We have shown already that, in general, employees do
not want Management to cease being the decision-making
group 482 - though there is an expressed desire by those
outwith Management that they should be able to exercise
more influence than they do now 483 • We have attempted to
demonstrate why this should be from the perspective of
those outwith Management.
Why, however, do Management want to carry on being, in
this sense, the dominant group? To some extent this may be
seen as a naive question! but it is one which, for
uniformity, has to be posed ~.
An obvious reason may be argued to be self interest,
though we did not explore this directly. Our reasoning can,
however, go deeper than this. We have portrayed the
Lifeworld of Staff and Hourly paid as defining Management
as the professional decision makers. Our data in Chapter 5
suggests that this is true for Management as well. We show
there that -
a) the statistical analysis, using factor
analysis and MCQuitt~ Linkage Analysis, showed that
not only for Staff 85 and Hourly paid 486 but for
Management grr as well, the control exercised (actual
but in particular ideal control) by Management was
perceived as conceptually different from whatever
control was exercised by other groups 488 •
b) the interview data we have reproduced as
excerpts points to Management perceiving themselves,
and the control which they exercise as conceptually
different. For instance if we return to Excerpt 5.17
which is a discussion with a Manager about th~
management of financial decisions, the Manager talks
of
computation of figures, calculation of
forms, filling in pieces of paper, the
shop floor isn't qualified or employed
to do that 489 •In the view of this manager, therefore, the work
involved in financial decision making is work for
Management to do, and not anybody else 490. If things
were otherwise, this would be an infringement of the
Management role 491. Management see themselves as
professional decision makers 492, with the skills
required to run the firm efficiently 493 • This is not a
role for anybody else 494 other than in a
consultative capacity (in the sense of providing
information for further professional analysis) 495 •
c) we have also indicated the problem of
maintaining control for Management 49 in any
participative or more democratic system. This can be
seen in at least two pieces of evidence we present in
Chapter 5 - Table 5.67, but in particular Table 5.63.
The former summarises data on how company
profits ought to be allocated (See too tables
5.64 -5.66). For all the groups the first two
options -
i) all profits to go to the parent
company, and
Ii) all profits to go to the parent
company with a bonus for Management -
are not acceptable. Other more radical
options were considered too-
A) all profits to go to the parent
company with a bonus for all employees,
negotiated with the unions.
B) Profits to be shared equally between
the parent company, and the employees of the
firm.
These are acceptable to at least 50% of
Staff and Hourly paid, but not to Management. The
most radical option that
"Profits should go to employees alone"
was not acceptable to any group.
The only acceptable option to all groups was that
"profits would go to the parent
company, but with a bonus paid to all
employees, the size of which would be
determined bv Management".Hence for Management the importance ·of retaining
control is apparent from these figures 497 • The principle of
distributing profits among employees appears not to be the
obstacle - rather the nature of the problem is whether (or
to what extent) they as Management will be able to retain
ultimate control over this 498 •
The other side of this concerns Hourly paid and Staff,
who are prepared, like Management, to accept a bonus whose
size would be determined by Management.
a) For Staff, we can see from Table 5.65 that
this is the most favoured option of all with 68%
finding it acceptable or totally acceptable. On the
other hand the option allowing the bonus to be
negotiated with the unions is acceptable or totally
acceptable to 63%.
b) If we consider the Hourly paid (Table 5.66)
then we see that while 65% find acceptable a "bonus
whose size would be determined by Management", even
more 89% find acceptable the bonus being
"negotiated with Management".
Hence the issue is not Management control itself -
that appears to be accepted - for instance the idea that
profits should go to employees alone finds support from
only 20% of employees. The issue is, as we have argued
above, the degree and "fine print" 499 of Management control
500. This can be seen even more clearly from the data in
table 5.63 (which summarises data in tables 5.60 -5.62).
This table deals with control over access to company
information. It shows that while for Staff and Hourly paid
the proposition that "all information should be available
to all employees" is acceptable, it is not so for
Management. For Management the only acceptable proposition
is that "all information should be available, but subject
to a Management veto" - 69% finding that acceptable or
totally acceptable. Among Staff exactly 50% find this
acceptable or totally acceptable, but only 29% of Hourly
paid find it thus 501 •
Hence this table follows the same lines as the data on
worker directors, distribution of profits and (to a lesser
't' 502 Th degree) communl.ca l.on • e general concept of moving
toward such practices appears to be not unacceptable but,1) it is clear that no group wants to displace
Management - the objective is to secure, what is
perceived (by whichever group we are considering) as
an appropriate measure of influence on Management.
There is, for instance, no majority demand for joint
decision-making, for profits to be distributed to
employees. In both cases the aspiration of employees
is to be able to enter into dialogue with Management,
so that in taking their decision Management are aware
of the expectations etc. of their employees, and that
these will be input for Management in taking their
decisions 503
2) difficulty, however, remains with the exact
conditions on which this would happen.
Establishing what these conditions would be is made
more difficult because it is clear that Management and
their employees have a less than full understanding of each
other. For instance, as we have seen, the view that
Management take of the objectives which a board with worker
directors would pursue, does not correspond to their
.employees' view 504 • The variance, on views of. how a board
with worker directors would act, is greatest between
Management and Staff and between Management and Hourly
paid, than between Staff and Hourly paid. This reflects
there being no effective dialogue between the parties 505 ,
which we have already argued is manifested by, .
a) the conscious power of Management, which
obstructs dialogue 506 , and
b) the differing Lifeworlds of Management, Staff
and Hourly-paid 507 , and
c) the. unconscious power of Management
originating in the Lifeworld, which impedes full
dialogue (in the sense implied by Ideal Speech) 508 •
Thus, as well as the conscious power vested in
hierarchy, a major obstacle in introducing more democratic
forms is that due to structures of their Lifeworlds, both
those within and outwith Management are restricted by,
1) their inability to imagine the operation of
such structures (Eg while there may be more equality
in decision-making, it would always stop short of full
equality) so that claims for more democratic
structures are forgone,
2) their inability to agree on the form such
structures should take CEg should profit shares be
determined by Management, or SUbject to Negotiation),
3) their inability to agree the conditions on
which there should be movement toward such changes CEg
should Management have a veto on access to com an
information, or should there be some other system?5~ ) -:The situation we have found, therefore,' is not just
that employees do not think in terms which would allow a
challenge to Management and to hierarchy. We have found,
rather, that employees think in ways which logically rule
out such a challenge. For instance when our Lifeworld
defines Management as the decision-makers, then challenging
that position appears illogical. So for employees outwith
Management the practice of management appears to be
something of a conceptual "black hole", in that not only
are they unclear about what happens in management (as an
activity), but also their Lifeworlds fail to give them
criteria for assessing Management, beyond their immediate
work experience 510 •
In other words, while employees on the Shop Floor may
be able to complain about the adequacy of a Manager in (for
instance) working methods - which is a matter they have
experienced, and for which the Lifeworlds provide them with
relevances for interpretation 511 - this is much less so
for assessing the adequacy of a Manager in taking strategic
decisions, since in contrast their Lifeworlds provide them
with little or nothing in the way of interpretational
relevances on such a matter 512 •
. i. Hence, in the event that a particular Manager (or even
team of Managers) appears less than competent as a
strategic decision-maker, then, as we argued in relation to
Ford and Baucus 513, the particular Manager (or team of
Managers) may be removed, but even that would not
necessarily transform the Lifeworld to a degree which will
lead to Hierarchy bein~ questioned sUfficiently for a
challenge to be created 14. It is necessary to appreciate
that ·there appears to be a distinction between particular
Managers on the one hand, and the practice of management on
the other 515. Conflict with, or even challenge to the
former, does not necessarily lead to challenging the
process of the latter•
., ....
, : Thus, we would argue that it is not that the employees
of, an organization have considered more democratic
structures but rejected them - rather what we have shown is
that their Lifeworlds render it impossible for such
structures to be contemplated as realistic possibilities
516 • It is only through modifying such restrictions created
bY the Lifeworld that hierarchh and the dominant role of
Management could be challenged 5 •
The present structure of the Lifeworld, therefore
restricts reasoning to structures based on hierarchy 51a'
which yields an additional dimension of power to Management
(Lukes I third dimension) 519. It would only be by changin
the structure of the Lifeworld that radically differenf
structures could be introduced and work successfully 520 •
339What we shall go on to consider now is-the extent to
which the literature on participation and industrial
democracy takes such issues into account. We shall argue
here that the debate is held back by a lack of clarity
concerning the present situation in organizations, from
which changes in the direction of industrial democracy will
have to be constructed. specifically that there is a
failure to take fully into account,
1) power 521 and in particular the power which
Management exercise unconsciously
2) the structure of the Lifeworld, and especially
i) the typified role of the manager
Ii) the colonization of the Lifeworld
Iii) fragmentation of consciousness
and the consequences that these have for creating
change.
This in turn leads to lack of clarity of the likely
direction of future change, other than as a priori
arguments.
The former point is not always clearly understood.
poole for instance presents two models - one which is
integrative another which is disjunctive 522 but the
expertise of Management, and its perception by employees,
means that no matter which model we use, Management
persistently have the advantage over their employees in
that they are considered to have a special expertise in
running the business, an expertise which is lacked by
others 523. At the same time, however, Management require
the cooperation of others in the firm - hierarchy as
cressey et al. point out is never complete 524 • This means
that on the one hand there is domination of the
organization by a restricted group - Management - yet s.t
the same time this same group- claims partnership with the
remainder of the organization 525 •
We can see in this an analogy with the contradictory
existence of Sarah Danzig (liThe LE:aves of Spring" - A.
Esterson, Pelican 1972.), whose real~ty was ~o fractured by
contradictions that she began to show signs of
schizophrenia. ~6We do not seek to argue from this analogy that our
sample display signs of schizophrenia, but it is part of
Habermas's argument concerning the development of
pathologies in the reproduction of the Lifeworld due to its
colonization by the System in advanced capitalism, that
psychopatholoqies may develop at the level of the
individual 527. It is, however, a tribute to the level of
domination which Management enjoy (though to which they too
are sUbject), and the effectiveness of the Lifeworlds which
they occupy, that
a) this contradiction goes sUbstantially
unnoticed, at least to the extent that the present
situation certainly continues to operate, and
b) appears to be, on the whole, acceptable.
We would argue that to introduce a perfected system of
industrial democracy S~8 we have to take into account:
a) the present Lifeworlds, and
b) the domination which they lead to.
Simply to say that tomorrow employees will have the
\ right to participate at board ,level may be doomed to
. justifying the arguments of those who argue against
- industrial democracy, and confounding those who favour
°t529
~ .
This, however, should not be taken to mean either that
no move away from hierarchy and toward industrial democracy
" . is possible 30. This is not the thrust of our argument.
" What we have shown are the difficulties of so doing. We
shall now go on to consider how, up to a point
'organizations could move toward industrial democracy. '
We have argued that
a) if we distinguish between work issues which
are more directly related to the work of the
individual - work pace, metho?s, pay, discipline, etc.
- and other more strateglc ~ssues investment
policies, sales policy, financial policy, etc. - that
there is more demand for involvement in the former
than the latter
b) that it is generally accepted - by Management
as well as those outwith Management - that there
should be more particip~tlon in decision-making by
those outwith Management 3 •
34fc) that those outwith Management do not wish to
'::. replace Management as decision-makers. Rather they
would contend that Management should consider the
.., input they could potentially make to decisions (eg
information on which machines to buy, how to improve
..' designs, and so on 532), but always that the decision
. ",., would be taken by the Manager 533. Management on the
',' ," other hand were clearly concerned about maintaining
.. '> their decision-making rights. Thus it appears to us
,< c that there is no fundamental problem, and that any
(: '" problems of developing a more participative system are
problems of detail than of ,fundamental principle.
". Thus, an~ problems would 'seem to us to be
negotiable 34 •
"'"Given this, therefore, how might· such a system
develop535 ? Maintaining the distinction between directly
relevant and strategic issues,. indicates a need for
participation to develop at both of these levels. It is
clear from our evidence and analysis that participation at
the former level would be more relevant, for employees,
since it would take them into issues for which their
Lifeworlds are suited536 • It would involve matters for which
they already have interpretational relevances (though this
does I not rule out the possibility that they would have to
be.developed further to deal with the,wider range of issues
they would come into contact with).,
Hence a component of the system of participation would
seem to us to be to develop participation at the level of
the· individual employee, and/or his' work group. This, at
shop-floor level might involve employees in designing new
production techniques, having meaningful influence when new
equipment is being chosen and so on. This form of
participation would originate in' the activities of the
employees who participate 537. At"the same time, however
this points to a need for them to participate at th~
strategic level as well 538
.. '", .
~ , ,
This has the disadvantages that
a) their Lifeworlds as we have seen, are not well
suited to this area of business,
, ,
,/ ,., ..
b) it would involve'indirect participation
participation by representatives - shop stewards
instance) rather than being direct. Hence there is
risk of the alienation of the representative
those he represents.
(ie
for
the
fromAt the same time participation at this level would be
functionally necessary for participation at lower levels539 •
say, for instance, that a group of. employees had decided
that they would recommend to the company· the purchase of
new machines for their department, which would cost several
million pounds. Unfortunately this does not fit in with the
investment policy of the firm. This points to the ultimate
permeability of the distinction we have drawn between these
two types of issues 540 • It is certainly clear on the basis
of our own research, and that of others referred to above,
that this distinction looms large in the thinking of
employees. It is not, however a watertight distinction in
the context of company strategy. By participating at the
1evel of their jobs, or their department (or in between),
employees will eventually come into contact with strategic
issues. For this reason some participation at board level
seems worthwhile, while recognising that the immediate
returns may be limited for the reasons we have discussed
541 •..
Moreover, by participating at board level, in however
a, limited way, the Lifeworld of those outwith Management
can- be expected to change through either actively
participating in strategic management, or (to a lesser
degree) by being represented in strategic management. The
issues, experiences, etc. of involvementiof.decision-making
at this level can enter into the Lifeworldthrough the
vehicle of experience 542 •
Hence participation may not achieve its fullest
potential, unless the intrinsic problems of the Lifeworld
are addressed. Thus as Chell argues,
The first practical step - individuals
, ; must take in such a learning process is
. . to become more conscious of;~their own
behaviour in order to be able to'change
it. The next step is to know what needs
to be changed. (supra)
It is only when employees -outwith Management become
aware of the limitations placed on them by their own
Lifeworlds, that they can even begin to move toward
participating equally with Management in their
organizations. We would argue, additionally, that the
outcome of legislation to introdu.ce industrial democracy
from the level of the board down w1ll be restricted by the
1imits imposed by the Lifeworld.
To take this analysis further would require the kind
of development which Bowles refers to When he. argues that a
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new set of social values and beliefs
are beginning to emerge which will
precipitate new ways of understanding,
experience and ways of relating. Xn
other words, a new form of mythology
might be forming which may potentially
create new conditions of freedom of
i
543 human thought and act on.
While not having any evidence to the effect that, as
Bowles claims, there are new sets of social values and
belie~s emerging, which will allow us to understand,
exper~ence and relate in new way, it is clear from our data
and our argument that such change will be necessary for
industrial democracy to progress toward full equality 544 •
For instance it would be necessary for beliefs about the
role of the Manager to change - both for Managers as well
as for those outwith Management - to enable Managers and
employees to relate to each other on a more equal basis
than now - if indeed these roles still exist, and it has
not proved necessary to develop altogether new roles even
to the extent "of having different names. A similar argument
is made by LeYmann 545 , who argues that
democratic behaviour is a personality
variable which correlates strongly with
experiences of identity. A democratic
work environment cannot be organized
unless a personality shaping pedagogic
situation is also built into the plans
for democratization. (pg. 112)
In other words democratising a workplace is not merely
a structural/procedural matter, but that the identities of
the participants in the sense of how they define
themselves must be taken into account 546. We have
attempted to illustrate the obstacles which exist here from
the perspective of the Lifeworlds which they occupy. 547
This is not to say that we cannot move in the
direction of more democratic organizations without changes
to the Lifeworld, but it would be our argument that only a
certain amount of progress would be possible. This progress
would appear to be maximized by addressing not only
"strategic participation" (at board level), but also by
developing "work level" participation. The problem with
this is as Tannenbaum et ale (2) point out
If legislators in countries like Sweden
intend to achieve such effects, they
may have to consider laws that
encourage direct (our "work level") as
well as indirect participation (our
strategic level), although the
formulation of such laws may not be
00
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344Thus while it may be easy to develop laws requiring a
certain level of participation at board level for employees
(for instance as with the Bullock report, or
Mitbemestimmung)
a) the degree o~ benefi~ - f~r .eit~er side - to
be had from this is, 1n our V1ew, l1m1ted.
b) the degree of benefit to be had from
participation at the individual ~mplo~ee's .wo~k le~el
is much greater (though the leg1slat1ve d1ff1cult1es
would be much greater) since at this level the
individual employee would be able to
i) maintain a sense of competence, which
would not be possible at the strategic level,
since his Lifeworld has developed out of this.
ii) be able to develop a clearer sense of
control, since the effects of his initiatives
would be potentially much more apparent than at
the strategic level.
Hence a way forward may be to encourage developments
at both "work" and "strategic" levels, such that as we
argued above their experiences at each level gradually grow
together 549 • The danger in this is, as we have argued, that
the Lifeworlds of employees outwith Management come to be
colonized in the same way as those of Management. While on
the one hand the needs of the System would indicate that
this is functionally necessary, by considering Habermas I s
argument, we can see that this is not necessarily so•.
In "Theory of Communicative Action" he argues 550 that
there is an exchange relation between the Private sphere
("the institutional orders of the Lifeworld") and Economic
system ("Media-steered SUbsystems"). Through this exchange,
in return for provision of Labour power we obtain an
income. This income is in turn used to purchase goods and
services, which creates demand for labour power, to produce
more goods and services etc.
Hence we lead two existences - one as a producer, the
other as consumer. The more the consumer dominates the more
our role as producer is sUbject to system imperatives as
consumers demand additional benefits (better products,
lower prices, higher quality, etc.). Hence, as producers,
the market demands that we must be more efficient. As the
Lifeworld is colonized by the system, so the market
develops an image of increasing independence - in other
words that it is an irresistible force which we cannot
resist but can only obey. However, if the Lifeworld is able
to reassert itself, so that the intrusions of the System
can be stripped out allowing a fully rational determination
of will, then the exchange between consumer and producer
emerges as negotiable and subject to our potential control
rather than as one determined by the forces of a market
outwith our control.
34 5"We would argue, therefore that avoiding the danger of
absorption of employee representatives into Management
requires on the one hand that they are able to participate
in Management, yet at the same time avoiding the
colonization of their Lifeworlds by system imperatives. Yet
if we consider the data from our own chapter 5 (when we
consider the possibilities of employees being represented
at board level) one of the constraints which staff and
Hourly paid put on themselves before considering it
possible to participate with management on an equal basis
is that "the should understand how the company works" (see
excerpt 5.33). In other words Staff and Hourly paid can
only consider equality at board level once their Lifeworlds
have, in effect, been colonized by the System. Yet only
through a Lifeworld free of system imperatives can issues
can be determined fUlly rationally (ie consistent with the
Ideal Speech Thesis) and only in this way can we have fUlly
democratic organizations 551.
Gustavsen 552 suggests a list of criteria, toward
which we should be trying to reform work, in order that a
dialogue5develop which will reduce the degree of domination
in work 53.
~t i~ clear that such conditions were not present in
our f~rm ~n respect of decision-making, which as we have
shown. was largely a management monopoly - hence there was
pe~ce~ved to be very limited dialogue for exchange of
po~nt~ and arguments, far less considering the extent of
equal~ty,.or rules for a dialogue to take place. Moreover
as we pou~t out a~ove there are very real and important
~bstacles ~n the L~feworlds of our respondents which stand
~n the way of such a development.
Likewise the similarity between the above conditions
and the Ideal Speech Thesis is obvious - but as Gustavsen
suggests
they are rUdimentary and fairly open.
It is, however, possible to apply these
in actual reform work. 554The difficulty is that, as we have shown, there are
obstacles in evolving toward the type of situation which
would begin to satisfy such conditions. Most notably the.
structure of the Lifeworld of those within and outwith
Management represents a formidable obstacle. It would,
however, be our argument that only by moving in the
direction of Gustavsen's conditions (and/or the Ideal
Speech Thesis) will the Lifeworld be changed - but in
making such changes we must always be conscious of the
impediment which the Lifeworld represents 555 • Democracy at
work - to the extent it is possible - will only be achieved
throu~h many small steps, rather than a single giant
step55 • In other words changes toward democracy - no matter
how limited - by developing a greater sense of competence
will modify the Lifeworld, making further change appear
desirable for the participants - though the danger, we have
considered above, to which this may lead is to greater
colonization of the Lifeworld of those outwith Management.
CONCLUSION
What we' propose to do is to draw two sets of
conclusions - one set at the practical level, and then a
second set of conclusions which draw together the
theoretical implications of this work.
Practical level
What our model has shown is that
, a) ~anageme~t ~ower is a function of their formal
h1er~rc:h1c~1 POs1st1on. Thus to develop a system of
par~1C:1pat10r:t, and, a ~ore democratic system of
dec1s10n-mak1ng 1n 1ndustry, would require
modification of this hierarchical position. But,
b) the management position in the hierarchy is
we have shown, subject to an (unconscious) agenda'
since the mana~ement !Ote is ~ssociated with an imag~
of competence 1n dec1s1on-mak1ng. This image is real
for
i) management, who consider themselves as
prof~ssional decision-makers and that those
outw1th management are not ("they are not
employed to, do this"). Management are, however,
prepa~ed - 1ndeed see this as proper - to concede
more 1nfluence to those outwith management.
347-ii) those outwith management, who perceive
managers as possessing the skills required to
take strategic decisions and (though to a lesser
degree) "work related" decisions. Thus, while
this group wish to exercise more influence - and
more influence than Management would appear (on
the basis of our evidence) prepared to concede -
the final say would still rest with Management.
ManagemeQt - even on this basis would retain
control 557. To move beyond this, to a higher
degree of equality, would require that employees
"know how the company runs" - in other words that
their Lifeworlds be colonized by system
imperatives.
The issues which, seem to us, to emerge from this are
1) not whether forms of participation, and more
democratic decision-making should be introduced,
because there was agreement over all in every group
that these things should happen, but rather the degree
and form of particifation (what we have referred to as
the "fine print" 55 )
2) the difficulties which the Lifeworld creates
since
a) its constraints - through the definition
of the management role
i) prevent management yielding
influence beyond a point where their
"competence" is restricted.
ii) prevent those outwith management
seeking influence beyond a certain point,
since they cannot go beyond what they
perceive as the limits of their technical
competence. This would certainly stop some
way short or equality 559.
b) the possibility of a more wide spread
coloniziation of the Lifeworld by system
imperatives. By creating more equality in
decision making, by creating more access to
decision-making for those outwith Management, all
that happens is that their Lifeworlds too are
colonized by system imperatives. Thus the freedom
which is created by participation and industrial
democracy may be a freedom to obey system
imperatives, rather than to fUlly conscious and
rational decisions about the future.
Thus, only by being aware of this unconscious agenda
can we attempt to move toward equality• Doing so we
requires the assessment of alternatives against the rules
of the Ideal Speech Thesis - or the criteria suggested by
Gustavsen 560.The objective would be to create not only
1) a formal (or struct~ral) equality in decision-
making (equal representat10n at board level for
instance), but also
2) that while there may continue to be a
managerial role, the influence and decision-making
powers of management would always be potentially
sUbject to requirin~ justification - "control of the
mandator position" 5 •
In other words the creation of democracy requires not
only changing structures but changing Lifeworlds, such t~at
those outwith Management are capable of challeng1ng
Management and require them to justify their decisions
morally ~ather than simply in technical-rational terms.
This capability would require not only the possession of
appropriate skills, but also the awareness necessary to
make use of them. These developments can only be
forthcoming through changes in the Lifeworld.
Theoretical level.
At this level we have shown the limitation of purely
conscious theories of power. Their main weakness is to fail
to take into account the power which emerges from the
reality which is negotiated by the participants (the
Lifeworld), and the manner in which the reality which is
negotiated. The power which develops in this way is largely
unconscious - to the extent there is awareness of it, it is
regarded as normal, and in no sense power. This position
creates two problems:
a) how do we identify such situations? The Ideal
Speech Thesis provides us with criteria to distinguish
social action where power is exercised. Power
identified in this way can be conscious and/or
unconscious. Taking the management:employee
relationship as an example, certain elements involve
elements of conscious power - the power to hire and
fire, take strategic decisions, and so on - but also
unconscious power (intertwined with conscious power
and its exercise) - the perception of management as
being the only group with the skills necessary to take
decisions, the perception of management as being the
onl¥ ,group for whom it is appropriate to take
decl.sl.ons.
b) what is the mechanism whereby unconscious
power operates? Several mechanisms have been proposed
for consicous power - control of resources, physical
coercion, etc. but how does unconscious power
operate, even if we can show, using the above, that
unconscious power has operated? The mechanism we have
proposed is the Lifeworld. Through the basic
categories of knowledge whichi) organize our routine knowledge in use
and,
ii) indicate the interpretational relevances
which are appropriate in particular situations.
To the extent that the Lifeworld mechanisms ascribe
certain powers to particular roles, then the exercise of
that power will appear to be "natural" and be taken for
granted, and may not even be understood as an exercise of
power.
It is through the Lifeworld that the individual
acquiesces in the full system of power - conscious and
unconscious. Habermas argues (after Freud) that the
individual is self repressed - and we have argued in a
sense that this is true. However, through consideration of
Laingian psychoanalysis we can see that how the individual
perceives himself and others is reaffirmed in interaction
and thus strengthened, even when this interaction is
distorted. Hence, while we can analytically talk of a
number of Lifeworlds (Management, Staff, Hourly paid etc.)
we can only fUlly comprehend them by reference to each
other (eg the Hourly paid Lifeworld by reference to the
Management Lifeworld.)
Thus only by grasping the implications of
a) the interdependence of Lifeworlds for each
other, and
b) the implication of the Lifeworld for the
exercise of power
can we begin to understand the underpinnings of
hierarchy in bU~iness organizations, and the obstacles thus
created for mov~ng toward more democractic organizations.
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1 By hierarchy we have in mind the form of organizational
structure referred to by Fayol as
the line of authority in an
organization which runs in order of
rank from top management to the lowest
level of the enterprise. (H. Fayol
"Industrial & General Administration".
International Management Institute.
Quoted in J. stoner and E. Freeman
"Management [4th Ed] Prentice Hall
1989.)
We have in mind, however, not simply the structural
principles of hierarchy, but more importantly the
associated rights and powers associated with each level in
the hierarchy, such that "top management" have more power
and authority than "the lowest level of the enterprise".
2 This form of organization has been considered critically
from a -number of sources, many of which will be considered
here. For instance the function of the Bullock committee
(Lord Bullock "Report of the Commission of Inquiry on
Industrial Democracy" cmnd. 6706, HMSO 1977) was to
recommend a system of worker participation in company
affairs. See too Bowen P. "Social Control in Industrial
Organizations". RKP 1976: Burawoy M. "Manufacturing
Consent" University of Chicago Press 1979: Cressey P.,
Eldridge J • and McInnes J • "Just Managing"• open
University Press, 1985: Edwards R. " Contested Terrain"
Basic Books 1979: Emery F. & Thorsrud E. "Form and Content
in Industrial Democracy". Tavistock 1969: Gustavsen B.
"Workplace Reform and Democratic Dialogue". Economic &
Industrial Democracy 1985, pp. 461-479: ILO "Workers
Participation in Decisions within Undertakings". ILO 1981:
Semler R. "Managing without Managers". Harvard Business
Review September-october 1989: Storey J. "The Challenge to
Management Control" Kogan Page 1980: Tannenbaum A.
"Hierarchy in Organizations" Jossey Bass 1974.
Our aim will be to establish how and why it is that a
system of organization of technically unequal power is able
to persist.
3 This point is made by Husserl
The paradoxical interrelationships of
the "objective1y true world" and the
"life-world" make enigmatic the manner
of being for both. ( E. Husserl " The
Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology".
Northwestern University Press 1970, pg.
131)
4 It is defined by Schutz asthe total sphere of experiences of an
individual which is circumscribed by
the objects, persons and events
encountered in the pursuit of praqmatic
objectives of livinq. It is a world in
which a person is "wide awake", and
which asserts itself as the "paramount
reality" of his life. (A. Schutz
"Phenomenology and Social Relations.
University of Chicago Press 1970, pg
320).
We shall elaborate on this later.
5 This model is used to guide our research, but will be
adapted as necessary in the light of results. This will be
reported on in Chapter 6.
6 In this discussion of Schutz's work, we shall frequently
refer to Schutz in the text, even though in many cases the
work we are drawing on will frequently be "Structures of
the Life World", pUblished after Schutz's death, and co-
written with T. Luckmann.
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1971.
Schutz A. "The Phenomenology of the Social World"•
Heinemann 1972.
Schutz A. and Luckmann T. "Structures of the Life World"
Heinemann 1974.
7 Habermas J. "Towards a Theory of Communicative
Competence" Inquiry, Vol 13, 1970.
Habermas J. "Legitimation crisis". Heinemann 1976.
Habermas J. "Theory of Communicative Action (1)", Polity,
1984.
Habermas J. "Theory of Communicative Action (2)". Polity
1986.
Habermas J. "Hannah Arendt's Communications concept of
Power". In S. Lukes (ed.) "Power" Blackwell 1986.
McCarthy T. "Translators Introduction to J. Habermas
"Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1". Polity 1984.McCarthy T. "A theory of Communicative Competence"
Philosophy of Social science 1973••
McCarthy T. "The critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" 3rd
Edition, Polity 1984.
Pusey M. "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock Publications 1987.
Roderick R. "Habermas and critical Theory" MacMillan 1986.
White J. K. "The Recent Work Of Jurgen Habermas". Cambridge
uni. Press 1988
8 Laing R. D.
1960.
"The Divided Self". Tavistock Publications,
His Work and its
Laing R.D. "Self and Others". Pelican 1966.
Laing R.D. and Esterson A. "sanity, Madness and the
Family". Tavistock 1964.
Laing R. D. , Phillipson H. and Lee A. R. "Interpersonal
Perception" Tavistock Publications 1966.
Esterson A."The Leaves of spring" .Pelican 1972.
Edgar D. "My Hero, R. D. Laing". "Independent" Magazine
3/6/89, pg. 62.
Friedenburg E.Z. "Laing". Fontana 1973.
Howarth-williams M. "R. D. Laing
Relevance for Sociology." RKP 1977.
Sedgwick P. "Self, SYmptom and society". In "R. D. Laing
and Anti-psychiatry" R. Boyers (Ed). Octagon Books, 1974.
9 Lukes S. "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974.
10 See Habermas J. "Towards a Theory of Communicative
Competence" Inquiry, Vol 13, 1970.
McCarthy T. "A theory of Communicative Competence"
Philosophy of Social Science 1973••
11 Schutz regards knowledge as
1) shared by social actors and which they take
for granted
2) b) acquired through our social experience,
either at first hand, or acquired through other forms
of learning (eg education, from parents etc.), and as
such is developed over time as we acquire and/or
modify the content knowledge.
3) organized into three categoriesi) Basic
structures,
or Fundamental elements or
...
ii) Routine or Habitual elements ,
Iii) Specific Component contents.
but with category three being the only one we are routinely
conscious of. The first is "responsible for organizing our
knowledge and our use of knowledge. Category two involves
skills which we have used so often, and are so familiar
with we may not even be aware of using them - they may be
"obvious". This creates the possibility of the very
organizing categories which we use, being a source of
unconscious power, since it may create, for instance one-
sided norms which cannot be redeemed in communicative
action.
4) as using 'knowledge determined by a system of
relevances and typicalities, which indicate to us what
type of situation we are in and the relative
importance of its elements
5) where the 'knowledge which we employ is
SUbstantially drawn from a social stock of knowledge,
and our use of it is limited by "social givens".
6) This (and especially the former relationship)
is particularly important in Laing's work, as we have
seen. It too creates the possibility of power, since
1) 'the social givens may explicitly involve
power (eg the power of a policeman)
)
2) the social givens may create unconscious
power, since, for instance, they may limit the
right of some to speak in discourse.
f) where the social stock of knowledge will not
be evenly distributed - there will for instance be
specialised knowledge, which is not open to those
outwith the specialty in question. This too creates
the possibility of unconscious power since it will be
difficult for others to question specialist knowledge
to which they have no, or only limited access. To the
extent that these are accepted in an uncritical way
(Which they normally will be) they create the
possibility of unconscious power. An example of a
typicality would be "a manager", and to the extent it
accords that type of person certain powers, these may
simply blend into the social horizon and appear to
disappear.
4Likewise the sUbjective stock of knowledge of
individuals will vary inter-personally, since being
drawn from our biographies (which will vary), the
sUbjective stocks will differ. Hence we will each
bring to a social situation, stocks of knowledge which
to some extent will be inter-personally different.
This too creates the possibility of unconscious power
since it will be difficult for others to question
specialist knowledge to which they have no, or only
limited access.
g) where the Lifeworld, in aggregate defines our
social horizons.
12 The stock of knowledge is
What a person knows in toto••As a whole
this stock is incoherent, inconsistent
and only partially clear. It serves its
purposes adequately as long as its
recipes yield satisfactory results in
acting and its tenets satisfactory
explanations. By contrast,
philosophical and scientific knowledge
serves purely intellectual interests,
and is SUbject to controls, principles
of coherence etc. (A. Schutz "On
Phenomenology and Social Relations".
University of chicago Press 1970, pg
319. )
Schutz and Luckmann suggest
All interpretation of this world is
based on a stock of previous
experiences of it, our own or those
handed down to us by parents or
teachers; these experiences in the form
of "knowledge at hand" function as a
scheme of reference. (A. Schutz
"Collected Papers. Vol.1"' Martinus
Nijhoff, 1971, pg. 7).
....
13 Morgan G• " Images of Organization " Sage 1986.•
....
14 For instance when we consider Habermas I s Ideal Speech
Thesis we shall see that when its conditions are not
satisfied, this creates the possibility that agreements
reached have been the result not of the force of the better
argument and rationality, but of the use of power - either
conscious or unconscious (eg one sided rules operating
during the negotiation to the advantage of one side, but
not perceived as power by the other, or perhaps by either
side). Thus it may be that the Lifeworld is "held together"
in a social sense through power, and in particular that the
Lifeworld does create horizons for us, which we are unaware
of, but which define out of consideration other forms of
social arrangements which may be seen as non-viable.
Furthermore Habermas would argue that the Lifeworld has
been invaded by Social System imperatives which direct our
behaviour according to money and power, rather than
rationality and Communicative Action. So to the extent that
hierarchy is associated with concepts like efficiency and
profit, it will be in a Lifeworld sense, endorsed.
Hence given the very obviousness of the Lifeworld, we can
begin to see its implications going beyond mere
description. The fact that knowledge is treated as obvious
means that it is much less likely to be sUbjected to
scrutiny, or questioned. It just "is", and to this extent
the implications it has for power may not be identified.
Hence the category of "manager" is learned, for instance
in many cases in our firm, from parents who also worked for
the same firm (See Chapter 3).
15 See above
16 For instance Management may be able to make an argument
to justify a particular decision they have made (for
instance why Hourly paid can only have a 5% pay rise when
they wanted 10%, or why new machines are being introduced,
or why 200 Hourly paid and Staff are being made redundant,
and so on), but we would argue that we have to proceed
onward to identify why Hourly-paid and Staff accept or
reject the Management argument. We shall argue that there
is an inherent bias to the former, and that even when the
latter comes about (for instance over pay) the process
whereby Management take this decision is not what is
challenged, rather it is the outcome of the decision. There
may be challenge to outcomes, but there is a bias
restricting challenges to the process whereby these
outcomes are produced.
17 Schutz A. "Phenomenology and Social Relations".
University of Chicago Press 1970,·pg. 86.
18 Hence Schutz I s description of the Lifeworld as being
composed by a process of "sedimentation".
19 This has obvious connections with Psychological theories
of cognitive dissonance. See for instance L. A. Festinger
"A theory of Cognitive Dissonance". Row Peterson 1957•20 For Schutz's definition see above
21 It is suggested by Schutz and Luckmann (page 5 of
Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974.) that we take
for granted:
a) the existence of others,
b) that the environment of others is the same as
your own and has the same meaning for you both,
c) that you can enter into interrelations and
have reciprocal relationships with others,
d) that you can be understood by others,
e) that there is stratified social and cultural
world historically pregiven as a frame of reference
for us all,
f) the situation you are in, therefore, is only
to a small extent created by yourself.
22 R. Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social and Political
Theory" Methuen 1979, pg. 134.
23 The stock of knowledge is
What a person knows in toto••As a whole
this stock is incoherent, inconsistent
and only partially clear. It serves its
purposes adequately as long as its
recipes yield satisfactory results in
acting and its tenets satisfactory
explanations. By contrast,
philosophical and scientific knowledge
serves purely intellectual interests,
and is sUbject to controls, principles
of coherence etc. (A. Schutz _"On
Phenomenology and Social Relations".
University of Chicago Press 1970, pg
319. )
Schutz and Luckmann suggest
All interpretation of this world is
based on a stock of previous
experiences of it, our own or those
handed down to us by parents or
teachers; these experiences in the form
of "knowledge at hand" function as a
scheme of reference. (A. Schutz
"Collected Papers. Vol.1" Martinus
Nijhoff, 197i, pg. 7).
24 Schutz and Luckmann suggestIt is built on sedimentations of
formerly actually present experiences
that were bound to situations.
Inversely every actually present
experience is inserted into the flow of
lived experience and into a biography
according to the set of rules and
relevance found in the stock of
knowledge(Schutz and Luckmann
"structures of the Life World"
Heinemann 1974, pp. 99-100.)
25 Schutz and Luckmann suggest
All of my experiences in the life-world
are brought into relation to this
schema, so that the objects and events
in the life-world confront me from the
outset in their typical character - in
general as mountains and stones, trees
and animals, more specifically as ridge
and oaks, birds, fish and so on. Schutz
and Luckmann "Structures' of the Life
World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 7.
26 Rogers points out, for instance, that it is part of
Goffman's argument that
Moreover the actor can be completely
taken in by his own act, his motives
operating "naturally'" in the course of
"being himself" or "being involved".(M.
F. Rogers "Goffman on Power". The
American sociologist 1977, pp. 88-9).
27 This point is also recognized by Giddens, who states that
Schutz sees the
actor's stock' of knowledge (as) taken
for granted as adequate until further
notice: it is a totality of self
evidences changing from situation to
situation, being set into relief at any
given time by a background of
indeterminacy. (A. Giddens. "New Rules
of Sociological Method". Hutchinson
1976, pp. 29-30)
28 Schutz and Luckmann suggest,I simply take it for granted that other
men also exist in this my world, and
indeed not only in a bodily manner••but
rather with a consciousness that is
essentially the same as mine. Thus from
the outset, my life-world is not my
private world but rather is
intersubjective: the fundamental
structure of its reality is that it is
shared by us. (Schutz and Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World"
Heinemann 1974, pg. 4)
Hence, taking school as an example, I assume and behave as
if everyone knows that it is wrong to talk in class, and
that we are agreed on this. Hence if others behave
differently (eg talk in class) then it is not just that
they have behaved differently from my expectation, but that
they have furthermore broken a rule of my Lifeworld. Schutz
and Luckmann suggest,
In the natural attitude, I only become
aware of the deficient tone of my stock
of knowledge if a novel experience does
not fit into what has up until now been
taken as the taken-for-granted valid
reference schema. Schutz and Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World"
Heinemann 1974, pg. 8.
In these circumstances my Lifeworld would have been
developed (or re-explicated, see Schutz and Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World" Heinemann 1974, pp 11 - 12.)
my stock of knowledge represents solutions to the
problems I have faced up to now, so when I face a situation
for which it is deficient I must re-assess it. Hence it is
argued by Bernstein,
If we were to freeze an individual's
stock of knowledge at any given time,
we would discover how his set of
typifications is organized by a system
of relevances. And as his situation
changes, this system of relevances also
changes. (R. Bernstein "The
Restructuring of Social &, Political
Theory" Methuen, 1976, pg.147).'
, " '
9When I face a novel problem my existing stock of knowledge
may be helpful, but may not be able to solve the problem on
its own - consequently the Lifeworld has to be developed,
which may be done through a "motivated interpretational.
relevance". This concept is discussed below. Thus I may
come to recognize that, in certain circumstances, talking
in class conditionally may happen - for instance if the
teacher encourages discussion (officially in terms of
formal rules), or if the teacher is very boring
(unofficially in terms of informal rules).
29 As we shall see below, this means for Schutz that since
our experiences are likely to differ inter-personally, so
our Lifeworlds, as a summation of these different
collections of experience, are likely to differ inter-
personally.
30 Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World"
Heinemann 1974, pp 6.
31 This first category is, in effect the foundation of our
knOWledge of the Lifeworld. Schutz argues that these
fundamental structures
do not enter into the grip of
consciousness in the natural attitUde,
as a core of experience. But they are a
condition of every experience of the
Lifeworld and enter into the horizon of
experience. (See Schutz and Luckmann
"structures of the Life World"
Heinemann 1974, pg. 104.)
Thus these elements, are as their title suggests, our
foundations for knowing about the Life-world they
determine how we organize and categorize our knowledge.
Schutz states these
consist of knowledge concerning the
limiting conditions of all such
(specific) experiences, a knowledge
that is more or less automatically
given along with every
experience••••Know1edqe about the limit
of inner duration, about the
historica1ity and finitude of the
individual situation within world time,
about the limits of corporeality and
about the spatial, temporal and social
structures of experience, is the
substratum of the determination of
every concrete situation. (Schutz and
Luckmann "Structures of the Life World"
Heinemann 1974, pg. 135.)
There is a double status for this basic knowledge in that
10and how
of the
of the
a) they are part of our stock of knowledge, but
also
b) determine the knowledge we acquire it,
we understand it. For instance in talking
system of relevances, which is a component
basis stock of knowledge, Schutz says,
someone can say of himself "I know that
such things don't interest me" (Schutz
and Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 183).
Thus, because the relevance system directs us away from
"such things", we pay little attention to them. The
~elevance structures are, therefore self prophesying - they
~ndicate to us what is interesting and what is not, so we
are interested in what they indicate are interesting and
away from other things which are not. This self-prophecy
will be important later in our discussion of Schutz•• This
type of knowledge will be relatively invariant over an
entire society (though he does suggest they may differ for
a sighted person compared to a blind person). This is the
system of themes and typifications which we shall consider
in detail below.
32 Routine or Habitual knowledge - the second category -
deals with areas which may at one time have been
problematic to us, but which we have now solved on a once
and for all basis Schutz describes these as
activities that have to a great extent
lost the character of acts. I would
indeed have to learn them, but the
continuing realizability of the goals
and the exclusiveness of the "means"
that can be used has so often been
confirmed, the skills on which they
touch are so self-evidently obvious,
that they have one a high degree of
trustworthiness. (and sUbjective
certainty) • (Schutz and Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World"
Heinemann 1974, pg.107.).
"~he examples given by Schutz relate to physical situations
- for instance the habituality of our bodies is shown by
~he trauma of loss of limbs and the reassessment which has
to be made of bodily image in this situation. (On this
point, see Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 106.) In this discussion
s~tuations are considered which may be better known to a
w~der range of people - where we have a tooth extracted,
and at first explore this "hole" almost obsessively with
our tongue, but then gradually come to terms with it, so
that the "hole" is just as habitual as the tooth which was
once there. Likewise certain skills which we have learned -
walking for instance - become skills which we simply take
for granted. They become matters of habit, and thus
habitual.
This habitual knowledge extends into areas of even higher
skill than this. For instance there is a distinction drawn
between
a) useful knowledge, which is knowledge used to
solve what were once problems, but which have now been
solved so' definitively that they are no longer
problematical. The examples given include - playing
piano, riding, and frying eggs. (See Schutz and
Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann
1974, pg• 107.)
b) knowledge of recipes, which is knowledge which
is applied over a range of situations, but which is
automated. The kind of examples given by Schutz are a
hunter reading tracks; a mountain climber orienting
himself to changes in the weather, or a translator
automatically translating phrases (See Schutz and
Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" Heinemann
1974, pg. 107.).
33 See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World"
Heinemann 1974, pg. 105. This category is the knowledge of
which we are conscious and aware. It may be very obvious to
say so, but this is what we know about the social world and
particular situations within it. This knowledge will be
specific to particular situations (eg knowing how to behave
in particular circumstances), and may even vary across a
society (eg that different categories of person may employ
different stocks of knowledge in particular situations - so
you may eat peas with a fork, another person with a spoon
or a knife).
34 Clegg uses a similar analogy in "power, Rule &
Domination". Our use of it here is not mere coincidence. We
would argue that his use of the analogy is restricted and
that he failed to
a) consider fully the implication of holding
certain views, or knowledge (eg if a Police officer
can hold up the traffic, what else can he do?)
12..b) progress to consider the deeper levels of
knowledge which are essential in Schutz's theory.
:::::55 This categorisation, and in particular the basic and
::.tabitual categories are of very great importance to our
.argument. But there are other elements to Schutz's theory
2nd we shall consider these first, before returning to
-these unconscious elements of the Stock of Knowledge.
~6 Schutz argues
Only a very small part of my knowledqe
of the world oriqinates within my
personal experience. The qreater part
is socially derived, handed down to me
by my friends, my parents, my teachers
and the teachers of my teachers. I am
tauqht not only to define the
environment, but also how typical
constructs have to be formed in
accordance with the system of
relevances accepted from the anonYmous
unified point of view of the in-qroup.
This includes ways of life, methods of
cominq to terms with the environment,
efficient recipes for the use of
typical means ,for bringing about
typical ends in typical situations. The
typifying medium par excellence by
which socially derived knowledqe is
transmitted is the vocabulary and
syntax of everyday lanquaqe. (A. Schutz
Collected Papers, Vol 1. Pp. 13-14)
Our purpose in this, fairly lengthy, quote is to draw
attention to two points,
1) confirmation of the importance of experience
as the foundation of the Lifeworld, though this can be
at 2nd (or more) hand, or even be vicarious.
2) the importance of language in Schutz, which as
we shall see is shared with Habermas.
11:>......
37 These are basic (fundamental) structures. The former
determines the importance ascribed to the different aspects
of a particular situation (for instance that if we meet a
Police Officer his powers of arrest are more important than
the fact that he is wearing a blue suit). Taken together
his system of relevances will determine priorities for the
individual - though these will not necessarily be stable
over time. Certain elements of the system of relevance will
be determined by the individual - volitional system of
relevance, but other elements will be imposed on him by
society - social system of relevance. (See A. Schutz " On
Phenomenology & Social Relations". University of Chicago
Press, pp.321-2, and Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the
Life World" Heinemann 1974, pg. 119.)
Typicality organizes our knowledge in categories - or types
(hence typicality) - which we see as "the same". An example
of typicality given by Schutz concerns dogs. Hence if we
see an animal of a certain shape etc. we can categorise it
as a dog. Moreover if we were employed as a postman we may
categorise dogs as friendly, or as dangerous etc. (See
Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 142
- 146.)
38 Typification is described by Schutz as:
disregarding those individual features
in the typified objects. facts or
events which are irrelevant to the
problem at hand. In a certain sense it
could be said that all objects falling
under the same type are equal or at
least deemed equal. For instance we
think of people as Frenchmen or
Germans, or Catholics or Protestants,
aliens or neighbours, Negroes or
orientals, men or women•••Each of these
terms designates a type. (A. Schutz
"Collected Papers. Vol. 2." Hartinus
Nijhoff, 1971. pg 239.)
In this, we can see how the system of relevances will
arrange the system of typifications, since the role of the
former being to define the problem, will determine for the
individual what the appropriate information/typifications
he requires to use. If the system of relevances defines a
problem as involving, for instance, sport then our
typifications concerning nuclear physics are unlikely to be
relevant.
14What are typifications? As the above quote makes clear they
are basically categories of information. Using
typifications we can treat categories of individual in the
same way - we "know" what to expect of Frenchmen - randy
gits who smell of garlic - or of Germans - authoritarians
who walk funny and have even funnier moustaches - etc. Our
stock of knOWledge is, therefore, organized around a set of
types or categories. These may be of types of person, as in
the above quote, or they may be categories of recipe or
solution - in this type of situation you do "x", and if a
type works, then it may be used again. The more a type is
used the more it is likely to enter into habitual
knOWledge, and to be used automatically.
This makes the important point, which runs through Schutz's
work, that we do not hold information for nothing, or for
its own sake. The possession of knowledge in Schutz, is
always problem-oriented. Just as the system of relevances
is ultimately oriented toward solving problems, we use
typifications likewise. Hence we may have categories of
problem solving solutions (eg if the lights go out, check
the meter), but even a category called "Frenchmen" is
potentially problem solving since it contains our
information on how to behave toward a Frenchman. Schutz
argues
The meaning contexts of determinations
is established through the predominant
thematic and interpretive relevances
in the situation of acquisition acting
in unison with the motivational
relevances. From this it follows there
can be no types as such, rather only
problem-oriented types. (See Schutz and
Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World", pp. 231.)
See also Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World", pg. 232.
Types can, however, vary in their degree of certainty for
the user. For instance we would be pretty certain of a
category which we call "dog", but perhaps not so certain of
a category we call "diamonds". Types will be more or less
definitive, and the more definitive they are, the more
confidence we will feel able to put on them. Others will be
less definitive and used with less confidence (eg a
hypothetical interpretational relevance). Moreover a type
may lose definitiveness if it does not deliver the expected
consequences. Types at this level are described by Schutz
as provisional. (See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the
Life World", pp. 232-3.)
/5An important example of a system of typifications, which
Schutz puts forward, is language. He argues, that language
is at the same time a set of typifications (in its grammar
etc.) which we acquire mainly through childhood, and also
the medium through which other typifications are
transmitted. (See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the
Life World", pg. 233.) It is, however, noted that
typification is primary, since language presupposes
typification (eg that a certain sequence of letters has a
certain meaning), and that pre-linguistic children can
employ typifications (eg if I cry, my mother will come to
me). Indeed it is mainly through language that
typifications are transmitted.
Language, in so far as it provides us with the skills to
interpret and to behave within our surroundings, also
confines us to that interpretation. The link between this
and the Ideal Speech thesis we consider obvious. Language
provides us with themes and types which endow management
which much of their power. It is certainly true to say that
this power is consciously experienced - our own results
indicate this most clearly. It is however, routinely
experienced as legitimate, because this is what the types
etc. we have acquired indicate to us that this is how it
should be perceived. The management role is defined as
having certain rights and duties. Moreover the themes and
types indicate to us that Management possess special
skills, and entitle them to take decisions from which
others may be excluded.
This point is reinforced in his consideration of
atypicality. Atypicality is anything for which there is not
already a type or category available. Thus the difficulty
in challenging the already defined Management role, in a
world constructed around hierarchy, is that it is likely
that there is no comparable type available in our
individual stocks of knowledge. Of course it may be
objected that Schutz goes on to point out that atypicality
can be suppressed - which we have to do, since many common
situations contain atypical elements.
We would, however, contend that the type "manager", and the
themes it calls forth, are so fundamental that it is
difficult to treat seriously alternatives. In any case the
existence of non-hierarchical organizations is well
documented - it is possible for other forms to exist.
Kibbutzim are but one example. On the other hand attempts
to introduce workers control in countries like Yugoslavia
indicate the difficulties of breaking the grip of hierarchy
in our life-worlds.
b. ,&For the avoidance of doubt, we are not suggesting that no
alternative to hierarchy is possible. Indeed if anything we
would argue to the contrary. What we are asserting is that
the pre-existence of hierarchy and management roles biases
our Lifeworld and understanding toward the maintenance of
hierarchy. This is not merely because of the greater degree
of conscious power which management have (eg to hire and
fire), but because the understanding which our Lifeworld
gives us of the situation, is such that we not only think
it legitimate to allow them to do so - sUbject to limits
imposed by unions and the legal system - but also that it
would be unintelligible for it to be otherwise.
39 The system of relevances, applied to a situation will
indicate to us that one thing is more important than
another. For instance in "structures of the Lifeworld",
Schutz discusses the problem faced by someone entering a
darkened room, and seeing what appears to be a coiled rope
in the corner, but may be a snake (See pp.197 -223). Using
the system of relevances he is able to work out that it is
a rope and not a snake, but Schutz asks, why is he
interested in that particular object at all - why not some
of the other objects which are there as well. We can say
that they do not interest him - but as Schutz recognizes
this is not enough. We have to understand why they do not
interest him This will depend on the system of relevances.
There are a number of different categories int the
relevance structure. They include,
1) Thematic Relevance situations are
categorised as involving a particular theme
2) Interpretational
to be interpreted to
relevance is appropriate
circumstances.
Relevance - situations have
establish which thematic
(or most appropriate) in the
3) Motivational Relevance that we face a
problem of how to act in a situation, _and thus are
motivated to dealing with it.
It is clear from Schutz's discussion of the systems of
Relevance that they cannot be considered in isolation from
each other. If we use the snake/rope example which Schutz
describes we can see this. Thus a man enters a darkened
room, and sees an object which he is unsure of in the
corner,
a) is motivated to accurately identify its true
nature,
b) employs his interpretational relevances to do
so (eg inanimate objects don't move on their own), and
comes to the conclusion on the basis of the evidence
he has available to him (eg what he can see, smell
etc.) that it might be a coiled rope, or it might be a
coiled snake.
b.
Ii--c) using thematic relevances he knows that if it
is a rope he is safe, but if it is a snake then he is
in danger.
d) this may lead
interpretational relevances
hissing noises)
him
(eg
to use further
ropes don't make
e) using the stock of knowledge in the category
"snake", he may make a hypothetical thematic relevance
- for instance "if it is a snake I should not pick it
up, but I could poke it with a (long) stick".
f) he is then motivated to act in this way.
Each category of the relevance system, therefore does not
stand alone, but are used in association with each other.
40 Schutz points out,
Experiences which are not presented as
problems requirinq explication
introduce no new elements of knowledqe
into the stock of knowledqe. Also they
do not chanqe the relevance structures
or elements of knowledqe. In any case
they do not chanqe the determinations
of the elements of knowledqe in
question. In contrast they confirm the
typical applicability these elements of
knowledqe and confirm the efficacy of
the relevance structures. That means
that the determination of the affected
elements of .knowledqe become more
familiar and more unquestionable.
(Schutz and Luckmann "structures of the
Life World", pg. 226)
41 Alternatively where the situation is novel and has not
been experienced before there will be a problematic
situation, where the individual will have to have the
knowledge imposed (ie be told what to do), or explore and
experiment with the situation. See Schutz and Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World", pp. 125.42 The successful use of a typification or a theme is
therefore important in Schutz's theory. But like all our
knowledge what is success - what we can reasonably expect
in a situation - is something which we learn. It too will
be part of our stock of knowledge. Thus what you can expect
in the way of reward etc. by working in a particular
capacity will be learned. We would not expect for instance,
to run a Jaguar, and live in a mansion if we worked as a
clerk or a machine operator. They may, however, be
realistic expectations for a Director of a large company.
Our findings in relation to Job satisfaction are consistent
with this argument, since not only were our respondents
satisfied with their emploYment relative to their reference
groups ("how satisfied are you with your wages relative to
others you know?" for instance), but even when asked if
particular elements of their jobs would have to be improved
to make their job ideal, their was surprisingly little
demand for change. Contrast this and what the
implications might be for Schutz's theory - if "success"
Was not pre-defined for us in this way. Then if our
aspirations knew no bounds at all, the clerk may become
dissatisfied if he does not have a Jaguar and a mansion,
and critical of the system of distribution.
43 See Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World",
pg. 243.
44 Schutz points out,
the sedimentation of experience are
indirectly and also socially
determinable since they are based on
the socially conditioned, sUbjective
relevance structures... (and) the
specific elements of knowledge•••are
not for the most part acquired through
processes of explication, but rather
are derived socially. (A. Schutz and T.
Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World", pg~ 243.)
45 Schutz points out that
the meaning structures of the everyday
life-world, of the world of nature as
well as of society are indicated and
expressed in language along with the
line of demarcation between these two
provinces which can be shifted from one
relative-natural world view to another.
(Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the
Life World", pg. 248.)
46 Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg.
257.
47 Schutz argues as follows,
.... -the biographically modelled
interpretational and motivational
relevances which both partners "bring
into" the we-relation cannot be
identical, although they are
sUfficiently congruent with regard to
the similar socialization of the
partners for the determination and
management of the situation. (Schutz
and Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World", pg. 254.)
This has echoes of the point we made above, on page 8
concerning the differences in behaviour only becoming
critical when they actually contradict each other
48 Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg.
255.
49 This point is made by Schutz as follows
It (subjective relevance system) is
indeed extensively "socialized" and
shows· extensive, typical similarities
with the sUbjective relevance systems
of fellow men and contemporaries••••But
since the sUbjective relevance systems
are biographically modelled, they
naturally cannot be identical. They are
the unique possession of the
individual, and whenever the individual
turns to his own relevances they appear
to him in this uniqueness. (Schutz and
Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World", pg. 261.)
50 This is defined by Schutz as having a
"social" prehistory· which contains
"independent", as well as "empathic"
. and "socialized" interpretational and
motivational relevances. The latter are
derivations of the relevance structures
predominant in the relative natural
world view, structures which are
filtered through a specific historical
social structure. (Schutz and Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World", pg.
260. )51 Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg.
260. This aspect of Schutz's theory may explain the
difficulty encounter by Clegg (referred to on page 64),
where he encounters "bed-rock" - see Clegg, "Power, Rule
and Domination", pg. 84. The difficulty for Clegg, in
Schutz's terminology, is that he has reached a "routine for
mastering life" (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the
Life World", pg. 260.) which the SUbject regards as
obvious, and one which any educated adult will know about.
This is certainly a problem, but as we have argued it
really is only where the challenge begins. What we have got
to go on to consider, is what this uncritical acceptance
means. Having identified that it is as basic as this, and
accepted uncritically does not solve the problem - it
merely restates it in a more accessible form.
52 Schutz argues
the typical solutions to problems and
the typical conditions under which a
problem can be regarded as solved are
socially derived, along with the
typical determination of that which is
problematic. (Schutz and Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World", pg.
261).
53 This relationship is defined by Schutz as
face-to-face relationship in which the
partners are aware of each other and
sYmpathetically participate in each
other's lives for a short time. (A.
Schutz, "The Phenomenology of the
Social World" Heinemann, 1972, pg. 164)
We have considered this first, since it is the closest form
of relationship which Schutz considers, but it is related
to the "thou" relationship, since the "we" will emerge from
the "thou", by the two parties being aware of the existence
of each other. Thus if the observation is one-sided we
Would describe it as a "thou relation", but where the two
parties are 'reciprocally aware of each other there is a
"face to face" relationship, or a "we relationship". (A.
Schutz "The Phenomenology of the Social World". Heinemann,
1~72, pg. 168). This "we relationship" can again be
~~fferentiated into its own degrees of intimacy. For
~nstance, even though we are aware of each other, we may
a) only look at each other, or
b) we may try to interpret each other's thoughts
(eg by interpretation of facial expressions and other
physical clues), or
c) we may tell each other our thoughts and
consider them.
11These demand interpretation of us, and as such would depend
on our own sUbjective stock of knowledge.
54 This orientation is described by Schutz as
the intentionality of those Acts
whereby the Ego grasps the existence of
the .other person in the mode of the
original self. (A. Schutz " The
Phenomenology of the Social World"
Heinemann, 1972, pg. 164)
Thus, in this orientation we experience those others with
whom we interact as "something in the world like me" Schutz
and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 62. On the
other hand, Schutz goes on to argue, we do not understand
this other only as another man - but as a particular type
of other man (eg a policeman, or postman, or student, or
tax inspector, or manager, etc.). This therefore, like the
"we" relation demands interpretation of us, and as such is
drawn from the sUbjective stock of knowledge.
55 This is described as where
I am not aware of the ongoing flow of
the Other's consciousness. My
orientation is not toward the existence
(dasein) of a concrete individual Thou.
It is not toward any sUbjective
experiences now being constituted in
all their uniqueness in another's mind
nor toward the sUbjective configuration
of meaning in which they are taking
place. Rather the object of my They-
orientation is my own experience of
social reality in general, of human
beings and their conscious processes as
such (A. Schutz - " The Phenomenology
of the Social World" Heinemann, 1~72,
pp. 183-4).
Thus we are no longer involved in a situation where we are
necessarily as one with the individual in terms of space or
time. For a "they" relation the other individual does not
even have to be present. To use Schutz's terminology, they
may be "out of reach". Thus the "they" orientation is based
on our objective social stock of knowledge (ie everyone
knows that this category of person is like this).56 These should no be considered as discrete entities, but
rather as major points on a continuum, with one shading
into another. ("they (we and they orientations) may even be
spoken of as two poles between which stretches a continuous
series of experiences". A. Schutz " The Phenomenology of
the Social World" Heinemann, 1972, pg. 177 .) Thus, if we
put this continuum into our own research site, and
referring to the diagram showing its layout in Chapter 3,
we would expect that the closest relationships to be within
groups - in other words that "we relations" would be most
intimate within particular groups. Less intimate we
relations may extend across groups both horizontally and
vertically. Thus there may be a "we relation" between a
supervisor and some of the Hourly paid employees who work
for him. On the other hand, given the physical distance
between financial staff (who worked in the offices), and
shop-floor employees, we might expect their relationship to
be closer to the "they" end of the continuum. Other Staff -
Production Control for instance - who are located on the
shop-floor and whose work frequently took them out onto the
shop-floor, would be more likely to have a "thou relation"
with hourly-paid employees. Correspondingly managers whose
work kept them away from the shop-floor (eg the Finance
Director) be likely to have a "they relation" with hourly
paid staff (indeed with production personnel in toto),
whereas managers whose work was directly involved with
production would be likely to have a closer relationship
with shop floor employees, more like a thou-relation. Only
those with thou relations can transform into a "we
relation".
This has implications for Habermas's theory of
communication, since it is only when there are conditions
which satisfy the Ideal Speech Thesis that there can be a
rational consensus. Thus in a "they" relation, there can be
no rational consensus by definition, since there is no
dialogue between the parties to such a relation.
57 It is argued by Schutz thatto this encounter (with the other'in
the "we relation") I bring a whole
stock of previously constituted
knowledge. This includes both general
knowledge of what another person is as
such, and any specific knowledge that I
may have of that person in question. It
includes knowledge of people's
interpretive schemes, their habits and
their lanquage. It includes knowledge
of the taken-for-granted in-order-to
and because-motives of others as such
and of this person in particular. And
when I am face to face with someone my
knowledge of him is increasing from
moment to moment.'(A. Schutz " The
Phenomenology of the Social World"
Heinemann, 1972, pg. 169).
Thus while there may be other modes of learning - at second
or third hand for instance - the we relationship is an
important source of extending our social knowledge - and of
practicing its use.
58 This of course begs a whole range of questions, which
Schutz simply does not take on board. Basically our concern
amounts to this. As we will argue, as with many theories of
power - for instance of Gamson and Gaventa - Schutz does
not consider the possibility that this is anything other
than a "fair game" - or at least that everything is "up
front". In other words, Schutz does not consider the
possibility that Ego and Other are anything other than
equals. Indeed it is a matter to which reference is made
but is then passed over:
To what extent personal structure is
influenced by long-term sociohistorical
changes in the predominance of one or
another type of social relations, or by
the reqular repetition of living we-
relations in contrast to other
sequences of social relations, is a
question that must be left open at this
point. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures
of the Life World", pp. 72-3.)
The power of the participants is not, therefore, a matter
of import to Schutz - his concern is with the acquisition
of knowledge by the individual. To remedy this we shall,
SUbsequent turn to Habermas, and ·in particular his use of
communicative action, and the ideal speech thesis.
59 See Schutz and Luckmann "structures of the Life World",
pg. 254.
60 It is argued by Schutz that
;(4
...._------= •
one can seek the origin of the social
stock of knowledge, more exactly, of
the elements that form it, only in
sUbjective experiences and
explications. (Schutz and Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World", pg.
263.)
61 It is pointed out by Schutz,
Once we have established the
fundamental priority of the sUbjective
stock of knowledge, in contrast to the
social stock of knowledge, we must
stress that in its actual development
things are otherwise. (Schutz and
Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World", pg. 263.)
62 Schutz argues,
The social stock of knowledge contains
not only "more" than the sUbjective,
but also "more" than the "sum" of them.
Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the
Life World", pg. 264.
This point is developed later in our discussion of Schutz.
63 By this Schutz means
the embodiment of sUbjective processes
in the objects and events of the
everyday Lifeworld. Schutz and Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World", pg.
264.
This takes a number of forms in schutz's theory:
a) at the simplest level objectivation takes
place by mere observation - by one person watching and
learning from the behaviour of another. The example
Schutz gives of this is where A is unsure whether
water in a pot is hot or cold. He could make
experiments to find out for himself, but by watching B
put his hand in the water and then remove it quickly,
having an expression of pain on his face transfers
this knOWledge from A to B. Of course this allows for
the possibility, which Schutz recognizes that B could
fool A - for instance knowing that A is watching he
may only pretend that the water is hot, so the look of
pain etc. are deceptive. (Schutz and Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World", pp. 264-267).
i5b) at a more complex level objectivation can be
in the form of one party indicating to another that
they possess information. An example which Schutz
gives of this, is that A has not actually seen B
putting his finger in the water, but he does see B
blowing on, or rubbing his finger as if in pain. This
would indicate to A that the water is hot. What
matters now is not when B acquired this knOWledge - it
may have been some time ago. What is important for
this objectivation is how the indications of knowledge
are interpreted by the other. This too allows B to be
deceptive - for instance to indicate special knowledge
falsely (ie when he does not in fact possess it), or
to exaggerate it, or to conceal it. Thus through
interpreting B's signs, A is able to take over B's
knowledge. (Schutz and Luckmann "Structures of the
Life World", pp. 267-271)
c) in this case objectivation is in the form of
objects, rather than behaviour. An example of this,
given by Schutz, is where A has got lost in the woods.
He comes across footprints made by B, and by following
them is able to find his way out. Hence by
interpreting the results of B's behaviour, rather than
the behaviour itself, and without even seeing B (or
even knowing that it is B's footprints) A is able to
achieve his purpose and find his way out. It is not,
however, any object which falls within this category.
It is required that they should
objectivate SUbjective knowledqe
convey it to others (Schutz
Lucmann "Structures of the
World", pp. 267-271)
The three categories of objects are
and
and
Life
•
1) marks (see Collected Papers Vol. 1,
pp.308-310) - these can be interpreted for the
message they give, and thus are similar to the
next main category (d)
2) tools - for instance an archaelogist will
interpret the use made of primitive tools
3) works of art - will be interpreted for
the meaning they are supposed to convey to us•Thus we can once again see the significance of
the systems of relevance and typification, since if we
take as an example a large office, with an expensive
carpet etc., this does not speak for itself. Rather it
must be interpreted through our typifications - for.
instance the relevance system "important man" may
carry such connotations. This indicates that such
objectivation allows for the possibility of deception
- for instance that a relatively minor official puts
into his office such signs to exaggerate his own
importance.
d) social signs can be· considered as
objectivations of sUbjective knowledge. (See Schutz
and Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp. 277 -
286). Important here is the possession of a common
system of interpretation (eg language), since by using
this, we can inform the other not only of problems but
also of solutions - "you will come across a river
which you can cross at this point" is the examp,le
given by Schutz (pg 280 "Structures of the Life
World").
Once there is a common system of signs (like a
language) then subjective knowledge can be translated
into this system, and then re-translated into
sUbjective knowledge. Translation in turn raises the
issue of distance, since social signs may be created
and interpreted by people who are very close, with A
knowing how B is likely to interpret a sign, while B
knows how A communicates, and (for instance) his
objective in doing so. But A and B may be at great
social distance, and may never meet - indeed they may
not even be alive at the same time. The more true this
is, the more the information transmitted by social
signs can evade practical review by the recipient -
who will not know what the sender is like, what his
objectives are etc. Thus,
a) where information does not use social
signs, it can· be categorised readily (leaving
deception to one side) as true or false.
b) information which uses social signs
cannot be so readily assessed, because of the
distance involved. It therefore becomes not only
idealized, through being objectivated into the
social stock of knowledge becoming a component of
the relevance structure, and being true as such,
but also anonymous.
~ ~_-=r _Such knowledge will therefore, not easily be
criticised, and because of its self-evident truth, we
may not even wish to consider criticising it. This
objectivation again opens up the possibility of
deception, since as we have said, the informant will
be anonYmous, and the information idealized and as
such taken for granted.
64 This point is also considered in Berger and Luckmann "The
Social Construction of Reality", Penguin 1967. They argue
The institutional world is objectivated
human activity, and so is every sinqle
human institution. In other words
despite the objectivity that marks the
social world in human experience,' it
does not thereby acquire an ontological
status apart from the human activity
that produced it. (pg. 78)
65 An example of a model of behaviour to be followed might
be the model of behaviour of "a manager", who take
decisions etc. See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the
Life World", pg 286.
66 An example given by Schutz is where B having solved a
problem - where to cross a river - assumes that A has the
same problem, and tells him of his solution. See Schutz &
Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg 288.
67 See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg
290.
68 See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World" , pg
292.
69 Schutz points out that
the earliest we-relations are typically
determined by the structure of the
kinship system. For the child the
family is the first immediately
experienced social reality. (Schutz &
Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World", pp 293-4.)
70 It is suggested by Schutz
......._----where solutions to socially relevant
problems are precipitated as routine
forms of acts, which in turn are bound
to an institutionalized structure of
roles, the transference of knowledqe is
then also typically institutionalized
and routinely taken over by certain
role-bearers. Thus there are teachers
and masters, non-commissioned officers
of development and officers in the
province of reliqious, commercial and
political institutions. (Schutz ,
Luckmann "structures of the Life
world", pp 294-5.)
Thus the transfer of knowledge has reached such a pitch of
Sophistication, and functional importance, that it cannot
be left to chance. Not only is the process itself
institutionalized but also there are specialized roles for
the transference to be accomplished efficiently.
71 See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg.
296.
n Thus the need to confirm the rationality of a solution to
a problem is ignored, so potentially better solutions are
ignored by definition. The solution or arrangement in use
is thus accepted uncritically. This may give us a possible
reason for the acceptance of hierarchy - it· works why
change it? Management wisdom explicitly endorses this
if it ain't broke, don't fix itl
This may appear to be the answer to our question - why does
hierarchy persist? The answer could be taken to be "well it
Works". That, however, as we shall show in our discussion
of Habermas, is an inadequate answer since it fails to
direct our attention to the conditions for hierarchy to be
perceived to work.
73 On the other hand, the possibility of the stock of
knowledge being a form of social control is perhaps no less
- important than an inter-generational division of labour.
74 See Schutz & Luckmann "structures of the Life World", pg.
301. The difficulty with Schutz's view is that it is purely
descriptive, failing to allow for the possibility that the
specialist will take advantage of his monopoly possession
of specialist knowledge. See above, 109.
75 See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg.
305.
76 See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp.
306- 308. Schutz points out thata) if everyone were to know the same then we
would all have to face the same range of problems,
since we acquire knowledge which is socially relevant
to us.
b) the processes of objectivation and
interpretation would have to be parallel for us all,
otherwise, even to a small degree, we would acquire
"different" knOWledge.
c) our biographies would have to be excluded - or
ignored - since they
i) will be different
ii) will thus induce us to interpret even
the same information in different ways.
d) the possibility of accumUlating further
knowledge would have to be ruled out once we have
acquired the "universal" social stock, since we can
only retain so much knowledge and to acquire more
would necessitate getting rid of some.
n A. Esterson "The Leaves of Spring". Pelican 1972
78 See Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pp.
308-316. We have mainly concentrated on the second of the
two sections - the complex distribution - since it appears
to be more relevant.
~ It is, however, made clear that it is possible for this
general knowledge to become differentiated between
different groups who share a common biography - an example
given by Schutz is the Catholicism of rural popUlations, in
contrast to the Catholicism of intellectuals. See Schutz &
Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 314.
80 In contrast to general knOWledge, even of a
differentiated form, this requires even further
partitioning, so that specialized knOWledge is not part of
the social stock of knOWledge which is available to the
non-professional. This can be accomplished, Schutz points
out, by requiring long learning processes, and through the
imposition of role specific requirements of various kinds.
There is therefore specialization in two senses:
a) the meaning structure of the specialty is
specialized and restricted
b) the transmission of its knowledge becomes
institutionalized, and specialized.
Schutz concludes (pg 314) that the specialty takes on the
appearance of a career•
........ ~)O81 Schutz's observation has much in common with Habermas's
concept of "fragmented consciousness", which we shall
consider toward the end of this section.
82 That no person can take an overview of society as a
whole, is similar to one of Habermas's concepts - the
.consequence of the development of Social System steering
media to such a level of complexity that no person can have
an overview. We deal with this in much more detail in our
consideration of Habermas.
M The fact that differences in access to the social stock
can be relevant for understanding the structure and
operation of power.is not a matter which is lost on Schutz
What repercussions this has for the
social structures is a question of the
greatest interest for the empirical
sociology of knowledge. Here it can
only be pointed out that knowledge can
become more and more of a power factor
in complex social distributions of
knowledge. Groups of experts form one
of the institutional catalysts of power
concentration•••A further epistemo-
sociologically relevant possibility
associated with the highly complex
social distributions of knowledge is
that some experts become socially,
nearly completely invisible. (Schutz &
Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World", pg. 315.)
Hence it should not be argued that Schutz was unaware of
the problem of power - but it is not developed further in
his work.
84 These are described by Schutz as "provinces" .;. see Schutz
& Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 315.
85 Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg.
319.
86 It is argued
,J
.' nthe essential elements of the former
(social stock) do not appear as such in
the latter (the subjective). That is
they do not appear at all as objective
social data, as aspects of the factual
social structure, as "conventions",
etc. Rather they are for the individual
a taken-for-granted possession, a
component of his subjectivity. The
habits derived from the social stock of
knowledge are hi§ habits, the explicit
elements of knowledge taken over from
it are hi§ knowledge, the relevance
structures originating from it function
as hi§. motive. and categories of
explanation. (Schutz &- Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World", pg.
319, my emphases).
In this it becomes quite apparent how power can operate
unconsciously - we absorb "habits, knowledge and relevance
structures" without awareness of doing so. It is clear that
the implications of so doing have to analysed out.
87 Schutz gives as an example of this the problems which a
one-armed man is likely to have becoming a black-smith
(Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg.
322).
88 Schutz gives as an example of this the existence of
secret knowledge (Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life
World", pg. 322). This in certain respects is alluded to in
our own findings, since to some extent the power of
management, we have suggested, depends on their
SUbordinates not really understanding it. For instance we
have already discussed two views which can be taken of
Management. One is the well ordered and rational view, of
for instance Roland Christensen, John Argenti or Igor
Ansoff. The other is the "emergent", ex-post, incremental
(and generally messier all-round) approach of for instance
Henry Mintzberg and James Quinn. If Management was
understood as the latter rather than the former then the
legitimacy of Management may be problematic. The fact is,
however, that the kind of picture of Management, especially
by those on the Shop-floor who are at the greatest
distance, is one of not understanding it very much at all.
We are almost reminded of religious rites, where the priest
carries out religious acts which the lay people do not
Understand.~ This is certainly a feature of Management to the extent
that not only is Management impenetrable to those outwith
it, but also increasing functional specialisation means
that different specialties of Management are increasingly
impenetrable to Managers from other specialties. Power may
be exercised as a result. For instance in a company
. dominated, say, by accountants, one would require to have
access to their specialty and its meaning structures etc.
For those outwith Management altogether the problem is writ
even larger. This is a phenomenon remarked on by Habermas
also. See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action,
VOl.2" Polity 1988, Chapter VIII part 2.
90 If we accept schutz's contentions that
i) we can only retain a certain volume of
knowledge, and beyond that we throw off other less
relevant/older elements,
ii) the knowledge we possess is driven by the
problems we face,
then to the extent that our major problems are within our
specialty (eg our job) we may begin to make space for the
additional specialist knowledge we require by jettisoning
portions of general knowledge, cutting back again on our
ability to take a comprehensive social view.
91- We have made a similar point above, concerning
Management, in that the different specialties of Management
are increasingly separated (eg Personnel specialists and
Management Scientists).
92 The system of classification goes further then merely
whether someone is a good Manager, or a bad Fitter etc. The
classification, Schutz points out is not related to the
individual, but rather is related to the area of expertise
itself - in other words that there is a rank order of
different types of expertise, such that even a bad manager
has more prestige than a good fitter.
~ Likewise we can determine our own place in this system of
classification/typification, and this will be an important
influence on our own subjective self-image (eg street
sweeper or brain surgeon).
~ Much of Garfinkel's work is typical of this.
~ Lukes S. "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974.
96 M. Crenson "The Un-politics of Air Pollution" John
Hopkins Press 1971.
97 Lukes S. "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974, pp. 11-
12. R. A. Dahl "The Concept of Power". Behavioural Science
1957•
........ 0 ,_, _~ For instance where Management are unwilling to discuss an
issue on the grounds that it is a "management prerogative".
99 Bachrach P. & Baratz M. "Two Faces of Power". American
Political science Review 1962, pp. 947-952.
100 For instance an attempt to do this in an industrial
context, took place in 1977 after the pUblication of the
BUllock report, when the EEF announced that it would
oppose the bringing forward of a Bill to enact the
proposals in the report, or anything similar.
101 Lukes S. "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974, pq. 42.
102 Indeed as Cooper points out in "Death of the Family", we
are from the very outset socialised into acceptance of its
organizational structure, the parents being autocratic
heads (D. Cooper "Death of the Family". Penguin 1972.).
This happens without us ever realising that the interests
of the family may diverge from our own - occasionally with
tragic results, as Laing's work has revealed (On this see
below, 25.).
103 Lukes S. "Power a Radical View" MacMillan 1974, pg. 24.
104 It does have to be said, however, that Lukes does
recognise this:
cren.on'. analy.i. lie. on the
borderline of the tvo-dimensional and
three-dimensional views of power. It is
on the face of it a two-dimensional
study of non-decision-making a la
Bachrach and Barats. On the other hand
it begins to advance beyond their
position (pq. 44)
Nonetheless it does not become clear in what respects
Crenson's work is two-dimensional and in what respects
three-dimensional.
105 A similar situation could be said to exist with the
Clyde Naval Submarine base at Faslane and Coulport. On the
one hand there is the danger of nuclear accident and/or
Pollution, but on the other hand the bases are important
sources of employment which may not be replaced in the
event of the base closing.
106 Bradshaw S. "A critique of Steven Lukes "Power a Radical
View". Sociology 1976, pp. 121-127.
107 Lukes S. "A reply to Bradshaw". Sociology 1976, pp. 129-
132.
1~ In this, as McCarthy points out
....... 34truth claims can ultimately be decided
only through critical discussion and
not through appeal to sense
certainty:..truth belongs to the world
of thoughts (Gedanken in Frege's sense)
and not to that of perception.
T. McCarthy "critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" pg 307. In
other words truth will be what we can agree it to be. Or as
Habermas puts it
Pacts are what statements (when true)
state. They are not constituted since
they are not entities in the world but
correlates of propositions on the level
of argumentative reasoning.
Quoted in D. Held "Introduction to critical Theory"
Hutchinson 1980, pg 341. However, as Habermas points out
Truth is not the fact that consensus is
realized, but ratb,er that at all times
and in any place, if we enter into a
discourse a consensus can be realized
under conditions which identify this as
a warranted consensus
Quoted in R. Roderick "Habermas and critical Theory"
MacMillan 1986 pg 85. Thus it is not the mere fact of
consensus that we have to be aware of, but also the
conditions under which that consensus was arrived at.
1~ This is sUbstantially drawn from the discussion in
MCCarthy supra pp 306-307.
110 Hunter would have sympathy with the communication
element of Habermas's work:
There are appears to be a tenuous line
of communication between the governors
and the governed. (F. Hunter "Community
Power structure". university of
Carolina Press 1953, pg 1.)
111 The claims are:
a) that the statement is comprehensible in order
that speaker and hearer can understand each other,
b) that the statement is true in order that the
hearer is able to share the knowledge of the speaker,
c) that the speaker has expressed his intentions
truthfully so that the hearer can trust him,
d) that the speaker's statement(s) are right in
the light of existing norms and valuesThis can be found in J. Habermas "communication and the
Evolution of Society" Heinemann 1979, pp. 2-3.
112 McCarthy supra pg 307.
113 Habermas argues
althouqh it (the mediatization of the
Lifeworld) comes about
counterintuitively and cannot be easily
perceived from the internal perspective
of the Lifeworld, there are indications
of it in the formal conditions of
communicative action. (J. Habermas
"Theory of Communicative Action.
Vol.2". Polity 1987, pg 186. My
emphasis)
It is therefore through the application of an external
standard - like the Ideal Speech Thesis - that we can
identify this exercise of power, and the possibility that
"things could be different". In a similar sense, Hickson et
ale observe of Tannenbaum's Control Graph technique
In theory, therefore, the distribution
of power is open to deliberate
variation. It could be more
hierarchical or less so. (D. Hickson, w.
Astley, R. Butler and D. Wilson
"Organization as Power". In L. cummings
and B. Staw "Research in
organizational Behaviour. Vol 3"• JAI
Press 1981, pg. 163)
114 Quoted in T. McCarthy "A theory of Communicative
Competence" Philosophy of Social science 1973. pg.140.
115 Habermas distinguishes between Communicative Action:
-
those forms of social interaction in
which individuals tacitly and
uncritically accept the norms, social
practices and belief systems of
everyday life
and Discourse:
thematises and criticises the
backqround consensus concerninq belief
systems, norms, values and ideoloqies
taken for qranted in every day life.
R. Roderick "Habermas and Critical Theory" MacMillan 1986,
pg.82.
116
See J •Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol 1"
POlity Press, 1984, pg 333.
~ ..._------111 See footnote 259.
118 Gaventa's findings are good examples of these forms of,
what Lukes calls, first (a i) and second (a ii) dimension,
power.
119 This type of behaviour (lying, deceiving, manipulating
etc.) is described by Habermas as follows,
Such communication pathologies can be
conceived of as the result of a
confusion between action oriented to
reaching understanding and actions
oriented to success. Zn situations of
concealed strategic action, at least
one of the parties behaves with an
orientation to success, but leaves
others to believe that all the
presuppositions of communicative action
are satisfied. This is the case of
manipulation which we mentioned in
connection with perlocutionary acts.
J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action" Vol.l supra pg
332.
120 This type of behaviour is described by Habermas as,
the kind of unconscious repression of
conflicts that the psychoanalyst
explains in terms of defense mechanisms
leads to disturbances of communication
on both the intrapsychic . and
interpersonal levels. Zn such cases at
least one of the parties is deceiving
himself about the fact that he is
acting with an action oriented to
success and is only keeping up the
appearance of communicative action.
J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action" Vol.l supra pg
332.
121 See pp. 333 fig. 18 "Theory of Communicative Action.
Vol.l".
122 T. McCarthy supra pg.306.
1~ As Held points out,
when it (the ideal speech situation) is
clearly violated doubt can be cast on
the genuineness of the consensus and
the legitimacy derived from it.
Held, supra pg. 344.124 See above 19.
125 See above, footnote 116
126 J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)",
Polity, 1988. pg 126.
127 situation is defined as "a segment of the Lifeworld
delimited in relation to a theme" J. Habermas "Theory of
Communicative Action (2)", Polity, 1988. pg 127.
128 J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)",
Polity, 1988. pg 126.
1~ It is pointed out
participants pursue their plans
cooperatively on the basis of a shared
definition of the situation. If a
shared definition of the situation has
first to be neqotiated, or if efforts
to come to some aqreement within the
framework of shared definitions fail,
the attainment of consensus, which is
normally a condition for pursuinq
qoals, can in itself become an end. In
any case, the success achieved by
teleoloqical action and the consensus
brouqht about by acts of reachinq
understandinq are the criteria for
whether a situation has been dealt with
successfully or not. (J. Habermas
"Theory of Communicative Action (2)",
Polity, 1988. pp 126-7.)
130 For Habermas the Schutzian Lifeworld too closely ties in
with consciousness at the level of the individual, so in
"Theory of Communicative Action", he develops further
dimensions of the Lifeworld which go beyond the
consciousness of the individual, to emphasise social
integration and the culture of society and consider
mechanisms for their maintenance. Thus in the Habermasian
Lifeworld there are three dimensions, each with an
associated maintenance process:
a) PERSONALITY which is defined as "the competences
that make a subject capable of speakinq and actinq,
that put him in a position to take part in processes
of reachinq understandinq and thereby to assert his
own identity". (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative
Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 138). This emphasises
interpretations and motivations of the individual and
is maintained by processes of socialization
3 8b) SOCIETY, which is defined as "the leqitimate
orders throuqh which the participants requlate their
memberships in social qroups and thereby secure
solidarity". (J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative
Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 138). This
emphasises the need for legitimacy, reciprocity etc.
which is maintained by social integration.
c) CULTURE, which is defined as "the stock of
knowledqe from which participants in communication
supply themselves with interpretations as they come to
an understandinq about somethinq in the world" (J.
Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2".
Polity 1987, pg 138). This emphasises the transmission
of social knowledge, legitimations etc. (See J.
Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2"
Polity 1987, pp. 140-142.), and is maintained by
cultural reproduction.
Much of this is dealt with by Schutz- in the sUbjective and
social stock of knowledge, but as Habermas goes on to make
clear, the Schutzian analysis is one-sided, since
communicative action is not only a
process of reachinq understandinq; in
cominq to that understandinq about
somethinq in the world, actors are at
the same time takinq part in
interactions throuqh which they
develop, conform and renew their
memberships in social groups and their
own identities. communicative actions
are not only processes of
interpretation in Which cultural
knowledge is tested against the world;
they are at the same time processes of
social integration and socialization.
(J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative
Action. Vol. 2" Polity 1987, pg. 139.)
This summarises many of the points we have made about
Schutz's theory previously, but in particular that
a) the Lifeworld has to be understood not only at
the level of the individual, but at a social level
b) the Lifeworld is not only about
interpretation, but about socialization and
integration and thus potentially about control.
Hence, if one or more of the maintenance processes
breaks down, social control would be under threat (See
J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol.
2". Polity 1987, pg 143, fig 22). For instance if
~~ -------------i) cultural reproduction was to break down,
then there would not be production of the
required meanings for the Social System to
persist,
ii) if social integration was to break down
we would expect the development of anomie,
Iii) if socialization broke down then in
Habermas's scheme we would expect the development
of individual psychopathologies.
The Schutzian analysis therefore takes the Lifeworld "as
read", and this leads to its failure to take its analysis
further. Hence it does not go on to consider what
consequences follow from the content and structure of a
particular type of Lifeworld, and why a Lifeworld should
have the structure it does. This restrains Schutz's
analysis from proceeding into the areas explored by
Habermas (eg Ideal Speech, impact of the Social system
etc.) and thus to the inadequacies indicated.
On the other hand Schutz's analysis of the Lifeworld,
within these constraints, does provide a more detailed (a
finer-grained) analysis of the elements of the Lifeworld,
giving more detail than Habermas - who takes much of the
detail as read anyway. (See J • Habermas "Theory of
Communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, Chapter 6)
131 Schutz's theory, as we have seen, is expressed in terms
of the "Lifeworld". The transition into Habermas, however,
poses no difficulties since as Habermas points out,
basic features of the constituted
lifeworld can be easily explained if we
treat "lifeworld" as a complementary
concept to "communicative action".(J.
Habermas "Theory of Communicative
Action (2)", Polity, 1988•.pg. 130)
For Habermas there are three important elements of Schutz's
theory:
1) that social actors treat the lifeworld as
unproblematic - that it is something which is just
there, as something which we take for granted
"everyday communicative practice is not compatible
with the hypothesis that everything could be
different" (supra pg. 132).
2) that it is intersubjectively shared through
the medium of language - "that the members of the
lifeworld count themselves as belonqinq to the
lif.world in the first person plural" (supra pg. 131)•
3) that the lifeworld is somethinq
which the social actor cannot qet
beyond "we cannot qrasp the
limitations of a lifeworld that is
dependent upon, and chanqes alonq with
a cultural stock of knowledqe that can
be expanded at any time. Por members
the lifeworld is a context that cannot
be qotten behind and cannot in
principle be exhausted (supra pg 133 ).
132 Habermas argues that:
If we assume that the human species
maintains itself throuqh the social
coordinated activities of its members
and that this coordination is
established throuqh communications
and in certain spheres of life, throuqh
communication aimed at reachinq
aqreement - then the reproduction of
the species also requires satisfyinq
the conditions of rationality inherent
in communicative action(J. Habermas
"Theory of Communicative Action (1)",
Polity, 1986. pg. 397)
This points to a fundamental distinction between the
phenomenology of Schutz and Habermas's theory. In Schutz
the emphasis is on the individual and his cognitive
content. In Habermas, however, we have to get beyond
consciousness to its use in the social world, which is
articulated in speech. Thus the conditions - the structure
- under which speech take place become critical.
133 Indeed Habermas's own view of the Lifeworld refers to
collectively shared backqround
convictions to the diffuse
unproblematic horizon within which
actors communicate with one another and
seek to reach an understandinq. The
Lifeworld of a society or social qroup
preserves and transmits the
interpretive work of precedinq
qenerations (J. B. Thompson
"Rationality and Social
Rationalization: An Assessment of
Habermas's Theory of Communicative
Action". Sociology 1984, pg 285.)
Thus, it can be seen clearly that Habermas's view of the
Lifeworld is consistent with that developed by Schutz, as
we have argued above. The distinction is that Habermas
explores the implications of the Lifeworld for social
action, in a way that Schutz fails to do.
tl1~ Habermas defines this as
the ability of a speaker oriented to
mutual understanding to embed a well
formed sentence in relations to
reality, that is,
1. to chose the propositional sentence in
such a way that either the truth conditions of
the proposition stated or the existential
presuppositions of the propositional content
mentioned are supposedly fulfilled (so that the
hearer can share the knowledge of the speaker)
2. to express intentions in such a way that
the linquistic expression represents what is
intended (so that the hearer can trust the
speaker)
3. to perform the speech act in such a way
that it conforms to recognized norms or to
accepted self-images (so that the hearer can be
in accord with the speaker in shared value
orientations) (J. Habermas "Communication and the
Evolution of Society", Heinemann 1979, pg 29.).
Thus what Habermas is asserting here is that Communicative
Competence is required for the individual, not only to
talk, but also to make connections with the external world
which those with whom he interacts will be able to accept.
135 This is described by Pusey as
the medium through which speaking and
acting subjects interlace their speech
action. (M. Pusey - "Jurgen Habermas"
Tavistock Publications 1987, pg. 79)
In other words communicative interaction is where social
actors talk to each other, and specifically seek to reach
consensus.
1~ He points out
•Consensus does not come about when, for
example, accepts the truth of an
assertion but doubts the sincerity of
the speaker or the normative
appropriateness of his utterance; the
same holds for the case in which a
speaker accepts the normative validity
of a command but suspects the
seriousness of the intent thereby
expressed or has doubts about the
existential presuppositions of the
action commanded (and thus about the
possibility of carryinq it out). ". (J.
Habermas "Theory of Communicative
Action (2)", Polity, 1988. pg. 121)
137 It is important to understand the role played by
rationality in Habermas's work. For Weber and Marx, the
development of rationality had pathological elements for
the development of society. For instance it is the
development of rationality which lies at the basis of the
Weberian "Iron Cage", and of the Marxist concept of
reification. Habermas's view is that the problems which
they identify originate in
the failure. to develop and
institutionalize all the different
dimensions of reason in a balanced way.
(T. McCarthy "Translator's
Introduction" in J. Habermas "Theory of
Communicative Action", Polity, 1984, pg
xxxvii)
As we shall see, Habermas takes the view that if the
Lifeworld and Social system were in a more appropriate
balance with each other then the Iron Cage could be
avoided, and reification demystified.
138 It is argued by Misgeld that
qrowth in practical communicative
knowledqe is needed in late capitalist
societies if people livinq in these
societies are to remain capable of
makinq claims and beliefs problematic
in discourse. These developments are
required if people are to remain in
possession of their critical capacities
and to be able to act in the society on
the basis of insiqht and arqument. They
are also needed so that people can be
self determined, yet also cooperate in
the arranqement of their social
relations. (D. Misgeld "Hermeneutics
versus Neoparsonianism". Theory and
society 1985, pg 63.)
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!139 We have up to now used Ideal Speech simply as a bench-
mark. It will, however, become increasingly important to
understand Habermas's view of the role of rationality as it
develops in modern society (the relation between developing
rationality and modernity). Habermas considers that as
society develops from traditional to modern, it becomes
increasingly differentiated, and increasingly rationalised.
He does not see this as unambiguously bad - indeed he takes
the view that since greater rationalisation opens up the
possibility of a greater learning capacity, it can be
progressive for modern society, since it allows for
a) the critical appraisal of traditional norms,
practices and consensus
b) it allows for the development of a rational
political will, conduct of life, which is not based on
force but on free and equal discussion.
The purpose of the Ideal Speech Thesis, is therefore
to measure the extent to which rationality is operating. He
does of course recognize that in many aspects of social
life rationality does not fully operate, and that in many
situations the Ideal Speech Thesis is the exception. The
problems are not with rationalisation in itself, the
problems lie with the forms of rationalisation in modern
society - for instance technological rationalisation.
140 It is pointed out by Mccarthy that
It seems clear that actual situations
of theoretical discourse rarely if
ever, even approximate this purity.
("The Critical Theory of Jurgen
Habermas" - T. McCarthy. Polity 1984,
pg. 309)
The ideal speech thesis, despite its unreality, can act as
a "bench-mark" against which situations can be assessed for
the absence/degree of power. In the model of pure
communicative action there is an analogy with the Theory of
Perfect Competition in Economics. In the late 1940's and
early 1950's -a vigorous debate took place within Economics
concerning the usefulness of this theory. An important view
is that of Andrews who says:
44At the one level, perfect competition
theory could be kept in all its details
with a clear conscience, as a theory of
perfection which could be used for the
assessment of the condition of any
situation which would be consonant with
maximum economic welfare, and for the
correspondinq criticism of any
diverqent conditions in the actual
world. (P.W.S. Andrews "On Competition
in Economic Theory MacMillan 1964.
pg.4)
Andrews is making three points here:
a) the
unrealistic.
theory of perfect competition is
b) despite that, it can be used for the
assessment of any empirical situation. For instance to
compare two, or more situations, and assess which
one(s) diverge more from the purity of perfect
competition.
c) divergence from perfect competition can be
used to criticise real economic situations (eg to
argue that the structure of a particular industry is
against the pUblic interest).
We would argue that pure communicative action can be
seen in the same way. For instance, if we re-word Andrews,
At the one level,(pure communicative
action) could be kept in all its
details with a clear conscience, as a
theory of perfection which could be
used for the assessment of the
condition of any situation which would
be consonant with maximum
(rationality), and for the
correspondinq criticism of any
diverqent conditions in the actual
world. (my emphases)
For a rationally grounded consensus to arise it is required
that the conditions of pure communicative action are
satisfied - ie that validity claims are raised rightly and
can be justified. In reality it is unlikely (though not
impossible) that these conditions can be achieved.
Nonetheless to the extent the model's conditions are not
satisfied, we can question the rationality of any
agreement, on the basis that it represents to some extent
an exercise of power.
141 Habermas argues,
45The ideal speech situation is neither
an empirical phenomenon nor a mere
construct but rather an unavoidable
supposition reciprocally made in
discourse•••••Of course we cannot know
a priori whether that appearance is a
mere delusion - however unavoidable the
suppositions from which it springs - or
whether the empirical conditions for
the realization (if only approximate)
of the supposed form of life can
practically be brought about. (J.
Habermas "Wahrheitstheorien" pp. 258-
259. Quoted in "The Critical Theory of
Jurgen Habermas" - T. McCarthy. Polity
1984, pg. 310.)
142 J. Habermas. "Towards a Theory of Communicative
Competence" Inquiry, Vol 13, 1970, pg. 372.
143 M. Pusey - "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock Publications
1987, pg. 70
144 He argues in "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1"
that
Anyone who systematically deceives
himself about himself behaves
irrationally. (Habermas supra, pg 21)
The role of psychoanalysis is to assist the patient to
become aware of his irrationality through not only the
reflection which is central to psychoanalysis, but also
through the identification of reasons and grounds which
point to his irrationality. This process is described by
Habermas as "therapeutic critique" (supra, pg 21). The
criticism which this has led Habermas to is considered
SUbsequent.
psychoanalysis is used in preference to the verstehen of
Weber and Dilthey, or the hermeneutics of Gadamer (See
Chapter 10 of "KnOWledge and Human Interests" J.
Habermas), which, he argues, stop at the point of fully
understanding the individual, lacking the emancipatory
interest which he finds in psychoanalysis. Thus Habermas
argues,
with his analysis of ordinary language,
Dilthey only mentioned the limiting
case of discrepancy between sentences,
actions and experiential expressions.
For the psychoanalyst, however, this is
the normal case. (pg. 217)
4i1, and
The depth hermeneutics that Freud
contraposes to Dilthey's philological
hermeneutics deals with texts
indicating self deceptions of the
author. (pg. 218)
145 The use of Freud is by no means to unique to Habermas,
as Freud's work has been prominent in the work of other
Frankfurt School Theorists. For instance Horkheimer on
authority ("Authority and the Family"), Adorno on prejudice
("Anti-semitism and Fascist Propaganda") , Marcuse on
instincts ("Eros and Civilisation"), Reich on Fascism ("The
Mass Psychology of Fascism") all drew, in a variety of
ways, on Freud. See J. Habermas "Communication and the
Evolution of Society", Heinemann 1979, pp. 70-71.
146 As Pusey notes,
he (Habermas) has not the slightest
interest in Freud's theory of
instincts,' in the theory of sexuality,
or indeed in any other aspect of
Freud's very positivistic social
biology. The inspiration comes purely
from the process and method of the
therapeutic relationship. In this
relationship we find the source of
several of the seminal elements of the
later theory of communicative
competence and communicative action.
(M. Pusey - "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock
Publications 1987, pg. 70. My emphasis)
147 Habermas argues,
Psychoanalysis is relevant to us as the
only tangible example of a science
incorporating methodical self-
reflection. The birth of psychoanalysis
opens up the possibility of arriving at
the dimension that positivism closed
off, and of doing so in a methodical
manner that arises out of the logic of
inquiry. (J. Habermas "Knowledge and
Human Interests(2nd Edition).
Heinemann, 1978. pg 214)
The same point is made by Pusey who argues,the patient learns to reflect on his or
her own experience and in this way to
reassimilate repressed material into
consciousness and at the method's best
to affirm a larger rational control
over complexes of systematically
distorted perceptions, responses,
compulsions and inhibitions that lie at
the root of the neurosis. In short,
reflection is the social process
through which irrationally impaired or
broken communication is restored and
rationally redeemed. (M. Pusey
"Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock
Publications 1987, pp. 70-1).
This leads into the realm of unconscious thought, which
cannot be analysed by, for instance, hermeneutic methods.
148 Habermas argues that
suppressed interpretations and
fragmented needs no longer need appear
on the level of acknowledged cultural
tradition and prevailing norms J rather
they establish themselves behind the
backs, as it were, of the acting
subjects - as unconscious motives. They
are still motives and that means they
are action-orienting meaning. But now
they act in the manner of external
causes. (J. Habermas "On the Logic of
Social sciences". Polity 1988, pp. 185-
6)
The role of psychoanalysis is to identify such repressions,
and by making them conscious create the conditions for them
being brought back within control, rather than appearing to
be "quasi natural relationships" (Habermas supra, pg 186).
149 J. Habermas "Knowledge and Human Interests(2nd Edition).
Heinemann, 1978. pg 217. Habermas in Chapter 10 of
"Knowledge and Human Interests" contrasts psychoanalysis
with the work of Oilthey and others involved in
hermeneutics. The difficulty which Habermas sees in
hermeneutics, and the analysis of ordinary language, is
that it is restricted to what the SUbject is conscious of.
In contrast as Habermas notes, for the psychoanalyst having
to go to the unconscious is normal. He observes,The flaws eliminated by its
(psychoanalysis) critical labour are
not accidental. The omissions and
distortions that it rectifies have a
systemic role and function. For the
symbolic structures that psychoanalysis
seeks to comprehend are corrupted by
the impact of internal conditions. The
mutilations have meaning' as such. (J.
Habermas "Knowledge and Human
Interests(2nd Edition). Heinemann,
1978. pg 217.)
This quote makes a number of points,
1) the role of psychoanalysis is to identify
flaws (omissions and distortions)
2) the source of flaws in the individual are
internal to him. We, therefore, by using
psychoanalysis have to identify
a) what the source of the flaws are - why
the Lifeworld produces such behaviour,
b) what causes such distortions?
150 A number of criticisms have been made of Habermas in
this respect. We shall consider some here:
1) Gadamer has been a major critic of Habermas's use of
psychoanalysis questioning the relationship between the
social theorist (as analyst) and social actor (as patient).
Gadamer fears that the theorist (analyst) may come to
dominate the relationship, and in effect impose his
interpretation of the actor (patient) on the actor (See H-G
Gadamer "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical
Reflection" in H-G Gadamer (Ed.) "Philosophical
Hermeneutics". Berkeley 1976, pg. 42.).
The answer Habermas would give to this, would be to point
out that all the theorist (as psychoanalyst) would have
done, would have been to provide an analysis which
indicates the sources of repression of the actor(s).
Whether or not this explanation is valid would only be
established if the actor(s) sees it as enlightening and
makes use of it. In other words, the fact that the theorist
regards his analysis as correct - and indeed even if other
analysts agree that it is correct - the ultimate test is
whether or not the actors who are the sUbject of the
analysis find it enlightening and convincing, so that they
make use of the analysis.-
An example of this is given by Laing in "The Divided Self"
(Tavistock Publications 1960). He considers a classical
description of schizophrenia given by the 19 century
psychiatrist, E. Kraeplin ("Lectures on Clinical
Psychiatry." Balliere, Tindall and Cox, 1905, pp. 79-80).
Kraeplin describes bringing into a lecture theatre a young
schizophrenic, showing signs of catatonic excitement - not
responding to questions, screaming, and in particular
"talking nonsense". In particular the patient is said by
Kraeplin to have
understood all the questions (but) he
has not given us one useful piece of
information
While Laing accepts that the patient does show signs of
catatonic excitement, and that everything he says can be
interpreted to be nonsense, Laing shows that the patient's
talk and behaviour can be interpreted as a dialogue between
his (the patient's) parody of Kraeplin, and his own (the
patient's) rebellious self. Laing instances one example of
the patient's talk:
You want to know that too? I tell you
who is being measured and is measured
and shall be measured. I know all that,
and I could tell you, but I do not want
to.
This could be interpreted as "crazy" talk - and indeed was
by Kraeplin. On the other hand it could be interpreted as
the patient expressing his resentment at the form of
interrogation he was being subjected to (in front of. a
lecture room full of students, attending to see a "mad
man"). As Laing points out,
He probably does not see what it has to
do with the things that must be deeply
distressing him. But these things would
not be useful information to Kraeplin
except as further signs of the disease.
(R. D. Laing "The Divided Self".
Tavistock Publications 1960, pg. 31)
Hence in this case the patient, on Laing's interpretation,
did not agree with the diagnosis of the analyst, and was
making this clear (unsuccessfully) in his talk. Likewise if
the patients (social actors) of Habermasian psychoanalysis
do not agree with the analysis, they will presumably say so
too, and reject the analysis.
A further interesting issue of this is that as Sedgwick
notes
5DKraeplin's interpretation of his
patient·s behaviour has been on record
for decades in several countries as a
classical case-note of psychiatry
without anybody, apart from Lainq in
1960, tryinq to revalue it. (P.
Sedqwick: "R. D. Laing "Self, Symptom
and Society". In "R. D. Laing and Anti-
Psychiatry" R. Boyers (Ed). Octagon
Books, 1974. pg. 5)
The interesting facet of this is that the failure by
generations of psychiatrists to appreciate this
possibility, demonstrating how "knowledge" can exercise
power by becoming "self evident" in this case that
(apparently) talking nonsense etc (apparently) indicates
schizophrenia.
On a different, but related issue, we have to appreciate
that Habermas's model of adequacy is rather different from
the model of adequacy we found in Schutz. In Schutz's model
the adequacy of explanation would be established within the
terms of the existing Lifeworld, which, following the
psychoanalytic analogy, is repressing the individual. For
Habermas, however, in cases of unconscious repression it
would be necessary to identify the sources of repression
and thus to take the sUbject beyond the existing Lifeworld,
by the demonstration of the sources of repression. (See
above)
2) Another criticism is made by Giegel, who argues that
"the revolutionary struqqle is by no means a psychoanalytic
treatment on a larqe scale" (H-J Giegel "Reflexion and
Emanzipation" in Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik (Frankfurt
1971), pg. 247. Quoted in T. McCarthy "critical Theory of
Jurgen Habermas", pg. 207•). Habermas' s response to such
criticism is to point out that the use of psychoanalysis is
not to provide a model for political struggle, but only to
provide an opportunity for enlightenment._ In other words,
the role of psychoanalysis will be to create the conditions
of enlightenment such that the struggle, to which Geigel
refers, is caused to begin. How that struggle is then
played out would not be a matter for psychoanalysis, which
is a component of the process of enlightenment. Thus,
5"1The organization of action must be
distinguished from the organization of
enlightenment•••Decisions for the
political struggle cannot be first
justified theoretically and then
carried out organisationally. The sole
possible justification at this level is
a consensus attained in practical
discourse among the participants who in
the consciousness of their common
interests and in the knowledge of the
circumstances. predictable consequences
and side-effects. are the only ones who
can know what risks they are willing to
take and with what expectations (J.
Habermas quoted in T•_Mccarthy
"critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas",
pg 211 my emphasis)
Thus, the role of psychoanalysis is to· establish conditions
for which rational (justifiable) conditions can be taken
about the struggle, by identifying the sources and types of
social repression which exist unconsciously. What those
sUbject to such repression then do is not a matter which
can be determined by the analyst.
3) Giddens is critical of the use of psychoanalysis by
arguing that the conditions required for its use - for the
patient to voluntarily to enter into treatment, for analyst
and patient to have a common interest in the outcome, for
the patient to be improved, for treatment to involve
sYmbolic communication - are unlikely to be replicated in
real social life. (See A. Giddens "Profiles and Critiques
in Social Theory". Macmillan 1982, pg. 97) We can do no
more than agree with a view that the relationship between
analyst and patient will never be exactly paralleled in
real life. Nonetheless there are, we would argue,
equivalents which are both interesting and indeed obvious.
For instance may the theorist (analyst) and actor (patient)
not have a common interest in the outcome? May there not be
sYmbolic communication between the theorist and actor - for
instance during the former's data collection? As a method
of social change, psychoanalysis, as Giddens argues, is not
viable. This is not to say, however, that it is not a
useful analogy, and that as such there are not important
lessons to be acquired from it.
4) McCarthy has argued ("Critical Theory of Jurgen
Habermas" -T. McCarthy. Polity 1984, pp. 211 - 3) that it
is required in psychoanalysis that
a) the patient should experience "suffering and desperation
with their condition" etc., and wish to be released from
it.b) if the sUffering of the patient disappears before the
treatment is completed, then it will be for the analyst to
reinstate it. The difficulty with doing this outwith the
dyadic analyst:patient relationship can be quite easily
imagined.
c) the patient is expected to resist the analyst (and in
the light of the second point, who can blame him?), and it
is expected that this will intensify as the treatment
progresses.
The difficulty with this criticism is that it appears to
ignore
i) the fact that Habermas is drawing an analogy
rather than an exact parallel, and
ii) the fact that psychoanalysis and Habermas's
social concerns are at quite different levels of
analysis. What at the macro-social level would
correspond to the "suffering and desperation" required
at the micro-individual-small group level of
psychoanalysis? Certainly, we would argue, it is
unreasonable to expect parallel forms of behaviour at
the social level. Nonetheless pathological behaviour
has been identified in society, most notably and
classically by Durkheim, in "suicide" and "Division of
Labour"• Habermas points to the development of
psychopathologies (such as anomie and alienation) as
an indication of crisis when social reproduction
processes are disturbed (See J. Habermas - "Theory of
Communicative Action, Vol. 2", Polity 1987, pg 143,
fig. 22.)
It is also pointed out by McCarthy in his
introduction to Volume 1 of "Theory of Communicative
Action" that when sYmbolic reproduction breaks down
there arise disturbances in the
reproduction process and corresponding
crisis manifestations: loss of meaning,
withdrawal of legitimation, confusion
of orientations, anomie,
destabilization of collective
identities, alienation,
psychopathologies, breakdowns in
tradition, withdrawal of motivation.
(T. McCarthy - Translators Introduction
to J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative
Action, Vol. 1". Polity 1984, pg xxv).
Likewise the Marxian
indicates social pathology,
scathing of this:
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concept of Alienation
even though Habermas is--
In an extensively rationalized
Lifeworld reification can only be
measured against the conditions of
communicative sociation, and not
against the nostalgically loaded
frequently romanticized past of
premodern forms of life. (J. Habermas
"Knowledge and Human Interests(2nd
Edition). Heinemann, 1978. pg 342)
The difficulty with many of the criticisms is that, as
McCarthy points out "perhaps we have taken it too
literally" (T. McCarthy "The critical Theory of Jurgen
Habermas". Polity 1986, pg 212.). We do have to keep in
mind that when Habermas considers psychoanalysis· he
considers it only as an analogy, as we pointed out in
quoting Pusey (above).
5) A further criticism by McCarthy of Habermas' s use of
psychoanalysis is that in Freud's psychoanalysis, the
analyst has to "work through" the identified neurosis with
the patient, assisting the patient to appreciate for
himself the source/cause of his neurosis. As McCarthy asks,
"What would correspond to "working through" at the
political level? "("critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas" -
T. McCarthy. Polity 1984, pg. 212.). Again it has to be
admitted that in terms of the practice of psychoanalysis,
it is difficult to imagine any exact (or even anything
which is not inexact) counterpart to this. Again, however,
we would respond to this by remembering that
a) Habermas is drawing an analogy,
b) its purpose is to explain not merely
understand - the distortions in communication.
Essentially this is the same problem which Geigel
identifies - but as with Geigel we have to recall that for
Habermas, the purpose of psychoanalysis is to identify the
distortions and give them explanation.
the theory that creates consciousness
can bring about the conditions under
which the systematic distortions of
communication are dissolved and a
practical discourse can then be
conducted: but it does not contain any
information which prejudges the future
action of those concerned•••••theory
cannot have the same function for the
organization of action of the political
struggle, as it has for the process of
enlightenment. (J. Habermas "Theory and
Practice" - Heinemann, 1974, pg 39)Its role then ends, having no role in the struggle itself.
The role of psychoanalysis is only to identify the
conditions which prevent rational decisions from being
taken. It may be argued that this is too theoretically
"pure" a position to adopt - too "laissez-faire". We would,
however, agree with Habermas in "Theory and Practice" that
Decisions for the political struggle
cannot at the outset be justified
theoretically and then be carried out
organisationally. The sole possible
justification at this level is
consensus •••••there is no privileged
access to truth. (J. Habermas "Theory
and Practice" Heinemann, 1974, pg
35) •
151 On the other hand, the use of Freudian analysis has
produced interesting results in organizational analysis.
For instance, taking up the considerable influence which F.
W.. Taylor has had on organizations, using Freudian
analysis Morgan shows,how Taylor's work was the product of
a disturbed and neurotic personality.
His attempt to organize and control the
world, whether in childhood games or in
systems of scientific management, was
really an attempt to control himself.
("Images of Organization" - G. Morgan.
Sage 1986, pg. 205.)
The work of Bion, at the Tavistock Institute, by focusing
on the unease associated with the death instinct
experienced by children. A response to this is what her
terms "fight-flight", through which a group will project
its fears onto some kind of enemy. Whatever the enemy is
(and it can be as wide as a competitor or a government
regulation, or another organizational group), it
personifies the unconscious persecution anxieties which the
group experiences. The group is thus united, through the
emphasis on fighting off this perceived enemy, but the
difficulty is that the group may come to devote more time
to doing this, than to rationally examining its problems.
An example of this, given by Morgan, is that when Japanese
cars first began to make serious inroads to the American
car market, the manufacturers response was to define the
Japanese as the enemy, and to concentrate on things like
import controls, thus diverting them from the task of
examining their own products.
A further example is Jaques who shows that "scape-goating"
is a feature of union-management relations, such that one
group will seek to define the other with bad images to
project them as "the baddies" and themselves as "the
goodies". Industrial disputes frequently manifest this type
of behaviour (See "Images of Organization" - G. Morgan.
Sage, 1986, pp 203-231).Hence the role which can be played by Freud is a very real
one. We are simply proceeding down a different path.
152 It is argued by Habermas
psychoanalytic interpretation is
concerned with those connections of
symbols in which the subject deceives
itself about itself. (J. Habermas
"Knowledge and Human Interests (2nd
Edition)". Heinemann 1978, pg 218.)
The difficulty here is not the nature of the connections
made between symbols by the individual, but rather that in
Habermas's view of psychoanalysis, following on from Freud,
the analysis is clearly at the level of the individual
since the sUbject is deceiving "itself about itself", and
it is difficult to see how the analysis can get beyond this
to a higher (social) level.
He also argues, as we have seen above
The flaws eliminated by its
(psychoanalysis) critical labour are
not accidental. The omissions and
distortions that it rectifies have a
systemic role and function. For the
symbolic structures that psychoanalysis
seeks to comprehend are corrupted by
the impact of internal conditions. The
mutilations have meaning as such. (J.
Habermas "Knowledge and Human
Interests(2nd Edition). Heinemann,
1978. pg 217.)
The difficulty here is the reference to "the impact of
internal conditions", suggesting that we are to look for
the source of the problems within the individual. Now given
that the Lifeworld must be internal this is obvious. We do,
however, have to look beyond this as we argued in
relation to Schutz for the causes of the (internal)
Lifeworld problems.
Thus even as an analogy the use of Freud is defective.
While the emphasis on the individual is not, in our view,
unacceptable, it is important that there should be a
connection out beyond the individual. If we fail to do so
then the causes of the neurosis must be within the
individual.
153 It is argued by Giddens that Habermas's use of
psychoanalysis means that:the "domination" which the patient
overcomes as a result of successful
therapy is that of his or her own
inner make-up, not the domination of
others. CA. Giddens "Profiles and
critiques in Social Theory". Macmillan
1982, pg. 97)
154 We have used Laing as the title of this section, and
while we shall rely heavily on his own work we shall also
refer in this section to others who have worked closely
with him and can be seen to be in the same tradition. Those
we would include as falling into that category would
include David Cooper and Aaron Esterson.
155 Laing defines schizoid as
an individual, the totality of whose
experience is split in two main ways:
in the first place, there is a rent in
his relation with his world, and in the
second there is a disruption of his
relation with himself. Such a person is
not able to experience himself
"together with" others or "at home in"
the world, but on the contrary he
experiences himself in despairing
aloneness and isolation: (IIR. D. Laing
"The Divided Self". Tavistock
Publications, 1960, pg 15).
For the avoidance of doubt, we are not suggesting that
these are symptoms exhibited by our sample. Moreover, Laing
himself does not believe in schizophrenia - or at least he
believes that not all those diagnosed as such are in fact
mentally ill. Thus
We reiterate that we ourselves are not
using the term schizophrenia to denote
any identifiable condition that we
believe exists in anyone person. (
"Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R.
D. Laing. Pelican 1970, pg 19)
156 It is argued by Friedenburg thatwhat Laing insists on as the essence of
his position is that the statements of
those deemed to be mentally ill are by
no means irrational, but sensible when
viewed from the position of the person
the patient has been. What the patient
does and is makes sense from his point
of view; even his nonsense serves
strategic purpose of counter-mystifying
the parents and hospital authorities
who have devoted his life to mystifying
him. ("Laing - E. Z. Friedenburg.
Fontana 1973, pg 11).
This does not, however, lead to the conclusion that the
patient has been sane all the time, and that the treatment
has only been administered because of the family
Laing does not in the bulk of his work
endorse the patient's view of things to
that extent (but) he does lay himself
open to misinterpretation of this kind.
("The Philosophy and Politics of
Psychotherapy" - A. Collier. Harvester,
1977. pg. 54).
In other words, and in distinction to'Freud, Laing seeks
explanation and understanding of the patient not only
within the patient but in the situation he/she occupies.
157 "The Divided Self" - R D Laing, Tavistock Publications,
1960.
158 "Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A.
Esterson. Pelican 1970.
1~ "The Leaves of spring" - A. Esterson, Pelican 1972.
1~ There were five members of the family - Mr Danzig (aged
56) and his wife (aged 50), Sarah (oldest child aged 23),
son John (aged 21), and younger daughter Ruth (aged 15).
"Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A.
Esterson. Pelican 1970, pg 110.This case concerns the mental illness of the elder daughter
in the family - Sarah. Sarah was held to have first shown
signs of mental illness at about the age of 17, when she
began to stay in bed all day, getting up only at night to
read the Bible. She began to lose interest in normal
affairs, and lost her place at Commercial College. By the
time she had reached 21 years of age her behaviour had
become increasingly strange, as she claimed to hear voices
on the phone, claimed that people on TV were talking about
her. She began to make outbursts against other members of
the family, and after one outburst stayed out all night.
Following this she was removed to an hospital, where her
she was observed to be listless, withdrawn and apathetic.
She was however allowed to return to home, and took a job
in the office run by her father. During this time, however,
her bizarre ideas continued - others in the office did not
want to work with her, they got hold of her letters and
tore them up (she also claimed that this happened at home),
she claimed the staff in the office were incompetent.
Eventually she refused to go to work, lying in bed all day,
once again only getting up at night to read the Bible. She
also resumed attacks on her family, and following an
outburst against her father she was again taken to
hospital. It is at this stage that Laing and Esterson
became involved.
In hospital her behaviour continued to be unusual' described
by Laing and Esterson as "delusions and psychotic
manifestations". ("sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D.
Laing and A. Esterson. Pelican 1970, pg 111.) She claimed:
a) the hospital were holding back letters to her
from her family, and not passing on telephone messages
b) she was inhumanely detained by the hospital
c) she feared never being able to leave hospital
to return home
d) her mother had only agreed to Sarah being put
in hospital because she did not want her to leave home
e) she feared her father, who was responsible for
her being put in hospital.
Laing and Esterson then go on to show how these apparent
"delusions and psychotic manifestations" can in fact be
understood in the context of the situation she occupied in
her family.
59First of all there is the issue of her mail being
intercepted, and phone messages not being passed on. As a
result of their interview with the family collectively. but
mostly separately, Laing and Esterson found that Sarah had
been told by her parents and brother that they phoned every
day, and left messages for her. In fact this was not so as
no mail or phone messages had been intercepted as no mail
or phone messages had been received. ("Sanity, Madness and
the Family" - R. D. Laing and A. Esterson. Pelican 1970, pg
111.). Thus this delusion, this evidence of her illness,
can be understood in the context of her family,
Turning to now to her feelings about her father, Laing and
Esterson demonstrate a similar explanation. Her brother
while being supportive and sYmpathetic to Sarah in front of
her, warned Laing and Esterson not to be fooled by her, and
that when she agreed with them it was only to win sYmpathy
to try to get out of hospital. Likewise her mother, whom
Sarah also thought to be an ally, had told Laing and
Esterson that if Sarah continued to be hostile to her
father then she should be kept in hospital permanently
("sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A.
Esterson. Pelican 1970, pg 113.). When with Sarah, however
she insisted that it was her father and brother who wanted
her kept in hospital. Her father, on the other hand,
supported Sarah only when she was not present - with his
wife and/or son. He would not defend her when she was
attacked by her mother and/or brother, or when he was alone
with her. Thus her idea that it is her father who is
against her, and her mother and brother who are her allies
can be understood. Laing and Esterson conclude of the
family that it
functioned largely through a series of
alliances - mother and father; mother·
and son; mother, father and son. Sarah
was left out. (pg. 122)
For instance, Laing and Esterson show evidence that Sarah
was expected to fulfil rules which all the other members of
the family broke, using their intra-family alliances for
support. For instance, it was insisted that Sarah should
observe the Sabbath (the family were Orthodox Jews), but
the mother, with the connivance of the son did so without
the knowledge of Sarah or Mr Danzig.·
Likewise, John visited coffee-bars and restaurants etc.
even though both he had been forbidden by their father to
do so. But when Mr Danzig attempted to impose similar
limitations on Sarah, John sided with him.
From my point of view when it comes to
Sarah its not intrusion - when it comes
to me it is intrusion. (pg 124)
~oIf we go further back, to the problems experienced in her
father's office, we can see how the analysis can operate
there as well. She had gone to work in his office after her
first breakdown. He had insisted that she should keep quiet
about this, but it had leaked out among the rest of the
staff, who began to gossip about her behind her back,
though being pleasant to her face. Moreover being "the
boss's daughter" did not help. Nor did the fact that she
discovered errors being made in the office which she
reported to her father. As a result, Laing and Esterson
report, she was sUbject to subtle insinuations, which no
one would confirm explicitly. When some of her
correspondence was mislaid by another girl in the office,
Sarah accused her of doing so deliberately. The girl, in
response, made a remark which questioned Sarah's sanity. In
a very upset condition she rushed to her father's office,
seeking reassurance. The fact this was not forthcoming made
her still more agitated, and having accused him of being a
liar, and in collusion with the others, she left the office
and never returned.
Thus what appears to be bizarre behaviour on the part of an
individual, can be understood from the context of the
situation which they occupy, even if they are not fully
aware of all its facets.
161 "Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A.
Esterson. Pelican 1972, pg 23.
162 Indeed it is part of Laing's method to suspend belief in
the schizophrenic diagnosis, and to seek to make sense of
their behaviour, even if it appears to be senseless. See
quotation (footnote 134)
163 This is especially true in "The Leaves Of spring" by
Esterson.
164 "Sanity, Madness and the Family" - R. D. Laing and A.
Esterson. Pelican 1972, pg 19.
165 Esterson argues
since persons are always in relation,
one cannot study persons without
studying the relations they make with
each other. (The Leaves Of Spring - A.
Esterson, pg. 217)
1~ Laing and Esterson argue,
We are concerned with persons, the
relations between persons, and the
characteristics of the family as a
system composed of a multiplicity of
persons. "Sanity, Madness and the
Family" - R. D. Laing and A. Esterson
Pelican 1972, pg 19. •
61167 This point is elaborated in "Interpersonal Perception" -
R. D. Laing, H. Phillipson and A. R. Lee. Tavistock
Publications 1966. This deals with a model of interpersonal
perception in which married couples are asked to make
jUdgements about their partners in relation to their own
relationship (ie how the husband feels his wife understands
him as a person - how well/badly she may understand others
is not measured.). This gives rise to a complex system of
perspectives (how A sees B), meta perspectives (how A sees
B seeing A), meta-meta-perspectives (how A sees B seeing A
seeing B) , and beyond. To the extent that these
perspectives coincide, the better for the marriage in the
view of Laing and his colleagues. We can, however see in
this,
a) the possibility that communication may
unconsciously go wrong. Thus, while Schutz may argue
that we assume that the Other sees the situation in
the same way as Ego, the assumption may be wholly
false. Two individuals may see the same situation -
and even one with the intimacy of marriage in
different terms. Yet the situation may be able to
persist until the contradictions become too great. As
Schutz and Luckmann argue
the biographically modelled
interpretational and motivational
relevances which both partners "bring
into" the we-relation cannot be
identical, although they are
sUfficiently congruent with regard to
the similar socialization of the
partners for the determination and
management of the situation. (A. Schutz
and T. Luckmann " structures of the
Lifeworld. pg 254)
b) the emphasis on the truth of communication.
Thus it is better that Mrs A should regard Mr A as a
wife-beating, good-for-nothing drunkard, if this is
what he really is, than for her to regard him, wrongly
as a well-mannered, caring husband. There are,
therefore, certain connections with Habermas's ideas
on communicative action, and distorted forms of
communication. Thus a family which comes out of this
test well is closer to communicative action, and to
being able to take rational decisions about their
future (together or apart). On the other hand a couple
whose communication is distorted (perhaps even
systematically distorted) are unable to take rational
decisions even if each thinks the other is
wonderful.
168 See P. Sedgwick: "R. D. Laing "Self, SYmptom and
Society". In "R. D. Laing and Anti-psychiatry" R. Boyers
(Ed). Octagon Books, 1974. pg. 15)169 Esterson says of the Danzig family
The family had become a pseudo-orqanism
to which they were now obliqed to
relate in a pattern of reciprocal
riqhts and obliqations. Throuqh
interiorizinq the interiorization of
the qroup-for-outside-others, the
family as qroup praxis, as persons in
relation, became process, an opaque
object with laws and a beinq of its
own. This family object they
experienced as other than the praxis of
the persons comprisinq it. (liThe Leaves
of Sprinq", pq 71, my emphasis).
Thus in this case the family felt themselves to be sUbject
to certain forces (the need to be respectable religiously
and socially) which were outwith their control, but were in
fact a function of the goals Mr and Mrs Danzig had set for
themselves. There is a likeness between this situation and
the Lifeworld understanding of Management by Staff, and in
particular by Hourly-Paid. For them, Management did not
appear to be "praxis" - it did not appear 'to be fully
understandable as the motivated actions of specific
individuals. Indeed as we have pointed out already, the
whole procedure of Management was something of a mystery
for Staff and Hourly-Paid. It was something which just
happened - in other words it was, in the Laingian sense,
"process". There is a conceptual similarity between the
Laingian concept of "process'" and Habermas I s "fragmented
consciousness", since both rely on failure to understand.
170 It is a (structurally) similar situation which Habermas
deals with in his discussion of the Colonization of the
Lifeworld, when Social System imperatives are uncritically
accepted as inevitable, and not subject to control.
171 It is important to understand that not only the Hourly-
Paid can be restricted by unconscious power. For instance
the Hourly-Paid may see an Investment decision as process.
But if they work through routine procedures which they do
not question, for Management too the process may appear to
them to be process, and thus largely a technical function
with no overtones of power.This same point is explicitly taken up by Esterson, who
considers the Sartrean concept of "serial groups" • Groups
are termed this way because from the point of view of "the
constituting agent", or the plan the group is designed to
achieve, no member of the group differs from any of the
others. Therefore an employee can be replaced by another
similar employee. Most importantly, however, the serial
group is always constituted by somebody/something external
to the group for the achievement of something outwith the
group (eg a corporate plan), which is something they will
only be vaguely conscious of. ("The Leaves of Spring" - pg.
38) •
172 " R. D. Laing" - A. Collier. Harvester Press 1977. pg 45.
1n Laing gives the following as a definition of the
unconscious
The unconscious
communicate, to
another. ("Self
Laing. pg. 32).
is what we
ourselves or
and Others"
do
to
- R.
not
one
D.
This raises the very important issue of exactly what is
meant by "unconscious" and "the unconscious". The latter
occupies a significant place in the work of Freud - it is
the receptacle for the repressions, and other
psychopathologies from which Freud's patients suffered.
Freudian psychology emphasises how
human personality is shaped as the
human mind learns to cope with raw
impulses and desires. Freud believed
that in the process of maturation these
are brought under control or banished
to the unconscious. The unconscious
thus becomes a reservoir of represses
impUlses and painfUl memories and
traumas that can threaten to erupt _at
any time. The adult person deals with
this reservoir in a variety of ways ,
engaging in various defense mechanisms
to keep them in check (inclUding
repression denial, displacement,
fixation, projection, etc.). (" Images
of Organization" G. Morgan. Sage,
1986. pg. 206•)By freeing them from these repressions etc., the mental
state of his patients could, at least, be ameliorated. It
is not, however, this which Laing is referring to in the
above quote. Laing when he refers to the something which is
unconscious is referring, as the above quote indicates, to
something we do not communicate - in· other words it is
something we are not aware of. But where can this lack of
awareness originate? We have seen before that Laing does
not simply seek his explanation for the condition of the
patient internally. He also looks outwith the patient to
the family of which he is a member. Like any social group
the family will have a structure. As Laing and Esterson
say,
If one wishes to know how a football
team concert or disconcert their
actions in play, one does not think
only or even primarily of approachinq
this problem by talkinq to the members
individually. One watches the way they
play toqether. (R. D. Lainq and A.
Esterson "Sanity, Madness and the
Family." pq 21)
Thus we have to consider not only the individual
consciousness of each member of the family but also the
Social system of which they are a part. In other words, as
well as consciousness we have to consider structure.
All of this creates the possibility of two, not unrelated,
forms of unconsciousness:
a) the individual may not be fully aware of the
Social System of which he is part. For instance, Sarah
Danzig was not aware the fact that while her brother
supported her in her presence, was highly critical
behind her back (eg in interviews with Laing and
Esterson). Thus in this case their is unconsciousness
in the sense that John has not communicated fully with
Sarah. Likewise to the extent there are one-sided
rules operating in the Social System (eg a firm), the
social actors may not be fUlly aware of this - for
instance, to go on with Laing's football analogy, the
fact the goalkeeper may use his hands within the
penalty area may simply be accepted by the players
uncritically. This is similar to the reference which
Clegg makes to the position of a Queen in chess
depending on the rules of the game, which creates a
certain position for her
b) the individual may not be fully aware of his
own consciousness. We have seen that in Schutz there
are three component parts to our knOWledgeBasic or Fundamental elements or structures
(themes and types),
Routine or Habitual elements, and
specific Component contents.
We are, according to Schutz, only fully aware of
the last component, as the other two are so basic that
we use them without thinking and thus without being
aware of using them. Thus in this sense there is
unconsciousness in that the individual has not
communicated fUlly with himself. This leads to the
restrictions of our Lifeworld not being routinely
recognized by social actors.
The advantage of the Laingian concept of unconsciousness is
that while allowing us to consider the consciousness of the
sUbject, it directs our attention to matters and influences
of which the subject is unaware and which may influence the
behaviour he exhibits.
174 This is very close to Habermas's project as well. He
argues
From the perspective of linguistic
analysis, psychoanalysis appears as a
hermeneutic exploration of
unconsciously motivated behaviour. (J.
Habermas "On the Logic of the Social
sciences". Polity 1988, pg 182.)
175 A method for doing so is well described by Esterson
("Leaves of spring", Chapter 17).
1n Indeed if we consider Habermas's concept of
"systematically distorted communication" at the micro-level
of psychoanalysis, while the patient and the family are
unconscious of the sources of the repressions and
contradictions, according to Habermas it is in their
distorted communication that these sources are to be
located.
1n For instance in the case of the Danzigs
1) the brother supported Sarah to her face, but when alone
with the Doctors warned them not to be taken in by her.
This is an example of Conscious Deception in the
relationship between Sarah and John.
2) the father would not support Sarah when she disagreed
with her mother, but in private would intervene on her
behalf. What is especially important is that he would not
intervene on her behalf because of the image of the type of
father he felt he ought to be. (See "Leaves of Spring", pp.
113-4.)178 It is argued by Sedgwick that the kinds of family
relationships which Laing is arguing for (eg unlimited
reciprocity) are extremely uncommon, and that the kinds of
problems which he describes in his work are probably the
norm. This points to another parallel with the Ideal Speech
Thesis, since it too is unlikely to be found empirically.
We would argue that the relationships which Laing is
arguing for - like the Ideal Speech Thesis can be
considered as an analytical benchmark which we can use for
the analysis of a situation. (See P. Sedgwick: "R. D. Laing
"Self, SYmptom and Society". In "R. D. Laing and Anti-
Psychiatry" R. Boyers (Ed). Octagon Books, 1974. pg. 25)
179 The use of Laing would allow Habermas to avoid the
problems encountered through the use of Freud. We said
above (footnote 120) that for Habermas
1) the role of psychoanalysis is to identify
flaws (omissions and distortions).
2) the source of flaws in the individual are
internal to him. We, therefore, by using
psychoanalysis have to identify
a) what the internal source of the flaws are
- what it is in the Lifeworld which produces such
behaviour,
b) what causes these internal distortions.
What we have tried to show in this section is the manner in
Which Laing's work deals with these difficulties.
180 The introduction of Habermas' s concept of Structural
. Violence (see above) would enhance Laing's analysis of the
situation of his patient.
181 The playwright, David Edgar says of Laing
Most importantly his (Laing's) work
qave flesh to the notion that
individual relations can operate as a
paradiqm of social relations, and that
the personal is both metaphorically and
literally political. " (liMy Hero, R. D.
LaingII D. Edgar. Independent Magazine
3/6/89, pg. 62.)
182 In other words while we can seek to develop our
understanding of our sample through not only considering
their consciousness but their interaction in the Social
System of which they are members, we have to go beyond
this. For instance, having identified that the Hourly-Paid
have a mental division of labour which accords to
Management the right to take strategic decisions according
to their criteria, we have to ask why it is they should
hold that set of ideas.183 "Theory of Communicative Action (2)". ~ J. Habermas.
Polity 1986, pg. 136.
1M When asked how they think control should be distributed
respondents may be limited by a basic element defining
Management as "decision-makers". It is therefore possible
that while others outwith Management may wish to exercise
more influence, Management will remain the dominant group.
Indeed this may be so basic as to be routine, so that the
very act of (even appearing to) challenge it can appear to
be absurd See for instance S. Clegg "Power, Rule and
Domination" Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975, who reports
exactly this.
185 Basic and Routine elements are particularly important
elements of the Lifeworld for Habermas, since they are
components of which the individual in unconscious - they
are
"what one prereflectively knows. If
then the solidarities of groups
integrated via norms and values and the
competences of socialized individuals
flow into communication a tergo, in the
way that cultural traditions do, it
makes sense for us to correct the
cultural abridgement of the lifeworld "
"Theory of communicative Action (2) II -
J. Habermas. polity 1986, pg. 135.
Thus we. have to consider not only what individuals and
groups know and think. We also need to know how and why
they have come to know and think in the way that they do.
These basic (prereflective) elements are critical in this
respect.
186 "Theory of Communicative Action (1)" - J. Habermas.
Polity 1984, pg. 335.
187 It is pointed out by Morgan in his "Psychic Prison"
metaphor, that
our imprisoned state prevents us from
imagining and realizing alternative
modes of existence. For claims that
proposals for change must be feasible
and realistic inevitably confine change
to modifications of the status quo.
("Images of Organization" - G. Morgan.
Sage, 1986. pg. 231).
1M Clegg (S. Clegg "Organization and Control"
Administrative Science Quarterly 1981, pp. 545-562) argues,
quoting Marcuse and Perrow, thatcontrol is best achieved by employing
agents that have rules and rationality
built into them through educational
socialization.
189 Morgan (G. Morgan "Images of Organization". Sage 1988)
shows the psychic prison analogy can have other features,
in addition to those instanced above. For instance he shows
that in securing organizational change, a change agent may
have to
create transitional phenomena when they
do not exist naturally. Just as a
father or mother may have to help find
a sUbstitute for Teddy, a change agent
must usually help his or her target
group to relinquish what is held dear
before they can move on. -(pg. 222)
Thus, when change is immanent we cannot simply impose
change - the group must be helped, in effect to expand (or
change) the limits imposed by their Lifeworld. Thus
developing a system of worker participation, or industrial
democracy, would have to take into account the Lifeworld
definition of Managers as "decision-makers".
Morgan presents several advantages which he claims are
possible from this analogy:
a) it may disguise the extent to which what
appears to be rationality is in fact no more than
irrationality in disguise (pg 229). Morgan's
perspective on this comes from Freud, but as we have
shown, this is the very argument which Habermas, from
his discursive theory of truth, would make also, since
breaches of the Ideal Speech Thesis give rise to
decisions which are less than fully rational.
b) Morgan, referring to attempts to_ consciously
manage meanings within organizations, points out that
through the psychic prison metaphor, we can see how we
all pray a role in the construction of meanings which
give rise to unconscious power - even if only in their
enactment.(pg 230)
c) while Morgan concentrates on what we have
termed the "unconscious" (the Freudian sense) he goes
on to note that the metaphor can be extended to
include all the ideological processes which function
to produce and sustain unconscious power. (pg 230) It
is in this specifically extended sense that we refer
to Morgan's analogy.
190 See Jimmy Reid "Reflections of a Clyde-built Man" •
souvenir Press 1976.191 Though as Mr Reid has demonstrated since, this is not to
say that over time this cannot change.
192 R. Blackburn and M. Mann "Ideology in the non-skilled
working class". In "Working Class Images of society" - M.
Bulmer [ed], RKP 1975, pg, 155.
193 See for instance weir D. " Radical Managerialism "
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 1976 pp 374-388.
1~ For instance
. .
Xn the late 1960's there was a huqe
decline of dockers' jobs (on
Kerseyside) as industrial
rationalisation introduced new carqo-
handlinq methods. The dockers were
resentful, but had to try for new work
at the new car plants. They brouqht
with them an enormous suspicion aqainst
manaqement and bosses, born on their
foggy. frozen morning dockyards. (J.
McLouglin. "The Heritage of the
Dockers". The Guardian 23/10/79. Our
emphasis)
195 Martin R. & Fryer R. "Redundancy and Paternalist
Capitalism".
196 P. McHugh "Defining the situation". Bobbs Merrill 1968,
pg. 37.
197 For instance from working in other similar firms
though several of our sample have worked for the same firm
all their working lives - or from earlier events in the
firm.
198
12.
"The Leaves of Spring" - A. Esterson, Penguin 1972, pg.
...
1~ See above. where we argue that the use of Freud by
Habermas restricts attention on the role· of interaction
with others in the repression of needs.
200 For instance the Bullock report in 1977 could have led
to this, Likewise the European Social Charter may yet do
so.
201 See for instance J. Child and B. Partridge "Lost
Managers" Blackwell 1982•--
202 As for instance Maslow argues in his hierarchy of needs
model - see A. Maslow "Motivation and Personality", Harper
and Row 1954. This has of course been an influential model
see for instance D. McGregor "The Human Side of
Enterprise", McGraw Hill 1960, C. Argyris "Personality and
Organization Theory revisited", Administrative Science
Quarterly 1973, pp. 141-167.
203 In practice the data collected in this respect added
little to our 'findings, and have been included as an
appendix to this document.
2~ See Chapter 4.
205 See Chapter 5.Our project is resonant of McHugh, who argues
I am asking whether the definition of
the situation can be described, not by
going outside of itself not by
calling it determined by constitutive
rules, or socialization, or social
structure - but according to its own
motif. What sort of logic does it
represent, not how is it caused. (P.
McHugh "Defining the situation". Bobbs-
Merrill 1968. Our emphasis. )
2 Thus we cannot consider respondents individually, or
groups of respondents individually (eg how management
think). We have to consider the firm as a pattern of
interaction, and that the expectations for which each group
presses will have effect on other groups. For instance
employees demanding more open access to company information
is not an issue just for them - it would depend on how
management respond and behave towards this issue.
3 It sometimes appears to us, from much of the research
which is carried out as well as the emphasis in many
methodology text books and courses, that methodology
historically had been based as a rule on the use of
quantitative methods - generally on statistical techniques
of varying degrees of sophistication and power. During the
last 15 years, however, there has been a greater emphasis
on qualitative techniques which pay greater attention to
the dynamic nature of social reality - in other words its
on-going quality as opposed to the "one-off" experimental
orientation of the former. It appears to us to be important
to recognise the distinction between these two types of
method. To fail to do so undermines research, and it shall
be our argument that it is necessary, to consider the use of
both sets of techniques, as appropriate to add weight to,
widen and enrich our research.
The fundamental dichotomy between these two types of method
of research, we would argue is most clearly apparent in the
dominance of particular individuals as cult figures (eg
Garfinkel's association with quantitative methods is
somewhat limited). This difference can, however, be
usefully employed for our purpose. Each, in our view, has
its own part to play, and we shall not therefore be
involved in polemicising for' either school of though, but
instead to consider the principles of each, and their
possible contributions.
This will require some statement of what we mean by
quantitative and qualitative research methods in order that
we can more adequately discuss their relative contributions
and uses. simultaneously we can made clear our
methodological principles and their justification and aim
in being used.Employee
"Man &
Watson
4 a) By social statics we have in mind, for instance the
type of image which is held of the company at a particular
moment in time. We can examine the salient aspects of this
image (eg is it exploitative, what knowledge does it
evidence, what kind of system of logic does it represent
and so on. However, to consider this image at one point in
time is not sUfficient, since over time it is reasonable to
expect that it will change. In what direction will it
change? It has been our argument that the system of logic
in the Lifeworld operates in such a way as to support
hierarchy. To examine this at the level of empirical
reality it is necessary that we examine its structuring as
a social process.
5 b) It is here that what we have described as social
dynamics becomes important. We have to be able to consider
the use of knowledge as something which is on-going, to
leave open the possibility that while the Lifeworld is as
it is now that there is always the possibility that it
could different in the future. This would be the case if
the system of logic in the Basic or Fundamental elements or
structures of the Lifeworld were to be overthrown and
replaced. To consider this we must consider the company, as
McHugh puts it, "according to its own motif". We have to
consider the implications of this system of logic for
behaviour - for instance why does it persist, what could
lead to it being changed? These are not static, but rather
are dynamic issues.
6 On this point see W. Daniel "Understanding
Behaviour in Context", in J. Child (ed)
organization". Allen & Unwin 1973, and T.
"sociology, Work & Industry", RKP 1980.
7 Each respondent was approached individually by the
researcher personally - the firm was not involved in the
approach in any way - and asked if he would mind coming for
interview. It was explained that the interview would be
concerned with his feelings about his job and the firm. In
general there was no problem since most respondents had
already heard of the project, either through their shop
steward/staff union rep., or if at management level from a
circular sent round by the Personnel dept. at the outset of
the project(the negotiation of entry to the firm is
described in the next chapter). Interviews were all
conducted in private, in the firm's time, arranged where
necessary with the respondent's superior. (The structure of
the firm is considered in more detail in Chapter 3.)8 See for instance H. Beynon & R. Blackburn "Perceptions of
work". Cambridge University Press 1972: J. Goldthorpe et
ale "The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and
Behaviour" cambridge University Press 1968: G. Ingham "Size
of Industrial organization and Worker Behaviour". Cambridge
University Press 1970: S. Parker "The Future of Work and
Leisure", Paladin 1971: S. Parker, R. Brown, J. Child, M.
Smith "The Sociology of Industry", Allen & Unwin 1977: W.
G. Runciman "Relative Deprivation and Social Justice"
Pelican 1967: C. Sofer "Men in Mid Career" cambridge
University Press 1970: .D. Wedderburn & C. craig "Relative
Deprivation in Work" in D. Wedderburn (ed) "Poverty,
Inequality and Class Structure". Cambridge University Press
1974:
9 In the previous chapter we argued that expectations 'were
achieved in competition with others in the firm, but that
the system Whereby this happened was imperfectly
competitive, in that it was structured to the advantage of
some and disadvantage of others. .
10 In contrast to the above, which is concerned with
relative deprivation within the company, this is concerned
with the relative deprivation associated with the wider
social system. These questions therefore permit and
encourage the respondent to break out from the constraints
of the social system, whereas the former is predicated on
their existence.
11 In fact in only a few cases were there any ties at all.
The size of the list could have made the task impossible,
but in fact it appeared to be an operation done with a
great deal of though and the results reveal a great deal of
consistency. This procedure provides data on the relative
importance of each expectation to each group specified -
for instance we may find one ordering for management and
another for staff, while hourly paid have a third order
again. Such divergence from our perspective is not a
problem of method (ie the fact that differen~ groups have
differences in their ranking does not cast doubt on the
method) , but rather a problem for theory (in that we have
to consider what it is about their experiences etc. which
lead to the group's ranking taking on the form it has), and
therefore to consider its role in the system of experience,
knowledge and logic which form the Lifeworld.
12 In this way a measure was obtained of the adequacy of
provision (satisfaction) not in isolation, nor in relation
to some unidentified dimension known only to the
respondent, but in relation to dimensions which in
principle are known and matters of experience for the
respondent - in relation to others in the firm, and in
relation to the respondent's concept of an ideal job.-
13 See for instance H. Beynon & R. Blackburn "Perceptions of
work". Cambridge University Press 1972, chapter 5: and J.
Goldthorpe et ale "The Affluent Worker: Industrial
Attitudes and Behaviour" Cambridge University Press 1968,
pp. 63-68: and J. Child and B. Partridge "Lost Managers"
Blackwell 1982. On the other hand, as Nichols (T. Nichols
liThe British Worker Question", RKP 1986) points out, the
supervisor may not be particularly well trained technically
either. He argues
this research points to the limited
technical traininq of Dritish foremen
(pg. 228).
In other words the assessment of supervisors is a matter of
position what may be good supervision from the
perspective of those supervised ("man management") may not
be good from a purely technical perspective.
14 This type of research has generally been carried on at
lower levels in the hierarchy - shop floor, lower level
white collar workers - but seldom amongst managers. Though
this is not to say that managers are not unaware of this
problem. More than one of our management respondents made
clear that their view of the quality of their hierarchical
superior would be a factor in deciding whether or not to
stay with the firm. On the other hand, as Fox points out
(See A. Fox "Beyond Contract". Faber 1975.) the managerial
role is (in his terms) one of "high trust" and thus not
perceived as being one which requires the closer
supervision to which hourly-paid are subjected. Moreover
the management role requires a high level of discretion,
and thus is not easily amenable to high levels of
supervision - though is not to say that high levels of
supervision are necessarily warranted for hourly paid
workers either. Indeed as Fox points out (See "Beyond
Contract". Faber 1975, and "Man Mismanagement" [2nd Ed'n.]
Hutchinson 1985. ) too close supervision - leading to a
perception of lack of trust by the supervised may
actually be counter-productive.
There is, however, no good reason why managers should not
encounter similar problems, and expect similar qualities as
those lower down the hierarchy.
15 See above, (1).
Discretion has tended to be considered to be a quality of
more importance in work at higher levels of the hierarchy,
but we would argue that there is no good a priori reason
for this. Fox, for instance, has argued that low discretion
in work produces disfunctional behaviour (See A. Fox
"Beyond Contract". Faber 1975, pp. 103-113.). He does not,
however, consider the possibilities that1) discretion in the limited area of direct work experience
may not be valued, if there is an inequality of power in
the wider aspects of control of the firm. In other words
will workers want discretion in their own limited area of
the firm when they perceive that in wider areas of the firm
they are powerless? Might they not regard the power within
their own work area as an illusion?
2) the job carried out by an individual may appear to an
outsider to be lacking discretion, but the individual may
perceive himself to have a great deal of discretion.
16 See above, chapter 1, footnote 2.
Industrial in Control 17 See Bowen P. "Social
Organizations". RKP 1976.
18 These preliminary interviews are considered in the next
chapter.
19 See Tannenbaum A. "Control in organizations" McGraw Hill
1968, and "Hierarchy in organizations" Jossey Bass 1974.
20 E. Jaques "Equitable PaYment". Penguin 1967.
21 See above, 7.
22 This argument is consistent with the findings of
Gundelach and Tetzschner (P. Gundelach & H. Tetzschner
"Measurement of Influence in Organizations - Critique of
the Control Graph method". Acta sociologica 1976, pp. 49-
63.) who point out that an index of scores over all areas
for each group may not be legitimate, since there may be
fundamentally different sUbjective attitudes on each
decision-making area for instance Gundelach and
Tetzschner find that influence on financial matters
(strategic issue) was fundamentally different from
influence on matters like redundancy (work related),
amongst a sample of shop floor workers in Denmark. In the
latter case the workers expected their influence to be
effective, and that their views would have a significant
effect on the outcome, whereas in the former case they only
wished to be informed about what was happening. This
finding emerged from a factor analysis of. their data which
showed a number of decision-making areas formed a strategic
cluster, while others formed a work-related cluster.
Gundelach and Tetzschner argue therefore, that influence is
contingent on the decision-making area in question, and
that the legitimacy of a composite index for all areas is
doubtful. This is a matter which can only be resolved by
statistical tests which we have carried out on our own
data, and will report on at the appropriate point.
Indeed this point has been recognised by Tannenbaum too:In addition we examined how the
distribution ,of control differs amonq
different areas of decision-makinq, a
question that has concerned many
authors (Bartolke K., Eschweiler W.,
Flechsenberger D. and Tannenbaum A.
"Workers Participation and the
Distribution of Control as Perceived by
Members of Ten German Companies".
Admin. Science Quarterly 1982, pg. 382)
It appears that there is a possibility, to which we have to
be sensitive, that there are qualitatively different types
of perceived influence. We would argue, however, that this
is not a problem of the Tannenbaum control graph method,
but instead one of theory and research. Our theory can
embrace the problem of different types of influence, since
it is set up to investigate the SUbjective supports of
industrial hierarchy. The Gundelach and Tetzschner findings
mean that we have to recognise that industrial hierarchy
may not be uni-dimensional. certainly the problem does not
lack complexity, but at the same time it makes for a richer
empirical reality to be investigated. As for research
problems, these will be considered in the section on
qualitative methods, in which we discuss the methods by
which we can gather the data on the Lifeworld its
knowledge and the logic it employs - which constitute these
as qualitatively different forms of influence.
It may be argued that this is merely to escape the problem
posed by the inadequacy of Tannenbaum's method, and that we
should seek the solution in more "powerful" and
"sophisticated" quantitative methods. We would contend that
such criticism would itself be and reflex and misconceived,
since it does not consider the possibility that
quantitative "rigourous" methods may not be where we should
be looking to for our solution. For instance Gundelach &
Tetzschner argue
the concept of the distribution of
control and the distinction between
perceived and desired influence seem in
themselves to be so relevant that they
should not be qiven up merely because
more sophisticated methods of
computation cannot be used (P.
Gundelach & H. Tetzschner, supra, our
emphasis. )
This position is echoed by Blackburn and Mann in relation
to quantitative methods in generalIt is now necessary to move on to other
methods••••The way forward does not lie
with the traditional critic of the
survey method, the omniscient narrator
of most qualitative studies. We may
suspect that the coherence of the story
lies in the narrator's art rather than
empirical reality ••••the research we
now favour would make clear as does the
survey method the nature of the
investigator's stimulus as well as the
worker's response and would add to that
more persistent and explicit probing of
possible structures of response. We
need to know not simply the final
result of whether workers are able to
synthesize ideological contradictions
but also the process by Which they
attempt to do this...... Whatever the
approach the methods should be
integrated to the theory and seem to be
integrated. (Blackburn R.M. and Mann M.
"Ideology in the Non-Skilled Working
Class". In "Working Class Images of
society", M. Bulmer (Ed.) RKP 1975, pg.
156. )
Our methods to this end will be considered in the section
on qualitative methods, but we wish to make clear here that
1) quantitative methods, though well accepted,
cannot be used exclusively, given the dynamic nature
of social reality,
2) qualitative methods must be methods of
research, and not merely rules for narration.
We shall return to this problem in considering the
transition from quantitative to qualitative methods, our
use of qualitative methods and data, and in particular how
data analysis is guided by the theoretical structure of
Chapter 1.
23 This method has been developed by Sherif and Sherif. See
Sherif M. & Sherif C "Attitude as the Individual's own
Categories". In Warren N. & Jahoda M. "Attitudes" (2nd
Ed'n.). Penguin 1973, pp. 395-422.24 For instance before beginning our interviewing programme,
We had agreed to allow management, staff union reps. and
shop stewards to see the questionnaire to be used. The two
shop stewards who assessed the questionnaire were intrigued
by all the questions on control, access to information' and
so on, but in particular by our questions on what
newspapers the respondent read. It was explained to them
that newspapers were an important source of information,
and thus of views. Both nodded in understanding, and then
one of them said
Aye, that's very interesting, but the
problem is the quys in here don't read
much else than the racing section.
25 In actual fact no respondent took us up on this open-
ended offer, and thus there is no data to report.
26 These questions will be important in that they face up
squarely to the possibility of rejection of existing
hierarchical structures, and in subsequent discussion 0
qualitative methods they will be employed to understand the
non-rejection of hierarchy as a process, drawing on the
logic underlying these views.
27 A strong implication of this is that the more often one
is exposed to a particular source or form of knOWledge, the
more relevant and used it will be. This begs the question
of one's orientation to the knOWledge - for instance if one
is critical of a particular source (eg TV news), one may
react by totally challenging its validity so that
considerable exposure would not lead to considerable
acceptance, but in fact the very opposite. This possibility
was taken into account in our questions, in that
respondents were not only asked for the frequency of their
exposure, but also whether or not they perceived any bias
in a particular source.
In any case mere frequency of exposure does nQt alone lead
to acceptance of a particular view - we may all vary in the
degree of exposure we require before it has use value for
Us. Our position on this is that the knowledge used to
constitute the meaning structure by which we define and
interpret reality will be contingent with that meaning
structure - in other words where a particular item of
knowledge manifestly is at variance with the Lifeworld, and
its contents and logic, it will require more exposure for
acceptance than another item which is consistent with the
Lifeworld. Likewise knowledge which is acquired other than
by direct experience (at second or third hand, or further)
may not have the same degree of impact - for instance
unemploYment may loom larger in the Lifeworld if one has
actually been in this position, than if not.
28 These were adapted from Willener - See T. Burns (ed)
"Industrial Man", Penguin 1972.-.
29 See Glasgow University Media Group "Bad News". RKP 1976,
and, Beharrel P. & Philo G. (eds) "Trade Unions and the
Media". Macmillan 1977.
30 N. Nie et al. "statistical Package for the Social
Sciences". McGraw Hill 1975, Chapter 23.
31 See Nie, supra, pg. 435.
32 G. Dalton "Men Who Manage". John Wiley, 1959.
33 Permission was, however, usually forthcoming.
Interestingly the higher we went in the hierarchy the more
often respondents were unwilling to be recorded. This was
especially true of senior managers. The exact reason was
unclear, but there was a general sensitivity about being
interviewed among managers. It should, however, be
emphasised that not all managers refused to be recorded -
only that proportionately more were unwilling than other
groups.
34 See A. Esterson "the Leaves of Spring". Pelican 1972
Chapter 17 passim.
35 In both chapters 4 and 5, we refer to a number of
excerpts - for instance excerpt 5.2, or excerpt 4.7. All
such excerpts - which are relevant excerpts from semi
structured interviews with respondents - can be found in
Appendix 4 (for the excerpts referred to in chapter 4,
beginning 4.) or in Appendix 5 (for the excerpts referred
to in chapter 5, beginning 5.)., since-our research was completed the firm has been taken
over by another holding company - again leaving it part of
a much larger group, with the HQ being in London.
2 Organizational structure
The most remarkable feature of the firm's organizational
structure is its legal constitution. Its control is
organized around a local group company, subordinate to the
parent holding company which has absolute control over it,
but only exercises this on long term matters, tending not
to interfere on day-to-day matters. Instead it maintains a
watching function over the local group.
The local group contains within it:
the manufacturing division
the financial and commercial divisions
the marketing and sales divisions (Which as we
pointed out above are contained in a legally separate
company) •
The manufacturing division, during our research period, had
direct control over:
1) Quality Control - inspection of goods inward,
and the final product at various stages in its
manufacture.
2) Production Control - including stock control
and production planning.
3) Shipping' - dispatching the final product
(nearly always overseas).
4) Production, which is organized into two
identifiable areas:
a) the engine works where
production and any electrical work
out.
mechanical
is carried
b) the fabrication works - where the frames
of the final product are made and assembled.
5) Personnel this includes personnel
administration, training and industrial relations
(though managers had responsibility for this last
item, with Personnel providing policy, advice and
back-up where needed). Even though the personnel
manager reported to the Manufacturing Director, the
service was supplied to the entire firm.
~IThe financial division exercises financial control and
gives advice to all parts of the firm. In addition it is in
charge of data processing. It is divided into sections
dealing with
a) management accounting,
aUditing, d) data processing.
b) finance, c)
-
The divisions are, however, much less rigourously enforced
and less apparent than in manufacturing, either spatially
or in terms of social interaction (though this is less so
for data processing).
The commercial division is responsible for:
a) Purchasing - raw materials, semi-finished or
finished parts.
b) Assistance with financing contracts.
c) Coordination of different divisions of the
firm, but in particular finance, manufacturing and
sales.
The problem of coordinating different parts of the firm
exists in other companies as well, in that each function
believes no one really understands them or gives enough
account to their problems. This in our firm showed itself
as a contempt for others - production engineers referred to
accountants as "bean pushers", and one said he had never
met a competent salesman. It does have to be pointed out,
however, that this was not restricted to engineers, and
that their feelings about others were fully reciprocated.
This problem of functional loyalty - though not one we
consider - we would suggest could be another manifestation
of differing Lifeworlds and experiences, leading to
restricted perceptions.
These three divisions, with the Group Managing Director's
office and Central Services (internal mail, telephones,
etc.) constitute the local group company. Its
organizational form is shown in fig. 3.1, over.
As can be seen from the chart, the firm is organized along
functional lines. The key roles appear to be those of
Manufacturing Director and Finance Director, since only
through them is there access to the Group Managing
Director.
The Marketing and Sales Company is legally autonomous and
has three different sectors -
1) a marketing and sales section, concerned with
locating customers, researching their product needs,
making tenders and securing contracts, and the
provision of parts.TEXT BOUND INTO
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,~2) an operations section which provides the
technical expertise required to make tenders (eg
drawings, checking the feasibility of customer
requests), providing drawings for each order, ensuring
that orders are progressed through the Manufacturing
division, coordination of the different elements of
each order, and the installation of orders.
3) planning and development, which was
responsible for forward planning of the structure and
operation of the firm, in order to maximise future
orders.
The organization structure of this part of the firm is
shown in fig 3.2. As can be seen from this, the
organization is again functional, but rather more complex
than Manufacturing and Finance. The structure of the
Marketing and Sales Company has the following significant
features,
a) it is a separate legal entity having its own
Board of Directors. Control is formally ultimately
exercised by the Group Managing Director who is
Chairman of this company. The extent to which this
control was exercised should not be exaggerated since:
i) there was a good deal of rivalry between
the Managing Director (Sales and Marketing) and
the Group Managing Director, so that the former
resisted the latter.
ii) the Group Managing Director had a fairly
easy managerial style, and close control would
have been out of character.
b) the Managing Director (Sales and Marketing)
was also the Marketing Director - indeed selling was
really his game. The product, however, requires
considerable attention both during production
meeting customer requirements as well as after
production installation presented constantly
differing requirements. These areas were taken up by
the Operations Director, and those subordinate to him.
This gave the Operations Directory considerable power
as it was not enough merely to be able to sell -
indeed it could be said that selling the product was
only the start of the firms' problems and its was the
Operations Director who frequently had to solve these.
This gave rise to further observable divisions
between those who worked in Sales and Marketing, and
those in the Operations Division.
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7;- C{'-" t.,.c) the existence of the Planning and Services
Division, which formally served the 'firm, but in
practice through investigation, research and
reporting - exercised a good deal of power in the
firm, far in excess of the relatively small number who
worked in this part of the firm. (For instance when -
toward the end of our research period the
Manufacturing Director was relieved of his
manufacturing responsibilities leaving him with
Personnel - it was widely believed that the Planning
and Services Director was ultimately responsible,
through his investigative responsibilities.)
d) the final important distinction between this
part of the firm and the Manufacturing and Finance
Division, is that Sales and Marketing had no formal
link with any Hourly-paid workers.
In discussion with people in the firm, our view that the
existence in law of two companies was an artificial device
with limited practical relevance and even less
justification was confirmed. The relationship between the
two was that Marketing and Sales (henceforth Sales) won the
order, which involved the presentation of detailed
technical plans, liaising with the customer during
production, and was responsible for final installation.
Production was carried out in the Manufacturing and Finance
Division, which in addition exercised financial control.
Also overall policy was controlled within the Manufacturing
and Finance Division since 7 of the 11 directors of the
Sales company were board members of the local group. The
board of the local group comprised 12, of which 8 were full
time.
The firm, especially given its size, has a rather complex
structure, made all the more so by the variability of the
span of control - for instance the Shipping Manager had 25
people under him, but the Works Manager (formally his
equal) had about 500 subordinate to him. In addition to
this, communication could be a lengthy process, as
departments often talked to each other only at managerial
level. It could be said that this firm is an example of
Burns and Stalkers' mechanistic form (Burns T. & Stalker G.
"Management of Innovation", Tavistock 1961.), in that
1) authority was concentrated at the top of the
firm,
2) work is functionally specialized,
3) interaction, in so far as work is concerned,
was vertical - between superiors and subordinates.
___.'6~We will show that authori~y is perceived as being
concentrated at the top 1n our research findings
(especially chapter 5). The functional specialization in
the firm has already been indicated by our discussion of
the firm's structure. The final condition that
interaction was vertical - was, at least in part, due to
the geography of the place. For instance works staff worked
near to the shop floor, but all other staff are in a suite
of offices separate from the point of production. This can
be seen in the plant lay-out, fig. 3.3.
The product began. to be produced in Bays 5-9, where
components were made and/or sub-assembled. These components
were taken to Bay 1, where 4 or 5 units of the product
would be assembled at anyone time. The product itself is
large - upwards of 10 tons, so cranes were used in each of
the bays to move components or sub assemblies around the
bay or from one bay to another. When the product was
completed in Bay 1 it was lifted by crane on to a bogie and
pulled to Bay 11 for testing. If test was unsuccessful,
and the fault was more than minor (which could be remedied
on the test stand) then it would be returned to Bay 1. If
test was successful then the product was dispatched on a
large transporter, usually to the docks.
Hence the plant was a good deal of movement which
management realised was not desirable, and could have been
avoided in a custom-built plant. However, as we explained
above (See above, 1.), the firm had inherited its
facilities which had been constructed for the production of
another product, and had been designed and built many years
before. The view of the firm's management was that they
were doing their best with what they had.
The offices of Finance, Sales and Marketing were adjacent,
as shown in the diagram. Broadly Finance occupied the lower
floor, while Sales and Marketing occupied the second floor.
Finance did, however, have a limited presence in the Plant
as time-keepers were responsible to Finance for the
calculation of bonus earned under the bonus system. Also
the Wages office was first left out of the exit marked "way
out (2) " , conveniently located for Hourly-paid employees
who reckoned that their wages were short.
The geographical division and functional specialization was
overcome, somewhat, by joint committees and occasionally
personal initiative. This, however, appeared to be rare,
and functional loyalty was almost tribal
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c)«&(:iJIn one aspect after another Glasgow, it
is arqued, had the worst provision of
any city in the united Kingdom - in
overcrowding, in lack of bathroom
facilities, in unemploYment (especially
males), in the low proportion of motor
cars. (S. Checkland "The Upas Tree"
Glasgow University Press 1975, pg 35.)
4 The following are intended to be indicative:
1) employment since 1945 has seldom been above
95%, compared with a UK national average of 98%.
2) during the 1980's the number of full-time jobs
in the region declined by 100,000.
3) to keep unemployment down to
population of Strathclyde region has to
25,000 every year. (Figures from the
Regional Report 1986.)
10%, the
decline by
Strathclyde
In other respects things are even worse, since clydeside
performs worst on 6 of 11 indicators of social deprivation:
1) homes with more than 1-5 persons per room,
2) most unemployed, economically active males,
3) most unemployed, economically active females,
4) fewest cars per head of population,
5) most economically active, retired males,
6) largest proportion of the population 0-14
years.
On another three measures the area performed only second
worst:
A) homes with no hot water,
B) homes with no bath,
C) homes with no exclusive use of basic
amenities.
We could enlarge on this, but our attention is to provide
background data on the research site rather than to look at
the deprivation of the area as such. (Indeed it does have
to be recognised that during the latter part of the 1980's
much has been improved in Strathclyde.) Nonetheless, the
point which can be made with clarity is that the area is
economically depressed and socially deprived..... -
What makes this all the worse is that it is not
something new, but rather a condition which has existed for
many years - during the 1920's unemploYment in the area was
never less than 14%, and never less than 25% in the 1930's.
This type of social history has been recorded in "No Mean
City", and the ballet "Miracle in the Gorbals". The area,
however, has not been assisted by this condition, nor by
the myth of "Red Clyde". The origins of this are not
certain, but can be observed in the "40 hour strike" in
1919 and more recently in "the UCS work in" in 1971. Events
such as this have led, as Checkland argues, to the view
that
there can be little doubt that Glasgow
and the west of Scotland have acquired
a bad reputation in industrial
relations which compounds the
difficulties of the region. (See
Checkland, supra. .)
This problem has been addressed at least in part by the
revival of the Glasgow city Centre, and events such as "the
Garden Festival" in 1988, and the "European city of
Culture" in 1990. While initiatives such as this have
diminished perceptions of the area as "Red Clyde", this
will remain part of the overall tradition. Nonetheless
there is a clear policy on the part of organizations such
as the SDA, Strathclyde region and the district councils to
change perceptions held elsewhere. This may be argued to be
responsible for investments in the area and the development
of new types of work (eg in electronics at IBM, National
Semi-conductor, Compaq, etc.). Through success in this type
of venture we may remedy the deprivations identified, by
providing more and better paid work. Directly, however,
"the Year of Culture" provides little other than a
temporary increase in demand.
S For instance when work in John Browns shipyard, on the
Cunarder Number 534, was suspended in 1931 employees were
quoted as reacting as follows:
Well if they'd had the work, we'd have
been back there.
We are used to not having work - if
there was no work there was no work.
You just had to thole ·it. (Foster J.
and Woolfson C. "The Politics of the
UCS Work-in" Lawrence and Wishart 1986.
pg 86.)Such statements are hardly typical of Communist
revolutionaries, and despite the levels of unemploYment (eg
in Alexandria in the Vale of Leven it was 37%) there was no
direct action of an overtly political nature. Yet in the
minds of many the "Work-in" in 1971 is typical of Red
Clyde. Historically, however, this is the exception, and
Red Clyde is more apparent than real - more a consequence
of over reaction by those who know little of the area, than
the consequence of typical behaviour.
6 This point is made both by Reid (Reid J. "Reflections of
a Clyde-built Man". Souvenir Press 1976.) and McShane
(McShane H. "No Mean Fighter". Souvenir Press 1976. ).
7 See Checkland, supra 18, pg. 64.
8 For instance as with "Working for Ford" by Beynon, or the
"Affluent Worker" studies by Goldthorpe et ale
9 Letter 21/11/1975.
10 Martin and Fryer make a similar point in "Redundancy and
Paternalist Capitalism".CkQp-£e,. &" ':-00 t:f)otes
1 See Chapter 1.
2 See above Chapter 4.
3 Examples of the former would include the exercise of
discipline, safety, moving employees around the factory,
and, most obviously, pay. Examples of the latter would
include investment decisions, financial pOlicy decisions,
decisions influencing the winning of orders. Clearly the
latter group are of great significance, but their effect is
less direct on the individual, and thus is less easily
perceived. See, for instance, excerpt ,where we discuss
with a shop steward the difficulty in getting his members
to take action over an investment decision, compared to a
pay decision by Management.
4 See above chapter 5.
5 See footnote 3, above.
6 As we shall argue below this creates the difficulty that
taking on this understanding would expose the Lifeworlds of
Staff and Hourly paid to the same level of colonization by
system imperatives as Management, which may itself be an
obstacle to the achievement of the Ideal Speech Thesis and
equality.
7 It"is argued by Clegg that for power to exist there must
be organization (S. Clegg "Frameworks of Power", Sage 1989,
pg 17). It is moreover highly undemocratic, as Abrahamsson
makes clear in "Form and Function in organization Theory"
Organization Studies 1985 pp. 39-53. See our discussion of
this below.
8 Clegg argues in "Frameworks of Power" that
To be invariably told, rarely asked,
infrequently consulted, and be expected
not to participate in the formation of
these collective goals is hardly a
secure basis for obtaining commitment
to these goals. (pg. 135)
This may well be so, but we should still need to reflect
that in general it does appear to work!
9 And our sUbjects are highly aware of the exercise of
power over them.
10 See " Power and the Division of Labour " - Dietrich
Rueschemeyer. Polity Press 1986.
11 It is pointed out that,lilt is the ability of top decision
makers to provide plausible and viable
interpretation . that allows their
continuation"
" Organizational Adaption to Performance Downturns" - J.
Ford & D. A. Baucus. Academy of Management Review 1987, pg.
376.
12 See our own (tDoendiX 7 (above), and in particular the
section on the met1l.a. Also see a recent article on the
presentation of industrial relations news on breakfast time
t.v. news and in particular the 1984 miners' strike
"Reporting of Industrial Relations on Breakfast Time TV:
Industrial Relations Journal 1987, by Clive Hutt. He
concludes,
II within this (presentation of
industrial relations news) there are
certain traits which do not appear
unhelpful to the maintenance of
traditional relationships between
labour and capital and which could be
construed as enhancing established
norms and values. II (page 98).
13 See footnote 6.
14 The similarity between our findings and the ideas of
Habermas about the increasing dominance of technical
rationality should be fairly clear. For instance,
. II 'l'he growth of technological control
in society ultimately implies II,
Habermas argues, IIan entire
organization of society: one in which
technology, becomes autonomous,
dictates a value system - namely its
own - to the domains of praxis it has
usurped ". Quoted by David Held in "
Introduction to critical Theory ", pg.
265.
15 This is not, of course, to argue that technical
rationality is absolutely correct. It is a set of values
which holds good as long as its fundamental assumptions
(its world view) hold good. When/if this ceases to be the
case - when assumptions like the role of efficiency/profit/
technical expertise etc. get challenged by alternative
standards (like fairness/equality, or by some other value
set), then technical rationality will be in question.
Jaques has provided an elegant defence of hierarchy (E.
Jaques "In defence of Hierarchy". Harvard Business Review
1990, pp. 127-133). He arguesManagerial hierarchy is -the only
effective organizational form for
deploying people and tasks at
complementary levels, where people can
do the tasks assigned to them, where
people in any given layer can add value
to the work of those in the layer below
them, and finally where the
stratification of management strikes
everyone as necessary and welcome (pg.
133)
There are two problems with this argument:
a) first of all, on this basis, the existence of
hierarchy is concerned with the achievement of a
particular goal - we can only assess effectiveness in
relation to some further objective. It is clear, we
would argue, from Jaques's argument that this
objective is technical efficiency. As we have argued
above technical rationality is a set of values which
will hold good only as long as its fundamental
assumptions (its world view) remain unchallenged by
some alternative standard. Thus the existence of
hierarchy cannot be predicated only on· the basis of
efficiency, since it too, being a "value position",
can be challenged and as such is shifting sand.
b) Jaques requires that hierarchy should "strike
everyone as necessary and welcome". What we have shown
in our empirical evidence, and will go on to elaborate
in the theoretical argument which makes up the bulk of
this Chapter, is that managers and employees regard
hierarchy as inevitable, normal and technically right
and not something which can be questioned with any
more sense than challenging laws of nature.
Consequently whether hierarchy is "necessary and
welcome" is not a question which is asked. Rather
hierarchy is simply accepted. Indeed this point is
recognised, to some extent, by Jaques, who argues
What we need is
that understands
purpose. (pg. 133)
managerial hierarchy
its own nature and
That nature and purpose, as we have argued, is technical
efficiency, which is a position which can be readily
argued. The implication of following the Ideal Speech
Thesis is that there should be equality such that
1) there is awareness of the role of technical
efficiency in the organization of work: and
2) there can be a fully rational discussion and
acceptance of technical efficiency as the basis for
work organization.
yl16 The situation may, therefore, be more difficult than Ford
& Baucus (supra) suggest. When things go wrong, they
hypothesize that the top Management team will be replaced.
What we are suggesting is that if things go sUfficiently
wrong, sUfficiently often then it may be Management as a
role which finds itself getting replaced.
17 This is in contrast to the situation which existed in the
ClYdeside shipyards, when men would be dismissed on the
spot, with no legal redress.
18 The role of technical rationality is apparent too in
decisions taken by Industrial Tribunals. For instance, the
Tribunals have in many cases emphasized the role of
maintaining efficiency in companies, as an important
consideration in arriving at their jUdgments. Thus if we
look at the law of unfair dismissal, which is supposed to
be the floor of rights for the individual worker, we can
see that these rights have been restricted by technical
rationality. In one case, where employees had their shift
system changed by their employer from five to six days per
week, the tribunal held that, in dismissing their claim to
have been made redundant,
" an employer is entitled to reorganize
his business so as to improve its
efficiency, and in doing so, to propose
to his staff a change in the terms and
conditions of their emploYment: and to
dispense with their services if they do
not agree".
JOhnson v. Nottinghamshire Police Authority, 1974. Quoted
by Wedderburn in " The Worker and the Law" 3rd. Edition
1986, page 266.
19 We can see connections between this and Hunter:
"There appears to be a tenuous line of
communication between the governors of
our society and the governed". It is a
situation he abhors because it "does
not square with the concept of
democracy we have been taught to
revere" (F. Hunter - Community Power
structure. Quoted in S. Clegg
"Frameworks of Power", Sage 1989, pg
8) •
Hunter therefore links with .Habermas I s emphasis on
communication and on democratic structures.
20 " The critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas " - T. McCarthy
3rd Edition, Polity, 1984, pg. 306.
21 " Power: a Radical View " - S.Lukes MacMillan 1974. pg.
24.22 An element in this is Ideology. We have argued already in
this chapter that the role of the media is essentially, in
our view, an endorsement of the perceptions within the
Workplace. We have already indicated in footnote 11
research which points to the media ( in this case
breakfast time tv) playing a role in supporting what are
described by Hutt as" traditional relationships". We have
referred to various studies of the role of the media in
Appendix 7, which we concluded, led us to the view that
their role was to support the dominant role of Management.
Now, it can be argued that this type of research
Overstates the role of the media, and in particular that
the messages in the media are more diverse than is supposed
egboth Paul Foot and Alistair Burnett appear{though the
latter somewhat more often). This may well be the case, but
whether it is or not need not detain us here. All we have
to argue is that the logic of the message on the media and
its parameters are such as not to offend against the
dominance of Management. Thus, for instance it may be
acceptable to criticize individual managers/managements but
not Management as such.
The role of Management is simply part of culture - and
to the extent which it has been absorbed by our sUbjects it
Plays a supportive role in the relationship between
Management and their employees.
23 This, let us be clear, is not to say that Management are
Unaware of their dominance. Our results point quite
unambiguously to the fact that they do. What we are
suggesting is that while they may be aware of their 1st and
2nd dimension powers, they are not aware (or not fully) of
their 3rd'dimension power, and its basis.
24 "Images of Organization" - G. Morgan pg. 199.
25 Clegg reports in " Power, Rule and Domination,
It Nobody could offer any reason why
organizations should be like that. We
just knew that they were, and to
question this was to invite suspicion
of one's intentions •••••••To persist
in asking questions with such obvious
answers is to risk censure of oneself It
"Power, Rule and Domination", pg. 84.
26 This point is recognized by Schutz who recognizes that
two individuals are likely to interpret situations
differentlyIn principle the same events, objects,
etc. can consistently have a different
meaninq for each of the partners. (A.
Schutz , T. Luckmann "structures of the
Lifeworld. Pq 254)
Only when the interpretations become contradictory will
there be conflict. For instance, if an interpretational
thematic relevance is used which suggests that one is
attending a happy occasion, while the other uses an
interpretational thematic relevance which says it is sad.
27 And within this we can identify conscious power which
theories constructed around this phenomenon can analyse~
28 We would argue that such constraints depend on the
existence and operation on unconscious power. The analysis
of this is beyond the limits of many theories of power
which deal only with power of which the parties involved
are aware.
29 It is for this reason that we would dissent from Clegg's
conclusion that one dimensional power is the most
economical form of power (See S.R. Clegg "Frameworks of
Power", Sage 1989, pg 18). It is certainly true that for,
what we have called, unconscious power into place can be
very difficult and costly. On the other hand to the extent
that this has been done successfully events move with an
apparently effortless spontaneity.
30 This is not to say that only those below Management
operate within this "cognitive prison". Management too are
constrained in a similar (though perhaps more advantageous)
way. It is pointed out by Rueschemeyer that in 1862,
"a report for the Zollverein, the
common market which in northern Germany
preceded the unified empire, identified
issues of control and difficulties with
manaqers as a significant obstacle to
the further growth of enterprises"~
From, "Power and the Division of
Labour"- Dietrich Rueschemeyer, supra,
pg 57.
Hence at the time of this report, when as Rueschemeyer
points out, the owner-manager was beginning to be replaced
by the professional manager, some form of control of
Managers too had to be developed.34
31 It would not have been possible for Huw Beynon, for
instance, to have written " Working for Ford " if this were
not true. But no matter how much conflict Beynon found at
Hailwood, the fact remains that it did/still does produce
cars under the direction of Management. The problem with
the development of theory in the area of conflict/consensus
is perhaps, that as a reaction to the work of those like
Parsons who focus on consensus and treat conflict as
pathological, we have tended to treat (workable) consensus
as too obviously / easily explained, when if fact,as we
have sought to show, it is in fact a most fragile flower.
32 In this way conscious and unconscious power are related.
As the model indicates, both forms support the hierarchy,
but the latter does so by the creation of perceptions which
legitimate the hierarchy, and thus (within the constraints
which organizational rules create) allows for the use of
conscious power. In other words unconscious power makes
legitimate the use of conscious power.
33 " Profile of British Managers " - J. Melrose - Woodman,
pages 8 -10.
Supra, pg. 10.
35 "Managers in Industry" - T. Leggatt. Sociological Review
1978.
36 " Who are the Managers " - R. Mansfield, pg. 18.
In " Managerial Roles and Industrial Relations " - edited
by M. Poole and R. Mansfield. Gower 1980.
37 There is however, an extensive body of research into
leadership traits which suggests that we can
predict/identify the leaders from the non-leaders by
certain of their personal features. This has been reviewed
in Alan BrYman I s "Leadership and Organizations" RKP 1986
pp. 18 35: and more extensively in B. M. Bass "
Stodgill's Handbook of Leadership ", Free Press 1981, and
R. M. Stodgill " Handbook of Leadership ", Free Press 1974.
38 " Nature of Managerial Work " - H. Mintzberg. Harper &
Row 1973.
~ " Establishing Blissful Clarity in Organizational Life "
- D. Golding. Sociological Review 1980.
40 Golding, supra. pg. 771. This is a concern of Habermas,
that specialist groups may be able to exclude others from
dialogue through their specialist knowledge to which others
are not admitted. This gives rise to what he describes as
"fragmented consciousness". See our discussion in
"Lifeworld" section, and in J. Habermas "Theory of
communicative Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1986. pg 355.
41 "The Role of Management in Industrial Relations"- D.
MacDonald Journal of Management Studies 1985 pp. 523-544.48
42 " Contested Terrain" - R. Edwards, Basic Books 1979, pg
12.
43 " Industrial Relations: A Marxist· Introduction" - R.
Hyman, Mac Millan 1975, pg. 25.
44 D~ MacDonald supra pg 534.
45 "Management In Action" - P. Lawrence. R.K.P. 1984.
46 " Nature of Managerial Work ", Mintzberg, supra.
47 " Nature of Managerial Work " I. Glover. Unpublished
Report, city University, London 1977.
Lawrence, supra.
49 J. Marshall and R. stewart " Managers Job Perceptions:
Parts 1 and 2 ". Journal of Management Studies 1981.
50 Marshall and stewart supra pp 177 -178.
51 This was a perception which emphasized defined areas of
responsibility and objectives, constraints, and delegation.
52 This perception emphasized the setting of various
priorities (Eg production, customer satisfaction levels).
53 This perception emphasized the significance of change and
adaption.
54 A. Spybey "Frames of Meaning for Managers" sociology
1984.
55 A. spybey supra pg 555.
56 See page 556.
57 C. Kerr et AI. " Industrialism and Industrial Man ".
penguin 1973.
58 In other words, while we explicitly do not see our
management interviewees as in any way attempting to mislead
far less lie - we would argue that underlying what
appears to them, and superficially to be, a non-political
(in the sense of using power) role, is in fact a reliance
on power to a degree that they are unaware.
59 Alan Bryman concludes in "Leadership and Organizations"It should be apparent by this juncture
that there is evidence that it is
difficult to distinguish leadership
from kindred notions of headship, the
exercise of power and authority, and
Management Moreover while various
writers have attempted to forge
distinctions they have often not been
embodied in empirical
research, •• ("Leadership and
organizations" pg 7).
More historically, it is pointed out by stephen Marglin
that
It is important to emphasize that the
discipline and supervision afforded by
the factory had nothing to do with
efficiency, at least as this term is
used by economists. Disciplining the
workforce meant a larger output from a
larger input of labour, not more output
for the same input.(pg 248)
The notion of Management as a purely technical function
is echoed in the following
in the competitive market economy, only
least-cost methods are technologically
efficient••••Hence the factory must
have been technologically superior to
the alternatives. (pg 238)
Both II origins and functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist
Production ". (From II Capital and Labour: a Marxist Primer"
T. Nichols ed.)
The importance of these two quotes from Marglin's
influential article, is that the latter demonstrates quite
clearly how an emphasis on efficiency and technical
rationality can divert our attention from the power
elements of the managerial role. As is pointed out in the
former quote from Marglin, Management is not about
efficiency in the sense of securing more output from the
same input (improving the input:output ratio), but rather
is a means of securing more input from the .individual
employee through the domination which the early factories
allowed, and Which more modern Management techniques have
refined and developed.60 See for instance- Floyd Hunter " Community Power
Structure" university of North Carolina Press 1953: A. S.
Tannenbaum "Control in Organizations" McGraw Hill 1968, and
"Hierarchy in Organizations" Jossey Bass 1974: P. Bowen
"Social Control in Organizations" RKP 1976. Moreover our
own work points clearly to managers themselves regarding
themselves as powerful. This is most clear in their own
answers to the questions on the distribution of control.
While they may have seen the difference between themselves
and other groups as smaller than perceived by others, even
in the perception of Management themselves they were the
most powerful group.
61 See for instance
D. Hickson et Al. "strategic contingencies
Organizational Power" Administrative science
1971, pp. 216-229.
Theory of
Quarterly
organizational Decision-
" Administrative Science
C. Hinings et Al. " Structural Conditions of
Intraorganizational Power" Administrative Science Quarterly
1974, pp. 22-44.
G. Kenny and I. Palmer "Individual Power Bases in
Organizations" Management Forum 1980 :
G. Kenny and D. Wilson "Interdepartmental Influence of
Managers" Journal of Management Studies 1984:
A. Pettigrew " Information Control as a Power Resource "
Sociology 1972, pp. 187-204; and,
" Politics of Organizational Decision-Making" Tavistock
1973
J. Pfeffer and G. Salancick "
making as a Political Process
Quarterly 1974, pp. 135-151.
S. Ranson et AI. "The Structuring of ·Organizational
Structures" Administrative science Quarterly 1980 :
G. Salancick and J. Pfeffer "The bases and use of power in
organizational decision-making" Administrative. science
Quarterly 1974, pp. 453-473.
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66 See for instance Child J. and Partridge B. "Lost
Manage:-s", who discuss the process of unionization of
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our company with the reaction of Management. They do
however point out that
although the absence of overt
Management hostility in either company
to the development may have facilitated
its (supervisory unionization) progress
significantly. The importance of
Management reaction has been emphasized
by several writers. (pg. 176.)
67 The point is made by Alan Fox that
for Management to concede collective
bargaining and other means by which
employees or their representatives can
participate in making some kind of
decisions may well strengthen rather
than weaken their control" ( Beyond
Contract pg 208)
Thus to grant union recognition may well increase rather
than diminish Management control. John Purcell notes that
by its
ability and willingness to deal with
the sort of issues which trade unions
raise in negotiation ensures that in
the eyes of employees it is a
"reasonable" employer which makes it
unnecessary, as far as they are
concerned, to ask more fundamental
questions ( "A strategy for Management
control in Industrial Relations": in
"control of Work"- J. Purcell and R.
smith reds] MacMillan 1979
68 See for instance -
G. Bamber " Trade Unions for Managers "
Review 1976 pp. 36-41.
D. Weir " Radical Managerialism " : BJIR 1976 pp 374-
388.
.....- ____ ---:...~9__P. Frost " Representation of Managerial Interest ": in
"Managers in Focus" - M. Poole et Al (eds), Gower 1981.
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70 Frost supra pg 118.
71 This is in contrast to the evidence presented by Weir
(supra) in his table 7 (pg 333) which showed that about 3/4
of all managers in his study held unfavourable views of
trade unions.
n D. Weir" Radical Managerialism ": a paper presented to
the SSRC Seminar Group on Management Attitudes and
Behaviour in Industrial Relations, May 1976. Quoted in G.
Bamber supra pg 37.
73 It is important for the reader to appreciate that this
was not merely word play, as on more than one occasion we
witnessed senior managers instructing junior managers to
ask senior stewards for information.
74 Bamber supra pg 37.
7S This sense of being outflanked can be found among the
Staff of our sample and is an important reason for their
unionization. It has been reported in other studies as
well, of supervisors, that they have a sense of
responsibility but no power or control. See, for instance
M. Burawoy "Manufacturing Consent" University of Chicago
Press 1979, and Child and Partridge, supra.
76 See footnote 54.
n This is consistent with the finding of Child and
Partridge. Thus
In terms of their attitudes at least,
the bulk of these supervisors looked
towards Management rather more strongly
than they did in other directions. liThe
Lost Managers" pg 184.
78 Child and Partridge argue
the dissatisfaction which supervisors
expressed in their jobs was centred on
status aspects, namely their pay
relative to other groups, their
opportunities for promotion and their
benefits and privileges. Supra pg 197.
This replicates too Mercer & Weir 1972.
79 Frost supra pg. 126.
10080 This is supported by Poole et AI. who found in their
study,
"ManagersI commitment to collective
rather than individual means of
representing their interests is
strongly correlated with membership,
and -is the second most important
variable in the mUltiple regression. (
H. Poole et Al. "Why Managers Join
Unions": Industrial Relations 1983, Vol
22, pg 440)
It should be recalled that at several· points in this study,
and in particular in Chapter 6, we have pointed to a
strongly individualistic emphasis on the part of the
managers in this study. Hence, following the Poole argument
we should not be surprised they have not unionised.
81 See Weir pg. 325; and Frost pg. 124. Both supra.
82 Frost supra pg 120.
M Indeed it has been pointed out by Guest & Dewe that,
"it is dissatisfaction with involvement
rather than with terms and conditions
of emploYment that is more
important."(D. Guest and P. Dewe "Why
Do Workers Belong to Trade unions".
British Journal of Industrial
Relations, 1988, pg. 189.)
Keeping in mind, Chapters 5 and 6 our results are in the
same mould as Guest and Dewe.
M This point is reinforced by Child and Partridge. Thus:
supervisors generally took a pragmatic
view of their trade union membership.
This was seen as a necessity in order
to safeguard and further their
interests in times when these could no
longer be assured by their employer.
Union membership was directed primarily
against the "company" and not against
the middle managers, some of whom were
members of the same union." The Lost
Managers" pg 194.
85 It is argued by Kirkbride that
IDrthe concept of organizational or
corporate culture has in recent years
forced its way to the forefront of the
managerial and academic literature. So
much so that the 1980s seem destined to
be the "culture" decade.
"Personnel Management and Organizational Culture: A Case
of Deviant Innovation?" - Paul Kirkbride. Personnel Review
1987 pp. 3-9.
86 By Pettigrew as
an amalgam of beliefs, ideologies,
language ritual and myth ( On studying
organizational cultures. Administrative
science Quarterly 1979 )
By Kirkbride as "
the "atmosphere" of the organization,
or the attitudes, feelings and beliefs
of the employees. Supra pg. 3.
By Gunz and Whitley as
beyond preferences of individuals for
growth or efficiency, to the collective
system which generates, sustains and
rationalizes ••• preferences and
beliefs. ( " Managerial Cultures and
Industrial strategies in British Firms
Hugh Gunz and Richard whitley.
organization studies 1985 pp 247-273 )
87 Deal and Kennedy" corporate Cultures ". Penguin 1988.
88 "The last Frontier of Control" Carol Axtell Ray.
Journal of Management Studies 1986 pp 287 - 297~
89 Ray, supra pg. 291.
90 See E. Durkheim "The Division of Labour in Society",
"The Elementary Forms of Religious Life", "On Morality and
Society".
91 Ray supra pg. 295- my note and emphasis.
92 This point is made by Alvesson; who points out that
research into culture tends to treat culture
a) as if the culture of Management were the
culture of the organization. Peters & Waterman (In
Search Of Excellence) and Deal & Kennedy ("Corporate
CUltures) are both criticised for this
_----..Jl D<)..100
101
'''''n.
b) as if it can only be considered in terms of
its functional utility, rather than its relationship
to the truth. For instance Peters and Waterman suggest
that organizations should encourage their staff to
think of themselves as "excellent", even though this
is clearly statistically absurd.
c) as something to be described only in positive
terms.
d) as something which is always consistent even
if it is in fact full of inconsistencies.
See M. Alvesson "Organization Theory and Technocratic
Consciousness". De Gruyter 1987, pg. 206-213.
93 For instance A. Athos and R. Pascale "Art of Japanese
Management": T. Deal and A. Kennedy "Corporate Cultures":
T. Peters and R. Waterman "In Search of Excellence": C.
Hickman and M. Silva "Creating Excellence".
94 See footnote 68 above.
95 See, for instance, Henry Mintzberg "Strategy Making in
Three Modes" California Management Review 1973, pp 44-53:
James Quinn "strategic Change: Logical Incrementalism'"
Sloan Management Review 1978, pp 7-21.
96 Ray, supra pg 289.
97 If we assume that it is a matter consciously thought out,
then it may have, as Kirkbride suggests, strategic value.
Supra pg 6.
98 Reference 68, supra.
99 He says
It is difficult to separate the concept
of IIqoodll employee relations from
notions of culture and climate as they
are so interconnected.
Kirkbride supra pg 4.
R. S. Schuler "Personnel and Human Resource Management
II. West 1981.
Kirkbride supra pg 5. My emphasis.
102 Kirkbride supra pg 6. D. Torrington and J. Chapman
IIpersonnel Management": Prentice Hall 1979 pg. 10.
103 Gunz and Whitley footnote 60 supra.
1~ Gunz and Whitley supra pg 271.
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II105 One example of this, from' Japan is given by Kono
(strategy and structure of Japanese Enterprises) who
describes how the corporate missions of Matsushita and
Hitachi have led the two companies in different directions.
The former has a much stronger consumer and market
orientation than the latter, which tends to emphasize
,technology and (Japanese) national interest. (See pages 64-
67) Thus the strategic decision-making in these two firms
is dominated by different philosophies, which emphasize
different types of information, and lead to different
courses of action. To some extent, therefore, the decisions
which are taken are predetermined in advance by the
rationalizes, not of the managers ( as Gunz and Whitley
would have it ), but of the culture.
1~ A similar issue is considered by McNulty ("A Question of
Managerial Legitimacy" Academy of Management Journal
September 1975 pp. 579-588) who, having rejected property
ownership rights as being the basis of managerial
legitimacy, turns to Locke's definition of property.
"Every man has a "property" in his own
"person". This nobody has any right to
but himself••••Whatsoever he removes
out of the state that Nature hath
provided and left it in, he hath mixed
his labour with it, and joined to
something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property" (Two Treatises
on Government pp. 186-187 - quoted by
McNUlty pg 585.)
McNulty suggests that Locke argues that property rights are
vested in the personal contribution of employees to the
organization. From this there are the following
implications:
a) different groups of employees (Eg managers)
make contributions of different value to the business
- in other words that the property rights claimed by
managers originate in that they make the greatest/most
valuable contribution to the company. Indeed there is
support for this view from Shepelak ("Role of Self-
Explanations and Self-Evaluations in Legitimating
Inequality" - Norma Shepelak. American'sociological
Review 1987 pp 495-503), who argues that relatively
advantaged people will justify their reward by
reference to their own worth (Eg "I am paid more
because I am worth more") and that they see this as
fair and just. While we would not deny this - indeed
our own data from Managers in Chapter 6 tends to
support it - the point we would wish to make is that
it can become a highly contentious issue in
organizations having a high degree of internal
interdependence, and while there is support for this
view from Managers in Chapter 6, among non-Managers
, this is not so widely accepted. '
I 6 1-b) this raises the whole question of what it is
that Management do that is so valuable. If we take
strategy making as our reference point, then there are
two possibilities. One is a conventional approach
which says that managers are highly skilled and
rational decision-makers, analysing vast amounts of
information to take optimal (or at least satisficing)
ex ante decisions. This for instance can be seen in
many of the conventional theories and models of
Corporate Management (Eg Christenson, Ansoff, Argenti
etc.). Another view is put by Pfeffer & Salancik who
argue that
"Management action operates lar.gely
with and on symbolic outcomes, and that
external constraints affect primarily
substantive actions and outcomes in
organizations" ("Management As Symbolic
Action" - J. Pfeffer in Research in
organizational Behaviour Vol 3 1981,
edited by Larry cummings and Barry
staw).
In "External Control of Organizations" Pfeffer
and Salancik argue that the Management role is largely
symbolic - it is about appearing to have control over
the environment. This shares much with the ideas of,
for instance James Quinn, and Henry Mintzberg, both of
whom regard Management as an activity which is less
controlling than the conventional strategic Management
models would ( Mintzberg argues in "Patterns of
strategy Formation" that while firms may go through
the conventional steps to produce a strategy, what
they actually do in practice may be different again) •
To the extent that Pfeffer & Salancik/ Quinn/
Mintzberg are more nearly correct, then that may tend
to devalue the way in which Management are seen to
make their contributions, and as we argued in
discussing Ford and Baucus (above footnote 8), this
may tend to produce questioning of the managerial
role. (See J. Pfeffer & G. Salancik-"External Control
of Organizations. Harper and Row 1978: J. Quinn -
"strategies for Change: Logical Incrementalism". Irwin
1980: Henry Mintzberg "Patterns of Strategy
Formation". Management Science 1978 pp 934-938.)
Hence, while not necessarily dissenting from Locke's idea
on property rights- indeed there is no inconsistency with
our argument - we do have to dissent from the McNulty,s
implication that the foundation of Management's legitimacy
is their contribution (the value of what they do). We would
contend that this is only by successful assertion and that
thus their position is by no means certain since their
claim may be contested by others in the organization who
also contribute. '
101 This point is also made by Pfeffer who points out that"a manaqer miqht be said to be
constrained by the demands of
subordinates, peers and supervisors
while at the same time influencinq
these other actors throuqh his or her
own behaviours and preferences" (pp 3-4
in staw , cumminqs supra).
Manaqement is therefore, not a free field, but rather one
in which manaqers too are sUbject to constraints on the
ways in which they behave. This does not, however, diminish
their power - indeed it is one of its most important
features. They too are sUbject to Plato's Cave (See above
footnote ~4 .).
108 We mean by this that they consider control from the
point of view of getting a job done, which is consistent
with our earlier argument about their views of Management
as an activity, as a job. Control is not about domination
or power it is a purely technical function. This
sanitized version of Management is considered further when
we discuss Habermas.
109 This is considered in "Domination, Justification and
Self-Doubt" - Richard M. Merelman: Journal of Politics
1986, Vol. 48, pp. 276-300. Merelman concludes his review
of Psychology literature by suggesting that there are,
"several perceptual, coqnitive and
motivational tendencies Which qenerate
qroup conflict and domination under
even the most eqalitarian initial
conditions. Once empowered, dominant
qroups employ a second set of social-
psycholoqical devices perceptual,
coqnitive, and motivational in an
attempt to justifY their dominance to
themselves". (Our emphasis) pg 297.
A similar, though more direct point, is made by Pfeffer in
"Power in organizations" pitman 1981,
"The theory that efficiency
considerations, bureaucratic
rationality, or both, drive out power
and politics, reassures those in or
enterinq into the corporate world, that
their success in risinq throuqh the
ranks will be more a function of their
marqinal product than of their ability
to diaqnose power distributions and
play politics. Inequality in outcomes
becomes justified by the presumed
decision-makinq processes Which produce
such outcomes" (pp. 12-13).
r O~..... -
We would contend that emphasise the technical aspects of
the manager's job is evidence of Merelman's conclusion,
though not necessarily that our respondent's are conscious
of this as this "justification" may simply be a part of the
manager's sUbjective equipment, as Pfeffer points out.
110 B. Abrahamsson "On Form & Function in Organization
Theory" - Organization studies 1985, pp. 39-53.
111 This shares certain similarities with Habermas I s
thought. In "Technology and Science as Ideology" (In
"Toward a Rational Society" - Heinemann 1971) he takes
issue with Marcuse I s critique of contemporary science and
technology. Marcuse argues (for instance, in "One
Dimensional Man") that the emancipation of the human
species would not only free it from the domination of
science and technology, whose results are being used for
the legitimation of the existing order, but emancipation
would also lead to a completely new science and technology.
Habermas, following his distinction between communicative
action (interaction) and purposive-rational action (work)
to which science and technology belong, argues that
emancipation would not lead to a completely new science, as
Marcuse argues. Instead through communicative action,
science and technology would be rationally controlled and
directed by the abolition of systematically distorted
communication. Hence, in the same way Habermas argues that
emancipation does not necessarily require the restructuring
of science and technology but rather their rational
control, Abrahamsson argues that hierarchy need not be
abolished but rationally controlled.
112 See Abrahamsson, supra, pg 50.
113 For instance, to take a very simplistic example, no one
really cared how the sales Staff got the orders in - all
that mattered was that they were won on a basis which would
allow the firm to continue. It was not the process, it was
the outcome which mattered.
114 See Abrahamsson, supra, who· argues,
The orqanization qenerates its own
inner transformations toward hierarchy.
However law-like this statement may
seem, it differs from Michels' iron law
of oliqarchy in a critical respect.
The appearance of hierarchy is one
thinq: its use for illeqitimate or
oppressive purposes is quite another"
(pq 49).
115 This point is recognized by Culbert & McDonough, who
suggest121
II(1) Trusting relationships are a
necessary condition for the long-term
effectiveness of any organization.
(2) The Human Relations people were
right, communication skills and empathy
are the keys to trusting relationships.
(3) But, before good communications
leading to trusting relationships are
possible, one first has to recognize
the political forces that are inherent
in the situation. and then one must
deal skilfully with themll[my emphasis]
("Radical Management"- s. Culbert and J
McDonough, The Free Press 1985 pg ix~
It is their argument that Management, even participative
Management, is about Managers using their (special) skills,
and thus in our sense using their power.
100 See Stephen Hill "Competition & Control at Work", who
points out,
lilt should also be borne in mind that
all levels of managers have an interest
in the preservation of managerial
prerogative, because this affects the
scope of their own jobs.1I (pg 84).
Hence in using their jobs as their explanations of what
they do, Hill argues, Managers side-step the issue of
power, because their very job definition is an expression
of power. On this point see also Merelman supra.
117 Page 13.
118 Robert A. Dahl "The Concept of Power"• Behavioural
Science 1957, pg. 201.
119 R. Emmerson "Power Dependence Relations". American
sociological Review, 1962, pg. 32
120 M. Weber "Economy and society". pg. 53
P. Blau "Exchange and Power in social Life" 1967
122 J. Gaventa "Power and Powerlessness", pg. 22.
123 W. Connolly "The Terms of Political Discourse" pg. 88.
124 G. Salancik and J. Pfeffer "Who Gets Power - and How
They Hold On To It". Organizational Dynamics 1977, pg. 3.
125 B. Russell "The Forms of Power" in s. Lukes [Ed]
"Power". Blackwell 1986, pg. 19.
[0 ?5126 R. Dahl "Power and the Control of Behaviour" in S.
LUkes, supra, pg. 40.
127 In this way we begin to deal with the problem considered
by Knights and Roberts. They argue that
pluralist examinations of competinq and
conflictinqclaims for influence and
control in orqanizations are bequn from
an initial assumption of a balance of
power and a respect for the "rules of
the qame" that maintain the system in
equilibrium. In this way much of what
. requires explanation is assumed: the
hierarchical distribution of positions
that represents the formal structure of
an orqanization and is the medium and
outcome of the actual exercisinq of
power is left unexamined (D. Knights
and J • Roberts "The Power of
Organization and the organization of
Power". organization studies 1982, pp.
47-63). pg 48.
1~ It is pointed out by Spender that Weber defines power as
one person's ability to force another
to specific actions in spite of that
other person's wishes. (J. - C. Spender
"Industry Recipes". Basil Blackwell,
1989, pg. 16)
Spender later goes on to question why anyone would accept
even the (Weberian) rational-legal authority of another
Weber arques that bureaucracy is the
purest rational-leqal form of
orqanization••••But qiven our
democratic commitment . .to personal
freedom, we must consider why anyone
would voluntarily . accept another's
authority. (Spender supra, pg 17)
It . precisely this inadequacy which requires to ~s us go
beyond Weber.
129 In S. Lukes "Power: A Radical View" • MacMillan 1974.
130 S. Lukes, supra pg. 23.
131 S. Lukes, supra pg. 51.
132 T. Parsons "Sociological Theory and Modern Society" Free
Press 1967, pg. 308.
109......
133 As well as the implications which Parsons draws from it
- for instance that the power of A over B becomes merely a
precedence in decision making.
134 H. Mintzberg "Power in and Around Organizations".
Prentice Hall 1983, pg. 4.
135 H. Arendt "Communicative Power" in S. Lukes (ed)
"Power". Basil Blackwell 1986, pg 64.
136 J. Habermas "Hannah Arendt's conception of Power". In S.
Lukes (ed) "Power" • Basil Blackwell 1986, pg 75.
137 J. Habermas "Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of
Power". In S. Lukes [Ed] - "Power", Blackwell 1986, pg 88.
138 S. Clegg "Power, Rule and Domination". RKP 1975.
139 J. Pfeffer "Power in Organizations". Pitman. 1981, Page
6. (My emphasis)
140 This latter point is where, we shall argue below, Clegg
(supra) becomes inadequate.
141 He tells us
this consent emerges only if Management
does not arbitrarily dictate choices to
workers - if for example transfers are
always taken at the initiative of
workers and through the bidding
process. (M. Burawoy "ManUfacturing
Consent" University of Chicago Press
1979, pg 120)
Biggart and Hamilton show that
in order to be powerful an actor must
limit acts of power to the norms of his
or her role, or convince others that he
or . she is exercising power within the
limits of the role••••Interpersonal
power is in important measure a matter
of getting others to view one's acts of
power as acts of obedience to one's
role•••This obligation to act within
the bounds of one's role does not
decrease as one assumes higher
positions of authority; a role may
grant more discretion in how it is
enacted, but there are normative
constraints to even the highest level
positions. (M. Biggart and Hamilton G.
"The Power of Obedience" Administrative
science Quarterly 1984, pp 540-549.).
110142 A similar point is made by Gaventa when he suggests that
power can be treated accumulatively. He suggests the
movement to be from 1st to 2nd to 3rd. We will argue that
this process in reverse (ie from 3rd to 2nd to 1st) can be
equally important, if not more so. (See J. Gaventa "Power
and Powerlessness". Clarendon Press 1980, pp 21-22)
1U G. Morgan "Images of Organization". Sage 1986, pg. 199.
144 W. Gamson "The Strategy of Social Protest". Dorsey Press
1975.
145 He considers, for instance, the "Little Steel strike"
which began in 1937 against Republic Steel, Bethlehem
Steel, Inland Steel and Youngstown Steel and Tube. The aim
of the strike was to force recognition of the fledgling
Steel Workers' Organizing Committee (SWOC). On May 26 of
that year, a march of strikers toward the Republic Plant in
Chicago was ordered to disperse by the Police. within
minutes of the order being given, 7 strikers were dead, 3
fatally wounded, scores wounded and 35 Police were injured.
The Senate hearing into these events (the Lafollette
committee) found that none of the 10 dead were shot in the
front (7 in the back, 3 in the side) and that the first
shots came from the Police. Gamson concludes by pointing
out that, first of all recognition was eventually secured
by 1941, and that the union (now the united Steel Workers
of America) dines with the President.
other similar events/organizations considered by Gamson
include the American Association of University Professors
(which between 1914 and 1922 fought for greater academic
freedom, and tenure to prevent trustees firing teachers for
holding unpopular views): the National Union for Social
Justice ( led by the "radio priest" Father Coughlin, which
during 1934-36 sought to mobilise working class Catholics,
farmers and the unemployed to influence the government to
inflate the economy): the American Birth Control League
which attempted to secure greater acceptance of birth
control and to influence legislation toward this: the
American Federation of Teachers which mobilized teachers to
achieve better working conditions for themselves: Christian
Front Against Communism which between 1938 and 1942, again
led by Father Coughlin, attempted to influence working
class Catholics, farmers and the unemployed to influence
the government to stay out or European conflicts, but was
also anti-communist and anti-semitic.
Some of these groups failed (Eg those involving Father
coughlin), others succeeded (Eg the steel workers), while
others were effectively absorbed (the American Association
of University Professors).
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146 In this tradition he locates E. Hoffer "The True
Believer": A. Kornhauser "The Politics of Mass Society": E.
Smelser "Theory of Collective Behaviour", which Gamson
describes as "the most sophisticated statement of this
theory". Gamson argues that the Collective Behaviour
theory portrays the behaviour of many protest groups as
irrational. For instance Smelser suggests that such groups
are motivated by a "generalized belief" which
contains elements of magical thinking
and omnipotence. liThe proposed reform
will render opponents helpless and will
be effective immediately•••Because of
this exaggerated potency, adherents see
unlimited bliss in the future if only
the reforms were adopted. For if they
are adopted, they argue, the basis for
threat, frustration and discomfort will
disappearll(Smelser IITheory of
Collective Behaviour") • For all his.
sophistication then, Smelser retains a
sharp distinction between the
essentially 1 rational action of
routine politics and the oversimplified
"generalized beliefsll by which
participants in mass movements are
moved to actll(W. Gamson "supra, pg 132)
147 Gamson supra pg. 132.
148 Gamson supra pg. 138.
149 But perhaps just as interestingly would be seen as
irrational by the majority of non-Management employees.
150 Gamson supra pg. 141, see below.
Gamson supra pg. 141.
152 Dahl's stUdy of New Haven ("Who Governs?" Yale
University Press 1961) is a classic of this kind, in that
Dahl examines the decisions taken by the local authority,
and identified those who had won and lost in decision-
making. This, however totally leaves out those who could
not even gain admission to the decision-making system, far
less being able to lose.
153 This quite clearly has echoes of Bachrach and Baratz's
second dimension of power.
154 See also Knights and Roberts, supra on this.
155 E Oberschall "Social Conflict and Social Movements",
Prentice Hall, pg 28: quoted in Gamson supra pg. 137.
156 J. Foster and C. Woolfson "The Politics of the UCS Work-
in" Lawrence and Wishart 1986, pg 413•157 J. Pfeffer & G. Salancik "The External Control of
Organizations". Harper and Row 1978.
158 This has similarities to the idea presented by Gaventa
(J. Gaventa "Power and Powerlessness". Clarendon Press,
1981, pg. 255) that one of the signs of the third dimension
of power is that the powerless become so partly because
constant defeat creates a sense of powerlessness. In the
same way observing Management as the decision-makers
creates a sense of powerlessness.
159 Foster and Woolfson quote Gerry Ross (Boilermakers
Convener at John Brown's) in his description of the
decision to go ahead with the work-in.
Many of the stewards could not grasp
the significance of the work-in,
including even we among the leadership,
knowing we were making a decision of
this nature, and we'd no position in
the past where we could draw
comparisons with such a situation. We
did not understand••••maybe Reid and
Airlie did, what the actual decision
meant, what complications we'd be
confronted with, and how gigantic a
step was necessary to make a success
come out ofitll(Pp 172-175)
This is not to say that the stewards did not have the
skills to use resources - the organization which they set
up during the work-in denies that as well an anything could
- but the point we wish to make is that at the outset their
experience militated taking this course of action.
160 And was SUbsequent copied - Lee Jeans at Greenock,
Lovable Bras at CUmbernauld, and Plessey at Bathgate.
161 To such an extent that the EmploYment Act 1982 extends
in effect the English law of trespass to Scotland in cases
of industrial dispute, to enable factory owners to obtain
interdict in the event of a work-in or sit-in. See K.
Miller "Plessey v Wilson". Industrial Law Journal 1982, pp.
115-117.
162 D. Maddison, R. Allen, L. Porter. P. Renwick and B.
Hayes "Organizational Politics: An Exploration of Managers'
perceptions". Human Relations 1980, pp. 77-83.
163 The same area has also been researched by
R. Allen, D. Maddison, , L. Porter, P. Renwick, and B.
Mayes "Organizational Politics". California Management
Review 1979, pp. 77-83. This deals with perceptions by a
group of managers of the personal characteristics of
effective political actors
1/3D. Kipnis, S. Schmidt, and I. Wilkinson
"Interorganizational Influence Tactics" Journal of Applied
Psychology 1980 pp. 440-452. This deals with the strategies
they used in getting their own way.
J. Pfeffer and W. Moore "Power in University BUdgeting"
Administrative Science Quarterly 1980, pp. 637-653. This
shows how power can be used to predict budget allocations
in a University. A similar issue is dealt with by
F. Hills and T. Mahoney "University BUdgets and
Organizational Decision-making. Administrative science
Quarterly 1978, pp. 454-465.
J. Pfeffer and G. Salancik "organizational Decision-making
as a Political Process" Administrative Science Quarterly
1974, pp. 135-151.
G. Salancik and J. Pfeffer "The Bases and Uses of Power in
organizational Decision-Making" Administrative Science
Quarterly 1974, pp. 453-473.
H. Mintzberg "The Organization as a Political Arena"
Journal of Management studies 1985, pp. 134-154.
The common factor in all of this is that while the parties
involved are aware of the exercise of power, there is no
analysis of why it is that power gets used in this way.
164 Madison et al., supra pg. 81. This is an interesting
analogy for them to draw, since as we have pointed out
before, shop stewards tend to think of their power in a
similar way - like a bank account, such that they had a
"balance of trust" with their members, which they "spent"
in influencing them to certain acts, and if this led to a
successful outcome then their balance would be topped up,
or reduced if not.
165 Madison et al., supra pg. 87
166 J. French and B. Raven "The Bases of Social < Power". In
D. cartwright & A. Zander (Eds) "Group Dynamics".
167 Madison et al., supra pg. 94.
168 M. Patchen "The Locus and Basis of Influence on
organizational Decisions". Organizational Behaviour and
Human Performance 1974, pp. 195-221.
169 Madison et al., supra pg. 96.
170 H. Mintzberg "Power in and Around Organizations".
Prentice Hall, 1983.
171 M. Crozier "The Bureaucratic Phenomenon". University of
Chicago Press 1964 and
f 14M. crozier and E. Friedberg "Actors and Systems" University
of chicago Press 1980.
1n Perhaps we should say here "because they are not well
understood" they are accorded special status. This point
will become more apparent in the following section when we
consider Habermas's concept of fragmented consciousness,
where we can consider Management as being accepted
uncritically not because employees are unable to understand
it (in the sense that it is too difficult or complex), but
because Management skills etc. are areas of knowledge from
which they are excluded, in that Management skills are, in
effect, an "insulated" area of specialist expertise. See J.
K. White "The Recent Work Of Jurgen Habermas". Cambridge
Uni. Press 1988. pg 117.
1n Moreover, as we have pointed out above, the Managerial
knowledge is insulated, excluding other groups.
174 H. Mintzberg "Power in and Around Organizations".
Prentice Hall, 1983, pp. 114-115.
1~ In this respect see his discussion of Hirschmann, who
argues in "Exit, Voice and Loyalty", that an individual has
three basic options
1) he can leave - exit
2) he can stay and contribute as required
loyalty
3) he can stay and try to change the system -
voice.
Mintzberg focuses most on the last of these - voice. It is
clear that organizations would run much less smoothly than
they usually do, if those who chose voice were to outnumber
those choosing loyalty (albeit of an apathetic variety). By
focusing on voice 'therefore, Mintzberg focuses on conflict
and how that can be controlled, rather than on loyalty (in
the sense used by Hirschmann) and how it arises. See
Mintzberg supra, pg 23, and, A. o. Hirschmann "Exit, Voice
and Loyalty". Harvard University Press 1970.
176 H. Braverman "Labor and Monopoly Capital". Monthly
Review Press 1974.
1n Dahl, for instance, insists that there can be no
exercise of power without conflict - and even the Bachrach
and Baratz perspective requires that power is exercised
consciously.I
178 For the avoidance of doubt we are not arguing that Ii
Mintzberg, or Braverman or Gamson are wrong, or that what
they are saying is not relevant. Rather it is our argument
that they consider only one view of the
superior:sUbordinate relationship, analysing from the
position of the former, and how that role can be made to
work. Our argument would be that if we treat power as a
feature of a relationship rather than an individual
capacity, then to be adequate we need to consider both
parties to the relationship, and thus the perspectives of
both as a gestalt and not just one side.
179 T. Nichols and H. Beynon "Living with Capitalism". RKP,
1977.
180 Nichols and Beynon, supra pg vii.
181 Nichols and Beynon, supra pp. xi-xiv.
182 This is simply one of very many, but see for instance
Pg. 86 where a worker relates the effects of too many
"double shifts".
1~ Nichols and Beynon supra, pg. 139.
184 Indeed there is evidence of (a) in reverse, in that
Managers told us that sometimes when work was being
inspected it would become apparent that it had not been
done as instructed. But on further inspection it would
become clear that in fact the way it had been done was
better - in other words rather than sabotage there was
evidence that employees would use their skills to improve
on the job. There is, however, a difference between our
site and Nichols and Beynon's, since ours was much more
concentrated and limited spatially. The consequence of this
was that it was much more likely than in Chem-co that the
Shop Steward would know about the dispute at the time and
thus would be more likely to be involved.
185 ~ee Appendix 5, section on transfers.
186 Nichols and Beynon, supra, pg 115.
187 Nichols and Beynon, supra, pg 119.
188 Nichols and Beynon, supra, pg 120.
189 Though they do recognize that conflict was limited in
its scope:
J J!.f•••in this most modern of corporations,
where a determined effort is made to
process everythinq, both manaqers and
workers find themselves covertly
neqotiatinq the reality of corporate
production. Conflict and antaqonisms
are contained beneath the surface by
way of tacit understandinqs and
unmentioned limits. (Nichols and
Beynon, supra pq. 140)
And yet, as we argue in the main text, could it be
otherwise? The fact is that things work at Chem-Co, Zap and
Zap X get produced and sent out. Perhaps we need to
understand how it is, that despite everything, this still
happens.
190 See Nichols and Beynon, supra pg. 70.
191 In any case we have to be clear about what we mean by
the "Management function". Do we mean the analytical/
organizational aspect of Management (getting information,
scheduling, writing reports etc.) ? Or do we mean the
decision-making function of Management? It would seem to us
that Nichols and Beynon have the latter in mind, but is it
realistic to disengage one from the other, since the latter
often depends on the former. Our evidence suggests to us
that this is the perception of Management held by our
sample, and that realising this, and that they are not
trained in the analytical Management skills, it is more
effective for them to seek to influence Management
decision-making through making representation, which makes
clear the pOlicies, decisions etc. which they will/will not
accept. Hence non-Management employees focus not on the
Management function, because they do not see themselves as
having the necessary and skills (Whereas Management do),
but instead focus on the likely outcomes of Management
actions.
192 R. Harris "Power and Powerlessness in Industry".
Tavistock Publications 1987.
193 Harris, supra pg. 1.
194 Harris, supra pg. 3.
195 Harris, supra pg. 106.
196 This is the conclusion also reached by
w. Brown "A Consideration of Custom & Practice". British
Journal of Industrial Relations 1972, pp. 178-184. and
J. W. Kuhn "Bargaining in Grievance Settlement". Columbia
University Press, 1961.
I':rIt is also an example of Nichols and Beynon's "nods and
winks".
197 Harris, supra pg 108.
198 Harris, supra pg 108.
199 Harris, supra pg 232.
200 This to some extent contradicts Harris's view that it is
lower Management who rely on good will. See pg. 108.
201 See above.
202 S. Clegg "Power, Rule and Domination". RKP 1975.
203 S. Clegg, supra, pg 155.
204 F. Hunter "community Power Structure". University of
North Carolina Press 1953.
205 C. stone "Pre-emptive Power". American Journal of
Political science 1988, pp. 82-104.
206 P. Bachrach & M. Baratz " Decisions and Non-Decisions".
American Political science Review 1963, pp 82-104.
207 stone supra, pg 88.
208 Stone supra, pg 88.
209 stone supra, pp. 89-91.
210 stone supra, pg 102.
211 See above.
212 Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" points to many of the
practical advantages controlled by the powerful.
213 J. Gaventa "Power and Powerlessness". Clarendon Press
1980, pg. 255.
214 Indeed this is further argument for caution on the
rotation of the Management' role, suggested by Nichols &
Beynon. The potential problem is that if workers (or a
group of workers) were to occupy the role for a period of
time, and be signally unsuccessful, then this may discredit
the whole concept, and simultaneously reinforce the role of
Management.
215 Abrahamsson supra, pg 39.
216 In this there is obviously commonality with Nichols and
Beynon.
J f%211 Another example of this is an experimental study carried
out by Zucker (L. Zucker "The Role of Institutionalization
in cultural Persistence". American sociological Review
1977, pp. 726-743). This put (experimental) sUbjects into
one of three contexts to be influenced in estimating the
position of a point of light (the Sherif autokinetic effect
experiment) - they could be
1) subject to influence by an individual on the
position of the light,
2) sUbject to influence through being members of
an organization with others,
3) SUbject to influence through a member of the
organization being given a particular office (in this
case the Light Operator).
In each condition - as with the original Sherif experiment
- there were confederates who would seek to influence the
experimental SUbject in· a particular way, so as to give
wrong estimates. Zucker found that the most effective
condition for influencing SUbjects was the third - where
there was a "formal office". This condition would be
closest to conditions of hierarchy and control by a "boss".
This leads Zucker to conclude that
Any act performed by the occupant· of an
office is seen as hiqhly objectified
and exterior (Zucker supra, pg 729)
This is consistent with the theory of the Lifeworld
developed by Schutz, who in his discussion of the
development of Social Knowledge as opposed to the
SUbjective Knowledge of the individual, puts an emphasis on
the objectification which takes place as the latter is
transformed to the former. Moreover, Zucker's results are
not inconsistent with our own since we have found that the
role of Manager is imbued with "special qualities". The
limitation of Zucker's results is that she does not seek to
explain why the office holder should be peculiarly
effective as an influence.
218 The use of this title for this section is intended to
draw to the attention of the reader, that while we shall
spend the first part of this section on the derivation of
the Lifeworld (Which is ultimately individual), the latter
part shall be more concerned with inter-subjectivity.
219 This point is made by Walton in his article on Sabotage
in S. Cohen and J. Young "Deviance", Pelican 1971.
220 See footnote 110, above.
~1 Simon has argued
119The question of where political. ideas
come from is not only highly deserving
of study, but also within the
competence of our contemporary research
techniques. I join Bill Riker in
commending it to you as one of the
truly exciting and significant areas of
investigation in our field (H. Simon,
quoted in A. Wildavsky "Choosing
Preferences by Constructing
Institutions: A Cultural Theory of
Preference Formation". Americal
Political science Review 1987, pg. 1)
222 K. Thompson "Organizations as Constructors of Reality
(1)", in "Control & Ideology in organizations" - G. Salaman
& K. Thompson (Eds.) Open University Press 1980, pg 232.
223 P. McHugh "Defining the situation". Bobbs-Merrill 1968,
pg. 3.
224 As Buckley observes
Social order is not simply normatively
specified and automatically maintained
but is something that must be worked
at, continually reconstructed. (W.
Buckley " "Society as a Complex
Mechanism" in W. Buckley [Ed] "Modern
Systems Research for the Behavioural
Scientist", Chicago 1968. pg 497.)
225 In this discussion of Schutz I s work, we shall frequently
refer to Schutz in the text, even though in many cases the
work we are drawing on will frequently be "Structures of
the Life World", pUblished after Schutz I s death, and co-
written with T. Luckmann.
226 See above, footnote 32, Chapter 1.
227 Se above, Chapter 1.
228 It is suggested by Schutz and Luckmann
By the everyday life world is to be
understood that province of reality
which the wide awake and normal adult
simply takes for granted in the
attitude of common sense. By this
taken-for-grantedness we designate
everything Which we experience as
unquestionable; every state of affairs
is for us unproblematic until further
notice. (A. Schutz and T. Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World"
Heinemann 1974. pp.3-4.)
I~O
~_._---=----------------....-
The stress in this on the taken-for-grantedness of the
Lifeworld shows the relevance of Habermas's claims in that
1) in the Ideal Speech Thesis every state of
affairs is problematic until further notice and that
2)in interaction, however, we behave as if the
Ideal Speech Thesis is true. If we did not - if we
entered into dialogue every time - there would clearly
be chaos. For instance if somebody wished you "good
morning", might you ask "are you meteorologically
qualified to be able to say that?"
There would be obvious difficulty if we did not behave in
most cases as if the Ideal Speech Thesis is true. This in
turn raises the issue of the implications if it is not in
fact true, but this is concealed from us.
229 This point is made by Husserl
The paradoxical interrelationships of
the "objectively true world" and the
"life-world" make enigmatic the manner
of beinq for both. ( E. Husserl " The
crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology".
Northwestern University Press 1970, pg.
131)
230 See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action (2)",
Polity 1986, pg. 129.
231 Habermas makes this point as follows,
The members of a collective count
themselves as belonqinq to the
Lifeworld in the first-person plural,
in a way similar to that in which the
individual speaker attributes to
himself the SUbjective world to which
he has privileqed access in first-
person sinqular. communality rests, to
be sure on a cultural stock of
knowledqe that the members share. (J.
Habermas "Theory. of Communicative
Action (2)", Polity 1988, pg. 131.)
~2 On the other hand, as we have argued above in footnote
399, this begs the issue of what is success, and why it
should be defined in this way.
233 Schutz & Luckmann "Structures of the Life World", pg. 4.
234 See G, Morgan "Images of Organization", Sage 1986, pp.
199-233. The "psychic prison" is one of the metaphors
considered by Morgan. He describes it as joining
19..\the idea that organizations are psychic
phenomena, in the sense that they are
ultimately created and sustained by
conscious and unconscious processes,
with the notion that people can
actually become imprisoned or confined
by the images, ideas, thoughts and
actions to which these processes give
rise. (pg. 199)
~5 It is pointed out by Habermas that
as long as we do not free ourselves
from the naive, situation oriented
attitude of actors caught up in the
communicative practice of everyday
life, we cannot grasp the limitations
of a life-world that is dependent upon,
and changes along with a cultural stock
of knowledge that can be expanded at
any time. For members the life-world is
a context that cannot be gotten behind
and cannot in principle be exhausted.
(J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative
Action (2)", Polity 1988, pg. 133).
This of course at the same time points to the major
limitation of Schutz I s theory - that he does not fully
consider the causes of this, nor the implications its
limitations have for society generally beyond the level of
the individual.
~6 This point is taken up by Habermas, who points out that
Schutz, beginning as he does from Husserl, adopts an
egological consciousness as the basis of the Lifeworld.
Thus Schutz does
not get at the structures of the
Lifeworld by grasping the structures of
linguistically generated inter-
sUbjectivity directly; but rather in
the mirror of the isolated actor's
subjective experience.(J. Habermas
"Theory of Communicative Action (2)",
Polity 1988, pg. 130).
~7 Habermas makes a similar point of Arendt
1"'-9- ..._---------=-------------One may regard the method by which
Hannah Arendt develops her practical
philosophy - a method reminiscent of
Alfred Schutz's social phenomenoloqy -
as inadequate; but the intention is
clear: she wants to read off of the
formal properties of communicative
action (or praxis) the general
structures of unimpaired
intersubjectivity. (J. Habermas "Hannah
Arendt's Communications Concept of
Power"• In S. Lukes (ed. ) "Power"
Blackwell 1986, pg 79).
238 This point will be taken up more fully when we go on to
consider Habermas.
239 Howarth-williams has argued this point (M. Howarth-
Williams "R. o. Laing - His Work and its Relevance for
Sociology. RKP 1977, pg 181), but see Schutz and Luckmann,
pg 254.
240 R. Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social and Political
Theory", Methuen 1976, pg 158.
241 See R.o. Laing and A. Esterson "Sanity, Madness and the
Family". Tavistock 1964, pp 19-20.
242 This point is taken up by Howarth-Williams, who uses a
case in Laing's "Sanity, Madness and the Family" to show
how the family of a girl, diagnosed as mentally ill, was
controlled in such a way by her mother and father that she
began to appear to exhibit symptoms of mental illness. In
particular the parents consistently denied the truth of any
statements she made, so that when she was found to be
unable to exercise normal skills of perception etc., it was
not that she failed to exercise them, but that because of
the control exercised by her parents she actually did not
have these skills to use. It may be argued that if
Management , for instance, deny employees influence in the
decision-making of their firms because they appear not to
be interested r to have the necessary skills, then the
employees will have no motive and no opportunity to develop
these skills. Thus they can be excluded because they are
not interested and not skilled. See M. Howarth-Williams "R.
o. Laing - His Work and its Relevance for Sociology". RKP
1977, pg 183. We shall develop these ideas later on in this
chapter.
243 In other words it does not allow for the possibility
that the content of the social stock of knowledge plays a
functional social role, through its substantive content and
its influence on the subjective stock of knowledge. This is
a point we shall take up later in considering Habermas I s
"colonization of the Lifeworld".
h..... '_'L... 2 _244 R. Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social and Political
Theory", Methuen 1976, pg 161.
245 There is no attempt to consider the possibility that the
content of the social stock plays a functional role for
society.
246 His discussion of objectivation points to conditions
which are necessary, but are certainly not sufficient for
the transfer of sUbjective knowledge into the social stock.
For instance do certain individuals - media personalities
for instance - not have a greater chance of having their
sUbjective knowledge enter into the social stock. Schutz's
requirements are necessary - being generally accepted and
being passed over the generations - but they do not, we
would argue, on their own, explain the content of the
social stock.
247 It is pointed out by Habe~as
Communicative actions are not only
processes of interpretation in which
cultural knowledge is "tested against
the world"; they are at the same time
processes of integration and
socialization. (J. Habermas "Theory of
Communicative Action (2)", Polity 1988,
pg. 130).
248 It is pointed out by Bernstein that
an interpretation of reality cannot be
limited exclusively to discerning
regUlarities among dependent and
independent variables. (R. . Bernstein
"The Restructuring of Social and
Political Theory", Methuen 1976, pg
156.)
consequently, he goes on to argue
what is lacking in phenomenology is
anything that could serve as a basis
for critical evaluative jUdgements.
What is worse, it turns this lack into
a virtue - the presumed virtue of pure
description. (R. Bernstein "The
Restructuring of Social and Political
Theory", Methuen 1976, pg 168)
249 For instance a problem with asking people whether they
are satisfied with their jobs is that they are biased to
answer in the affirmative, since if they say "no", then
they are open to the response "well, why are you still
here?".
ht... ,L ..... ~ _250 We shall consider such mechanisms in the following
discussion of Habermas, and of Laing.
251 . clegg (S. Clegg "organization and Control"
Administrative science Quarterly 1981, pp. 545-562) argues,
quoting Marcuse and Perrow, that
control is best achieved by employinq
aqents that have rules and rationality
built into them throuqh educational
socialization.
252 Morgan (G. Morgan "Images of Organization". Sage 1988)
shows the psychic prison analogy can have other features,
in addition to those instanced above. For instance he shows
that in securing organizational change, a change agent may
have to
create transitional phenomena when they
do not exist naturally. Just as a
father or mother may have to help find
a substitute for Teddy, a chanqe aqent
must usually help his or her tarqet
qroup to relinquish what is held dear
before they can move on. (pg. 222)
Thus, when change is immanent we cannot simply impose
change - the group must be helped, in effect to expand (or
change) the limits imposed by their Lifeworld. Thus
developing a system of worker participation, or industrial
democracy, would have to take into account the Lifeworld
definition of Managers as "decision-makers".
.
Morgan presents several advantages which he claims are
possible from this analogy:
a) it may disguise the extent to which what
appears to be rationality is in fact no more than
irrationality in disguise (pg 229). Morgan's
perspective on this comes from Freud, but as we have
shown, this is the very argument which Habermas, from
his discursive theory of truth, would make also, since
breaches of the Ideal Speech Thesis give rise to
decisions which are less than fully rational.
b) Morgan, referring to attempts to consciously
manage meanings within organizations, points out that
through the psychic prison metaphor, we can see how we
all pray a role in the construction of meanings which
give rise to unconscious power - even if only in their
enactment.(pg 230)c) while Morgan concentrates on what we have
termed the "unconscious" (the Freudian sense) he goes
on to note that the metaphor can be extended to
include all the ideological processes which function
to produce and sustain unconscious power. (pg 230) It
is in this specifically extended sense that we refer
to Morgan's analogy.
253 T. McCarthy - "The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas".
Polity 1984. pg 358. This also points to other differences
with Marx.
a) Most importantly while Marx saw any crisis of
Capitalism arising in the economic sphere, Habermas
(though not denying that economic crisis would happen)
sees the possibility of other forms of crisis - in the
administrative (or rationality) system, in the
legitimation system, and in the motivation system, as
well as economic system - and that it would be as a
consequence of crisis in one of these that would cause
capitalism to fall. While Marx worked in liberal
capitalism, the capitalism which Habermas deals with
is much more organized (administered) and the state
now plays a central role. The state will
fill in functional gaps in the market,
the state intervenes in the process of
capital accumulation. It heightens the
productivity of labour through the
production of collective commodities
(material and immaterial
infrastructure) and through organizing
the educational system in general and
scientific-technical progress in
particular. ("The Critical Theory of
Jurgen Habermas" -T. McCarthy. Polity,
1984. pg 364)
b) price setting by the market has been replaced
by administered price setting, over which the parties
will negotiate - for instance the price of labour will
be determined by the relative power of the unions and
employers, rather than by the market directly.
Through the system of "political"
wages, negotiated on the basis of wage
scales, it has been possible - above
all in the capital and growth intensive
sectors of the economy - to mitigate
the opposition between wage labour and
capital and to bring about a partial
class compromise. ("Legitimation
crisis" - J. Habermas. Heinemann 1976.
pg. 57.)
~...--..,;, I_'l_lJ _hze
The point which Habermas draws from this is that
organizational principle of capitalism has changed from the
time when Marx wrote. At that time the organizational
principle was the relationship of wage labour to capital
(Ie wages had to be kept sUfficiently low to allow the
development of capital. The organizational principle which
Habermas now sees in capitalism is that the quasi-political
distribution of the products of society, between labour and
capital (still a relation of capital and wage labour),
should continue to be seen as legitimate. While the
"economy" remains, sUbstantially, in private ownership, it
now relies on an substantial state system which
"administers" the economy in order to produce adequate
economic growth. To pay for this system the state takes
part of the generated private profit in the form of
taxation. This is used by the state to
a) provide various services (education, welfare
etc.) for the population,
b) manage the economy (through adjusting economic
policies, providing sUbsidies, advice etc.).
c) support and maintain the ideology of the
Social System (Eg Habermas's technocratic
consciousness - see "Toward a Rational Society" - J.
Habermas. Heinemann, 1971, pg. 111) in order to
legitimate the Social System
What is necessary to the maintenance of the Social System
is that the it is seen to be "legitimate" by the
population. If it is not then they will not be "motivated"
to conform to the Social System any longer.
Crisis is possible in any of the four systems. If there is
a crisis in one system, then it is for the state to manage
it, and prevent it from reaching the point where the Social
System is in crisis - or, as Pusey puts it, when
"the condition of a society is hard up·
against its own survival limits" (M.
Pusey "Jurgen Habermas". Ellis Horwood
1987, pg. 92).
254 "Introduction to critical Theory" - D. Held. Hutchinson
1980. pg 286.
255 White points out thatthe notion of the lifeworld must be
introduced in order to link action
theory more convincingly with
rationalization processes. This means
jUdging not just how particular actions
might be jUdged as rational, but how
the rationality potential made
available in modern culture is "fed
into" particular actions and thus makes
possible a "rational conduct of life"
in general. ("The Recent Work of Jurgen
Habermas" S. K. White Cambridge
University Press 1988, pg. 97)
256 See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2"
Polity 1987, pp 232-234. Thompson argues
Actions are not only' embedded in the
sYmbolic space of the lifeworld, but
they are also organized into functional
systems. Hence societies must be
conceived simultaineously as system and
lifeworld - or as Habermas summarily
states lias systematically stabilized
action-contexts of socially integrated
groups. (J. B. Thompson "Rationality
and Social Rationalization: An
Assessment of Habermas's Theory of
Communicative Action". Sociology 1984,
Og 285)
257 Habermas argues
The rationalization of the lifewor1d
makes possible the emergence and growth
of sUbsystems whose independent
imperatives turn back destructively on
the Lifeworld itself. (J. Habermas
"Theory of communicative Action (2) " •
Polity 1987, pg 185.)
258 J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action (2)".
Polity 1987, pg 187.
259 Habermas is scathing of those who would look backwards
to traditional society for a solution. He argues that we
can only assess the condition of contemporary society in
relation to
the conditions of communicative
sociation (Ie coordination) •• (and) "not
in relation to a nostalqically
conjured, often romanticized past of
premodern forms of life. (Quoted in S.
K. White - "The Recent Work of Jurgen
Habermas" Cambridge University Press
1988, pg. 109).260 See T. McCarthy - "Translator's Introduction" in J.
Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1" Polity
1984, pg. xxix.
261 These are defined as
steer(ing) a social intercourse that
has been largely disconnected from
norms and values and above all in those
subsystems of purposive rational
economic and administrative action that
on Weber's diagnosis, have become
independent of their moral-political
foundations. (J. Habermas - "Theory of
communicative Action. Vol. 2" • Polity
1987, pg 154.)
262 McCarthy refers to this process as
decoupling action in certain ways from-
yes/no responses to validity claims,
these media neutralize the usual
Lifeworld requirements for consensus
formation (T. McCarthy - "Translator's
Introduction" in J. Habermas - "Theory
of Communicative Action, Vol. 1" Polity
1984, pg. xxix.)
263 International money markets would be an example of such
developments.
264 J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2".
Polity 1987. See Chapter 7, part 2, but especially pp. 270-
2.
265 This is considered by Purcell (J. Purcell "A strategy
for management control in industrial relations". In J.
Purcell and R. Smith (eds.) "Control of Work". Macmillan
1979), who argues that
a) management will seek to develop a facade of
cooperation and partnership, which portrays conflict
as unnecessary and indeed as irrational. (pg. 38)
b) to develop . an image of managerial power an
based not on property and property rights, but rather
on an authority located in their (claimed) technical
expertise.
.... I ~'1 ...............:.-_------------Both of these can be seen in our results. Management
certainly regarded conflict as irrational - in that there
was a claim by management that everyone in the firm was
pursuing the same interest. Interestingly this claim was
confirmed by other employees in the firm, though there may
be dissent about how to achieve these "identical" ends -
but no dialogue to resolve this. The latter argument is
central to our own, and has been central to our discussion
of the Lifeworld. As we shall see this is a powerful
obstacle in the development of more democractic work
organizations.
2~ Habermas argues
power needs
confidence,
Habermas
Action. Vol.
an additional basis of
namely legitimation. (J.
"Theory of Communicative
2". polity 1987. pg. 270.)
It.
It is apparent that there are forms of power which do not
require legitimation violence is the best example.
However, for a stable and on-going exercise of power,
legitimacy is necessary. For instance even if we take the
most' vile dictatorships - even Amin in Uganda - there was a
need for him to be perceived to be legitimate by those who
actually applied the terror. A better documented example is
Nazi Germany. On this see F. Neumann - "Behemoth: the
structure and Practice of National Socialism". victor
Gollancz 1944, who shows how the Nazi terror depended on an
organizational structure of such complexity that the Nazi
party would have a "block warden" in each area (Eg in a
block of tenements).
267 Habermas argues,
institutions are replaced by compUlsory
associations and organizations of a new
type; they are formed on the basis of
media that uncouple action from
processes of reaching understanding and·
coordinate it via generalized
instrumental values such as money and
power. These steering media replace
language as the mechanism for
coordinating action. They set social
action loose from integration through
value consensus and switch it over to
purposive rationality steered by media.
(J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative
Action (1)". Polity 1984, pg 342.)
In other words as the Social System begins to invade the
Lifeworld, communicative action - and behaviours
appropriate to it - are overwhelmed by strategic action
guided and motivated by power and money. '
2~ Structural Violence is defined by Habermas asdeception, of
consciousness
structural violence does not manifest
itself as force: rather unperceived, it
blocks those communications is which
convictions effective for legitimation
are formed and passed on. Such an
hypothesis about inconspicuously
working communication blocks can
explain, perhaps, the formation of
ideologies: with it one can give a
plausible account of how convictions
are formed in which subjects deceive
themselves about themselves and their
situation•••in systematically
restricted communications, those
involved form convictions subjectively
free from constraint, convictions which
are however illusionory. They thereby
communicatively generate a power which,
as soon as it is institutionalized, can
also be used against them.II (J.
Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's Conception
of Power" in S. Lukes "Power". Basil
Blackwell 1986, pg. 88.)
Habermas argues that initally the system entering the
Lifeworld does not alter it. When, however, the system
begins to actively intervene in forms of social
integration, while it continues to do so in a way which
cannot be experienced by social actors, it begins to
"instrumentalize" (J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative
Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 187) the Lifeworld which
until then has been communicatively structured, and thus
oriented toward achieving rational understanding. The
Lifeworld distorted by Social system imperatives now takes
on instead
the character of
objectively false
(Habermas supra)
In this way the effects of the Social System on the
Lifeworld remain hidden, but nonetheless critical. The
social System having infiltrated the Lifeworld begins to
impose constraints on communication in the Lifeworld, such
that
interrelations of objective, social and
subjective worlds get prejudged for
participants in typical fashion.
(Habermas supra)In this way, matters which should be sUbject to
communicative action and thus to having to show
justification- simply come to be passively accepted. Hence
for instance, particular social arrangements may, in a
Lifeworld, distorted in this way, come to take on the
appearance of innevitability, and being unchangeable
indeed may even appear to have the status of natural laws.
Our data has shown this to be SUbstantially true of
hierarchy in many respects - for instance decisions about
Investment or Financial Policy - but not in all - most
notably on issues like Pay, where employees take a more
independent line. On the other hand even in such issues the
Lifeworld is constrained. We have argued that even in Wage
disputes, the fundamental hierarchical assumptions of the
Management:Worker relationship are not challenged.
269 See J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol.
2". Polity 1987, pp. 318-331, esp. fig. 39.
270 Our own data - see Appendix 6 - suggests that our sample
considered this exchange relationship to be acceptable.
271 This is derived by Habermas from Weber I s work on
rationality (See "Technology and Science as Ideology" in J.
Habermas "Toward a Rational society" Heinemann 1971).
2n Habermas supra, pp 83-85.
2n Habermas argues:
The quasi autonomous progress of
science and technology then appears as
an independent variable on which the
most important sinqle system variable,
namely economic qrowth depends. Thus
arises a perspective in which the
development of the Social system seems
to be determined by the loqic of
scientific-technical proqress.
(Habermas supra, pg. 105.)
2~ Habermas supra, pg. 105.
bn
275 Pusey argues
science and technology fuse toqether
into a new productive force that
reappears, not as somethinq that is
man/woman-made to serve us accordinq to
larqer and freely chosen purposes, but
rather as an independent variable of
development a notion that is now
narrowed to mean the economic
development facilitated by the State
with no other purposes. (M. Pusey
"Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock
publications 1987, pg. 91.)280
276 This might not be a pure example of the Ideal Speech
Thesis, but it would be a move in that direction.
2n See for instance T. Cummings & E. Molloy "Improving
Productivity and QWL". Praeger 1977. Especially Chapter 8.
2n See our Excerpt 5.17.
Another example of this is the study by Brian Barr and Ron
McKay of the "Scottish Daily News", though we would accept
that it failed for internal, as well as external reasons.
2N Indeed we might almost distinguish between managers and
hourly paid, on the basis the Lifeworlds of the former have
been comprehensively colonized by the Social System,
whereas for the latter it is a process of mystification.
By this he means
the tendency toward an increase in
formal (or positive written) law that
can be observed in modern society
(("Theory of communicative Action (2)"
- J. Habermas. Polity 1984, pg 357.)
281 until the mid 1960 I s the dominant view of UK industrial
relations was on of "laissez-faire", which meant that the
state largely kept our of industrial relations. There were
of course exceptions to this - health and safety, paYment
of wages etc but in general emploYment rights were
determined by common law and by collective agreements.
since 1971, however, we have had an unquestionable
explosion in the volume of labour law, with three different
phases of legislation.
(1) The Industrial Relations Act 1971
(2) The Trade Union & Labour Relations Act
1974
The EmploYment Protection Act 1975
The Trade Union & Labour Relations
(Amendment) Act 1976
(3) The EmploYment Acts 1980, 1982, 1988,
The Trade Union Act 1984
h:........--=-- I_J? _The process goes back to the report of the Donovan
Commission, which was set up by the Wilson government of
1964-70 to examine industrial relations and make
recommendations for improvement. Much of the motivation for
this was (what was seen as) a rash of wild-cat [unofficial]
strikes, and also to remove obstacles to updating
technology in UK industry. (This view we would suggest is
substantially vindicated by the eventual White Paper - In
Place of strife - which, while holding our certain rights
for trade unions and their members, was directed at dealing
with these perceived problems.) The Industrial Relations
Act 1971 was aimed at bringing the "unions under the rule
of law", and as such set up a comprehensive Social System
of legislation which administered rights to strike, rights
to claim unfair dismissal, rights to union membership etc••
(The failure of this legislation is well documented in "The
Limits of the Law" - B. Weekes et ale Blackwell 1976.) The
incoming Labour government made the repeal of this
legislation one of its first acts - but then replaced it
with its own legislation, which had been part of the
"social compact" which they had struck with the unions to
secure wage restraint. The objective of this legislation
was to set "a floor of minimum rights" for all workers,
irrespective of their trade union membership or otherwise.
Additionally the legislation created new rights for
industrial action. For instance secondary action was' made
more simple by inducing breach of commercial contract being
made immune by The Trade Union & Labour Relations
(Amendment) Act -1976. This legislation was since been
reformed by the Conservative governments since 1979. (As
well as the Acts we have referred to which have dealt with
a wide range of rights claim unfair dismissal,
redundancy, written statement of contractual rights,
written pay statements etc. - other legislation has been
brought forward which deals with other areas - Statutory
sick Pay, statutory Maternity Pay, Health and Safety
(through regUlations brought in through the Health and
Safety at Work Act.)
Thus an area which had been largely free of legislation has
over the last 20 years been extensively juridified - a
process which few seriously consider reversing, and
returning to "laissez-faire". The consequence has been to
some extent to make employers and employees more dependent
on the law to control their lives. For instance in the case
of the former, the ability to prosecute an industrial
dispute is no longer merely a matter of the relative power
of each side, but also of the present rights enshrined in
the legislation and of its interpretation by the courts.
For the latter, his ability to get his job back after
dismissal no longer depends so much on the ability and
willingness of fellow employees to take action to support
him, but on the Industrial Tribunal System.
131Indeed the legislation on unfair dismissal is evidence of
colonization of the Lifeworld. Prior to The Industrial
Relations Act 1971, dismissal could only be challenged on
common law grounds, and even then usually only on the basis
that the contract had not been terminated lawfully (Eg
without the required notice). The reason for dismissal did
not have to be justified by the employer. Since 1971,
employers now have to give dismissed employees (Who qualify
- currently usually those who have worked for them for 2
years) a reason for the dismissal, and potentially to be
able to show that it is reasonable at a Tribunal. We would
indicate that this represents colonization in that the
decision to dismiss, and whether it is fair is not to be
determined in communicative action by the parties, but by
outsiders in relation to general legal principles.
Moreoever, it should be observed that it is the Lifeworld
of both the manager and employee which has been colonized
by the juridification of dismissal. But why juridify this
areas of life at all? One reason is that dismissals can
provoke industrial disputes, which is disfunctional as far
as the system is concerned. Moreover it is a means by which
emploYment is made less unattractive, in that casual
dismissal is now less likely. See J. Habermas - "Theory of
Collective Action. Vol. 2". Polity 1987, pg 349.
Why have we juridified industrial relations? A reason, as
we suggested above is for Social System reasons - Donovan
was appointed to find ways of preventing wildcat strikes.
The law has, to varying degrees at different times and in
different ways, attempted to prevent industrial disputes.
(The present legislation attempts to do this, by making it
more difficult to organize a lawful dispute. The 1974-79
law emphasised more removing the need for the dispute.) The
legislation has, however, also been presented in terms of
fairness to employees- which has varied over the years as
well. The legislation can be seen, at least in part, as
increasing the non-pecuniary rewards to employees (Eg
creating a more secure job). Moreover it seems most likely
that if there is to be a move toward some kind of
industrial democracy (Eg EEC proposals) it will be through
legislation rather than through the action of workers in
companies.
282 Habermas tends to talk of "income from emploYment" (See
J. Habermas - "Theory of Collective Action. Vol. 2". Polity
1987, pg 320, fig. 39). We think this is rather narrow, and
would rather consider the worker being rewarded in other
ways as well for his labour - a "reward package".
2~ The differing reaction of German companies and UK
companies to EEC proposals for worker participation is
interesting in this respect, since the while latter tend to
see such proposals as a threat, the former see them as a
means to improve participation.where the required
.... ,
284 Habermas discusses such problems at length in
"Legitimation Crisis". Here he points out that there are
four possible crisis tendencies:
a) economic - whereby the economic system does
not produce sufficient goods and services
b) rationality crisis whereby the required
quantity of rational decisions are not forthcoming
c) legitimation crisis
motivations are not generated
d) motivation crisis - where social actors are no
longer motivated to act according to the meaning
system appropriate for the Social System.
These should not be seen as being discrete, as one can feed
into another. For instance if the state does not produce
sufficient rational decisions (a rationality crisis), then
there may be an economic crisis, since the state manages
the economy for the avoidance (or at least minimisation) of
economic crisis. As a consequence of this there may be a
legitimation crisis,~leading on to a motivation crisis. The
crises should, therefore, be understood as being at least
loosely coupled.
285 J. Habermas - "Theory of communicative Action. Vol. 2".
Polity 1987, pg 349.
2M Habermas considers that rising real standards of living,
and certain current emploYment practices are designed to
have the effect of making the work subjectively bearable
(OWL would be an example of this). The costs of this are
then transferred on to the consumer. This is certainly one
form of transfer which is possible - to deal with problems
in the control of labour, by transferring the problems into
the consumer market. This, however can work the other way -
that problems in consumer markets can be transferred across
on to emploYment conditions, leading to stable (or even
falling) real living standards, and poorer working
conditions. Habermas tends to see immanent crisis in the
former, but in our view this would be by no means certain.
287 What Schutz describes as Specialized Knowledge.
288 See above for our discussion of the distribution of
knowledge in Schutz's theory of the Lifeworld.
289 This parallels the earlier argument about the
development of rationality. Just as Habermas does not see
rationality as an innevitable threat, but rather that it is
how it has developed and been used in'modern capitalism he
argues that the problem with specialist knowledge is ho~ it
has developed and been used in modern capitalism•..
290 In this respect the development of a more coherent
system of Management qualifications, which followed the
pUblication of reports by Handy (c. Handy - "The Making of
Managers" MSC: NEDC: BIM. 1987) and by Constable and
McCormick ( J. Constable & R. McCormick "The Making of
British Managers" BIM: CBI. 1987) represents a further
support for the managerial role, since then the position of
manager is not sustained by mere assertion, but by a
formal qualification (which to the extent that it does
improve management performance serves the Social system not
only by easing steering difficulties, but also by enhancing
the material performance of the Social System, and thus
increasing its legitimacy)
291 White argues
In advanced capitalism, this splitting
off of expert cultures helps generate a
"functional equivalent" for ideologies.
The latter had to facilitate social
integration in a positive way by
providing some overall interpretive
framework for core aspects of social
life. Today, however, this function is
performed negatively in the sense
systematically hindering "everyday
knOWledge" from even reaching the level
of articulation of an ideology••••as
the insulation of expert cultures grows
so does the incapacity of the average
individual to make effective use of the
cognitive arsenal of cultural
modernity. ("The Recent Work Of Jurgen
Habermas" - J. K. White. Cambridge Uni.
Press 1988. pg 117.)
292 An interesting study showing such fragmentation is.by
Blackburn and Mann (R. M. Blackburn and M. Mann "Ideology
in the Non-Skilled Working Class". In Working Class Images
of Society, M. Bulmer (Ed.) RKP 1975.) who· consider the
types of belief held by non-skilled workers ("lower working
class", to use their description - pg 132). The study was
aimed at establishing whether or not there was a consistent
right-left ideological dimension in their attitudes (Ie
Whether their views had a consistent structure). Hence they
pose relatively straightforward questions, like
Most decisions taken by foremen and
supervisors would be better taken by
the workers themselves (Anyone agreeing
with this was deemed to be left wing)
All Management will try to put one over
on the workers if they get the chance
(Anyone agreeing with this was deemed
to be left wing)Managers know what is best for 'the
firm and workers should do as they are
told (Anyone agreeing with this was
deemed to be right wing)
The worker should always be loyal' to
his firm even if it means putting
himself out a bit. (Anyone agreeing with
this was deemed to be right wing: see
pp. 132-133.)
The questions posed, therefore, were entirely of an
attitude survey style, and did not explore deeper aspects
of the thinking of these workers. Their results, however,
have three important aspects for us:
a) a variable which they describe as "generalised
demands".' (which is defined as
a composite measure of nine items
expressing criticism of aspects of
their generalised employment situation
(pg 137.)
This variable they found was
the most important influence (on
ideology), followed by job satisfaction
(pg 140.) ,
This, we would suggest, is consistent with our own
findings. We have argued that the legitimacy of the role of
Management depends on their claim to special competence -
but to the extent that employees become critical of "their
generalised emploYment situation", the Management claim to
special competence must become all the more difficult to
sustain. For instance if our own sample were to be critical
of their emploYment situation either generally or in terms
of some aspect(s) Eg their job security (which they were
not), then they may begin to question the competence of the
Management whom they work for. Our findings are therefore
not inconsistent with this part of Blackburn and Mann's
work.
The mechanism which we have suggested already is that
to the extent that the' management of a company run the
company unsuccessfully (so leading to poor conditions,
redundancies, lack of opportunity for employees etc.) then
their claim to special competence may then come under
scrutiny. In other words, despite the colonization of the
Lifeworld,' employees may begin to be able to see through
the mystification and question management's claim to
special competence, which at the moment is acceded to more
or less automatically.
b) Blackburn and Mann report thatthe ,higher ,the jobs in his (the
respondent's) personal experience, the
more, conservative the worker. (pg 144.)
While our two samples are not directly comparable -
our own drawing on a much wider range of employees than
only the unskilled working class - it is interesting that
even with a restricted sample, what is in effect
hierarchical position (or at least experience of it) can
influence thinking in a systematic way. Our own research
has shown not only that Management ideas differ from those
of other employees (which is only to be expected) but also
that ideology can be systematically related to hierarchical
position.
i) satisfaction with company information was
systematically related to hierarchy, since the closer
to the bottom of the hierarchy one was the less
satisfied one was with the information received from
the firm.
ii) when we considered. decision-making we found
that, for instance staff were less radical in their
ideas than Hourly-Paid employees.
An interesting issue in this respect is raised by
Thomas who argues that Weber stresses
the creativity of the human agent
whilst simultaneously asserting the
congruence of beliefs and interests.
The relationship of interests or social
position to belief systems is not
causal but contingent, the connexions
that are sUbsequently to be found
between the two are not causal
connexions strictu sensu, that is they
are not deterministic. (J.J.R. Thomas
"Ideology and Elective Affinity".
sociology· 1985, pg.43) -
ThUS, according to Thomas, it would be Weber's
argument that the beliefs which we holds are not determined
by our class, or social position, but rather they are
contingent on it. This is a position broadly similar to
that adopted by Beyer, Dunbar and Meyer who argue,
Ideologies are sets of ideas that
evolve out of specific social contexts;
they cannot be understood unless one
understands those contexts. (J. Beyer,
R. Dunbar, A. Meyer "Comment: The
concept of Ideology in organizational
Analysis." Academy of Management Review
1988, pp. 483-489.)
This position is also supported by Thompson who argues,
139
'Ithe concern with ideology directs our
attention towards the relations of
domination which characterize the
context within which symbolic
constructions are produced and
received. particularly important in
this regard is the study of those
aspects of social institutions which
.endow particular agents or groups with
power in systematically aSYmmetrical
ways. . (J.B. Thompson "Mass
Communication and Modern Culture"
Sociology 1988, pg. 371)
Thus in this view, it is not our position which
determines our (or a group's) ideology, but that
ourposition is the context within which ideology is worked
out.
Our own position in our research has been to accept
that the ideologies exist, and to consider the manner of
their use, and their effects. However, our own view, on the
origins of ideologies, is instanced very well by the above
quotations. It can be seen in the above quotation from
Thompson, the congruence with the Ideal Speech Thesis. This
position is elaborated later in the text.
c) Blackburn and Mann find inconsistent views held by
their sample
the ideology items do not logically
interrelate, so it is quite possible
for a worker to hold compatible views
on different items which are
ideologically inconsistent (pg 148. )
Their explanation of this is that pragmatism [Which
they define as,
a response to the specific substance of
an item (possibly" inter-mixed with
confusion) pg 148.]
.is more important for the sample members than
ideology. We have not ourselves examined the views of our
sample in this degree of detail' (partly because of the
magnitude of the data set, which would arguably make it
unreasonable to expect them to be consistent!). Our reason
for picking up this finding of Blackburn and Mann is that
it raises the issue of what we expect of ideology as an
operationalised concept.
14-0...
Lockwood has, for instance argued that working class
consciousness can be conceived as composed of distinct sub-
cultures deferential, privatised and proletarian (D.
Lockwood "Sources of variation in Working -Class Images of
Society". In Working Class Images of society, M. Bulmer
(Ed.) RKP 1975). This has been criticised by, among others,
Mann (M. Mann "Consciousness and Action Among the Western
Working Class". MacMillan 1973), and Daniel (W. W Daniel
"Industrial Behaviour and orientation to Work - A critique"
Journal Of Management Studies 1969). Part of the criticism
centres on the argument that, as Blackburn and Mann put it,
it is unlikely that they (the working
class) can develop inSUlated and
cohesive sub-cultures of the kind
posited by Lockwood. (pg 131.).
The point we wish to make from this is that Blackburn
and Mann too have found that the person's ongoing situation
is a greater influence on attitudes and behaviour than
abstract ideological ideas, or even any need for
consistency. This is common with our own findings, as we
have shown how the working situation of our sample
exercises a significant influence on their attitudes.
Blackburn and Mann's finding still leaves open,
however, the issue of how this happens. After all if it is
pointed out to us that we hold inconsistent views we will
try to adjust in order to at least appear to be consistent.
This is supported by work on Cognitive Dissonance.
See, for instance, Leon Festinger "A theory of Cognitive
Dissonance", Stanford University Press 1957: or Barry Staw
"Attitudinal and Behavioural Consequences of Changing a
Major Organizational Reward", Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 1974, pp. 742-751.
How then can workers walk around with inconsistent
ideas in their heads? We would contend that this is another
finding which can be explained by the unconscious power
(see the following section for an extended discussion of
this), and the Ideal Speech Thesis.
It is suggested by Blackburn & Mann that,
We need to know not simply the final
result of whether workers are able to
synthesize ideological contradictions,
but also the process by which they
attempt to do this. (Blackburn and
Hann, supra pg. 156)
Hence, Blackburn and Mann argue as we shall do that we
need to know more than just the ideas that workers have in
their heads, but that we also need to know how they get
their - what the process is whereby they take on particular
ideas. Their recommended way to do this is,
14 ,intensive thouqh structured
with individual workers
them about contradictory
thouqht
or
discussions
challenqinq
lines of
discussions amonq qroups of workers in
which arqument is encouraqed (both pq
156)
Both ideas have played a role in our own methodology
(though not groups of workers) - but of more importance is
the structural similarity between these types of
methodology and the structure of the theoretical Ideal
Speech Thesis. Through methods such as these we can begin
to approximate its requirements, and experiment with the
ideas it produces.
If, for instance, in a dialogue one of the parties
breaks a condition for Ideal Speech (Eg the use of one-
sided norms) then it becomes possible that that party can
convince the others of the applicability of two views,
which could, otherwise, be said to be inconsistent. This
may be done consciously, but it may be that whether or not
there is consistency may not even have to be argued. This
may come about if the proposal is made by someone whom the
Lifeworld defines as appropriate to make such statements or
claims. In this way the inconsistency can be concealed and
sustained through such a process of unconscious power.
This is consistent with the view put forward by Mann
(Supra). He argues
where capitalism becomes heqemonic and
eliminates "archaic" institutions the
diversity of forms of orqanized
consciousness declines amonq' both the
workinq and the employinq classes,
leavinq both qroups dominated - by
moderate, seqmented, reformist
ideoloqies. (pq 39)
It is also consistent with another element of our
argument, that Management (Mann's employing classes) are
subject to the influence of unconscious power.
293 This issue of the consistency of ideologies is also
taken up by Billig et ale in "Ideological Dilemmas". (M.
Billig, S. Condor, D. Edwards, M. Gane, D. Middleton, A.
Radley "Ideological Dilemmas". Sage Books, 1988.
[Henceforth Billig et al.])
Central to their work is a distinction they draw between
a) "intellectual ideologies" They define this asa system of political, reliqious or
philosophical thinkinq and as such is
very much the product of intellectuals
or professional thinkers. (pg 27.)
What they have in mind at this level are the formal
schemes of thought of professional ideological thinkers (Eg
"the New Right")
b) "lived ideologies". By which they mean
"ideoloqy as society's way of
life••which includes what passes for
common sense within a society" (Billig
et ale pg 27.)
At this level what they have in mind is the thinking
of ordinary people trying to get by in their normal every-
day lives.
This distinction is central because while Billig et ale
accept that the former may well be internally consistent
and logical, the latter may not since the dilemmas which
"ordinary people" face in their every-day lives may not
allow them to do so. Billig et ale argue
Ideoloqy is not seen as a complete,
unified system of beliefs which tells
the individual how to react, feel and
think. Instead ideoloqy and indeed
common-sense are seen to comprise
contrary themes. (pg 2.)
This can be seen in the work of Blackburn and Mann and
their emphasis on pragmatism. They report
The ideoloqy items do not loqically
interrelate, so it is quite possible
for worker to hold compatible view~ on
different items, which -are
ideoloqically inconsistent. For example
he may seriously hold a "left" view on
workers' riqhts to profits, and a
"riqht" view on workers' control. (pg
147).
They then conclude
it seems clear that praqmatism, in the sense of
response to the specific substance of an item
(possibly inter-mixed with confusion) far outweiqhs
ideoloqy for our sample (pg. 148)Both, it seems to us, are taking the view that people lead
lives which can be confusing, and expecting them to be
entirely consistent is probably expecting too much.
Moreover, it is pointed out by Billig et al., that the
confusions and paradoxes which we face are important for
the development of our thought. They argue,
without contrary themes, individuals
could neither puzzle over their social
worlds nor experience dilemmas. And
without this so much thought would be
impossible. (Billig et ale pg 2)
Thus to the extent that a thematic relevance lets us down,
we would review this, identify the problem and develop
another thematic relevance (This process is described by
Schutz as follows
derivations of the relevance structures
predominant in the relative natural.
world view, structures which are
filtered through a specific historical
social structure. (Schutz and Luckmann
"Structures of the Life World", pg.
260. ) •
Thus Billig et ale see the individual,
thinking, but within the constraints of
ideology and with the elements of
ideology. (pg 27.)
This is not inconsistent with our own argument up to now,
but what we do wish to take issue with is what follows,
Thus ideologies in everyday life should
not be equated with the concealment, or
prevention of thought. (pg 27.)
The problem here, we would suggest, is that ~illig et ale
have fallen into the same trap of which they criticise
others. They are critical (rightly in our view) of studies
which expect of "lived ideologies" used by social actors
should show the' consistency of "intellectual ideologies".
This is, we would agree, unreasonable in most cases. On the
other hand, having shown that there is a greater disparity
in thought than has been identified in many cases, and
given (in our view) an acceptable explanation for this
variation they then confuse
a) the degree of variation of thought Which is
possible, with
b) complete freedom to think - or at least with the
avoidance of "concealment or prevention of thought".
144This, in our view, does not by any means follow logically
as we would argue that· individuals may be allowed the
freedom to think only within certain parameters. In other
words the fact that, as Billig et al. have shown,
ideologies are not uni-dimensional in their structure, but
are rather more broadly structured does not prevent
ideology operating in a constraining manner as they
themselves recognizeI
thinkinq within the constraints of
ideology. (pg 27.)
While ideology allow a diversity of thought this is not to
say that it cannot create limits. To the extent it does so
means certain ideas do not get developed (Eg the ideologies
we employ may define them as not relevant or important).
Hence while ideology may'be more diverse than may have been
allowed, to the extent it imposes parameters on our
thought, Which is accepted by Billig et ale For instance in
discussing Education (pp.43-64), they point out that there
are really only two competing ideologies - progressive and
traditional. Thus it is less likely that ideas inconsistent
with either ideology could emerge. Moreover, it means that
the stock of ideas available to educationalists is
restricted to the ideas coming from these two - even if the
educationalists do draw on them in contradictory ways. In
this way ideology becomes a form of power.
This is not to say that ideology cannot operate where power
is a conscious. Many studies illustrate situations where
ideology operates in situations where the participants are
all aware of the operation of power. Let us consider some
examples where ideology operates in situations of conscious
power.
Amstrong, Goodman and 'HYman ("Ideology and Shop-Floor
Industrial Relations". Croom Helm 1981. henceforth
Armstrong et al.) consider the role of competing ideologies
in the context of the ongoing emploYment relat}onship.
They suggest,
whilst it may be true in the lonq run
and at the society wide level that
leqitimisation is Ultimately
SUbordinate to questions of power and
interests, in the short run and at the
level of the workplace the means of
leqitimisation appear much more as a
nqivenn. ( Supra pg. 15.)We do not wish to dissent from the initial part of this -
that at the level of society, and in the long run, the
ability to secure legitimacy depends on power. What
concerns us is the extent to which they distinguish , or
disengage short and long run, and the level of society and
the work place. To the extent that claims for legitimacy
compete at the level of the work-place, they do so
according to rules - which Armstrong et ale go on to
identify - but these rules are, we would suggest, a form of
power in themselves, though as we have shown the parties
are not necessarily and/or fully aware of this. It puzzles
us that this point appears to have escaped the authors,
since the short term is only a moment in the long term, and
the role of power in the long term is acknowledged
explicitly.
Thus the struggle to secure legitimacy in the short term
takes place in the context of the longer term power
structure. This is not to say, of course, that there is no
possibility of change - that the dominant side will always
remain so - but rather that the dominant side will always
start off with an advantage. Thus it is difficult to see
how we can disengage short term/work-place conflict over
legitimisation from long term/societal power structures, in
the way that Armstrong et ale appear to suggest. , with
success being attributed to the ability to secure
legitamisation. The ability to do so, they tell us, depends
on three factors:
a) the availability of legitamising principles in
the culture of Managers and workers, which act as a
constraint on the ability of either side to put
forward ideas/justifications etc. depending on the
availability of suitable principle(s). This in many
ways parallels our own research, in that what we have
tried to do is to identify the principles which
legitimise Management's perceived right to take
decisions etc.. In other words, success through
ideology is dependent on our· ability to select the
more appropriate ideas. (In this respect we diverge
from Armstrong, in that not only do we have to
recognize that there is an advantage to Management in
that the available stock of ideas tend to advantage
them, but that the rules by which ideas are deployed
are also to the advantage of Management. This idea is
developed in the next paragraph, in relation to ideas
of structural Violence.)
b) the ability to mobilise legitimisation, both
in convincing members, but also managers of the
"correctness" of an argument. Armstrong et ale say,while the mobilisation dimension
(convincing the members) is a pre-
condition for making rules, the
importance of the tactical dimension
(convincing the managers) depends very
much on the balance of power.
(Armstrong et ale pg 37.)
The difficulty we see in these is that they ignore at least
part of the power structure - that element the parties are
unaware of. Returning to the Ideal Speech Thesis we can
see, using it as our bench-mark, that the environment_in
which the Steward would have to mobilise legitimisation is
even less equal than it would appear because of the
procedural advantages accorded to Management.
This is similar to the arguments made earlier using the
concept of Structural Violence. Habermas, it will be
recalled, defines it as follows:
structural violence' does not· manifest
itself as force; rather unperceived, it
blocks those communications is which
convictions effective for legitimation
are formed and passed on. Such an
hypothesis about inconspicuously
working communication blocks can
explain, perhaps, the formation of
ideologies; with it one can give a
plausible account of how convictions
are formed in which SUbjects- deceive
themselves about themselves and their
situation•••in systematically
restricted communications, those
involved form convictions subjectively
free from constraint, convictions which
are however illusionory. They thereby
communicatively generate a power Which,
as soon as it is institutionalized, can
also be used against them.II • (J.
Habermas, "Hannah Arendt's conception
of Power" in s. Lukes "Power"• Basil
Blackwell 1986, pg. 88.)
We would have preferred Armstrong et ale to have explored
to what extent the ideologies restrict the action of
stewards, or the extent to which Managers have more
principles available to them, than there are for Stewards.
The analogy of the perfect market is relevant here, since
while Armstrong et ale do not treat the market for ideas as
perfect, we would contend it is rather more imperfect than
they allow.c) the ability to pUblicly legitamise our view. In other
words the ability to convince others that what you are
trying to do, or are proposing etc. is legitimate.
Armstrong et ale give as an example a worker who objects to
a new management rule but can find no pUblicly acceptable
legitimising principle for his objection. Thus he is unable
to mobilise his fellow workers behind him to protest about
this new rule - they would not see it as "right".
The problem we see in this is that while, as Armstrong et
ale argue, legitimacy can be contested, we cannot consider
only the fact of success and failure - we have to explore
why one group may be consistently more/less successful.
This is similar to the criticism of Dahl by Bachrach and
Barartz. Their view is that conscious power cannot be
considered simply from the point of view of who wins and
who loses - in other words to explain what has happened -
but that we have to also consider the possibility that
power is used to prevent things happening - for instance
that power is used to prevent certain issues entering into
the decision-making system. The problem with Armstrong et
ale is similar in terms of the structure of their argument.
They seek to identify situations in which legitimacy may be
contested, but do not consider the form of the rules for
this contest, and the possibility that the rules
systematically favour one side over another (Ie structural
Violence again). This, as we have argued, involves a
consideration of more than just conscious power.
This is not to say, however, that they do not consider the
role that unconscious power can play. Later on in the book
they say,
The unproblematic exercise of
management power is founded in an
ideology Which confirms its legitimacy.
Based among other things on... claims
to special competence on the part of
management. (pg 40)
They·also quote storey, who argues that what may appear to
be a challenge to the power of Management is in fact an
attempt to set limits on it (See J. Storey " Workplace
Collective Bargaining and Managerial Prerogatives".
Industrial Relations Journal 1976-1977, pp. 40-55.). The
difficulty is that this is not followed up to an adequate
degree in the analysis. The struggle of ideologies in
Armstrong et ale takes place in a market which appears to
be nearer perfection than we have found. Their view, we
think, is suspiciously naive. '
So how does ideology work in the view of Armstrong et al.?
They give two main reasons for Management perceiving
themselves to be legitimate:
..justify their
prerogatives
assume them.
a) the law itself through ownership, company law,
contract of emploYment, the right to recruit and dismiss
etc. The problem with this as a foundation, we have found
is that our own sample of managers tended to see themselves
as workers too. The role of the legal system was not to
give them rights, but to give responsibilities and
obligations. The law was not important for its connections
to ownership.
b) functional responsibility. This is typified in the
following:
You change tools when I tell you, not
when Ken tells you. I'm responsible for
production and he's not. (Armstrong et
ale pg. 67.)
The problem with this is that this is precisely the
point of management authority - a manager would have the
authority to tell a worker when to change tools, but the
issues are surely:
i) why he feels he has the legitimate right to do
so? and
ii) why the worker obeys?
The deficiency with Armstrong et aI's analysis is that
it does not go into sufficient depth here. For instance,
Typically mangers do not
decision-making
explicitly: they simply
(Armstrong et ale pg 66.)
But, why do Managers do this, what is it about their
thinking, and how do they get away with it? Questions such
as these are not fully addressed in this analysis, rather
it stays at the level of a description of the principles
which are employed. These include .
a) consistency - that if, for instance, all
workers are treated in the same way in the same
circumstances, then that leads to legitimacy. So, to
take one of their examples, two workers with equally
bad time-keeping records should be treated in the same
way. This, however, only gives us the justification,
or the principle which the manager uses, but it tells
us nothing of why/how the workers come to accept it.
In this analysis consistency is a principle leading to
legitimacy. Period.b) Precedent - that a decision made in the past
can be used in the future to justify/argue for a
decision in the future. This is an even more difficult
area. Even in the formality of the legal system, in
any case there are likely to be several precedents
available, and which one you argue for will depend on
whether you are defence or prosecution. Thus in any
dispute etc. what is to be taken to be the appropriate
precedent? If the manager is to decide that, why
should his jUdgement be accepted? In other words why
particular precedents work is not addressed in this
analysis.
c) Fairness - what this means depends as HYman &
Brough point on whether we mean fairness between
managers and workers, or between workers (R. HYman &
I. Brough "Social .values and Industrial Relations"
Blackwell, 1975.). In the view of Armstrong et ale the
former is relatively unimportant. While discussing the
form of a new bonus as part of a cost saving scheme,
they report that the workers did not chose to question
the company I s share of the savings being 25%. While
this may. be remarkable in itself, it is no less
remarkable than that the authors do not consider why
this happened. (See Armstrong et al., pg 102). This
contrasts to some extent with our own sample, who did
give voice to a sense ,of unfairness. For instance the
Shop Steward who complained of the lack of
information, and that "some people just seemed to
waddle about". Yet, in practical terms this was
accepted - even the Shop Steward only wanted to know,
to be able to find out. Why was it accepted? For the
reasons we have spoken of already - Management were
the ones with the skills, experience and knowledge to
be in charge. On the other hand the importance of
fairness between workers is similar to our findings,
most especially the perceived injustices on the part
of Hourly- Paid workers in relation to their
conditions of emploYment relative to Staff.d) Relevance that Management only exercise
their authority in areas relevant to doing the job, or
to employment. An example which they give is parallel
to events in our own firm. This is where they describe
the problem of one company to get (in their case) the
girls to wear safety glasses in a hazardous area,
because they were uncomfortable. Exactly the same
thing happened in our firm, where it was very
difficult to wear their safety glasses. This, however,
points to another portion of our analysis - namely
that while management (even in an ideal world) may
have the perceived right to take decisions, Hourly-
Paid and Staff would still resist if the outcome of
these decisions was against their interests. In the
case of wearing safety glasses, this was against their
interests, since they were (are?) uncomfortable to
wear, even for a short time, never mind all day. Hence
while Management may have had the perceived right to
take the decision (as decision-makers) they had the
right to object to it. Now this points to further
problems with Armstrong et al., since up to now we
have considered areas where Management have won out,
but now we come up against one where they do not - or
at least not without appealing to other, different
principles. On this see Armstrong et al. pg 105, where
they tell of a foreman who gets his group to stagger
their smoking breaks so that the manager does not come
down to find all the machines off at once.
At the immediate level of course these
requests are in the interests of the
workers themselves but at another level
they depend on the workers acceptinq
the leqitimacy of sparinq HIS fee1inq.
Yes that is the question - but they never get
round to giving an answer to it. We have ourselves
found similar situations - for instance workers found
drinking tea/coffee outside normal breaks would put it
down, because in their view they recognized that they
should have been working and were prepared to accept
the authority of the manager/foreman to put them back
to work. Why should Management have this power?
Because they are the decision-makers -they are the
ones with the task of running the company••e) Humanitarian and Ethical Standards. This final
category is in essence what is seen to be right in a
moral sense. An example which they give is a situation
where the lavatory cleaner was about to be sacked a
week before Christmas. In this case the success of the
steward was to postpone the sacking until the week
after Christmas. All the principles we have
considered up to now are essentially internal, or
within the firm. This category involves bringing in
from outside, a wider social code - basically doing
the (moral) right thing. Perhaps we could ask why this
does not happen more often - that is why workers do
not employ such standards more than they seem to do?
Once again this parallels our own work, which showed
the acceptance of hierarchy to be sUbstantially an
internally (to the firm) generated phenomenon, with
the world outwith the firm making little contribution.
The problem we have with these principles is that while we
would concede that they do occur, and are used (indeed we
have ourselves found similar -and in one case identical -
events), there is no attempt made to establish why, or how
they work. In effect what Armstrong et ale have done is to
explore in some detail the way the game is played just now,
rather than why we play it this way, and what the
possibilities are for another game? Another example of
similar research is from Kirkbride. (See Paul Kirkbride
"Legitimising Arguments and Worker Resistance". Employee
Relations 1988, pp. 28-31). He suggests that worker
resistance can take two forms - where workers resist a
management rUle/decision, and where they dispute
statements of management authority. The restriction is,
however, that like for instance Dahl, Kirkbride restricts
himself to situations of resistance, where there will be an
awareness of conflict and power.
The difficulty with the position of these authors is that
they focus on situations where there is awareness of the
use of power. This type of position, as we have tried to
show, does not exhaust all the potential explanatory
potential of power. In particular it does not recognize
that the power of ideology is
a) most potent to prevent the need to exercise power,
for instance to convince employees that a particular union
policy is extreme, and thus reduce the possibility of
industrial action.
b) nonetheless effective when the above fails, because
it may then be used to restrict the forms which the
conflict takes, or to restrict the forms of exercise of
power. McCarthy argues (following Habermas),
15~there is a tendency to sublimate social
processes entirely into cultural
traditions and to reduce sociology to
the interpretation of transmitted
meanings. If however culture is viewed
in relation to the social, political
and economic conditions of life, it
loses the appearance of self
sUfficiency. It becomes evident that
the traditional meanings can conceal
and distort, as well as reveal and
express these conditions. (T. Mccarthy
"Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas".
pg. 183) My emphasis.)
The tradition which Armstrong et ale have worked in is
the former, while we have worked through the latter
(emphasised) tradition. Hence we would endorse the
conclusion of Nichols and Armstrong in "Workers Divided",
they (the workers at ChemCo) were a,
divided workforce: that these men and
women lacked solidarity; that they
exercised only meagre control over
their lives at work; and that their
trade union and political consciousness
were weakly developed. (T. Nichols and
P. Armstrong "Workers Divided", Fontana
1976 pg. 211.)
However, while we may agree that,
these workers didn't act as fully
conscious agents engaged in class
struggle (pg 211)
we would not necessarily agree with the conclusion
that,
the management did, whilst protesting
to the contrary (pg 211).
since it has been our view that both Management and
their employees are enfolded in the structure of ideas. In
other words the thinking of Management is likewise
restricted, so for example both Management and other
Employees regarded Management taking decisions as right and
proper (though not necessarily the extent to which
Employees should be able to exercise influence).
The problem with this aspect of Armstrong et al.'s analysis
is that ideology, and the role of ideas, is sUbstantially
just taken to be powerful - the fact that the workers are
prepared to accept certain ideas gives Management power
which is certainly true. A position such as this however
creates definite problems: '
153a) what is it about these ideas which makes them
powerful? ( We mean by this more than simply acceptance of
the Management role, but rather the manner in which certain
ideas yield power - Eg Management as decision-makers.)
b) how do they get absorbed or accepted - what is the
mechanism? Why are they accepted? (The difficulty with much
of the writing on ideology and the source of much
persistent criticism - is that it fails to show how the
ideas are absorbed and accepted - they just are.)
Let us deal first of all with the former problem. We
shall do so from the perspective of the Ideal Speech
Thesis, which requires that the parties to a dialogue
should be formally equal through
a) all the participants to the discourse having
the same chance to speak,
b) all participants having the same chance to put
forward, or call into question, or ground, or refute
statements and explanations etc., such that no
assertion is exempt from critical consideration,
c) all speakers being able to demonstrate to the
others in the discourse their "good intent" - that all
speakers will have the same chance to express their
attitudes, feelings etc. so as to show that they are
being truthful to themselves and to the others in the
dialogue,
d) all speakers having the same chance to employ
regulative speech acts(Ie to command, oppose, permit,
forbid etc) such that one-sided norms and privileges
are ruled out, and formal equality can be practiced. (
This is SUbstantially drawn from the discussion in
McCarthy supra pp 306-307.)
The role of ideology, in this context, is to act in such a
way .as to conceal the exercise of power. For instance
ideology may sustain a rule which gives a party a greater
opportunity to speak and hence violates the first
condition. In ways such as this, ideology can function in
such a way as make an exercise of power appear to be
altogether natural. For instance Wiles argues that,
One of the most important general
functions of ideology· is the way in
which it turns uncertain and fragile
cultural resolutions and outcomes. into
a pervasive naturalism. ( Paul Wiles
"Learning to Labour". Gower 1977, pg.
162.)
151_Hence, with Wiles we would· argue that a function of
ideology is to make what could in fact be a contestable
issue appear to be quite natural, and thus not requiring to
be contested. It is, therefore, one of the most important
functions of ideology to conceal - and to make to appear
to be natural - systematically distorted communication,
and in this way allow for unconscious exercise of power
(Ie action in breach of the Ideal Speech Thesis) •
Habermas' s critique of ideology is well expressed in the
following,
how would the members of a Social
system, at a given stage in the
development of productive forces, have
collectively and binding1y interpreted
their needs if they could and would
have decided on organization of social
intercourse through discursive will
formation, with adequate knowledge of·
the limiting conditions and functional
imperatives of their society.
(Legitimation crisis, pg. 113).
in that ideology is precisely a critical barrier to such
discursive will formation. Or as Pusey succinctly
interprets Habermas,
ideo10gy••reaches back into the very
constitution of knowledge of society.
(M. Pusey - "Jurgen Habermas" Tavistock
Publications 1987.)
or ideology influences how we know what we know1 This is
similar to the position adopted by Thompson:
to study ideology is to study the ways
in Which meaning serves to sustain
relations of domination. (J. B.
Thompson "Mass Communication and Modern
Culture". Sociology 1988, pg 370.)
Thompson then goes on to instance the possibility that,
a system of domination may be sustained
by being represented as legitimate,
that is a system which is worthy of
support. (Thompson supra, pg. 370).
This same issue is approached somewhat differently by
social Closure Theory .( See for instance, F. Parkin "Class
Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972: F. Parkin
"Marxism and Class Closure". Tavistock 1979: R. Collins
"Sociology since Midcentury". Academic Press 1981. R.
MUrphy "Social Closure" Clarendon Press 1988.) This is an
approach which explicitly includes a role for power and in
partiCUlar a role for the power of ideas. 'A version of Closure theory can be derived from Weber, who
means by Closure,
the process of subordination whereby
one group monopolizes advantages by
closing off opportunities to another
group of outsiders beneath it which it
defines as inferior and ineligible. (R.
Murphy "social Closure" Clarendon Press
1988, pg 8.)
This clearly has connections to social action. For
instance, Weber uses these ideas to consider the
monopolization of markets - but the concept of Closure can
similarly be applied to ideas and ideology. This sort of
concept of Closure has been developed by Parkin, who
points out that closure can take on either of two forms -
a) exclusion Which involves < the' use of power
downwardly by a dominant group to maintain their advantage
and exclude others.
b) usurpation which involves the use of power upwardly
to diminish the advantages of the powerful. (See F. Parkin
"Marxism and Class Closure". Tavistock 1979.)
The problem here ·is that since usurpation will always be a
possibility, we have to ask why do the subordinate
groups/classes not actually· exercise their power to at
least diminish the power of the dominant group. There are'
several reasons given for this by Parkin.
An explanation lies in the existence of a number of
different value systems. One such is the dominant value
system (see F. Parkin "Class Inequality and Political
Order" Paladin 1972, pp. 82 - 88) which is used by the
dominant group in society or an organization, but so too
may the subordinate group use it. This, as Parkin points
out,
derives from Marx's celebrated
statement that lithe ideas of the ruling
class are, in every age, the rUling
ideas. (See F. Parkin "Class Inequality
and Political Order" Paladin 1972, pg.
82) •
Following this value system requires that, for instance,
the reward system is perceived to be morally correct, that
dominant values define what is perceived to be "right" in
cuIture, art, speech patterns etc. There is, however, an
explicit role for power in all of this, since as Parkin
points out,
15~-
moral and political rules hold sway
(under the dominant value system) not
because they are self-evidently
"right", but because they are made to
seem so by those who wield
institutional power. (See F. Parkin
"Class Inequality and Political Order"
Paladin 1972, pg. 84.) .
As Lukes points out, the more completely the dominant class
succeed in this way, the more completely they will prevent
the development of conflict in the society/organization
etc. - the more the subordinate class defer to the dominant
class, not just in terms of material reward but also
ideological dominance the easier it will be for the
dominant class to maintain their domination. It is argued
by Lukes,
is it not the supreme and the most
insidious exercise of power to prevent
people, to whatever degree, from having
grievances by shaping their
perceptions, cognitions and preferences
in such a way that they accept their
role in the existing order of things,
either because they can see or imagine
no alternative to it, or because they
see it as natural and unchangeable, or
because they value it as divinely
ordained and beneficial? (S. Lukes
"Power: A Radical View" • MacMillan
1974, pg 24.)
An alternative to this is what Parkin describes as the
subordinate value system (See F. Parkin "Class Inequality
and Political Order" Paladin 1972, pp. 88 - 96), which does
not fully endorse the dominant value system, but rather
adapts to it, so that while those who may use this value
system are critical of the dominant value system they do
not go so far as to actually reject it. Parkin suggests for
instance
Trade Unionism could be said to
stabilize the modern capitalist order
by legitimizinq further the rules and
procedures which govern the allocation
of resources. (See F. Parkin "Class
Inequality and Political Order" Paladin
1972, 'pp. 91.)
Thus, while the subordinate class are exposed to the ideas
of the dominant class, through TV and the education system
etc., they do not simply adopt these ideas directly - as is
so with the dominant value system - but rather they modify,
or negotiate them - or as Rodman puts it, they
t 5 ;;."stretch the value system", (H. Rodman
"The Lower Class Value Stretch", Social
Forces 1963. Quoted in Parkin supra, pg
92. )
especially in abstract situations (like attitude surveys).
In action situations, however, they are more likely to
employ a negotiated version - a more strongly subordinate
system of values, rather than the adapted dominant value
system of value stretch.
The final value system is what Parkin terms the radical
value system (See F. Parkin "Class Inequality and Political
Order" Paladin 1972, pp. 97 - 99.). The main attribute of
this is that it does not attempt to accommodate the
dominant system, but in fact denies its legitimacy
altogether. Hence rather than promoting the view that, for
instance, Management are/ought to be the dominant group it
promotes the view of "the dignity of labour and accords the
worker a position of honour" (H. Rodman "The Lower Class
Value Stretch", Social Forces 1963. Quoted in Parkin supra,
pg 92.). The radical value system, therefore, explicitly
ruptures the dominant value system rather than trying to
come to an accommodation with it as the subordinate system
does.
Parkin argues, as· we have found too, these three value
systems are found to varying degrees among subordinate
groups. Hence in a subordinate group we would expect to
find elements of all three - Ie ideas which endorse the
role of the dominant group (dominant), ideas which are
critical of them without going so far as to actually reject
dominant group (subordinate), and ideas which do reject the
dominant group (radical).
We can consider the possibility of what would happen if one
of the systems was to "run dry" (as Parkin puts it) - for
instance what would happen if the radical system, or the
dominant system were to cease to function (See F. Parkin
"Class Inequality and Political Order" Paladin 1972, pp.
100 - 102.). Parkin suggests that if the latter were to
come about then the subordinate value system would become
increasingly important for the subordinate group. This may
be so, but
a) it is by no means apparent that this is foregone
b) it is by no means apparent why it should happen
that way.We shall return to these questions later, but first we wish
to consider another possible reason, given by Parkin for
the absence of usurpation. This is the possibility that the
subordinate group will use dual modes of closure (See R.
Murphy "Social Closure" Clarendon Press 1988 pg 11.)
basically that part of the subordinate group will try to
cope with its position not by challenging the dominant
group but rather by sUbordinating another group. The
examples he gives are white workers against blacks in the
US and UK, and Protestants against Catholics in Northern
Ireland. We too can provide evidence of this,
a) the consistent status consciousness of Staff
against Hourly Paid. Indeed on certain matters Staff were
more hostile to the Hourly Paid than the Management were.
b) the consistent status consciousness of Skilled
workers against Unskilled workers, which manifests itself
for instance in the jealousy with which wage differentials
are maintained. One event we collected during the research
happened while we were talking casually to a skilled
worker, waiting for his labourer to come back with a
particular tool for the machine. When the labourer (who was
considerably older than the skilled man) came back he was
told,
that's the wronq fuckinq tool. Go back
and qet the riqht one.
When the labourer left to get the tool, we said to the
skilled man,
"Do you always speak to him that way'l".
He replied'
"Yes, why shouldn't 11 I'm skilled,
he's not"••
All qf this we would not dissent from, but we do see a
difficulty in that Parkin does not explain why the
subordinate group accept their position. Certainly if the
subordinate group employ a subordinate value system, they
are unlikely to mount a serious challenge to the dominant
group. This does not tell us, however, why they accept this
value system in the first place, nor why they continue to
accept it. Parkin, through dual closure gives us modes by
which the subordinate class can cope, but this in itself is
not an entire explanation.
159To begin to explain this acceptance requires that we bring
power explicitly into our consideration. Certainly Weber
and Parkin bring in power, or allow for it to be brought
in. The problem is that the power which they allow in is
always conscious. (This is not to say that unconscious
power could not be incorporated into this approach. For
instance, Murphy argues that "neo-Weberian" closure theory
requires a wider focus than Marxist theory in that it
requires us to enlarge rules of closure from
rules of private property to other
forms of monopolization and exclusion,
such as credential, racial, ethnic,
reliqious, qender, Communist Party
monopolization and exclusion. [R.
Murphy "Social Closure" Clarendon Press
1988 pg 61]
To the extent that these "other forms" come to blend into
the environment, and take on the appearance of naturalness,
or inevitability, then the unconscious power which they
exercise could be even more effective than conscious power.
The difficulty with Closure, as conceived by Murphy and
Parkin is that the distinction between Conscious and
Unconscious Power is not clear.
Moreover there is no indication of how to identify and
distinguish each. Indeed it seems clear from their work
that for Closure theorists this is not a problem. • For
instance,
a) Parkin
moral and political rules hold sway
(under the dominant value system) not
because they are self-evidently
"riqht", but because they are made to
seem so by those who wield
institutional power. ( See F. Parkin
"Class Inequality and Political Order"
Paladin 1972, pg. 84, my emphasis.)
b) Weber (It is objected by Murphy that to claim that
Weber's theory of power must involve resistance by the
other party is to misunderstand Weber. (See R. Murphy
"Social Closure" Clarendon Press 1988 pg 133.) For
instance:
authority is characterized (by Weber)
precisely by a lack of resistance, and
is seen by Weber as a special case of
power, the broader meaninq of
domination. (pg.133)·
This may well be so, and we do not necessarily wish to
dissent from this as far as it goes, but,
, ~Oa) it is by no means apparent that we are not dealing
with conscious manipulation, rather than the more demanding
systematically distorted communication. In conscious
manipulation it is essential for the dominant party to be
aware of the exercise of power, but in systematically
distorted communication neither is aware. It seems to us
that systematically distorted communication goes beyond
Weber.
b) in any case it is not fully apparent how authority
works in Weber. certainly appeals would have to be made to
the legitimacy of authority - rational legal, traditional,
charismatic - but even if we accept that one or more of
these apply, it is by no means clear why the claim to
legitimacy should be accepted in the first place and why it
should continue to work. For instance it is all very well
to say that Hitler exercised power because of his charisma.
But what was about his personality that made him
charismatic rather than, as Lord Bullock put it, "a bore in
a bar". ["The Fatal Attraction of Adolf Hitler". BBC TV
April 21, 1989])
capitalistic interests thus favour the
continuous .extension of the free
market, but only up to the point where
some of them succeed, through the
purchase of privileges from the
political authority or simply through
the power of capital (M. Weber "Economy
& Society" (Ed G. Roth & C. wittich).·
Berkeley 1978, pg. 638.)
The view we take of power, in the context of. ideas, is
rather more thorough than that taken by any of the above
authors. It appears to us that all of them take the view
that ideas are accepted through the medium of power - Ie
that we use our power to put forward or to resist ideas.
This much can certainly be true, and we would not wish to
contest this. We do, however have a further view of power
in the context of ideas.
It is surely important not only that people hold certain
ideas, but also that we know
a) how they came to adopt these ideas, and
b) how they use these ideas.
In both cases to identify that certain ideas are held is
important and indeed essential because they are the means
through which power operates, but it is not adequate for
our purposes. Ideas as well as being a function of power
must be argued out and accepted by the relevant parties in
the particular context.
/6 (For this to happen there must be rules and procedures (Eg
rules of debate), and it has been our contention that the
context and the rules operate as additional forms of power.
Thus even if the results of the "debate" appears to be
power-free, we would still want to consider the rules by
which it is governed to establish whether it is in fact
free of power. This deeper form of power is not included in
the considerations of these authors.
In other words, to take an Industrial Relations analogy,
ideology may be just as important procedurally as it is
SUbstantively - how the ideas which are held are generated
and sustained may be just as significant as the fact that
the ideas are held at all. Thompson reaches a similar
conclusion when he points out,
we must focus on the space of
transformation within which the
meaning mobilized by media messages is
transformed in 'the process of
reception, serving thereby to sustain
or SUbvert, to reinforce or undermine,
relations of domination. (J. B.
Thompson "Mass Communication and Modern
Culture". Sociology 1988, pg 380.).
Hence the rules by which ideas are negotiated - and the
power implications of these rules can be just as
important as the fact that particular ideas are held at
all. The shortcoming of the work done in ideology is that
it does not progress this far. Hence while ideology can be
and is employed in situations of conscious power, we would
contend that it is not used to its fullest degree.294 It is always possible, however, for such a clash to come
about. This is well described by Dunbar et Al in a study of
a clash of ideologies in an American Business School, where
the faculty had decided to allow all its undergraduates to
design their own course, with the faculty really only
acting as consultants if things went wrong. This, fairly
revolutionary approach was not challenged until a young
academic was hired with deviant habits (at least for an
American Business School) - taking off the door to his room
and replacing it with a string of neckties; hanging a
parachute in his room; staying with faculty families in
return for cooking, organizing impromptu parties,
organizing games for children and grown-ups. As a result he
was investigated by the FBI, but even more seriously was
quoted in a newspaper interview as saying "Traditional
education is shitty". Following this the head of the
School's Foundation and the head of the University Board of
Trustees visited the Dean to tell him that, because of this
faculty member's radical views, he must be sacked otherwise
.there would be no further· financial support. Some three
weeks later the member of staff in question left, and
within five years the undergraduate course had reverted to
normal. The implication of this example is that not only
were the two sets of beliefs - the radical faculty on the
one hand, and the heads of the Foundation and the
University Trustees - different, they did eventually come
to be in conflict with each other, and at that point a
power struggle began. Had things been different if
changes in the Business School had not been so far-
reaching, if the controversial faculty member had not been
so controversial, or indeed if he had kept a lower profile,
if the Foundation had been brought to accept the changes -
things might not have got to this stage. This was, however,
a case where the beliefs (or styles, to revert to the
football metaphor) were not only contrasting, they actually
did contradict each other. (See R. Dunbar, J. Dutton & W.
Torbert "Crossing Mother: Ideological Constraints on
organizational Improvements". Journal of Management Studies
1982, pp. 91 - 108. Ideological struggle is therefore quite
possible, and it is not our intention to deny this, but
rather to point out that this does not exhaust all the
possibilities.
295 This, we shall argue goes much of the way to dealing
with the argument of Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, (N.
Abercrombie, S. Hill & B. Turner "The Dominant Ideology
Thesis", George Allen and Unwin 1980. (henceforth
Abercrombie et al.). They contend that there is no
successful dominant ideology (though there is an ideology
of the dominant class), and that the working class, far
from being absorbed by what Parkin would describe as the
dominant ideology, or operating under a restricted
subordinate ideology, actually have their own systems of
ideology. So, we are told,the inherent conflict of interests that
exists between labour and manaqement is
visible to most workers. Indeed the
relationship between men and manaqement
is based on power rather than
authority, on low trust, on anomie and
normative conflict. The rejection of
manaqerial ideoloqy sometimes may
extend even to the rejection of the
special competence claimed for
manaqerial jobs or to a denial that
manaqers have this quality if it is in
fact required. (See Abercrombie et ale
pg.146.)
For this they refer to S. Hill "The Dockers", who finds
that the dockers do appear to reject the claim to special
competence made by management (See S. Hill "The Dockers",
Heinemann 1976, pp.114,150). A problem with this is that
while Abercrombie et ale refer to Management, Hill actually
refers only to Supervisors. Hence the "distance" between
dockers and what Hill calls Managers is much less than the
"distance" between our Hourly Paid sample and Management.
It is less surprising we would contend that where the
"distance" between groups is limited that the lower group
takes the view that it could do the job of the superior
group. Let us however accept the argument of Abercrombie et
ale at its face value. We would suggest that even then it
does not conflict with our argument. We have not argued
that Hourly-Paid, or Staff cannot challenge the legitimacy
of Management - what we have set out to do is to consider
why they do not. We have tried to do so by pointing not
only to the ideas which they hold, and also to the
implications for power which these bring. What we would
want to know of Hill's dockers is if they reject the
claimed legitimacy of Management, how it is that the
established system continues to work? We would suggest that
the answers to this do not lie completely in their "self
interest", but·in the structure of their ideas and for
inst~nce why they perceive their self interest in this
particular way.
Additionally Hill's findings could easily be consistent
with Habermas's theory of crisis tendencies. Hill's finding
that dockers reject the claim to special competence made by
management could be said to be a Rationality Crisis (in
that the requisite rational decisions are not forthcoming,
in the view of the Dockers), or even a Legitimation crisis
(in that the requisite generalized motivations are not
forthcoming, in the view of the Dockers). Certainly,
however, there is no Motivation Crisis, since that would
require there to be insufficient "action-motivating
meaning", since the Docks do normally carryon (even in
1976). The questions we would want to pose concerning
Hill's sample would be,
IlR 4a) how 'the Rationality, and/or, Legitimation
crisis was produced - how it came about,
b) why they have not proceeded' to a full-blown
Motivation crisis.
The situation in the docks, as described by Hill, is
certainly not the image of work and industrial relations
that we left our research site with. To say that the
relationship of management and men was based on power, low
trust, anomie and normative conflict is just not consistent
with the data which we collected. Why should there be this
disparity between us? We would suggest two reasons:
a) Our first reason relates to the interpretation
of Habermas by Abercrombie et ale They say, of
Habermas's concept of legitimation,
Habermas does in fact largely refer to
legitimation as involving beliefs,'
particularly as held by subordinate
classes•••he speaks of the technocracy
thesis as "a background ideology that
penetrates into the consciousness of
the depoliticised mass of the
population, where it can take on
legitimating power". (See Abercrombie
et ale pg.16.)
This is simply a misrepresentation of Habermas's position
in two respects. First of all, as we have argued above, the
effect of the technological consciousness is not to dictate
ideology, but rather to put limits on possible ideologies.
Secondly, as the following from "Technology and Science as
Ideology" shows, it is quite consistent with Habermas's
theory for there to be different forms of ideology adhered
to by the different classes:
This means not that class antagonisms
have been abolished but that they have
become latent. Class distinctions
persist in the form of subcultural
traditions and corresponding
differences not only in the standard of
living and life style but 'also in
political attitude. (J. Habermas "Toward
a Rational society". Heinemann 1971,
pg. 109).
We would suggest that the defect in Abercrombie et al.'s
analysis is that they fail to consider fUlly that, as they
themselves would accept, Habermas does consider the
structural conditions under which ideological struggles
will take place. They say,In Habermas's view there has to be some
process which legitimates social
systems•• •Habermas does not argue that
the only mechanism of legitimation is
an implantation of certain beliefs in
the minds of social actors so that they
"believe" in a particular set of social
arrangement••In theory, for example,
people could have any set of beliefs
about parliamentary democracy; it is
their participation in the institution
which produces legitimation.
[Abercrombie et ale pg.16.])
Thus, while the beliefs which people hold are
critical we need to consider
i) the structural conditions under which
these views are negotiated, and
ii) the behavioural implications of holding
particUlar views (We would question much of the
Abercrombie et ale thesis on the basis that if it
holds good, why society should have the level of
cohesion which it does.)
Therefore we would suggest that Abercrombie et
ale like many of the other authors on ideology
concentrate only on the retention of particUlar ideas,
and in particular fail to carryon to consider
1) the implications of holding these ideas,
2) the structures within which ideas compete
for attention and recollection
In other words we have to consider not only what
ideas are held, but the structure in which they are
developed and maintained.
b) We would question whether Abercrombie et ale
do not perhaps pose too formidable a question? They
ask for instance,
Do SUbordinate groups believe in the
dominant ideology?
Our view on this would be
i) No probably they do not - our research
certainly indicates this. But this leads on to
our next pointii) In an exact sense (and it does seem to
us that for Abercrombie et ale there does need to
be a fairly high degree of precision) do they
need to, and does it necessarily matter if they
do not? (Abercrombie et ale may be an example of
Wrong's "Oversocialised conception of Man in
Modern sociology" American Sociological Review
1961, pp. 183-193?) We made this argument in
above, where we pointed out, by analogy, that two
football teams could play quite contrasting
styles, but still be playing football (for
instance Celtic and Inter Milan in the 1967
European Cup Final). Likewise for ideology, the
dominant system is not harmed unless the
competing ideologies actually contradict each
other behaviourally. An important point is made
by Schutz:
the biographically modelled
interpretational and motivational
relevances which both partners bring
into the we-relation cannot be
identical, although they are
sUfficiently congruent with the similar
socialization of the partners for the
determination and management of the
situation. In principle the same
events, objects, etc., can consistently
have a different meaning for each of
the partners. (A. Schutz & T. Luckmann
"Structures of the Lifeworld. pg. 254).
Thus, it is quite clear from this that two
parties to a situation may interpret a situation
in different ways, but not so differently that
the situation cannot proceed or be managed. There
is, however still the issue of what happens ,when
this breaks down the situation cannot be
managed - but Schutz is less than clear on this
point••
Let us say, however, that Abercrombie et al are right,
and that we cannot explain social cohesion in terms of a
dominant ideology. How then do we explain cohesion? (It is
clear in their work that they accept the existence of
social cohesion). Cohesion, they suggest, is maintained in
other ways which are unrelated to the values and beliefs of
subordinates as these affect social order and social
cohesion. (Abercrombie et ale pg.154) Their main
explanation for social cohesion relates to self interest.
ThUS, we are told,Workers may perform their roles in the
division of labour simply because this
is necessary for the continued survival
of the system on which they themselves
depend.The integration of the system is
in their own self interests.
(Abercrombie et ale pg.154.)
We would not necessarily say this is wrong. One
construction we could put even on our own findings - and
putting it at its shortest - is to say,
well we think the management here know
best, they're the ones who know how to
take the decisions. So we just go along
with that, because if we don't it might
be bad for the firm.
In other -words our own· findings could be located
within the view put forward by Abercrombie et ale But there
would still be one question we would have to put. Namely,
why is it that employees see their interests in this way?
Why do they define their self interests in the way
Abercrombie et al suggest - if indeed they do? Why should
self-interest be so defined as to allow the perpetuation of
Management and of Hierarchy?
To answer these questions must take us back to consider the
ideas which workers carry about in their heads - ideology,
even if only in a simple sense. Having considered what
these ideas are, we then have to consider why they came to
hold these ideas. There may well be other ways to do this,
but we have argued that the Ideal Speech Thesis gives us a
model for doing so, whereas Abercrombie et ale do not. They
are content - like the ideology theorists they criticise -
to stop their analysis at the surface and not to analyse in
the depth necessary.
particUlarly is phenomenology of Bernstein's view
applicable here,
There' is frequently a lack of
sharpness about the level and
specificity of structures and what
influences their emergence,
reproduction and decline. (R. J.
Bernstein "The Restructuring of Social
and Political Theory" Methuen, 1976, pg
160.)
The role of ideology we would argue, therefore, is not
causal, but it is supportive of the system of power we
considered in the previous section. It is argued by
Eyerman, for instance, thatFalse consciousness perceives the world
and organizes experience in a
hierarchical way. Both in terms of
power and authority, and as a ladder of
success to climb, reality is conceived
as a vertical structure which notches
and steps. In work relations, such a
structure emerges as a consequence of
the internal labour markets previously
described and runs not from "workers"
to "bosses", but rather from low
skilled to skilled, white collar and
highly paid occupations. (R. Eyerman
"False Consciousness and Ideology in
Marxist Theory". Almqvist and Wiksell
1981, pp 273-274)
In the way that Eyerman refers to low skilled and skilled,
white collar and highly paid, we would recall the types of
tension we found in our own data - the conflicts between
Staff and Hourly Paid, the status consciousness by skilled
toward the semi-skilled, etc. To understand fully how this
system of power, supported by ideology, works we must
consider how people make sense of their surroundings - or
in other words their negotiation of reality. Our view of
ideology is therefore what Alvesson describes as a
pejorative, negative or critical one.
Ideology is viewed as beliefs and forms
of consciousness that (may be)
misleading, false or distorted. The
distortion is of a systematic kind and
rooted in· social conditions.' It has
nothing to do with lack of information,
coincidental mistakes or
misunderstandings or with individual
"private" peCUliarities. (M. Alvesson
"organization Theory and Technocratic
Consciousness". De Gruyter 1987. pg.
146)
We prefer to say "may be misleading••" in this definition,
While Alvesson adopts the positive (Ie "are misleading"). A
similar concept is discussed by Eyerman,
1~9"False" in the sense that'I use it here
when referrinq to an individual's
beliefs and consciousness about himself
in relation to society is not the
opposite of true, but rather a mistaken
acceptance of a partial or limited
perspective for the whole
itself.Overcominq such partiality and
limitedness, then implies a theory of
the totality•••some aspects of a
person's beliefs and understandinq
about themselves must be correct, how
else could he or she survive in
society? ••A partial view of oneself
and one's relation to society is false
because it remains trapped in the
correctness of appearance and cannot
rise to thouqht concreteness, Ie to the
qraspinq of society's essential
nature. (R. Eyerman "False consciousness'
and Ideoloqy in Marxist Theory".
Almqvist and Wiksell 1981, pp 279)
Hence in considering ideology we need to consider not only
the holding of certain beliefs, ideas etc. We need to go on
to consider the structure they have - what is it that makes
them mistaken in their totality, and the implications of
holding these views - what they prevent us from seeing or
understanding. Hence we must take into account the process
by which our SUbjects negotiate their reality. Habermas
tells us,
In so far as the leqitimations do not
articulate the relations of force that
they make possible, in so far as these
relations are merely expressed in the
leqitimations, lanquaqe is also
ideoloqical. (J. Habermas "Review of
Gadamer I s Truth and Method" in
"Understanding and Social Inquiry" - F.
DallYmar and T. McCarthy (eds) • Quoted
in T. Mccarthy "Critical Theory of
Jurgen Habermas" Polity 1984, pg 183).
Following on from this it is clear, as Habermas suggests,
that we must examine the use of language, and' thus the
construction of reality. However, as Eyerman points out,
As both Mead and Schutz stressed,
somethinq in a person's experience must
become problematic for him to seek
explanation beyond the familiar and the
commonsense. (R. Eyerman "False
consciousness and Ideoloqy in Marxist
Theory". Almqvist and Wiksell 1981, pp
285).
l;roAn adequate analysis of the negotiation of reality, it is
apparent must involve a consideration of,
a) the role of power in all its configura~ions
b) the role played by ideas, and that some ideas
, are more powerful than others, and that the acceptance
of certain ideas (Eg the technical competence of
Managers in taking decisions) can have implications
for further negotiation of reality.
296 J. Purcell "A strategy for management control in
industrial relations". In J. Purcell and R. smith (eds.)
"Control of Work". Macmillan 1979
297 This is similar to what Halaby (C. Halaby "Worker
Attachment and Workplace Authority", American sociological
Review 1986, pp. 634-649) calls "the workplace authority
approach", for which two features are described as central
(See Halaby, pg. 635):
a) workers's behaviour can be considered to be a
response as subordinates to the domination exercised
by their managers. In other words whether they consent
or resist, they do so in response to the domination of
management.
b) the domination of management is sustained by
normative codes which designate what is appropriate
under the system of domination - thus it would be
possible 'for a manager to "over-step" their limits of
behaviour toward their employees.
This approach is clearly similar to our own, in at least as
far as Halaby's argument is based on understanding how the
domination, of management actually works. Halaby, however,
as supporting evidence develops an essentially historical
argument - and at a high level of abstraction - of the
domination exercised by American management. Associated
with this is secondary analysis of the American Quality of
EmploYment survey. Unlike our own research
a) there is 'no deep analysis of, for instance,
the normative structures, which are central to
Halaby's argument. Hence while Halaby has generality,
our own approach has allowed the degree of penetration
necessary;
b) there is no mechanism described to
how we move from normative structures
behaviour of workers. The mechanism we have
is that of the (Habermasian) Lifeworld.
As Halaby observes,
indicate
to the
advancedThere is virtually no research that
systematically maps the nature and
structure of beliefs regarding the
proper exercise of domination in the
workplace (Pg. 647)
298 As Knights and Wilmott (D. Knights and H. Wilmott "Power
and SUbjectivity at Work". Sociology 1989, pp. 534-558)
point out the problem with the Schutzian position on the
Lifeworld is that it treats social construction (the
Lifeworld) as having liberating potential in itself, rather
than seeing that it could - as we have shown it to do -
pose threats as well opportunities for
emancipation (pg. 545)
Thus in considering the Lifeworld it is not enough merely
to identify its strucure - not enough merely to map it out
- rather we have to proceed to consider its implications.
What we have shown is that the Lifeworlds of our
respondents and the structure of their Lifeworlds have
profound implications for the exercise of power.
299 Knight and Wilmott (D. Knights and H. Wilmott "Power and
SUbjectivity at Work". Sociology 1989, pp. 534-558)
illustrate the difficulty of changing the Lifeworld when
they argue
the identity of the worker bears the
contradictions of the institutions and
social relations in which identity is
constituted and solidified. Nonetheless
the desire to conserve rather than
challenge, everday practices and
values. Such desires may indeed prove
problematical in the reproduction of
capitalism - for example when managers
seek flexibility through the
restructuring of industries or working
practices. But the capacity of the
resistance fuelled by these desires to
transform social relations in an
emancipatory direction is, to say the
least, debatable. (pg. 542)
In other words, though it may be ironic, the maintenance of
the managerial role in the hierachy, may owe
(uncomfortably) much to the same mechanisms Which were the
despair of generations of managers seeking to do away with
demarcation and such other (managerially inneficient)
practices.
300 As Knights and Wilmott (D. Knights and H. Wilmott "Power
and SUbjectivity at Work". Sociology 1989, pp. 534-558)
observe..
although power is exercised over
others, it is necessary to appreciate
and theorise how those who are
subjected to (and by) its truth effects
are themselves active participants in
the process through which power
relations are reproduced.
In other words, what Kinghts and Wilmott argue here is very
close to our own position. It has been our contention that
employees themselves participate in the exercise of power
over them by Managment, in that by and large this is
positively endorsed by their Lifeworlds. The Lifeworlds of
Management too participate in and endorse the system of
domination. This endorsement is not however, simply a
matter of self interest - but in fact is seen by Management
as the most technically appropriate system of organization.
301 This is an example of our· point (a), in that Schutz
identifies the existence of this phenomenon, which he
describes as "specialised knowledge", but fails to go on to
consider the implications which this has.
302 This opens up an analogy with Habermas's theory of
crisis. There are, it will be recalled, four possible
sources of crisis, in Habermas's theory Economic,
Rationality, Legitimation and Motivation. This theory is
elaborated at the level of society by Habermas, but if we
take it to the level of the individual organization it can
be put to work also. Thus if Management (in the role of the
state) fail to produce sufficient rational decisions, other
employees may not be aware of this. They will however,
become aware if as a result of this inSUfficiency of
rational decisions the company goes into an economic
crisis. This may result in lower rewards and/or more labour
for non-Management employees. This may produce a
legitimation crisis among the non-Management employees,
possibly leading on to a crisis of Motivation which may
include the replacement of hierarchy with another
organizing principle. Now it does have'to be said very
firmly that we detected no sign of such developments, but
Habermas's theory of crisis does indicate. a possible way in
which hierarchy may come to be replaced, and that an
obstacle in the way of this happening is that non-
Management employees have no basis for being critical of
Management other than the extent to which the existing form
of organization works or does not work.
303 The development of pathologies, as a consequence of
disturbances of the personal Lifeworld are analysed by
Laing in the work we have referred to above. laing's work
we have argued is a better analogy of repression than that
of Freud.
304 See "Theory of Communicative Action (2)" - J. Habermas.
Polity 1988, pgs. 142-3•,
"
305 R. J. Armstrong, J .F.B. Goodman "Ideology and· Shop-Floor
Industrial Relations". Croom Helm 1981 and N. Abercrombie,
S. Hill & B. Turner "The Dominant Ideology Thesis", George
Allen and Unwin 1980.
306 R. M. Blackburn and M. Mann "Ideology in the Non-Skilled
Working Class". In Working Class Images of Society, M.
Bulmer (Ed.) RKP 1975.
307 M. Billig, S. Condor, D. Edwards, M. Gane, D. Middleton,
A. Radley "Ideological Dilemmas". Sage Books, 1988.
(Henceforth Billig et al.).
, ,
308 This is another area where Laing gives a micro level
analogy, since one of the problems faced by Sarah Danzig
was precisely that certain elements of social reality were
mystified to her by her parents and brother.
309 See the Appendix reporting on our findings of
perceptions of the media.
310 Thompson accords this role to ideology
to study ideology is to study the ways
in which meaning serves to sustain
relations of domination. (J. B.
Thompson "Mass Communication and Modern
Culture". Sociology 1988, pg 370.)
While we would not disagree with Thompson that ideology
plays this role, our findings have pointed strongly to
domination' being maintained by factors less formal than
ideology - for instance the experiences of the workplace
and cognitive restrictions which it leads to.
311 The wider ideological elements of this are indicated by
storey, who suggests that one of the claims asserting the
right of management to manage is that
managers alone have the knowledge to
take the "right" decision. A logical
element of the principle of the
division of labour is that a specialist
cadre is made responsible for
coordinating the work of others and is
responsible too for the specialist
function of making decisions. (J.
Storey "The Challenge to Management
Control" Kogan Page 1980 , pg. 45)
312 See "The Limits of the Law" - B. Weekes et ale Blackwell
1976.
313 Cressey et ale conclude in a similar way in their study
of partipative schemes,~.
What is striking is the extent to which
the process of management is not seen
as a social process at all, but as an
uncontroversial technical function: it
is "just managing". (P. Cressey, J.
Eldridge & J. McInnes "Just Managing".
Open University Press 1985, pg. 176)
314 It is suggested by Vout, in discussing the development
of management education in Britain between 1920 and 1950,
that
Management thought was presented (by
Fayol, Sheldon, Parker-Follett and
urwick) as a neutral coordinating
force, a set of universal principles
which could direct capital and labour
towards good relations and efficiency.
(M. Vout "The Schooling of Management
in Britain". Paper presented to British'
Academy of Management, 1989, pg 13)
This pUblicly expressed view of Management (as an activity)
is certainly supported by our sample of Managers, and
(perhaps more importantly) sUbstantially endorsed by the
Staff and Hourly Paid samples as well. The ideas of these
classical thinkers, considered by Vout in his paper and
described by him as "Executive Training", appear to have
percolated down - at least in general terms - to the level
of the firm, its managers and employees.
315 This definition points strongly to Abrahmsson's Mandator
position being an important concept in any development of
worker participation, since this emphasises focusing on the
implications of Management work, and exercising control
over that.
316 See Abrahamsson, above.
317 Hickson et ale quote Robinson (J. Robinson "Economic
Management China 1972" Anglo-Chinese Educational
Institute 1973) concerning a factory manager in China, who
was purged during the Cultural Revolution,
When I was criticized by the workers I
was aggrieved. Didn't I work hard, come
early and leave late, carry out all my
duties conscientiously?Hickson et at. point out that what the manager had been
unaware of was that he had very gradually come to dominate
the entire organization. They quote King ("A. King "A
Voluntarist Model of Organization". British Journal of
Sociology 1977, pp. 363-374) in saying that the ,Maoist
opposition to experts was the "dilemma of redness' versus
expertness". This is observed too, though in a wider
context, by Salaman (G. Salaman "Towards a Sociology of
organizational Structure". The sociological Review 1978).
He argues that efficiency and rationality can be used
inappropriately to justify the continuing domination of
organizations by a minority of Managers and Management
expertise (See Hickson et ale pg 155). Hickson et ale
conclude
318
2".
In this way (the use of arguments of
efficiency and rationality), power as
technique supports power as domination,
with ideologies of efficiency
buttressing, disguising or justifying'
organizational inequality. «D.
Hickson, W • Astley, R. Butler and D.
Wilson "Organization as Power". In B.
Staw and L. Cummings "Research in
Organizational Behaviour. Vol 3"• JAI
Press 1981, pg. 155).
See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action. Vol.
Polity 1987 , pg 155.
319 His own theory is considered by us in Chapter 1, where
as it can be seen, it is found wanting in certain respects.
320 J. Gaventa "Power and Powerlessness". Clarendon Press
1980.
321 In the 1st dimension he follows Polsby who'suggests that
power can be measured by
who participates, who gains and loses,
'and who prevails in decision-making.'
(N. Polsby "Community Power and
Political Theory" Yale University
Press, pg. 55.)
as well as Dahl's formUlation. Gaventa suggests that
between them Dahl and Polsby make three assumptions (See
Gaventa supra pp. 5-8.):
a) people act upon their grievances,
b) the system is open, ie anyone can participate if
they want to,
c) given that the system' is open, then non-
participation is in no wayan issue worthy of study, since"political silence would have to be
taken to represent consensus" (See
Gaventa supra pg. 7)
The difficulty with this position is that, Gaventa points
out, it does not allow us to investigate why B does not
behave in a way that he might otherwise do were he not
powerless relative to A.
At least as important, however, is the critique of this
view of power put forward by Bachrach and Baratz. This is
the substance of the second dimension of power.
2nd dimension. Gaventa begins his discussion of this
dimension by quoting Schattschneider,
absenteeism reflects the suppression of
the options and alternatives that
reflect the needs of the
nonparticipants. (E. Schattshneider
"the Semi-Sovereign People" Holt
Rinehart and Winston 1960, pg 105.
Quoted in Gaventa, supra pg. 9.)
This, Gaventa points out, was later developed by Bachrach
and Baratz to become their second face of power by which
power is exercised not only in the decision-making process,
but also in order to exclude certain people and/or issues
from decision-making •
The difficulty with this position, albeit that it is an
advance on the 1st dimension, is that while it includes
consideration of the barriers to action
upon qrievances, they (Bachrach and
Baratz) equally maintain that it does
not qo so far as to include how power
may affect conceptions of qrievances
themselves. (Gaventa, supra pg. 11.)
As Lukes points out, however, the fact there is no
grievance cannot lead us to the view that there is a
consensus - far less a genuine consensus (S. Lukes "Power a
Radical View" MacMillan 1974, pg 24.). In other words, as
we have suggested in the earlier section on conscious
power, this approach does not ask all the questions. Just
as we said that Mintzberg, Gamson, Braverman, and Nichols
and Beynon all focused on conflict (or on managing it and
minimising its effects), so
a) omitting consideration of situations
without conflict, thus
b) missing out the consideration that power
could be used to avoid conflict,
this approach goes in the same direction.The solution to this lies, Gaventa tells us; in the 3rd
dimension.
3rd dimension. Gaventa uses Lukes I own definition of the
3rd dimension,
A exercises power over B when A affects
B in a manner contrary to B's
interests.(S. Lukes supra pg. 34.
Quoted in Gaventa, supra pg 11.)
This style of power, Gaventa argues goes beyond what can be
done in either of the other two approaches (See Gaventa,
supra pg. 12.):
a) A may influence, shape or determine the
very wants of B.
b) A may affect the very conception of
issues of B.
c) there may be no observable conflict.
d) it allows' for the variety of ways in
which potential issues are kept silent, either
through social forces, institutional practices or
individual decisions.
In addition, Gaventa points out, these three dimensions of
power must be seen as interrelated, in that the power in
one dimension can be seen as supporting the power in the
other two:
the dimensions of power and
powerlessness may be viewed as
interrelated and accumulative in
nature, such that each dimension serves
to reinforce the strenqth of
another••••••The power of A to prevail
in the first dimension increases the
power to affect B's actions in the
second dimension, and increases the
power to affect B's conception in the
third. (See Gaventa, supra pp. 21-22.)
In this, Gaventa is supported by Pfeffer who argues,
power in use can provide those sub-
units . who possess power with the
&bility to acquire resources, which in
turn are helpful in the maintenance of
power. (J. Pfeffer "Power in
organizations"~ Pitman 1981 pg 304. See
also pg 290.)
Both Gaventa and Pfeffer,
"additiveness" of power.
therefore point to the.....
If we consider this in relation to our own data, then we
could suggest that since the management routinely· take
decisions - for instance in the first dimension what the
pay rise should be, or in the second dimension that certain
issues are non-negotiable - that this reinforces their
power in the third dimension where their power (even though
unconscious) is based on a division of labour which makes
Management the decision-makers.
Gaventa gives empirical examples of the three dimensions of
power. In the first and second dimensions the results fall
clearly into one or other of the categories. Gaventa argues
that first dimension, power was evidenced by a path-
breaking (at that time 1893) agreement on working
conditions. This was achieved through the use of militant
action by the miners.
The second dimension is evidenced by the events surrounding
the possibility of land-slip, due to strip mining, onto the
homes of a small, poor community, and the possibility of
restarting mining. An example quoted concerns the case of
BUffalo Hollow (pp 227-237). This is a small, very poor
community of about 40 homes, threatened by the effects of
strip mining nearby. This was causing a local mountain to
begin to slide down the valley, to the extent it has slid
onto the home of a retired miner and threatens the rest.
This had been treated with quiescence,
One night it'll rain and we'll all be
washed away and destroyed.(pg 229).
The quiescence of the community changed when they had the
opportunity to make a film about this problem which would
by-pass the local Management and go direct to the absentee
company, in London. Faced with the evidence of the film and
the threat of legal action, the local Manager appeared' in
Buffalo for the first time in many years, and the Company
began to build damns to try to hold back the movement of
the Mountain.
While this was going on, however, the strip mine operator,
who had caused all the problem as a lessee of the company,
applied to re-commence operations. As Gaventa points out,
the operator's previous record had been
atrocious. Not only had he caused this
damage, but he had then claimed to have
gone out of business (apparently to
avoid legal action against him) and he
had, like the company, failed to
respond to the citizens' previous
complaints. Now he proposed to continue
this time further down the hollow on'
land adjacent to that of the company
(pp. 229-230) •The citizens of Buffalo had rights of appeal to two
government bodies:
1) to the Commissioner of the Department of
Conservation, who would hear complaints from any party
concerning an application to mine.
2) to the Board of Reclamation Review, which had
the power to overturn any decision by the
Commissioner.
The community were unsuccessful in their approach to the
commissioner, since he had granted permission to mine in
the minimal legal time, but more importantly he gave
permission to the operator one day before he sent out the
forms to the Community to enable them to make their
protest.
The community therefore appealed to the Board of Review, in
the hope that the Board would overturn the Commissioner's
decision. Gaventa points out that in this litigation the
community faced a number of problems:
a) the community was able to employ a single
lawyer to present their case. The state (the
commissioner) and the operator each had their own
lawyers, backed up by technical assistants.
b) the community was split by the operator:
i) he visited the church in Buffalo Hollow
(for the first time in years according to
Gaventa- see pg. 236) and made a handsome
contribution to the collection plate,
ii) he took on a member of one of the key
families in the litigation, and as a .result ~they
dropped out for fear of losing a relative his
job.
c) Gaventa argues that the collection of information was
biased against the community:
i) much of the information concerned the
petitioners being described as "agitators", or having
a negative "attitude".
ii) the gathering of information by the "Expert~"
was carried out within an interaction and ideology
biased in favour of the operator. For instance the
state geologist visited the site in the company of the
operator, and on a dry day. On the basis of this, he
reported to the Board that there was little danger
little damage, and such as there was had been caused
some 12 years before by another operator.
I~OThe community therefore faced considerable
obstacles in addition to the formal ones,' in
presenting their case
Gaventa shows that:
a) the powerful mine owner used the system to his
advantage,
b) the system operated against the powerless,
c) the community was significantly disadvantaged
relative.to the mine owner (eg he had several lawyers
and technical specialists, while the community could
only afford a single lawyer),
d) the mine owner deliberately set out to split
the community,
e) the collection of information was biased
against the community.
We found no particular instances of, such a degree of
formality, but it is clear to us that Staff and Hourly Paid
could have experienced similar problems in the event of
trying to make a challenge to Management. For instance, in
dealing with documents like financial statements the
professional assistance they would be likely to receive
would be likely to be meagre [Gaventa's(a)]. The Staff and
Hourly-Paid are split, and even within these two groups
there are divisions which could be exploited [Gaventa's
(b) ] •
For the third dimension, Gaventa suggests there are two
indications of this operating:
a) the direct mechanisms of third dimension
power the legitimation of inequality,
glorification of the dominant ways and values,
the degradation of older values and culture•
. b) indirect mechanisms the continual
defeat of the non-elite, which gives them a sense
of powerlessness, and an inability to develop
political skills.
The former of these' two signs are clearly apparent in our
own research - the power of Management is unmistakable. The
latter, however, is less so, since, there were few defeats
for either side to have learned from. As we have pointed
out, the Staff and Hourly Paid were not seeking to displace
Management, and the company was relatively strike free.
322 See Chapter 1.
3~ Gaventa, supra pg 29, my emphasis.
I ~ I324 J. March "Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity and the
Engineering of Choice". Bell Journal of Economics 1978 pp.
587-608.
325 See for instance
.....-
Karl Weick: "The Social Psychology of Organizing" Addison-
Wesley 1969, and "Cognitive Processes in Organizations", in
Barry Staw (ed.) "Research in Organizational Behaviour Vol.
1" JAI Press 1979 It is Weick's argument that people tend
to act first and then rationalize later.
Daryl Bem "Self-Perception Theory" in L. Berkowitz (ed)
"Advances in Experimental Social Psychology" Academic
Press 1972. Bem argues that we imply our attitudes Ceg
goals, interests) from what we do.
G. Salancik and M. Conway "Attitude Inferences from Salient
and Relevant Cognitive Content about Behaviour" Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 1975 pp. 829-840. This
suggests that our attitudes Ceg goals/interests) depend on
the information which has been made salient to us. So, for
instance, if it was salient to a respondent that the
interviewer wanted to hear about Management inefficiency or
incompetence or about their efficiency and
competence - then Salancik and Conway would suggest this
is what the interviewer is likely to get.
A similar point has also been made by Schutz. He argues,
For the act of attention presupposes an
elapsed, passed away experience - in
short, one that is already in the past,
regardless of whether the attention in
question is reflective or reproductive.
(A. Schutz "The Phenomenology of the
Social World". Heinemann 1972. pg 51).
326 Habermas has, for instance argued,
the ,only knowledge that can trUly
orient action is knowledge that frees
itself from mere human interests - in
other words, knowledge that has taken a
theoretical attitude.
J. Habermas "Knowledge and Human Interests" Second
Edition Heineman 1978. pg 301.
327 Gaventa, supra pg 29.
328 We shall go on to argue that this is a role which can
be filled by Habermas's Ideal Speech Thesis.
329 Gaventa, supra pg. 25•P. Bachrach & M. Baratz "Decisions and Non-Decisions".
American Political science Review 1963, pp. 641-651.
See P. Bachrach & M. Baratz "Two Faces of Power". American
Political Science Review 1962, pp. 947-952
S. Clegg "Frameworks of Power". Sage 1989, pg. 12.
R. E. Wolfinger "Non Decisions and the Study of Local
Politics". American Political science Review 1971. pp.
1063-1080.
Lukes' view is
I. Boraston, S.
Frenkel "Shop
They argue that
330 This point is well made by, for instance, Wolfinger in
his critique of Bachrach and Baratz, on the ground that the
type of exclusion which they argued for could not be
observed. As Clegg observes
writers like Wolfinger accorded as much
credence to the idea that there was
somethinq unobservable called non-
decision-makinq as they might have done
to the notion that there were fairies
at the bottom of the garden.
\
This dispute points to the need to be able to produce
positive empirical evidence and/or an analytical framework
to produce positive evidence, rather than argue on the
basis of absence. The debate between Lukes ("Power a
Radical View) and Bradshaw (A critique of Steven Lukes
"Power a Radical View". sociology 1976, pp. 121-127)
demonstrates the same point. Lukes I theory requires
essentially "negative" evidence (that the subjects do not
act in the way that would be to their interest), and thus
Bradshaw points out, it is possible that they had
considered such action, but decided to reject it.
331 Habermas I s Ideal speech Thesis.
332 Another example of research based on
"Shop Stewards in Action" by E. Batstone,
Frenkel (E. Batstone, I. Boraston, S.
Stewards in Action" Basil Blackwell 1979.).
.......-
a convener will have far less trouble
and hence will achieve greater power
if, instead of having to arque about
issues or having to squash the issue
initiative of others, he is able to
develop a situation in which members
see it as his right to decide what are
problems and how they should be
handled. Along with this he will be
more powerful if he can instil into
other members .of the organization
particular priorities and viewpoints,
for example about Management and their
behaviour, so that members act in the
manner he desires without his active
involvement in certain issues. In these
ways the probability of conflict over
the agenda of issues and the terms of
the debate can be reduced (LUkes 1974,
Crenson 1971). Accordingly, power is
not to be discerned solely within
situations of manifest conflict. (pg
9. )
333 M. Burawoy "Manufacturing Consent" University of Chicago
Press 1979.
Central to Burawoy's ideas is the idea that the labour
process can usefully be conceived as a game in the sense
that the piecework system becomes an object for them to
outwit (ie making out), as a means of maintaining interest
in what they are doing and thus to counteract the
deprivations of work ("Can the satisfaction involved in
playing the piecework game be preserved in our factories at
the same time that the attendant conflicts are reduced" W.
F. Whyte "Money and Motivation" Harper 1955 pg. 37. Quoted
in Burawoy, supra pg 78.). This notion he points out is by
no means new - it can be found, for instance in the work of
Whyte (W. F. Whyte, supra.), Mayo (E. Mayo "Human Problems
of an Industrial civilisation" MacMillan 1933.) and
Roethlisberger and Dickson (F. Roethlisberger and W.
Dickson "Management and the Worker" Harvard University
Press 1939). Burawoy contends that these writers· regarded
such games as constructs of workers alone and in opposition
to Management. To this he responds by quoting Crozier (M.
crozier "comparing structures and Comparing Games" in
"European contributions to Organization Theory"- G.
Hofstede & M. Kassem. Van Gorcum 1976.), who points out
that if the games of workers begin to threaten Management
and
to take place without any check, the
power struggle would bring paralysing
conflicts and unbearable situations.
(M. crozier "The Bureaucratic
Phenomenon". University of Chicago
Press, 1964)
1~4Thus Burawoy argues, as we have done, that Management
the other workers in the company are both involved in
same game (at least as a system of rules).
For Burawoy, the concept of the game is critical, yet it
still possible for the rules of the game to be matters
conflict:
This leads Burawoy to argue that the game of making
cannot be seen as being carried on independently
Management and that indeed,
Manaqement, at least at lower levels,
actively participates not only in the
orqanization of the qame but in the
enforcement of its rules. (M. Burawoy,
supra pg 80.)
The source of the qame itself lies not
in a preordained value consensus but in
historically specific struqgles to
adapt the deprivation inherent in work
and in struggles with Management to
define the rules. (M. Burawoy, supra pg
82. )
and for the possibility that the game can change:
Once a game is established, however, it
can assume a dynamics of its own, and
there is no quarantee that it will
continue to reproduce the conditions of
its own existence. On the contrary, it
is possible that playinq the qame will
tend to undermine· the rUles that define
it••••one can ask••Under what
conditions will·the game's own dynamics
undermine the harmony its also produces
and so lead to a crisis?••Does makinq
out sow' the seeds of its own
destruction? (M. Burawoy, supra pg 86.)
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Workers, he argues, will continue to make out as long as
there is,
a) neither too much nor too little uncertainty in
making out, such that they feel they are exerting
control over the production system (avoiding a
legitimation crisis),
b) value in it for them (avoiding a motivation
crisis),
c) profit can to be made by the company by
allowing them to make out (avoiding a system crisis) •The fact that the workers participate in the game of making
out "generates" consent to the rules of the game (M.
Burawoy, supra pp 81-86.). Burawoyargues,
the qame does not reflect an underlyinq
harmony of interests; on the contrary
is (the qame of makinq out) is
responsible for and qenerates that
harmony. (M. Burawoy, supra pg 82.)
Moreover, he shows that the effect of external influences
(ie experiences outwith the workplace) on perceptions is
limited, and that:
variations in "imported consciousness do
not qive rise to different relations in
production;••imported consciousness
mediates the translation of relations
in production into activities, but only
within narrow 1imits;••the mediatinq'
effects of such consciousness varies
in accordance with position in the
labour process,' that is its effect is
shaped by the labour process
itself••• (and) that the labour process
at Allied is relatively autonomous. (M.
Burawoy, supra pg 156.)
Burawoy, therefore, concludes as we have done on the basis
of our interviews, that external sources play little part
on consciousness within the firm.
334 For instance:
chanqes in the labour process and the
rise of the internal market expand the
choices of workers and thus constitute
the basis of consent to deqradation.
However this consent emerqes only if
Manaqement does not arbitrarily dictate
choices to workers-if for example,
transfers are always taken at the
initiative of workers and throuqh the
biddinq process and further if punitive
sanctions are confined to the
transqressions of the limits of
choice•• (My emphasis) pq 120.
At this point Burawoy introduces an example perfectly
consistent with our own data:
when restricted to violations of the
rules that define the limits of choice,
the application of force becomes the
object of consent.
( ~ It
i ,
~.
iFrom our own, data, in· discussing discipline we found
exactly this - that a persistent offender (whilst he may be
represented by his union official) would not receive
sympathy from those with whom he worked. Likewise, if we
take up the issue of transfers, in our own firm, we
identified examples of where Hourly Paid workers would
object to a transfer from one job/bay to another if this
was not carried out within the particular rules which
applied there.
335 It is implied by Harris (Power and Powerlessness) that
Burawoy suggests they are fully aware:
he (Burawoy) seems to have implicit
faith in capitalist manaqements as
omniscient and omnipotent.
She goes on to contrast this with a "non-Marxist"
commentator (Anthony Jay - "Management and Machiavelli")
who,
can comment caustically on Manaqement
ineptitude; (Harris supra 219).
Yet, in our view, Management ineptitude need not lead to
its SUbversion, just as long as there is not too much
ineptitUde, as we argued in our discussion of Ford and
Baucus (See above).
336 S. Clegg "Power, Rule and Domination" Routledge and
Kegan Paul 1975.
337 L. Wittgenstein "Philosophical Investigations".
Blackwell 1968, para 241, pg. 226. Quoted in S.
supra pg 34.
338 S. Clegg supra pg. 35.
339 S. Clegg supra pg. 36.
340 See S. Clegg, supra pg. 49.
Basil
Clegg,
341 S. Clegg supra pg. 61.
I!e..
342 M. Weber "Economy & society" Bedminster Press, 1968, pg
33. Quoted in Clegg supra pg 61.
343 Walsh et ale suggest that Clegg argues thatIt is not simply access to the decision
arena that is important (as Dahl and
Bachrach & Baratz would suggest) but
also the ability to define the criteria
that govern the way in which things
are, and are not, to be recognized as
issues. This predefinition of what can
be decided constitutes what Clegg has
termed domination. (K. Walsh, B,
Hinings, R. Greenwood, and S. Ranson
"Power and Advantage in Organizations".
Organization studies 1981, pg 136).
344 Clegg, supra Chapter 5.
345 A. cicourel "Cognitive Sociology", Penguin 1973. Quoted
in Clegg supra pp. 70-80.
346 Clegg supra pg 73.
347 See above .- footnote 13.5·.-
348 Clegg supra, pg 77.
349 Clegg supra, pg 90.
350 At the same time it is important for an actor to behave
within the limits of his role if he is to remain powerful~
This is argued by Biggart and Hamilton, supra.
351 Clegg, supra pg 58, quoting M. Weber Economy arid Society
pg 53.
352 We have considered this above (pg. 58). This issue is
clarified by Habermas, who distinguishes between
systematically Distorted Communication (where there is
unconscious deception), and also Manipulation (where there
is conscious deception). See Figure 18 in J. Habermas -
"Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 1" Polity 1984, pg
333.
353 Clegg, supra pg 49. (My emphasis).
354 Nichols and Beynon, supra pg 102.
355 See also Astely and Sachdeva, alt. cit.
356 .(AeJ~) ~~f(4 ~. ,
,~
357 Clegg, supra pg. 84.
358 See for instance the Joiner's Tale in "Power, Rule and
Domination".
359 In contrast consider the following from "Legitimation
crisis" concerning "Organizational Principles",Organizational principles limit the
capacity of a society to learn without
losing its identity. According to this
definition, steering problems can have
crisis effects if (and only if) they
cannot be resolved within the range of
possibility that is circumscribed by
the organizational principle of the
society. (pg 7)
Clegg's analysis ends when the "form of life" has been
identified. We, on the other hand, would follow Habermas
and contend that we have to go further, to consider the
internal logic of the organizational principle, to identify
the types of steering problem would lead to crisis - ie
circumstances which go beyond the possibilities of the
organizational principle/form of life. This follows from
the Kantian philosophy which argues that any inquiry into
human knowledge cannot be restricted only to the contents
of human consciousness, since these have already been
organized and interpreted in a particular way by the human
actor, and to stop at the contents of human consciousness
would only be to describe his cognition (though that is not
to say that is not vital). There has to be, however, a
further object of inquiry which is to try to understand the
structure and logic of cognitive organization and
interpretation. What we have done in our analysis is to
seek out the factors which appear to support hierarchy as
an organizational principle (Management expertise in
decision-making has proved to be important in this
respect) • This has provided us with a means of
understanding the conditions of its continuation, as well
as the possibilities of its demise.
3~ We would suggest that this stems from his analysis being
rooted in Wittgenstein. It is argued by Thompson of
Wittgenstein (J. Thompson "critical Hermeneutics" Cambridge
University Press 1981),
by emphasising the integral unity and
self-sufficiency of discrete language
games, the philosophy of the later
Wittgenstein is easily transformed into
an a-theoretical pluralism. (pg 81).
The same problem ,afflicts Clegg, since he identifies
language games (forms of life) which appear to just exist
relative to each other. Language is a concept· which can
only be fUlly understood on an intersubjective basis. It is
certainly individual as the means of cognition (especially
if you like talking to yourself), but it has a further
critical interactionist role which theories, like
Wittgenstein's can ignore. Thus, while Clegg has, unlike
Gadamer, taken on board that language can be a medium of
domination, he has treated language monadically which
restricts his analysis of power•
. ( fLC[be
361 Clegg, supra pg. 77.
~2 Some bases of this identified by Habermas are,
Technocratic consciousness reflects not
the sundering of an ethical situation
but the repression of "ethics" as such
as a category of life.
Quoted in T. McCarthy "critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas"
Polity 1984 pg 39. Taken from "Toward a Rational Society"
Heinemann 1971. He continues,
Technocratic consciousness makes this
practical interest ( individuation and
socialization through communication in
ordinary language ) disappear behind
the interest in the expansion of our
power of technical control.
Toward a Rational Society, pg. 113.
363 See above page5 ~00-30J..
364 From those works we have considered an example of the
former would be Burawoy's "Manufacturing Consent", and as
an example of the latter Nichols and Beynon's "Living with
Capitalism".
365 This is related to point 2, since in many cases the
emphasis on A reflects attention to conscious power. It is,
however, important to appreciate that our argument is not
to concentrate on B, 'and leave out A. That would be the
same error in reverse. We contend that we need to
concentrate on both sides of the dyad. This is central to
Habermas's thought,' as Thompson observes in "critical
Hermeneutics",
communication is an intersubjective
phenomenon that is not merely monologic
but dialogic, and hence "communicative
action is a system of reference that
cannot be reduced to the framework of
instrumental action".
J. Thompson "critical Hermeneutics" Cambridge University
Press 1981 pg. 80. Quote from "KnOWledge and Human
Interests" Heinemann 1978, pg. 137.
Thompson further observes in a review of "Theory of
communicative Action" (in its original German version):
{Cf 0
!I:
,The first shift is from a teleological
concept of action - that is as the
successful pursuit of an agent's aims
or desires to a concept of
communicative action which emphasises
the interaction in which two or more
sUbjects seek to reach an understanding
concerning their shared situation.
(John Thompson "Rationality and social
Rationalization: an Assessment of
Habermas's Theory of communicative
Action. sociology May 1983. pp. 278-
294) pg 279 Underline my emphasis
remainder by Thompson.
Thus, what Habermas contends is that we have to move away
from how, for instance, A achieves his purpose to how A and
B act together to the advantage of A.
3M Though it does seem to be clear that B is not aware
~7 See chapter 1, pp. 15-31.
368 Consider the following as an example of this. It is
required by the ideal speech thesis that all participants
should have the same chance to employ communicative acts so
that they can initiate and perpetuate a discourse. It·is
clear from our findings that for Staff and Hourly paid
there are certain matters which are beyond their reach, and
which consequently they cannot employ communicative acts to
initiate and perpetuate a discourse. Even on an issue like
Pay there are issues beyond their reach. For instance in
Excerpt 5.8 we discuss with our respondent the issue of
fairness in setting levels of pay
S Do you think there is a fair system? (of
setting levels of pay)
R No I don't think its fair - I think it should
be the company's books, as I said earlier, should be
open. An d let's see what everybody gets.
S The management salaries
R You see, although I'm saying my wages, it's not
just in this company. I mean. There's wages paid for
lawyers and for the work they do and the money they
get. I mean I'm underpaid, grossly underpaid OK. Other
people might not see it like that but that is how I
see it, you know. In the same respect with directors
in here. I see some guys in here that just waddle
about they don't appear to do anything. OK maybe I'm
ignorant of the facts. I don't know what they actually
do. They might work and the work they might involve
quite a lot. It's out of sight what you don't see.
What you see is they're getting quite a lot and they
appear to do nothing.S Right
R To me that causes unrest, dissatisfaction
S Right. You would like to see more openness?
R Aye. I think you would find people reasonable
because it happens on the shop floor. You've got
foremen, skilled men, labourers, toilet attendants. At
the end of the day they all accept that the skilled
man, if you like is due more money. There is that gap
and they accept where the gap should be.
S Right
R But there is a gap between the Director and the
labourer. He doesn't know what the gap is. He doesn't
know what the job is that the Director does.
This point directly to an important breach in the ideal
speech thesis, in that the requirement that each side is
intelligible to the other is not satisfied, because of
differences in access to information. Given this there can
be no discourse. There are, moreover, situations where in
no discourse can take place because in the view of
management the restriction of access to information is
appropriate, and that discourse would not be appropriate.
For instance in excerpt 5.17 we discuss with a Director,
certain issues in respect of financial planning.
S Obviously everybody in the company has got to,
has a part to play in achieving the profitability of
the company. Who would be involved in drawing up this
plan? Obviously managers would. Would staff or the
shop floor be involved in that, in actually drawing
the plan up rather than implementing it?
R The shop floor wouldn't be ,involved in drawing
it up. They are not employed to draw it up.
What the director seems to be arguing here is that drawing
up a financial plan is just another function - like welding
a pipe or filling out documentation for exports. Nor is
this a view only held by Managers. For instance in Excerpt
5.21 (from an Hourly-paid employee) the same view of
financial decision-making as just another function is
apparent
S What about decisions on the company's financial
policy? Who do you think decides on that?
R Oh top management.
S Why do you think that?
R Well they've got the brains againS They Ive got the expertise to do it. Do you
think its fair they should make that decision?
R I think so, yes. You don't get any workers
qualified.
S. Should guys - should employees have any sort
of input into it or should it be left up to
management?
R Left to Management
It appears, therefore that there is a clear division of
labour, which obstructs the satisfaction of the first
condition of the ideal speech thesis, representing for
management a source of power. A source of power, moreover,
of which neither management nor others in the firm is
aware. It just "is".
Additionally the above means that the thesis is broken in
its second condition - that all participants should be able
to call into question any explanation, interpretation or
justification such that no opinion remains exempt from
consideration or criticism.
Let us say, however, that condition 1 is satisfied - that
any party can initiate discourse. Would this mean that
condition 2 would be satisfied? No, it would not. Consider
a situation where there is employee participation at board
level - there are a number of employee directors. Our data
on this suggests that for all sides (management, staff, and
hourly-paid) the main function of this would be to enhance
the quality of communication within the company. Decisions
would continue to be taken by Management. Thus even if
condition 1 was met, there is no proof, on the basis of our
evidence from our Staff and Hourly-paid, that condition 2
would be met in any effective sense. Habermas argues (in
"Knowledge & Human Interests", pg. 354)
in wittgenstein and his disciples the
logical analysis of the case of
language always remained
particularistic: they failed to develop
it into a theory of language games.
It appears to us to be clear that management are winning
the language game. Organization theory tells us that
everyone in the organization has a function (see for
instance H. Mintzberg "The Structuring of Organizations")
and essentially the language game revolves around
"function", and in particular the ability to so define
functions so that on the one hand a function (eg
management) has responsibilities SUfficiently important to
justify a high level of reward, but is performed out of
sight of the vast majority of the organization. The final
element of the definition is that no one else in the
organization is capable of performing the function.
/q , b _he
The third condition - requiring all the participants to be
truthful - is broken too, we would argue. A difficulty with
this concerns what we mean by truth? The waters around this
are 'too deep and dark (not to say extensive) for us to deal
with here. Our point is simply that it is clear that on
certain matters, Management, Staff and Hourly paid are not
agreed on what the truth is. For instance our discussion on
pay shows that Management regard the unions as too
powerful, while Staff and Hourly paid took the view that
the gap between them and Management is overly large.
This does not mean that either side is lying. Held points
out (D. Held "Introduction to critical Theory")
it is Habermas1s contention that
conflict, competition and strategic
action in general, as well as other
forms of social action, represent
derivatives of action oriented to
reaching understandings1 they are
derivatives because they involve a
suspension or putting out of play
certain of its dimensions (validity
claims) [pg. 332]
In other words, we may attempt to sustain a validity claim
by means which are other than truthful. Does this happen,
and if so, why does it happen? Such action, it appears to
us, does take place, most clearly in relation to the first
two dimensions of power. Industrial relations appear to be
well popUlated with such behaviour - the threat of strikes,
disputes over manning levels, tactical alliances and so on.
In industrial relations what is true frequently depends on
who you talk to.
The final condition of the thesis requires that each side
recognises the legitimacy of the other to participate in
the dialogue. It is clear from our data that this is not
satisfied. While Hourly-paid and Staff recognise the
legitimacy of the management function,
a) management do not correspondingly recognise
the legitimacy of staff and hourly paid to participate
in certain areas of company decision-making. But even
more importantly
b) staff and hourly paid do not recognise their
own legitimacy to participate in company decision-
making. This point is well made in Excerpt 5.35, where
the Hourly-paid respondent sums things up by saying
theyI re the management and we are the
workers, and that the way it is.
/91... -
We do not necessarily mean to imply by this that staff and
hourly paid simply accept the role that Management would
allot to them - our data suggests that they seek more than
Management would offer. But our data is equally clear that
hourly-paid and staff would not regard it as legitimate
that they should participate equally with management in
company decision-making.
Given the unconscious power which operates within
hierarchy, suppressing any alternative, hierarchy can be
seen to have a self-reinforcing quality - at least in part
is sustains itself," and would thus be difficult to
dismantle (for instance in developing more democratic forms
of organization). As Habermas points out
the barriers to communication Which
make a fiction precisely of the
reciprocal imputation of
accountability, support at the same
time the belief in leqitimacy that
sustains the fiction and prevents it
beinq found out. (quoted by T. McCarthy
in his introduction to "Legitimation
Crisis", pg xv).
The legitimacy of hierarchy is precisely thus. The rUles,
norms, etc. of hierarchy represent at the same time a
barrier to communication, and provide a legitimacy which
allows hierarchy to continue without challenge or being
contested. In other words to revert to the theoretical
structure of the first chapter, the Lifeworlds of the
employees produce and structure expectations about
hierarchy, but the Lifeworlds itself is critically
influenced by hierarchy. The fact of spending one's
working life in a hierarchy makes formidable the
imagination of a workable alternative. It is moreover
important to realise that this is true not of Management or
Staff or Hourly paid alone - but rather of them all. By no
means should it be thought that what we have described is a
management plot - rather it is a social artifact in which
they"all collude.
Management see the rights and obligations of their position
in the hierarchy as natural, and indeed as essential for
the efficient running of the company. While there may be
disagreement at the margin, Staff and Hourly paid by and
large go along with this. The support for hierarchy is
therefore in an important sense, self-generating. The
problems which may arise in moving away from hierarchy will
be considered in the next section of this chapter on
information and control.
369 This point is made by Brown, (R. Brown "Bureaucracy as
Praxis" Administrative science Quarterly 1978, pp. 365-382)
who argues"".
Hakinq decisions is not the most
important exercise of orqanizational
power. Instead this power is most
strateqically employed in the desiqn
and imposition of paradigmatic
frameworks within which the very
meaninq of such actions as IImakinq
decisions" is defined. (pg. 376)
We would perhaps take issue with Brown in that our findings
indicate that Management are likewise constrained by
"paradigmatic frameworks", but our findings indicate that
relative to the conscious exercise of power, its
unconscious exercise is both more-important and effective.
370 See above footnote -13, where Habermas I s definition of
technical rationality is given. See too footnote 17 for an
example of an Industrial Tribunal operating under the same
rationality, making an argument of very much the same form.
371 Thus when Managers, faced with an eager academic anxious
to discuss the uses of managerial power, says that he has
none, or very little, this does not mean that he is trying
to conceal something ( or get rid of the academic). It may
mean that he genuinely perceives no power in his position.
3n See Robert Dahl "The Concept of Power"• Behavioural
Science 1957.
373 See P. Bachrach and M. Baratz "Decisions and Non-
decisions" American Political Science Review 1963, pp. 641-
651.
374 See C. stone - "Pre-emptive Power" American Journal of
Political Science 1988 pp. 82 - 104.
3~ This is defined by Habermas as follows:
/9 Ct"structural' violence - does not manifest
itself as force; rather unperceived, it
blocks· those communications in which
convictions effective for legitimation
are formed and passed on. such an
hypothesis about inconspicuously
working communication blocks can
explain, perhaps, the formation of
ideologies; with it one can give a
plausible account of how convictions
are formed in which subjects deceive
themselves about themselves and their
situation•••in systematically
restricted communications, those
involved form convictions subjectively
free from constraint, convictions which
are however -illusionory. They thereby
communicatively generate a power Which,
as soon as it is institutionalized, can
also be used against them." (J.
Habermas "Hannah Arendt's
Communications Concept of Power". In S.
Lukes [Ed] - "Power", Blackwell 1986,
pg 88)
3U Where the validity claims can be rightfully raised, and
redeemed according to the ideal speech thesis (See J.
Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action" Vol. 1, Polity
1984, pg 333.). Thus power is not present where there is
true communicative action.
3n Where the conditions of the ideal speech thesis are in
one way or another violated (See J. Habermas "Theory of
communicative Actionll Vol. 1, Polity 1984, pg 333.).
378 Where the parties are each aware of their power and
their differing interests.
3N Where strategic action is hidden.
380 Where the more powerful party is aware of the exercise
of power, but employs it in such a way that the less
powerful are unaware. For instance he considers Goffman's
work on "impression management" as an example of this (See
J. Habermas "Theory of communicative Action" Vol. 1, Polity
1984, pg 94.). This type of power is recognized, albeit in
a marginal way, by Bachrach and Baratz who speak of power
as manipulation (P. Bachrach & M. Baratz "Power and
poverty. Theory and Practice". Oxford Uni. Press, 1970, pg.
20.) •
381 Where both parties are unconscious of the operation and
influence of power (See J. Habermas "Theory of
communicative Action" Vol. 1, Polity 1984, pg 333.). For
instance the role of ideology isa form of systematically distorted
communication, one which functions
simultaneously to disguise and defend
the suppression of generalisable
interests. (John B. Thompson "critical
Hermeneutics"• Cambridge Uni. Press
1981, pg 135.)
Interestingly, this too is recognized by Bachrach & Baratz
as well, in that they define authority as
agreement based up reason. (P. Bachrach
& M. Baratz "Power and Poverty. Theory
and Practice". Oxford Uni. Press, 1970,
pg. 20.)
The difficulty here is that it fails totally to take into
account the possibility that reason - rationality - can be
distorted in the ways examined by Habermas's theory.
382 This is what we have described as conscious power, which
is suggested by
studies•••by which control over
structural conditions is regarded as an
outcome and not necessarily a
determinant of subunit power. Having
obtained a position of power, SUbunits
will tend to' use their power to gain
control over structural conditions and
organizational resources (eg. G. R.
Salancik and J. Pfeffer "Who gets power
and how they hold on to it".
organizational Dynamics 1977, pp. 3-21.
J. Pfeffer "Power in Organizations"
pitman 1981). (R. Lachman "Power from
What?" Administrative Science
Quarterly, 1989, pg 231.)
Moreover it is pointed out by Edelman that
Force signals weakness in politics, as
rape does in sex. Talk, on the other
hand, involves a competitive exchange
of sYmbols, referential and evocative,
through which values are shared and
assigned and coexistence attained. (M.
Edelman "The SYmbolic Use of Politics".
University of Illinois Press, 1964, pg.
114)Hence the use of open power is something which the parties
would prefer to avoid - hence dismissal, strikes etc. we
would expect to be the exception rather than the norm, and
indeed this is the kind of situation we found in our firm.
On the other hand when we turn to the second sentence in
Edelman's quote, it would be important to consider whether
the "competitive exchange" is one of perfect competition.
It appears to us that the exchange within the firm could
not be so described, with one party - Management - having
advantages in respect of their structural position in the
hierarchy, and in respect of the Lifeworld.
3~ This is consistent with the work of Goffman. For
instance his definition of control, it is argues by Rogers,
includes
control as an effect, as when one has
"control of" or "control over"
perceptions. Control of people results
from shapinq their definition of a
situation or determininq what they
perceive. (M. F. Rogers "Goffman on
Power". The American Sociologist, 1977.
pg 92.)
384 See J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action" Vol.
1, Polity 1986, pg 332.
385 See "The Recent.Work of Jurgen Habermas" - S. White pg.
40.
386 This is characterized by Walsh et al. (K. Walsh, B.
Hinings, R. Greenwood and S. Ranson "Power and Advantage in
organization". organization Studies 1981, pp. 131-152) who
describe this situation as "Unthought Consensus" (pp. 142-
4), which is a situation where
the parameters are accepted in an
uncritical way without evokinq any such
positive response (pg. 142).
and that what is important is
not that individuals and qroups accept
particular values and the operative
rules which express them, but that they
do not reject them (pg. 143)
They quote Buckley as arguing that
. ,This is very similar to the empirical situation we have
described. Walsh et ale however, then go on to argue
In such a situation· qroups and
individuals are likely to express a
qeneralized, unspecific dissatisfaction
with their interest position, or to be
apathetic.
Our evidence would suggest this to be a somewhat harsh
jUdgement to make, . and in particUlar the latter comment
concerning apathy. Our evidence suggests that
a) employees in our firm (and to the extent that
they are typical) are dissatisfied, but not to a
degree that they are fundamentally critical of
Management, in that they would significantly vary the
degree of hierarchy. Rather, while they would wish to
.exercise a greater degree of influence, the decision-
makers would continue to be Management.
as a
the
qiven
not
rUles and procedures 'of
orqanization are accepted as
conditions of action and
questioned. (Walsh et al pg 143)
We cannot rule out the possibility that
for a larqe percentaqe of the actors in
any social system, the norms are
accepted merely as qiven conditions of
action with little understandinq of
their oriqin or ideo10qica1
justification, and with J even less
comprehension than they miqht
otherwise. (W. Buckley "Sociology and
Modern Systems Theory". Prentice Hall,
1967, pg. 196: and Walsh et ale pg
143).
,.
Walsh et al describe the "unthought consensus"
situation where
b) there was certainly no evidence of apathy, in
that our SUbjects appeared to have a strong influence
in their firm - to the extent that we would conclude
they were if anything frustrated by the lack of
information (See our Chapter 4, and below in this
Chapter on Control of Information) rather than being
apathetic.
Walsh et al.'s argument that
Dissatisfaction will be inartiCUlate
and erratic (pg. 144)
is not supported by our data•
.1tJo~7 See footnote 276.
3M We can see a similar approach to this in V. Rus
"positive and Negative Power". (Organization Studies, 1980,
pp. 3-19). Rus argues that
Authority, therefore, does not mean the
neqation of· resistance (which he
equates with "negative power"), but its
conditional 1eqitimation••••This
peculiarly contradictory formation
called authority, is a creation of
equilibrium between induction
("positive power") and resistance
without eliminatinq either one or the
other•••The relationship between
induction and resistance is no longer a
direct contradictory interaction:
instead it is mediated by leqitimacy
(Rus supra, pp. 12-13)
There is much in this with which we can agree. Most
especially the way in which the concept of induction (eg
Management seeking to induce their employees to act in a
particular way), and resistance (eg employees resisting the
attempts of Management to behave in a particular way) are
not defined away. This reflects nicely the firm in which we
carried out our research, since though the two parties were
not in open conflict, recourse to such action was an option
Which neither would rule out. As Rus observes the key to
this is legitimacy, but where one point on which we part
company with Rus is that he appears to see no need to
consider the basis of this legitimacy, and how and why it
persists. A further problem with Rus's position is that
there appears to be no clarification by Rus whether the
existence of legitimacy renders the operation of power
unconscious. Our view has been that it does.
389 This reflects again Habermas's ideas on technical
ration.ality.
390 For instance Gerry Ross, (Boilermaker's Convener at John
Browns) is quoted as saying,
Many of the stewards could not qrasp
the siqnificance of the work-in,
includinq even we amonq the leadership,
knowinq we were makinq a decision of
this nature, and we'd no position in
the past where we could draw
comparisons with such a situation. We
did not understand ••••maybe Reid and
Airlie did, what the actual decision
really meant, what complications we'd
be confronted with, and how qiqantic a
step was necessary to make a success
come out of it"
~O(391 A difficulty in accomplishing this is made clear'in
Tannenbaum and Rozgonyi. They argue that hierarchy is
functionally necessary to achieve coordination - but on the
other hand they suggest there is considerable agreement
that workers should be more involved through
participation. The problem is that
hierarchy is partly responsible for the
problems of motivation and attitude
that call for participation but also
seem to provide evidence that
participation will not work. (A.
Tannenbaum and T. Rozgonyi "Authority
and Reward in organizations". Survey
Research centre, 1986. pg. 243)
Hence a major impediment to moving toward a situation more
consistent with the Ideal Speech Thesis is not only that
hierarchy is not consistent with it, but that hierarchy
produces evidence which can be used in the discourse to
suggest that such change may not be a good idea.
392 The Ideal Speech Thesis can therefore assist us to
reveal areas where power has operated in way(s) of which we
are not conscious. It should be emphasised that while it is
oriented toward achieving understanding, it will not by any
means suppress conflict. Indeed it would be a condition of
Ideal Speech that any suppressed conflict would have to be
brought to the surface and resolved. Hence we can employ
the Ideal Speech Thesis and concur with Cressey et al. that
the concept of economic organization
without conflict is absurd and
implicitly totalitarian. (P. Cressey,
J. Eldridge & J. McInnes "Just
Managing". Open University Press 1985,
pg. 175.)
393 Holmes ("Legitimacy and the Politics of the Knowable" -
R. Holmes. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976) points to the
structural disadvantage suffered by workers.
workers cannot give each other as much
support as can the members of the
professions•••workers are usually
employed by alien organizations where
promotion means removal from friends
and colleaques, removal from the union
itself (Holmes pg. 56)
Hence the ability of workers to pursue their wage claims is
further restricted in this way, of which again they are
likely to be unaware. .It:.0z
394 Clegg on the other hand, argues that (as he puts it) the
different "circuits of power" are separate from each other.
See S. Clegg "Frameworks of Power", Sage 1989. This appears
to us to be unfortunate, in that
a) we are considering what is supposed to be a
single variable, and for this to be differentiated
into three distinct, independent sub-variables opens
up the issue of whether we are talking about a single
variable at all. Allowing for linkages between the (we
would accept) different types of power diminishes this
problem.
b) the different forms (or'dimensions) of power
can be shown - as we have - to interact with. each
other, supporting each other. To take a more general
example, Bachrach & Baratz's critique of Dahl is
rooted in the argument that the powerful can exercise
their power by preventing certain issues being
introduced into the decision-making system at all
(second dimension power). Yet where does the power
come from to do this? Why'are these issues organized
out of the system? It must be because either,
1) a decision has been taken by the powerful
that this should be so (first dimension power),
or that
2) it is not seen as appropriate by the
powerless to press this demand (third dimension
power).
Hence, in some cases at least, we can only fully
understand the particular form, or exercise, of power
by considering its linkages to other dimensions (or to
use Clegg's terminology, "circuits") of power. Only by
analysis to the level of unconscious power have we
been able to understand the use of conscious power by
the participants in the firm.
395 The reasons why Investment rather than Pay can be
"carried off" by Management are suggested by Pfeffer (in J.
Pfeffer "Management as Symbolic Action" in L. Cummings and
B. staw- "Research in organizational Behaviour. Vol 3". JAI
Press 1981, pp. 1-52) He quotes Thompson and Tuden (J. D.
Thompson & A. Tuden "Strategies, Structures and Processes
of organizational Decisions" in J. D. Thompson et ale
"comparative Studies in Administration". University of
Pittsburgh Press" 1959) who argue that there are two
elements of decision making
a)' whether' there is consensus about goals or
values
b) whether there consensus about beliefs
concerning cause-effect relations, or the
organization's technology
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Pfeffer argues that it is easier for Management to develop
consensus about the latter than the former. Pfeffer
advances three reasons for this:
1) the rationality which goes into technological
decisions is not only a procedure, it is also a valued
social ideal indeed to be said to be lacking
rationality would be held to be a critical statement.
Values on the other hand are not sUbject to
rationality - these are sUbjective matters of opinion,
taste, etc.
2) definitions of technical situations are more
flexible than preferences and values. Pfeffer suggests
We know what we like with more
certainty than we know how to achieve
what we like (pg. 15)
3) we can influence perceptions of cause:effect
relations through informational social influence more
easily than values etc. can be so influenced. Hence
through their control of information Management can
exercise influence over cause:effect perceptions of
their employees
We would contend, however, that while Pfeffer is perfectly
correct as far as he goes, there is further dimension to
this process, which he omits because first of all he
considers only Management, and not how this is "carried
off" in relation to other employees, and secondly because
he does not allow for the exercise of unconscious power.
Doing so would lead to appreciation of
a) decision-making technicalities which those
outwith Management appeared not only not to understand
but also to perceive as a matter outwith their role,
and
b) Management's role being seen as decision-
makers
In this way it becomes clear why agreement about technical
issues - especially at a distance from their task - and
cause:effect relations is easier to accomplish than
agreement about values. Not only are there all the
advantages which Pfeffer points to, but in addition
Management are regarded as the authorities on such matters
- hence any competing views on cause:effect begin from this
very disadvantage. Indeed as Pfeffer sUbsequent makes clear
Once a paradigm is established, it
-requires a great deal of
disconfirmation and challenge to undo
the established patterns of analysis,
data collection and choice of
activities (pg. 19)Pfeffer here is using the well known Kuhnian argument
concerning overthrow of dominant paradigms. We would
contend, without being critical of this view that within
organizations the problem goes deeper than just the
procedural elements of decision-making paradigms. The
problem the role of Management indicates is that paradigms
not only can have a role as decision-making tools, but also
as to who should be involved in taking the decision. The
paradigm may, therefore, indicate not only how the decision
is taken, but who should be involved in the decision-making
process. We could change one or the other, but as we shall
see below in our consideration of information it may be
necessary to change both in order to move toward more
democratic organizations.
396 It has been argued by John Thompson in "critical
Hermeneutics" that
no empirical interlocution is likely to
accord with the model of pure
communicative action. (pg 134).
We would argue that this is quite correct, but rather an
unimaginative view of Habermas. For instance, if we go back
to our re-wording of Andrews' view of perfect competition
At the one level,(pure communicative
action) could be kept in all its
details with a clear conscience, as a
theory of perfection which could be
used for the assessment of the
condition of any situation which would
be consonant with maximum(rationality),
and for the correspondinq criticism of
any diverqent conditions in the actual
world.
(my emphases)
we can begin to see the applicability of the Ideal Speech
Thesis as a "bench-mark" for the analysis of empirical
situations.
391 Lukes argues:Indeed is it not the supreme exercise
of power to qet another or others to
have the desires you want them to have
- that is to secure their compliance by
controllinq their thouqhts and
desires? •••The trouble seems to be
that Bachrach and Baratz, and the
pluralists suppose that because power,
as they conceptualize it, only shows up
in actual conflict, it follows that
actual conflict is necessary to power.
But this is to ignore the crucial point
that the most effective and insidious
use of power is to prevent such
conflict arisinq in the first place.
S. Lukes "Power: a radical View".- MacMillan 1974, pg 23.
398 See E. Goffman on "fabrication", which is a strategy of
influence which uses a variety of techniques including,
innuendo, deliberate ambiguity, crucial omissions, lies and
impersonation. (See "Presentation of Self in Every Day
Life" Doubleday pp. 62,64).
Further, his emphasis on consent is perhaps indicated by
the following, on false consciousness:
he who would combat false consciousness
and awaken people to their real
interests has much to do, because the
sleep is very deep. And I do not intend
to provide a lullaby but merely to
sneak in and watch the way people
snore. J
See E. Goffman "Frame Analysis" Harper and Row 1974, pg
14.
399 This is observed by Barlow (G. Barlow "Deficiencies and
the ~erpetuation of Power: Latent Functions in Management
Appraisal". Journal of Management Studies 1989, pp. 499-
517) in a study of Management Appraisal systems.
~O.tR ...._--------_....._-----,. They (Management' Appraisal' systems)
also legitimate power structures and
exchange relationships in terms that
are consonant with the rational-legal
id.ology of mod.rn busin.ss
organizations. Cardinal to this proc.ss
are activiti.s dedicated to the
construction of belief systems which
assure continu.d complianc. commitment
and positive effort on the part of
participants regardless of how th.y
far. in the contest for resourc.s••••As
such they provide prescriptions which
identify social purposes as technical
ones (pg. 500) ,
In this sense the function of Management Appraisal is to
motivate Managers to higher levels of performance in a way
which conceals the power to which they are sUbject. Hence
rather than being seen as a form of organizational control,
Appraisal is perceived as reward for "technically good"
performance. Barlow concludes
It (Management
mobilized power
support of power
512)
Appraisal system)
as a technique in
as domination. (pg.
400 "Power and Powerlessness in Industry" - R. Harris.
Tavistock PUblications 1987.
r
401 Thus Pfeffer when he argues that
The activity of Management is viewed as
making what is going on in the
organization meaningful and sensible to
the organizational participants and
furthermore . developing a social
consensus and social definition around
the activities being undertaken.
Management involves more than labelling
or sensemaking i t involves the
development of social consensus around
those labels and the definition of
activity(J. Pfeffer "Management as
Symbolic Action" in L. Cummings and B.
Staw- "Research in Organizational
Behaviour. Vol 3". JAI Press 1981, pp.
1-52, pg. 21)
he does appear to ignore that employees acquiesce in this
process. In other words that while Management have to
accomplish this process, they are expected to do this by
their employees, which will of course render the
accomplishment of this task much easier.402 We would contend therefore,that in a precise sense it
is not necessary for paradigms to be shared - see for
instance Pfeffer supra, pg. 21 - and that it is enough for
the paradigms to coexist through not contradicting each
other, and/or being in conflict. Thus with the division of
labour it becomes likely that there will be a degree of
drift from the Management paradigm, but this does not
create difficulties unless the paradigms begin to conflict
by requiring conflicting actions to be taken.
403 The need to consider power as a multidimensional concept
has been recently emphasised by Lachman, who argues
power (which he defines as "the
capacity of a subunit to influence the
behaviour of other subunits - pg 232)
should be considered as a
multidimensional and abstract concept,
with several observable manifestations,
and it is only through these
manifestations that power can be
understood and measured. It is
suggested that coping with uncertainty,
nonsubstitutability and centrality be
regarded as these tangible
manifestations of power rather than
either its sources or outcomes. In
other words power is the capacity of a
subunit to cope with uncertainty in
inputs, to control information or to
place itself in a central position in
the work interaction networks. (R.
Lachman "Power from What."
Administrative Science Quarterly 1989
pg. 248.)
Lachman is dealing with another province of power
especially in that we are dealing with power in its
unconscious form - but we would certainly endorse his
conclusion on the mUltidimensionality of power.
4~ It is argued by Knights and Wilmott that
as long as subordinates are relatively
compliant, the extent to Which the
powerful are dependent upon them can be
readily unacknowledged, if not entirely
forgotten. (D. Knights and H. Wilmott
"Power' and identity in theory and
practice". sociological Review 1985,
pg. 25).
405 Clegg observes
.1 0 athe ideal speech situation is thus the
counter-factual by which real interests
may be realized. consequently power
would consist of placing barriers which
constrain others from realizing what
their interests are in the structure of
a situation. (S. • Clegg "Frameworks of
Power". Sage 1989, pg 94).
406 This is consistent with the conclusion of Wall and
Lischeron, who find in their study that the most that
employees want to do is to influence managers by direct
interaction within an accepted power structure. See T. Wall
and A. Lischeron "Worker Participation". McGraw Hill 1977.
407 For the avoidance of doubt, we are not necessarily
arguing that Management control ought not to work - or that
Management control is necessarily bad - but rather that we
should understand the conditions under which Management
control operates. On the other hand, as Clegg observes (S.
Clegg "organizational Democracy, Power and Participation".
C. Crouch and F. Heller (Eds.), "Organizational Democracy
and Political Processes". John wiley 1983, pp. 3-34)
no fundamental need necessarily
attaches to any historical conventional
functional differentiation , nor one
might observe, to its legitimation.
(pg. 5)
In other words, hierarchy is not innevitable and that
we should be concerned with why it is justified,
perceived to be legitimate. As Blau & Scott (P. Blau
Scott "Formal Organizations". RKP, 1963).argue
One of the more enduring myths of
administration is that a formal
hierarchy of authority is essential for
co-ordinating in complex organizations.
(pg. 183)
thus
and
& W.
llt...
408 The data presented in Appendix Six· on' Job satisfaction
are supportive of this, in that poor working conditions may
lead employees to become critical of Management. We have
found in our firm that on the whole the employees are
satisfied with their jobs and the rewards they receive.
Hence the Lifeworld role of Manager as competent decision-
maker is sustained by their experience of work - for
instance relatively few had experienced redundancy, and
even then not in this firm.
4~ It has been argued on structural grounds that management
is an inevitable component of organizations. For instance
it has been so argued by Leblebici and Salancik (H.
Leb1ebici and G. Salancik "The Rules of Organizing and the
organizational Role". Organization Studies 1989, pp. 301-
325) who argue thata well developed analytic definition of
"an orqanization" must modify the
Weberian definition by incorporatinq a
sixth element: an orqanization is an
associative social relationship
characterized by an administrative or
executive staff who are the agents of
the relationship itself and are
empowered to seek the continuation of
the relationship. (pp. 322-3 my
emphasis)
We do not intend to criticise the research which led to
this conclusion - but rather to consider its perceptual
framework. Leblebici and Salancik begin by considering the
development of trade associations in the US, as entities
which display the five characteristics required in Weber's
definition of an organization. Their analysis of trade
associations leads them to conclude that
The theoretical and empirical results
provided here suqqest that an
orqanization as a unique type of
corporate qroup consists of a diverse
qroup of participants who may have
conflictinq interests that must be
managed. (pg. 322 my emphasis)
The difficulty, as we have argued above, is with the
omission of any consideration of
a) why the other participants consent to be
managed?
b) the conditions on which such management will
take place?
The argument about the role of Management does not end by
showing that any
definition of orqanization must
incorporate an additional element - the
existence of the aqent of the
relationship. Whether these aqents are
called manaqers, paid staff or
administrators, they are the aqents of
the relationship rather than the aqents
of the members or of the elected
officials. (pg. 322)
9..1 0Following, as Leblebici and Salancik do, the legal analogy
used by Weber, any agency agreement - even if it is
functionally necessary - has to be negotiated. It is not
enough to say merely that it has been negotiated. We are
then obliged to consider what type of agreement has been
entered into and what does it mean for the parties, both
now and in the future. Indeed Abrahamsson's "mandator
position" (B. Abrahamsson "On Form & Function in
organization Theory" - Organization studies 1985, pp.39-
53.), as a' means of describing the role of Manager,
implicitly points to the structural significance of the
role of Management. Doing so, however, only opens up the
issue of the limits of the role of Managers, and the degree
to which they should be subject to more democratic control
by the employees of the firm. This, as we have seen above,
is central to Abrahamsson's discussion, and more
importantly, we will argue, consistent with our own
findings - in other words that while the role of Manager is
accepted, the issues which remain concern the degree of,
and rules for, its control.
410 In this way, as storey points out
the dual reality of labour is that it
is both dominated and yet also
cooperative. (J. storey "Management
Control as a Bridging Concept". Journal
of Management- studies, 1985, pg. 281)
411 Our efforts indicate that there is very little such
research.
412 It has, however, been found by Jackson-Cox et ale (J.
Jackson-Cox, J. McQueeny, J. Thirkell "strategies, Issues
and Events in Industrial Relations" RKP, 1987) in their
research that communication by Management is not always
prompted in this way. They argue (see page 197) that
Managements do (though not always) communicate with the
objective of
a) securing greater employee identification with
the firm, and/or
b) moderating wage claims.
9..1 1It would be hard for us to conclude on the basis of the
evidence that we found that our firm was perceived to
communicate on anything other than an ad hoc basis, and
that, if the former was the objective (and we found no
direct evidence of this being practiced though some
managers were aware of its importance and were looking "to
do something"), this was not consistently pursued. Indeed
our firm is at variance with the Jackson-Cox findings in
that it was clear to us from informal discussion with its
accountants that the Employment Protection Act requirements
were ones which were taken seriously by the firm. At the
same time distinguishing between information communicated
to satisfy the requirements of the Employment Protection
Act, and to moderate wage claims, will not always be easy.
413 See the Employment Protection Act 1975, ss 17-21, and
ACAS Code of Practice Number 2.
414 There are of course other areas where disclosure must be
made by companies - the duty to submit annual accounts is
the most obvious. Another area where disclosure has to be
made is in the event of Industrial Tribunal proceedings,
since as a consequence of the Industrial Tribunal
Regulations 1980, rule 4, a company would have to disclose
documents to the applicant. We are, however, distinguishing
between
1) these types of information, where
a) the former concerns essentially pUblic
domain information,
b) and
adversarial,
the latter is specifically
2) set against information disclosed to
employees, at least notionally, for the purpose of
reaching consensus.
415 There are several reasons why this could be expected:
a) Lyall finds that on the whole the shop stewards to whom
the information was disclosed lacked the skills to be able
to use it effectively. (D. Lyall "Opening the Books to the
Workers". Accountancy 1975, pp. 42-44.) He argues
shop stewards are not able to
understand the implications ot
financial intormation. (pg 42)
For instance, having set a sample of 30 stewards 6
questions on financial decision-making, the success rate
averaged 20%, varying from 0% to 53% (See Lyall supra, pp.
43-44. )b) the legislation came into effect (1975) during a period
of incomes policy, so that negotiations then would be
dominated by the statutory norm, rather than the financial
position of the firm, and/or to what extent it might be
able to afford to pay more (See for instance P. Dair and T.
Kynaston Reeves "Why Disclosure Could be a non Event"•
Personnel Management, January 1979 pp 24-27, 39, pp. 24-
25. ) •
c) stewards often have unofficial means of getting to know
much of what they need to know, and thus the statutory
provisions were beside the point.
We have found clear signs of this in our company, with
stewards having their own information system. See too P.
Dair and T. Kynaston Reeves, supra, pg. 26. and purdy (D.
Purdy "The Provision of Financial Information to
Employees", Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1981,)
pg. 334. Cooper and Essex (D. Cooper & S. Essex "Accounting
Information and Employee Decision-Making". Accounting,
organizations and Society, 1977, pp. 201-217) find that the
most important sources of information for stewards were
their union, and other stewards. After that came company
accounts, and only then management information (see table
6, pg. 213) which is in disagreement with our findings. We
found plant management to be an important source of
information, though it does have to be said that this
varied from one steward/union rep to another. For instance
shop stewards representing manual workers tended to be
better informally informed by management than staff union
representatives were. Likewise younger/less experienced
stewards felt themselves less well informed than older/more
experienced stewards. Access appeared to be a function of
time.
d) it is concluded by Jackson-Cox et al. (See J. Jackson-
Cox, J. Thirkell, J. McQueeny "The Disclosure of Company
Information to Trade Unions". Accounting, Organizations and
society, 1984, pp. 253-273; and J. Jackson-Cox, J.
McQueeny, J. Thirkell "strategies, Issues and Events in
Industrial Relations" RKP, 1987) that only in some
companies does communication enter into an overall
industrial relations strategy. In those firms Which they
describe as having an integrated approach to their
industrial relations, the implications of successful
communication for
1) control, and in particular
2) securing strong employee identification
with the firm
are appreciated by Management. On the other hand in other
companies there is an ad hoc approach by Management, so
that information is communicated only intermittently and in
relation to specific situations where the need for
communication is clear and unequivocal (Eg a redundancy).
'1 f. , ...._--------_....._----b.
We would argue that it is clear from our evidence that our
firm falls into the latter, ad hoc category. Indeed more
than one Shop Steward, and Staff Union Rep. commented that
notice of a briefing by Management was always a harbinger
of bad news.
Moreover in practice it appears that' few trade unionists
have made much use of the statutory provisions. Dair and
Reeves report in a study in East Anglia that
very few indeed of these firms were
under pressure from their trade unions
to provide information, nor, among
those that were taking the initiative
to supply information to employees was
there any evidence that the disclosure
legislation, which had recently come·
into force, was having any impact on
their thinking. Supra, pg 25.
stewards would indicate awareness of the· statutory
provisions, but that
i) they were content with the way in which
management communicated with them at the moment,
ii) they did not trust management, and so what
information they did get would have little credibility
in their eyes.
iii) their members were really only interested in
their wage packets, and that it was a "them and us"
bargaining situation. (Dair and Reeves supra, pg 25.)
We would have to say that we have found elements of all
three of these in our research. Most obviously we have
evidence of lack of trust, in that those who were told
least placed least trust in whatever they were told. We
have, however, also shown evidence that informally the
stewards (in particular the senior more experienced, and
thus more trusted stewards) were kept informed by senior
line management (see above) - though this would not always
be visible to their members. Hence the distinction between
Dair and Reeves' categories (a) and (b) might depend on the
seniority of the stewards who were interviewed (and nair
and Reeves' study only interviews "stewards and local union
officials", and with no other distinction). Finally, it is
clear from Appendix One that emphasis is placed on "the
wage packet" by employees, though we would be unwilling to
draw the conclusion that because of this employees are
never interested in communication by the company
Why therefore has this attempt to "open the books" not been
as successful as might have been hoped? certainly the
environmental factors we have already referred to, have not
helped. That, however, would be a superficial argument and
it is important to "dig deeper". '
~.'r 4 _Lyall, and Dair and Reeves put forward the following,
1) Lyall argues that employees are aware of the possibility
that management may distort the information which is
provided. He instances one case, where Management
manipulated the costs charged to each of two factories -
one automated and the other labour intensive - so that the
former showed the higher level of profit. Lyall goes on to
observe
One finds in interviewing trade unionists that it
is this sort of manipulation which can create a
credibility gap between management and unions. (See
Lyall supra, pp. 42-43)
2) Dair and Reeves observe that information is not
disclosed for its own sake, by management - even by the
more altruistic managements - but in order to achieve an
end.
As Jones (D. Jones "Disclosure of Financial Information to
Employees" IPM 1978) points out
To have access to information is to
have access to a source of knowledqe
and knowledqe itself is power. It is
not surprisinq therefore that there has
been some reluctance on the part of the
majority of owners of companies and
other orqanizations to disclose
information.
We would not wish to dissent from this - another excellent
example of information being a critical source of power in
Management is Pettigrew's "Politics of Organizational
Decision-Making" - but on the other hand if we wish to move
toward more democratic forms of work organization then some
degree of equalization of power is innevitable. Moreover
for one party to have privileged access to information is
quite clearly a breach of the Ideal Speech Thesis, and thus
not only stands in the way of equality, but also of
dialogue.
But most importantly they observe that the dissemination
of information is always controlled by Management. This
need not always be deliberate restriction of information.
As we shall go on to argue, it may reflect the Lifeworld of
the Manager that certain types of information, the
Lifeworld suggests, are for Management and could be of no
relevance to others. Thus failure to disseminate may be
seen as a purely technical or practical matter and not at
all political. Moreover as Towers Cox and Chell argueworker directors were distanced from
their boardroom colleagues by non-
access to informal information
networks. (B. Towers, D. Cox, E. Chell
"Worker Directors in Private
Manufacturing Industry in Great
Britain. " Department of Employment
Research Paper No. 29, pg. 31)
Thus restriction of information may reflect not simply the
power implications of hierarchy, but also the more
straightforward structural implications, in that employees
of a similar grade and function are likely to interact with
each other on a regUlar basis and to be in a position to
swap informal information (which for instance Mintzberg
shows in "the Nature of Managerial Work" is significant for
managerial decision-making - H. Mintzberg "the Nature of
Managerial Work" Prentice Hall 1972), and conversely that
those who are of the different grades and functions are not
- for instance full time executive directors, and worker
directors. Our own evidence of reported interaction between
different grades (shop floor, staff and management) was
that such interaction was low, with members of the same
grade tending to interact with each other rather than with
other grades. Thus the opportunity for employees outwith
Management to obtain informal information from Management
was limited by the fact that their interaction with
Managers was limited. An example of this is given by
Gardell (B. Gardell "Worker Participation and Autonomy". In
C. Crouch and F. Heller (eds.) "organizational Democracy
and Political Processes". John wiley and Sons, 1983, pp.
353-387.) who reports that in ALMEX (in Sweden) one form
taken by participation was for elected union stewards and
management to make informal contact during their normal
daily work. Similar interaction 'could be identified in our
own firm, though on an even more informal basis, but as
Gardell argues,
It is this more informal day-to-day type of co-
determination which is the most important and proves
strong position of the metal union in the firm (pg. 362).
Thus what employees know, or find out, is always the
consequence of a management decision (See Dair and Reeves
pg 26.).
3) Dair and Reeves observe that even if (b) did not apply
it is unlikely that trade unionists would know what
information to look for at all. They observe
Knowing the right information to seek
is more important than knowing what one
has a right to. This issue of knowing
what is the "right" information is not.
alt.ogether a simple one., (Dair and
Reeves, p 39)This, they point out is not just a matter of putting trade
unionists or employee representatives on to training
courses. More importantly the form of information is
currently dictated by what is useful to managers, who are
responsible to shareholders not to employees.
Moreover as Lyall points out stewards may lack the skills
to be able to make much use of the information.
Additionally the problem for proposals like that of Cooper
and Essex of "opening the books" (D. Cooper & S. Essex
"Accounting Information and Employee Decision-Making".
Accounting, organizations and Society, 1977, pg. 215) would
be undermined by the form of the information there.
Attempts have been made to address this by putting
information in more "accessible forms". For instance Purdy
(D. Purdy "The Provision of Financial Information to
Employees", Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1981,
pg. 331) reports that one company presented an annual
report to employees in cartoon form to make it more
understandable than the standard accountancy format. This
certainly begins to deal with the skills problem, but does
nothing about the purpose for which the information has
been reported - in other words it only makes it more
possible for employees to understand information which has
been prepared for < the purposes of management and
shareholders. The information is from a dialogue to which
they are not party.
416 This can be seen in a study by Hussey (R. Hussey "Who
Reads Employee Reports" Touche Ross 1979) who shows - just
as we have shown that perceived quality of information and
trust in the information are structured hierarchically -
that the retention of reports is likewise hierarchically
structured. He finds that 72% of managers report "still
having" the most recent employee report, while 45% of
unskilled manual still have their copies, though as Hussey
points out this may reflect the fact that white collar
workers having (perhaps) an office and (certainly) a desk,
have a greater opportunity to do so. Again, however, the
readership is hierarchical, with 55% of managers reading
all of the report, but only 15% of unskilled workers doing
so. Interest too appears to be hierarchical.' Hussey and
Marsh point to
the high level of interest claimed by
managers, and the relatively lower
levels of interest expressed by
clerical workers, semi-skilled workers
and in partiCUlar by unskilled workers.
(R. Hussey and A. Marsh "Disclosure of
Information and Employee Reporting".
Gower 1983, pg. 116)
The importance' of hierarchy is common with our own
findings, as our own Chapter 4 demonstrates that
Management, then Staff, then Hourly Paid <a) 'report greatest satisfaction with the
information communicated to them by the Firm,
the information
(See above, our
greatest trust in
them by the Firm.
b) report
communicated to
table 4.15)
417 In this respect the role of the Lifeworld becomes
important, since as the reservoir of interpretive
relevances, this means that if two individuals have
significantly different Lifeworlds (as an Hourly Paid
employee and senior Manager may well have) then they may
interpret the same piece of information in quite different
ways. For instance the senior Manager may be sending out
information which he regards as important, but which the
Hourly Paid employee defines as irrelevant - and thus he
may report that he has been told nothing about the issue in
question. We are not arguing that this undermines any
argument about the adequacy of the volume of information
made available by Management, or about access to it. This
problem of different Lifeworlds and interpretive relevances
is, however, quite consistent with this, and may exaggerate
an otherwise existing problem. So for instance, the results
reported in Chapter 4, that employees perceive themselves
to be badly informed may reflect not only (or even
necessarily mainly) an inadequate emphasis on
communication, but instead a form of communication which
one party does not (fully?) understand. In this way we can
begin to understand the finding in table 4.1, whereby only
one management/staff respondent felt that they gave
inadequate attention to communicating with their
subordinates. Given the other results, an explanation is to
say that these respondents were overstating their own
efforts, or being not entirely truthful. Another
explanation is to say that, in terms of, for instance, the
Management Lifeworld, the communication by Management to
staff and Hourly paid was adequate - but that it was not
adequate in terms of the Staff or Hourly paid Lifeworld.
The same argument can be applied to Staff. Thus the failure
to communicate effectively may reflect not a lack of effort
(or not only this), but an inability of the parties to
communicate because of Lifeworld differences.
418 A similar conclusion is reached by Lund, who reports
that in a study of 3 major decisions in a small Danish firm
which had employee directors, that they were simply
overwhelmed by the facts and figures put before them, which
were so far from their normal experience. As a result their
input to the decisions was extremely limited. (R. Lund
"power and Indirect Participation" Organization Studies,
1980)
419 This,
structural
point out
of course,
advantages of
reflects the (organizational)
Management. Astley & SachdevaHigher levels of the hierarchy
therefore are characterized by a
positive relationship between resource
control and network centrality, rather
than the negative relationship found at
lower levels. (W. G. Astley & P. S.
Sachdeva "structural Sources of
Intraorganizational Power: A
Theoretical Synthesis". Academy of
Management Review 1984, pp. 104-113.
pg. 110)
Essentially what Astley and Sachdeva are arguing here is
that Management are not powerful just because they are at
the apex of the hierarchy, or just because they have
control over the resources of the organization, or because
they are at the "crossroads"-of the communication channels
(formal and informal) in the organization. Management, they
argue, are powerful because they are all these things
concurrently.
Additionally Astley and Sachdeva direct us to Offe, who
points out that hierarchical position does not necessarily
correspond to the importance of one's functional role. Offe
distinguishes between
a) task-status-continuous organizations in which
formal authority and functional expertise do
correspond and
b) task-status-discontinuous organizations in
which formal authority and functional expertise do not
necessarily correspond. This type of organization,
Offe argues is becoming increasingly prevalent, but
which may not be perceived or not clearly so, given
the
gradually evolving institutionalization
of an organization. (0. Hickson, W.
Astley, R. Butler and o. Wilson
"Organization as Power". In B. Staw and
L. Cummings "Research in organizational
Behaviour. Vol 3". JAI Press 1981, pg.
190)
See Astley and Sachdeva, supra, pg. 107, and C. Offe
"Industry & Inequality", Arnold 1978.
Astley & Sachdeva deal with power from a structural
perspective, whereas our' deals with the perceptions of
organizational members. But accepting Astley & Sachdeva's
argument of the structural advantages of Management, and
Offe's argument of task-status discontinuity, we are left
to ponder as to why this persists. It is this we have
considered•
...... '2.. ....1 ifmanagerial
proved
to break
Democracy".
420 See also our discussion, above, concerning paradigm
change requiring not only changes in how decisions get
taken technically, but also changes would be required on
who is involved in taking decisions. The control of
information is, therefore, in an important way about
a basic aspect of the
prerogative that has
extraordinarily difficult
down. (TUC "Industrial
1974, pg. 12)
The kind of information which the TUC (TUC "Industrial
Democracy". 1974, pp. 32-33) argues employees ought to be
given includes:
1) for all employees: the information which is
sent to shareholders: the terms and conditions of
their emploYment: a job specification: an indication
of their emploYment prospects: access to their own
personnel file. The second item was provided by the
firm - at least to new employees, as a matter of
emploYment law. The first, fourth and fifth items we
know were not made available to employees in our firm
- indeed employees learned of an order being won which
guarantied their emploYment for two years, from the
local evening paper!
2) for workplace representatives in addition to
the above: manpower figures (number employed, turnover
and absence figures, recruitment, training, redundancy
and dismissals): earnings by different occupations.
The former may have been found by shop stewards
through a variety of means, but the latter certainly
was not.
On the other hand the TUC does recognise that
enforced disclosure is hardly likely to
be followed by meaninqful discussion
(pg. 34)
It is recommended by the TUC that the role of ACAS should
be to conciliate between management and unions, as required
on this issue. This confirms, we would argue, our view that
information is not only important in respect of what is
provided, but also in respect of the quality of the
dialogue which follows.
421 This is confirmed by Craft, who arguesthe accountant is likely to continue to
play a partisan role and will probably
become increasinglY involved in a
number of support activities in
collective bargaining. For example he
will help prepare management and
industrial relations staff for
negotiations. (J. Craft "Role of
Accountant in Collective Bargaining".
Accounting, Organizations and Society".
1981, pg• 106)
422 Hence While structures are important therefore - are
there regular briefing groups, are employees immediately
informed of significant events in the firm, etc. - no less
important are the rules which govern these structures. For
instance who controls access to information - do Management
have a right of veto? Is the flow of information a way - do
Management inform, and employees can then only advise, but
not question? (See Purdy supra,· for a discussion of the
forms of structure used, and D. Wallace Bell "Industrial
Participation" pitman 1979, for the possible structures
available to firms).
423 See Lyall, supra. It is also noted by Loveridge that
Blockages in communication often
emanate from differences in the· frames
of reference being used by the parties.
Information may be offered but not
recognized or accepted within the value
context in which it is being offered
(No better example exists than in the
use of the term "profit")•.Failure to
recognize the pervasiveness and
longevity of these differences may
cause management to disappear into an
endless spiral in which "solutions"
serve only to make the perception of
the "problem" seem more acute. (R.
Loveridge "What is Participation",
British Journal of Industrial
Relations" 1980, pg. 298)
1.,i: IHence a proportion of the problem of communication may be
that Management are, in their context terms, communicating
with their employees. The problem with this may be that the
terms and context used, may not be accessible to employees
so that for them it is a message they do not understand,
and thus its information is lost. We reported in Table 4.1
that, with a single exception, all Managers and Staff in
the firm who had responsibility for a hierarchical
SUbordinate, felt that they did all the could to keep them
informed. The possibility that Managers and Staff who
answered this question may, from their perspective,
genuinely have been attempting to communicate may go some
way to explaining why the evidence in this area should be
so consistent. Thus despite the attempts of Management and
Staff to communicate, the messages they were sending out
were not being received as intended - or perhaps not even
at all. Thus when we take into account the different
Lifeworlds occupied by different hierarchical levels, it
becomes apparent that failure to communicate may not
entirely be due to Managerial silence, but partly be due to
a genuine inability (on the part of both sides) to
communicate with each other. The existence of this
situation would, it should be noted, represent a breach of
the Ideal Speech Thesis in that this requires a participant
to be able to make him/herself understood by the other
parties to the dialogue. The source of such situations, we
would argue, is at least partially in the kind of
fragmentation of consciousness.which we considered in the
previous section of this Chapter. This is supported by the
observation by Towers et ale that
a mistake is made when the qualitative
aspects of disclosure are relegated
beneath the quantitative, that is .where
concerns with "how much" assume greater
importance than concerns with "how
well" information is used. (B. Towers,
D. Cox, E. Chell "Worker Directors in
Private ManUfacturing Industry in Great
Britain. " Department of EmploYment
Research Paper No. 29, pg. 22)
Hence in communicating with employees there has to be an
emphasis on ensuring that the information is in a form
which is accessible to them, thus creating the conditions
for dialogue. Our own data suggests that employees in our
own firm are doubly disadvantaged. We have shown the lower
in the hierarchy, the less well one perceives oneself to be
informed. Likewise those who perceive themselves to be
badly informed put little trust in the information which
they do receive. The sources of this we have argued in
Chapter 4 are clearly hierarchical, but we cannot
distinguish whether this is due to employees low in the
hierarchy not being informed, or being informed but in a
form they cannot understand, or both of these factors. It
is, howev!!r, clear t~at ,both obstruct the development of
dialogue ~n the organ~zat~on.424 It is argued by Cooper and Essex (D. Cooper & S. Essex
"Accounting Information and Employee Decision-Making".
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 1977, pp. 201-217)
on the basis of the information needs of shop stewards
report that
it seems that a reorientation of
accountinq information would be of
benefit to potential users (pg. 215)
On the other hand this point does not always appear to be
widely appreciated. Consider for instance the following
from "Industrial Democracy" by the TUC (TUC, 1974).
The above information should normally
be available from manaqement 'control
systems and should be a presumption
that it will be made available.
However, more information miqht be
necessary. (Para 74, pg. 30)
The last sentence notwithstanding - and also the indication
that it is questionable how far employees could understand
such information - it is clear that in general the TUC view
is that access to the management system of information
equates with communication. It does have to be said that
developments of the kind indicated in the quote would be a
move toward better communication. However, it does have to
be recognized that what the TUC are calling for is greater
access to a system of Management communication, and thus a
system of communication predicated on the existence of
hierarchy - it would be a system of communication of what
the top of the hierarchy are thinking and/or doing.
425 R. Hussey and A. Marsh "Disclosure of Information' &
Employee Reporting". Gower 1983.426 R. Hussey and A. Marsh , table 7.2, page 61. On the
other hand, these - essentially Management - aims can be
understood from' other perspectives. For instance, as Hussey
and Marsh point out (table 7.3, pg. 63) "increasing
employee involvement" can be understood from the
perspective of the employee as "the company discharging its
responsibility to its employees in respect of their right
to know"; cUltivating employee identification with the
company" can be understood as "having a well informed work
force", and so on. This raises the issue of the purpose of
communicating with employees, but in particular (a) the
values which underlie these purposes - for instance "having
a well informed work force" could be understood (from a
more skeptical perspective) as "having a well conned work
force"; which leads to (b) the structure within which the
communication takes place. We shall argue below that this
is critical, and that in this respect there are two
fundamental problems. First of all that because one party -
Management - has control over the system for communicating
with employees, that dialogue (in the sense of the Ideal
Speech Thesis) is impossible. Secondly that because of
Lifeworld differences, even where there is communication,
the parties may not be able to enter into dialogue. Hussey
and Marsh provide an example of this. The interviewer has
asked the repsondent whether or not he has understood the
financial information provided in the company report to its
employees. The respondent replies
Aye, I understand it•••••but what does
it mean? (R. Hussey and A. Marsh
"Disclosure of Information and Employee
Reporting". Gower 1983, pg. 121)
427 CBI "Guide-lines for Action on Employee Involvement".
CBI 1980. This put forward 5 objectives in seeking to
involve employees (pg. 6.)
1) to create a
contribution made by
creating
greater understanding of the
employees to the company in
i) wealth which is of benefit to the
community at large, and
ii) a more efficient company and thus
greater job security.
2) developing understanding involvement by each
employee with his job and of its relation to, and
dependence on other jobs in the company.
3) to ensure that all employees are aware of the
reasons for major decisions which affect them, and of
the factors taken into account by management in taking
such decisions. correspondingly to ensure that
management are aware of the views of employees before
they take these decisions.4) to ensure that all employees are aware of the
situation of the business.
5) to inform employees of the objectives of their
.J' • company, and to allow d~scussion of these.
If we treat the first two of these as saying that employees
ought to understand their own role in the company, and the
role they play with others in developing its profitability,
then we could argue, on the basis of our evidence, that our
firm has not succeeded in doing this. That, however, would
be something of a harsh jUdgement. From our evidence it is
clear that particular groups of employees do have a
meaningful level of understanding of the technology which
they produced, and of the contribution of their group to
its production. On the other hand, if we move on to the
second part - the role of others - then the jUdgement would
have to be rather more harsh, since it is clear that
between the different groups there was a limited
understanding of the contribution of others. Thus, it was
made clear in Chapters 4 and 5 that Hourly paid often did
not understand the role of Management, and while they may
have had a greater understanding of the role of Staff, the
further Staff got from the point of production the less
this understanding became.
Moving on to the next three stated CBI objectives the
jUdgement becomes even more unsYmpathetic.
Arguing for objective three would be extremely difficult.
The thrust of our evidence in this respect is that for
other employees, management was something which just
happened. For instance even the announcement of a large
order, creating two or three years of secure emplOYment was
"communicated" to Hourly paid and Staff employees via the
local evening paper.
It does, however, have to be pointed out that this is not
atypical. Clarke findsAt present efforts' made by firms to
communicate information of importance
to workers are patchy. The survey' made
the connection with the inquiry
referred to found that the commonest
means were the notice board (94% of all
respondents) and works or shop meetings
(66%). Nearly three quarters of the
firms surveyed made no special effort
to inform their employees of the
financial position of the firm. Over
one half gave no attention to providing
information about the order book, and
half of them made no particular effort
to provide information about the firm's
productive achievement. (0. Clarke
"Workers Participation in Management in
Great Britain".' ILO Research Series No.
58, pg. 12).
If we turn to the latter part of the objective, this is
even more difficult to sustain in that
a) there was no mechanism for this to happen
b) an attempt to develop a production committee
had degenerated to such an extent that the committee
was known as the "pigeon shit" committee, since the
non-Management group, feeling that Management were not
. paying attention to their views, ended up complaining
about broken glass in the roof (hence pigeon shit).
Objective four is undermined by frequent references by shop
stewards in particular, that the -only time they were
informed by the company about the situation of the company
was when it was not doing well, and redundancies were
possible.
Objective five - informing employees of the objectives of
the firm - was not an activity which we found to be
practiced in the firm through the means of the company
newsletter. This, however, is indicative of communication
in the company. The communication was erratic, superficial,
but most importantly was consistently controlled by
Management.
This is consistent with findings of Cressey et al.(P.
Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial
Democracy and Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of
EmplOYment Research Paper No. 28, 1981) , who quote a
manager as sayingI don't think its a bad thinq at all,
except in those areas where to reveal
your strateqy is to reveal your hand,
and that in the commercial market at
certain times would· be suicidal.
Therefore there is no simple answer. It
would still have to remain the
discretion of the company as to what it
revealed. (pg. 35)
The authors continue
The emphasis was therefore on
explaininq to and informinq the work-
force about why the company was
planninq to follow a certain course of
action, rather than seeinq the course
of action itself as neqotiable.
We shall consider below the conceptual and practical
difficulties that treating such issues as even negotiable
would create.
We found no evidence that employees could insist on
information - the information of the company was controlled
by Management.
It is, however, clear that our firm was not exceptional.
For instance Hussey and Marsh show that 78% of single
establishment businesses did not issue their employees with
an annual report(Hussey and Marsh table 8.2, pg. 69). The
reasons for not doing so varied confidentiality,
information being misunderstood, employees not ,interested
and the information being the business of the shareholder
were the most important (Hussey and Marsh table 9,3, pg.
80). The forms of communication most widely used were house
journals and notice boards (Hussey and Marsh table 8.5, pg.
71). Thus it would seem that firms generally do not keep
their employees well informed. Hussey and Marsh argue
both manaqers/supervisors and employees
were clearly dissatisfied with the
level of formal manaqement
communication (Hussey and Marsh, pg.
90)
A study by Wilders and Heller show that where firms with a
high level of information provision have (a) better
management:worker. relations, (b) a higher level of trust
between the parties, (c) more employee satisfaction, (d)
lower absenteeism and labour turnover (M. Wilders and F.
Heller "Company Information to Employees". In A. Marsh and
F. Heller (eds) "Employees, Trade Unions and Company
Information, Research and Practice" Touche Ross 1981)Thus while there may have communication in the firm, it
could by no means be described as dialogue, which involves
a two way exchange of information.
This is not to say that such issues are not considered. For
instance Wilmot (R. E. Wilmot - "How to Really reach Blue
Collar Workers". Public Relations Journal 1988, pp. 35-37)
takes Management to task who are unwilling to communicate
freely - that the problems of not communicating will not
disappear by continuing not to communicate, that not
answering employees difficult questions only leads to their
frustration. He recommends that Management should establish
from surveys etc. what employees want to know, and then to
set about informing them suitably, and that employees
should meet with their Managers and be able to question
them about the decisions they have taken and why they have
done so. The difficulty with this is that
a) the structure of the communication is still
clearly from superior to subordinate within a
hierarchical structure, in that the system is
controlled by management - they would (presumably)
arrange for the survey, lead the meetings etc.
Moreover the access would be to a system of Management
information which is designed to satisfy their needs
(this point is developed below).
b) it could by no means be said to be descriptive
of our firm.
The failure to establish two way communication is taken up
by Drennan (D. Drennan "Are You Getting Through".
Management Today August 1989, pp. 70-72.), who argues that
it is essential for Management to establish a two way
communication with their employees. This would appear to
begin to establish dialogue, but as we shall see it is (in
Habermas's terms) an unequal dialogue, and one which
reveals the difficulty with communication in hierarchical
organizations.
Drennan instances with approval a manUfacturing business
Which had decided to try to improve its communications with
its employees. To this end it went through several stages -
"I) setting out goals, which would be constant
(over the next 5 years), could be acted on by every
department, and could be understood by every employee
- broadly this was to
compete throuqh superior customer
service; and to improve business
performance continuously. (pg 70.)
2) employees in groups and teams were then asked
what they could do to contribute to the goals of the
firm.It, •
3) comparisons were drawn between the firms'
products and those of its competitors; operators were
sent to work on the production lines of its customers
to see for themselves how their product was used.
Changes were then made to the firm's product.
4) production groups began to set output and
quality targets for themselves, which were monitored
by the group.
Drennan argues, and we would not disagree.· that this is a
better system of communication. In particular, he says
Communications became meaningful and
understandable to employees only when
they hang from a clear overall
purpose. without it communications can
be little more than a confusing
collection of random information. (pg
70. )
This begins to indicate perhaps part of the reason why
employees perceived themselves to be badly informed. If we
consider table 4.1, we showed there that with one
exception, all of our sample who had somebody working for
them in a subordinate capacity, felt they were doing all
they could to keep their subordinates informed. An obvious
reason for this finding is that insufficient effort was put
into communication to generate a higher jUdgement, and this
would certainly be our jUdgement - in other words that
communication was not given a high enough spot .in the
system of priorities.
Another explanation within reach is, however, that
communication was in a language or form understandable to
the sender, but not by the recipient. We have already
considered this problem above, but Drennan adds a further
dimension by pointing out that to be understandable it has
to be put in an overall context which the employee can
share in - in this case the overall objectives of the firm.
Clearly, from Drennan's description there has been an
increase in communication in this firm, but set against the
Ideal Speech Thesis we can perceive systematically
distorted communication in this, in that the dialogue is
structured not by all the participants, but rather by one
group - Management. The Ideal Speech Thesis, we would argue
has been broken in that the system of communication which
is operating has been set up by Management - basically it
is they who have determined the objectives, and the system
follows on from that.
19-9 _Thus, even in the kind of situation which Drennan describes
- where communication is actively sought cannot be
described as a system of equality, or even contributing
toward this. certainly Drennan identifies the difficult of
understanding' as one of the major obstacles to effective
communication. other difficulties with communication are
shown in his work, in that communication in this case is
predicated on Management objectives - it is a system of
communication established to facilitate the achievement of
Management objectives. The communication system is one
Which is grounded in the existence of hierarchy.
428 In addition to the documents referred to above, Bell
gives a comprehensive listing of the devices available to
Management for communication with their employees. See D.
W. Bell "Industrial Participation". pitman 1979, pp 21-45.
429 As Hussey and Marsh.(Hussey R. and Marsh A. "Disclosure
of Information & Employee Reporting". Gower 1983) point out
Most discussions on "fairness",
"truth", and "impartiality" in relation
to decision-makinq have taken place
within the company-shareholder
relationship. Moved out of that settinq
some fo the arguments appear even less
tenable. Maunders has claimed that "to
evalutate current and future practice
in reportinq to employees, it is
therefore necessary to inquire into
decision needs (pg. 124, our emphasis)
We would argue further that it is necessary to understand
what underlies and produces these needs. This, as we have
argued, is to be located in the structure and implications
of the structure of the Lifeworld.
430 Marsden argues that:
consultation is an attempt to extend
information exchanqe without makinq
concessions over control ((D. Marsden
"Industrial Democracy and Industrial
Control in West Germany, France and
Great Britain". Dept of Employment
Research Paper No.4, 1978, pq. 44),
This is certainly true - nonetheless 'a successful system of
consultation, which develops to the level of being a
dialogue between Management and other employees, does
represent a move toward equality (though still a long way
from it), and further moves may develop from this.
431 Bowen makes a similar point to this when he argues that
~3,·ocommunication which is irrelevant to,
or divorced from involving people and
their occupational groups in
departmental problem-solving and beyond
will remain limited in its impact and
effect. We arque for the extension of
joint role-determination, for the
balanced growth of workplace labour
influence over work activities which
workers themselves identify as
significant, and in forms which permit
some enlargement of inter-occupational
communication. (P. Bowen "Social
Control in Industrial organizations".
RKP 1976, pg. 248.)
432 It is argued by Kiloh that
It is generally agreed that industrial
democracy is a good thing, but
agreement as to the meaning of the
term, its justification, practical
application and limitations is hard to
find. What is proposed is intimately
connected with why it is proposed and
who is proposing it. (M. Kiloh
"Industrial Democracy". in D. Held and
C. Pollitt "New Forms of Democracy".
Sage 1986. pg. 14.) .
433 M. Marchington "Responses to Participation at Work".
Gower 1980.
4~ Marchington, supra, pp. p-11.
435 K. F. Walker "Toward the Participatory Enterprise: a
European Trend". Annals of the American Academy 1977, pg.
10. Quoted in Marchington supra, pg. 18.
436 To take another football analogy, for a player to be
offside, he must, among other things, be "interfering with
play". This is innevitably a matter of interpretation for
the referee.
437 P. Bowen, supra.
438 There is, however, a variation in that Bowen I s questions
also included not only management "on site" (Ie in what he
calls Ironhill) but also top and divisional management,
which had no counterpart in our firm. Nevertheless, even if
we treat top, divisional and Ironhill management as either
single groups, or as a composite, makes no difference to
the comparisons which we can draw with our data. A further
difference, which does somewhat restrict the width of the
comparisons which we shall be able to draw, is that Bowen
did not obtain data from management (See Bowen supra, pg.
187, table 8.1).439 It is, however, interesting that like our own group of
Hourly-Paid workers, clerical workers (the closest there is
in Bowen's categorisation to our category of staff) are
perceived to be of equal influence to the manual workers.
See Bowen Tables 8.10 and 8.15. This was frequently
perceived to be the case in our own research - but as we
showed, Staff did not agree with this perception,
consistently rating themselves more highly than Hourly-
Paid. On the other hand Table 9.2 suggests that this was
not perceived in the same way by Bowen's clerks who seem to
see themselves as having broadly similar amounts of control
as the manual workers. This is, however, a not entirely
safe comparison since Bowen's category of "Clerk" is
restricted in comparison to our "Staff" category.
440 Which we would argue is conceptually similar to our
"ideal", and which Bowen uses interchangeably with
"preferred" in any case.
441 This is most true for local Ironhill management - indeed
top and divisional management's perceived control would
decline. This clearly indicates a degree of aversion toward
these non-site management. This, however, was not a
situation which we encountered in our own research, since
non-site management were not perceived as an issue. See
Bowen, supra, pg 198, table 8.10.
442 Our own list, as we make clear in Chapter 2, was derived
from this.
443 See Bowen, supra, pg 199, table 8.11.
444 ThUS the top two items in the "preferred" mode were
"safety", and "pay rates and bonuses" (with indices of 2.6
and 2.4 respectively). In the "actual mode" the top two
were "work pace" and "safety" (each with indices of 2.0).
445 The bottom two in the "preferred" mode were "financial
policy matters" and "purchasing new machines and equipment"
(with indices of 1.6 and 1.4 respectively), and likewise
for the "actual mode" (each with indices of 0.7).
446 We have, however, chosen not to integrate the
perceptions over a number of areas into a single average,
since as we have shown in our factor analysis, control in
one area may not be conceptually similar to control in
another. See too P. Gundelach and H. Tetzschner
"Measurements of Influence in Organizations" Acta
sociologica, 1976; pp. 49-63.
447 See Bowen, supra, pg 248.
4~ For instance Loveridge points out that theadherence of writers like Fayol and
Urwick to classical hierarchical forms
and to a strict division of
responsibility within their
orqanizations, even when complemented
by the Cadbury welfare philosophy of
man-manaqement, provides evidence of
the manner in which the practisinq
manaqer's desire for certainty and
predictability was most expressed then,
as it is now, in bureaucratic forms.
(R. Loveridge "What is Participation",
British Journal of Industrial
Relations" 1980, pg. 298)
Thus, not only, as we have shown already is the possibility
of moving away from hierarchy limited by the inability of
those outwith Management to mount a challenge, but also by
the fact that such changes are unlikely to be ceded easily
by Management.
449 Hanson and Rathkey (C. Hanson & P. Rathkey "Industrial
Democracy: A Post Bullock Shop Floor View". British Journal
of Industrial Relations 1983, pp. 154-168), show that there
is a
hiqh level of support for participation
at the workplace (pg. 158)
and that between 90 and 96% of their sample (from four
firms) were in favour of "participation in decision-making
at the workplace" (pg. 158, table 2). On the other hand it
is clear from table 3 that
1) while 25-36% of their sample (four firms)
wanted to participate in decisions about their own
work AND working conditions and decisions about the
company as a whole
2) 58-61% wanted to participate ONLY in their
decisions about their own work and working conditions.
(see table 3, pg. 158)
Hence the implication of their findings is that
a) while there is clear demand for participation,
b) there is significantly greater interest in
participation in direct employment matters.
On the other hand, this begs the question of whether or not
it is feasible to participate meaningfully only at this
level, or whether "company decisions" do not restrict
"direct decisions" to such an extent, that for it to be
meaningful, participation must be at both levels, even if
the latter is more appreciated by employees. We shall
consider this later.451
450 An interesting view of this is given by Marsden (D.
Marsden "Industrial Democracy and Industrial Control in
West Germany, France and Great Britain". Dept of EmploYment
Research Paper No.4, 1978) who argues that
The principle of "managerial functions"
is not just .a bold assertion by
management, but an agreement between
the union and management as to the
function of the latter, (pg. 33)
In this sense, therefore, when a trade union seeks
recognition from Management there is an implied recognition
by the Union of the right of management to manage.
Bowen, supra, pg 248.
452 For instance Towers et ale find in their study that
the great majority of the worker
directors were led to think of their
board posts only in terms of the
managerial perspectives that had
underlain and later permeated the
schemes. This last dimension .of power
was perhaps the most important of all
since it ensured that the limitations
upon the worker directors• power and
influence were structural, that is they
were written into the schemes from the
outset. (B. Towers, D. Cox, E. Chell
"Worker Directors in Private
Manufacturing Industry in Great
Britain. " Department of EmploYment
Research Paper No. 29, pg. 31)
This is quite consistent with the argument that we have
presented here in that this would forecast that employee
directors would indeed find it difficult to define their
experi~nce at board level in any other way, since they have
no experience which would enable them to do otherwise. In
this respect writing the constraint into the scheme is
perhaps irrelevant. On the other hand experience of working
at board level, to the extent that it modifies the
Lifeworld may cause employees .outwith Management to
challenge the perceived Management monopoly of required
skills. In this respect writing restrictions into a scheme
for participation may again be irrelevant, since if the
Lifeworlds of employees outwith Management change
sufficiently, then such restrictions may be no defence.
453 K. Bartolke, _W. Eschweiler, D. Flechsenberger and A.
Tannenbaum "Workers Participation and the Distribution of
control as Perceived by Members of Ten German Companies".
Admin. Science Quarterly 1982, pg. 380. Henceforth we shall
refer to this as Tannenbaum et ale (1).i
't
454 K. Bartolke, W. Eschweiler, D. Flechsenberger and A.
Tannenbaum "Workers Participation and the Distribution of
Control as Perceived by Members of Ten German Companies".
Admin. Science Quarterly 1982, pp. 381, 388-393.
455 K. Bartolke, W. Eschweiler, D. Flechsenberger and A.
Tannenbaum "Workers Participation and the Distribution of
Control as Perceived by Members of Ten German Companies".
Admin. Science Quarterly 1982, Figs. 1-3.
456 K. Bartolke, W. Eschweiler, D. Flechsenberger and A.
Tannenbaum "Workers Participation and the Distribution of
Control as Perceived by Members of Ten German Companies".
Admin. Science Quarterly 1982, pg. 393.
457 S. Rubenowitz, F. Norrgren, A. Tannenbaum "Some Social
Psychological Effects of Direct and Indirect Participation
in Ten Swedish Companies". Organization Studies, 1983, pp.
243-259. Henceforth Tannenbaum et ale (2).
458 This is considered by Fatchett (D. Fatchett "Industrial
Democracy the Prospects". Universities of Leeds and
Nottingham, 1977, see pp. 15- 22) who defines indirect
methods participation as including collective bargaining,
consultation and worker directors, all of which are found
by the author to be of limited value or that aspirations
have run ahead of progress.
459 S. RUbenowitz, F. Norrgren, A. Tannenbaum "Some Social
Psychological Effects of Direct and Indirect Participation
in Ten Swedish Companies". organization Studies, 1983,
pp.245-6.
460 This is considered by Fatchett who defines direct
methods participation as
those processes which operate through
the individual worker and not through
some system of representation. (D.·
Fatchett "Industrial Democracy the
Prospects". Universities of Leeds and
Nottingham, 1977, pg. 14)
461 S. RUbenowitz, F. Norrgren, A. Tannenbaum "Some Social
Psychological Effects of Direct and Indirect Participation
in Ten Swedish Companies". organization Studies, 1983, pp.
246-7.
~2 This is illustrated by the following quote from Dowling
et ale (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D, Gotting, J. HYman
"Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North~
west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of EmploYment Research
Paper No. 27, 1981) from a union official,
~,"~ ...._-------_.........._------There are no rank and file'demands for
more participation. The main
preoccupations of the shop floor are
improvements in wages and conditions
(pg. 29)
463 It is reported by Cressey et ale (P. Cressey, J •
Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and
Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment
Research Paper No. 28, 1981) that managers in their survey
were
far more favourable towards job based
participation (pg. 33)
This repeats our finding - but in addition, as we have
argued, this is so also for those outwith Management.
The distinction is also found by Clarke (0. Clarke
"Workers' Participation in management in Great Britain".
OECD), who found that most workers wanted more say on
issues like wages, conditions of employment, discipline,
but less on financial, commercial and technical decisions
unless they were going to be directly affected (pg. 18).
It is a distinction also drawn by Gundelach & Tetzschner
(Acta sociologica 1976) who show, by using factor analysis
that there are statistically significant between
perceptions of control of different areas of work. It is
also shown in another context by Enz (C. Enz "The
measurement of perceived intraorganizational power".
Organization Studies 1989, pp. 241-251) who' shows that
general measures of perceived power produce different
results from issue specific measures.
464 This is also reported in Gardell (B. Gardell "Worker
Participation and Autonomy". In C. Crouch and F. Heller
(eds.) "Organizational Democracy and Political Processes".
John Wiley and Sons, 1983, pp. 353-387.) who reports that
workers wanted to make their demands on general issues
through the union-board, rather than to do so directly or
through their own work-group. Thus it is shown that on
direct issues (Gardell describes these as "individual") -
Rebuilding; Selection. of new recruits for the work-group;
Training; Planning material supplies; choice of machines,
tools; Production volume - employees wanted to exercise
influence through their work-group or individually. But on
strategic issues (What Gardell calls "collective") - New
appointments, Selection of Higher Managers, Finance and
Investments, Production development - employees preferred
to make demands through the union board. See Gardell, pg.
382, table 18.2. A similar conclusion is drawn by Dickson,
who argues that
~3'~
~-----------------The scores on the participation
composite show that 'most participation
occurs with respect to departmental
employee decisions. (J. Dickson
"Participation as an Interaction,
communication and Influence Process".
Personnel Review 1983, pg. 20).
A similar conclusion is reached by Poole who finds that
smanagerial control over the bulk of
strategic decisions remains intact
under disjunctive bargaining, although
authority, power, and influence over a
number of issues are more evenly
shared. (M. Poole "Managers, Industrial
Democracy & Control", in M. Poole & R.
Mansfield "Managerial Roles in
Industrial Relations", Gower 1980,
pg.85)
Consistent with this it is argued by Ursell that both
managers and stewards, in her study, felt that employees
should have a "major say in redesign process" of their
jobs. (See G. Ursell "The View of British Managers and Shop
Stewards on industrial democracy" in "Organizational
Democracy and political Processes" C. Crouch and F.
Heller [Eds] John Wiley and Sons 1983, pg. 336).
465 They argue that
Members are likely to feel committed
and satisfied first and foremost to the
extent that they perceive themselves to
personally have authority to make
decisions; second, and in lesser
degree, to the extent that they
perceive their immediate work group to
make decision, and hardly at all to the
extent to the extent that they perceive
that decisions are made' by
representative bodies in their company.
Thus. the closer the participation is
perceived to be with the respondent
himself or herself. the more likely
participation is associated with the
effects predicted for it. (s.
RUbenowitz, F. Norrgren, A. Tannenbaum
"Some Social Psychological Effects of
Direct and Indirect Participation in
Ten Swedish Companies". Organization
Studies, 1983, pg. 254, my emphasis)Hence the argument put forward suggests that industrial
democracy, in the form of participation at; say, Board
level is not likely to be enough, because it appears to
employees outwith Management that, while those involved in
its operation may have changed, the system of control has
not. This point is also made by Gardell.
the unions will soon run into the same
problems found with the German
xitbestimmunq and Yuqoslav Self-
xanaqement, namely that they will be
reqarded by the rank and file' as part
of the control system of the company
with neither the chance nor the
interest in lookinq after the every-day
workinq conditions of the members. (B.
Gardell "Worker Participation and
Autonomy"• In C. Crouch and F. Heller
(eds. ) "Organizational Democracy and
Political Processes". John Wiley. and
Sons, 1983, pg.359)
To operate successfully then it appears that influence has
to be distributed more widely than bringing in additional
company directors, and that employees (Gardell's rank and
file) need to have their own sense of being able to
exercise control.
4M Gardell notes
The conditions for autonomy are related
to self-confidence, inter-personal
relations and a sense of
responsibility. (B. Gardell "Worker
Participation and Autonomy". In C.
Crouch and F. Heller (eds.)
"Organizational Democracy and Political
Processes". John wiley and Sons, 1983,
pg. 371.)
See too the discussion on pp. '373-379, where there is an
elaboration of this in the context of a democratised work-
place. It is argued that there will be changes in
a) employee identity, because in the new
environment there is a developing sense of competence
from the opportunity to the greater autonomy for work-
groups - more technical skills are acquired, planning
skills are learned, the group is able to participate
at higher levels of the organization than before.
b) greater self-confidence due to
autonomy
~?>s ...._-.:-_-------------
greaterSuch changes, and in particular the former, we would argue,
clearly operate through the Lifeworld, in that through a
more democratic work-place the employee is given the
opportunity to develop a new identity through the changes
in the activities that he is involved in, and by behaving
in this way to learn to develop an interpretive relevance
of himself as competent in such activities that he may
previously have regarded as the monopoly of others.
467 A similar view is taken by Loveridge, who argues, that
It is unlikely that a desire for
collective involvement in managerial
authority will take precedence over
more immediately attainable shopfloor
goals (R. Loveridge "What is
Participation", British Journal of
Industrial Relations" 1980, pg. 299).
468 Lammers et ale (c. Lammers, P. Meurs, T. Mijs "Direct
and Indirect Participation in Dutch Firms and Hospitals".
Organization studies 1987, pp. 25-38) present evidence
applicable to this in a study of Dutch firms and hospitals.
They conclude that-
By and large there is no evidence that
shopfloor participation and co-
determination via a Works council are
interdependent•••••It stands to reason
to surmise that a general sense of
well-being due to direct participation
leads workers in such settings to
believe that their representatives at a
higher level are also quite involved
and influential with respect to a
company wide issues. (pp. 34-35)
As well as pointing to the conceptual distinction between
direct issues relating to the employee's own working
situation, and indirect issues of a more strategic nature,
the argument presented by Lammers et ale indicates that a
more effective way of creating more democratic structures
may be to develop them "bottom up" - in other words rather
than starting by developing roles like workers directors,
it may be more effective to develop democracy at work by
beginning from the working situation of employees, and
developing this to include increasingly organization-wide,
strategic issues. This is an issue we shall consider at
more length at the end of this chapter. This argument also
findS support from FitzRoy and Kraft (F. FitZRoy and K.
Kraft "participation and Division of Labour: a West German
Case study". Industrial Relations Journal 1985, pp. 68-74).
They argue that-
formal or representative participation
in any form which retains extreme DOL
(Division of Labour) does not offer
this potential (Gains in motivation,
job satisfaction, better team-work).
Herein too lies a major obstacle to the
realisation of those co-operative
qains. (pg. 70)
This is based on a study of two German Firms, one of whom -
which they call firm X - introduced participation from the
top, at the initiative of the manager/owner. The other firm
-Which they call firm Z - introduced participation'as the
result of an economic crisis. This resulted in work groups
taking more control over their own work. The authors report
that while the latter firm has prospered, the former has
not, and has in fact gone into decline. For instance in Z,
sales have risen, emploYment has grown, profits and profits
shared to employees have grown, value added per employee
has grown. On the other hand in X all these indicators have
either declined or grown much more slowly. (Appendix, pg.
73). This leads them to conclude that
the incentive effects of worker
participation are unlikely to be
realised in centralised schemes
involvinq only representation, or under
traditional division of labour which
impedes cooperation and cohesion of the
'workforce. The motivatinq effects of
profit-sharinq and horizontal
monitorinq (where in effect employees
monitor their fellows' efforts) depend
upon opportunities for interaction
among workers to maintain a
collectively efficient, co-operative
response and apply peer group pressure
against shirkers. In turn this is only
feasible when work is re-organized and
the extreme division of labour
according to scientific management is
abandoned. (pg. 73)
469 The consequences of experience of hierarchy on the
Lifeworld can be further illustrated by the IDE
International Research Group study of Industrial Democracy
in Europe (IDE International Research Group "Industrial
Democracy in Europe: Differences and Similarities Across
countries and Hierarchies" organization Studies, 1981, pp.
113-129.). This study explores perceptions of hierarchy in
12 countries - all in Europe with the exception of Israel.
Despite the variation in culture which would be
anticipated in a study of this degree of generality, they
conclude
~40Even if the political and economic
environment institutionally reflected
in de jure participation can
significantly modify the hierarchical
patterns in organizations, it
apparently cannot dissolve the
hierarchy itself. (pg. 124.)
They argue this on the basis of, similar statistical
evidence to our own. In particular that even at (what the
authors describe as) the "desired" level of involvement,
Management would remain the dominant group - a finding
common to all 12 countries which they study (though there
is variation in the degree of dominance from one country to
another) [pg. 125, table 6.]. They finally conclude that~ in
explaining variation in power, participation and influence
too much weight may have been placed on contingency factors
(personal characteristics of organizational members,
technology etc.), whereas in fact
it is hierarchy which is most important
(pg. 128.)
While we would not dissent from this, it is important to
point out that while the IDE group may have produced
satisfactory statistical evidence for their explanation,
they have not produced a mechanism whereby hierarchy can
have the effects they claim. As with the Tannenbaum et ale
(1) case we would assert that our explanation, based on the
Lifeworld providing Management with an unconscious
dimension of power, provides such a mechanism.
This is also shown very clearly in a study by Hanson and
Rathkey (C. Hanson & P. Rathkey "Industrial Democracy: A
Post Bullock Shop Floor View". British Journal of
Industrial Relations 1983, pp. 154-168), who find
considerable variation in perceived participation in four
companies in the north of England. In one of the four
companies, 77% of respondents reported "more than a very
little participation" already existed in their firm. In the
other three firms the relevant figure was 16%, 35% and 18%
(See table 1, pg. 157). The explanation given for this was
the management style in the four firms - the first firm
(77%) were described as having
made a sustained effort to adopt a
participative style. (pg. 157)
~4 IOn the other hand at least on of the others managed in a
"more autocratic way" (pg. 156). The point we would derive
from this is more than just that management style
influences perceptions of participation. Rather the
employees of the firm using the participative style, we
would argue, would be aware of the degree of difference
between their firm and others in the area. In this way they
may be influenced to rate highly the level of participation
in their firm because it is greater than normal in the
area. On the other hand this same firm, and its practices,
may not have been rated so highly in another country where
general expectations of participation were higher (for
instance west Germany or Sweden). Thus comparing perceived
participation between companies/countries has to . be
performed mindful of the possible variation of expectations
of participation which the respondents hold.
470 Marsden (D. Marsden "Industrial Democracy and Industrial
Control in West Germany, France and Great Britain". Dept of
EmplOYment Research Paper No.4, 1978) argues similarly,
Just as there is nothinq inherently
separable in the powers of the
executive, the leqislature and the
jUdiciary in political constitutions,
so there is nothing which renders a
particular pattern of the division of
control in industry inherently
necessary. (pg. 3, our emphasis)
471 • Lund argues,
The fact that top· manaqement can more
readily take the initiative results in
them beinq in a position beinq in a
position to carry throuqh the
employerls viewpoints i.e. to qet
workers to yield power. To counteract
this sort of power it is necessary•••
to restructure the hierarchy and chanqe
leqitimation of exertinq initiative and
similar leadership elements. (R. Lund
"Indirect Participation, Influence and
Power". organization stUdies, 1980, pg.
158.)
Hence it is apparent, we would argue, that to change
hierarchy means more than just changing the structure - to
change hierarchy has very. significant implications for the
structure of the Lifeworld - for instance for the
justifications for action which it accepts as legitimate.
4n K. Thurley and H. Wirdenius "Towards European
Management". pitman 1989, pg. 100. My emphasis.
4n In the way the IDE group argue, for instance.474 Lund finds that
value orientations in the investigated
company and in society at large assume
that the director is the initiating
force, with the workers and their
representatives waiting for a situation
defined by management. This structure
and value orientation appear to
severely restrict workers'
participation to comparatively impotent
and unconstructive responses regarding
what is, in any event happening. (R.
Lund "Indirect Participation, Influence
and Power". organization StUdies, 1980,
pg. 156.)
We could ask at this point, "yes but why do workers and
their representatives wait for Management in this way?",
but Lund does go on to point out
This is an aspect which ought to be
investigated further. (Lund, supra, pg.
156)
From an alternative perspective, it is argued by Scraton
and South (P. Scraton & N. South "The Ideological
Construction of the Hidden Economy". contemporary Crisis,
1984, pp. 1-18) that
Discipline provides an anatomy of power
which permeates throughout social
formations. Its universal application
is hegemonic in so far as it represents
the backbone of legitimacy of political
and ideological formations. Discipline
has become the structural form of
control of workers in their subservient
authority relationship to management
(pg. 310)
While agreeing with this, again the difficulty is that as
with Lund there is no indication of the mechanism whereby
this comes about.
475 This problem explains the observation, first made by
Clegg that the role of trade unions is to be a "permanent
opposition to management". See H. Clegg "A New Approach to
Industrial Democracy". Blackwell, 1960. This view has more
recently been repeated by Loveridge «R. Loveridge "What is
Participation", British Journal of Industrial Relations"
1980, pp. 297-317), who argues
~4 '3British experiences of steward
involvement in formal management
responsibilities, dating back to the
productivity agreements of the 1960's,
tend to confirm rather than show any
significant modification to Clegg's
view of the role of the trade union
under liberal-pluralistic conditions as
that of "permanent opposition to
management". (pg. 301)
While it may be the case that, as Clegg and Loveridge both
show, stewards and their members are unwilling to
participate in Management, it surely appears necessary to
go on to consider why this is so rather than merely accept
that it is so.
4~ This emphasises the argument that we cannot consider the
likely effectiveness of participation, purely on the basis
of what employees think, or want, or feel about it. We also
have to take into account the views of Management. As
Dickson argues, we cannot consider participation
without determining the level of value
conflict inherent in the participation
process (J. Dickson "Participation as a
Means of organizational control".
Journal of Management Studies 1981, pg.
161)
4n It was found by Ursell (See G. Ursell "The View of
British Managers and Shop Stewards' on industrial
democracy" in "Organizational Democracy and Political
Processes" - C. Crouch and F. Heller [Eds] John Wiley and
Sons 1983) that 75% of stewards but only 35% of managers,
in her sample, wanted equal powers on financial matters for
worker directors (pg. 335). While the questions asked by
ourselves and by Ursell are not directly comparable, in
both cases we would argue that they indicate the gUlf which
exists, between the Lifeworlds of Management and their
employees. Another of Ursell's findings does, however,
support our finding directly. It was found in her research
that the majority (51%) of managers preferred to restrict
the role of worker directors to an advisory function only
(pg. 335-6).
.. - . 144478 This is found too be Ursell, (See G. Ursell "The View of
British Managers and Shop Stewards on industrial
democracy" in "Organizational Democracy and Political
Processes" - C. Crouch and F. Heller [Eds] John Wiley and
Sons 1983) who finds that Management are "generally more
cautious" (pg. 338), taking the view that the main positive
role of worker directors would be in reducing industrial
conflict, and promoting and defending employee interests.
(See table 17.4, pg. 339). It is also reported by Dowling
et ale (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D, Gotting, J. Hyman
"Employee Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-
west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research
Paper No. 27, 1981) who conclude
This opposition (to worker directors)
had several bases, but prominent among
them were the anticipated detrimental
effects that such an innovation would
have upon the capacity of company
boards to make decisions and thereby
its impact on the efficiency of the
business. (pg. 37)
Teulings (A. Teulings "A Political Bargaining Theory of Co-
Determination". Organization Studies 1987, pp. 1-24) has
found in Holland, with their system of Works Councils, that
in practice most Works Councils
generally have no < independent
initiating and steering function in the
managerial decision-making process,
with regard to strategic decisions (pg.
16).
Thus, even with the powers of Works Councils being
autonomous of management, having extensive rights to
company information (almost all company economic and
financial information), and rights to advise management on
a range of decisions including investment, takeovers,
changes in the division of labour etc. they remain
largely responsive to Management. Interestingly Teulings
reports (pg. 18) that in attempting to influence Management
councilS are increasingly using external conSUltants, who
presumably are more highly skilled in Management as an
activity, and will be correspondingly have Lifeworlds more
typical of Management.
4N Indeed much of the work on the consequences of
participation on efficiency and profitability has tended to
suggest that the effects are positive. For instance
Rothschild-Whitt (J. Rothschild-Whitt "Worker Ownership in
Relation to Control" in C. Crouch and F. Heller
"organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John
Wiley 1983) argues that,
t) A J"'"
~--~-------"..... ,......_----the transformation (of a business) to
employee ownership carries with it the
potential to enhance the motivation and
commitment to the firm. The likely
result is that costs caused by
excessive turnover, absenteeism and
waste will be reduced, While quality
and productivity will improve. (pg.
396)
This is also reported by Cummings and Molloy (T. cummings
and E. Molloy "Improving Productivity and Quality of
Working Life". Praeger, 1977) who argue.
democracy resulted in both high work
effectiveness and member
satisfaction•••• while autocracy tended
to create hostility, aggression and
scapegoat behaviour; it also produced
SUbmissive dependence and a lack of
individuality•••• there was more group-
mindedness and friendliness in
democracy than under the other styles
of management. (pg. 104)
Hence it can be suggested that the effects of greater
democracy are rather more positive than seems to be
anticipated by the management in our sample.' On the other
hand it is important that, as cummings and Molloy argue
later
since increased rank and file decision
making is contingent on managers giving
employees greater authority, management
must feel secure enough' to allow
individuals such freedom and
responsibility. (supra, pg 119)
While the mechanism indicated by Cummings and Molloy
suggests that Ultimately control is retained by management,
it is perfectly consistent with our argument that lack of
confidence - due to Lifeworld structures - on the part of
management is an obstacle to developing democracy in work
organizations. cummings & Molloy's argument quite
explicitly and clearly emerges from an 00 model of
organizations, . but their, argument can be linked to
argUments from other tradl.tions. For instance Marchington
and Armstrong (M. Marchington & P. Armstrong "The Nature of
the new Joint Consultation". Industrial Relations Journal
1986, pp. 158-170) argue that effective consultation
between management and employees creates
trust between the representatives of
employer and employee (pg 167)Thus security and trust on both sides appears to be a
necessary condition for democratising work places. In this
respect the Lifeworld makes this more difficult to achieve,
since the Lifeworlds which appear to be occupied by
Management define employees as not competent to participate
in decision-making, and thus not to be trusted in this
respect. Likewise the Lifeworlds of those outwith
Management define Management as a group not to be fully
trusted. For instance, the data presented in Chapter 4
indicates a clear perception of not being fully informed,
While in Chapter 5 the perception is that while Management
may be the decision-makers those outwith Management wish to
be more involved so that their interests can be better
represented, and by implication that Management cannot be
trusted to do so.
surveying the Economics Literature Weiermair (K. Weiermair
"Worker Incentives and Worker Participation". Journal of
Management Studies 1985, pp. 547-570) concludes that
the level of opportunistic behaviour is
not invariable over time, and hence the
static assumption of perfect
rationality or perfect opportunism
inherent in most neoclassical models
ought to be relaxed. (pg. 560)
480 This becomes particularly pUZZling When, considering not
only our own theoretical position and our results, but also
that as Chell observes (E. Chell "Political Perspectives
and Worker Participation". C. Crouch & F. Heller
"organizational Democracy and Political Processes". John
Wiley 1983, pp. 487-504),
While the idea of worker director
schemes may be thought to be radical,
the practice has proved to be far from
it. Worker directors have performed in
a conventional, and to the managements
in the firm concerned, acceptable way.
(pg. 500)
strategy for
Smith (eds.)
"A
& R.
Further, Purcell argues (J.Purcell
Management Control". In J. Purcell
"control of Work" MacMillan 1979) that
the development of industrial democracy
involving more extensive consultations,
and in some cases worker directors is A
logical progression in the means of
achieving and maintaining control (pg.
49)
In other words, to the extent that management can maintain
their image of claimed technical skills, industrial
democracy may actually be to their advantage.481 Clearly to the extent that
a) if the changed objectives were at variance
with those acceptable to the market, and
b) the Lifeworlds of the Management had been
colonized by the System,
then such dissonance is inevitable. This finding is,
therefore indicative of colonization of the Lifeworlds of
Management, in the manner discussed in the above section on
Negotiating Reality.
Fox argues
some of those' who consign job
enrichment to instant disparagement do
so because they see it as in some way a
relaxing of management control a
slackening of the which they take to be
inevitable under capitalism•••••To
(this) point it cannot be stressed too
often that top management's search for
control in the fullest and broadest
sense does not necessarily require an
unchanging commitment to any particular
system of work patterns and job
structures. (A. Fox "Man Mismanagement"
[2nd Ed'n.] Hutchinson 1985, pg. 136)
While, in terms of the empirical evidence Fox is correct,
we nonetheless have to recognise that management may wish
for affective reasons to retain their level of control -
even if it would be more perceptive to yield a degree of
discretion to their employees. Such developments are
happening - as Fox continues
Already some company employees perform
discretionany tasks on a computer in
their own home, free of both immediate
technical constraint and direct
supervision. (Fox supra pp 136-7).
This degree of discretion could not be made available in
our firm - for technical reasons it would be impossible for
some (though not all) employees to work from home.
Nevertheless this evidence does indicate that it is
possible for Management not to seek to diminish their
degree of control.
482 This too is found by Cressey et al' (P. Cressey, J.
Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and
Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment
Research Paper No. 28, 1981) who quote an employee
representative
___ .:;;:.24.....1n"--- _I ' wonder ' if anyone's got, the
intelligence and education to do this.
Directors have the knowledge,
experience and expertise - that's their
job. I wouldn't like to see this
(discussion of company strategy) as a
union role, you would have trouble
finding somebody to do this••••Is Joe
Soap going to sit there and put in his
tuppence worth as a clerk with the
chief executive. (pg. 37)
4M This is found too by Hanson and Rathkey, who argue
shopfloor workers do want more say in
workplace decision-making, particularly'
in task related areas and matters of
manpower planning and work
organization. However, they generally
place limits on the extent of that
involvement. The desire for more say
falls far short of joint decision-
making (c. Hanson & P. Rathkey
"Industrial Democracy: A Post Bullock
Shop Floor View". British Journal of
Industrial Relations 1983, pg. 166)
A similar finding is reported by McInnes (J. McInnes
"conjuring up Participation". British Journal of Industrial
Relations, 1985.) who argues
They (Shop stewards) saw it
(consultation) as an opportunity to
gain information they could pass on to
their members, raise grievances, press
on management the distinct interest of
the shop· floor on issues such as job
security and contribute knowledge of
the reality of shop floor life to the
management the decision making process.
It could be summarised as the demand
for management to manage "fairly". (pg.
·102)
Hence on the basis of the evidence we have gathered, and
that presented elsewhere by others, it would appear to be
clear that whatever the level of demand for participation
by those outwith Management, it does not extend to equality
with the Management.
4M It is found by, for instance Emery & Thorsrud thatWhen people talk about industrial
democracy they are usually referrinq to
the sharinq of manaqerial power, but
when they come to the 'practice of
industrial democracy they tend to
assume that steps to increase the
effective application of their
independent power will automatically
lead to a qreater sharinq of manaqerial
power. In the cases we have examined
there is no evidence that this happens.
(F. Emery & E~ Thorsrud "Form and
Content in Industrial Democracy".
Tavistock 1969, pg. 85)
On the other hand it is argued by Elliot (J. Elliot
"Conflict or Cooperation". Kogan Page 1978) that
since industrialists have been workinq
for years to turn the present, often
destructive, conflict in industry into
a more positive and constructive
relationship and have too otten been
unsuccessful, a more radical approach
(industrial democracy) can hold
attractions (pg. 288)
The problem in sustaining this view, is that it would
appear on the basis not only of our own evidence, but also
that which is presented by Elliot, that management are not
enthusiastic about introducing schemes of industrial
democracy and/or participation. We will argue, in what
follows, that the reasons for this are locatable within the
Managerial Lifeworlds. Hence while it may be that, as
Elliot argues
there is no reason why "manaqement
should not be able to accommodate the
introduction of direct employee voice
into their top-most deliberations (pg.
288)
management "can see problems, other than the purely
practical issue which Elliot indicates.
485 Tables 5.36 - 5.45
4M Tables 5.46 - 5.55
487 Tables 5.26 - 5.35
488 As McTiernan (M. McTiernan "Workers' Alternative Plans"
University of Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations 1986)
observesIf it is accepted that managerial
powers and prerogatives are based upon
their possessing, or being believed to
possess some degree of technical
superiority over their employees then
an Alternative Plan which tends to
reduce that superiority will be seen as
a direct challenge to managerial power
and prerogative, an attempt to lessen
managerial legitimacy «pg. 2)
4~ It has been reported by Cressey et ale (P. Cressey, J.
Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and
Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of EmploYment
Research Paper No. 28, 1981) that
For managers, the work force as a whole
lacked precisely those features which
qualify management to reach pOlicy
decisions. They did not have the
education and financial expertise to
deal with such matters and would have
required a tremendous amount of
training to discuss such matters on
equal terms. (pg. 32)
This repeats our own finding, but from this we draw a
rather different conclusion. We would concur that "the work
force" lack the education etc., but we would question
whether it is only the lack of "education and financial
expertise" which is the problem. We shall go on to argue
that the activity of Management is a dialogue from which
other groups are excluded on grounds other than only their
lack of expertise. In particular we shall argue that the
differences in Lifeworlds between Management and other
groups is such that a full dialogue is not possible. The
differences in Lifeworld are such that the entry into
Management decision making by Hourly paid, would not only
be, by analogy, an interference in an ongoing conversation
- but it would moreover be a conversation that they could
not understand. Training in "Management skills" (Eg reading
a balance sheet, or Sales Forecast) would not of themselves
remedy this obstacle (though in truth they would assist),
but it would then be necessary for the those outwith
Management to also absorb the interpretive relevances etc.
Which underlie these skills - in other words it would be
necessary for the Hourly paid etc. to begin to take on the
Management Lifeworld. The difficUlty that this leads to,
however, is that as we argued in the previous section, this
Lifeworld is more deeply colonized by System imperatives.
Thus by participating in Management, an effect may be to
expose them to System Imperatives to a greater degree than
at the moment. Hence by entering fUlly into the Management
dialogue the assumptions Which underlie it (the System
imperatives) will not necessarily be revealed. Only by
~_. ?t_5 __, _1) changing Lifeworlds in such a way, could there
be
2) greater freedom, and
3) movement toward a structure more consistent
with the Ideal Speech Thesis, thus
4) creating a democratic work organization.
To develop participation by Staff and Hourly paid in the
current world of Management is only to expose their
Lifeworlds to the degree of colonization which we have
argued is so for Management. The extent to which this can
be perceived is well illustrated by Dowling et al.'s (M.
Dowling, J. Goodman, D, Gotting, J. HYman "Employee
Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west
Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of EmploYment Research Paper
No. 27, 1981) conclusion that
it (participation) was regarded as a
process that must contribute to the
success of the business. As one
divisional personnel manager said
"Participation schemes have got to be
viewed within the context of profit-
making because this is still the
essential thing." (pg. 26).
490 This is consistent with the conclusion which Clarke
arrives at. He argues
many managers have seen integrated
participation as a time-consuming
nuisance a threat to their own
authority and to achieving the goals of
the enterprise as they see them (0.
Clarke "Workers Participation in
Management in Great Britain". ILO
Research Series No. 58, pg. 16.)
We would not argue that this is wrong - indeed we will go
on to consider precisely these reasons established from our
own data - but rather that it omits the perception that,
for our Managers at least, participation would mean people
doing inappropriate activities. Thus participation was not
only wrong in the sense of challenging management authority
or altering the goals of the enterprise - both of which are
Ultimately subjective - but was also wrong in the technical
sense of requiring employees to participate in activities
for which they had no expertise. At least as important, as
we have shown is that employees endorse this.
491 Dowling et ale (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D, Gotting J.
Hyman "Employee Participation: Practice and AttitUde~ in
North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of EmploYment
Research Paper No. 27, 1981) find
~ .......65 ....._"" _Whichever form of participation
management favoured they stressed that
management must retain responsibility
for decision-making (pg. 26)
492 This point is made by McInnes (J. McInnes "Conjuring up
Participation". British Journal of Industrial Relations,
1985.) who argues
Managers saw consultation as a forum
for explaining to the stewards why they
took various decisions, especially ones
that might be unpopular, and why the
ability of management to take such
decisions quickly and effectively was
important. Their aim was to make the
stewards understand why decisions were
necessary and sometimes invite comment
in how they could best be implemented
and operated (pg. 102).
There are a number of aspects to this. First of all it
should be observed that the function of consultation for
participation is for Management to give explanations of
decisions they had taken, and in this way to develop
understanding of Management by the stewards. The function
of participation is not dialogue, other than for stewards
to advise Management on how best to implement the decision
which Management have already taken. Participation, in so
far as it exists, would appear to be basically a form of
communication for Management, rather than a form of
dialogue. This attempt to restrict participation in this
way, and its implications will become an increasingly
important part of our argument.
493 This is not to say that Management did not recognise
that employees had a legitimate interest in other issues on
Which there would be consultation and/or negotiation. The
distinction we drew above between issues which were
basically job-related, and other issues which were of a
more strategic nature, reflect this distinction, in that
the former were areas on which there would be consultation
and/or negotiation (pay and discipline would be examples of
this), whereas the latter would not (investment and
financial policy). This is suggested by Dowling et ale (M.
Dowling, J. Goodman, D, Gotting, J. Hyman "Employee
Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west
Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of Employment Research Paper
No. 27, 1981) who quote a manager as follows,(E. Langer "Illusion of Control". Journal of
and Social Psychology", 1975, pp. 311-328)
They (the unions) are involved in all
aspects of the business as it is. with
all the issues open to negotiation they
want to ensure that management sticks
to agreements that are concluded
between the two sides. within these
management has the right to manage as
long as the agreements are adhered to.
If management starts to act incorrectly
then our workers believe they have the
right to intervene. In this sense the
workers do not want co-determination,
but a right of appeal. (pg. 11, my
emphasis)
First of all it is important to observe the emphasis of the
right of management to manage, sUbject to the constraints
of the collective agreements. Hence within these limits
(which may vary in their width or narrowness) management
would be free to behave as they see fit. Secondly, and more
importantly, despite the manager's assertion that,
"They (the unions) are involved in all
aspects of the business as it is."
logically, if there is no agreement between management and
unions on a partiCUlar issue then the constraints referred
to sUbsequent will not operate. Hence if there was no
agreement on taking decisions about investment (or other
strategic issues) Management's right to manage would be
unfettered in such circumstances. For instance if such
issues were perceived by shop floor workers as the province
of Management, they would see no need to even try for an
agreement.
494 Langer
personality
argues that
people are motivated to control their
environment•••The greatest satisfaction
or feeling of competence would
therefore result from being able to
control the seemingly uncontrollable•••
(additionally) there is motivation to
avoid the negative consequences that
accompany the perception of having no
control (pg. 323)
Hence, following this argument it would appear that for
Management, there is a psychological danger in
participation, in that it may cause them to appear to be
less in control than under the present circumstances. ThusThe preference for the status quo is
more than likely a function of the
security it provides: it is seeminqly
controllable. (pg. 325)
Hence a problem with moving toward more democratic
structures is that Management may develop a sense of
insecurity because of the apparent diminution of their
control. At the same time, those outwith Management may be
discouraged from participating in it by their perception of
having no control - or sense of competence - in it.
4~ This view was emphasised by James Prior in his Guildhall
Lecture in 1980,
It is vital that the encouraqement and
quidance on employee involvement of the
kind qiven by major employer
orqanizations should now be acted on
throuqhout industry. It is the means to
harness the talents and co-operation of
the work-force in the common interests
they share with manaqement. (Granada
Guildhall Lectures "The Role of the
Trade Unions". Granada 1980)
There are a number of points to be observed from this. Most
important is that the paradigm which underlies this
suggests that through participation, workers and managers
will be able to work together for their mutual benefit. Yet
the schemes to which he refers ("major employer
organizations") do not go beyond consultation, whereby the
information and views which can be passed on through
(effective) communication systems, and will then be input
for managers to take decisions. For sure this is more
democratic than the situation in many firms - including our
own but it would still be Management who have the
monopoly of taking decisions. This is graphically
illustrated by the following quote from a personnel
director in a study by Dowling et ale (M. Dowling, J.
Goodman, D, Gotting, J. HYman "Employee Participation:
Practice and Attitudes in North-west ManUfacturing
Industry". Dept. of EmploYment Research Paper No. 27, 1981)
participation from workers would help
when decidinq on the details of capital
chanqes and plant investment. One
example would be where workers' ideas
and experience ,could be used to make
sure that the best desiqn features were
built into a new machine or
incorporated in a workshop layout. (pg.
25).This makes our point very well, in that while in the first
half of the quote, it is 'clear that the views etc. of
workers would be input to the decision-making process,
there would be no dialogue between workers and managers in
deciding the design of the machine or the workshop layout.
These would be decisions taken by Management.
496 See Loveridge, supra on this.
497 Even in a firm like Semco, in Brazil, which places a
high emphasis on participation (see below), the proportion
of profit which is distributed among the employees is fixed
by Management at 23% of division profit. On the other hand
Semler does point out the importance of ensuring that
employees understand the connection between what their
work, and the profits of the firm. (See R. Semler "Managing
without Managers". Harvard Business Review September-
October 1989, pg. 82.) This points to the problem of
ensuring that the conditions for dialogue (as opposed to
communication which may simply be one way) exist in any
firm. Hence, we would question, exactly what is meant by
Participation in the following:
participation is more likely when the
organization has structured the
framework for participation and retains
management control. (J. Dickson
"Participation as a Means of Management
Control". Journal of Management Studies
1981, pg. 170•)
This kind of argument merely reinforces the argument of,
for instance, Jain (H. C. Jain [Ed] "Worker Participation:
Success and Problems". Praeger 1980), who argues that
participative systems do not necessarily involve industrial
democracy, or movement toward it. In practical terms this
is demonstrably true - Dickson's findings are evidence of
this. However, while we would accept that participative
systems will vary in the degree to which they are
democratic, any system which sets out not only to retain
but to enhance management control cannot meaningfully be
described as participative. It may be that they can
properly be described as pseUdo-participative, but if the
purpose is to, at least, maintain management control then
questions have to raised about the authenticity of the
participation allowed (Which is terminologically correct)
employees.
498 The conservatism of management on industrial democracy
is shown by the evidence of Ford (UK) and Phillips to the
Bullock Commission. Phillips for instance arguedthis contributes to a "them and us"
mentality, and is largely responsible
for the implicit assumption in
industrial relations that in every
situation a conflict exists which can
only be resolved by "antagonists".
Ford argued
the them and us division in Britain
lies pretty deep••••In the process (of
Britain's economic development) it bred
attitudes amongst working people of
antipathy , not only to the men
concerned, but also to the objectives
of industry and all that it stood for.
(both in J. Elliot "Conflict or
Cooperation". Kogan Page 1978, pg. 100)
Thus in the view of two of the larger employers in the UK
the possibility of developing industrial democracy is
handicapped by the ingrained attitudes of (we would argue)
both sides. Rather than stop there, we have argued that we
have to consider how to "unpick" the attitudes identified
by Phillips and Ford.
Yet, it has been argued in a recent article that for
management to seek to maximise control may be irrational
even in their own terms. Halaby and Weakliem (C. Halaby
and D. Weakliem "Worker Control and Attachment to the
Firm". American Journal of Sociology 1989, pp. 549-591. )
argue that the primary mechanism in ensuring maximum
attachment by the worker to his firm is what they describe
as "match quality", by which they mean the extent to which
the job uses the skills and abilities of the worker. They
argue that if Managment give workers a degree control this
not only has advantages .for employees, but also imposes
costs (for instance the time spent in involvement in
decision-making). Likewise for Management there are costs
(losS ~f discretion for instance), ,but also advantages (in
that workers are more strongly attached to the firm).
Halaby and Weakliem conclude
The implication of this is that control
should be sUbject to the same
instrumental logic of systematic trade
offs that governs sociological analyses
of other job conditions. (pg. 586)In other words control ought to be distributed with these
considerations in mind - there will be a point where the
costs and benefits of employee involvement for employees
will intersect, and a point where the costs and benefits of
employee involvement for managers will intersect. Ideally
these intersections will be the same for both groups. This
has commonality with" Fox's observation of the opposition of
certain unions (for instance the AUEW) to the Bullock
Commission proposals on the grounds that,' as Fox points out
Aloofness from any commitment to
manaqerial pOlicies was essential if
the unions were to preserve their
oppositional role. (A. Fox "Man
Mismanagement"[2nd Edition) Hutchinson
1985, pg. 121)
Now it may be argued that this undermines the Ideal Speech
Thesis, in that if the parties do not wish to proceed to
full equality this renders the Thesis redundant. We would
argue that this would not be so, for two reasons:
a) the Ideal Speech Thesis is no more than a
bench mark. It makes no pretence to describe anything
which does currently exist nor we would argue
necessarily to anything which might exist. It is an
strong definition of equality, against which we can
measure situations and assess the extent of their
inequality, and identify the exercise of power - even
where it may not be conscious for one party, or even
for all parties.
b) Halaby and Weakliem contend that a
cost:benefit analysis should be conducted to establish
the appropriate degree of employee control. Yet this
"appropriate" degree of control would be determined,
ultimately, through the Lifeworlds of Management and
their employees - "what is appropriate that I should
give for this degree of influence?", "what is
appropriate that we should require for this degree of
influence?". The appropriate level of control would be
subject to a strong degree of influence from the
existing Lifeworlds and is thus subject to
significant influence from the existing structure of
power. In this way movement toward greater equality
(the conditions of the Ideal Speech Thesis) is
restricted by the inequality of power which exists at
the moment. Thus what employees may regard as
appropriate now will be rather less than if their
Lifeworlds were less dominated than the degree we have
shown.
4W By this phrase we have in mind the precise rules which
would establish the precise relative rights of Management
and other employees.
500 poole and Jenkins find that1) employees, in firms which have started SAYE
schemes for their employees in shares in their own
firm, reckoned the rewards for themselves were
adequate, but
2) that managers rather than themselves
were the main beneficiaries (M. Poole ,
G. Jenkins "How Employees Respond to
profit Sharing". Personnel Management.
July 1988, pg. 31)
Thus even where a form' of profit sharing is conducted we
can see difficulties precisely with control of the scheme.
Thus, as we argue above, the difficulty is not with the
principle of profit sharing as with how it is organized and
controlled. Indeed the benefits of doing this efficiently
are observed by Richardson and Nejad, who conclude
if management skilfully and
successfully construct a cUlture of
financial participation.it is possible
that they powerfully and cumulatively
affect the performance of their
organisation. CR. Richardson & A. Nejad
"Employee Share Ownership Schemes in
the UK an Evaluation". British
Journal of Industrial Relations 1986,
pg 248)
Thus an, obvious, reason for Management to want to retain
control over profit sharing is to ensure that the firm
obtains the performance improvement which Richardson and
Nejad report in their study.
501 Indeed for Hourly Paid, another proposition - that only
information applying directly to their job would be made
available to them - found more favour than allowing a
Management veto.
502 It is argued by Semler that reforms in these three areas
cannot be considered separately
Semco has three fundamental values on
which we base some 30 manaqement
programs. These values democracy,
profit sharing and information - work
in a complicated circle, each dependent
on the other two. If we eliminated one,
the others would be meaningless. (R.
Semler "Managing without Managers".
Harvard Business Review September-
October 1989, pg. 77)Semler's argument can be seen in that, for instance,
genuine democracy would be impossible if some of the
parties were systematically better informed than others -
likewise genuine democracy implies that the parties are
equally well informed. In this respect Semler's description
of Semco the firm he runs in Brazil is an
operationalised version of a structure which begins to
approximate Ideal Speech. For instance
a) the firm was looking for a larger factory in
order to expand and one particular site was preferred
by Management (or counsellors and coordinators as they
are known in Semco), but since the decision was to be
reached by democratic vote and the workforce as a
whole voted for another site, Management accepted this
(pg. 78).
b) employees attend classes'to
learn how to read and understand the
numbers, and its one of their unions
that teaches the course. Every month
each employee gets a balance sheet, a
profit and loss analysis and a cash
flow statement for his or her division.
(pg. 82)
This is not to' say that Semco represents an example of
Ideal Speech - we have already argued that it is difficult
to imagine a working pure example. On the other hand it
does show that movement in this direction is possible -
though, while within the constraints of a journal article,
it is difficult to assess this precisely, there is a strong
sense of Management continuing to dominate.
503 This is resonant of the definition' of participation
provided by Wall and Lischeron (T. Wall & J. Lischeron
"Worker Participation" <McGraw Hill 1977):
participation is not a unitary concept,
but consists of interrelated elements
which may be manifested in the
decision-making processes of an
organization in a variety of ways.
Three elements central to the concept
of participation: are influence,
interaction (where the parties in' a
decision process reach agreement by
working' together rather than through
recourse to a balance of power based
upon the exercise of sanctions) and
information sharing (by which they mean
sharing information relevant to the
issue in question) (pp. 36-37)What we have argued is that these three qualities are
sUbstantially absent from the relationship of the managers
from their employees in our firm. We have shown that the
quality of information communication is low, and that the
degree of influence exercised by those outwith management
is less than they would wish - and indeed less than even
Management would wish. Moreover without these three
qualities there can be no effective dialogue, and no
meaningful participation. However, with the Wall and
Lischeron definition we can see that participation is a
continuum - ie situations can be described as more/less
participative. Thus in developing participation toward
greater democracy at work, we can consider the degree of
participation according to these three criteria.
5~ This has also been found by Hyman et ale (J. Hyman, H.
Ramsay, J. Leopold, L. Baddon & L. Hunter "The Impact of
Employee Share Ownership". Employee Relations 1989, pp. 9-
16), who conclude their study of share ownership in two
companies
Perhaps the main conclusion to be drawn
from these two case studies is the
divergence between management
objectives and employee responses.
Management objectives in each instance
are presented in terms of attitudinal
changes in employees. The time scale of
this is often vague and certainly more
oriented to the long run than for
immediate benefits. Employees on the
other hand, view the opportunity to
participate in option schemes primarily
in instrumental terms. They recognize
the potential gains to be made and, if
they can afford it, elect to
participate. But in both companies it
was only a minority who chose to do so
(pg. 15).
This finding is consistent with our own - that employees
and management understand things in differently. In the
case considered by Hyman et ale the Management see share
ownership schemes as a means of enhancing employee
involvement with the firm. Employees see it as an
opportunity to make a few bob. The situation we have
considered is where Management and their employees foresee
different consequences from having worker directors sitting
on the board. The problem, however goes deeper than simply
getting them to talk to each other, since due to Lifeworld
differences they would not necessarily be talking about the
same thing. It is necessary for the parties to begin to set
the conditions where dialogue is possible, and if it is to
be equal, a dialogue corresponding as closely as possible
to Ideal Speech.505 This is not to say that the parties cannot work
together. For instance Richardson (P. Richardson "Courting
Greater Employee Involvement Through Participative
Management". Sloan Management Review 1985, pp. 33-44),
concludes in a study of attempts by four firms to introduce
different levels of participation "from improving
communication" to "treating employees as partners" (pg. 33)
- that
the most surprising finding of the
study will be the extent to which the
union, workforce and management can
agree and work together on what appear
to be tough cost objectives. The
successful companies... found that
employees and unions understand the
economic reality and are willing to
accept fewer jobs as long as they are
secure and as long as necessary
terminations can leave with dignity.
Those who remain can then have the
pride in their contributions to the
competitiveness of their operation. (pg
43)
From this there are two important points. First of all it
provides evidence of Management and employees being able to
attain sufficient unders~anding to be able to take the
difficult decisions which Richardson considers. This,
however, takes us to the second point which concerns on
what basis this understanding was reached, and in
particular whether what. Richardson describes as
participation may have been (in effect) cooption. We shall
consider this problem below.
5~ The conscious power of Management is clear from the data
we have gathered on disclosure of information - which
indicates that access to information is systematically
structured - and the data on control which indicates that
Management are perceived as the dominant group on every
issue investigated.
507 This point - in relation only to managerial levels - is
made by Poole
;t~~
~_-..:..-_-----------h
the distinction between director and
manager, between personnel at different
levels in the managerial hierarchy, and
between "cosmopolitan" managers with
skills anchored in the professional
association and their more "local"
counterparts in the line hierarchy may
all be of fundamental importance in
producing different social experiences
which in turn engender variations in
outlook and behaviour not least on the
question of industrial democracy
itself. (M. Poole "Managers, Industrial
Democracy and Control". In M. Poole and
M. Mansfield "Managerial Roles in
Industrial Relations". Gower 1980, pg.,
76) •
Poole I S argument is around a relatively limited area of
employees in an organization different levels of
management - but the structure of our arguments are similar
in that differing experience leads to differences of view.
508 Marsden (D. Marsden "Industrial Democracy and Industrial
Control in West Germany, France and Great Britain". Dept of
EmplOYment Research Paper No.4, 1978) presents evidence of
West Germany which points in the same direction. He argues
that
Had the TOC pressed (the Bullock
Commission) for its original idea of
parity representation on a supervisory
board as part of its long term strategy
of influencing the future demand for
labour by influencing investment
policy, it would probably have found
that it gained little more than the
West German unions. It would be hard to
relate discussions at this level to
normal shop steward bargaining because
of differences of time horizon and lack
of influence, over the intermediate
body, the management board, (pg. 56 our
emphasis)
What Marsden' reports finding in West Germany is that
employee representatives found difficulty in relating their
lives as workers to events in the (supervisory) board room,
which we would seek to explain in the differences in
Lifeworld of workers and directors.
a~,·'5~ It is shown by Whyte that a greater degree of equality
has been created in Mondragon. Ursell, in a review, notes
that Whyte shows that dominant social outcomes 'for the
cooperatives are equality and the active participation of
all members. It may be argued that Mondragon stops short of
the conditions required by the Ideal Speech Thesis, but it
does represent (Whyte I s evidence suggests) a significant
move in this direction. See W. F. Whyte & K. Whyte "Making
Mondragon" ILR Press 1988. Also G. Ursell Review of "Making
Mondragon" , Organization studies 1989, pp. 594-597.
510 Lane (T. Lane "Economic Democracy: Are the Unions
Equipped?". Industrial Relations Journal 1986, pp.321-328)
argues that
Trade unionists reqardless of their
office, have not normally and as a
matter of practice concerned themselves
with the loqic of the enterprise. In
the workplace this shows itself in an
unconcern with the orqanization of
production unless it affects health and
safety, the ability to earn, the
division of labour between skilled and
other workers and the loss of jobs.
Isolated instances apart it is not
common for workers to express concern
about what is produced and how. (pg
326)
From another direction, this is confirmed by Fligstein (N.
Fligstein "Intraorganizational Power Structure". American
sociological Review 1987, pp. 44-58) who argues that the
existing structure of an organization provides stability
since
a) the existing structure in itself is a source
of power, (eg for those at the top of the hierarchy) -
as Fligstein puts it
what is in place will tend to stay in
place (pg. 56)
b) the structure provides an organizational story
which simplifies the world for the organizational
actors (see Fligstein page 56) - we would argue that
as well as simplifying the world it provides a
"working" story of the world. Consequently, if we seek
to move away from hierarchy toward greater democracy,
another "story" would have to be provided, and as we
have shown, it would have to be a story which seems to
"work".511 This point is also made by Cressey et al (P. Cressey, J.
Eldridge, J. MacInness, G. Norris "Industrial Democracy and
Participation: A Scottish Survey". Dept. Of Employment
Research Paper No. 28, 1981) who refer to perceptions by
employees of
manaqement inexpertise and inefficiency
when it came to decisions about
production. (pg. 40)
512 Such concerns are well illustrated in a quote from
Cressey et al (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G.
Norris "Industrial Democracy and Participation: A Scottish
Survey". Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No. 28, 1981)
'It (participating in management
decisions like Marketing, Investment
etc.) miqht show up the limits of your
capabilities, and you become dependent
on what other people tell you because
your out of your depth: you would
simply nod your head without really
understandinq - maybe become a puppet
because you don't want to be seen as
not knowinq or understandinq ,these
thinqs. (pq. 38)
We would argue, however, that the problem goes deeper than
just the skills Which most employee representatives would
lack - though the provision of these would be necessary.
Skills have to be applied in context, with assumptions
(interpretational relevances) being used. Just as Schutz
discussed the problem of the man who doesn't know whether
its a snake in the bag, Managers have to use
interpretational relevances to indicate to them how to deal
with a situation, which skills to use, how to use them,
etc. Employee representatives would have to have access to
these assumptions too, otherwise dialogue with Management
would be restricted, and perhaps impossible.
513 J. Ford & D. A. Baucus. Academy of Management Review
1987.
514 This is not to say that such a challenge could not be
mounted. Elliot (J. Elliot "Conflict or Cooperation". Kogan
Page 1978) argues in the context of the debate which
surrounded the Bullock Report on Industrial Democracy thatpart" of the interest· in industrial
democracy has stemmed from a lack of
faith amonq employees in the abilities
of the manaqement to manaqe. This has
arisen aqainst a backqround of poor
manaqement performance with a number of
companies failinq to cope with both
larqe and small problems across a wide
field stretchinq well beyond labour
relations (pg. 98)
While the situation of the late 1980' and early 1990's is
different from the time when Elliot wrote, the implication
still holds good. Today the image of the professional
manager is somewhat less tarnished than during the 1970's -
but if management (as a function) are seen to fail to
perform adequately, and thus fail to maintain the image of
professional decision-makers, then the entire function
could once again come under the threat which Elliot
considered existed in the 1970's.
515 Gronn argues (P. Gronn "Talk as the Work".
Administrative Science Quarterly 1981, pp. 1-21) that
educational research indicates that the domination
exercised by a headmaster is only by virtue of the
confidence of teachers, parents, and pupils in him or her
(see page 1). Hence if a particular headmaster proved
inadequate to justify their confidence, he would find it
difficult to maintain his dominance. Our argument would go
on to argue that if a succession of headmasters were to
prove to be inadequate then the very role - as well as the
associated domination - may come to be challenged.
516 For instance, Dowling et ale (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, 0,
Gotting, J • Hyman "Employee' Participation: Practice and
Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of
Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981) argue
Many of the manaqers and trade union
officials in the survey presented
perceived the basic pattern of British
industrial relations as beinq
adversarial or oppositional in nature.
They have qrown up under this system,
contributed to its maintenance and
their typical ways of actinq and
thinkinq have been moulded by it (pg.
39)
517 Cressey et al (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G.
Norris "Industrial Democracy and Participation: A Scottish
Survey". Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No. 28, 1981)
argueRamsay (H. Ramsay, "Phantom
participation: Patterns of Power and
Conflict" Industrial Relations Journal
1980) suggests that the two most likely
long term outcomes for participation
schemes are either triviality in which
discussion gets relegated to tea towels
and toilets issues, or change of
committee status where after a
pragmatic management adaption,
bargaining is allowed to take place
within the participation machinery.
(pg. 56)
We would argue that this is consistent with our own
findings and argument since both situations referred to can
be explained by a lack, or failure, of dialogue. Such a
lack of dialogue could result in the former if the
participants can only sustain dialogue at such a trivial
level. The latter indicates that since dialogue has failed
the parties have resorted to forms of behaviour which they
know and are able to sustain.
518 Clegg & Wall (C. Clegg & T. Wall "The Lateral Dimension
to Employee Participation". Journal of Management Studies
1984, pp. 429-442) argue that communication difficulties do
not exist only hierarchically, but that there is an equally
difficult problem laterally in organizations, in that the
influence which can be exercised by different lateral
interest groups who have different objectives, values and
rights has to be taken into account as well in trying to
develop a system of participation in any organization. They
argue that
precisely because these issues have not
been anticipated and planned for, they
provide stumbling blocks against which
even a well-designed vertically
oriented system will falter (pg. 430)This issue is not one that our own research would readily
have picked up, since by considering hierarchy we are
innevitably drawn into the vertical dimension. Yet they do
provide further evidence of the efficacy of Lifeworld as an
important explanatory concept. If we say that the lateral
groups were functional - Production, Marketing, etc. - then
because of their different experience (professional
training for instance) we, would expect their Lifeworlds to
be different, and to that extent that they would have
difficulty in communicating. A number of examples of this
arose in our own firm because of the inability of
Production staff and Management to communicate effectively
with Financial staff and Management. A related example is
Spender's work on "industry recipes" (J-C Spender "Industry
Recipes", Blackwell 1979) which considers the "recipes"
used by Management to deal with uncertainty in strategic
decision-making. This study used evidence collected from
three different industries, and demonstrates that
Management in these industries would find some difficulty
in communicating clearly because of differences in their
Lifeworlds.
This is of interest not only by pointing to problems for
participation from other than hierarchy, but by pointing to
the problem for achieving undistorted communication (Ideal
Speech) created by the Lifeworlds which we occupy, since it
is only by becoming aware of this, and the assumptions etc.
which it involves that undistorted communication is
possible. We have argued that this is an obstacle
vertically (from the hierarchy) but Clegg and Wall show it
is a lateral problem too.
519 This leads to the possibility that, as Thompson (P.
Thompson "The Nature of Work". MacMillan 1983) points out,
workers do not always need to be
overtly controlled. They may
effectively control themselves. (pg.
279)
certainly it never appeared to us that the employees in our
firm were SUbject to high levels of control. There were
procedures like clocking in and out, work study, and so on,
but Management were aware of the skills of their employees,
and control was not so tight as to stand in the way of
preventing these from being used. For instance managers in
Production would tell of situations where shop floor
workers would simply ignore the drawing supplied for a job,
and do it their way based on their skills and expertise.
Usually, we were told, it was the shop floor worker who was
right.
520 McCarthy & Ellis consider certain relevant issues in
"Management by Agreement" (W. McCarthy & N. Ellis
"Management by Agreement", Hutchinson 1973). While they
argue thatan increasing number of workers of all
degrees of skill feel that traditional
authoritarian power structures are no
longer acceptable (pg. 89)
their solution to this is through the extension of
collective bargaining such that
unions would have the right to seek to
influence management policy in any area
and
what management would be committed to
is providing reasonable explanations
for policy decisions in these areas.
They would also be committed to
listening to union criticism and
pledged to doing their best to answer
it (both pg. 97)
There is much in what McCarthy & Ellis put forward that we
agree with, especially their argument, which is consistent
with our own data , that employees are seeking more
influence on Management, and on a wider range of issues.
Likewise it is clear that extending collective bargaining
would represent movement toward more democracy. There are,
however, problems which their argument will not deal with.
In the first place, our own evidence suggests that it is
unlikely that Management would voluntarily move in the
direction that McCarthy & Ellis argue for - for· instance
that faced with union objections to their policies that
Management would be pledged to doing their best to give a
meaningful answer. More importantly, however, Mccarthy &
Ellis's argument does not allow for the difficulties of the
Lifeworld, in that by extending collective bargaining in
the manner they propose does not acknowledge the
differences in experience, and associated differences in
Lifeworld, which would stand in the way of dialogue between
the parties. Certainly the McCarthy & Ellis thesis of
extending collective bargaining would represent a movement
toward greater democracy, but by not taking into account
the Lifeworld differences they cannot recognise the
difficulties which are thus created. Consequently, while
the structures which they discuss represent a starting
point for achieving more democratic structures in
organizations, more radical structures would have to be
developed subsequent to achieve even greater levels of
equality. As Baumgartner et ale argue in relation to the
German system of participation - Mitbestimmung -n
there is little or no chanqe in the
capability to structure power
relationships between workers and
manaqers in enterprises, to restructure
the production processes, the
orqanization of production, or the
distribution of its products, or to
reshape the institutional context of
production. Even hiqhly developed self-
manaqement systems may fall far short
of this standard ( T. Baumgartner, T.
Burns, and P. DeVille "Work Politics
and Social Structuring Under
Capitalism". In T. R. Burns, L. E.
Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power"•.
Sage 1979, pg. 209)
Nor do they take into account the possibility that, as
Cressey et al. found·
the schemes were operated at the
discretion of manaqement since there
was no commitment by manaqement to be
bound by discussions. They insisted
firmly that participation had to be
subordinate to manaqement1s riqht to
manaqe. (P. Cressey, J. Eldridge and J.
McInnes "Just Managing". Open
university Press, 1985, pg. 164)
More radical structures, than suggested by McCarthy and
Ellis, would necessitate attention to Lifeworld
differences, and their possible dissolution - or at least a
means of translating from one Lifeworld to another more
effectively than appears to happen at the moment. As
Baumgartner et al. conclude
workers as well as the pUblic might
develop new conceptions or workinq
people (or at least their
representatives) e.q. leqitimizinq
their broader participation in societal
decision-makinq. ( T. Baumgartner, T.
Burns, and P. DeVille "Work Politics
and Social Structuring Under
Capitalism". In T. R. Burns, L. E.
Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power"•
Sage 1979, pg. 210)
521 As Marchington points out even in participative
situations
it is naive to assume sanctions are not
used in participative interaction (M.
Marchington "Responses to Participation
at Work" Gower 1980, pg 10.)
2~D522 Poole suggests that we can consider two categories of
industrial democracy integrative models (where the
interests of management and workers are reconciled by the
introduction of industrial democracy) and disjunctive
models (where no such accommodation is seen as possible,
even with industrial democracy). Poole argues
under integrative models of
participation, the crucial bases upon
which the successful exercise of power
(and also, in large measure, of
influence and authority depend) rest
especially upon expertise and knowledge
and above all control over information
on technical, commercial and even
personnel questions. Hence in these
circumstances, the cession of extensive
formal powers to democratically elected
decision-making committees may amount
to little in practice........ In
contrast in disjunctive modes of
participation rather different bases
of power are marshalled. For instance
in forms based upon trade union and
shop steward systems, union
representatives typically deploy
numbers.. organization.. and various
resources. Meanwhile managements
correspondingly initiate actions based
upon their crucial leverage over the
enterprise organization, together with
its financial resources and the right
to provide or terminate emploYment. The
upshot then is a continual struggle for
power in an environmental context in
which wider exigencies technical
movements and normative beliefs and
aspirations variously favour one party
or the other. (M. Poole "Managers,
Industrial Democracy and Control". In
M. Poole and M. Mansfield "Managerial
Roles in Industrial Relations". Gower
1980, pg. 80).
As we have argued above, the privileged access of
management to information - technical, commercial or on
personnel - would have to be varied in a democratically run
enterprise, though, as we have shown, doing so would by no
means be straightforward. But the central difficulty with
poole's argument is that he proposes, what can be argued to
be, a false opposition, in that
a) if the model is integrative, then it is clear
that the expertise of Management is, as Poole argues
critical, and this may nullify any move toward
democracy.
2ft IEmery & E.
Democracy".
b) even if the model is disjunctive, we would
contend, the expertise of Management continues to be
critical. Indeed we could consider as an example of a
disjunctive model, the possibility of extending
collective bargaining into areas from which previously
it has been excluded. If we take investment as an
example, then it would be possible for union/ stewards
to use their nUmbers, organization, etc. against
Management proposals. The problem is, however, that as
we have shown, the stewards without access to
privileged management information would have
difficulty in negotiating with Management. Yet more
difficult, however, would be the perceptions among
stewards - and more importantly among their members -
of managers as professional decision makers. In this
way even with a disjunctive model, the expertise of
management - and employee perceptions of this - play a
significant role.
523 It is concluded by Emery & Thorsrud (F.
Thorsrud "Form and Content in Industrial
Tavistock 1969) that
when we look at the behaviour of
Norwegian boards, it becomes clear that
although they share in the power of the
board they find it very difficult to
see how to use that power in ways that
are in accord with the usual board
purposes and at the same time make a
direct impact on the working lives of
their constituents. (pg. 83)
Yet what our data, and the theoretical discussion of this
chapter have shown is that this is pretty much what we
would expect, since given the differences in Lifeworlds the
possibility of effective dialogue between board level
employees and other employees is tenuous.
524 They point out
Management can never completely control
the labour power it has formally
purchased: some autonomy and initiative
always remains with the work force.
This means that it is desirable for
Management to have some degree of
common purpose with the work force, to
ensure that this initiative is
exercised in ways compatible with
management's goals. (P. Cressey, J.
Eldridge and J • McInnes "Just
Managing". Open University Press, 1985,
pg. 159)
525 storey makes the same point in the following way,In pursuit of these diverse objectives,
manaqement stresses both that it is a
partner with labour (indeed often
arguinq that it is just another seqment
of labour) yet at the same time it
stands separate from and over it. (J.
storey "Management Control as a
Bridging Concept", Journal of
Management Studies 1985, pg. 283)
526 For instance, Laing and Esterson show evidence that
Sarah was expected to fulfil rules Which all the other
members of the family broke, using their intra-family
alliances for support. For instance, it was insisted that
Sarah should observe the Sabbath (the family were orthodox
Jews), but the mother, with the connivance of the son did
so without the knowledge of Sarah or Mr Danzig. Likewise,
John (her brother) visited coffee-bars and restaurants etc.
even though both he had been forbidden by their father to
do so. But when Mr Danzig attempted to impose similar
limitations on Sarah, John sided with him.
From my point of view when it comes to
Sarah its not intrusion - when it comes
to me it is intrusion. (pg 124)
Metaphorically the situation of the employees in our study
is similar, in that they are on the one hand told that they
are "partners" in the enterprise, but on the other hand are
systematically treated less favourably than Management (See
for instance our data in Chapter 4 showing the
hierarchically systematic way in which employees appear to
be informed. Also see Appendix 6, where we show that while
the employees are on the whole satisfied with the rewards
which they receive from the firm, at the same time the
hierarchically systematic distribution of reward is
perceived to be legitimate.) This is observed too by
Baumgartner et ale who argue
~.'.,..Employees are compelled to lead a
double existence: outsider their work
they may enjoy considerable liberties,
independence and self confidence,
althouqh their capacity to any
siqnificant deqree is quite limited; in
their place of work they are subject to
strict authority and control,
particularly those at the lower end of
the hierarchy, and to forces of
technoloqical and social orqanizational
chanqe over which they have little or
no control in Touraine's phrase
"dependent participation". ( T.
Baumgartner, T. Burns, and P. DeVille
"Work Politics and Social structuring
Under capitalism". In T. R. Burns, L.
E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power".
Sage 1979, pg. 182»,
and are dominated both consciously -
cressey et ale for instance argue
Consultation was therefore a forum for
manaqement to promote an extremely
unitarist view of the firm. (P.
Cressey, J. Eldridge and J. McInnes
"Just Managing". Open University Press,
1985, pg. 165) ,
Hence even in what appears to be a participative procedure
control is
a) maintained by Management (Cressey et ale go on
to confirm that such consultation was purely
advisory, and subject to Management's right to manage.
See Cressey et al., pg. 165)
b) strengthened by the ability of
take advantage of such apparently
situations to actually reinforce
Lifeworld.
Management to
participative
the existing
and (we would contend, more importantly) unconsciously by
Management. Batstone argues that
By layinq down rules and procedures an
attempt is made to create a larqely
taken-for-qranted world for the
participant such that his behaviour
furthers the qoals of those in control
of the orqanization. (E. Batstone
"Systems of Domination, Accommodation
and Industrial Democracy" in T. Burns,
L. Karlsson and V. Rus [Eds] "Work and
Power" Sage 1979, pg. 252)....
We would argue, however, that this system of domination
extends to Management as well, and that indeed their
Lifeworlds could be argued to be even more extensively
colonized by system imperatives.
527 J. Habermas - "Theory of Communicative Action (2)"•
.Polity 1986, pp. 140-145, esp. fig. 22.
528 It may of course be argued that seeking perfection is
Utopian, and we would probably agree with this. On the
other hand perfection appears to us to be a good measure,
and thus we would suggest that schemes/models of industrial
democracy can be assessed by how well they measure up to
this standard. Batstone argues that complete democracy is
impossible, but that what we have now is less than could be
expected.
It may also be suggested that it is
impossible to achieve a totally
democratic form of industrial
organization. A degree of hierarchy is
inevitable for work has to be co-
ordinated and skills and expertise
will ·be differentially distributed
among people. But even if one takes
this point into account it can scarcely
be argued that the experience of the
"democratic" operation of industrial
enterprises matches what might
reasonably be expected. (E. Batstone
"Systems of Domination, Accommodation
and Industrial Democracy". In T. R.
Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work
and Power". Sage 1979, pg. 250.)
529 The evidence of research into the experience of being a
worker director indicates that the position is found to be
very difficult. For instance cressey et al. report
representatives would be least likely
to have the expertise to deal with
matters discussed, (at board level) yet
would be most alienated from the work-
force in their activities, and most
hampered by the problems of boardroom
and commercial confidentiality. (P.
Cressey, J. Eldridge, J. MacInness, G.
Norris "Industrial Democracy and
Participation: A Scottish Survey"•
Dept. Of Employment Research Paper No.
28; 1981, pg. 42.)
Baumgartner et al. argue that even in relatively well
developed systems of industrial democracy, as in west
Germany - Mitbestimmung - thatthere is little or no change in the
capability to structure power
relationships between workers and
managers In enterprises to restructure
the production process, the
organization of production, or the
distribution of products, or to reshape
the institutional context of
production. Even highly developed self-
management systems fall far short of
that. ( T. Baumgartner, T. Burns, and
P. DeVille "Work Politics and Social
structuring Under capitalism". In T. R.
Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work
and Power". Sage 1979, pg. 209)
Yet why should this happen? Why do worker representatives
not seize the opportunity to further the interests of
their members at the highest level of the company? We would
argue that this is due to employees having been schooled
into Lifeworlds which provide Management with such a level
of dominance that the consequences which Cressey et al.,
Baumgartner et ale have described (and they are merely
instances) are probably innevitable. This is not to say
that there are no structural obstacles. For instance
Meacher (M. Meacher "How the Mandarins Rule". New Statesman
4/12/1980, pp. 14-15) instances a number of strategies
which management can use to make the role of the worker
director more difficult. For instance
a) "the expert ploy" where decisions are taken on
the advice of (management) experts in particular areas
- marketing, finance and so on.
b) "the fait accompli ploy", where decisions are
taken between options derived by sub-committees
(composed of managers), so that the worker directors
can chose only between managerially approved options.
c) "the timing of papers ploy", where the worker
director, because he is peripheral to the management
information flow, often is much less well informed
than others at board meetings
530 Indeed it can be argued that since greater initiative
and cooperation is necessary to operate successfully in
turbulent environments, precisely this kind of movement is
necessary in any case. For instance the work of Lawrence
and Lorsch (P. Lawrence & J • Lorsch - "Organization and
Environment", Harvard University Press, 1967) and Burns and
Stalker (T. Burns & G. Stalker "Management of
Innovation", Tavistock 1961) indicates precisely this, in
that when the environment becomes turbulent - changing
rapidly in unpredictable ways - firms are recommended to
decentralise decision-making downwardly from the centre.
This by no means is industrial democracy, but it does
suggest,given the
previously
sense of
b
a) a move away from rigid hierarchy,
b) control over decision-making being distributed more
widely, and that more importantly
c) others outwith Management are being
opportunity to take decisions which they may
have been excluded from, and to develop a
competence in so doing.
Similarly the argument for Theory Z (W. Ouchi - "Type Z
Organization: stability in the Midst of Mobility". Academy
of Management Review 1978, pp. 305-314) emphasises the
importance of securing consensus, group loyalty, treating
the employee like a member of the family, collective
responsibility, etc. All of these, while certainly not
being seen as forms of industrial democracy, do require a
greater degree of participation by employees than would
normally be found in organizations. The argument Ouchi
develops is that this form of organization wlll become
necessary for purely commercial reasons - in order that
firms will be able to continue to compete and to survive in
increasingly turbulent economic conditions and in the face
of increasing Japanese competition.
531 Our evidence points in general terms to the conclusion
of cressey et ale that the shop-floor and staff want
-management to manage fairly in the
sense of having regard to the interests
the work-force. (P. Cressey, J.
Eldridge and J. McInnes "Just
Managing". Open University Press, 1985,
pg. 166)
At the same time we would agree with Cressey et ale that
the creation of such a system would face very many,
profound obstacles, requiring change outwith the
organization as well as within. We would, however, argue
that some at least of these obstacles reflect differences
in Lifeworld, with consequential (but unseen) effects on
the operation of power. For instance Cressey et ale argue
that the schemes of participation which they studied
never reached the stage of taking
decisions or reviewing jointly the
range of information relevant to taking
a decision. (P. cressey, J. Eldridge
and J. McInnes "Just Managing" • Open
university Press, 1985, pg. 170)ll.._
We would argue that this is not really surprising since the
Lifeworlds of our subjects indicated that Management saw
themselves as "professional"· ,decision-makers, a view
SUbstantially shared by their employees. Thus in the event
of the type of participative scheme studied by Cressey et
ale was to be introduced, there would be two obstacles to
this:
a) the very proposal would offend the perception
which Management have of themselves and of their
employees in relation to decision-making, and
b) while employees outwith Management may have
been given additional power which it would be in their
interests to use, their perception of themselves and
of Management in relation to decision-making would
stand in the way of these new powers being used to
anything like their fullest degree.
Hence given. this, we would not be 'surprised to find
participative schemes like those studied by Cressey et ale
do not develop in the way forecast. This, however, does not
mean that they cannot be successful. It does mean that they
face obstacles from the Lifeworld which may not be easily
apparent.
532 This issue is considered by Elliot (J. Elliot "Conflict
or cooperation". Kogan Page 1978), who argues
As far as individual workers are
concerned, many British companies often
seem to take too little positive
account of their employees interests,
whatever many industrialists and senior
managers may claim. (pg. 283)
533 Hence we would argue that we can explain, as storey has
argued
it remains important to see how
managers seek to legitimatize their
superordinate position and their lines
of action. (J. storey "Management
Control as a Bridging Concept". Journal
of Management Studies, 1985, pg. 285)
We have sought to· do this, not only by considering what
Management do to sustain their control, ..but that through
considering the Lifeworld we can understand why
1) Management seek to hold on to power, without
reference to imputed Managerial interests;
2) employees accept Management power, because
Managers are deemed to possess special qualities in
decision-making which the employees perceive
themselves to lack.(Worker
and the
at this
534 Fox argues
whether collective bargaining maintains
ordered relations free of prolonged
breakdowns and recurrent disruptions
depends on there being (a) a high
degree of congruence between the views
of the two parties as to what
categories of decisions are to be seen
as negotiable and what as non-
negotiable, and (b) a closeness between
the claims, aspirations or policies of
the parties with respect to negotiable
issues SUfficient to make possible
those agreed compromises or syntheses
which maintain uninterrupted working.
(A. Fox "Man Mismanagement"[2nd. Edn.]
Hutchinson 1985, pg. 157)
Taking the second point first, there had been no strikes in
the firm - other than national stoppages - for at least 15
years. This suggests that the second of Fox's conditions
was satisfied. We would argue that the first is also
satisfied, given the degree of congruence of the views
expressed in our data. This is reflected in the congruence
of the Management Lifeworld, and that of other employees• .
535 It is as much as we can do to point to the difficulties
that stand in the way of more democratic organizations. We
would, however, concur with Clarke (0. Clarke "Workers
Participation in Management in Great Britain". ILO Research
Series No. 58, pg. 16.) in arguing that
The precise form it
participation) will take,
effects it will have cannot
stage be foreseen. (pg. 23)
536 Emery and Thorsrud argue (F. Emery &E. Thorsrud "Form
and content in Industrial Democracy". Tavistock 1969)
In so far as industrial democracy means
more than extended negotiations and
consultations, there' is a need for the
transfer of some real managerial power
to the employees. It is diffiCUlt
indeed to see how this sharing can be
started at the top - at board level. If
democratic participation is to become a
reality it seems inevitable that it
must be started at a level where a
large proportion of employees are both
able and willing to participate (pg.
86, my emphasis)
537 Emery and Thorsrud (supra), quoting Holter, argue that
the majority of lower grade employees(a) feel that they could cope with more
responsibility in their daily work, and
(b) want more such responsibility (pg.
86)
538 A union official is reported by Dowling et ale (M.
Dowling, J. Goodman, 0, Gotting, J. HYman "Employee
Participation: Practice and Attitudes in North-west
Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of EmploYment Research Paper
No. 27, 1981) as arguing that
People should be involved in the
detailed decisions about how they
should do their work and bottom-up
schemes would help achieve this
involvement ••••• (such schemes) are
important in that they can help break
down the managerial "right to manage"
attitude (pg. 35)
Equally, however, we would argue that such schemes would
help to break down the employee " only management can
manage" attitude.
539 Fatchett argues
it is these decisions (on
strategy) which have
implications for the
workplace. (D. Fatchett
Democracy the
Universities of Leeds and
1977, pg. 16)
finance and
profound
individual
"Industrial
Prospects".
Nottingham,
540 In this respect we would have to dispute the argument
put forward by Marsden, who suggests that the parties
(Management, and those outwith Management) can
separate out groups of issues from each
other via different forms of
negotiation and consultative machinery
so that changes in one will be less
likely to affect the situation in
others. (D. Marsden "Industrial
Democracy and Industrial Control in
West Germany, France and Great
Britain". Department of EmploYment
Research Paper No.4, pg. 6)
Given the system basis of organizations, eventually this
distinction will begin to break down. Marsden himself uses
the example of machinery, suggesting that while control of
work methods, but that control if investment in new
machines would be retained by Management. ultimately,
however, this distinction would break down for the reasons
we have provided in the main text. Whether this would
happen slowly or quickly cannot be forecast•
...-541 The Industrial Participation Association suggest that it
may take from 18 months to 4 years for employee directors
to become fully effective ("Employee Directors and
Supervisory Boards", 1973, pg. 13).
542 For instance it is argued by Chell that
people can learn to cope with
participative situations; tobe'able to
reduce stresses and anxieties in
themselves and others; to be able to
know when to make requests and when to
give commands and to whom and how to
disclose information. The acquisition
of such skills requires both a great
deal of thought and practice since the
skills incorporate both cognitive and
affective elements. The first practical
'step individuals must take in such a
learning process is to become more
conscious of their own behaviour in
order to be able to change it. The next
step is to know what needs to be
changed. The third stage is to find or
put themselves in a position where
behaviour change is a practical
possibility. (E. Chell "Participation
and Organization". MacMillan 1985, pg.
257. )
McLean (I. McLean "Mechanisms for Democracy". In D. Held &
C. Pollit "New Forms of Democracy". Sage 1989, pp. 135-
157.) points out that
both Rousseau and J. S. Hill saw
participation as good in
itself••••Participation it is said
broadens the mind. It makes you see the
other person's point of view. (pg. 142)
There are several important points which come from
this:
a) by pointing out that the skills participation involves
the affective and not·only cognitive elements, reinforces
our view that successfully introducing participation,
especially at the strategic level, involves more than
simplY acquiring technical skills - learning how to read a
balance sheet or a cash flow forecast. The fact is that the
participators (whoever they may be) must feel able to
participate on something which at least resembles equality.
Gardell (B. Gardell "Worker Participation and Autonomy". In
C. Crouch and F. Heller (eds.) "Organizational Democracy
and Political prochesses
f
"· John ,Wiley and Sons, 1983, pp.
353-387.) argues t at or part~cipation to sUcceed it is
necessary for workers to have1) self confidence, by which he means
you feel confident about yourself, you
know what you want; you feel you are
able to do thinq for yourself; you feel
that you are not inferior to people
hiqher up in the orqanization (pq. 374)
2) good interpersonal relations with
other workers (see pg. 371)
3) a sense of responsibility by all the
workers in a group. (see pg. 371)
4) appropriate identity - for instance
of competence in relation to others
(see pp. 373/4).
The necessity of all of these can easily be seen from the
perspective of the Ideal Speech Thesis, since to
i) lack a sense of competence, or
ii) have poor relations with others,
will clearly obstruct the satisfaction of its criteria.At
the moment - as we have shown - this would be lacking
because of the interpretational relevances within the
Lifeworld. It would, therefore require that these change -
and this may be possible through experience of
participation. There is, however, a further difficulty.
b) At this stage, given our present evidence, we would
expect deference to Management on strategic issues. On the
other hand, given that the experience of those outwith
Management of strategic issues will be more direct, there
may be changes to the Lifeworld. These changes may be such
that deference to Management is reduced, and that the
assumptions conventionally made by Managers,in·taking these
decisions are brought out, and sUbjected to rational
criticism.
It is, for instance argued by Rus that
the whole complex of participation is
thus revealed as a self generating
process, or rather as a self-
reinforcinq process. (V. Rus" Limited
Effects of Workers' Participation and
Political Counter-Power" In T. R.
Burns, L. E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work
and Power". Sage 1979, pg. 234)Hence is Rus contending that participation can in effect be
self developing, independent of even the socio-technical
environment. A' mechanism for this to happen would indeed
through the experience of participation modifying the
Lifeworlds of employees, such that the decision-making
powers of Management became progressively sUbject to
challenge. On the other hand the development of
participation may only extend more widely than Management
the colonization of the Lifeworld by system imperatives.
Rus argues that the self-perpetuation of participation is
independent of the socio-technical system. This may well be
so. We would contend, however, that what is critical is the
ability of Management to successfully manage the firm in
its commercial environment, and thus to maintain an
appearance of competence, and in this way legitimacy. A
continuing failure to control the' firm (or the system to
take a wider, Habermasian perspective) would, we would
argue, be disastrous not only for particular Managers (or
Management teams), but for the entire organizational role
of "Manager".
We have already argued, however, that the Lifeworlds of
Managers are colonized by the System to a greater degree
than those of other employees. Another possibility is,
therefore, that the Lifeworlds of employees outwith
Management are changed, but not in a way which leads them
to be critical of Management, but rather in ways which lead
them to be less so.
In other words, the possibility is that the Lifeworlds of
those outwith Management come to be colonized in a way
similar to those of Managers•.
This kind of, problem is indicate by Gardell (B. Gardell
"Worker participation and Autonomy" in C. Crouch and F.
Heller (eds) "Organizational Democracy and Political
Processes", John Wiley 1983), who argues
the unions will soon run into the same
problems found with the German
Hitbestimmung and Yugoslavian self-
management, namely that they will be
regarded by rank and file as part of
the control system of the company with
neither the chance nor the interest of
looking after the everyday conditiona
of the members. (pg. 359)
This is what may occur when employee representatives are
co-opted or absorbed into the Board, rather than
participating in its activities and discussions.
It is argued by Baumgartner et alepast experience in industrialized
capitalist countries seems to indicate
that participation has been accompanied
more by integration than by
emancipation of workers. ( T.
Baumgartner, T. Burns, and P. DeVille
"Work Politics and Social structuring
Under capitalism". In T. R. Burns, L.
E. Karlsson & V. Rus "Work and Power".
Sage 1979, pg. 210, my emphasis.)
Cressey et ale consider a similar argument as what they
describe as "incorporationist" analysis, by Which they mean
analysis which sees
management act(ing) largely as a cypher
for market forces and that therefore
industrial democracy schemes insofar as
they only affect who takes decisions
cannot alter what decisions will in
fact be taken. This will really be
determined by the logic of the
capitalist system itself. (P. Cressey,
J • Eldridge and J. McInnes "Just
Managing". Open University Press, 1985,
pg. 162)
We would concur with cressey et al's conclusion that this
approach is not
an adequate analysis of power and
authority in the capitalist enterprise
(P. Cressey, J. Eldridge and J. McInnes
"Just Managing". Open University Press,
1985, pg. 164)
but it may not always be correct to say, as Cressey et ale
do, that it is not
a good quide to· how management or
employees actually define and pursue
their interests(P. Cressey, J. Eldridge
and J. McInnes "Just Managing"• Open
University Press, 1985, pg. 164)
It would be our contention that the kind of analysis
presented by what Cressey et ale describe as
incorporationists will not always be correct. At the same
time, however, there is the danger that through the
absorption of employees into the managerial Lifeworld, that
precisely what they suggest may come about.This points again to the need for the Lifeworlds of
Management to change too. For instance that executive
directors recognise that the role of employee directors
would be to represent the interests and aspirations of
employees in the running of the company, and that as such
they are not standard board members with functions of
primarily representing the shareholders.
Thus a different approach would have to be followed than
that described by Ramsey (H. Ramsay "Cycles of Control".
Sociology 1977, pg. 496), in that
a) participative schemes in the past have tended
to be proposed by management as a means of heading off
challenges to their authority,
b) the schemes proposed have tended to emphasise
a unitary framework for the firm. While, ultimately
the ideal speech thesis is oriented toward reaching
understanding and agreement, this would not as
unitarism does imply management dominance, but
rather the dominance of the "best argument".
Only then can they move to Chell's third stage
to find or put themselves in a position
where behaviour change is a practical
possibility. (supra)
So as long as there is domination of employees by
Management, through the vehicle of the Lifeworld, the
possibility of employee participation, especially on
strategic matters, will always be limited. Hence any
proposals for the development of industrial democracy which
is begun from the strategic level (as for instance the
Bullock proposals did in 1977) must take into account the
Lifeworld limitations which our research indicates.
For instance Dowling et ale (M. Dowling, J. Goodman, D,
Gotting, J. HYman "Employee Participation: Practice and
Attitudes in North-west Manufacturing Industry". Dept. of
Employment Research Paper No. 27, 1981) report a union
official as arguing
If we shun participation today how are
we going to get any experience of
running industry (pg. 33)
This opens up the argument that changes contingent on
participation at board level may only come in the longer
term, for instance because changes in the Lifeworld are a
long term matter... -
The importance put on practicing Managers to possess
qualities of leadership by Management authors (see for
instance C. Handy "The Age of Unreason") is suggestive of
this too, only from the Management perspective. In other
words the observation by Handy of the importance of
personal leadership qualities is a recognition that
Managers cannot continue to manage simply through
authoritative structures and commands issued on the basis
of the legitimacy of their hierarchical position. Rather
Managers must be able to secure legitimacy by, we would
argue, maintaining the image of special (and peCUliar to
them) competence we have shown in this stUdy.
543 M. Bowles "Myth, Meaning and Work Organization".
Organization studies 1989, pp.405-421. Pg. 416. Bowles
defines mythology in a way consistent with Schutz:
The second function of a living
mytho1oqy is to provide a set of ideas
which incorporates the stock of
knowledge existing at that time, which
helps to provide an image of the
universe and events experienced within
it. (pg. 408)
Hence Bowles' view of mythology is similar to the Schutzian
concept of Lifeworld, in that mythology, in the same way as
Lifeworld, provides a comprehensive set of explanations for
what goes on in our "universe". A distinction, however,
between our own view of Lifeworld and Bowles' Mythology is
that the latter does not, in our view, stress SUfficiently
the constraining qualities of Lifeworld/mythology.
544 Field's argument (R. Field "The Self FUlfilling Prophecy
Leader". Journal Of Management StUdies 1989, pp. 151-175.)
concerning Self-fulfilling prophecy in the context of
management has relevance for us here. Basically his
argument is that
1) if the Management's prophecy is negative (say
about employee participation), while the employee is
positive the consequence is a self defeating prophecy
(what Field describes as "the I'll show you effect").
2) if the manager is positive, but the employee
is negative then again there is a self defeating
prophecy (what Field describes as "the suppression
effect").3) if both are negative then there is a self-
fulfilling prophecy - what Field describes as "the
confirmed failure effect". We can see this in our own
findings, in that both sides are pessimistic about the
prospects for participation. Management are negative
on the possibilities of participation, and use the
restricted demand from employees as evidence for this.
From the perspective of self-fulfilling prophecy,
therefore, Management I s pessimistic prophecy can be
said to have produced a negative behaviour from
employees.
4) alternatively the manager may make an
optimistic and employees may be positive, thus
producing a self fulfilling prophecy which he calls
"the Pygmalion effect". (See fig. 1, pg. 153. Pygmalion
was king of cyprus, who fell in love with a statue of
a woman, and because he treated the statue as if it
were alive it became so. The live statue was called
Galatea, and she and Pygmalion had a daughter,
Metharme. )
Field considers a number of variables which may be involved
in the production of the Metharme effect (By this he means
a successful self-fulfilling prophecy - Metharme being the
daughter of Pygmalion and Galatea.) For instance he
considers the expectations which leaders have of the
members of the organization. For instance if the leader
holds strong beliefs then people are more likely to have
strong expectations about him (See page 159.). Thus in the
context of participation, Management holding expectations
that participation would work could be expected to improve
the prospects of it actually working successfully.
The extent to which leaders influence the self concept of
the organizational members is also considered by Field.
Using the work of Gergen (J. Gergen "Toward Generative
Theory". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1978,
pp. 1344-1360.) and Bandura (A. Bandura "Self Efficacy:
Toward a unifying theory of behavioural change".
Psychological Review 1977, pp. 191-215.) Field argues that
leaders could influence the self concept of members by
providing them with a positive image of their future self.
As we have shown, however, the Management view of employees
is that their role is about right now, and there is little
evidence of Management seeking to create a positive image
of participation by their employees.
On the other hand, Field argues leaders should
hold and communicate high expectations
for members and capitalize on small
positive expectancy increments (Field
supra, pg. 167.)
-....-
As we have seen, however, this does not happen. We have
indicated some of the reasons for this - not least of which
is that for Management to adopt an optimistic prophecy, and
possibly initiate a Metharme effect, would be contrary to
their Lifeworld. Likewise for the employees to respond
positively would be contrary to their Lifeworld.
545 H. Leymann "The Significance of the Learning Process
underlying Democratic Participation" Economic & Industrial
Democracy 1987, pp. 111-130
546 Elliot (J. Elliot "Conflict or Cooperation". Kogan Page
1978, pp. 120-1) draws our attention to a similar problem
when he considers the problems which arise when management
have to move from "old-style conflict relationships" to
"anything like full participation in decision-making". For
instance when Leyland moved from piecework to measured day-
work at its Cowley plant. Elliot argues that many of the
problems associated with the change were caused by a
failure to train line managers in sUfficient management
skills. We would argue, however, that in addition to the
training necessary it would be necessary for there to be
suitable Lifeworld changes. This is (albeit implicitly)
recognised by Elliot when he argues that this is an example
of
the problems that can ensue when one
tries too quickly to clamp a
·participative system on to a bargaining
system (pg. 121)
When a bargaining system is transformed to a participation,
an essential condition is that there should be dialogue
between the parties. We have argued that due to Lifeworld
structures, dialogue is at best restricted.
541 Leymann suggests three models of industrial democracy
(page 123):
a) a minimum version, where employees are able to
exercise some choice and organization of the control
mechanisms to which they are sUbject (eg working
methods, payment systems, etc.). This is similar to
what we have described as work-related participation.
b) power-sharing version where all employees,
directly or through elected representatives, influence
decisions on short and long term decisions. This is
similar to what we have described as participation on
strategic matters.
c) solidarity version where situations are
created where the participants have a learning
opportunity, changing attitudes so that mutual
problems are solved in a spirit of solidarity•for
those
a
all
This last model is the most interesting for our purpose,
since, while Leymann tends not to consider the problems
inherent in creating such a learning process, it is clear
that such learning - to induce changes in the Lifeworld -
are clearly necessary. For instance it may well be that the
role of Manager, and what it means for Managers and for
those outwith Management, is a primary obstacle in
attempting to create more democratic organizations, and
that a learning process changing this is necessary.
It is perhaps awareness of this - among other things which
leads the CBI to argue
The eBI rejects the Tue proposals for
compulsory union representation on
boards of directors and calls instead
for a flexible approach Which would
leave the appropriate form of
participation to employees, unions and
management in particular companies.
(Industrial Relations Review and Report
No. 124, March 1976)
The advantage of the CBI pOlicy is that it allows for a
high degree of flexibility, unlike the restrictions of the
Bullock proposals. On the other hand its disadvantage is
that it would retain control - at least initially - in the
hands of management, since arrangements would have to be
negotiated through each company.
As LeYmann argues (page 127) for democracy to develop two
conditions are necessary:
a) to change the structures of work
organizations, in order to change the environment
which we occupy, and to create dialogue directed
toward more democratic decision-making,
b) to change ourselves through exposure to
emotional learning, by creating dialogue directed
toward changing personality toward more democratic
behaviour leading to solidarity with fellow employees.
He concludes
There is an important need
competence 1earninq within all
areas mentioned in the model
competence learninq open to
employees (page 127)
While whole-heartedly endorsing this, we would argue that
it will first of all be necessary to address ourselves to
existing Lifeworlds, and to the difficUlties of "un-
learning" that, for instance- only Management are competent
to be involved in decision-making, and other obstacles
therein.548 (S. Rubenowitz, F. Norrgren, A. Tannenbaum "Some Social
Psychological Effects of Direct and Indirect Participation
in Ten Swedish companies". organization Studies, 1983, pg.
255, my emphasis)
549 A proposal to introduce a form of industrial democracy
was made by the SDP in 1985 (SDP "Democracy at Work",
1985). They argued that as well as participation at "works
council" level (corresponding to what we have described as
strategic participation) there should be a development of
"comprehensive participation•••providing for employee
participation at all levels of decision-making" (pg. 4).
This would be overseen by an Industrial Democracy Agency
whose role would be to "assess participation agreements
against guide-lines and options in a code of practice".
(pg. 4) The agency would also provide training, support and
advice on industrial democracy, and on drawing up
participation agreements, which are defined as "an
agreement among all sides of the organization on forms and
methods of participation which give employees an effective
voice in decision-making at all levels with a reasonable
period of time" (pg. 15). The practical difficulties with
this concerns what is meant by (1) effective, and (2)
reasonable time. Given our evidence of the effect of the
Lifeworld on management and those outwith management, it is
certain that (a) they will not agree, (b) that neither side
would aspire to the level of democracy implied by the Ideal
Speech Thesis. Nonetheless a standing agency, with the role
of encouraging the development of industrial democracy over
as long a period as is necessary, would seem on the basis
of our evidence to be a way forward. On the other hand,
the limits of its powers and its objectives would be
critical elements in all this. Equally, its progress would
be limited by the willingness of the parties to develop in
the direction of greater democracy, and thus by the
structures of the Lifeworld.
550 J. Habermas "Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2",
Polity 1987, pp. 318-373, esp. fig 39, pg. 320.
551 we" are not arguing that such conditions can be realised
empirically, rather we only wish to lay down the conditions
for equality. By contrasting situations and circumstances
with these conditions we can identify relative defects and
indicate whether particular conditions are more/less
democratic than others. At the same time 'there has been a
good deal of misunderstanding of this position. For
instance it has been argued by Clegg (S. Clegg
"organizational Democracy, Power and Participation" in C.
Crouch & F. Heller "Organizational Democracy and Political
Processes". John Wiley 1983) that,
'>
~qosubstantive ideals such as "non-
distorted communication" cannot
possible function in an organization
which is task-discontinuous. without a
return to small scale communities,
local technologies and energy sources
it is difficult to see how our present
mode of life can be supported other
than through complex task-
discontinuity. (pg 26)
While SUbsequent disclaiming both that task-discontinuous
organization is necessarily either functionally necessary
or morally defensible, Clegg, in our view, fundamentally
misunderstands Habermas's argument. What Habermas contends
with the Ideal Speech thesis, is not that we should return
to "small scale communities, local technologies and energy
sources", but that we should identify, through the use of
the Ideal Speech thesis as a criterion against which we can
assess empirical reality, the obstacles which make task-
discontinuous organization appear to be innevitable.
Habermas is not proposing how things should be different,
but rather is proposing conditions under which it would be
possible to consider how things could be different.
Conditions, which apply at the moment are far from
propitious for this - as Gustavsen (B. Gustavsen "Workplace
Reform and Democratic .Dialogue". Economic & Industrial
Democracy 1985, pp. 461-479) points out,
The creation of a rational dialogue
around workplace issues can be seen as
the bringing of the workers into a
democratic dialogue of which they were
never intended to be part, and at a
time when the dialogue no longer
exists. The prospects of democracy in
working life are thus far (sic) bleak
indeed. (pg. 472)
Clegg's misunderstanding is illustrated by his argument
that the conditions for ideal speech would undermine the
possibility of its existence since it would be so time
consuming (page 27). We cannot disagree that ideal speech
conditions (if they were achievable) would be very time
consuming, which would damage the efficiency of the
enterprise. It is pointed out, for instance by Williamson
(0. Williamson "The Organization of Work", Journal of
Econ~mic Behaviour and Organization 1980, pp. 5-17),
Alch1an and Demsetz (A. Alchian & H. Demsetz "Production
information costs, and economic organization". America~
Economic Review 1972, p~. 777-795), and Weiermair (K.
Weiermair "Worker Incent1ves and Worker Participation".
Journal of Management Studies 1985, pp. 547-570) that
prevailing hierarchical structures are
found efficient (Weiermair pg. 551)
~q ,Hence, it can be argued with conviction that in terms of
theoretical efficiency hierarchy is more efficient than any
other structure we currently are aware of. Thus, to move
away from hierarchy is certainly to lose technical
efficiency, as Clegg argues. Yet the purpose of ideal
speech is different from this - to allow consideration of
the hypothesis (and it is no more than that) that employees
would be willing to take the time, and reduce the economic
efficiency of their enterprise in order to take a more
rational control of their own existence. On other hand it
is argued by Cummings and Molloy (see (1» that the
introduction of participative techniques can lead to real
increases in productivity. This is supported by King and
Rodriguez who show that the degree of a manager's
participation in the development of an MIS system (for
strategic decision making) influences the perception he has
of the worth of the ~ystem, illustrated by the fact that
users who have participated in its design use the system
more often than those who did not. (See W. King & J.
Rodriguez "Participative Design of Strategic Support
Systems". Man~gement science 1981, pg. 722).
It is argued by Williamson (0. Williamson "Transaction Cost
Economics". Journal of Law and Economics 1979, pg. 233-261)
that with higher standards of education and changing social
values that maintaining management control in a traditional
hierarchy will become more difficult, and thus expensive.
Consequently participative forms, and other structures of
organization - while theoretically less efficient - may
become optimal in practical terms.
Moreover it is pointed out by McLean (I. McLean "Mechanisms
for Democracy". In D. Held & C. Pollit "New Forms of
Democracy". Sage 1989, pp. 135-157.)
opponents of direct democracy often
dismiss it with a wave of the hand. "It
can't be done. Decision-makinq would
take far too lonq. Anyhow you can't
discuss options at mass meetings". Now
IT opes possibilities that were
unsuspected only a few years ago (pg.
141)In other words, through the means of (still developing)
Information Technology, the conditions for the Ideal Speech
thesis (condemned by Clegg as a potential cause of
inefficiency) at least could be brought closer than now.
Exactly how this would work would vary from place to place,
but in so far as IT potentially makes information more
widely available, more quickly, it is a consideration which
merits consideration in removing obstacles to democracy at
work. McLean gives as an example, a workers' cooperative,
where it is proposed to distribute bonus paYments in
proportion to educational qualifications rather than length
of emploYment. This, requiring a constitutional amendment,
would have to be discussed at an AGM, which some may find
difficult to attend, and others may not be bothered to do
so. McLean argues that if enough computer terminals were
sited in the workplace, then each member of the cooperative
could register a vote on the issue with little trouble.
This would not resolve all the obstacles to achieving Ideal
Speech - but as we have argued it may well be that it is
not achievable anyway. As McLean concludes, however,
Direct democracy with such groups is in
principle feasible and new technology
makes it easier. (pg. 153)
To the extent that IT allows movement toward Ideal Speech,
therefore, it is a force for greater democracy - though not
necessarily as much as we might like.
Thus, for the practical reasons we have considered - the
practical improvements in productivity from participative
forms of organization: the possibilities inherent in IT -
Clegg's criticism of Ideal Speech, as a basis for
organization is less penetrating than it may appear to be.
552 B. Gustavsen "Workplace Reform and Democratic Dialogue".
Economic & Industrial Democracy 1985, pp. 461-479.
553 a) to create a dialogue during which there is exchange,
points and arguments moving between the participants:
b) all concerned being admitted to the dialogue:
c) everyone being active in the dialogue:
d) all participants being equal in the dialogue:
e) the experience of all participants must provisionally be
considered to be' legitimate - though may be disproved in
subsequent discourse:
f) it must be possible for everyone to develop an
understanding of the issues in question:
g) all argument~ put fo~ard are provisionally legitimate _
though may be d1sproved 1n subsequent discourse:
~'------------------h) the dialogue "should produce agreements which provide for
further investigation and action. (B. Gustavsen "Workplace
Reform and Democratic Dialogue". Economic & Industrial
Democracy 1985, pg. 474. This is similar to the argument
advanced by Wall and Lischeron (See above Wall and
Lischerson 331.)
554 B. Gustavsen "Workplace Reform and Democratic Dialogue".
Economic & Industrial Democracy 1985, pg. 475.
555 For instance Benelli et ale (G. Benelli, C. Loderer,T.
Lys "Labor participation in corporate Policy-making
Decisions:west Germany's Experience with Codetermination".
Journal of Business 1987, pp. 553-575) argue
given the heated debate typically
surrounding the issue we find little
evidence that codetermination has any
effect. This result suggests that
employees are unable or unwilling to
affect management decisions, possibly
because they lack a common objective.
(pg. 555)
Benelli argue that there is no statistically significant
tendency for "co-determined firms" in Germany to exhibit a
lesser rate of profit. They explain this by reference to an
inability to agree on wealth maximization which would be to
the benefit of employees (in the form of better working
conditions, more job security, as well as wages - all of
which would tend to depress profits), While not necessarily
disagreeing with Benelli et ale that this is happening, we
would suggest that an important mechanism for the failure
of codetermination (to have the kind of effects they imply)
is that the Lifeworlds of those involved do not allow for
this - as with the Lifeworlds of our SUbjects.
556 It will require changes to the Lifeworld before we would
be able to claim that there is
effective participation (which)' means
the ability of the representative to
affect managerial decisions to
influence and jointly control the
decision outcome. (E. Chell "Political
Perspective and Worker Participation".'
C. Crouch & F. Heller "Organizational
Democracy and Political Processes".
John wiley 1983, pg. 503).
other than that we would argue that effective participation
can be achieved other than through representative systems,
and that direct systems are possible as well, we would
concur with Chell's argument.•
557 Our argument that employees outwith management lack
experience of management issues - is supported by storey
who shows that while 54% of establishments had formal
agreement to negotiate on speed of work, 66% on manning
levels, 63% on discipline, 58% on job content, only 6% had
an agreement to negotiate on investment policy. (See storey
J. "The Challenge to Management Control" Kogan Page 1980.
pg 129 table 6.1). Storey concludes that
The daily fracas seems to lack a
consistent pattern. It is difficult to
interpret it as a concerted attack upon
management prerogative. Indeed as our
results show, there are a number of key
strategic areas of management
decisions, such as investment, pricing
and type of product, which have only
been rarely challneged (storey J. "The
Challenge to Management Control" Kogan
Page 1980, pg 173).
558 This point is well described by Fox who argues
Management was saying in effect:
"contribute your constructive
proposals, offer your opinions, advance
your jUdgements - and then trust us to
fashion the best policies in the
interests of the company and all its
members". But this was precisely what
the rank and file felt unable to do.
(A. Fox "Man Mismanagement (2nd
Edition] 1985, pg. 117)
We might be somewhat less negative than Fox about the level
of difficulty that the "rank and file" would have in
trusting management. There is, however, a clear difficulty
in that our results suggest that on the one hand - as Fox
argues - management are trying to secure the trust of their
employees, and that the employees do see management as the
group with the skills to "fashion the best policies", but
the problem remains of the conditions on which employees
will put their trust in management to do this in "the
interests of the company and 9.l.l its members".
5~ Elliot (J. Elliot "Conflict or Cooperation". Kogan Page
1978) argues that
union officials might gain a different
response if they went out and explained
to their members that they had within
their grasp the potential to take part
in key decision-making that would
affect their livelihoods in the future.
(pg. 289)Accepting this, we would have to ask why this has not yet
happened. We would argue that the reasons are to be located
in the structures of the Lifeworld, but Elliot - on the
previous page - indicates a similar conclusion when he
suggests that
any advocate of a worker director
system will have to admit that such a
move is something of a leap in the
dark, especially since the result will,
if it is successful, mean a radical
change in industrial society. (pg. 288)
In other words the rank and file have not followed their
leaders toward participation and democracy precisely
because it is, as Elliot suggests "something of a leap in
the dark".
5~ See above Gustavsen
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ITable Bj.,
How well informed does the company keep you about Safety matters?
Management Staff Union Hourly Paid Shop - Reps.- Stewards
Very Well 14 (44%) .19 (27%) 0 10 (21%) 4 (24%)
Quite Well 18 (56%) 40 (56%) 2 (29%) 18 (38%) 10 (59%)
Quite Badly 0 8 (11%) 3 (43%) 11 (23%) 2 (12%)
Very Badly 0 4 (6%) 2 (29%) 9 (19%) 1 (6%)
From this table it can be easily seen that while Management and Staff
have clear majorities who are at least "quite well informed" (100%
and 83% respectively) the majority for Hourly-Paid is., much
less, being only 59% who felt at least "quite well informed".
This data was collected in 1977, only 2 years, after lithe Health and
Safety at Work Act (1974)" began to come into effect, so it could be argued
that the Firm have not yet had time to organise properly in this
respect - though with the appointment of 2 Safety Managers and the
creation of a Safety Committee which (certainlY),meets weekly and is
(or so we are told by those members of it) extremely, vigorous, it may
appear to be doing so. There is, however, a major reservation in our
minds as to the relative importance of Safety in the Firm since
(A) it is, clear to anyone that safety legislation is being blatantly
ignored by, for instance, Hourly-Paid failure to wear eye protection.
At the same time the eye protection is extremely uncomfortable to wear,
since after a brief period of even mild exertion they steam up. The Firm,
however, has made no attempt to introduce an alternative, to our knowledge.
(B) As we mentioned in Chapter 3 the product is extremely heavy
(approximately at least 80 tons), but the Firm has developed the
unfortunate habit of dropping them - once during our field work, and
once, we believe, since then. The first occasion was put down to a
defective sling, but it eventually transpired that the crane used was
3 IT..
inadequate for the weight. That it took an accident in which that no
one was killed was due only to chance, does in our view, indicate,
that while Safety may be important it is not important enough.
Given the awareness of this which exists on the Shop-floor, the
grudging acceptance by the Hourly-Paid and their Shop Stewards becomes
rather less surprising than it may otherwise have been. This attitude
may be reinforced by a dominant Management view (particularly amongst
those directly involved with production) that "everyone is their own
Safety Manager" - in other words everyone ought to look after them-
selves, which was the very attitude of mind which the 'Health and
Safety at Work Act' was supposed to replace. It has much greater emphasis
on the role of the employer, as well as the employee, in maintaining
safety in the place of work.
We should not like to give the impression, however, of a factory which
was a death-trap - rather that the relative emphasis on different
activities varied throughout the Firm, something which was not always
to its benefit. Given the legislation which we have referred to we
should perhaps expect employees to be confident of the information
they receive on Safety. This, however, is not so, as in the 'Hourly-
Paid', 'Shop Steward' and 'Staff Union Rep.' categories, 33%,41% and
42% either do not receive any information on Safety (which.is in fact
illegal~) or do not place a lot of trust in it•llo..._
Table I'i 3.1
How far do you trust the information you receive on'Safety?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 15 (47%) 30 (42%) 0 13 (27%) 2 (12%)
Quite a Lot 17 (53%) 37 (52%) 4 (57%) 19 (40%) 8 (47%)
Not a Lot 0 3 (4%) 1 (14%) 10 (21%) 5 (29%)
Not at All 0 1 (1%) 1 (14%) 4 (8%) 1 (6%)
No Information 0 0 1 (14%) 2 (4%) 1 (6%) Received
On this item of information therefore while the majority of employees
do express satisfaction with what they receive from the Firm, there are
a number who c& not. This number is sufficiently large to show that the
Firm is doing this on the theory perhaps it ought to.
(2) Information on the availability of Overtime. This item with the
next 3 items we shall discuss - Pay, Recruitment and Redundancy - are
items' which unions, by virtue of the development of collective bargain-
ing are able' to exercise a good deal of influence, either directly,
or indi rectly.
Information on overtime has different relevance for the Manager and
for the employee. In the case of the employee he wishes to know how much
overtime he can expect in a week as socn as possible, in order that he can
prepare for it (e.g. make the appropriate domestic arrangements) •
In the case of t~e r~anager he wishes this information to maintain his
relationship with his own subordinates, as well as to be able to make
appropriate arrangements for the work to be done. At the same time
the trade unions in the Firm exercised influence in this respect by
trying to ensure the 'normal' amount of overtime for the purpose of,.
maintaining their members' pay. The part played by the Unions in this
respect should be kept in mind in considering this data.
Table It]. 3
How well informed does the Company keep you about Overtime available?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 9 (28%) 15 (21%) 1 (14%) 21 (44%) 6 (35%)
Quite Well 7 (22%) 16 (23%) 3 (43%) 18 (38%) 7 (41%)
Quite Badly 0 6 (9%) 0 5 (10%) 2 (12%)
Very Badly 1 (3%) 6 (9%) 1 (14%) 4 (8%) 2 (12~)
Not Relevant 15 (47%) 28 (39%) 2 (29%) 0 0
The least satisfied category on this item were the Shop Stewards, who
if a problem arose on overtime, had to sort it out with the Foreman.
~ho~ Stewards felt they should be more closely involved
e.g. to ensure it was shared out fairly and that no one was discrim-
inated against. Other than that no category reported more than 18%
(Staff and Hourly-Paid) were badly informed to some> degree or another.
This ;s much lower than was true for the figures on Safety. Much the
same holds true on how much the information is trusted.Table A3, 4·
Staff Management
How far do you trust the information on Overtime which you receive?
Union d Shop
Reps. Hourly-Pai ....Stewards ..' .
19 (40%) 7 (41%) Completely 13 (41%) 22 (31%) 3 (43%)
Quite a Lot 3 (9%) 13 (18%) 2 (29%) 20 (41%) 7 (41%)
Not a Lot 1 (3%) 5 (7%) a 7 (15%) 2 (12%)
Not at All a 2 (3%) a 1 (2%) a
No Info. a 1 (1%) a 1 (2%) 1 (6%)
Received
Not Relevant 15 (47%) 28 (39%) 2 (29%) a a
Once again we find that those expressing sentiments amqng the Hourly-
Paid and their Shop Stewards have been halved on' the levels which we
found held true of information on Safety.
(~) Information on Redundancy. This was rather a difficult item as
there was no respondent who had been made redundant by the Firm in
the past~ or who had been with the Firm when there had been a
. redundancy, or could even remember th~re having been one, though
there has been one since we finished our research work. '~Jo r~solve
this problem we employed events of the previous year when tQere had
.been rumours and warnings of redundancy if business did not improve.
,
Fortunately business did improve and the threats were never carried
out. Respondents, therefore, employed the Firm's behaviour at this
time. In general, it can be seen from what follows, that it behaved
fairly well in this respect.
,~l-------------Table A-1"5"
How well informed does the Firm keep you about Redundancy?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 21 (66%) 22 (31%) 3 (43%) 11 (23%) 6 (35%)
Qui te Well 8 (25%) 25 (35%) 2 (29%) 24 (50%) 7 (41%)
Quite Badly 2 (6%) 16 (23%) 1 (14%) 3 (6%) 2 (12%)
Very Badly 0 5 (7%) 1 (14%) 9 (19%) 2 (12%)
There are, however, still quite substantial minorities who say they
are, to some extent, badly informed about Redundancy - Staff, 30%;
Union Reps. 28%; Hourly-Paid, 25%; Shop Stewards, 24%. Thus even
though the majority of each category say they are well informed, there
are minorities of sufficient size as not to be unimportant amongst the
non-Management categories.
Similarly when respondents are asked how far they trust this inform-
atio~sizab1e, dissatisfied minorities appear.
Tab1l; it ;.~
How far do you trust the information you receive on Redundancy?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 24 (75%) 29 (41%) 3 (43%) 16 (33%) 8 (47%)
Quite a Lot 6 (19%) 21 (30%) 3 (43%) 15 (32%) 3 (18%)
Not a Lot 1 (3%) 8 (11%) 1 (14%) 6 (13%) 1 (6%)
Not at All 0 7 (10%) 0 5 (10%) 4 (24%)
No Info. 0 3 (4%) 0 5 (10%) 1 (6%) ReceivedFrom this table, it can be seen that among Staff 25% either receive
no information, or did not place a lot of trust in what they did get.
Among Hourly-Paid that figure was 33% and among Shop Stewards 36%.
Even though this data is based on events which did not actually produce
a Redundancy there are still figures indicating a system which is not
perceived as being as·efficient as it might be at communicating information
on Redundancy to its employees. In spite of the fact nothing came of
these events, the regulations on notification of impending redundancy
in the 1975 Employment Protection Act, make this data. of some concern.
These figures are more similar to those on Safety, rather than Payor
Overtime, and, therefore, given the influence which trade unions try
,
to bring to bear to prevent redundancy in other Firms, this may be
something of a surprise. On the other hand, the local union organis-
ation in the Firm regularly deals with Pay and/or Overtime problems
and is, therefore, practiced in these activities. In respect of
Safety, however, the legislation is perhaps too recent for as much
expertise as is desirable to be developed. Similarly for Redundancy -
given the recent legislation (1975), and in particular the infrequency of
Redundancy in our Firm, this particular local union organisation may
lack expertise, relative to its expertise on Pay and Overtime problems.
(.) Information on Recruitment. The final item of information we
Suggested to be heavily influenced by the Union Organisation was
Recruitment in so far as there is a Closed Shop among Hourly-Paid,
and in certain parts of Staff close to the Shop-Floor e.g. in
Production Control union membership is mandatory, but not in Finance.
The data for this is very similar to Redundancy, as the following
table shows.Table q3..:t
How well infonned does the Company keep you about Recruitment?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 21 (66%) 20 (28%) 3 (43%) 7 (15%) 4 (24%)
Quite Well 8 (25%) 24 (34%) 1 (14%) 20 (42%) 9 (53%)
Quite Badly 3 (9%) 17 (24%) 1 (14%) 9 (19%) 4 (24%) .
Very Badly 0 9 (13%) 2 (29%) 12 (25%) 0
Once again Management are much better informed than their subordinates
- 37% of Staff, 43% of Union Reps., 44% of Hourly-Paid and 24% of
Shop Stewards say that, to some extent, ,they are badly informed by the
Firm on Recruitment. This inability has its origin in failure to
infonn subordinates about newly recruited employees starting and then
just turning up'. Where there is a~post-entry closed shop (as in this
Firm) this can be extremely volatile if the new recruit is not already
a member of the appropriate union, or does not have a fully paid up
card. The A.U.E.W. Convenor, expressed annoyance quite frequently that
employees unsuitable in this respect were recruited, putting the blame
squarely on to Management for either (a) not ensuring the recruit was
a member or eligible to be a member and/or (b) not telling him to
bring his union card when he started. Both are clearly neces~ary to
work in a closed shop.
The figures do not change very much when we consider the trust placed
in the information received on Recruitment.
)14Table t:) l~~
How far do you trust the information you receive on Recruitment?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 22 (69%) 28 (39%) 1 (14%) 17 (35%) 6 (35%)
Quite a Lot 9 (29%) 24 (34%) 3 (43%) 16 (33%) 8 (47%)
Not a Lot 1 (3%) 6 (9%) 1 (14%) 7 (15%) 0
Not at All 0 4 (6%) 0 4 (8%) 1 (6%)
No Info. 0 8 (11 %) 2 (29%) 4 (8%) 2 (12%) Received
From this data it can be seen that 26% of Staff, 43% of the Union Reps.,
31% of Hourly-Paid, and 18% of Shop Stewards say they receive no
information, or do not have a lot of trust in what they do receive.
Thus even though, given trade union interest in these matters, we may
expect an adequate level of information we do not find this to be the
case, and instead find minorities who are badly informed by the Firm.
Even though the majority are well informed, these minorities are too
large to be ignored, and in our view are the first indications of a
system of communication not geared to either the needs or the
expectations of the employees of the Firm. This shall become clearer
as we consider other items of information.
(SJ Information on Work Expected by the Company. This item was
concerned with how efficiently the Firm instructed its employees and
monitored their progress, and correspondingly warned them of any in-
adequacy they may show in their work (e.g. failure to work to the
correct tolerance, failure to do what is expected in one's particular
function etc.). In general, the Firm appears to fulfill this function
rather well, but 20% of Staff, 43% of Union Reps. and 24% of ShopStewards say they are not well informed on this matter, as the following
table shows.
Table ~,.q
How well informed does the Company keep you about the Work Expected of
You? Union Shop Management Staff Hourly-Paid Reps. Stewards
Very Well 10 (31%) 17 (24%) 2 (29%) 11 (23%) 4 (24%)
Quite Well 17 (53%) 38 (54%) 2 (29%) 31 (65%) 8 (47%)
Quite Badly 5 (16%) 8 (11 %) 2 (29%) 5 (10%) 4 (24%)
Very Badly 0 6 (9%) 1 (14%) 1 (2%) 0
The problem which may arise as a result of this inadequacy is that
employees may feel unfairly disciplined and/or even dismissed, because
they have not been told their performance was not adequate. If, for
instance, this went as far as an Industrial Tribunal, such failure on
the part of the Firm may mean that the dismissal would be set aside as
unfair.
The work a Firm expects of its employees may be an area of almost
constant conflict, with the Firm demanding more of the employees than
the employee feels he can reasonably be expected to do. For this
reason when the Firm does supply this information the question of its
acceptability, and the amount of trust" placed in it, becomes very
important. The following table sets out the data from this question.Table ~ ,>}o
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 18 (56%) 24 (34%) 0 16 (33%) 4 (24%)
Quite a Lot 12 (38%) 26 (37%) 4 (57%) 27 (56%) 5 (29%)
Not a Lot 2 (6%) 12 (17%) 3 (43%) 4 (8%) 5 (29%)
Not at All 0 2 (3%) 0 1 (2%) 1 (6%)
No Info. 0 5 (7%) 0 0 1 (6%) Received
This information does seem to be acceptable to Management and to the
Hourly-Paid - though marginally less so in the latter. Among the
Staff, however, 27% either do not receive the information, or put
little trust in it. Among Staff Union Reps. 43% say do not have a
lot of trust in this information, while 41% of Shop Stewards say they
either do not receive the information, or do not have a lot of trust
in it. Given the potential for conflict in this area we should
perhaps be less surprised at the results for the union officials who
shall have wider experience of Management behaviour in this area,
and may be naturally more distrustful than those whom they represent.
The higher figure for the Staff may correspond to the less routinised
tasks which they perform, in contrast to those of, say, the Hourly-
Paid. At the same time, however, the Management too.do not perform
routinised tasks, and have at least as much freedom of action as the
Staff. Yet they do not report the problems we found among the Staff.
This, initially demonstrates a problem we shall return to subsequently
_ the bias towards keeping the higher levels of the hierarchy informed.
This, we shall argue, is symptomatic of many of the Firm's employees'
problems.(£) Information received on Orders. To keep employees informed of the
order situation of the Firm (the orders it has won, is trying to win,
and how the efficiency of the Firm is affecting this) is supposed to
be good company practice i.e. keeping the interest of the employees in
the Firm. Amongst the employees there is a perceived need to be kept
informed, largely as a result of 2 associated motivations.
(A) As an expression of their employment by the Firm i.e. they are the
employees of the Firm, which, they feel, gives them a right to be
informed about its progress.
(s) For the purposes of personal security, since if the Firm wins a
large order/large number of orders, then that means security of
employment for them.
This can be seen in ExcerptA3'.i
Thus we have work-force interested in being kept informed about this item
of information, but the final question in the quote did relate to something
which actually happened, in front of our own eyes, early on in our field
work. Alarge order had been won from abroad - yet the first the Staff
and Hourly-Paid knew about this was in their evening paper or on T.V. news
that night. The Firm, via their P.R. consultants, had informed the media
before their employees. This sort of event leaves an impression on
employees which cannot benefit their attachment to the Firm.
At the same time the Firm is in the market in which there is a good deal
of uncertainty, as negotiations to win an order can be long and arduous,
and can only be' certain when the customer has actually signed the
contract. In such a situation rumours of the type discussed above, can
easily begin. We shall consider such problems later in this chapter.
Given these problems we should perhaps be surprised that, with a few
exceptions, the Firm appears to keep its employees fairly well informed,
though once again Management do appear to be better informed than the
other categories.Table A;.n
How well informed does the Firm keep you about Orders?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 24 (75%) 33 (47%) 2 (29%) 18 (38%) 2 (12%)
Quite Well 5 (16%) 31 (44%) 4 (57%) 25 (52%) 12 (71%)
Quite Badly 3 (9%) 6 (9%) 1 (14%) 2 (4%) 3 (18%)
Very Badly 0 1 (1 %) 0 3 (6%) 0
Amongst the Management the dominant response is that they are kept
livery well II informed - this also holds true for Staff, though only just,
and to a much lesser extent than Management. In the other 3 categories
it is the next response - "quite well" informed - which is dominent,
especially among the Union Reps. and the Shop Stewards. In general
there does, therefore, seem to be a measure of satisfaction with the
Firm in this respect, though satisfaction is clearly not equally
distributed. This is, in part, due to the fact that the Firm may
negotiate over an extended period for a particular order, and during
this period rumours circulate around the Firm - "we 've got it", "no we
haven't", etc. - and given their position in the Firm Management are
kept more up to date either formally or otherwise, about the order
situation as time goes on. This is not, however, true for their subordinates
who rely on rumour (which varies with each telling) and the announcement
of an order which has actually been won. The view of the Management
concerning this problem is that very often secrecy is absolutely vital
for commercial reasons, but the view expressed by the work-force _
occasionally forcibly - was that they were at least as trustworthy as the
Board (using Sir Hugh Fraser's trial, then in progress, as an instance).
The problem'faced by employees is that while in general (not always!)
Management inform them promptly whenever an order is actually
won, in the intervening periods there is uncertainty as towhether or not the Firm is winning sufficient orders
to maintain employment. This is so even though the Firm has not had'
an enforced redundancy in 10 years. On the other hand whenever
production begins to go through for stock (A.O.'s - Advance Orders)
rather than for order, the warning signs, in their view, are there.
The problem of the Management, therefore, is to maintain commercial
secrecy, but the problem of their Staff and Hourly-Paid is to obtain
sufficient information to monitor their security. These two problems,
it may seem, are not easily simultaneously resolved, but we shall
return to this when we discuss communication within the Firm, in
general.
The data on how far the information was trusted is presented below.
Table fJ 3./t
How far do you trust the information you receive from the Company on
its order situation?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 23 (72%) 44 (62%) 3 (43%) 19 (40%) 7 (41%)
Quite a Lot 8 (25%) 21 (30%) 3 (43%) 24 (50%) 7 (41%)
Not a Lot 1 (3%) 4 (6%) 1 (14%) 5 (10%) 2 (12%)
Not at All a 2 (3%) a a a
No Info. a a a a 1 (6%) Received
While this information,does appear to be trusted, it is apparent, once
again, that the highest levels of trust are expressed by the Management.
,
The difference in level of satisfaction is, however, less pronounced
than in the previous table. This distinction may be due to theoccasional 'accident' when employees are only informed about an order,
on T.V. or in a newspaper, and not by the Firm. In certain cases the
view was put forward that when the Firm did volunteer information on
the order situation in general, and not just that another order had
been won, it was only when times were bad, and that this type of
information was purely manipulative on the part of the Management. At
the more basic level, when the Firm won an order it was more difficult
to be manipulative as all departments ultimately knew how much of
current production was for stock, and how much of it was for orders.
If the Management did not announce an order it would quickly be known
from the order numbers going through production that something was
being held back - or else the 'grape-vine' would become that much more
strident. In respect of information on orders being sought Management
were much less forthcoming, except when times, were bad, as we have
said. Hence the information which was usually received could be fairly
easily checked up on. The regular information, however, was not and
the justification of this (and in other areas) and reactions by the
employees, shall be discussed below.
el) Promotion.
A ~ngst the Hourly-Paid there is a less well developed sense of career
than was true for the Staff and Management. The latter in particular
have positive expectations of career opportunity. We will also show that
the system of promotion was not regarded as altogether fair. Afairly
typical response was that promotions "just sort of appeared" and that
it was "who you knew, not what you knew" that counted. Furthermore,
it was felt that if you did a job particularly well you would never be
promoted, because the Firm did not want to take you from that job. Theformer responses are particularly important concerning information on
Promotions. This would take the form of internal advertising of
vacancies, but the complaints that (1) the person was already selected,
or (2) that the notice was too late in being put up or not on all .
notice-boards, were heard. This is reflected in the following table•.
Table ,q, ./~
How well informed does the Firm keep you about Promotion?
Manifgement Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 8 (25%) 19 (27%) 1 (14%) 16 (33%) 3 (18%)
Quite Well 8 (25%) 19 (27%) 2 (29%) 17 (35%) 10 (59%)
Quite Badly 11 (34%) 19 (27%) 2 (29%) 6 (13%) 2 (12%)
Very Badly 3 (9%) 13 (18%) 2 (29%) 7 (15%) 2 (12%)
Amongst Management and Staff who.are more. Icar-eer orientedlwe find 43%
of Management, 45% of Staff and 58% of Union Reps. to be, to some
extent, badly informed about this item, whilst even among those cate-
gories who are . less career oriented - Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards
_ 28% and 24% respectively are likewise badly informed. (see Chapter VI)
In respect of,trusting this information the data is, for the Firm,
rather better.Table ~"3,14
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 16 (50%) 26 (37%) 1 (14%) 17 (35%) 5 (29%)
Quite a lot 9 (28%) 17 (24%) -2 (29%) 18 (38%) 8 (47%)
Not a lot 4 (13%) 12 (17%) 2 (29%) 4 (8%) 3 (18%)
Not' at All 1 (3%) "2 (3%) 0 5 (10%) 0
No Info. 0 13 (18%) 2 (29%) 2 (4%) 1 (6%) Received
Among the Management this table, taken with the previous table, shows
that if the information is received it is trustworthy, and that the
problem is not that the information is inaccurate, but that it is not
communicated efficiently. This tendency is less pronounced within the
other categories. Amongst Staff 38% either do not place much trust
in the information or do not receive any. Amongst their Union Reps.
this figure is 58%. It is 22% for Hourly-Paid and 24% for the Shop
Stewards. Hence there are those whom, as we suggested, regard the
system of promotion as rather less than it ought to be. Excerpt 4.3
illustrates one facet of this criticism.
This informant clearly regardS his chances of promotion as very
remote, not because of his lack of competence - but indeed for the
reverse - because he is too good at what he does already, and, in his
view the system is 'operated' to keep him there e.g. by declaring him
medically unfit, or by~~mploying strategies he confesses not to under-
stand. Excerpt A ~~~ again from the Staff, is more detached
in his criticism of the promotion system in the Company.The informant in Excerpt~3~i while having a critical attitude -
"it's who you know that matters a great deal in here" - but at the
same time can still see the system is fair, if those in charge
want to make it fair. The respondents we have considered up to
now regard the system as fundamentally unfair and distorted,
incapable, as it stands, of anything else. This informant believes
it to be basically sound, if it was operated properly i.e. as the
Director stated it was operated. in ExcerptA~.4· .
The informants - the majority - who believe they are kept well
informed and trust the information - for them the system of promotion
- or at least the communication of promoted posts - is adequate, and
not a charade in that certain-qualified-people are pre-excluded, or
that someone already has the job, or that the selection is basically
irrational. For the majority of respondents this was the case because
;
they had no reason to bel ieve otherwise, as Excerpt,q.3..5from an
Hourly-Paid respondent makes clear.
In this case there is no doubt that the decision is straightforwardly
one for lithe men at the top". There is no criticism here in this view,
because "it's up to them who they accept for the job, who's got the
capabilities to do the job and the experience". We shall consider
this more carefully in the next Chapter, on Decision-making, and
in particular who decides on Promotion, but in this section we have
shown both that certain respondents uncritically accept the Promotion
system, while others regard it as intrinsically unfair. We cannot,
however, consider this fully till that Chapter.
-------(9) Transfers. This item refers to moving employees to different
parts of the factory. Usually this concerns the Hourly-Paid since
the Shop-Floor is divided into 'Bays' (see Chapter lIn and a Fitter,
for instance, may be moved between Bay 1 (Final Assembly), Bay 5
(Pipe Shop) or Bay 12 (Test). It does, however, affect certain
categories of Staff e.g. a secretary could be moved to any office
(though only older, tougher, less attractive ones were placed in
offices which meant going through the Shop-Flo?r).
The data we obtained on this is as follows:Table ,q,.;~
How well informed does the Firm keep you about Transfers?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 16 (50%) 15 (21%) 0 3 (6%) 3 (18%)
Quite Well 13 (41%) 27 (38%) 2 (29%) 14 (29%) 6 (35%)
Quite Badly 2 (6%) 21 (30%) 2 (29%) 11 (23%) 4 (24%)
Very Badly 1 (3%) 8 (11%) 3 (43%) 14 (29%) 2 (12%)
Once again it can be seen that the Management are kept better informed
than the other categories. Among Staff 41% are badly informed, among
Union Reps. 72. say they are badly informed, among the Hourly-Paid 52%
say they are badly informed, and 36% of Shop Stewards.
Insofar as the information received is trusted the position does appear
to be a little better, as the following table shows.
Table 11 3.'"
How far do you trust the information on Transfers?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 25 (78%) 34 (48%) 0 10 (21%) 0
Quite a Lot 6 (19%) 20 (28%) 2 (29%) 14 (29%) 2 (29%)
Not a Lot 1 (3%) 8 (ll';) 3 (43%) 4 (8%) 3 (43%)
Not at All 0 1 (1 %) 0 7 (15%) 0
No Info. 0 8 (ll%) 2 (29%) 7 (15%) 2 (29%) Received
While there is an improvement on the previous table, still 23% of
Staff,- 72% of Union Reps., 38% of Hourly-Paid and 72% of Shop Stewards
say they are either not informed about transferring employees, or theydo not place much trust in the information. Why should this be?
Among the Hourly-Paid. as we said. an employee can be moved from one
bay to another. as ExcerptA3.bshows. The most important point in '
••• • • .. to
this is'that such a change can take place suddenly. without warning
to the employee. In the case of this informant his objection to this
is that he is moved away from the particular crane whose operation he
knows. to one with which he has less experience. This individual will
be a member of the G.M.W.U. who have a flexibility agreement with the
Firm, so that the labourers in the Firm are at greater risk than others,
whose unions do not have this agreement.
'. ..
Excerpt Il}.~ from a skilled Hourly-Paid informant goes into how this
may be resisted. In this case the strategy is clearly to visit, with
a good chance of success, given the effect of the A.U.E.W. (the
informant's union) in resisting such action by the Firm. How such
a decision is taken will be for the next Chapter, but the point has
been made here that communication of such information is not adequate
(see the previous two tables on this) and that such changes may be,
in certain circumstances, unwanted by the person who is shifted, but
that there can be resistince, successfully supported by the relevant union•
t'
elf) Information on Work Study.
,.
."
. ' '.,
Many respondents in the sample had no contact at all with Work Study,
since they were not themselves subject to its operation, or this
function was totally divorced from it•. Those who 'took this view are
excluded from the following table.Table fl3. 1-=1
How well informed does the Company keep you about Work Study?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid . Shop
Reps. Stewards
Very Well 7 (23%) 3 (10%) 0 4 (10%) 1 (9%)
Quite Well 9 (29%) 10 (33%) 1 (33%) 16 (39%) 2 (18%)
Quite Badly 12 (39%) 10 (33%) 1 (33%) 13 (32%) 7 (64%)
Very Badly 3 (10%) 7 (23%) 1 (33%) 8 (20%) 1 (9%)
While the distribution of responses reveals marginally less dissatis-
faction, especially among the Hourly-Paid, and Shop Stewards, we must
also note the, relatively high, level of dissatisfaction expressed by
the Management, where 49% say they are either 'Quite/Very Badly
Informed'. Even in the departments in which Work Study was particularly
relevant the position is very similar e.g. 50% in Works say they are
either 'Quite/Very Badly' informed, similarly 50% of Quality Control,
and 44% of the Board of Directors say they are 'Quite Badly' informed.
Huw Beynon in 'Working for Ford' refers to the cartoon from the
'Solidarity' pamphlet, 'What Happened at Fords' in which a worker is
being asked by a Policeman whether the Work Study engineer, lying
dead with the knife in his back "had the deadman any enemies? ~hile we can
regard this as a joke, it does indicate fairly forcibly the level of
conflict associated with work study as a function within a firm. For
instance, in our Firm we found an expectation amongst Staff in,this
section, much mor-e strongly pronounced than in other sections, that
their Manager would always back them up against others (e.g. Shop
Stewards) - even though he may later criticise them in private. There
was also an acceptance of the dislike which the function aroused e.g.
previous friends walking by without speaking, but "If they don't likeme, and walk by me, then that is a reflection on how good a job I'm
doing. Many Shop Stewards, and Hourly-Paid confirmed the view in
Excerpt A.lS from an Hourly-Paid informant which is typical and
informative.
The most striking point of this is the way in which Work Study is
itself effectively dehumanised e.g. the reference to the computer
(which is not in fact used), and, related to this, the view that once
Work Study have come to a decision it is, at best, very difficult to
get anything done. Certainly a great deal of time is spent
challenging Work Study e.g. in a casual conversation a Shop Steward
reckoned to spend 6U% of the time he put in as a Shop Steward fighting
Work Study. The final sentence of the previous respondent makes clear,
however, the attrition aspect of this struggle. This, contrasting with
the self-contained attitude of the Work Study Staff, lends support to
our view that this inability to communicate is related to the high
level of conflict which this. function attracts, and that on this
occasion we are not concerned only with the (what we have found to be)
normal failure to communicate on the part of the Firm, but is instead
related to the rather peculiar position of the particular function.
The Work Study department in our view had adopted a sort of
mentality in which no more information than necessary should be given
away - a view which applies not only to the Hourly-Paid, but to the
Management as well. This mentality extends quite logically from the
way in which the function is carried out, i.e. the unspeaking technician
with stop-watch in hand. The following table reinforces this view, bythe numbers who say they receive no information, who feel they should,
and the mistrust expressed by the Shop Stewards.
Table P~.J5
How far do you trust the information you receive on Work Study?
Management Staff Union Hourly-Paid Shop
Reps. Stewards
Completely 11 (35%) 7 (23%) 0 10 (24%) 0
Quite a Lot 9 (29%) 8 (27%) 1 (33%) 13 (32%) 2 (18%)
Not a Lot 7 (23%) 7 (23%) 0 10 '(24%) 5 (45%)
Not at All 2 (6%) 2 (7%) 0 1 (2%) 3 (27%)
No Info. 2 (6%) 6 (20%) 2 (66%) 7 (17%) 1 (9%) Received
This is the view we would expect of information from a department which
has cut many ties with the Firm at a social level e.g. while an
informant from this area expressed the view that while he would not
like it if he could not have a word with other Staff and manual workers .
because of his job, then he would regret it - but if that was how it
was •••• We indicated above that certain departments which one would
expect to have good communications with Work Study because of inter-
locki.ng functions, were, in fact, badly informed. Asimilar result
holds good when we asked how far they trusted it - 36% of Works trusted
it either 'Not a Lot'J'Not at All': similarly 33% of the Board: in
Production Control 33% said they did not trust information from Work
Study a lot, and 22% said they received no information at all.
;-4 0As we have made clear already, this is a Firm where the average worker
is highly skilled. In addition, as we saw in the previous Chapter,
."
a significant proportion had been employed by the Firm for a considerable
number of years. Because of this there was a noticeable craft
tradition in the Firm - the workers were noticeably pro~d of this
status as craftsmen. There was, therefore, a good deal of internalised,
personal emphasis on maintaining work standards, as part of the
maintenance of craft tradition.
At the same time there were external forces, from the Firm itself which'
attempted to exert control over work standards in the Firm. In
particular there were separate Managers and separate Depts. for -
Inspection, Quality Contr.o,l, Production Control and Work, S.tudy (this
, .
last one we saw in the previous Chapter to be somewhat deficient in its
Icommunication with other parts of the Firm).
Hence there was clearly an emphasis on Standard of Work from the different
functions present in the structure of the Organisation.
There were, therefore, two forces operating to maintain the standard
of work within the Company_
(1) the interna1isation of craft norms by the skilled manual workers
(2) the external motivation from the various relevant depts in the
Firm.
Arelevant question which arises at this point is the effect each of
these has on the other? In particular whether the latter has offended
against the form~r - or whether the former is so strong that the latter
has been an irrelevancy. Perhaps paradoxically we shall see that both
are true.
Work Pace has been introduced here because while recognising that each
is distinct in principle - hence asking the questions separately - they
are'crucia11y inter-related, in that if work pace in increased (i.e. time
for a job is not) then work standards become, at least, more difficult
to maintain. The above considerations, on Work Standards, therefore
apply here as well. There is, however, an added importance to the role
of work Study in looking at Work Pace - because of their role in
setting times for jobs for manual workers. As we saw in the previous
Chapter, manual workers did experience quite severe difficulties here
. -
(See, for instance, Excerpt A3.g).
It may well appear from this discussion that what we have had to 'sayis only concerned with Management and Hourly-Paid - that there is
nothing to say about the Staff role in these respects. As we shall
see, however, this is not true. Staff are nO'.less concerned than
Hourly-Paid with maintaining the standard of their work, and with
having sufficient time to do it in.
Management
If we look first of all at Work Standards on TabletJ-3,lfi, then it is'
clear that Management see themselves as being in control of ~his, with
the other categories playing a secondary role. So far as the Staff
and Hourly-Paid roles are concerned, this is a position which they
would like to persist. The role of the Foreman would, however,
ideally be increased, according to the 'ideal' Management perception.
The r(~le of Management in setting Work Standards would, however,
remain dominant.
If Wt1 look at Work Pace on tableA3.24 this we can see a much lasser
level of management control. In their perception of the existing
situation control is equally divided between themselves and the Hourly-
Paid. Foremen are seen as having slightly less influence than either
of these 2 categories - and Staff as having much less. Going on to
examine how they would like to be ideally distributed then the situation
changes. Management would become the dominant category - thoogh now
with the Foremen havin~ just slightly less. In this ideal distri-
bution of control over Work Pace, Hourly-Paid would have rather less
influence than either Management or Foremen, having only slightly more
influence than Staff, whose influence would be much increased.
Clearly, therefore, Management are 'fairly satisfied'with the positionWork Standards
.. . .' . - ..
~q''Management
..... .. .. .. .
Management 'Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
A Great 21/23 5/7 11/17 ' 7/7
Deal 66%/72% 16%/22% ' 34%/53% 22%/22%
So'ne . 8/9 2~/23 19/15 17/25
25%/28% 66%/72% 59%/47% 53%/78%
Very 3/0 6/0 2/0 8/0
Little 9%/0% 19%/6% '6%/0% 25%JO%
None 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
0%/0% ' 0%/0% 0%,/0% ' 0%/0%
Table A ..3-2:0,Staff
,. , .. ...
'Management 'Staff Foremen Hour1y':'Paid
A Great 36/49 15/28 22/32 10/19
Deal 51%/69% 21%/39% 31%/45% 14%/27%
Some 27/19 43/38 . 38/35 31/3:3
38%/27% 61%/54% 54%/49% 44%/54%
Vf~ry 7/3 11/4 10/3 23/11
Little 10%/4% 16%/6% 14%/4% ·32%/16%
None 1/0 1/1 0/1 6/3
1%/0% 1%/1% 0%1% 9%/4%
TableA3.~1 Staff Union Reps
Management Staff Foremen 'Hour1y':'Paid
AGreat 5/4 1/4 2/4 113
Deal 71%/57% 14%/57% 29%/57% 14%/43%
Some 2/3 5/3 3/3 3/4
29%/43% 71%/43% 43%/43% 43%/57%
Very 0/0 1/0 2/0 3/0
Little 0%/0% 14%/0% 29%/0% 43%/0%
None 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
0%/0% 0%/0% 0%/0% 0%/0%Table A:3.~ Hourly~Paid
... , .. ...... , ,
Management ,', Staff 'Foremen ' 'HourlY-Paid
AGreat 32/32 17/17 19/19 , 14/23
Deal 67%/67% ' 35%/35% '40%,/40% ' 29%/48%
Some 12/13 22/25 25/27 20/20
25%/27% 46%/52% 52%/56% 42%/42%
Very 4/3 7/3 ' 3/0 8/4
Little 8%/6% 15%/6% '6%/0% 17%/8%
None 0/0 1/0 1/2 6/1
0%/0% '2%/0% '2%/4% 13%/2%
, .
Table 42"~" 'Shop' Stewards
" , . '
'Management ' 'Staff 'Foremen .. Hourly~Paid
AGreat 13/10 2/3 4/6 4/8
Deal 77%/59% 12%/18% 24%/35% 24%/47%
Some 4/7 9/10 9/10 5/9
24%/41% 53%/58% 53%/58% 29%/53%
Very 0/0 3/1 3/0 6/0
Little 0%/0% 18%/6% 18%/0% 35%/0%
None 0/0 3/3 1/1 2/0
0%/0% 18%/18% 6%/6% 12%/0%Work' Pace
Tab1eJj;.1,' ,Staff,
Management ' 'Staff
Very 5/0 16/1
Little 7%/0% 23%/1%
None % 2/1
0%/0% 3%/1%
Tab1ea~ ..15Q Staff Union' Reps
Management Staff
AGreat
Deal
Some
Very
Little
None
AGreat
Deal
Some
AGreatJ
Deal
Some
Very
Little
None
'Management
15/25
47%/78%
16/7
50%/22%
1/0
3%/0%
0/0
0%/0%
39/58
55%/82%
27/13
'38%/18%
4/3
57%/43%
2/3
29%/43%
1/0
14%/0%
0/1
0%/14%
'Staff
, 3/15
9%/47%
24/17
, 75%/53%
5/0
16%/0%
0/0
0%/0%
21/35
30%/49%
, 32/34
45%/48%
2/3
29%/43%
3/3
43%/43%
1/0
14%/0%
1/1
14%/14%
Foremen
12/24
38%/75%
19/8
59%/25%
1/0
3%/0%
0/0
,'0%/0%
'Foremen
24/45
34%/63%
40/25
56%/35%
7/0
10%/0%
0/1
0%/1%
Foremen
2/4
29%/57%
5/2
71%/29%
0/1
0%/14%
0/.0
0%/0%
hourly,;,paid
15/18
47%/56%
16/14
50%/44%
l/O
'3%/0%
, 0/0
'0%/0%
'Hourly-Paid
27/34
38%/48%
31/32
44%/45%
12/3
17%/4%
1/2
1%/3%
Hourly-Paid
4/3
57%/43%
2/4
29%/57%
1/0
14%/0%
0/0
0%/0%Table' A;.UiHour1y-Paid
... . ......
Management Staff Foremen ' 'Hour1y';'Paid ._-
A Great 39/40 . 22/27 24/29 18/28
Deal 81%/83% 46%/56% 50%/60% . 38%/58%
Some 8/8 20/17 17/18 16/18
17%/17% . 42%/35% ' 35%/38% ' 33%/38%
Very 1/0 6/2 ' 7/1 11/0
Little '2%/0% '13%.'4% 15%/2% 23%/
None 0/0 0/2 ' 0/0 3/2
, 0%/0% '0%/4% 0%/0% 6%/4%
Table ~'.~1r 5hop'Steward!
..
'Management· ' .Staff .Foremen 'Hour1y';'Paid
A Great 11/12 3/3 5/7 5/11
Deal 65%/71% 18%/18% 29%/41% 29%/65%
Some 5/4 9/9 8/9 7/6
29%/24% 53%/53% 47%/53% 42%/35%
Very 1/1 4/3 4/1 2/0
Little 6%/6% 24%/18% 24%/6% 12%/0%
None 0/0 1/2 0/0 3/0
0%/0% 6%/12% 0%/0% 18%/0%vis-a-vis Work Standards - though Foremen would ideally playa
greater role - but in relation to Work Pace it is clear that Hour1y-
Paid are seen as having too 'much influence and that control should be
restored to Management, aided by the Foreman and'to a lesser extent
Staff. Th~s, how~ver, should not be taken to mean that Hourly-Paid
would have no role to play - rather that their role in setting Work
Stand~trds and control of Work Pace would be subject to Management
control finally. This rather subtle position is discussed in Excerpt
A-J ..GJ in which this problem is discussed with a Board member.
Virtually from the outset he makes clear their reliance on the nature
expertise of their employees. "I think we sometimes take quite a
lot for granted. I mean if one was setting up attempting to build a
(company product) ••••••••in the middle of agricultural 1and~••••••••••••
you'ld find there was an awful lot of trade skills, manipulative
skills that one takes for granted, one would need to expensively set
out to train". Inunediate1y after this, however, the argument changes
direction - "fundamental manufacturing -tactics ,strategy and
investment, then this is done at rather higher levels" i.e. the skill
of the manual worker/Staff employee is assumed - but he must be told
how to use it, he must be controlled. Hence the introduction of Work -
Study , which was introduced about 1971-72 (though because of union
resistance it has never been introduced into their Fabrication plant),
with the objective~ as the respondent makes clear "of control ••••••••••
of incentive". Once again, however, the argu l!lTIent moves in another
direction "the people that are so well motivated and they equate
their well-being in the Company to such a degree that one gets a
reasonable output for a reasonable salary" Le. because the employees
can identify their own future with that of the Company, then they can
be trusted to work effective1yl Or can they? Later on we see "ButI think it is important that we do have accurate standards. So that
we can control the business, recognise the business and recognise
difficulties while there is still time to do something about it".
Hence the rule seems to be, to recognise the loyalty of company
employees to secure decent work standards, and times for jobs - but
that this has to be subject to ultimate managerial control. In the
final analysis th~ work in the Company - with respect to standards
and pace - either has to be acceptable to Management, or to be controlled
by them. Thi~ 1ine is nicely put by a Manager in Excerpt A3.iO
This makes clear the need to discuss with one's subordinates the
requirements on the dept. - but in the final analysis, the decision
rests with the Management of the Company.
This does not mean, however, that all Managers are content with their
position, as Excerpt A~.illrom a Manager indicates. Managers, therefore,
experience this policy - that decisions which they feel should be taken
by them are the monopoly of more senior people (eg Board Members). As
weill see, however, their subordinates - Staff and Hourly-Paid.
experience the same restriction, except that their solution can be rather
different, to expecting to be educated with taking decisions, in this
area, as the Manager clearly does.
Staff
Table ~~~iOreveals a pattern of responses among Staff which shows, as
was the case with Management, thet Management are perceived as the
dominant category in setting Work Standards. Similarly, as withManagement, the second category are "Foremen. The differences are
" "
(1) the greater influence perceived for Staff themselves, compared
to the influence they were perceived to have "by Management
(2) the lower level of influence of Hcurly-Paid employees
If we consider their 'ideal' situation, then we see that the order
of influence would not change, nor would the differentials to any
significant degree - the only difference would be to increase the total
amount of influence (i.e. all distributions would move more toward
'A Great Deal of Influence).
In relation to Work Pace, the ordering of"categories is the same -
major distinction resides in the fact that all categories are perceived
as having more influence (both actually and ideally). One should
hardly be surprised at this as it is clearly easier to exercise control
over work standards than work pace - even if only negatively by high
failure in Inspection.
The responses of Staff Union Reps are "in something of a contrast to
those of their numbers. Firstly in relation to Work Standards from
Table R3.21 • The dominant category is clearly Management for this
group - but equally clearly, they believe that this is not a situation
which should persist. The 'ideal' distribution for Management, Staff
and Foremen having equal influence. The Hourly-Paid, in their perception
ought to have less influence, but this only marginal.
From table~~2hwe can see Staff Union Reps. attitudes on Work-Pace.
They share with their members the idea of the lesser gap in influence
on this between Management and other categories, compared to Work
standards. Once again, however, as was shown in looking at Vie S _____... 24k won Work Standards, held by this category, the dominance of Management
ought to be ended and replaced by an equality of influence between
Management, Staff and Hourly-Paid, with Foremen having rather more
influence than anyone.else. As was the case with Hourly-Paid in the
context of Work Standards, however, this too is marginal.
One source of influence on Work-Pace which has been shown to be a factor
not directly controllable by even individual managers, is .the
influence of the volume of the work in hand, which is introduced in
Excerpt A-~.I2.from a Staff respondant. He shows in this Excerpt the
influence of the amount of work which has to cope with, in setting his
Work Pace. In this Excerpt the respondant indicates how. given that a
certain amount of work has to be dealt with in a certain length of time.
one's Work Pace is more or less set for you. Even Management cannot
resist this - liThe Manager always asks us".
There is. however. the question of whether this is inevitable i.e.
whether or not with better scheduling of production and work-flow
would not eradicate the kind of difficulty which includes much of
Excerpt H3.f1. .. It can be seen in ExcerptA3.l~ that there is this kind
of pro'blem - namely that because some Managers are "lax" and out-of-touch.
the work is not processed as efficiently"as it should be. because the
organisation is not as efficient as it should be. This is a problem
which he identifies as beginning with Management.
Hence we have seen 2 influences on Work Standards and Pace - the volume
of work to be dealt with. and Managr:ment inefficiency. There are.
however. others directly related to Staff themselves. In Excerpt
Itl.14· we can see that Work Standard .is continuous - "the job's got to
be done to·such-and~such a standard. and that's it". Now it is.....
important to appreciate that.he could reasonably have left the expressed
view at that, but he goes on in the Excerpt to positively endorse theJ
standard,and to express what is a job need ~o feel that the work is being
done properly i.e. that part of his job satisfaction it to attain the
work standard, which has been established independently of him Ceg by
technical requirements). This idea of maintaining standards of work
by personal commitment is control in ExcerptnJ.l~, in which the Staff
respondent makes clear his own view of personal responsibility and
commitment to getting the job done properly. For him what matters
is to get his work through as quickly as possible - but note.not just
for his own benefit, but for everybody.
In both Excerpt~3.14- andtij.lp, there is an absence of Management control -
Standard and Pace of work are independent of Management, depending on the
job to be done, and the volume of work in other case. Despite the
absence of direct Management control, the personal commitment is
obvious. Indeed, going back to ExcerptsI13.l2. and4J.l"3, where there
is Management control - it is that the inadequacy of Management that
interferes with the standard of.work which they feel personally
committed to. Management control is, therefore, resented not only as
such, but because of the damage it·does to the standard of work which
they are committed to, 'but pr~vented from achieving.
Interference may not always be perceived as coming from Manaaement.
Unionisation in the Finn is at a fairly high-level - the Shop Floor
is 100% unionised, being positively a closed shop, while among Staff
employees there are areas where the closed shop operates Ceg Production
contr.ol) - nevertheless the level of unionisationamong Staff is lower
at (a still substanti.al) 80%. 'Among the 20% non-unionised sector we
find that pace and standard of work can be seen as being influencedby the trade unions. This is seen in ExcerptAJ.lt•.
As far as this Staff respondent (who was not a union member) sees things,
Management can only operate within the constraints which the "dictates"
of the closed shop will allow. Hence a job which should be done well
cannot be, because the appropriate person cannot be employed because
he won't join the appropriate union (When we consider the union role
later, in more depth, we will see that this 'is not a typical view -
but no less interesting for that).
Hourly';'Paid
At the beginning of this ,section we pointed to a conflict, between, on
the one hand the craft tradition of highly skilled manual workers, and on
the other hand the influence of Management and Staff on Standards and
Pace of Work via Management Techniques like Quality Control, Production
Control and Work Study. The problem which appeared to us to exist was
where these two sets of forces came into conflict eg where a job was to
be done a certain way (eg on instructions from Quality Control) or in.a
certain time (eg from instructions by Work Study), such that the manual
worker was in profound disagreement (i.e. he is told to do a job in a
way he regards as inefficient, or likely to produce a.poor standard of
Work).
The situation we have described saw Management regarding themselves as in
control of Work Standards - but to a lesser degree over Work Pace where
the Hourly Paid influence is much greater.. This perception is, broadly
speaking endorsed by Staff Respondents. In relation to Work Standards
the' '.ideal'. situation for Management would be virtuaJ)y unchanged.(though For~men would play more of a role). On Work Pace, however,
Management would wish to playa much bigger role, and this would involve
Hourly Paid workers being subcrdinated to Management -.and to Foremen
in this area. Similar responses are given 'by Staff Respondents in
both areas (though the role of the Foreman is given rather less
emphasis).
Hence it wOl'ld seem for Management and Staff the main intrusion by
Hourly-Paid is not in Standtrd of Work, but in Work-Pac~, and that
ideally their influence on this would be relatively reduced. The
implication of this, obviously being that manual workers would work more
at a pace to be determibed for them by Management and Staff, rather than
at a pace they decided for themselves.
As we shall see, however, as far as Hourly-Paid are concerned, this is
a situation whichalt'eady exists - and, furthermore, that this is only
at the expense of Standard of Work.
On standard of Work, Hourly-Paid respondents, clearly regarded Management
as being the dominant category (see table43.1~ - but if we look at their
ideal situation then while every other category would retain their level
of influence, Hourly-Paid would nearly double their influence. In
consequence, while Management would still be dominant, .Hourly-Paid
respondents clearly ,wished more influence than they had, and more even
than Staff or Foremen.
Their Shop Stewards take a very similar view - namely that Management are
dominant, and should remain so. Similarly they believe that Hourly-Paid
workers should possess more influence than they do at.present - and like....
their numbers, the.Stewards take the view that this.increased influence
should take them to a greater level than other Staff. or Foremen. The
main observable difference between Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards
categories, is that the latter would reduce, in an .absolute as well as
relative sense, the influence of Management over Standard of Work.
In th'!s al~ea, therefore, there is a clear conflict between Management
and Staff on the one hand, and Hourly-Paid on the other. While the
fOI1IDer seek to exert greater influence over Hourly-Paid worker, the
latter wish the reverse (i.e. more influence rather than less, over the
standards of work in the Firm).
Avery similar situation persists in relation to Work Pace, as Table
A3.2.~ we can see that the movement in relative influence betweE'n actual
and ideal, is toward Hourly-Paid. Their desired change would be for
them to exert more influence that they do at the moment. Management would,
however, I"l:main dominant - the change would be that Hourly-Paid would
have an equality (more or less) with Staff and Foremen. This is
slightly different from the views expressed by the Shop Stewards (Table
A"~~). Here the movement again is toward greater influence by Hourly-
Paid workers - but, unlike their members, the views of the Stewards are
(1) While Management would be dominant - as for Hourly-Paid respondents -
in the ideal situation for the Stewards, their dominance over Work
Pace would be less marked.
(2) Hourly-Paid would not be equal with Staff and Foremen - they
would have a greater level of influence.
For both categories - Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards - the changes desired, by
and large, .are relative rather than absolute - they do not overturn the
35'existing structure or order of influence over either of these 2
areas. Rather they seek more influence for themselves - moving to
equality with Staff and Foremen (at leas~ among Hourly-Paid). There
is, however, no challenge to Management being dominant. It would
......
seem that any challenge is to the'conditions of this dominance.
In particular, we shall now go on to show, the problem of Work Pace
v Work Standard is a real one for Hourly-Paid workers. This is true
for the respondent in ExcerptA3.I~, who is Work Studied, i.e. he has
a time given to him for each job, and his pay will depend on whether
or not he beats that time (via bonus payments). This conflict is
stated right at the start of the Excerpt - "Who decides that? (standard
of a job)" - "Well I would say the bonus decides that".
Hence for this Respondent the conflict between a Work Pace set for
him by outsiders, and the Standard of Work, is resolved by letting the
former set the latter. In other words how good a job he does will
be determined by the time he is given - if he can't earn his bonus
by doing a good job, then he'll do it to the level which Inspection
will accept, and that's that! Even if it does mean that the job
is done less well than it might otherwise have beenl.
In Excerpt~~lg another Respondent indicates that earning bonus is not
all that easy - and that once a time is set, because it is an average
of what has been done, it is difficult to get it changed - "It must
be yourself".
His solution is to abolish Work Study altogethe~, on the grounds that
the job was 'done before Work Study was introduced, and that its effect
has been to make poorer the standard of Work done. This point is made
,59-.....
by the Respondent in Excerptn3.l~ as well ·i~e. that if there was no
Work Study there would be an 'improved quality fo work. On the other
hand, if there was no Work Study - and no times - there may be a
disciplinary problem for Foremen. If there was no bonus system, people
might evade their work - "they would have to go and dig some of the
out of cornersII. This, however, is seen as part of ,the supervisory
role - if someone isn1t doin~ hi~ work then its for the supervisor to
move him.
This may appear a rather utopian view i~e. if there were no times,
people would work away, producing higher quality, and that the Foremen
could (or should be able to) handle lithe slackers". There is, however,
a motivation besides money, which emanates directly from Work St~ndard _
craft pride. Craft pride comes out clearly in ExcerptA3 .. i<l This is
an Hourly-Paid Respondent who, as he states, is not subject to times
from Work Study. If the "disciplinary" argument for Work Study held
then one could expect it to arise in this kind of work. Indeed,
towards the end of the Excerpt, he actually does say "Well you know youZ
can be lackadaisical" - illustrating the point of Work Study and times,
bonuses, Quality Control etc. Yet craft pride surfaces almost
i0111ediately - lilts only a matter of somebody coming up and saying "well
that wasn't a very good job". In other words there is a certain
standard of work almost 'built-in' to the craftsmen.
This point is illustrated again in ExcerptA3.20, again an Hourly-Paid
respondent. For him, Work Standard, is determined by Management _
liThe Board-Room" - on the grounds that 'that's what they're there for".
At the end, howver, there is again an endorsement of the idea of craft
pride - "A good tradesman doesn't need to, he can do it himself?" - "Aye" •Hence for the Hourly-Paid we can see a view of themselves as being
craftsmen (a view Management would endorse, since as one of the
better paid firms in the area, they regard themselves as having
certainly amongst the most highly skilled men in the area), but that
this craftsmanship is inflicted by Managerial control - Work Study,
times, bonuses, Quality Control, Production Control etc. From the
Excerpts we have cited here it is clear that they believe that if these
controls were removed, and they were left to get on with their jobs in
their way, that quality would improve. That by allowing them to fully
exercise their skill (both normally and mentally) a better quality of
work would come forth. Hence we can better understand the different
relative changes shown in tables ~;.iq-H~.iJ..~.
For the Hourly-Paid worker his aim is to more fully exercise his skill
in the ways we have suggested - he perceives he can do this only by
exerting more influence himself. This, however, is not carried to the
point of selfishness - it is recognised, on the whole, (the Stewards
dissenting) that Staff and Foremen must playa role - that they have
skills to offer as well. It is, however, the position of Management
which is most interesting, as they would, in any situation, be the
dominant group.
conclusions
From this we would suggest that, as we have seen earlier in other areas,
the objective is'not to overthrow the hierarc~, but rather to amend it.
The objective is not the overthrow of Management, as they will always
be dominant. Rather the objective .is to give Hourly-paid employees
sufficient influence, that Management will be influenced by their
ideas and wishes. On the other hand Management and Stadd, whilekeeping Management dominant, would keep the Hourly-Paid in their
position of subordinate influence to Staff. Thus 'we have a conflict -
are Staff and Hourly-Paid to be equal?
This is, in many ways the manifest problem being played out now, but
the more general problem really concerns the relative ordering of the
different categories.
The hierarchy, therefore, is not under challenge~- nor is.the Management
right to take decisions fundamentally. What is at issue is the
relat~ve ordering of the parties - in particular the degree of influence
to be possessed over Management as they make their decisions. As we
have seen before, and will see again, it is this ordering of influence
which is under challenge - not the existence of an ordering. The
differential of power is held to be right - it is the degrees of
difference between the different hierarchical groupings which will be
the major sources of concern.
Recruitment - Transfers - Promotion
in this section we shall be concerned with these 3 areas. They
are being taken together because it can be argued that they have a
meaningful relationship, being inter-related by the concept of 'career'.
This has traditionally been the focus of attention only when we are
considering Management, at least some, Staff. We shall see, however,
that this is not altogether warrented, and that in particular Hourly-
paid are very much concerned with the authority to Transfer employees
between different jobs - and to a lesser extent, but more surprisingly,
with Promotion itself.Tab1ett~.~~- Recruitment - Management
Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
AGreat 27/28 0/14 5/9 2/2
Deal 84%/88% 0%/13% 16%/28% 6%/6%
Some 4/4 12/14 17/18 6/13
13%/13% 38%/44% 53%/56% 19%/41%
Very 1/0 12/8 10/5 15/9
Little 3%/0% 38%/25% 31%/16% 47%/28%
None 0/0 8/6 0/0 9/8 .
0%/0% 25%/19% 0%/0% 28%/25%
Tab1eIl3.1Q- Staff
Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
A Great 53/51 . 4/14 12/25 5/9
Deal 75%/72% 6%/20% 17%/35% 7%/13%
Some 17/20 31/38 43/37 20/33
24%/28% 44%/54% 61%/52% 28%/47%
Very 1/0 22/15 9/7 24/17
Little 1%/0% 31%/21% 13%/10% 34%/24%
None 0/0 14/4 7/2 22/12
0%/0% 20%/6% 10%/3% 31%/17%
lli.3V Staff Union Reps
Management Staff Foremen HourlY-Paid
A Great 6/3 0/3 1/3 0/2
Deal 86%/43% 0%/43% 14%/43% 0%/29%
Some 1/4 2/3 3/3 1/4
14%/57% 29%/43% 43%/43% 14%/57%
Very 0/0 4/1 2/1 3/0
Little 0%/0% 57%/14% 29%/14% 43%/0%
None 0/0 1/0 1/0 3/1
0%/0% 14%/0% 14%/0% 43%/14%Table9";.J'- Hour1y';'Paid
Management Staff Foremen 'Hour1y';'Paid
AGreat 34/34 15/15 17/15 7/12
Deal 71%/71% 31%/31% 35%/31% 15%/25%
Some 7/8 19/22 24/24 9/22
15%/17% 40%/46% 50%/50% 19%/46%
Very 4/4 9/6 5/6 14/6
Little 8%/8% 19%/13% 10%/13% 29%/13%
None 3/2 4/4 2/3 18/8
6%/4% 8%/8% 4%/6% 37%/17%
Tab1e,43.-32 - Shop Stewards
Management Staff Foremen
A Great 15/13 4/14 4/5 6/9
Deal 88%/77% 24%/24% 24%/29% 35%/53%
Some 2/4 5/6 7/8 3/7
12%/24% 29%/35% 41%/47% 18%/41%
Very 0/0 3/3 4/2 6/0
Little 0%/0% 18%/18% 24%/12% 35%/0%
None 0/0 5/4 2/2 2/1
0%/0% 29%/24% 12%/12% 12%/6%·(l)' Recruitment
Before there can be any issue about a career in a Company, one must
first be recruited - to be taken on. There, however, 2 issues in
relation to Recruitment, as well as career (a) the Closed Shop which
operates 100% a~ongst Hourly-Paid workers, and in some areas of the
Staff (e.g. Productio n Control). (b) the level of unemployment in
the area, which has consitently been higher than the natural average.
The former, as weill see, created largely procedural problems - most
often recruiting employees in the wrong union/whose union card was not
fully paid up - rather than problems of principle. The latter may have
been expected to be used by Management as a source of pressure against
their employees. In fact this dod not happen - the policy was to
recruit the best, the most skilled. This kind of policy does not
lend itself to that kind of pressure or strategy!
Recruitment
Management responses of this category to the questions on Recruitment are
shown in table A-~ .."lg This shows 2 things very clearly
(l) Control is perceived to be very firmly in the hands of Management.
In the 1iaht of Comoanv Str.ictllre .. Authority and Ownership this is
hardly surprising. Companies where Management lack this control
must be very rare (Fleet Street being probably the most noted
exception). What is perhaps surprising is that the degree of
influence exerted by the other groups is perceived as so small,
indicating that for this Management at least, the Closed Shop,
which permeates a substantial part of the Firm (and was growing),
was not a problem.
(2) The Management wished to'see this situation continue~ thoughStaff and Foremen may exert slightly more influence. There was, however,
no doubt that Management saw themselves as the people who ought to
dominate decisions on Recruitment in the Firm.
It would however, be inaccurate to suggest that influence in this area
was equal in Management. It is not. It is concentrated very much
in the hands of the Board of Directors in the Company. This point is
made in ExcerptR3.~', where the (non-Director) Manager says precisely
this, and in particular that how and why decisions are taken are outwith
his experience - "I think its difficult to see exactly where the
decisions are being made".
For this Respondant, however, this is just something to accept. For
~he Respondent in Excerpt~3.~(again a non-Director Manager), however,
the issue goes beyond the fact that it is the Board of Directors who
take the decisions. For him there are a number of issues which have
to be considered
a) firstly the Panel have restricted recruitment, which means if there
is to be additional people in one area, there may be fewer else-
where.
b) this redistribution has largely been left up to Management - "We're
the in-betweens".
c) if the decisions Management take are not correct then there will
be serious consequences for the Firms - losses etc.
Hence what has happened is that the Board have taken a major decision -
~o new recruitment - but have left Management, below Board-level, to
work out the consequences of their decisions. The influence over
Recruitment has got to be seen in 2 ways
1) the influence possessed by the Board to say "no new people to be
taken on without justification".
3S~2) the influence within Management on how the employees they have are
to be affected within the Company. For the Respondent in 5.23
this decision is taken on a rational basis - "to make the strongest
case I could" - but as we shall see, their direct subordinates
(Staff) do not always agree that this is so.
Staff (Recruitment)
Staff responses to the questions in this area are shown in Table R.3.~9
and from their Union Repns on Table.Q3 ..S0 Taking the former first,
the distribution is very similar to what we have seen from Management,
though with slightly more influence for other categories, both in 'Actual'
and 'Ideal' situations. It is, however, clear that Management are
perceived as being the dominant category, and that this situation ought
to persist. If, however, we look at TableA3.30we see that while
Staff Union Reps share the view of their·me~bers. that Management are
the dominant category in this area, this is not a situation they perceive
as ideal. This makes them rather different from their members, who,
as we've said, express no strong desire for the distribution of influence
to change. Their Union Reps, on the other hand, express a desire for
equality of influence between Management, Staff and Foremen - slightly
less for Hourly-Paid. It would be very easy to describe this as
political i.e. simply as part of a generalised critique by politically-
motivated people, seeking to destroy Management power, as a goal in
itself. This, however, would not be accurate. From the figures in
TableP3~3Cit can clear'ly be inferred that the present situation is
seen by the Union Rep as less than ideal, and thus they are critical
of Management. We can, however, go further than this, as they are
critical of Management inefficiency.We have shown in the previous section on Management that the level
of Management below Board-level were critical of the Board's policy
of non-replacement of leavers and non~recruitment.without strong
justification, such that people leaving were very often not replaced.
For managers who regularly interact with Staff this poses not one,
but two problems.
1) getting the ~ volume of work (or more) done by fewer people
2) coping with the strain this creates, not only for the Manager himself,
but for the people in his dept. as well. This is a decision
taken by the Board, but it is others who have to live with it
in a day-to-day source.
Hence the Board policy on Recruitment has directly experienced effects
for Staff. As we have seen, by and large, Staff have not, as a
result of this policy, sought to change the way such decisions are
taken.
There is, however, a further problem, which is described by a
Respondent who is a Staff Union Rep., in Excerpt A.'.13 This Excerpt
illustrates the above failing - too few people to do too much work - but
a further one as well. Inefficiency by Management when recruiting e.g.
not publishing salaries, asking for an ONC when an HNC was required, too
little effort to find suitable people. The only 'solution' to this
failure by.the Company to recruit the members which are actually
required, is to let the work pile up - which in turn means they (Staff)
get the blame, but at least they have drawn attention to the problem.
Hence, up to now, we have seen evidence of 2 identifiable 'influence-
gaps' in the hierarchy
1) between Board members - and other Managers below this level. The
35"9latter resolve this problem, as we've seen, by 'putting up cases'
for extra people.
2) between "below Board-Level" Managers and Staff - Staff, however,
cannot 'put up cases' - just let the work pile up i.e. their
response, because of their position in the hierarchy, is less
sophisticated. They - following Excerpt~,~~- find their cases
are ignored, or not dealt with properly. Hence they resort to
their final means - letting work go undone "We've done all we can -
if you want more you'll have to find someone else" is what they
appear to be saying.
Staff respondents, however, do not appear to take such a critical view
of Management - see Table ~3~q- and in interviews with Staff this is
repeated. In ExcerptA3.14, with this Staff Respondent we have. in
Stewart Clegg's phrase. 'reached bed-rock'. For him Recruitment is a
Management function - and that is all lilt's got nothing to do with usl".
For staff. therefore. there is a much more passive and less critical
attitude than is true for their Union Reps. The attitudes of these
2 groUPS are very different indeed. The former seek little or no
change - the latter seek equality, and thus represent a challenge to
the hierarchy. In other areas the Staff Union Reps have been more
radical than their members. but more. up to now, more so than this.
Hourly-paid
Like staff and Management. we can see from Table 11-3.'31 the Hourly-Paid
perceive the Management as' being the dominant influence. This is a
situation which they appear to endorse since the change desired, looking
at the 'ideal' figures. are more or less the same - though there would
,,'0be more influence for Hourly-Paid. Even this, however, it would
still be Management who would still be very much the dominant category.
TableRl~~gives the distribution of Shop Stewards' responses to these
questions. This table has certain variations from the expressed
attitudes of their members - Managers are seen as having more influence,
as are Hourly-Paid, but Staff and Foremen have slightly less. There
is, therefore, as with Staff and Union Reps a difference in attitudes,
between Hourly-Paid Respondents and their Shop Stewards. The difference,
however, is less striking, as unlike Staff Union Reps, the Shop Stewards
continue like their members to recognise Management dominance ought to
continue - though to a lesser extent than their members. Compared to
Union Reps, the Shop Stewards are therefore less radical on this area.
As with the areas we have examined up to now, the Shop-Floor view
seems to be that Management are and ought to dominate - ought to take
the decisions - but that other categories ought .to exert more influence.
When we interviewed Shop Stewards and Hourly-Paid in more depth about
Recruitment, there were a number of issues which were
a) the role of the Union. We referred to this at the beginning of
this Section - the operation of the Closed Shop. The role of this
comes out clearly in ExcerptR9.i!i T~e.role of the 'Union Card'
in this Excerpt - from a Shop Steward - is almost.mythical (i.e. no
union card =no work).
Nevertheless, as he makes clear, Management do respect this, and in our
experience in the Firm, any problems in Recruitment of people without
the right union card, were administrative hiccups, and in any case there
were very few. It is, however, interesting to note that this Shop
steward does not even implicitly criticise Management. Like the Staff
Re?pondent in ExcerPtA3.~Ji}~sIManagement who take the decision onwhether, and who, to recruit - his only concern is on whether they hold
the right card.
This, however, was not, by and large"the concern of the Hourly-Paid
union members. Their major concern, as ExcerptsR3.~andh~.llmake
clear, is the reasoning on why particular people are recruited. The
respondent in ~3.~refers to what he calls 'screening' i.e. what their
part history has been. This process is endorsed by him on the grounds
that it keeps out trouble-makers etc. The actual decision,to recruit,
however, is not one he believes that Hourly-Paid should take on themselves -
it is for the Foreman to decide when more workers are required. At the
moment, in his view, this decision is actually taken by Management, on
the basis of information from Foremen. He believes, however, that the
decision should be taken by the Foremen, and Management should simply
fulfill his request as "they are the men on the floor and they know
where the need is for men". Hence the decision would be taken at a
lower level - but it would not be divided,on to Hourly-Paid workers
themselves. It is a Foreman's task.
The tensions are, however, reflected in ExcerptA3~~~ In this,
the respondent while making clear that the union would attempt to keep
a job open, refers to the conflicting Management motivation - lito run
the place on a shoe-string". Hence, while voicing the union objective
of maximising employment for their members, the respondent identifies
the Management objective of maximising efficiency in the Firm.
Clearly what is required is a compromise between these 2 conflicting
forces.
What this section ~as tried to show is that while Management dominance
3~~is endorsed all round, both Staff and Hourly-Paid employees seek to
secure more influence for themselves. The objective, however, is not
equality with Management, far less putting Management in a subordinate
position. Rather the objective is to get Management to listen to them -
to appreciate that the decisions they take as Managers have implication
for the people who work for them. Indeed non-Board Managers have
said the same thing about the Board - that the Board take a decision
I
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of non-replacement for people who leave, .but 'therf. it is up to .the non-
Board Managers to live with that decision. What is required, therefore,
is more examination on the part of the decision-maker on the implications
of his decision - and thus more influence for those for whom the
implications are most real. The decision would, however, still be taken
by Management.
'f,"ansfers
As we indicated in Chapter III, the factory is laid out in a number
of 'bays'. In each bay, work of a particular type is done e.g. in
Bay One final assembly is carried out, while in Bay Six specialised
-'
pipework is done, in Bay Thirteen the product is tested. The activities
done in each bay will require a mixture of skills. While manual
workers do tend to remain in the same bay, at least over the medium
term (with obvious exceptions like maintenance engineers), it may be
that they have to m~ve from one Bay to another. For instance if in
final assembly in Bay One a piece of pipework had to be done urgently,
a worker from B.?y SIx may be told to go to Bay One and do that work.
From the point of view of the workers, so transferred, the move may have
other implications e.g. moving him away from his workmates to others he
knoWs less well, possible a feeling of victimisation (e.g. if the job
was less good than the job he was doing) etc. In short, therefore, the
;{; .,Table A3.33- Transfers _. Management
Management .Staff Foreman ~ourly~Paid
A Great 24/29 1/4 3/7 3/3
Deal 75%/91% 3%/13% 9%/22% 9%/9%
Some 7/2 17/21 26/24 11/21
22%/6% 53%/66% 81%/75% 34%/66%
Very 0/0 12/5 2/0 13/5
Little 0%/0% 38%/16% 6%/0% 41%/16%
None 0/0 1/1 0/0 4/2
0%/0% 3%/3% 0%/0% 13%/6%
TableA,:?>34 - Staff
Management Staff .Foreman Hourly-Paid
A Great 38/41 7/15 15/18 7/7
Deal 54%/58% 10%/21% 21%/25% 10%/10%
Some 25/24 28/46 35/48 20/41
35%/34% 39%/65% 41%/68% 28%/58%
Very 5/3 27/8 16/4 25/15
Little 7%/4% 38%/11% 23%/6% 35%/21%
None 3/3 9/2 5/1 18/7
4%/4% 13%/3% 7%/1% 25%/10%
Table 4-3.')f' Staff· Union· Reps
Management .Staff Foreman .. Hour1Y':'Paid
A Great 6/3 0/3 0/3 0/2
Deal 86%/43% 0%/43% 0%/43% 0%/49%
Some 1/4 4/4 4/4 2/4
14%/57% 57%/57% 57%/57% 29%/57%
Very 0/0 2/0 3/0 4/0
Little 0%/0% 29%/0% 43%/0% 57%/0%
None 0/0 1/0 0/0 1/1
·0%/0% 14%/0% 0%/0% 14%/14%Table B3.3~ Hourly-Paid
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-paid
AGreat 28%/23% 18/11 18/12 5/13
Deal 58%/48% 38%/23% 38%/25% 10%/27%
Some 14/16 20/23 19/27 19/26
29%/33% 42%/48% 40%/56% 40%/54%
Very 2/4 5/6 8/5 10/3
Little 4%/8% 10%/13% 17%/10% 21%/6%
None 3/4 4/7 2/3 13/5
6%/8% 8%/15% 4%/6% 27%/10%
Tablen.'.21- Shop Stewards
Management. .Staff Foreman Hourly;'Paid
A Great 13/10 3/3 4/5 3/7
Deal 77%/59% 18%/18% 24%/29% 18%/41%
Some 4/7 4/5 12/11 7/8
24%/41% 24%/29% 71%/65% 41%/47%
Very 0/0 3/4 1/0 4/1
Little 0%/0% 18%/24% 6%/ 24%/6%
None 0/0 7/5 0/1 3/1
0%/0% 41%/2% 0%/0% 18%/0%;:,. ,
flexibility of the work-force indicated by transferring workers from
one job to another, has implications not just for the productivity of
the Company, but also for the perceived degree of control which the
worker has over his environment. Indeed the two would seem to have
inverse relationship.
While this introductory discussion has emphasised the portion of
the manual worker, the issues may be no less important for staff
workers e.g. transfer of a clock etc. from one dept. to another
dept. Indeed we shall see that this is so.
Management
Table~;.33 indicates the degree of control which Management believe
themselves to possess. It is clear from this table
a) that Management perceive themselves as very much the dominant
group
b) any desired change in this position would be in the direction
of a marginal increase in" influence for other groups, but
Management still being dominant. The change between 'actual'
and 'ideal' influence indicates - as we have seen on other issues -
that then below Management should have their views more
considered than now, but it would still be Management who would
take the final decision.
It is, however, interesting to note the distinction - however slight -
of Foremen, in that a small number of Managers would like to see
Foremen with 'a great deal' of influence. This reflects the functional
position of the Foreman in the Company. If for instance, a job has to
be 'done urgently in Bay One, it will be the Foreman in Bay One who will
3~4...
be aware of it before the Management are. Hence. the relative dominance
of Foreman over the Staff. and Hourly-Paid. reflects their strategic
position in respect of any such process.
Staff
Tables R3.~ and ,q;.3S'give the views of Staff respondents. and their
Union Reps to the issue of control over transfers. Clearly for Staff.
Management are the dominant group - though rather less dominant than
Management see themselves. On the other hand. the view taken by Staff
Union Reps is that Management are very much the dominant category. Their
view of Management. on how control over Transfers is distributed. is
very similar to that of Management itself.
The 'ideal' situation for Staff would still see Management as the
dominant category.- but the influence of other categories would have
"
been relatively increased slightly less~for Hourly-paid. than for. Staff
or Foremen). This category. therefore. repeats the usual pattern of
Management dominance. but with greater influence for those below than
in the hierarchy.
The authority of Management in this area is shown in ExcerptA.;.2i. For
this Staff Respondent. while the initiative is taken by·,the individual
employee. the final dQcision is one to be taken by the Management -
"I suppose it will be the Manager that will make the final decision•••
•••••••(otherwise) you might have guys going into jobs they're not
suited for
n
•
The only exception to this situation is where there is redundancy in
a dept. - then the union would become involved. to negotiate openings
for the redundant workers elsewhere in the Company. With that exception
. }'~the decision-making role is to be taken Management clearly, for this
respondent, it is Management who know least - who will know who is
suitable. The decision will be taken, therefore, in the light of
what is best for the Company.
Another side of this is, however, shown in Excerpt ~;·~1 This Excerpt,
again from a Staff Respondent, reflects Management dominance. Like
the previous Respondent it is Management who take the decisions -
decisions taken in the light of what is best for the Company. Unlike
the previous respondent, however, it is suggested in 5.30 that decisions
may over-reflect what is best for the Comapny, and that in particular
that this is done at the expense of the individual •. The problem, as
seen by this Respondent, is that if he applies for a transfer to another
dept., his Manager will be told of this. If his Manager does not
want to lose him, then he will not get his transfer. This, for the
Respondent, means that he is held back - his career is affected by a
Manager. Indeed it can be implied from this that this is more likely
to happen to someone who is particularly good at their job - under
these circumstances, in ,·the scenario described by the Respondent, a
Manager is more likely to want to hold on to a particular employee.
In Excerpt~~.~ therefore, the concept of what is good for the Company
is a remarkably static concept. In many ways this described a situation
in which change is something to be resisted. A more obvious meaning
of 'best for the Company' is that each employee would be in the position
at which he was most efficient. Instead it is almost as if the
Company's internal labour market had been Balkanised - that there were
barriers to internal marketing, of particular seriousness to more
talented employees. The Company policy appeared to be that if you
were good at whet you did then there you stay. In terms of Company
~~~well-being this clearly'emphasises company politics rather than Company
efficiency. We shall see similar'perceptions when we look at promotion.
Before moving on to look at Hourly-Paid workers, it should be emphasised
again, that among Staff and their Union Reps, while they would like to
see their influence increase, decisions would still be taken by Management.
Even in Excerpt 5.30 the right of Management to take the decision, on
whether he should be allowed to move to another dept., is not challenged.
What is at issue there is the role of his present Manager in vetoeing
any move the Management right to decide is, therefore, not at issue,
what is at issue are the unreasonable (for the individual) obstacles
to mobility.
Hourly-Paid
We sketched out at the beginning of this section how transferring'
Hourly-Paid employees could be a problem for them. Table nb~.~ shows
their views on influence on decisions in this respect - Table n?~ ~~
shows the views of the Shop Stewards. Both Hourly-Paid and their
Stewards, it can be seen from their respective tables, regard Management
as being the dominant category. It is, however, ·interesting that,
for both the Hourly-Paid, and the Shop Stewards, this dominance
should be reduced - but with Management still as the dominant category.
There is therefore, a movement toward equality in taking decisions on
this issue, but stopping short of equality.
At the beginning of this section we sketched out reasons for this-
these are illustrated in Excerpt A3..3t> This Respondent is a craneman
and his objection to bE!ing transferred to another bay, and therefore
another crane, is that the crane is likely to be different, and that
.. this wiJl cause him to make 3€s~kes in his work. Hence like the Staffz
Respondent in Excerptfl3.~~what is best for the Company is not
necessarily best for the individual. Indeed it may not even be best
for the Company!
This, however, is not to say that Hourly-Paid employees cannot
a) ask for and get a move if they want one, nor
b) that if they were told to move that they could not successfully
resist. In Excerpt~~31 it is quite clear that these can be
accomplished.
It is clear from the first half of ExcerptA13l that a worker can ask
for, and get a transfer to another part of the Company if he wants one.
It is, however, also clear in Excerpt~3.~1 that this is a Management
decision - "and its up to them, its a Management decision or a Foreman
decision whether to give me a change or not" - a system he feels to be
perfectly fair. This subordination to Management/Supervisory decisions
is repeated in ExcerptAl31 - if his supervisor has reason to move him,
then he will go e.g. if his machine breaks down or if someone else was
about and a job had to be done urgently, or if it was seen that he
(i.e. the respondent) was incompetant on that particular machine. All
of these would judgements to be made by the Company Management/Supervisors
_ and he is subordinate to that. For him, it is clear from the
Excerpt, this is quite natural and normal - it is in the way of things,
it is not power!
The general view amongst Hourly-Paid workers was, therefore,
(i) that Management had the right to take decisions on transferring
employees from one job to another,
(ii) but that the individual employee should be considered in all
of this - but on the other hand the employee had a duty to
fulfill the needs and31ijUirements of the Company and its Management.b
Promotion
For ambitious employees this will clearly be an issue of significant
importance - but even for the unambitious it may still be important
in so far as it is indicative of a fair and just management, or
otherwise.
Management
Responses. from Hanagement are shown in..Tab1eA;'';8. This Table illustrates
2 factors clearly
1) that Management see themselves as very much the category in control
of this issue - a situation they clearly wish to continue
2) that while the other categories may exercise some more influence,
any change would be marginal, with the possible exception of
Foremen. This last point reflects a finding stated above -
namely the functional importance of Foremen in respect of Hourly-
Paid workers. While Management can decide promotion among Staff
directly, in the case of Hourly-Paid workers guidance is required
from Foremen, and thus their level of influence.
We saw above, in considering Recruitment, that Managers, below the
level of the Board, exerted too little influence.· In the case of
Recruitment, this had taken the form of a freeze on new recruitment,
and then leaving their Management to work out and deal with the
implications of this policy. Excerpt~.3g expresses identical views
with respect to Promotion. For this Manager, while he has influence
over who is/is not promoted, xhe real control lies at Board level.
This is explained by him as an expression of lack of trust in Management,
by Directors afraid to delegate as they . fear lack of competance
, ,6 'lTab1eI}3.:;~- Promotion - Management
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
A Great 27/30 0/2 4/8 0/1
Deal 84%/94% 0%/6% 13%/25% 0%/3%
Some 5/2 14/18 14/18 7/13
16%/6% 44%/56% 44%/56% 22%/41%
Very 0/0 12/8 14/6 13/11
Little 0%/0% 38%/25% 44%/19% 41%/34%
None 0/0 6/4 0/0 12/7
0%/0% 19%/13% 0%/0% 38%/22%
Tab1eA3:}1 - Staff
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
A Great 60/48 4/9 7/23 3/3
Deal 84%/68% 6%/13% 10%/32% 4%/4%
Some 10/22 29/43 39/45 11/33
14%/31% 41%/61% 55%/63% 16%/47%
Very 1/1 25/15 20/1 28/22
Little 1%/1% 35%/21% 28%/1% 39%/31%
None 0/0 13/4 5/2 28/13
0%/0% 18%/0% 7%/3% 39%/18%
Tab1en-~..40- Staff Union Reps
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
A Great 7/1 0/1 0/1 0/1
Deal 100%/14% 0%/14% 0%/14% 0%/14%
Some 0/5 1/5 1/5 1/4
0%/71% 14%/71% 14%/71% 14%/57%
Very 0/1 3/0 4/0 2/1
Little 0%/14% 43%/0% 57%/0% 29%/14%
None 0/0 3/1 2/1 4/1
8%/0% 43%/14% 29%/14% 57%/14%Table filLlI- Hourly-Paid
Management 'Staff Foreman 'HourlY-Paid
A Great 37/33 10/10 12/12 4/11
Deal 77%/69% 21%/21% 25%/25% 8%/23%
Some 7/11 30/22 32/27 8/20
14%/23% 63%/46% 67%/56% 17%/42%
Very 3/3 3/9 3/6 15/8
Little 6%/6% 6%/19% 6%/13% 31%/17%
None 1/1 4/6 1/3 21/9
2%/2% 8%/13% 2%/6% 44%/19%
Tab1eI13~4'L.- Shop Stewards
Management Staff Foreman 'Hourly-Paid
A Great 16/11 4/2 5/4 2/4
Deal 94%/65% 24%/12% 29%/24% 12%/24%
Some 0/6 10/9 12/22 2/12
0%/35% 59%/53% 71%/65% 12%/71%
Very 1/0 2/5 OJ2 7/1
Little 6%/0% 12%/29% 0%/12% 41%/0%
None 0/0 1/1 0/0 6/0
0%/0% 6%/6% 0%/0% 35%/0%in their Management.
Hence while Tablen3.3~shows Management to be in control of Promotion
decisions, the failure to delegate,which we have observed elsewhere,
indicates real control to reside with the Board of Directors. Hence
it would appear that while a Manager may take the decision, he does
so under constraints established by the Board of Directors.
Staff and Staff Union Reps
Like Management both Staff, and their Union Reps, regard Management as
being the dominant category. But while both wish to see Management
control reduced, there's a very great difference in degree between the
Union Reps and their members. Tablest-l;'~~nd n~show that while
Union Reps wish to move to a situation very much like equality, their
members desire for change is much more marginal. Hence, as we have
seen before, Staff Union Reps have views more radical than these of
their members, and certainly deviate more from their members views, than
doShop Stewards from the views of their (Hourly-Paid) members.
Table B3;~shows that while Staff would not accept Management as being
dominant, that there should be greater influence for other categories -
especially Foremen. This, it should be remembered, is similar to the
view already expressed by Management i.e. that the influence of the
Foreman should be rather more than either Staff or Hourly-Paid.
The problems which Staff experience in getting Promotion are clearly
expressed in Excerpt 113.34. For this Staff Respondent the problem did
not express itself as a challenge to Management taking the decision _
rather the problem was the arbitrary and unplanned way in which Management
,=JOtook the decision. The Respondent does not challenge the right of
Management to take Promotion decisions. What he does express is the
unfairness when the decision is taken arbitrarily - no procedures, no
training in how to interview, no use of standardised interview techniques -
indeed he tells of his,2 promotion interviews when he was not even asked
any questioms.
It 15 in short the arbitrary use of Management power in this area which
1s challenged - not the use of that power itself. That is deemed to
be 1egitimate.
Hourly-Paid
As with what has gone before, for the Hourly-Paid, and their Shop
Stewards, it is Management who const)tute the dominant group in decision
on who is to be promoted. From Tablesll3.41 and 113Alit can be seen
that the desired changes in distribution of influence would be to
a) increase the influence of the Hourly-Paid over promotion
decisions. The level of Staff and Foreman influence would be
held more or less constant, though there is a slight decline in
their distributicn. Arron!} the Sho:, Ste'llards there \\oul~ te
a decline ir. Staff, but not Foreman ;nf1L.encE'. The nE:t. effect
cf this is to create equality of influence - between staff,
Foremen and Hourly-Paid for the Hourly-Paid sample, - but only
between Foremen and, Hourly-Paid for the Shop Stewards, Staff
having a lesser degree of influence.
"
b) reduce the level of Management influence. It is interesting
that while both Hourly-Paid and their Stewards create an almost
identical pattern of responses in response to 'how much influence
would Management ideally have over Promotion', the Stewards perceive
the Management as actually having much more influence than the
}':flHourly-paid sample perceive them to have. It should however,
be noted that the overall pattern of ,"esponses, for both Hourly-paid
and shop stewards, implies no challenge to the right of Management
to take decisions over promotion - even in response to the
'ideally' question Management are still the dominant group. This
dominance may also be perceived in Excerptn34;-- S'Who decides
that (promotion)?' R'Management'. For this Respondent, therefore,
it is a Management decision as to who should be promoted. There
is, however, still an element of fairness involved in all of this -
whoever is promoted must have the qualifications to merit this
promotion. Phenomena like favouritism or negotiation would
clearly offend. Unlike Staff, however, this Respondent makes
no reference to 'technical ' criteria in selection for promotion
i.e. the emphasis on procedure, training in how to interview the
mentioned in Excerpt", RI3.3~1.
For this Hourly-Paid Respondant, therefore, it is a Management decision,
which is questioned only if "the chaps no got qualifications (so) it '
looks like as if somebody's spoke for him". As long as the person
promoted is suitable to do the job then the Respondent goes along with
the decision. Even if there are the problems referred to - absence of
the appropriate qualifications - the Respondent is passive "just got
to accept it".
Hence for the Hourly-Paid worker - and for his Shop Stewards - this is,
and ought to be, a decision for the Management to take. Any change
is, as we have seen before, in the direction of increased influence
for the 'other categories i.e. that Management should take the
decision, but beforehand there should be an exchange of information and
views, so that the last decision can be arrived at. This, as we have
~~1.,seen is true also of Staff. The Management view emphasises this
really only for Foremen, though Staff and Hourly-paid would have more
influence. The exception to this are the Staff Union Reps whose
distribution of responses implies a move toward equally in taking
decisions on promotion. They, however, appear to be the only category
who hold this view.
In all 3 of these issues - Recruitment, Transfer and Promotion -
the dominant view has been the same i.e. that, even ideally, Management
would continue to take the decisions. The role of other employees
would be secondary. We"have interpreted this as meaning that their
influence (Staff, Foremen and Hourly-Paid) would increase, such that
they could make their views known to Management, and that this would
be an input to the Manager, when taking his decision. Such a view
has already been expressed directly by some Respondents (see for an
eXar1ple ExcerptR,3.33). This view will however, be expressed more
directly when we consider at the end of this Chapter specific
alternatives to the existing system of decision-making, and in particular
the possibility of worker ,directors.
Before that, however, there are still several other issues we have
to deal with. The next issue is oneiof considerable importance in, as
we saw in Chapter III, an area of high unemployment.
Redundancy
While unemployment in the locality is, and has been, high relative to
the rest of the U.K., speaking to employees of this Company about
redundancy was not particularly easy. As we stated in the previous
Chapter, there had not been a redundancy in the Company in the previous
30 years. Hence much of what follows required us to invite the
~ JX.}.. _Respondent to conjecture. While it may be objected that it does not
reflect accurately the situation with respect to a Redundancy situation.
what we shall present is (a) a reflection ~f perception of the power
structure in the Company and (b) a description of employee views on what
would happen if there was a redundancy declared by the Company. and
hence how we would employers to react if a redundancy was to come
about.
Management
The Management view on how influence would be/would ideally be distributed
1s presented in.TableJ1'.~. From this it can be seen that Management
regard themselves as the most influential group on the event of a
redundancy taking place. The distribution of response - both as
actually perceived. and ideally perceived - are very similar to those
we have already discussed above. In particular. while Management
perceive themselves as dominant - and believe that this dominance would
continue in an ideal situation - there is a. marginal. increase in the
increase of the distribution for the other categories. especially
Foremen. rather than Staff or Hourly-Paid.
It is. however. perfectly clear that Management believe. that in the
event of a redundancy being declared. that they would be dominant in
the course of events. The role of the other groups in the Company
would be qualitatei',ely different - to present their views etc••
but Management would be most important. As we shall see. perhaps not
unexpectedly this is not an attitude .the other groups necessarily go
along with.Tab1eH.3.43- Redundancy - Management
Management 'Staff . Foremen .. HourlY';'Paid
A Great 22/23 8/8 5/9 10/9
Deal 69%/72% 25%/25% 16%/28% 31%/28%
Some 10/9 12/19 15/19 11/20
31%/28% 38%/59% 47%/59% 34%/63%
Very 0/0 9/3 10/3 8/2
Little 0%/0% 28%/9% 31%/9% 25%/6%
None 0/0 3/2 2/1 3/1
0%/0% 9%/6% 6%/3% 9%/3%
Table A,.41- Staff
Management Staff . Foreman .Hour1y.;.Pa:id --
A Great 60/49 4/17 7/20 10/19
Deal 85%/69% 6%/24% 10%/28% 14%/27%
Some 10/22 29/42 33/43 23/36
14%/31% 41%/59% 47%/61% 32%/51%
Very 0/0 27/8 23/6 23/12
Little 0%/0% 38%/11% 32%/9% 32%/17%
None 1/0 11/4 8/2 15/4
1%/0% 16%/6% 11%/3% 21%/6%
Table IH.45- Staff Union Reps
Management .Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
A Great 5/2 1/3 1/2 1/3
Deal 71%/29% 14%/43% 14%/29% 14%/43%
Some 2/5 2/3 3/4 2/4
29%/71% 29%/43% 43%/ 57% 29%/57%
Very 0/0 2/0 1/0 2/0
Little 0%/0% 29%/0% 14%/0% 29%
None 0/0 2/1 2/1 2/0
0%/0% 29%/14% 29%/14% 29%Table R3~4~- Hourly-Paid
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 38/27 11/12 11/14 11/21
Deal 79%/56% 23%/25% 23%/29% 23%/44%
Some 7/17 20/21 21/21 16/22
14%/35% 42%/44% 44%/44% 33%/46%
Very 3/2 8/7 11/8 15/1
Little 6%/4% 17%/15% 23%/17% 31%/2%
None 0/2 8/7 5/5 6/4
0%/4% 17%/15% 10%/10% 12%/8%
Table n _~dl-Shop Stewards
Management Staff Foreman 'Hour1Y.;.Paid
AGreat 16/9 2/2 4/4 7/10
Deal 94%/53% 12%/12% 24%/24% 41%/59%
Some 1/7 6/9 9/9 4/7
6%/41% ,35%/53% 53%/53% 24%/41%
Very 0/0 4/3 2/2 4/0
Little 0% 24%/18% 12%/12% 24%
None 0/1 5/3 2/2 2/0
0%/6% 29%/18% 12%/12% 12%Staff and Staff Union Reps
We saw that in respect of Promotion decisions, above, and over other
issues, Staff Union Reps. have deviated from the views of their
members. In the issue of Redundancy, this happens again.
In TableA3_4J it can be seen that among Staff Union Reps, the
Management are deemed to be the dominant category. Their view of
the 'ideal' situation is , however, very different, as then the
dominant categories would be the Staff and the Hourly-Paid, with'
foremen and Management having slightly less influence. The reasoning
behind these attitudes in clear from Excerpt~~,3'from a Staff Union
Rep. In this he makes perfectly clear his reservations about the
way redundancy is currently 9rganised - the lemming - like 'rush
toward redundancy payments and an (unseen) life of long term unem-
ployment, exacerbated by the substitution of labour by capital
equipment. In his, ideal and Socialist, alternative such considerations
would not apply - profit and loss would only be one consideration - but
also considered would be the conviction of the employees e.g. to stop
overtime in order that nobody would lose their jobs. It is, however,
recognised implicitly that the basic wage would have to be higher than
now by using, for instance, money currently paid as unemployment benefit.
It is, however, the last phrase which is most telling - "What youv'e
got to do is to change people's thinking" - recognising an essentially
individualistic way of thinking as dominant now, to be replaced by a
more collectivist view e.g. that a is prepared to give up his overtime
in order that b can keep his job and not be made redundant. The means
to achieving this clearly require less emphasis on pure technical
efficiency, and on financial criteria, and rather more emphasis on (in
Marxist terms) 'human needs'. In other words at least, in relation to
the profits and productivity in the Company, the people it employs ought
>~fto count for rather more.
It could, however, be easily seen by comparison of Table,q.3.~~· (Staff
Union Reps) to TableA.3.44(Staff) that the Union Reps ideas were more
radical than those of the people they represent.
Excerptfl;.~indicates that, despite this, the difference may be a
lack of an perceived alternative to Management control over such,
redundancies. The Respondant in Excerpt 5.38, who is from the Staff,
makes clear the inhumanity of a redundancy (e.g. reducing his section
from 26 to 5 employees), and that alternatives to such drastic action
shoul d be considered. It is, however, clear from Excerpt R3.»- in
contrast to Excerpta3.~ that the Staff Respondent, frame of reference
is inaluenably hierarchial - his thinking is based on, at least a
pragmatic, acceptance of hierarchy. The emphasis is certainly on
fairness in what he says - but has he ma~es clear, the initiative
his with Management in the case - "the unions would try to push the
number involved back". In the society er live, the worker is, for
the Respondant in,q;.~ relatively powerless - "the trend in society
is to invest in machines that'll do away.with people". Only in a
socialist society would there be any change in this - but it is
clear that for him this is totally different from the society we have
now - the 2 types of society have so meaningful relationship to each
other in this Respondent's orientation.
Excerpt n3.~- from an Hourly-Paid Respondent - does, however, imply
some sort of middle ground between the alternatives partical in Excerpt
IJ: 3..'~. The Respondent in Excerpta'3~3rwhlle recognising the hierarchial
Position of Management, believes that by more discussion "an easier way"
, ' 2 =J-Ct,than redundancy could be f"u,,(j - nEven a cut in payne
It may well be objected that the Excerpt~3,3bshows a more comprehensive
and critical stance toward capitalism, but if we consider particularly
tablesIi3,14and f},?46(Staff and Hourly-Paid attitudes on Perceived Control
on Redundancy), it is clear that amongst these groups the attitudes in
Excerpt ft3,71are probably more typical, than these in Excerpt n.'.-3 t#
The dominant attitude appears~to be that while both Staff and Hourly-Paid
respondents want to feel they could exercise more control over a
redundancy, the dominant group would remain as Management•. Only
amongst Staff Union Reps, (TableA3,4», and Shop Stewards (Table R3.4V
is there any evidence of a desire to go beyond this, with both showing
(only a slight) desire for Management to be less than dominant. It is
interesting to observe that while Staff Union Reps would have Staff and
Hourly Paid of equal influence (both greater than Management), the
Shop Stewards mark Staff severely down, having much less 'ideal'
influence than Management or Hourly-Paid. This is symptomatic of a
conflict we have discussed above, between Staff. and Hourly-Paid -
particularly between their respective union officials.
Redundancy in view of the relatively high level of local unemployment,
does pose a puzzle. Faced with what are, objectively, relatively
poor chances of another job, it is a frequently remarked-on phenomenen
that workers'can be 'bought out' by redundancy payments. We can see
from Excerpt ~ 3.~ (An Hourly-Paid Respondent) that in this Company things
are much the same. The Respondent, even with 'first-in, last-out'
posed to him, emphasises that the lure of a large redundancy payment
would be sufficiently attractive to ensure that those to be made
redundant would be the older, longer service man. Hence, at the
end of the day, the role of the union - for this Repondent - is, in
the first instance, is to protest, and perhaps reduce the number of jobs
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to be lost, but eventually simply to get the best redundancy, payments
DO$$1ble. This clearly reflects the basac power structure - the
.1 ~~ntral decision, to make x number of workers redundant, is taken by
i ~nagernent. It is ,only, relatively, at the margin - size of redundancy
~~yments - that the union plays a role.
1'11f$ is a condition ,we have seen already. Indeed' it is the extent
~f Staff and Hourly-Paid influence at t~e margin which has been the
~$t important deature of this Chapter. In looking at Redundancy we
~~ve seen the dominant influence - even in the 'ideal' situation -
~ould still be in the hands of j'1anagement. The issue is the extent of
l~fluence which'Staff and Hourly-Paif would have iO an ideal Sit~~t1on. I~~ere 1s no clear wide-spread pver-throw·Of Management authority, or
J '11erarchy - though there is a minority who think in this way - the real
I '~$ue is the extent to which r'lanaQement are influenced by their
I ~1erarch1al subordinates as Manapement take the oarticular decision.
I ~~nagement are the decision-makers. Any other situation is unimaginable,
I ~r at most, relevant only in another type of society which does not
IOrders' and Company Profitability
As we mentioned in Chapter 3 this is a heavy engineering firm, which
is part of a group of companies. These 2 facts have implications
for this area
1) an order was not a frequent 'event - even in a good year only
about 40 units of their product would be sold. Many potential
orders were sought, but only a few were obtained. At the same
time obviously, the gaining of orders was of crucial importance
for employment - fewer orders meant fewer jobs. As we saw ,in the
previous Chapter the Firm1s Igrapevinel worked· overtime on this,
with contradictory rumours about whether or not an order had been
won, sometimes circulating at the same time. Its importance
for unemployment did mean, however, that decisions which could
affect whether or not a particular order was won or not was of
great significance.
2) the firm as part of a group was a profit centre.' It was
expected to stand on its own and make profits for the group
as a whole - though it could expect support if this was required.
Thus while profitability was perhaps not quite so crucial as
it might has been for a Firm operating on its own, outwith a
group, the pressures of the group meant that decisions whichf.
affected the profitability of the Firm were of great importance,
as consistent losses, or poor profits could have recent meant
being sold off to another company, or perhaps being closed down
altogether.
ThuS together decisions which affected the Firm1s ability to win
orders, and to make profits before - almost literally - life or death
decisions (at least in a commercial sense).Management
From examination of TablesR3.4.~(Orders) andnJ.5.'(Profits) it is
clear that the pattern which we have identified up to now, has
largely repeated itself yet again. Namely
1) that Management see themselves as having the greatest amount
of control, with the other categories playing a subsidiary
role, and
2) that Management see that their control over these areas should
continue, but with Staff and Foremen and Hourly-Paid playing
a greater role (i.e. that Management should consult with non-
Management employees, but that the final decision does lie with
Management).
It is, however, interesting to note a variation in view between
perceptions of Orders and Profitability. In the former the degree
of control perceived by Management as being possessed by non-Management
groupS is rather less than in the latter e.g. 25% of Management see
staff and Foremen, and 31% of Management see Hourly-Paid employees
as actually having 'A Great Deal' of control over decisions which
affect the Profitability of the Firm. Whereas the same figures
for Decisions which affect the Firm's ability to win orders are 3%
(staff), 6% (Foremen) and 3% (Hourly-Paid). While Management see
themselves as having most control in each area, it is clear the
control of other groups is seen as being more pronounced when
decisions are being taken which affect Profitability, than when
decisions affect the ability of the Firm to win Orders. Why should
this be?
First of all let us consider why it is that non-Management employees
are seen to playa role in the Profitability of the Company. In
25 0Tab1eA3.45- Orders - Management
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 22(69%) 1(3%) 2(6%) 1(3%)
Deal 28(88%) 2(6%) 4(13%) 2(6%)
Some 9(28%) 14(44%) 8(25%) 7(22%)
3(9%) 22(69%) 16(50%) 16(50%)
Very 1(3%) 14(44%) 16(50%) 14(44%)
Little 1(3%) 6(19%) 7(22%) 7(22%)
None 0(0%) 3(9%) 6(19%) 10(31%)
0(0%) 2(6%) 5(16%) 7(22%)
TableR3.41 - Staff
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 52(73%) 9(13%) 6(9%) 4(6%)
Deal 63(89%) 14(20%) 13(18%) 11(16%)
Some 16(23%) 21(30%) 25(35%) 12(17%)
8(11%) 41(58%) 42(59%) 27(38%)
Very 3(4%) 30(42%) 28(30%) 26(37%)
Little 0(0%) -13(18%) 12(17%) 23(32%)
None 0(0%) 11(16%) 12(17%) 29(41%)
0(0%) 3(4%) 4(6%) 10(14%)
TableA:;.;o- Union Reps
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 6(86%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(14%)
Deal 5(71%) 2(29%) 2(29%) 2(29%)
Some 1(14%) 1(14%) 2(29%) 0(0%)
2(29%) 5(71%) 3(43%) 3(43%)
Very 0(0%) 5(71%) 4(57%) 5(71%)
Little 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(29%) 2(29%)
None 0(0%) 1(14%) 1(14%) 1(14%)
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%)Tab1ettl5J- Hourly-Paid
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 42(88%) 12(25%) 7(15%) 5(10%)
Deal 43(90%) 18(38%) 14(29%) 10(21%)
Some 6(13%) 21(44%) 15(31%) 8(17%)
5(10%) 23(48%) 22(46%) 22(46%)
Very 0(0%) 7(15%) 15(31%) 14(29%)
Little 0(0%) 4(8%) 9(19%) 11(23%)
None 0(0%) 7(15%) 11(23%) 21(44%)
0(0%) 2( 4%) " 3(6%) 5(10%)
Tab1eft.;.S1- Shop Stewards
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 14(82%) 1(6%) 1(6%) 1(6%)
Deal 13(77%) 5(29%) 4(24%) 3(18%)
Some 3(18%) 7(41%) 8(47%) 7(41%)
4(24%) 8(47%) 12(71%) 12(71%)
Very 0(0%) 6(35%) 4(24%) 2(12%)
Little 0(0%) 2(12%) 0(0%) 1(6%)
None 0(0%) 3(18%) 4(24%) 7(41%)
0(0%) 2(12%) 1(6%) 1(6%)Table 112.2']- Profitabi1 ity - Management
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 22(69%) 8(25%) 8(25%) 10(31%)
Deal 25(78%) 11(34%) 11(34%) 12(38%)
Some 10(31%) 16(50%) 16(50%) 13(41%)
7(22%) 16(50%) 16(50%) 15(47%)
Very 0(0%) 8(25%) 8(25%) 7(22%)
Little 0(0%) 5(16%) 5(16%) 3(9%)
None 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(6%)
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2(6%)
Tab1eR 3,~54- Staff
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 50(70%) 8(11%) 8(11%) 9(13%)
Deal 59(83%) 18(26%) 17(24%) 12(17%)
Some 20(28%) 35(49%) 35(49%) 24(34%)
12(17%) 42(59%) 46(65%) 37(52%)
Very 1(1%) 21(30%) 22(31%) 21(30%)
Little 0(0%) 9(13%) 6(9%) 16(23%)
None 0(0%) 7(10%) 6(9%) 17(24%)
0(0%) 2(3%) 2(3%) 6(9%)
Table 8~.55- Union Reps
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
A Great 7(100%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%)
Deal 5(71%) 3(43%) 2(29%) 3(43%)
Some 0(0%) 2(29%) 4(57%) 2(29%)
2(29%) 4(57%) 4(57%) 3(43%)
Very 0(0%) 5(71%) 3(43%) 4(57%)
Little 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(14%) 1(14%)
None 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(14%)
0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%)Tab1eA3~· Hourly-Paid
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
AGreat 40(83%) 10(21%) 7(15%) 6(13%)
Deal 39(81%) 16(33%) 10(21%) 12(25%)
Some 7(15%) 20(42%) 12(25%) 10(21%)
9(19%) 27(56%) 26(54%) 26(54%)
Very 1(2%) 14(29%) 22(46%) 15(31%)
Little 0(0%) 3(6%) 9(19%) 6(13%)
None 0(0%) 3(6%) 7(15%) 17(35%)
0(0%) 1(2%) 3(6%) 4(8%)
Table A3'~5£- Shop Stewards
Management Staff Foreman Hourly-Paid
A Great 13(77%) 2(12%) 2(12%) 2(12%)
Deal 11(65%) 4(24%) 6(35%) 6(35%)
Some 3(18%) 8(47%) 7(41%) 3(18%)
6(35%) 8(47%) 8(47%) 10(59%)
Very 1(6%) 3(18%) 5(29%) 5(29%)
Little 0(0%) 4(24%) 1(6%) 0(0%)
None 0(0%) 4(24%) 3(18%) 7(41%)
0(0%) 1(6%) 2(12%) 1(6%)ExcerptR;.~ we are discussing the possibil ity of Profit-sharing
with a member of the Boar~ .in the context of motivation of employees.
While he explicitly rejects the idea that profit sharing would
necessarily make anyone individual work harder, it should ensure, in
his view that "people (equate) their well-being with the Company well-
being. It follows from that I think that if its reflected in more·
money when the Company is doing better it always fits this particular
picture".
Thus within this Excerpt there is recognition that without the active
co-operation of their employees the Firm would do less well (or, in
other words, make less profit). In another part of the same interview
he explicitly discusses the inter-depenedence of the Company - "You've
got to keep them all operating satisfactorily and effectively otherwise
the thing stops." While this may be a rather negative type of control -
that if their Shop Floor unions ceased their current level of co-operation
with each other, and with Management, then the effectiveness of the
Firm would be reduced (and profits reduced) - it is nonetheless control.
The role of all the Firm in ensuring its level of effectiveness, is
therefore recognised.
Why, though, should the influence of Staff and Hourly-Paid be rated
less highly when we look at the ability of the Firm to win orders?
After all if the order is to be won they must put in a good tender -
that will depend on, at least in part, the manufacturing efficiency
of the Firm. There is, however, avery clear conceptual decision for
Management where winning orders is concerned. This can be clearly
seen in ExcerptA"3.4afrom an interview with a Manager. ) For this Manager
there are 2 aspects to orders
1) it is up to salesmen to win orders
2). l manufacturing rely on salesmen to find work
,81Thus the ability to win orders depends on the ability to manage
the sales force - the sales force mostly having Management status
by the time a deal was being finalised. The role of the others
behind the person/group from the Firm who were actually face-to-face
with·the potential customer, was to provide them with the necessary
support. Their role, in other words, is conceptually subordinate
to:"that of the person actually doing the selling. In consequence
the" high degree of inter-dependence which was so prominant in considering
decisions which affect the level of profits, rather less prominant
in these decisions which affect the ability to win orders, notwith-
standing the fact that the degree of success in the latter is a
crucial influence on the level of the former.
Staff and Staff Union Reps
_ • f <,
It" is clear that broadly speaking the same interpretation can be
applied here as.before.' Namely, that for Staff respondents it is
Management who exercise most influence in each of these areas (Orders,
Table's "':""J and Profitability Table,q3.'~, and that a situation where
Management continue to exercise most influence ought to persist.
The degree of change is that the Staff suggest that other categories
ought to exercise more influence than they have in the past. As we
have 'seen before, though, this stops well short of equality - the
dominant group would continue to be Management in each type of
decision. From TablesA;'SO(Orders) and4J..5'5(Profitability) it is
clear'that Staff Union Reps share much the same view. The perception
behind this is clear in Excerpt 43.41 from a Staff respondent•• It is
quite 'clear from this that "Selling (i.e. getting orders) is a
Management job". The role of others is subordinate to this - but
clearly still essential "If we didn't produce the work they wouldn't
sell them". Hence there are 2 important attitudes in this
;S?:,1) the responsibility for winning orders is one for the Management
2) the role of others in the Company is to back this up - to produce
. product which Management can sell.
It is, then, all the more surprising that by examining Table 5.52 it
is clear that Staff see their own influence as being greater than that
of Hourly-Paid workers - a situation which they perceive ought to
persist. The difficulty here is that it could be argued that it is,
after all, the Hourly-Paid workers who actually physically produce the
product, with Staff performing various support (but nonetheless essential)
services e.g. technical drawing, design, finance, inspection etc. Why
should Staff be seen as exerting more influence on the ability of the
Firm to win orders. An explanation, we would suggest, has unspoken
in the final sentence of ExcerptAl.41. Underlying this sentence is
" hierarchy itself - a Manager is in a position to see and understand
more than me, thus I am in a position (as a Staff employee) to see
and understand more than an Hourly-Paid employee". The perceptual
basis of that final sentence is, in itself, hierarchial. For
Hourly-Paid employees to be seen to have as much influence as Staff
employees would clearly conflict with this.
Examination of other tables reporting Staff responses to questions
on influence exerted have shown a tendency for Staff influence to be
greater than that perceived for Hourly-Paid employees. What is
interesting in parttcular about Table~,4~is the degree to which this
is true. Only in two other decision areas has the level of desired
influence perceived by Staff for themselves had such a large difference
when compared to the level Staff believe Hourly-Paid workers ought to
have - on Promotion (Table~~~) and on Financial Policy (Table 5.~.
ThuS of all 14 decision areas which we questioned Staff respondents on,
only in these 3 is there a large discrepancy in the degree of influence
3~~they ,believe they ought to have, and what they believe Hourly-Paid
workers ought to have. On all of the rest - Work pace: pay: cost
reductions: transferring employees: work standards; redundancy:
recruitment: discipline: investment: decisions affecting profitability:
decisions affecting the ability of the Firm to win orders: and as we
shall see, on Safety -' Staff perceive that there ought to be more.or
less equality between themselves and Hourly-Paid workers. Why should
this be?
It is fairly clear that at least 2 of the 3 deviant decision areas are
of significant strategic importance for the Firm (i.e. the ability
to win Orders, and Financial Policy). It would, however, clearly be
wrong to say that more of the rest are of equal strategic importance
e.g. Profitability, Investment. Similarly Promotion decisions, without
being unimportant, probably come some way down a list of important
strategic decisions. It would not, therefore, be true to say that
Staff are arguing for Hourly-Paid workers to be kept out of
particularly important decisions.
To argue that way - what should we keep Hourly-Paid out of - is in any
case to consider the problem the wrong way round. We can understand
this paradox rather better if we approach it from the point of view
of 'what should Hourly-Paid employees be included in because they have
a contribution to make. The paradox as to why these 3 decision areas -
Promotion, Financial Policy and Orders - differ from the rest, is
explained by the inability of Hourly-Paid workers to make as effective
a contribution as they could elsewhere. There are a number of
reasons for this
1) when we consider Promotion what-we are in effect talking about
is a re-ordering of the people in the hierarchy of an organisation.
To have capability is in conflict with the principle of hierarchy.
- ;~4b
2) when we considered Financial Policy we saw that decisions in
this area depended on the possession of special mechanical skills
which even Hourly-Paid workers recognised they did not have.
Decisions which affect the ability of the Firm to win orders falls
into these categories - on the one hand it is clear that the possession
of special technical skills is necessary - but at the same time it is
clear from ExcerptR3.41 that influence on Decisions which affect the
ability to win orders is innately hierarchial, as we suggested above.
Looking at this another way, we could say that it is perceived that
Hourly-Paid should have as much influence as Staff on the other 11
decision areas because they have a contribution to make, because
a) of their (Hourly-Paid) special skills (e.g. Investment - to give
advice on what is/is not a good machine), or
b) simply because of their influence via their track unions (e.g.
most obviously on Pay, but also on issues like Discipline).
Thus just as we have suggested abo~e that Management claim influence
because they possess special skills, we are arguing here that
equality (or near equality) with Hourly-Paid workers is conceded by
Staff in these areas of decision-making (11 of 14) where it is perceived
thdt Hourly-Paid workers can make as effective a contribution as
Staff can, but not, conversely, where it is perceived their contributions
are unequal.
,'~ ,
Thus we would put forward 2 major points
1)' that Management could claim greater influence, and to be
dominant in the Firm because they possess special skills which
':'neither Staff nor'Hourly-Paid workers possess. They also claim
,",''"dominance precisely because they are Management. As we have seen
,~S-,;'these claims are substantially and effectively conceded by Staff
, and Hourly-Paid.
2) that Staff and Hourly-Paid ought to be formally more or less
.equal in influence in most decision areas. We have suggested
. that for Staff this is contingent on the Hourly-Paid being able
to make an effective contribution - something they are perceived
·to be able to do on 11 of the 14 decision-making areas which we
have looked at. We have consistently seen a claim for equality
~ by Hourly-Paid workers with Staff throughout this Chapter. This
, has frequently been on theirabi1ity to make a contribution (e.g.
,on Cost Reduction, purchase of new equipment - investment) - simply
, because they know by virtue of their work experience. Even more
-' basically, however, there is a claim by Hourly-Paid workers to
equality with Staff, as a matter of right. This claim to equality
.': with Staff as a matter of right becomes all the more clear in the
next Chapter - on conditions of employment and work expectations.
The important conclusion we wish to make here, however - based on the
2 major points above - is that there is no significant tendency for
hierarchial organisation to disappear, or be rejected. Its continuation,
however, does suggest that it may continue in a somewhat modified form -
in particular with a greater emphasis on
i) ., claims to specific competancies, and
ii) greater emphasis on consultation
We shall subsequently elaborate on these points, but first we must
finally discuss the remaining data on this decision-making area.
Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards
Among Hourly-Paid workers the results are similar to.t~ose which we
.have seen before for other areas of decision-making {Tables A,.:;,- Orders,
?~~and A3.5'" - Profitability). It is the view of the Hourly-Paid respondents
that Management have control of decisions in both these areas, and that
this ought to continue. On the other hand while Staff have been seen
as having more influence than they (the Hourly-Paid) do, but that there
ought to be a greater equality of influence - such as we argued above.
Tablesr::13..;1(orders) and A3..n-(Profitability), however, show a more
critical attitude toward Staff on the part of Shop Stewards. In
particular in the former, the Stewards while accepting that Management
do have, and ought to have, most influence in each area of decision-
making; disagree with their fellow Hourly-Paid members, on the question
of equality with Staff. It is the view of the Stewards that Hourly-
Paid ought to have more influence than Staff. This has also been
true in 5 other areas - Rectuirment, Transfers Investment, Promotion
Discipline. In the first 3,'however, Shop Stewards draw a distinction
between Staff and Supervisors - this in Recruitment, Transfers and
Investment, while Hourly-Paid workers ought to have more influence than
Staff, Foremen (Supervisors) ought to have more influence than Hourly-
Paid workers. The obvious explanation for this is that in these 3
areas a Foreman is in a better informed position to exert influence,
than-' any other member of Staff. There is, therefore, a clear
meaningful distinction for Shop Stewards, between different categories
of staff - at least for these 3 areas. In the case of Promotion
Stewards believe there ought to be more or less equality of Hourly-
paid'with Staff haing less influence than Hourly-Paid or Foremen
and Foremen, so that the same explanation can be seen to hold - a
distinction of Staff and Foremen, with the former having a lesser
ro1e to play.
In the decision in the areas of Promotion and Discipline, as well
as profitability, and in particular on Orders, the Shop Stewards are
L ' .__.- ..... ;_S'_7- ~saying .that Hourly-Pai dworkers ought to have more influence than
St~ff - but still less than Management.
Why should this be? There are in fact a number of reasons
1) at least in the case of discipline and there was a clear
<.' special interest for Hourly-Paid workers - that in this area
.they had interests which no one else could/should represent,
< < as the role of the union (and themselves as Stewards) was to
;represent their numbers (and thus exert influence) thrJugh
disciplinary procedure.
2)~ :~her.e was a marked degree of tension between.Hourly-Paid Unions
: :,and Staff unions. We shall see this clearly in the next Chapter
: con Conditions of Employment and Work Expectations, and in particular
-r: '
when we consider the role of unions in the Firm. This subordination
~" ..-
.of Staff to Hourly-Paid workers, may be an expression of this
tension.
This ,latter reason - while trading on personalities and not being
genera1isab1e - is in fact extremely important on tmis question.
The relationship of Staff and Hourly-Paid was not always an easy one.
This is. due partly to the personalities who were involved. It was,
however, also due to a more f ndamental reason, which was expressed
frequently by Shop Stewards and Hourly-Paid. This had its origins
in ~he ratio of Staff. Hourly-Paid in the Firm - which was rather
.more,than one Staff to each Hourly-Paid worker. In the view of
the Hourly-Paid this meant each of them was working to support 2+
employees -the Hourly Paid worker, and 1+ Staff employees in the
Firm. This was a matter of resentment,for Hourly-Pai~-employees
who did not (could no~ understand the function of·the·proliferating
~ --~-
Staff ~ see for instance. Excerpt 5.8 where a .Shop ·Stewa~d 'says "I
see some guys in here that just waddle about". It was not uncommon
3&'&therefore, to find an attitude toward anyone not at the production
end of'suspicion as to how they justified their position in the
Company.
The 'views expressed by the Shop Stewards in Tab1es~3 ..:Tl andA3.~can
thus be seen as an expression of this suspicion. The fact that it is
not repeated by their members is due to the fact that they had less
direct experience of union affairs, and of the tension between Staff
and··Hourly-Paid within the union structure in the Firm.
It. should therefore, be clear that in decision areas of Profitability
and winning Orders the hierarchy was subject to a more fundamental
challenge by Shop Stewards than by their members. In view of their
leading role it is perhaps surprising that we have not found this more
often. It has to be remembered that in 1 of the 14 areas we have
looked at the Stewards have shown no great discrepancy from the views
of their members, and have made clear that they believe that they
should be equal with Staff. In 3 of the remaining 7 areas the
greatest influence - apart from Management who dominate in all areas -
is accorded to Foremen, and in 1; Promotion there is equality of Foremen
and' Hourly-Paid workers. In these 4 areas the discrepancy between
Stewards and their members can be explained by Stewards distinguishing
between Staff and Foremen - a distinction these members made less often.
It is only in decisions on discipline, profitability and winning orders
that' stewards express a desire for Hourly-Paid to have more influence
than~staff, and thus to challenge the hierarchy at a.still more
fundamental level - though without challenge to Management.
Safety
l This is obviously a very basic
~ ~~
issue of working life - especiallyin an engineering company like this, where at the point of production
at least accidents could happen which could turn out to be serious.
We have, however, already discussed other important issues -
Discipline, Investment, Pay - indeed we could argue that all of the
decision-making areas we have considered are important (though perhaps
not life or death issues, as safety at work can be). It is not,
therefore, because of any intrinsic importance that we have left
Safety to be the last decision-making course which we shall consider
individually. There are 2 reasons why we have left it until last
1) with the commencement of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974
safety became - by law - a matter of joint decision-making. This Act
brought into being (union appointed) (a) Safety Representatives to
represent in a specialised way the interests of employees in respect of
their safety while at work (b) powers for these Safety Reps - to inspect
the work-place, to be able to make representations to Management (c)
Safety Committees on which both Management and employees (via their
Safety Reps) would jointly discuss and resolve safety problems. Thus
with safety we have an issue in which it is a matter of law that there
was to be, at least, a greater degree of quality between Management and
other employees - if not complete equality. The role of hierarchy
as a source of power for Management was, therefore, potentially devalued
by the Health and Safety at Work Act - at least in the area of safety.
2) From Tablesr:}$.5"'y-/l'.ta which deal with responses to the series
of questions on safety, it is clear that on this issue on the part of
all groups a greater degree of equality was (i) perceived as actually
existing, and (ii) desired to exist in an ideal situation, than for
any other issue.
Examination of these Tables shows for Management the main increase in
IS A F E T Y
Tab1 eA:}.5Js Management Responses
Management Staff Foremen Hour1y-Paid
A Great Deal 17(24 6(17 11 ~21 17 ~O
53% 75% 19% 53% 34% 66% 53% 63%
Some 14 1z8 23 /14 19 ~1 13 /12
44% 25% 72% 44% 59% 34% 41% 38%
Very Little 1x/0 3 /1 2 /0 2/0
3 0% 9% 3% 0% 6% 0%
None o/0 o/0 0/0 o/0
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Tab1ell';.,f} Staff Responses
A Great Deal 42 /61 13 /48 26 /54 28 /54
59% 86% 18% 68% 36% 76% 39% 76%
Some 26 /9 34 1'20 34 /17 25 /15
37% 13% 48% 28% 48% 24% 35% 21%
Very Little 2 /1 22 /2 10 /0 15 /1
3% 1% 31% 4%. 14% 0% 21% 1%
None 1 /0 2 /0 1 /0 3 /1 1% 0% 3% 0% 1% 0% 4% 1%
Tab1e1-13..t<O Staff Union Rep Responses
A Great Deal 3 /;5 1 /;5 1 /s4 3 /,5
43% 71% 14% 71% 14% 57% 43% 71%
Some 3 1z2 2/1 2/2 3 ~1 43% 29% 29% 14% 21% 29% 43% 14%
Very Little 1 /0 3 ~1 4 ~1 1 ~1 14% 43% 14% 57% 14% 14% 14%
None o/0 1/0 o/0 o /"0
0% 0% 14% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Table A-J.'l Hourly-Paid Responses
A Great Deal 27 ~47 10 ~8 16 /40 18 /41
56% 98% 21% 79% 33% 83% 38% 85%
Some 15 /0 21 /,8 22~6 16 /,6 31% 0% 44% 17% 46 13% 33% 10%
Very Little 4 /1 14 /2 8 /2 8 /1 8% 2% 29% 4% 17% 4% 17% 2%
None 2 /0 3 /0 2/0 6 /1 4% 0% 6% 0% 4% 0% 13% 2%
...Table~1"a. Shop Steward Responses
Management Staff Foremen Hourly-Paid
AGreat Deal 12 (i17 3/12 3 /14 7 /16
71% 100% 18% 71% 18% 82% 41% 94%
Some 4/0 6/4 10/ 2 8~ 1 24% 0% 35% 24% 59% 12% 47 6%
Very Little' 1v' 0 8/1 \/1
. 2 0
6% 0% 47% 6% 18 6% 12~ 0%
None o~o 0/0 1/0 o/0
0° 0% 0% 0% 6% 0% 0% 0%
influence ought to be for Staff and Foremen - though the influence exerted
by all groups ought to increase. This is particularly true for Foremen,
as it is clear from Table A3~:i8that their influence - Management bel ieve -
ought to be greater than that of Hourly-Paid workers. The group which
Management believe ought to have most control, however, is Management
itself. The implication of this is fairly clearly to re-assert the
hierarchy. At the moment Management perceive themselves and Hourly-Paid
workers to have most influence - then Foremen, then Staff. The Management
respondents, however, believe that they themselves ought to have most
influence, with Hourly-Paid workers having less than Management, and less
than Foremen. (The relatively lower influence of Staff reflects a view
that Safety is more of an issue at the point of production than where
many Staff were employed e.g. as clerks/typists etc.) Thus the hierarchical
ordering re-appears in Managerial views on how influence on safety
decisions ought to be distributed. It should, however, still be observed
that the level of influence of Hourly-Paid workers "in particular is
extremely high - higher than on any other issue we have considered. While
the influence of Hourly-Paid is maximised on this issue, it is, however,
still subject to hierarchical subordination by Management.It does, however, have to be remembered that we found that safety in
the firm was imperfect (perhaps an inevitable situation?). This was
so in at least two senses -
(i) in respect of wearing safety glasses (or, it may be more accurate
to say, not wearing them). We discussed this above when we considered
discipline, and in the previous chapter on Communications. Excerpt
5.'2, for instance, recounts the experience of a Staff respondent on
the 'attempts' by'Management to enforce company rules on safety glasses.
The view of Management that greater influence was required does, to
some extent, reflect the Management need to resolve the safety glasses
problem - and similar problems with respect to safety.
(ii) As we mentioned in the previous chapter, the firm's product is
heavy, and two accidents with cranes occurred during the research
period. This episode is discuss'ed with a Manager in ExcerptA~Al
Clearly, from this; before the Act came into force, the firm was a
pretty average operation with respect to safety - perhaps better than
some, but probably worse than others. Since the Act came into force,
the Manager quotes the reduced accident and days lost figures as proof
of the firm's increased emphasis on safety issues. Despite that, as we
have said and raise with the Respondent, there were two accidents with
cranes, with units of the product being dropped. As the Manager makes
clear, the accident happened because they did not know the weight
of the product (the Safe Working limit of the crane was prominently
displayed) - but the implication of the Health and Safety at Work Act
is that this should have been known,·and should have been acted on
before an accident came about. This raises two questions (a) whether
or not this firm was discharging its obligations under the Act? This
is clearly an important question, but not one which is relevant for
our purposes. :(b) How health and safety decisions come about? We
shall explore this latter question when we consider the views of Staff
and Hourly-Paid respondents.
_____ ........ ~J2-Management, therefore, see themselves as being in control of this
area - with Hourly-Paid. They believe that while all groups ought
to exercise a greater degree of influence than now, that this should
be done on a more hierarchical basis, with Management exercising the
greatest degree of influence, than Foremen, than Hourly-Paid. Thus while
this section began by talking about a greater equality here than in
other areas of decision-making, the views of Management make clear that
this greater equality is subordinate to the principles and needs of
hierarchy.
Tables~}.sqand ~3.e;fmake clear that such a view is shared by Staff
and Hourly-Paid i.e. that while influence of all groups is increased
(especially that of Staff), it is clear (i) that decisions on safety
are already taken on a hierarchical, and (ii) despite an emphasis on
increased influence for all groups, both Staff and Hourly-Paid believe
this ought to be on a hierarchical basis, with the greatest degree of
influence being held by Management. The only exception to this is the
group of Staff Union Reps. whose view is that there should be e~uality
of all groups except Foremen (see Table~.~). Even Shop Stewards
(Table~3J1~ take on a hierarchical view of how decisions on safety
ought to be taken.
At the moment safety decisions are influenced to a great extent by the
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unions within the firm. This point is made in both Excerpt4~(from a
staff Union Rep. Respondent) and Excerptll 3.44{from a Shop Steward).
In both of th~se Excerpts the role played by the unions in safety
issues (e.g. hearing protection - Excerpt 5.59) is made quite clear,
both in an advisory capacity (giving specialist advice on particular
problems) and as a channel for making efforts to improve the level of
safety.It is. however. still the case that even in the area of dects10nson
~fety - where by law this is sypposed to be a partnership and tqua11ty •
t~~t ~nagement are still dominant. a situation which few apparently
wish to chan;e.
L'The first question we asked specifically about worker directors ~as whether
'the respond-nt's confidence in the company would change if there w~re worker
> directors on the Board. The results appear in Table fl.,. t3.
Astriking aspect of 'this Table is that there is no cate90ry where at least
40% say their eonf1dence would increase. The most favourable cate~ory are
" .Hourly Paid, where 38S say their confidence would increase. Nevertheless
even amongst Hourly Pai~ the modal response is to say that their level of
"T~ble ~l.,) "00 you think if there were worker directors here your confidence
in the Company to take care of your interests would·
Management Staff Union Reps Hourly Paid Shop Stewards
Increase 2 (6%) 16(23%) 2(29%} 18(38%} 5(29%)
Stay about the Same 10(31%) 39(55%) 2(29%) 22(46%) 10(59%)
Be Less 20(63%) 15(21%) 3(43%} 8{17%) 2{12%)
confidence would remain about the same - 46% give that reply. That response
is also modal for Staff (55%) and Shop Stewards (59%), with 23% and 29%
respectively saying that their confidence would increase. Furthermore some
21% of Staff say that their confidence in the Company would be reduced if
there were worker directors.
Table ~;.~'does, therefore, suggest that worker directors are not seen as a
panacea for their problems by Staff or even by Hourly Paid, though the latter
do seem on the whole to be favourably inclined (there is a distributive skew
toward increased confidence, whereas among Staff it is virtually a normal
distribution.
It is, however, Management who are clearly against worker directors. Some
63% say their confidence in the Company would be less if there were worker
directors. This is wholly consistent with what we have seen so far in this
chaoter, concerning Management. While tney are prepared to concede a greater
degree of influence to Staff and to Hourly Paid, they have consistently
been of the opinion that they must retain control. It is clear from
Table ~3..ti3 that worker directors represent an excessive dirTllnition of
this control.
~~ua11Y it is clear, however, that worker directors are not, as we have said,the panaceq for Staff and for Hourly Paid. TaD1e 5,10] does indicate they
support worker directors more tKan Management, nut thetr enthusiasm for
participation at Board 'level is perhaps rather less than we might have
expected. This finding is similar to that reported by Paul Dathkey in
"Earticipation and Industrial Democracy" (chapter 7 passim), who concludes
tflat in lithe aDsence of major experiments (in industrial democracy) in the
private sector, it ·is to De douDted whether widespread shop floor support
for the idea will be obtained without the impetus of legislation". (p.95)
Given what we have seen of Staff and Hourly Paid views should we expect
any further support for industrial democracy/worker participation among
Staff and Hourly Paid? What have we found so far -
(1) that they feel i11-informed,and would have the system of communication
better organised (see chapter IV),
(2) that they wish to exercise more influence in decision-making - though
relatively more on issues closer to their own work situations (e.g. the
demand for increased influence was greater on Pay than on Financial Policy -
for Hourly Paid see Tables 5.4 and 5.aA, and Tables 5.2 and 5.2.t for Staff),
(3) a contraint majored by Hourly Paid and Staff themselves, as this demand .
for greater influence, was that Management should remain in control. We
saw already from the McQuitty Linkage Analyses, and Factor Analysis that
Management influence,was conceputally distinct from that of Staff and Hourly
Paid. Earlier we saw in .looking at the Graph data that even on an issue
like Pay, it was still concluded by Staff, Staff Union Reps, and Hourly
Paid, that Management ought to be the dominant category (see Tables 5.2-
5.4). Only Shop Stewards took a different view - they suggested that
Hourly Paid ought to fie of equal influence to Management (see Table 5.5).
Thus the demand to change the structure of the organisation away from hierarchy
toward equality is restricted to sucK an extent that the dominance of
Management is not fundamentally challenged oyettner Staff or Hourly Paid.It is the.refore ironic that, as we saw: in Table ~3"'..3 that Management should
see themselves,as 'under threat t by workers directors. In this Company at
least, however, any demand for worker directors is, for Staff and Hourly Paid.
a means to greater tnfluence, but not to challenge Management.
In essence, therefore, Table 1l3.,"3 develops further not a disagreement
between Management and their employees - but rather a misunderstanding.
This misunderstanding is developed further in Table ~3.~~. In this table
we present the results of asking respondentsto put into rank order of
importance 5 potential tasks for a worker director. The results are,
categorised into Management, Staff and Hourly Paid (Shop Stewards. and
particularly Union Reps are numerically too small to give meaningful
results.
An especially significant result of this Table, given the preceding
discussion of misunderstanding, is that all 3 groups say that the most
important task of a worker director is to lIHelp make the Company More
Effici'ent
ll
, and then to lIWork to Improve Company Relations
ll
• Thus over the
3 categories the first 2 tasks of a worker director are a matter of agree-
ment. Indeed Management and Staff agree on the total ordering of all 5
tasks - there are, however, certain differences with Hourly Paid. Hourly
Paid emphasise more strongly the importance for a worker director to
lIProtect Workers Rights
ll
, but the ordering of the other 2 tasks {'Keeping
Workers Informed of Company Affairs' and lEncouraging Participation in
Company Affairs} is thereafter, the same as for Staff and Management.
Thus Table Il~..',"tndicates a degree of agreel'lent between,those 3 groups on
vhat a worker-' d-ir~tor should be doing - with the exception that Hourly Paid
emphasise more strongly than either Management and Staff. his role in .
'Protecting Workers Rights'.
,I
I
;
ITab1e~~ What Do you Think is a Worker Directorts Most Important Task?
Management
Ranking Average 1 2 3 4 5
(1 ) Help make company more efficient 1.8 20 7 0 2 3
(2) Work to improve Company relations 2.3 10 12 5 2 3
(3=) Keep workers informed of company
3.2 5 11 14 affairs 0 2
(3=) Encourage participatton in .
Company affairs 3.2 1 8 10 11 2
(5) Protect Workers Rights 4.4 1 0 6 3 22
Staff
(.1) Help make Company more efficient 1.8 40 14 8 5 3
(2) Work to improve Company relations 2.6 9 25 24 8 4
(3=) Keep workers informed of Company
affairs· 3.3 7 13 11 26 13
(.3=) Encourage participation in
Company affairs 3.3 9 14 12 14 21
(5 ) Protect Workers Rights 3.9 6 3 14 19 28
Hourly Paid
(1-) :He1p make Company more efficient 2. 1 20 12 5 9 1
(2 ) Work to improve Company relations 2.8 9 12 11 11 4
(3.)-· Protect Workers Rights 3.2 6 10 10 9 12
(4) Keep workers informed of
Company affairs 3.3 6 7 14 9 11
(5) Encourage Participation in 3.6 6 6 7 9 19
Company affairsWhy, ther~fore, dO Management emphasis~ thetr need to retain control when
tn~re is less disagreement, and more a misunderstanding oetween them, and
Staff and Hourly Paid? Ther~ ar~ several reasons for tliis.
(i} Management are probably, by and large, unaware of this, i.e. they are
acting toward that which they perceive as real, even if incorrectly. The
belief of Management of the objectives of Staff and Hourly Paid if there
was worker participation is, in other words, incorrect.
(ii} We hav~ seen already the belief by Management that too free access to
information would not work (e.g. for commercial reasons), that Staff and
Hourly Paid are not trained to tak~ decisions at Board level. Reasons of
this type justify for Management their continued dominance in decision-
making. This reasoning, in isolation, can be defended - from our point of
vie~, however, what is interesting is that Staff and Hourly Paid would
probably concede much of this Management argument, in particular the latter
part. In other words, we have seen already how Staff and Hourly Paid do not
wish to usurp Management dominance. They do wish to be more influential -
but not at the expense of removing Management from their role of dominant
influence. If this was conceded, then the former point (on communication)
would be closer to resolution, as a greater access to decision-making would
not be possible without greater access to company information.
Would Management grant such access? We saw in looking at the options on
access to information (Tables 5.99~5.l02) that there was disagreement on the
role of Management. Management took the view that they should retain a
vote on information to be made available - Hourly Paid found this unacceptable
and wanted compl~t~ freedom of acc~ss. Staff were ambivalent - 55% found
complet~ fr~~dom of access acceptable, while 50% found a Management veto
acceptaDl~. There is, tfierefor~, disagreement on how access to company
information should be controlled. WRy do Management wish to r~tain control?
One reason we nave estaolisfied ts the argument of ensuring confidentiality.Thts was particularly strongly put by a Manager in Excerpt 5,t7 - but in
Excerpt 5.19 this is challenged D1 a Shop Steward on the grounds that
their interests are the same as tile Company·s. Or as he puts it "We're not
going to stab ourselves or the Company in the back". What this suggests is
that Management·s view of Staff and Hourly Paid is that they have different
interests from that of the Company, and would be more likely to 'leak'
confidential information.
Statistically it is true to say that the more people who have an item of
information, the greater the chance there would be of it being 'leaked'.
The issue of Staff and Hourly Paid motives is, however, rather different.
Impliedly Management may be saying that Staff and Hourly Paid are less able
to be trusted with the well-being of the Company.
Two questions emerge from this -
(1} are Management saying this?
(2) are they correct in saying that?
The following 3 Tables assist us in considering these questions. All of
them report the responses to 2 inter-linked questions. Respondents were
asked to rank 5 company goals according to how they think (a) the Present
Board would rank them, and (b) how a Board with Worker Directors would rank
them. Management responses appear in Table ~3.~S-. From this we can see
that the 2 orderings are as follows:
Present Board With Worker Directors
l} MaKing Profits 1} Providing good well paid employment
2} Making as many sales as possin1e 2} Making profits
3} Being as efficient as possible 3} Keeping employees informed of how the
41 Providing good wel l'-:paid emploJ11leflt Company is doing
5} Keeping employees informed of 4} Bei~g as efficient as possible
ho~the Company ts d~ing . 5} Maklng as many sales as possible
i;
i·'
!'Table t)..3..i#5' Which. Order would tal Present Board put these goals, and
. (pI a [ioard with. Worker Directors?
Management Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5
Providing good well paid employment (a) 4.2 4 2 4 11 14 1
(Ii} 2.0 1 16 7 5 3 1
Making as many sales as possible t a) 2.4 2 8 14 2 4 4
b) 3.6 5 4 4 5 8 11
Being as efficient as possible Ca) 2.9 3 6 3 13 8 2
(b) 3.3· 4 5 1 11 9 6
Making profits (a) 1.6 1 16 11 5 0 0
(b) 3.0 2= 4 11 3 6 8
Keeping employees informed of how (a) 4.8 5 0 0 1 6 25
Company is doing (b) 3.0 2= 3 9 8 6 6
As we can see, in Management's view there would be fairly major changes in
the objectives pursued by the Company if there were Worker Directors.
While making profits would still be an important objective, making as many
sales as possible would decline significantly in importance (from 2 to 5)
while providing good, well-paid employment would increase in importance
(from 4 to 1). Keeping employees informed of how the Company is doing
would also become more important (from 5 to 2nd, equal with Making Profits).
These changes represent a fairly pessimistic view, for Managers, since
the future well-being of, the Firm does rely (as we explained earlier) on
making sales through being.efficient. The ordering of goals makes fairly
clear a Management view that the worker directors would change the strategy
of the Firm to the personal benefit of those they represented (good well paid
employment, keeping them informed). As we shall see in Tables ~3~~and
fl.3.~1 this was not the view taken by Staff and Hourly Paid.
Table A-r..~ gives the responses of Staff to this question. These orderings
were -
40 JTable~3·tN. Which order would (al the Present Board put these goals,
and (bI a Board with ~orker Directors?
Staff Average Ranking 1 2 3 4 5
Providing good well paid employment Ca) 3.3 4 9 7 15 33 7
(b) 2.5 1 26 13 12 13 7
Making as many sales as possible fa) 2.0 1 28 13 12 13 2
b} 2.7 2 16 19 14 12 10
Being as efficient as possible ~~~
2.9 3 9 17". 27 11 7
3.0 3 10 13 23 14 11
Making profits (a) 2.3 2 23 22 11 9 6
(b) 3.1 4 12 12 18 16 13
•
Keeping employees informed of ~a) 4.5 5 3 1 3 14 50
how Company is doing b) 3.7 5 6 13 7 17 28
Present Board
(1) Making as many sales as possible
(2) Making profits
(3) Being as efficient as possible
(4) Providing good well paid
employment
(5) Keeping employees informed of
how the company is ~oing
With Worker Directors
(1) Providing Good well paid employment
(2) Making as many sales as possible
(3) Being as efficient as possible
(4) Making Profits
(5) Keeping employees informed of
how Company is doing
As we can see Staff and Management have a large amount of agreement about
the present board of directors' objectives. The only difference in their
rank orderings is that 'Making as many sales as possible' and 'Making Profits'
change places - the other 3 are agreed on. It is when we move to how they
think a Board with worker directors would order these objectives that the
differences begin to appear. We saw in Tab1elt~~~j;that the Management view
was that a Board with worker directors would emphasise the-provision of
good well paid employment, at the expense of efficiency and winning orders.
As Table Il;.~" shows clearly, this is not the view of Staff. Certainly
'providing good ~11 paid employment' Becomes the most important objective _
fiut fietng efficient and ~king sales remain tmportant objectives even for a
401- -----------'-Board with worker directors (number 3 and num~er 2 respectively), 'Making
profits· and lKeeping employees informed of how the Company is doing' would
not De as important for sucn a Board in the view of Staff, as they were in
the vie~of Management.
We argued aoove that Management seemed to take the view that Staff and
Hourly Paid could use particlpatfonA1ndustrial democracy to their own ends,
rather than for the benefit of the Company. Table A3.'bdoes show that in
the case of Staff this is not so - and that'in particular the inter-
dependence of their interest and of the Company is well understood.
Table ~3.~1shows identical v'iews on the part of the Hourly Paid. Their
orderings were -
Present Board
(1)
(2)
(3 )
(4)
(5)
Mak'ing as many sales as possible
Being as efficient as possible
Providing good well paid
employment
Making profits
Keeping employees informed of
how the Company is doing
With Worker Directors
(1=) Providing good well paid employment
(1=) Making as many sales as possible
(3) Being as efficient as possible
(4) Keeping employees informed of
how the Company is doing
(5) Making profits
An interesting contrast between Hourly Paid, and Management and in particular
Staff is the relative orderings of 'Making profits' and 'Providing good
well paid employment'. Among Management and Staff the latter was always
preceded oy the former (1,4 and 2, 4 respectively), but among Hourly Paid
they perceive in the present Board that 'Making Profits' is less important
than 'Providing good well paid employment'. To understand a little why
Hourly Patd should belteye this', we have to understand that this Company,
certainly at the time of the study and for many years before that, had been
one of tne Detter paying compantes tn the area. This, from the point of
_____--140 .,Tah1eA3.t.?71' W~ic~ order would tal the Present Board put these goals, and
(o} a Board wit~ WorKer Directors?
Hourly Paid Ayerage Ranking 1 2 3 4 5
Providing good well paid employment (a} 2.9 3 8 12 8 19 1
(o} 2.5 1= 15 10 8 13 2
Making as many sales as possible (a} 2.2 1 17 14 10 4 3
tb} 2.5 1= 10 16 13 3 6
Being as efficient as possible (a) 2.7 2 11 9 17 7 4
Cb} 2.8 3 13 7 13 9 6
Making profits ~a) 3.2 4 10 9 6 8 15
b) 3.5 5 7 6 9 10 16
Keeping employees informed of how ~a) 4..0 5 2 4 7 10 25
Company is doing b) 3.2 4 3 9 6 12 18
view of Management (as one of them put it 'to pay in the upper quartile')
was a quite deliberate policy to attract and retain a high quality labour-
force - a reflection of the high technical skills required to produce the
product. The fact that the Company did pay well had obviously not escaped
the Hourly Paid in making this assessment (though we do not know their level
of awareness of why the Company paid well).
Why did Management and Staff not take the same view as Hourly Paid? In
discussing pay at the very beginning of this chapter, their salaries tended
to be assessed by them in relation to what they could earn elsewhere. In
other words they essentially saw things the other way roun~ - that if they
could. earn more elsewhere, they would do that. Hourly Paid tended to see
the Company as paying more than they could get in most other companies.
In other respects the ordering for the Pr~sent Board as perceived by Hourly
Paid is very similar to that of the Staff and Management. Like Staff and
Management tfie Hourly Paid fielieve. the present Board place a high importance
on Making Sales, and relatively little on keeping tfiern informed about how the
Company is doing.
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Like Staff - nut unlike Management - the Hourly Paid oelieve a Board with
worker directors would place a htgh importance on 'Providing good well paid
employment·, and on 'Making sales~ (these 2 are equal: first), than 'Being
as effictent as possible'. Thus Doth Staff and Hourly Paid take a different
view from Management of how a Board with worker directors would behave.
Management, we saw, took the view that they would put the interests of
employees first, at the expense of efficiency and sales. TablesA3.~ and
A.3..i4";J show that while Staff and Hourly Paid bel ieve a Board with worker
directors would put a higher importance on Providing good well paid employment,
sales and efficiency would still be relatively important. Hourly Paid, like
Staff, recognise the inter-dependence of company well-being and their own.
To return to the 2 questions we started out from in this section, it would
appear -
(l) that Management do suspect that Staff and Hourly Paid may be less able
to be trusted with the well-being of the Company, but
(2) they do not seem to be correct in that view in so far as Staff and
Hourly Paid are aware of the inter-dependence of their interests and those
of the 60mpany.
Thus, wnile Staff and Hourly Paid would look to their representatives to
provide them with'good well paid employment', TableslT3.""" and A3.,lHdo seem
to indicate a clear connection in their minds between getting orders and
being efficient on one hand, and the provision of that 'good, well.paid
employment' on the other. The view of Management, bas'ed on Table A~~f
is rather more pesstmistic in that the view there seems to be that good
well patd employment, profits and keeping employees informed would be more
strongly emphasised than sales and efficiency, i.e. that the link we referred
to oetween sales, efficiency and employment, would not exist.This, nowever. ts not to say that Management are wholly pessimistic about
parttcipatton. The value of parttcipation in tfte percepUon of Management
ts apparent in Tables Il'.~i and Ir~.Ul
TaKing Tatileil3.'8 first this asks respondents if the experience of employees
would be valuable for company decision~aking. or whether their lack of
decision-making experience would permanently disqualify them from a role
in board level decision-making.
Table ~3,'A
Would you say -
Union Hourly Shop
Management Staff Reps Paid Stewards
(1) Experience of Employees be 24(75%) 55(78%) 6(86%) 35(73%) 14(82%)
valuable in Company decision-
making
2} Their latk of experience in 8(25%) 14(20%) 1(14%) 12(25%) 3(18%)
decision-maktng would'permanently
disqualify them from playing a
useful part in decision-making
at Board level
This table shows quite clearly that in the view of most Managers employees
do have a role to play in company decision-making - only 25% say that their
lack of experience would be a permanent disqualification. The view of
Management is in fact very similar to that of the other groups. though Staff
Union Reps and Shop Stewards are rather more in favour of the view that
employees' experience would·be a valuable input than Management. Staff and
Hourly Paid. The difference is. however. slight - and the members of Shop
Stewards and in particular Staff Union Reps is too small to draw any con-
clusion. It is. however. interesting that once again the lay union
re.presentaUve.s are taking a more. strongly held view than that of their
memcers. This, it sftould ne rernerncered. happened very often in looking
at tne control graph data at the oeginning of this chapter.Tah1ef.r,.~qshDWS the responses to a questton on whether more interest
would De shown Tn the Company if there was parti'cipation at Board level.
TaD1e A3.'~ If there was participation at Board level would personnel -
I
1
1
J
~
Union
Management Staff Reps
Hourly Shop
Pa~d Stewards
1) Take a great deal more interest
in the Company besides their own 7(21%) 23(32%) 2(28%) 21(44%) 7(41%)
work situation
2~ Have some more interest in
t e Company besides their own 17(53%} 28(39%} 4(57%) 18(38%) 8(47%)
work situation
3) Have about the same level of 7(22%) 20(28%) 1(14%) 8(17%) 1(6%)
interest as now
4) Have less interest 1(3%) 0 0 1(2%) 1{6%)
There is a very clear view being expressed in this table. that if there was
participation at Board level. there would De more interest shown by employees
tn the affairs of the Company generally (as opposed to the employee's specific
work situation). Management and Staff Union Reps. do perhaps hold this
view marginally less strongly than other groups. in that more than 50% of
each of these groups say there'wou1d be only 'some more interest'. while among
Staff. Hourly Paid and Shop Stewards the numbers saying 'a great deal more
interestt are nearly the same as those saying 'some more interest' would be
shown. That. however. is a marginal difference. It is quite clear that
there is agreement that participation would create'more interest in the
Company.
Thus in lOOKing specifically at worker directors we have seen that -
(ll Management in general takes a pessimistic view - their confidence in the
Company would decline, they belt-eve a Board with worker directors would
fundamenta11Jra1ter tne oDjectives of tfie firm away from sales and efficiency
toward provtding good, well paid employment. profits and keeping employeesinformed. Their vtew is not, however, wfio11y pessimistic - they do believe
that employees would draw-more interest on the company affairs, and that the
expertence of employees would Be a valuable input to the decision-making
in the Company.
(2l Staff and Hourly Paid would in contrast have more confidence in the firm
if there were worker directors, they believe they would have more interest
in the affairs of the Company and could make a valuable input to company
decision-making. In respect of what such a Company, having a Board with
worker directors would do, they agree with Management that it would give
more emphasis to providing good well paid employment, but unlike Management
they ce1teve it would continue to emphasise sales and efficiency.
(3) That the Management view of what worker directors would mean is different
in important respects from what Staff and Hourly Paid think it would mean.
Particularly in Table ~1:~Management can be seen to be saying that worker
directors would not be good for the Company, in that the relative importance
of temporary goals would change. In fact from Tab1eA;.", and Table 11; ...,~.
we can see that Staff and Hourly Paid foresee fewer changes in the relative
importance of Company goals, the main change being in respect of providing
good, well paid employment. In addition we have seen at various points in
this, and the preceding chapter, that employees appreciate very strongly
indeed the link between their employment and the ability of the Firm to win
orders. finally, on this point, we can see in Table 5.108 that Management
and Staff see the role of the worker director in exactly the same terms,
w.hi1e the differences among Hourly Paid are not great (the relative
importance of protecting workers rights).
Thus we can see that tne pessimism of Management in respect of worker
directors depends on a misapprenension about what Staff and Hourly Paid
would expect a worKer dtrector to do. As we have seen in this section
Staff and Hourly Paid would expect of a worker director pretty much what... ....l •
a Manage.r would 1ike. h.im t.o lie doing~
What sort of person would make a good worker director is suggested by Table
H"!J~6'1. This gives tfte responses to a question on which is the most important
quality for a worker director. ~tth tne exception of Staff Union Reps
(who take no really clear view) more than 50% of every other group take
the view that fits most important quality would be to try to make Ithe
Company more efficient and competitive than it already is
l
, which is
consistent with the argument that we presented immediately above, that
everyone in the Company took the view that what was required of worker
directors was to help it to be more efficient and so win more orders, and
thus create more secure, better employment.
Tab1eR;..6j Which i.s the most tmportant qual ity of a Worker Director?
Union Hourly Shop
Management Staff Reps Paid Stewards
21(66%) 43(61%) 3(43%) 26(54%) 10(59%)
(1) Integrity
(2) A good negotiator
(3) An interest·jn making t~e
Company more efficient and
competitive than it already is
10(31%) 19(27%) 2(29%) 9(19%)
1(3%) 8(11%) 2(29%) 12(25%)
4(24%)
3(18%)
It is also notable from Table ~~~~that Management, Staff and Shop Stewards
place relatively more emphasis on the integrity of a worker director that his
negotiating ability. Certainly, any other finding would have been surprising
for Management, and perhaps for Staff as well (though about 80% of Staff
are unionisedl, It is, however, surprising that Shop Stewards should place
even slightly more emphasis on integrity tha~ his negotiating ability. This
perhaps reflects a view-that the negotiating function should remain with them as shop stewards,
and not go the the worker directors. That, however, is merely a
suggested explanation. Hourly-paid, however, do emphasise the
negotiating ability more strongly than integrity.
The significant result of this table is, however. to show yet again that
worker directors are run by staff and hourly-paid as a means of making
the firm more efficient and competitive than it already is - an
•
objective management believe worker directors should pursue, but they
they wi 11 not.
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Excerpt A'3.J
s. "00 you feel you should have to go to them. or should they
supply you with the information on a regular basis?
R. Well. I feel this should be supplied on a regular basis for
obviously the men are quite content. in fact they they they are
going to get an order and they know they are going to be Secure
for another year or another two years. They'll not always have
that problem at the back of their minds and they are obviously
going to more efficient. But I feel put down on the Shop, it
happens time and time again, "did we get that?" ••• I mean
there's an order on just now for ( ) for 15 or 30. Now
just i and hour before I came up here a lad said to me "Did
you hear we got it?".
I says "Well, no I actually didn't hear we got it." He says,
"Well it's no actually finalised yet". I mean it goes on like
this all the time, it goes about that they've got it and
actually it hasn't been finalised and we don't know what the
deal is, whether its 30 of one machine or 15 of another. But
that's no official either. It's maybe that somebody's dropped
it somewhere and somebody has picked it up and passed it on.
S. Do you think there is any way of getting over that? I mean where
you get people worrying about their jobs?
R. Well, that's right, we know we are, we know for a fact that the
Management are bidding for a big ( ) order. We've no been told
whether, at the end of the day, whether we've got it or whether
we've got part of it or whether we-' ve not got it at a11. Whether
4- jI.....
we've lost it. We've no been told that. Maybe it's at the
stage they've no finalised it yet. I don't know, but there are
rumours going about. I assume at the end of the day, which could
possibly be a month or maybe two months later, they'll come and
tell us they've got it. I feel if they got it today they should
at least tell us next week or the week after. Put it into some
form of words on a notice saying that, so many machines.
s. Rather than find out in the Evening Times?
R. Aye, that's right. Instead of the sort of press and T.V. saying
the Firm ( ) has got a big order, and we've never heard about it,
you know. Oh, I think it helps to, the ••• O.K. the Management
see the workforce are interested in it. I would say there's no
doubt about that. r mean, the men, I would say 99~ of the men are
interested in the product, interested in seeing the Company doing
well."Excerpt 4J. '2..
s. "What do you feel about promotion in the Company?
R. Well the methods of selection are very arbitrary. I've been at
two interviews. and I've never been asked a question by the people
that are supposed to be interviewing me. But on that basis
decisions are made. There's no set down procedure, there's no
training about how to carry out an interview. But on the basis
of a i hour interview they'll decide whether you're the man for
the job. But there are standard techniques for selecting people
for jobs. and it should be these plus gut feeling that lets them
decide."Excerpt IJ 3.,
s. "What about promotion from the shop floor to staff? How do you
think the control of all that is distributed? Do you think it's
a Management decision or what?
R. Well, what I think here is it's who you know, that matters a
great deal, I think, in here.
s. Uhu.
R. That matters a lot. They write it up on a board maybe the
opportunity 'applications can be handed to the Personnel'.
s. Right.
R. And things like that, and a lot of them go in for it and nobody
gets it.
s. Do you think it's a fair system? For promotion.
R. Ah well I suppose if they want to, they're supposed to be
looking for the best person.
s. Hm.
R. If they get a variety of people coming in, they're bound to pick
somebody unless they've decided before."
4/4Excerpt 43.f
S. "What about promotion within the Company? Does the Company have
a policy on promotion? Other than, you know, you advertise
internally in the first instance and externally afterwards.
R. Well apparently there is a policy that we use internal talent
whenever we can
S. Hm.
R. That's paramount.
S. Yea.
R. Am. We try to identify talent, we try to identify urn probable
urn eh (what's the word I'm looking for) probable end points,
you know end jobs, appropriate situation.
S. Hm.
R. But 1 think we can do a great deal more about this. I think
we could structure careers rather more urn on the facts.
S. Hm.
R. 1 think as one gets higher up the organisation then of course
you've got a much more definitive pattern of, likely pattern,
for promotion, career developments, this sort of thing but I
think we've got to extend it down the way a bit.
S. Hm.
R. Got to formalise
S. What sort of criteria do you use in promoting people?'
R. Well 1 probably think the first one is that he's got to be
outstanding in his current job. I think that's the first
thing that draws attention to him.
S. Hm.
R. That in itself then leads and one looks at his qualifications,
his background, his general experience urn that's probably
number two. Then number three is his character, his personalitys. Hm.
R. How he fits into proposed organisations. These three are the
three major sort of factors.
S. How much is that see to the sort of
decision?
R. At the end of the day it is 90% qualities of judgment. See
to the if you like
S. Hm
R. But I think that's de-rating it a wee bit.
S. Hm.
R. There's a good deal of consideration and thought goes into this
S. Hm.
R. Because everyone's "acutely aware now of how vital it is that
you place the right people in the right jobs. It's so inflexible
an arrangement that you can't undo it.
S. How about the sort of social aspects to promotion?
R. Do you mean are there any social bars to promotion?
S. If you 1ike•
R. I think
S. Or social advantages?
R. I think, for example, in certain areas the social acts of a
person are important. For example you take the
sales marketing side. If you get a guy who eats all his food
with a spoon, for example, he's scarcely an appropriate candidate
for mixing with top level people you're trying to sell them a
multi-million pound order. That sort of thing.
S. Hm.
41 toR. That's the extreme example
S. Hm.
R. But if you take something like engineering and so on, if the
bloke's a very talented engineer and can do his ~rk, it's
difficult to see anything else being an impediment to this.
S. Well if we took the case of promotion to the Board - there's
a feeling that you don't get on the Board unless you've got
a degree.
R. Well I think ah this in fact - you've got to relate it
to age. I think in this day and age urn there is nothing
preventing a youngster taking a degree.
S. Hm.
R. Ten or fifteen years ago, it was a different matter altogether.
Family pressures and economic pressures could prevent this.
I think in this day and age a youngster coming up should have
a degree if he's got the potential and the capability. There's
nothing in my view that prevents him from doing so. If in fact
he hasn't done so.
S. Hm.
R. Then it generates in my mind a question mark.
S. What do you mean by young - less than 30?
R. Yea.
S. What about Senior M- fairly Senior Managers of say about 40/45
age group? .
R. I don't think a degree is an automatic disbarment. I mean if you
get the guy who is extremely good at his job and doing a crashing
good job.
S. Hm.R. Urn He obviously would be considered for the Board or any
other appointment. It's not a total debar. It is a general
proposition so I think that unless you have just reason for
not having taken a degree, you should have it.
S. Aye.
R. Our particular Board certainly they're all Board people,
they're all professional qualifed - or professional
qualification. Urn. I really think that's how it should be.
S. Hm.
R. Hm. And as I say, I think the younger people coming up I
don't think this is an unfair screening requirement, if you
like."
418ExcerptB3,5"
s. "What about promotion? If somebody gets promoted who do you
think decides that?
R. I think it's the men at the top who make the decision.
s. Works Management, Personnel Officer and that? Urn. Do you think
there should be more say from lower down than that or again
should they make the decision?
R. I suppose it's up to them who will.
S. Hm.
R. Get promoted.
s. Why do you say it's up to them?
R. I think ,it's a Management decision.
s. Hm. Why is that?
R. Well, you see when there's promotions and you apply for the job.
S. Hill.
R. It's up to them who they accept for the job, who's got the
capabilities to do the job and'ihe experience."Excerpt itj.t;
s. "What about transfer~ing people from one place to another, you
know, say you get transferred from one bay to another - who
decides that?
R. The Foreman I think and junior Management.
s. Do they just come along and tell you that you're moving?
R. Aye.
s. Do you think it's a fair system?
R. I don't think it's a fair system because a bloke can go in to
a job in one part of the shop and be shifted to another - a
different change altogether, a changeover, you know. The
same with cranes. I get shifted about on cranes but the cranes
all the controls are different. If you work on a crane for 10
years and you have the same handles but you go to another one
the handles are on a different side, you're apt to make mistakes,
you know.
s. Uhu.
R. They think the cranes are all rigged the same way.
s. Hm.
R. They just look into one crane and think they're all the same but
they're all different.
4~o5. Different side.
R. And if a bloke's content with the job he's got. he shouldn't
be shifted about.
5. 50 what should they do about the system?
R. Well the way they shift people about there's maybe nobody for
the job so they should start somebody else for the job.
5. Hm.
R. Cranemen's short.
5. Hm. They should take someone in to do the job rather than shift
them about?
R. I think so."
4~1Excerpt 83·t
s. "What about transferring people from one bay to another? I mean
if you were told you were being moved from the (A) shop to
assembly, would you get any say in that or is it just up to your
Foreman to say?
R. No, if I want a change, I can ask for a change and its up to
them - it's a Management decision or Foreman's decision.
s. Hm.
R. Whether to give me a change or not.
s. Do you think you should have more sort of say in the matter?
less?
R. No, I think it's just a pretty fair way as it is.
s. Why would you say it was fair?
R. Well, in my experience if somebody has wanted a change they've
got it all right.
s. If you want a change you can. O.K. what about the other way
round? If they want to shift you and •••
R. I didn't want to go?
s. You didn't want to go?R. Well. Id' just go and see the Shop Steward.
s. Hm. Would that work?
R. Aye. They tried to shift a boy in my department before but he
didn't want to go so they got him kept.
1I
49-3Excerpt A- 3.8
R. "I've been up to Work Study a few times and going by them, it's
like trying to get blood out of stone for even a minute.
S. Uhu.
R. They're not all the same.
S. Hm.
R. Just some of them are sort of ••••
s. Do you think you should have more control over the bonus system
than you've got?
R. Yes.
s. How it operates and all that?
R. Well, to start the way the times are they, well some of them,
are good and some of them are bad, but the bad ones are, well,
I'd like to get them all good.
S. Hm.
R. But still get the work out.
s. Right. How would you, I mean, if you objected to a time, who
would you see about getting the job re-timed.
4!L4R. Ah. itls not very easy sometimes because youlve got a •••• thatls
put into the computer.
S. Uhu.
R. Then they give you a percentage and you Ire supposed to make your
bonus off. Sometimes it makes you wonder.
s. Hm.
R. For instance the job you used to get a couple of years ago had
good times and the machines havenlt changed any. Itls only in
the last couple - say the last two or three years - that the last
times live got have got a lot tighter.
s. Theylve tightened them up?
R. Yes. I donlt know. possibly itls the man on the job thatls just
decided weill try and push him a wee bit harder.
S. Do you think itls fair that they should be able to do that? Do
you have any comeback?
R. Not to a great extent. I donlt see what I can really do about it.
because they just put the things out to the computer and they
give you a percentage of that. Therels not much you can do about
it unless you just keep complaining all the time.
S. Hm.
R. Sometimes it gets you an extra couple of minutes.
4i5s. Do you think there should be some sort of procedure that you've
got to agree the times?
R. Oh, aye, we should be able to do that. In a way we've got that
just now. If we've got a time and we don't think it's suitable,
we complain about it.
s. Hm.
R. To try and get more pay but it's hard. They'll no give you very
much.
s. Like banging your head against a brick wall?'
R. Aye, well, after a while, I've been here for quite a while now,
you just say och to hell you cann't be bothered for you know
you're no going to get anywhere."
4itoExcerpt A.'.tt
S. What about control over the way the product is produced? How
much do you depend on the expertise and the knowledge of the guys
on the shop floor and of your staff?
R. Well we have expertise plugged in at every level but I think we
sometimes take quite a lot for granted.
S. Hm.
R. I mean if one was setting up attempting to build a company product
such as we do for example, in the middle of agricultural land for
example say and using fundamentally agricultural labour you'd find
there was an awful lot of trade skills, manipulative skills that
one takes for granted, one would need to expensively set out to
train.
S. Hm.
R. So there's that and one clearly recognises the situation.
S. Hm.
R. I think this is true in.all the various intermediate levels. They
all apply their appropriate expertise as part and parcel of their
sort of jobs. But if you're thinking in terms of the fundamental
manufacturing tactics, strategy and investment, then this is done at
rather higher levels. If in fact we think the case warrants it we
call in consultants to this end•.
S. Hm. Ah. For instance you take the Work Study that you have down in
the engine works, this requires the employee to work rather faster
than he might do if there wasn't Work Study
R. It's not very
S. But if there wasn·t Work Study - I didn't say as fast as he could.
Do you feel that this has a cost for the Company in terms of
quality?R. No. I think one's got to be realistic about the current situation.
The current situation is this - we originally brought in Work Study,
or this particular phase of Work Study, some what - five or six
years ago.
S. Hm.
R. To try and establish some reasonably accurate standards on the
product. This in fact was done with some works payments system
generally in trouble. It wasn't universally applied.
S. Hm.
R. But a start was made and it covered certain areas in the company.
Now all of these payments systems I think have got a finite life.
S. Hm.
R. They gradually compromise - they gradually whittle down - they
lose the edge. I think,one has got to be realistic about what
they're worth.
S. Hm.
R. From the point of view of control. From the point of view of incentive,
and I think most of them probably about three years is the limit,
and I'm absolutely certain the one we've got here is not too
relevant to Time Study now. I doubt very much if it's very relevant.
I think the time has come where we've got to re-think the whole
position.
s. What sort of direction would you see it going? I mean the two,
but in one direction so that it is the sort of piecework argument
that you get the guys to work just as fast as they can. Then
you've got the old salaried approach where the guy comes in and he
gets paid whether he produces nothing or whether he works his tail
off.
R. Yea.
S. Well these are two extremes and very general but what sort of
direction would you see them going in? Or what direction would you
like to see the thing going in?
~ --.;41 BR. Ideally my point of view of course, the thing that we have, the
people that are so well motivated and they equate their well being
in the company to such a degree that one gets a reasonable output
for a reasonable salary.
s. Hm.
R. Ah. I don't think there can be any doubt that that's the most
.
attractive way•. Now of course you can set about it in a number
of different ways. You can introduce a profit sharing element.
s. Hm.
R. Various other sort of things. We're currently looking at that
at the moment.
s. Hm.
R. Out consultants are looking at this. But I think, depending what
sort of industry, certainly in our industry everything is sort of
time studied to the nth degree and
s. Hm.
R. Individual piecework and so on I don't think is relevant.
s. Hm.
R. No.long~r· relevant. But'I think it is important that we do have
accurate standards.
s. Hm.
R. So that we can control the business, recognise the business and
recognise difficulties while there is still time to do something
about it.EXCERPT A- 3.i£)
S. Who do you think controls the pace of work in the Company?
R. I think that that is in the hands of us - the management •••
it is one of the management tools and it's up to us to see production
is kept within the parameters that we set.
S. Do you think you maybe push a little bit too hard?
R. Well, a manager can always discuss with a section just what is a
viable production rate for that particular section ••• I can well
imagine that there could well be.a problem where things are left
to the individual to make a forecast. That.can be dangerous in
a sense. But r would have thoughtit is a Manager's duty to consult
with his people just what is required of them and discuss this
and what the actual dept. has been set.
S. Yes, I see. But in the final analysis, should management have
overall control.
R. Yes, it is a management function.
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s. How do you think decisions about the amount of work to go through
the firm are made?
R. Oh well, an awful lot of responsibility for decision-making is left
to the directors, but I feel that they don't delegate enough
authority to make decisions. My experience is, an awful lot of
managers, I don't think its through any fault of their own, but
they have to go back to their immediate superior to have a decision
made. You tend to find all the managers responsible to the same
guy for the same thing. So one guy is taking an awful lot of
decisions rather than delegated managers.
s. Why are things like this?
R. Hm. I think itls up to the directors to educate the managers to
take decisions.
l f31Excerpt
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'5. Right.' [What about the pace you've got to work at? Who do
you think controls that or do you control it yourself? Or
is it controlled.
R. Controlled by the number of contracts we have and when they're
supposed to be delivered.
s. It's the volume of work?
R. Hm.
s. That controls it for you? Do you feel that you should have
more control over it, or do you just have to go with that?
R. We've got to accept that as it is although we've been asking
for more personnel in our department.
S. Hm.
R. Just for the volume of the work. It's a problem.
s. If you were able to have more of an input into the decisions
that were made on to your volume of work and how many people
are to be involved, would you have then more control over it?
R. Cauld be.
s. Do you feel that you should have more input into how your
work is spread over a longer period? Or a long period?
R. No - put it another way. The Manager always asks us.
s. Hm.
R. You know for the - what type of work how much overtime we
want to work and things like that]•Excerpt ft3.l~
s. What about the pace at which people have to work? How's
that determined?
R. Well again you've got organisational problems. If in a
particular area of the Company, a Manager is lax, and he
doesn't take an interest through his supervisors, and in
their efficiency, then you get people just sitting about.
You do your best to maintain a reasonably high level of
efficiency, but when you see sections in the same dept.,
spend half the day picking their nose••••••it sort of
disillusions you. You see its not enough for a dept. head
to sit there and think he's too high above what is going on
at the ground - he should know what's going on at the ground
level, through his own dept. managers, who in turn should
know through their section leaders to operate an efficient
section•••••••But it just doesn't happen.ExcerptA3.l4
s. Your job means that youlve got to work to contain.standards -
do Management have much 'to do with that?
R. No not much, there's not a lot. that they have to do about
the standard I do the job too. I mean the job's got to
be done to such-and~such a standard and that's it - in any
case you want to do the job properly. If a job's worth
doing its worth doing right first time. When a job's getting
revved up being corrected or altered in some way all the time
you lose all job satisfaction.ExcerptA3.1r
s. What about the pace you 'do your work at? How does that get
set?
R. Ours is a fairly standard sort of job here••• ~ ••youv'e got to
be fairly steady. The kindof,job I'm in, you've got to get
~ staff in weekly. The quicker I get through the better it is
all round.
S. So your work pace is related to the volume of work?
R. That's right.
S. It's not dictated by Management?
R. Oh no - they just expect you to get through it if its there.
S. Are they ever unreasonable about this, you know if you have
a big glut of work?
R. Oh no•••••••1 think they would give you somebody to give you
a hand with it. There was a time I'd a big pile of stock -
cards to get through. Well they asked me 2 or 3 times did I
need a hand out. I told him no, I could manage it fine....
ExcerptA·3d J&
s. How do you see the control over the work-pace? How do
you think that's distributed?
R. The Management call the shots. But only as well as they're
able, with regard to sensibility and what they can get away with.
s. Is this fair?
R. It'll be' hanged for worse. Once there's a closed shop in -
here the unions can dictate what sort of person you're going
to get in here. You wont get people who have independent
minds who'll say 'No, I don't want to join' He's got to
become a sheep and join in. You get the wrong type straight
away' then when Management carry on and say 'Well you cannot
employ him, because he wont join (Union ATASS). It doesn't
matter whether its joining (Union ATASS) or (Union B ~~TSA)
or anybody else. It's all the same.
S. What would· you like to see happen?
R. Well, if I'm looking for somebody to do his own job, my
job and my boss's job, then I'm looking for somebody of that
quality. I don't want somebody coming down and saying 'youve
got to join such-and-such a union. He might not want to jojn
a union - but he has to join and if ~e does he's reduced to
the mentality of a sheep.Excerpt~l.l~
S. What bout um work standards say a wee job you've got to do
to such and such a standard.
R. Yae
S. Ah. who decides that?
R. Well I would say that the bonus decides that
S. Boh?
R. Hm. No the man that doing the job. You try. you're on bonus
so you try to do that job as fast as you possible can.
S. Hm.
R. And you're going to batter righ~ into it.
S. Hm.
R. You're no going to sort of say you should get a wee b4t better
finish on that.
S. Hm.
R. You're just going to do the job and. if it's good enough for
Inspection. that's it.
S. Hm.
R. But you could've done it better. made a better job if you'd
taken your time with it.
R. . But again on bonus you're pushing it.
S. The tighter the bonus the less.
R. Yea.
S. What would happen if there was no bonus system?
R. Ahm.
R. You'd get better work. There would'nt be so much scrap.
S. Hm.
R. But then again if we didn't have that we would likely go back
to piecework or somet~ing like that. . You know the way we were
before.s. Do you think piecework is better than the bonus?
R. Well lid just come in and there were men who had ,been maybe
two or three years on the piecework, they all had',experience
on it,but even at that ,time they were sort of eezy~ozie about
it. They were in competition as far as the work went. They
wanted the work done.
s. Right.
R. Youlve got to have a but I think it's up to
the gaffer. He's the man that tells you if youlre no
working enough. It's no up to a clock really.
s. Hm.
R. Your gaffer should know if you Ire doing your job right or no.
s. Somw foremen might feel that if there waslnt bonus system they
would have to go and dig some of the guys out of corners.
R. Yes.
S. Do you think that's true?
R. Yes. True.
S. So you need the bonus system to keep men at their machine?
R. You need a sort of time on the job but the gaffer should be
able to see who's doing it. If he's no doing his job then you
just have to move him if he's no doing it right.
S. Hm. What you really want them to do is something like best
times on the job?
R. Yes
S. To get more quality and that?
R. Yes that's right.
S. If the times were slacker do you think that it would push up
the quality or would the guys just sort of sleep on the job?
R. No I think it would put the quality of the job up because you
WQuld take more time whereas 'just now if you take a cut you say
that's no bad but it'll 'do.
4 3~s. Am.
R. But if you had more time you would say och I'll take.another
cut and make it better.
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s. How easy is it to make the bonus? Do you
R. You've got to work.
S. It's pretty tight?
R. Aye you've got to work.
'5. Do you - who decides this time? Work Study?
R. Work Study comes down and you do a job and they time you
when you're doing the job
s. Right.
R. And they say take the time of three men and they take the
average of whatever time you took to do it then they cut it
a wee bit maybe say you cut it a wee
bit
s. Hm.
R. Then they give you a time for the job and you've got to do it
in that time.
s. Is it negotiable the time? You say this time's too tight.
R. Well there's certain times for certain jobs so if you don't do
it in the time somebody's already, well they people have
already added the time out, well they say
s. Hm.
R. It must be yourself.
S. That it's your fault it's not theirs?
R. Well it's your fault.
s. Urn. Do you think the guts that are actually doing the job
should have more say what the times are?
R. Oh aye. I don't think they should have times at all.
s. What sort of effect do 'you think this would have? I mean
some of the Foremen might say 'that if you didn't have times
, you would have to go into 'corners and haul 'guys 'out to get
them to work. Would you agree?
AAnR. I don't see that because.before they had bonuses ,like that to
get the job done, the job done just the same.
's. Hm. It got done just as 'quick do you think?
R. I think so.
s. What about the work standard. Do you think the work standard
is affected by timing the jobs?
R. I think it has because you"re hurrying to get the job done and
you're looking at the closk.
s. Aye.
R. You've only been given so much that you're maybe just going
to kind of skimp a wee bit.
S. Stick it together the best you can in the time?
44/Excerpt ~~lq
s. What about the control you have over er the pace.at which you
work 'urn how do you think the control over that is distributed?
R. Well I thinks it's all right. They like you to do good work.
To get the job done they give you time, well they don't give
you time, they've got times.
S. Hm.
R. If your'e
S. Exceeding
R. That's right if they think you're exceeding the time, the charge-
hand will come up and say that this job should heva been done.
S. Hm.
R. Awee bit quicker, but it's no, we don't get given times.
S. You don't get timed?
R. We don't get timed.
S. You just work.
R. Aye, just work.
s. Urn. There's no
interference from anybody at all? As far as you're
concerned.
R. No.
S. What about the standard you've got to do your work to - is
that something you decide or is it something that's decided
for you?
R. It's something that's decided for me. The chargehand tells
you various standards to which you do the work.
S. Hm. do you feel that you should have more say about the standard?
R. Well you know sometimes you can be lackadaisical.
S. Uhu.
R. It's only a matter of somebody coming up and 'saying well that
wasn't a very good jObA4
_1, ... _-
s. Hm•. That you feel you 'need
so to speak to keep the.standard up?
R. Oh yes.
443ExcerptP3.2l!
s. Who decides the standard work has got to be done to 1
R. I would expect it's the Board Room I suppose.
S. Why do you think that?
R. Well they're getting the money for the job. That's what they're
there for.
s. It's their job to specify?
R. Aye.
s. Urn you don't feel that they are dictated to 'by.
R. I suppose they will be
s. Hm. Do you think the guys on the floor should be able to have
some sort of input on that
R.
s. That he shouldn't need to be.
R. Well some people do and other ones have just got to rely on
themselves
s.
R.
Agood tradesman doesn't need to he can do it himself
Aye
________4.!..4__Excerpt 11iJ,1
s. What about Recruitment?' Do you think that's over-
centralised to?
R. Certainly the policy of Recruitment is determined by the
Directors. And it's unfortunate that at the moment we're
going through a period of foreign recruitment ~ you know
non-replacement without justification. I find its difficult
to see exactly where the decisions are being made. I think
'again that the directors have agreat deal of control over that
They have the major say in whatever happens. What areas are
going to be expanded and so on.-
ExcerptIt". ~2-
s. What about Recruitment? Who'do you think influences that?
R. In my experience, I have 'applied for extra people to my Manager,
and he has said he has been,thinking along simi1~r lines. So
he must have been thinking, watching the work-load. In a sense
though, it's an easy thing to reflect upon, because there have been
quite a few people leaving the dept. and not being replaced.
The reason for that is outwith the Manager. There has been
a restriction by the Board on further recruitment.
S. Has this mattered?
R. Well the shortage of labour has been highlighted, but its been
left in Management's court to decide whether to recruit more
people. The Board set the limit and have us to get on with
taking the hard decisions.
s. Is this fair?
R. We're the in-betweens, obviously. It just depends how strong
the case is. I would take it on myself to make the strongest
case I cou1d•••••••that I needed extra hands and to try to paint
out the if we don't get these people. If the
whole thing isn't handled properly then inefficiency creeps
·in, and its all a big loss.R.
--Excerpt 1+.3..1.?
R. It's not boring then.
s. Right.
R. But we have had a recent push.
s. Uhu.
R. The -lad who works with me he's just done eight jobs in a row.
s. Hm.
R. And they've taken about two weeks each and not right.
s. You mean the jobs aren't right?
R. Aye.
S. THat you've been pushed too fast then?
R. Everthing's in a hurry.
s. Uhu.
R. On our backs all the time - work overtime.
s. Uhu.
R. Yet we've been trying to get assistance since last year.
s. Uhu.
R. Extra people in the department.
S. Hm.
R. . We got one from, a good lad there- from internal, and two
applicants from in here from I accepted one, put an advert
in the paper. The policy of the COmpany is not to disclose
any type of salary
s. Hm.
R. We said the minimum qualifications was H.N~C. they published
O.N.C.
s. Uhu.
So anybody with any thought of looking in the-paper-for a job
sees 'O~N;C; required doesn't think they'll pay: as 'much. I went
back up to Personnel who said they would re-advert,·se .. 4JJ ·l
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
Hm•.
That was only three weeks ago. There's been numerous adverts
in the papers from the Company but only one for ours.
Hm.
Yet we are pushed for wo~k.
Right.
Well I should say pushed for personnel to do the work.
Hm. Why does that happen?
I don't know.
Do you mean that they don't listen to you?
I don't know who's pushing where. It doesn't seem any - the
Company's getting a block
Uhu.
In the system. But the only way to prove the block is to let
it happen.
Aye. To let the work go out late and not get done properly
or something?
Then we start getting pounding from the
_____ ..... 4 .....4.2..... ~.....
Excerpt .,,~:~.. ~1-
S. What about Recruitment? How's that influenced?
R. Oh, that's 100% Management. They know how many are needed
It's got nothing to do with us.
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s. What about un recruitment if somebody's got who decides that?
R. Well management decides and you go and make sure that they've got a
UnioUnion card.
S. Hm.
R. Itts up to them
s. That's the one control that you've got where you can take it up.
R. Good old Union card.
If they don't have a union card it's up to them.
s. Uhu. Does the management respect that
R. The management respects that
s. As much as they should?
R. Aye
45"0EXCERPT 9~.).(,
5•. Um, what about recruitment - I'mean who do you think decides
about recruitment?
R. You mean if they're bringing men into the factory?
5.:.:. Hm.
R. r think Personnel's get a lot to do with that. I mean, I know
one or two lads that have been brought back because I heard they're
screening them before they bring them in now.
5. How do you mean screening?
R. To see what their past was like. Where they worked before and
5. Hm.
R. How they worked in that place and if they were troublemakers
or something like that
5. Hm
R. They weren't going to get in.
5. Do you think that
R. I know the gaffer, the chief Foreman, told two buys that it would be
likely that they would be able to be started in about a week.
These guys never got started.
5. Hm.
R. That was the head Foreman that told them that. But they had to be
screened.
5. Do you think it's a fair system the way they bring people into the
Company?
R. Aye, I think it is. I can see their reason for no bringing in
unemployed troublemakers and that.
5. Do you think there should be more say from the shop floor say?
Or from
R. Do you mean people that they know?
s. Aye.
_____4[1R. Applying for the job and sort of saying he's a good guy given him
the job?
S. Or oy saying look we need so many extra guys in this department.
R. Aye. I think it all comes from head foreman. I'm no dead
sure but I think he's the man that decides oh we'll need to get
another labourer in.
s. Hm.
R. We'll need to get another turner in, or something like that and he
goes and says to the management and they say OK and the Personnel
advertises it and they interview the man.
s. Hm. That information does go up from the Foreman but the
management make the final decision?
R. Yea.
S. Do you think the Foreman should have more say in the decision?
Or should he pass on the information to the Management to make the
decision?
R. Yea.
S. Do you think the Foreman should have more say in the decision?
Or should he pass on the information to the Management to make
the decision?
R. I think the men, I should say the Foremen, they're the men that
.should decide really.
S. Uhu.
R. Thet're the men on the floor.
S. Uhu.
R. And they know where the need is for men.
___4 S:~EXCERPT f+ ~.11
R. Well the unions specify that so many apprentices will be taken
on in each trade. For unskilled though, they only work on
wastage - people leaving, dying that sort of thing. If someone
leaves the union to try to keep the job open and get someone
into the job. Someone with personal connections very often.
That shouldn't happen but it is a fact of life. Sometimes the
union has a hard fight to keep a job open. Management' 11
say 'we'll run the place on a shoe-string'. Well that makes them
look like good Management.
4,,3EXCERPT If3.'l$
s. What about transferring people in the Company? You know,
moving them from one dept. to another. Is that a decision that
Management take. or is it one there's negotiation about?
R. Well. they advertise internally. so I suppose it's up to the
individual to negotiate.
s. So it's a matter for the individual?
R. Yes.
s. Nothing to do with the union?
R. Not unless there were redundancies in one dept. The unions would
negotiate openings in another dept. I suppose that would be quite
a good set-up. I think that would apply
S. But in general it would be the individual who would decide
whether he will be moved about.
R. I think it's up to the individual to apply as he sees it
cropping up.
s. Who do you think will make the final decision? Who's the most
important in that - the Manager-or the Individual?
R. I suppose it will be the Manager that will make the final decision,
whether or not the individual's suitable or not.
S. Is that fair? Should people be able to move about more freely?
R. I think it's pretty fair at the moment?
S. Why fair?
R. Well. they know the type of personnel they're looking for so you
might have guys going into jobs they're not suited for.
l 4£4 __EXCERPT ~1~J.q
s. What about transferring people in the Company? Moving them from one
dept. to another. Do management decide that?
R. That·s totally Management. I can go to Personnel and fill in a
form to request a move to another dept. But that goes to my
manager. saying I've applied to get a move. So the two managers
get together and mine says he doesn't want to lose me. So it's
not whether you're fit to do the job that decides whether you'll
move. Or it could be there are say 3 other applicants for a job,
none of them as good as you. but they'll take one of them
because they're short-handed. It might be good for the company
that sort of thing. but it holds the individual back. My manager
shouldn't be told till the decision's taken.
_____------'4 5" ~-
EXCERPT Ill.;o
s. What about transferring people from one place to another, you
know, say you get transferred from one bay to another - who
decides that?
R. The Foreman I think and junior Management.
S. Do they just come along and tell you that you're moving.
R. Aye.
s. Do you think it's a fair system?
R. I don't think it's a fair system because a bloke can go in to a
job in one part of the shop and be shifted to another - a
different change altogether, a changeover, you know. The same
with cranes. I get shifted about on cranes but the cranes all
the controls are different, If you work on a crane for 10 years
and you have the same handles but you go to another one the
handles are on a different side you're apt to make mistakes,
you know.
s. Uhu.
R. They think the cranes are all rigged the same way.
S. Hm.
R. They just look into one crane and they think they're all the
same but they're all different.
s. Different side.
R. And eh a bloke's content with the job he's got, he shouldn't be
~ shifted about.
s. So what should they do about the system?
R. Well the way they shift people about there's maybe nobody for
the job so they should start somebody else for the job.
s. Hm.
R. Cranemen's short.
S. Hm. They should take someone in to do the job rather thanshift them about?
R. r think so.s. What about transferring people from one bay to another?
What - how do you think con~rol over that is distributed?
r mean if you were told you were being moved from the pipe shop
to pipe assembly would you get any way in that or is it just
up to your Foreman to say?
R. No if I want a change, I can ask for a change and it's up to them
it's a Management decision or Foreman decision.
S. Hm.
R. Whether to give me a change or not.
S. Do you think you should have more sort of say in the matter? Less.
R. No I think it's just a pretty fair way as it is.
s. Why would you say it is fair?
R. Well in my experience if somebody has eanted a change they've got
it all right.
s. If you want a change you can go. OK. What about the other way
round. If they wanted to shift you and
R. I didn't want to go?
s. You didn't want to go?
R. Well I'd just go and see the Shop Stewart.
s. Hm. Would that work?
R. Aye. They tried to shift a boy in my department before but he
didn't want to go so they got him kept.
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S. What about transferring people from day to daYt from job to job -
who do you think controls that decision?
R. Well to me it's just the gaffer comes up if my machine breaks
down and says I'm putting you round here.
S. Hm.
R. And that's it.
S. Is that the only time you would be moved if your machine broke
down?
R. Yea.
S. You wouldn't be moved from one machine to another?
R. No. Well we might work the next machine too though it would be
the same machinet if the job was in a hurry an' that and the lad
wasn't in I would go on to itt if the job was in a hurrYt the
gaffer would ask me to go on there and do that job.
s. Right. But you wouldn't be shifted from your machine to a different
machine?
R. No.
S. Unless your machine was broken down?
R. Unless it.was broken down.
S. Um.
R. I suppose if they had a good reason they would do.
s. Uhu. Do you think that the way they would do that would be a
permanent move.
R. Especially if you were making a right mess of your work or something
obviously they would move you then and you can't crib about that.
s. Hm. What could you do?
R. ~ell obviously if you think you've been moved unfafrly or something
like thatt for some reason but I can't think you'd be moved.
s. Urn.
4 ~'}EXCERPTIf3.33
S. What about Promotion. How much influence do you as Manager
have over that?
R. Again, as a Manager, I do to a very small degree. But it's the
Directors who seem to control what's happening. Again we're
coming back to the point that the Directors are controlling too
much and they just can't cope with it all.
S. Should they be delegating more to their Managers then?
R. I think so. The Managers should be trusted more. I think maybe
that's another problem. The Directors have in the past managed
to control the Company and all its internal matters. Now it's
just getting too big for that to happen, but they're scared to let
go of the reins to the Managers.
S. Why are they scared? Do they think their Managers are incompetent
or do they not trust them?
R. I think it's a matter of trust really, but that's something
which grows only as cORfidence grows.
S. Do they think that Management aren't competent to take a decision,
or do they think that a Manager would pursue his personal rather
than company interest, or pursue his own ambitions rather than
those of the Directors?
R. I'm quite sure Management can deal with that. It's just that the
Directors don't believe that to be the case. It's the old adage
that I'm the only person able to do that job and not realising that
there are others equally capable of doing the job.
S. They don't realise how talented their Managers are?
R. Possibly, possibly. I'd be in exactly the same situation if I
owned by own business. I'd be a bit scared of leeting go of that
business to other people.
4~oEXCERPT 83..34-
s. What do you think about Promotion here? How is that influenced?
R. Well it's pretty arbitrary - the means of selection are arbitrary.
I mean I've been at 2 interviews for a job that would have meant
promotions and live never been asked a question by the people supposed
to be there to interview me. But on that basis a decision's made.
There's no set procedures there's no training given on how to
carry out an interview. But on that··!.hour interview they'll choose
a man for the job. But there are standard techniques for selection
that you mark job candidates on using thats plus gut feeling
gives you a way to select a man for the job. You've got to have
someone who can work with the other people in the Dept. But it's
all very aribtrary in here.
s. Who should take the decision then?
R. It should be up to the man who's in charge of the Dept. and if
he's responsible to someone else he'll choose the man who gets the
best results. But there should be clear cut procedures to
see if the man's fit to do the job. I don't just mean on paper
qualificationss but to see if he's got the right approach to be
in charge of people. You've got to balance one against the other.
4~,
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What about promotion in the company - who do you think decides
that?
Management
Do you think they should decide or as far as you're concerned?
I think it's just a matter of, you know, personality.
Hm.
Do you think the guys
Input to what?
To make them more have more views to get promotion.
I don't think so. I don't think this is how it happens as far as
promotion is concerned. As long as the chap's got the qualifications
It's only when the chap's no 'got qualifications it looks like as if
somebody's spoke for him.
Does that happen often?
I've never known it to happen.
Do you think that, I mean supposing you were needing a new
chargehand in here, do you think the foreman or the Personnel
would decide who the chargehand should be or should you get Some
say on who should get the job.
Oh I suppose it's the foreman who decides who the chargehand
should be.
Hm or should you, the respondent's work group, decide who your
chargehand should be rather than the foreman?
The person who is most suitable for the job.
Hm. It's left up to the foreman. What about a
In fact his decision might no be right.
Hm. What it it's no right should you have any comeback or do you
just accept.
Just got to accept.it.·s. What about redundancy the, do you think that you~ve enough
influence there - I mean if there was to be one?
·R. Well I don't know about that. I think the union would have
to be in on that a lot more than they are on some things•
.S. What do you think would happen?
R. Ah, the Management would come along and say 'right, that's
it you've no jobs and that's it, I mean you're out on the
street aren't you. Whereas they've got a nice lump sum
tucked away somewhere in the bank for future days.
S. Well obviously you think that's wrong, but what would you
like to see done to change it?
R. There should be more discussion on the whole thing. I mean
years ago, before I was here, I heard they cut back (Respondents
Section) from 26 to 5. Now I mean that's drastic. There
must be an easier way than that. Maybe not as far as the
Management's concerned, but as far as the men are concerned.
We should all be prepared, if the Company g~ts in a bad way,
there must be plenty alternatives to mass redundancy that can
be offered to the work force. Even a cut in pay. Weld
have to compare all of the alternatives to see which is the
best one.
, .EXCERPT A3~y
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
s.
s.
S..
R..
s..
s.
What about redundancy? If there was to be a redundancy in the
Company how do you think that would be decided?
Ah. I think the ones that are in a number of 'years - well
they're the first to go right away I think because they try
to hold on to and then the ones that are near retiring - they
want to get rid of them as well.
Just keep chopping it down.
Hm. It would be the oldest people that would go out?
Yea. They would be near retiring I would imagine.
It wouldn't be on ·last in first out-?
rio, for they would need to pay the men money. I think it would be
you know to try and save the Company, maybe
To payoff the longer service blokes, would that not mean more
money?
The ones that ~re in the longest would get the most cash.
Uhu. But if it were last in first out it would be the people
that were in shortest
And they would get
Aye they would get least.
Yea, they would get the least.
So why would it be the oldest people that would get, you know
the longest service people that would get paid off?
Oh guys that
are near retiring say och it's only another two years or
something like that.
After being in a long time. _____4-.L.d.-'5. That redundancy possibly·would help them?
R. Aye.
5. Urn. Who do you think would decide on redundancy? The
Management would obviously say we're having redundancies
would the Union have any
R. Do you mean what individuals would be going?
5. Well would the Union resist the redundancies?
R. I think they would try because they're always trying allover
the country to do this. It seems to never sort of work. Maybe
the C~pany keeps going for another year but then it still goes
down.
5. Hm. How would you know about that?
R. Well just what I hear on the news and that. You know you hear
that a firm that say, twenty years ago, spent so many million
pounds is closing for definite and the fact it's
closed they've no intention of opening it again.
s. Hm. That story in the Daily Record last week.
R. Yea.
5. Do you think the Unions could do any better to try and stop it?
Their resistance to redundancy?
R. 'Oh no. I think they would be in there to get the best that they
can for the men.Excerpt 'R;~ ,9
s. We were talking about profit sharing as one part'of improvement
R. Well
S. In the Com~any.
R. It depends on the point of view. We've obviously got to find
soem sort of meaningful adequate appropriate
S. Hm
R. System of wage,and salary payments over the next two or three
years.
S. Hm.
R. I don't think we have one at the moment - messed around by the
Government of course and have to more or less ad hoc each and
every year.
s? Hm.
R. From our point of view, what we would like to do, we would like
to be able to negotiate something meaningful, that would be
meaningful and relevant over two or three years and that's
what we're. trying to finn, Whether profit sharing, or whatever
we're keeping an open mind on it.
S. How much is the freerider problem?
R. How much is the ?
s. The freerider problem in your id~as on profit sharing in the
works?
R. The which problem?
S. Freerider.
R. Sorry I'm not following you. I'm not getting the drift.
S. Well the idea of your profit sharing scheme 'is that everybody
works a bit harder because if they work harder the COmpanymakes more profits and if the Company makes more.profits, they
get more money.
R. Oh ·aye. Ah.
5. 50 the freerider problem suggests that certain guys would say
well if I don't work any harder the Company will still make
more profits for everybody else will be working to try and get
more money for the same amount of work.
R.· Hm. I don't know really incentive from profit sharing is all
that direct immediate or relevant. I think it's all part and
parcel of the bigger pict~re. Urn. I think the actual
incentive is too remote from the point of view of individual
motivation. I think for most individuals, obviously for some
it would. No I think it's part and parcel of the bigger
picture - the bigger picture that I talked about earlier on - the
sort of people equating their wellbeing with the Company wellbeing.
It follows from that I think that if it's reflected in more money
when the Company is doing better it always fits this particular
picture. I think you would be a bit naive to think it starts
people working harder I don't think it does.
5. Hm.
R. But I think it could perhaps help more along the road to
having people work more positvely with you.
5. Hm.
R. That's the object of the exercise.
5. How much do you think you've already got that?
R. I think it's beginning to emerge in this particular Company. I
think we got this by virtue of a few other Companies in the region
were doing well, they were expanding - I think we got credit for
this. I think there's some measure of this at the moment.R. What worries me very much 'is that I don't see any corresponding
matching movement in the Trade Unions but,it's got to come
internally, I don't think it can be externally app1i~d. I
think they've got far too 'much fragmentation. I think ther2's
far too much living in the past. I think the~'ve still got
19th century ideas in some measure in the whole operation. I
think they've got certain fundamental internal problems with
robber barons, if you will.
s. Hm.
R. They've got vested interests in their own organisation structure
and authority
s. Hm.
R. Urn. This can only be resolved internally. I'm sure of that.
I see no movement here and it worries me.
s. You mean that the
R. No it's not even as simple as that. It's so fragmented it's
not appropriate I think for the - say the tail end of the 20th
century.
s. Hm.
R. It's got to be infinetly more effective, infinitely more stream-
lined. I'm not suggesting for one minute that the fundamental
role changes, it shouldn't
S. Hm.
R. That's not the point but the point is the way they go about it.
" The way they were orranised. The way they're set up urn it's
a most unholy industrial mess if you like. The whole structure
.._-----s.
R.
S. What do you mean by the WilY they're organised? 'Do you 'mean
that the fact that there is a proliferation of Vnions that you
R. Yes.
S. Can't see ten or eleven Unions 'being organised?
R. Yes, and I think these 'very fragments often 'poses a lot of
difficulty in industry. One problem calolses a lot of needless
strife for a needless problem.
· S. On the shop floor you face mainly 'two Unions, the A.U~E~W.,
and the Boilermakers, with the rest sort of tagging along.
R. Well it's nc't really as simple as that because eh you've got
first of ,all the indirect source of the 'Municipal &General
Workers the./' rl~
s. Hm.
R. Afairly significant group. You can do nothing without
cranemen an1 sling~rs and really you can't sort them out into
various sizes because in a complex inter-related operation such
as we've get you can't do without any section
5. Hm.
R. 50 as far as Man - they're all equally important from our point
of view.
S. Hm. Hm.
R. You've got to in fact keep them all operating satisfactorily and
effectively otherwise the thing stops.
S. Even the likes of the patternmakers who've got what - about
R. Oh yes.
S. Twelve members.
R. Well the patternmakers have but eh I mean you're not going
to set them aside and pick off the weakest or something like
that.
Right.
And eh but we are fortunate in here. I mean we've got the
.. 4t,qs.
R.
s.
R.
patternmakers, the joiners and woodworkers and they all work
in "cahout. I mean" if there is no work or less work" in one
there's a fair amount of flexibility. That makes it all
tolerable.
Hm.
But if you have the situatiori where ~ach of thos~ were
standing very much on their Union rights and "demarkatilln,
"it is a different picture altogether.
Hm.
But the fact is that we have a fair measure of flexibility in
here and therefore we get around that particular example that
you mentioned.
16z _ 4=1-0EXCERPT A3AO
S.
R.
What about problems getting orders? I mean it's not always
been as good either.
Well you see, it's very simple the Manufacturing Division
need work. It's for the salesmen in the Sales Division to win
orders to make sure that we get that work. The problems we have
between the two divisions are really a problem of personality,
rather than a problem of structure. It's a perceptual problem.
Something might be minor to a salesman , but the same thing might
be major for us in Manufacturing•
..-----
4-=1-1EXCERPT ~-lAI
S.
R.
What aBout the orders the Company's been getting? I mean
things have gone pretty well recently. Who's had the most
influence on that?
Well there's been a lot of propaganda about that one. The
Management have made sure they get the credit for these orders.
But then they had the foresight to build advanced orders so
that in the next year we captured the market because our prices
were last year's prices. If we didn't produce the work they
wouldn't sell them. Selling's a Management job. I can only
look at my side of the work, whereas a Manager has an overall
look at the whole set-up and he's the man to try to get the
orders•
• ...... A_+.:....:::::t).....::...........-__ ~EXCERPT A3.A9.
s.
R.
S.
R.
s.
R.
What sort of changes has the Health and Safety at Work Act
meant for (the Firm).
Well, it's certainly had the effect more safety conscious than we
were before the Act. We probably didn't pay enough attention
to safety before, but then most companies were the same.
Do you think things have really improved them?
Oh yes, I would say definitely. The number of accidents,
days lost and so on are all down.
What about the accidents with the cranes then? You had a
bad one last weekend when that unit was dropped.
Well that's something we've got in hand. We didn't know we were
using the cranes beyond their capacity, so we'll be bringing in
new cranes which can lift the sort of weights which we require.
6z -:. 4..:.,.9L....)_EXCERPT 112-1,
s. Hm. Ah. What about your Union - how much has it improved conditions
in the - for you?
R. For us? Quite a bit. It arrowheads quite a few of the staff
in here.
S. Hm.
R. And then the ways of getting me again 7p per hour for glasses.
S. Right. You are getting paid that as well?
R. Yes. Everybody who works in the works gets the 7p an hour.
S. Hm, Ah. In terms of salary say, how much has the Union helped?
Before Government legislation came in.
R. I'm going quite a while back in thoughts. They gave us quite a few
advisory
S. Yea they get - their main function really for you has been the
information that they give you?
R. Yea. At the moment they are still fighting for a few of us on the
test side of things because of the noise.
s. Hm.
R. The works were against the noise.
S. Hm.
R. In their fight they have had the whole end of the far end of Bay 12
there blocked off.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
s.
Yea
But what about all the people working inside?
Hm.
The noise level inside has increased because it is reflected.
Hm. So what's the?
There's no dispensation given to anyone working in that area. If
we get something, the workmen in that area will be bound to get it.
Hm.
., -!...4-:.....:J.~4 _R. But their Union's not following up at all.
S. Hm•. tt ..',s um -- sort of would you term Bay 13? Is it extra
payments or
R. Well something like differential.
S. You're looking for money rather than protection?
R. No. First of all more protection for the ears.
s. Just these muffs?
R. Those muffs - they're not much good
S. Hm. They stop you going completely deaf? They're not much use?
R They stop a biy, but we are talking about 120-130 decibels.
S. Hm. True
R. You should hear when we are firing 2 shafts that's the noisy
monger.
S. I wouldn't know if you were firing two shafts.
R. You'd know by the noise
S. Or whether it was three
S. Um.
R. Well put it like this they've had 90 odd decibels in a neighbouring
shop when one of these is running.EXCERPT 171.:.44
s. What sort of function do you think the Union plays in here?
R. What sort of function do I think the Union plays in here?
s. Yes, what sort of roles does it play?
R. r think it plays an important role in respect of looking after
the men's welfare and working conditions, hourly rate of wages,
looking after any - how would you put it - injustices that may
occur to the men, investigating circumstances and also playing a
role where we see possible trouble arising from failings of
Management or, on occasion, failings of men, we try and intervene
and make it right.
s. How much does the Management appreciate this?
R. Well they don't pay us enough, let me put it like that.
S Well I mean the function of the Union, I don't mean it that other way.
R. Well, I think that the Management, by way of the Government and by
way of general outside pressures, everybody is beginning to realise
that the Unions have a place,. and a big place, in industry and
should be playing a more important part than what they are and I
think over the last few years they are beginning to playa more
important part.
S. What sort of Unions would interest you? Would you alter them?
R. Well I would say in the area of the working conditions that workers
and works fancy. Look, just to give you an example of a recent, this
is over the last year or so, a couple of years, the safety angle, the
workers are getting very interested and very serious about the safety
situation which I think is good. But, their basic interest is to
better their working conditions and their working wages and they are
even going beyond that because there are policies being laid down and
I think the Unions are beginning to playa full part as they should be.s. How much has the increased interest helped the health and safety
of workers? How much by th~ Unions themselves?
R. Well I think we are trying our best. I think we are doing not too
bad but it is in its infancy just now. I think it is something that
has only started and will take a couple of years before anyone
really sees the fruits of their results - or their efforts I
should say
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/appendix 4Excerpt 4.1
R. "Oh yes, I've got a completely different perspective than
when I was on the Shop-Floor. When I was there I used to
say 'Oh what the hell, they've got bags of money. They
can pay me.' To be quite honest I used to skive a bit.
I'm not saying I don't skive now - but I think I'm working
a darn sight more than I did when I was on the Shop-Floor."
S. Why?
R. Well, when I was on the Shop Floor I was serving my time,
.and I think I've matured since then. But as well as that
.
you hear a lot more when you're on the Staff •• unofficially.
But you find these rumours materialise. I'm not saying I'm any
better informed than the Shop-Floor, officially, but I am
better informed unofficially."
fExcerpt 4.. t
B. "As far as 1
1mconcerned every Manager has a right to introduce
a Cost Reduction scheme, and as far as I know that information
is passed on to an overall section, set up to look into cost
reduction exercises. They look into the scheme and leave it to
the Manager to report back about how it is working.
S. Hm.
R. I suppose it could be better) but at the moment it comes as far
down as section leaders to report to a Manager what they would
like to see in their section, but I, as an individual, have never
been aasked about my opinion about how we could save here and there,
but it's possibly a matter for the Cost Reduction section.
S. Hm.
R. I suppose all sections could put forward something or other.
I mean the Shop-floor especially should be involved, because the
productive side, there are the guys who can do something in
improve efficiency. Not that I mean there's a lot of inefficiency
I
there, but the man there has a more tangible effect on his
environment. IIExcerpt 4.3
s. "What about cost reduction, you know the Company's trying to
reduce its costs?
R. J donlt know much about that at all.
S. Is there ever anything about,that on the shop floor?
R. Nothing.
S. What if they introduced some sort of system, do you ever hear
anything about it?
R. No, we never hear anything about costs at all."Excerpt 4. 4.:
s. "Ah. what about communications of information from your depart-
ment? Purely communications outwith the department to the shop
floor and to the staff in other departments. are they as
satisfactory as they should be?
R. Well. what do you mean by communications?
S. Communications about profit and loss well. talking or putting
out "bumph" for want of a better word. Ah. is that as
satisfactory as·it should be? Or. do you feel that you
should be telling them more - or less?
R. In fact if we'were telling them more or less it would change
what we are doing so obviously live got to say no to that
question.
S. Hm. Ah. if there was a demand for that sort of information
would it be accessible to employees?
R. Yes.
S. If they wanted it?
R. When I held this thing with 75 Managers at the end of every
session I said "O.K. there is what the Company produces at the
moment. not all of you get these pieces of paper. what piece of
paper do you want?
4S. Hm.
R. As a result of that two things happened. One, a guy who wasn't
getting part of the basic set said "Oh, I would like that piece
and that piece" so we arranged that next morning, and equally,
somebody said, "Look instead of, in addition to those five pieces
the Company produces could you also produce a sixth piece about
X." We started to arrange for Xto be produced. So we are open
to suggestions on these sorts of things. We don't know all the
answers.
S. Is there any information that would be almost subject to the
'Official Secrets Act'?
R. Yes. Profitability at this time of the year would be inclined
to have a dramatic effect on the share price of the Company. ,
S. Hm. Ah.
R. Which if we were to release at the moment - if people were to
know at, the moment what the profit and loss of the Company was
that would de~ress, if that were to leak out, it would have a
bad effect on the Stock Market, it would affect all sorts of
things. So, obviously, one would have to be extremely discreet
about using, that information.
S. How does that•••?R. I mean if I were at a party and a chap says to me "How's
(the Firm) doing?" I'm not going to say they are making
huge profits or huge losses.
S. Yes.
R. Because it would affect. it could go on to someone. and equally
therefore that one should not spread this sort of information
around because it could be used in a fashion. unconsciously.
which was to the detriment of the Company.
S. Hm. How much security would you have to impose on that sort of
information? You know. would you feel that you would be able to
release it to the Shop Stewards on condition that they don't leak
it themselves? Or to Staff Union people?
R. It depends. it depends how far they want the information and what
they are going to use it for.
S. Hm.
R. If a guy says to me "I want to know the profits of the Company
for A. Band C reasons" and those reasons are valid. he would be
told them.
S. Hm.
R. But if in fact there is no real reason for it. why do it? Why
run the risk of exposure?5. Hm. In protection of the members' interests. what's a valid
reason?
R. Well. in protection of the members' interests what is in the
employment of a Company is in fact Managers have been appointed
in that Company to be responsible for certain aspects of it.
hopefully of running the Company in the interest of the members.
5. Yes.
R. 50 I don't see in fact how disclosure of information or a desire
to obtain it necessarily means that if that desire or that
request be denied it wasn't in the interest of the members of the
Company. It could be the right thing to be done at a particular
point of time."it ,-; .' ~;
'r 1
l'......
Excerpt 4. 5"
S. Who should have the right to control that sort of meeting?
Should you be able to demand information that they are not
giving you or should they only give you what they are
prepared to give.
R. Well, we should be able to demand any information and ask any
questions on all the things we spoke about there and they
should be wanting to give us all the information. It
shouldn't be a case of, you know, it shouldn't be a case of
them not wanting to give it. They should be coming forward
with all the available information. If people have
information to give you and they don't give you it its wrong.
S. What about confidential information?
R. Well, O.K. then, we work in the factory. What's in the
factory is to our interests.
S. Right.
R. Confidential information could be that Vickers Armstrong is going
to have a take-over bid and that could possibly be against our
interests and we would be fighting against that if it seemed to
be against our interests, or we would be wanting certain
assurances that if they did take over the place what would not
happen.S. What about, I mean an example that was given to me the other day
there, was if you hold the responsibility of the Company as of
time of moment you would results, this could have
serious effects for the Company on the Stock Market, if that
information ••••
R. Somebody would have to know that we work in this factory and
we're not, for whatever information they've got at hand, we're
not out to turn round and stab ourselves or the Company in the
back, but if you're talking about if we're going into wage
negotiations and we know the profitability of the Company well
it puts us in a better position. I think we should know that.
At least it puts us on a start knowing what kind of money might
be available, but, at the same time, I have also got to say that
the Company, when doing that, could also put forward their
reasons of what they are doing with the money. You see what I'm
getting at? Now we are talking about an expansionist situation
in this factory. This is what we are looking for. That kind of
thing should be getting put across to us. The facts. It is
when they hide the facts that they might be doing themselves harm.
S. The ~rgument that they could not pass on confidential information
to you, the Shop Stewards, isn't because you would shoot your
mouth off.
R. All I'm saying is that a Board of ten or twelve Directors, or
twenty or thirty Directors are most honest than twenty or thirty
shop stewards or more liable to keep quiet. Well I think it
would be the other way about as has been proved time after time
after time.S. Why do you say that?
R. Well you've got a Board for instance, yesterday S.U.I.T.S., just
to give you an example. There's two Directors they're wanting
to keep the shares and there's another twenty Directors or ten
Directors they're wanting a profit out of it, they're wanting
to sell it. Whatever suits them moves down to England and
goes out of Scotland altogether, of no moment to them. That's
what I'm saying".
10Excerpt 4.b
R. But there again it's going back to what to ask and how they
go - they could give you information and they readily do it
on occasions. It just means nothing.
S. What do you mean - it means nothing?
R. They give you facts and figures but unless you have other
facts and figures to go along with it it's sort of means
nothing.
S. They just give you part of the gen?
R. The likes of. every year there's a - what do you wall it -
S. Abalance sheet. Yes. Profit and Loss Account.
R. O.K. you read up and down it but unless you know how to
interpret it you just don't know how the Company's position is.
We then have to take it back to our legal side.
S. But this is the fault of the Company or the fault that you lack
the expertise to•••••
R. I would say it's both. that's how I would think although we
should be allowed in and have meetings at Board level. When the
Board's meeting. we should be there representing. I mean. why
shouldn't we be? You know.
I I
----------Excerpt 4.'
s. Do you think they give you as much information as they should
do?
R. No, I think it's quite bad the information.
S. What sort of areas do they•••••
R. Well they say, for instance, that they can't give us a rise
because they've got this coming and this coming.
S. Hm.
R. And the next thing you read that they've made huge profits.
S. Yes.
R. And things like this that they've never told you about.
S.. Right. What sort of, information should they be giving you?
That you don't get.
R. Well, just general information - how they're doing and that.Excerpt 4.~.
s. Do you think some people might say that the shop floor lack sort
of expertise to make that sort of decision - do you think that's
true?
R. I think in some respects I do but then again when I think we have
two machines in there and I was told that it was higher Management
that decided to buy them. Those machines were hardly worked at
all.
S. Hm.
R. You know and it was higher Management that bought them in.
S. Right.
R. They made the decision to get them.
S. Hm.
R. What I mean is if they had asked. if they had just went and
consulted the Foreman and that what kind of machines would be
best.
S. Hm.
R. Instead they went out and bought these machines without saying
to anybody.
S. Hm.
R. And they're a white elephant.
'3s. And they don't work?
R. Not much. Well they're working now ans that's the first time
in the last...... They've been in, they've been lying round the
factory since they came in and that's before the last holiday.Excerpt 4. g-
R. "New machines - some of them in our eyes are bad.
s. But do they need that sort of decision as well?
R. Oh, they've got to do that.
S. Do you think You should be involved in that?
R. I think some of the people in the workshop area should be·
S. Hm.
R. That have experience on the type of machines
S. Hm.
R. These two Cincinnatti machines they got in - a waste of money
S. Universal borers?
R. No they do everything
S. Hm.
R. No, they're horizontal borers. Top of Bay 9.
S. YesR. Numerous troubles on them.
s. Hm.
R. There's one like the capstan head that does numerous jobs by
tape control. They never work. They've had trouble with
them since ever they got them."
IvExcerpt 4.10
s. The plan might be to introduce X new machines on the floor.
There are a large number of guys in this Company with very
long service who have possible developed a considerable
amount of expertise in this particular job.
R. If you take that particular example they, in fact, would be.
I wouldn't like to say that they are consulted. I can't give you
the answer to that. The proposal for capital expansion comes up
to us from the manufacturing division. You would have to ask the
manufacturing division how far they consulted with the individual
workmen who have been working that same type of machine for the
last twenty years. I don't know the answer to that but I can
say to you in fact decisions, for example, about the Rank Xerox -
we've just ~pent over £150,000 for the Rank Xerox - the
operators played a part in that. Well they say "this is a hellish
thing to use and this is a good thing to use
ll so they would play
a part in that.
S•. Yes.
R. Their views would be taken into account. I don't know how far
in that situation.
...
S.
R.
S.
Right. How would they be taken into account? Would you have a
formal meeting with them or just go and •••• ?
Just chat.
Chat.
1=1-r
I
I
I
I
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R. Formal meetings are a pain in the foot for everybody's embarrassed
to begin with.
s. Right.
R. So you just go up and say "which would you suggest?".
s. Right.
R. What do you want to do?
s. Right.
R. Formality of it puts everybody under pressure. puts everybody in
a situation where they are reluctant to express his views. I mean
you talk about brainstorming. One of the reasons why brain-
storming, I would suggest, has failed in the past is the fact
that what happens is "We are going to have a brainstorming session
so would you please all come into my room at 9 o'clock tomorrow
morning and all sit round the table.
1I It's so bloody artificial.
It's unbelievable to get effective brainstorming. The only
effective brainstorming you get is where five guys would have to
be sitting round the table and we say IIO.K. let's look at this
particular point."
s. Hm.
R. Then you really get a contribution.
s. Do you ever feel that the people below you might have ideas that
they don't pass on up?
R. Yes.
s. What would you say was the source of that and why?
, 8R. Why do they not pass it on up?
s. Yes, why do they not pass it on up?
R. Hm. For the same reasons as I wouldn't pass it on up because in
fact they may not be absolutely certain if it is a valid idea and
are reluctant to put it forward until such times as they really
feel confident about it.
S. They don't want to look stupid?
R. Thatls right. 1
1mexactly the same way, with my Managing
Director. live got a few ideas which 1
1mnot willing to put
forward to him at the moment because 1
1mnot sure that they are
right, and 1
1mnot going to put forward a half-baked idea at the
moment".
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S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
"What do you think of the communications in the Firm?
It gives nothing to its employees. it's extremely poor.
Why do you think this is?
Because they don't have any communication between the Management
and the employees.
Why is there no mechanism for this?
Well. there are faults on both sides. I'm sure - I'm not really
sure we need a mechanism for the men on the Shop-Floor.
Do you think they're not really interested?
I'm not sure that he would be all that interested. though having
said that the man on the Shop-Floor is interested if we sell a
large number of units. because that makes his job more secure.
But it's absolutely ridiculous if a person working here can hear
about an order on the radio long before he hears about it from
the Management. 'even though they've known about it for 2 or 3
months.
Why do you, think the man on the Shop-Floor is not interested?
He is interested in small things which affect him directly -
like £2 off a pair of industrial boots.
10S. But what about higher level information?
R. I can't really see him being all that interested, and if they
are I'm not sure they go to the right people for it.
S. Would they get it if they wanted it?
R. Yes, I think the Company would give it to them if they wanted
it. I don't think the Company would go out and say "we are
prepared now to give you all this information". What the Company
would say is "you tell us the information you want and we will
tell you".
S. Can the Shop-Floor trust this information?
R. Yes, I would think so.
S. You can make a Company appear to be almost anything if you
juggle the books long enough, and if you're sufficiently
disreputable?
R. No, I don't think that applies to this Company. Avery smart C.A.
could maybe paint a different picture, but at the end of the day
we don't have anyone as smart as Cooper Lybrand. I 'don't think
that applies at all. Any information they want I am sure they
would get it. If the Convenor said 'Could you tell us what our
profit forecast is this year?' we would give it to them. We
would give it to them, but say 'Could you please keep it quiet'.
They would trust the Shop Stewards and Convenor here that far.
S. What about really confidential information?R. Well, they've got to remember we're part of a group, and that the
group have carried us for years •••• I heard the other day that
they were talking about company insurance, talking about a new
contracting-in/contracting-out, and the men down there wanted to
know how much money the Company saved, and if the Company saved
this amount of money, with the money saved instead of getting 2
years life insurance, could they not get 3 years. There's nothing
confidential about that, it's something the men should know. They
can take it up and negotiate it from there. The Company said,
"that's the savings we make", but we have a 2% surcharge on
National Insurance and we can't afford it. If the men want it,
they get it. But there's no free hand-out of information.
s. Can you trust the information you get?
R. I don't take everything at face value.
S. Well how would you make that sort of judgment?
R. Well, if it looks reasonable and you can follow a pattern, and
doesn't deviate too much from the norm, then that information is
reasonable. Don't forget you don't get one piece of information
- you get lots of pieces of information which you can link one
with the other. If you've got something which is way out, you've
got to check it.
S. Do you think the Company should change its policy on how it
disseminates information?R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
They should really have a daily information sheet posted on the
notice board and as far as that notice board provides daily
informationt it could issue executive orders for work to be done
from that sheett or about matters of policy. I also think the
newsletter is appa11ing t it's one of the worst magazines I have
ever seen. Compare to the Shell Oil Company in getting somebody
professional. You have got to bring it to people's attention.
I'm not saying there should be a naked woman on the front - but
in next month's you'll see a picture of somebody who's retiringt
and 3 pictures of (Managing Director S) and 2 pictures of
(Managing Director C).
Do you think it's policy or is it just a sin of omission?
It's a sin of more ignorance - they just don't know.
Consciously?
Oh nOt quite unconsciously.
Is it just something which doesn't overly concern them?
No, it doesn't concern them. Once they've produced this limpid
document, they've made the effort - you can blame (the Company)
who product it. It's just unprofessional.
How would you change the information system?
Well, you have a newsletter which doesn't help to get rid of
the 'we and them' attitudet it doesn't get anybody involved at
2.,
~-------------------all, and as such it doesn't give offence to anybody, and since
it doesn't give offence to anybody it's absolutely blood dull.
s. Nobody reads it?
R. People do read it - they look to see if there's a picture of big
Fiona in it for a change and then put it in the waste-paper
basket.
1I
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s. liThe way the communications are organised, the guys you represent
are supposed to be informed by their foremen on certain things.
Does this happen?
R. Quite a lot of times it doesn't happen.
s. Tell me how it doesn't happen.
R. Well, just a failure of lack of communication from up above.
s. Does any of this information not get to the foremen or does it
get to them but they don't bother to pass it on?
R. I think it is half and half. Quite a lot of the information
doesn't come to the foreman and the half that does come to the
foreman sometimes I don't think the foremen bother their arse
putting it through to us. Or to the men, I should say.
S. Many of them say they are too busy.
R. Itcould possibly be. Or they don't think it important enough and
then you are coming back to the attitude.
s. Apathy.
R. That's right. Not only apathy but they're only them.
S. Right. The status is wrong.
R. Oh there's no doubt about that •••
15S. If you don't get information from a foreman t who would you go
to?
R. Me as a Shop Steward or what?
S. As a Shop Steward.
R. If I didn't get information from the foreman that I felt I was
due getting and I had already approached the foreman t I would go
to my Convenor and go above the foreman and try and get the
information from somebody else.
S. Through the Works Manager say?
R. Yes t that's right. Or t as they do in here t you'll find that most
of the Shop Stewards just go to Manager I or whoever they can get
a grip of.
S. Is there a bloke ••••
R. Or their Head Foreman I should say."
S. Is there one place that lacks communication to channel where
there seems to be a particularly strong blockage or is it just
a general thing through the staff and the management?
R. I would say it is just a general thing. I wouldn't say it was
in anyone area.
S. In all cases?R. I think it is something that people need to get used to, people
need to live with and get used to the fact that it's got to be
done, some people are not accepting it.
S. What sort of information do you think you should be getting?
R. Everything appertaining to the work, the factory workload,
conditions, orders, jobs, sub-contracting. Everything.
S. In a sense, anything to do with the Company appertains to your
job eventually.
R. Well, we had a period of time in here when people were talking
about takeover bids, that included the higher Management, where
at a meeting with Shop Stewards they did not deny it. As a
matter of fact lent themselves to the suggestion that it would
be there but they were very much in similar position to that we
were in. They appeared not to know even higher than the
Directors in here. So you've got that kind of situation. I
think we should know everything that's going on. Don't forget
people can come in here - you know this place is thriving just
now say in respect of orders - in another six months you could
find that somebody's "Oh this work is going away down to England
and this place is closing for some mysterious reason or a take-
over bid". Things like that. That's what I mean when we should
know everything that may affect our livelihood or our jobs.
S. Do you think the •••••.••• should be organised getting that
information to you.R. I think it would need to come down a Government decree first of
all. An Act of Parliament and then it should be organised on a
continuous basis just the same as safety is organised. It should
be something that is worked into the system so that people do it
as second nature.
S. You would have some sort of committee like you have for Health
and Safety? Acommittee who could meet regularly and be briefed.
R. Well O.K. 1
1mnot going to say its necessary to meet regularly.
S. Who would •••• if you don't make it regularly?
R. When you say regularly, they would have to ask - once a week?
Once a month I would say, aie.
S. Once a month say.
-. -
R. Once a month I would like meetings like that. Anything that is
liable to affect the Company. Orders for instance, lack of
orders, failure of orders.
S. Who should have the right to control that sort of meeting? Should
you be able to demand information that they are not giving you or
should they only give you what they are prepared to give.
R. Well, we should be able to demand any information and ask any
, "
questions on all the things we spoke about there and they should
be wanting to give us all the information. It shouldn't be a
case of, you know, it shouldn't be a case of them not wanting togive it. They should be coming forward with all the available
information. If people have information to give you and they
don't give you it its wrong.
S. What about confidential information?
R. Well, O.K. then, we work in the factory. What's in the factory
is to our interests.
S. Right.
R. Confidential information could be that Vickers Armstrong is going
to have a take-over bid and that could possibly be against our
interests and we would be fighting against that if it seemed to
be against our interests, or we would be wanting certain assurances
that if they did take over the place what" would not happen.
S. What about, I mean, an example that was given to me the other day
there, was if you hold the responsibility of the Company as of
time of moment you would ••••• results, this could have serious
effects for the Company on the Stock Market, if that information
....
R. Somebody would have to know that we work in.this factory and
we're no, for whatever information they've got at hand, we're
not out to turn round and stab ourselves or the Company in the
back, but if you're talking about if we're going into wage
negotiations and we know the profitability of the Company wellit puts us in a better position. I think we should know that.
At least it puts us on a start knowing what kind of money might
be available. but. at the same time. I have also got to say that
the Company. when doing that. could also put forward their reasons
of what they are doing with the money. You see what 1
1mgetting
at? Now we are talking about an expansionist situation in this
factory. This is what we are looking for. That kind of thing
should be getting put across to us. The facts. It is when they
hide the facts that they might be doing themselves harm.
S. The argument that they could not pass on confidential information
to you. the Shop Stewards. isn't because you would shoot your
mouth off.
R. All 1
1msaying is that a Board of ten or twelve Directors or
twenty or thirty Directors are more honest than twenty or thirty
shop stewards or more liable to keep quiet. Well I think it
would be the other way about as has been proved time after time
after time.
S. Why do you say that?
R. Well youlve got a Board for instance. yesterday S.U.I.T.S•• just
to give you an example. There's two Directors they're wanting
to keep the shares and there's another twenty Directors or ten
Directors they~re wanting a profit out of it. they're wanting
to well it. Whatever suits them moves down to England and goes
out of Scotland altogether. of no moment to them. That's what
1
1msaying.s. How does this. I mean there is a possibility that some time in
the future the Government is going to decide to impose some
form of information distribution on British companies. How
would that sort of communications network relate to that?
R. Communication? What communications - there's no communications
network.
S. If,there was to be a plan to give you all the information you
want do think that would be better or worse than having some
sort of participation at Board level?
'R. We're going to have participation in work. We should have
participation with Boards and Management at work level."
slExcerpt 4.J~
s. "What about information in the Company? Do you think what they
give you is really adequate?
R. Well in my line, Management is pretty good. But generally
information does not come down from the Board to the Managers,
and it can't go any further than that very well.
s. Why do you think the board would restrict information?
R. I don't think its intentional, it's just lack of experience.
It's still a fairly young company and I think some of the people
at that level don't have experience of a company this size~
S. What sort of information do you pass on down?
R. Well, any information that is circulated for general release is
passed on, which can, in some instances, affect the ,future of
the whole Company•. We get told about all the contracts that have
been signed. That's passed on - everybody's got to know what's
happening here.
S. Do you think that's done quickly enough, I mean people found out
about some contracts in the Evening Times?
R. That's right •••• It's kind of difficult to think about things
like that. There's general information comes round.
S. Do you tell your people everything you know?
R. I try to•
... ---s. Do you ever hold things back?
R. Well there are certain things I've got to hold back. For
instance. I was involved in wage negotiations last October-
November. Well obviously I could not pass that information on.
s. Why could you not pass that on?
R. Well. I was working on information that was of such a nature
that it could not be released at that time.
s. Why not?
R. It could not be released because it was subject to negotiation
with unions, and it couldn't be released before the unions were
told about it.
s. You had to tell the unions before you told enybody else?
R. Well that's the way the system works. We discuss things with
unions, and they go away and think about it. and then come back
to the negotiating table. It would be unfair to give them the
advantage of knowing what we are up to.
s. Before the negotiators found out?
R. That's right.
s. What would be unfair about telling 'the troopS before the
negotiations?R. Well, it wouldn't be unfair to tell 'the troops' in principle,
and get some feedback on what they thought. But for them to know
what was going to be offered by the Company, and be able to pre-
empt the whole thing. That's just not the way you would operate.
In other words you would have trade union negotiators coming to
the table, knowing what was going to be offered.
s. It's almost a war situation?
R. Yes. The Management come to the table with one offer. The
unions have their own offer, and then it's just a matter of
negotiation till. they meet somewhere in the middle. It's like a
game of chess.
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S. Ills there any particular type of information which the Board tend
to hang on to?
R. I probably did the Board a slight injustice earlier on. when I
said they're not experienced at the level they're operating on.
It's maybe true to a certain degree. but I do give them the
benefit of knowing a hell of a lot more than we do. What they're
doing is what I was doing with the wage negotiations. They
can't pass things on for security reasons. or they can't pre-empt
certain situations. But there are things like the introduction
of new products. to see what the general feel was from the
employee point of view. They wouldn't get any information on the
market. but internally they might get some feed-back. There are
things which just happen. and there doesn't seem to have been any
chance to discuss it with the Staff or the Managers. Especially
the Managers because there's a great deal of experience and
professionalism within the Management but they don't get allowed
to have any feedback from directors.
S. . They're not allowed to exercise their professionalism?
R. Yes. they're not allowed to get involved in some of the things
they could get involved in.
1I~ppendix 5Excerpt 5.1
S. Ho~ do you feel about how you're paid in the Company?
R. Well, compared to other managers here - doing work no less demanding
than mine, no less responsible and so on - I'm quite dissatisfied.
S. Why?
R. Well you see it's because I've been in here 3 or 4 years now, and
what they can pay me is held down by the Labour Government's incomes
policy. People are joining the Company, doing no less responsible
work, but being paid £800 a year more than I get. That's the
fault of the govt. - and of the trade unions, because well they're
calling the shots aren't they?Excerpt 5.2
s. Who do you think has most influence on Pay?
R. Well ••• one would tend to say it's the work-people. because they're
,always in asking. I suppose they're the ones with the control since
it's always them who start it off ••• the management never come down •••
management will say there will be a 10% increase. and then the workers
say they don't want it. they want 20%. I tend to think unions
get organised..··· -', in the area and decide they want a minimum wage
of such and such a week. and then its left to them to negotiate
with Management But I would like to see a system where Management
get down at a set time every year and discuss salaries ••• and
discuss salaries on the basis of profitability and the cost of
1iving outside. 'Excerpt 5.3
s. Who do you ,think influences what you get paid - you know, your
salary?
R. Well I mean the union goes in and it shouts for as much as possible
and management shouts for as little as possible, and what we get is
somewhere in the middle.
S. Do you think that's how things should be?
R. In this firm anyway the unions are pretty level-headed, so they
don't ask for anything extortionate. Or at least we don't get it.
And we're all reasonably happy with what we do get, so I think
the management play ball with us that way.
S. Yes I see. But do you think that's a fair system?
R. Well maybe not exactly, because management have more power because
they can decide their own pay. They can give themselves whatever
they see as reasonable, and that'll be higher than a compromise"
would be. So that gives them much more power in distributing the
total wage bill.
S. Do you think anything could be done about that?
R. Oh, that's a situation you would have a hard time changing •••
as the company stands you would have to change the whole company
structure. And the structure of management. We would have to have
workers on the board - but then you would have a bosss and somebody
to work under them.Excerpt 5.4
s. How do you think a pay rise has been decided on?
R. Oh that's Management. Management have the control. They're the
ones who'll decide whether or not you'll get an' increase or
not. They'll be advised by their section leaders or manager,
whether a man is justified an increase by the amount of work.
You could start here in a job and over the years the job starts
to get bigger and bigger. This is where you find some managers
are very lax. They must see some jobs are getting bigger and
bigger, but they're singing dumb about it, because it means going
to somebody higher up and suggesting an increase in salary there,
because of the amount of work that the man's doing.
S. Do you think the unions should have more say?
R. I would think so in a case like this. If you decide to do something,
all you can do is approach the union to approach management on your
behalf. But I wouldn't want the unions to get too much control.
That would be a bad thing.
S. Why?
R. Well, they would start to demand too much and put your job in
jeopardy. I mean this happened allover the country. You know
·as well as I do that the unions have put a lot of firms to the
wall ••• you've got to have men realistic enough to know when to
stop pushing. What I would like to see here is a referendum, where
you have Personnel and Management on one side, and the unions on
the other. Well they could sit down and analyse the payroll, and
they'd be able to say "How come this bloke's getting so much and
this other bloke who's doing the same or more is getting less?"
Because I think in spite of (a union) tnere's still a lot of this
going on. There are some sections where there's only one man doing
a job in a section and they call him the chief (job title).so howcan he be the chief (job title) Chief over what? Over himself?
You can only make a chief when you've got 2 or 3. Somebody's
bound to get extra money for being a chief (job title).11
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s. What about urn decisions on ah how much people get on behalf of a pay
increase? Some people say that Unions control wage rises. Who
do you think controls the decisions as regards that.
R. Well generally speaking. I think tneir level of increase nowadays
is negotiated more between the Government and the TUC than any other
particular body urn I don't think there is very much room for
maneouvring in the present system.
s.
R. Hm.
S. How would you like to see wage negotiations carried on by the
unions as such?
R. I think under present circumstances that some sort of incomes policy
must be implemented by a government. I think that we. as a country.
would go very sadly wrong with free collective bargaining. Certain
pressure groups in the country. such as the miners. I think they
would fare better than anyone else and at the moment I think that
there must be some soty of fixed income policy but within that
framework I think there should be urn more room for maneouvre.
s.
R. For the individual and perhaps the Company should say well OK
you have 5% fixed mandatory. perhaps 5% to be spread over department
which could help remove certain anomalies.
s.
R. Anomalies which have been created incidentally urn before present
restrictions were implemented urn people in this Company. person A
earning more than person B by virtue of the fact that person A
joined after person Band that at this moment the Company is
unable to say to person B. well OK we know that person Ais getting
more than you for a few days he joined after you but there is nothing
4/we can do under the present circumstances so urn that's part of the
increase and in such an anomaly perhaps some part could be used to
reward.b
Excerpt 5.6
s. What about the control you've got over your pay? I mean who controls
that? The union, yourself or the management?
R. Management
S. How do they do it?
R. Negotiations between the Management and the shop stewards.
s. Uhu
R. Then it's taken back to the men
S. Yea
R. It's up to the men whether they accept it or don't accept it.
S. What if they don't accept it? Do you think the manageIent have
too much control over that? Or the union too much control?
R. I don't think anybody should have too much control over'their
wages.
43Excerpt 5.7
S. What about the decisions on pay, how do you think control over
that is distributed, you know between the board, the management
and staff and so on?
R. I would think that it's the shop stewards that do our talking for us
with the Management and they come back and tell us what's happening.
s. Who do you think controls the system - the unions or the management
that control it or is it a bit of both?
R. Aye it's a bit of both.
S. Do you think iny one side's dominant?
R. Aye I think the management must be dominant a wee bit.
S. On what side?
R. I can't really see them letting the Shop Stewards run the factory
really.
S. How do the management dominate?
R. If you do it their way they'll give you what you're asking for.
You know that before you go in.
R. So you're asking for more than you really want because you know
they're not going to be giving you it.
S. Hm.
R. ·Because you know they're no going to give you it - there's no
much you can do about it. They expect you to drop it.
S. So you've got to push them to
R. Aye
S. Get what you want?
R. Aye.
S. Do you think the end result is closer to your aim or closer to their
aim?
R. You didn't really know what their aim is. Obviously they don't
want ever to give you all that much.
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s. In other words they offer you less than you've asked for but it's
somewhere between
R. They don't really tell you. You think you've got a good deal out
of it then they turn round and say that was good we got away with
that, you know.
S. Aye, Do you think there should be some sort of change in the
negotiating system?
R. I think ours is a pretty good system really. As I say we've got a
good management, they give us good conditions and all that. They're
doing no bad.
S. Do you think it's a fair system that you've got in here?
R. I would say it's fair.Excerpt 5.8
S. You said earlier on that you weren't satisifed with the sort of
differential between you and the Management. How do, I mean take
the whole sort of wage bill of the Company, this is divided up
between staff, shop floor and management. Who do you think
controls how that is divided up?
R. I would say it's probably the parent company of the group. I
don't really know, but I would say, obviously in other companies
up and down the country, and I would say that it's along the line
that they would pay a Director such and such, pay a labourer such
and such.
S. Hm.
R. Eh, and I think these are the people
S. Do you think that's
R. There would be slight flexibility, I would think. Whereas up here
this we can pay him a wee bit more and give him a wee bit less.
S. Right.
R. If they accept, who's to know?
S. Right. Do you think there's a fair system?
R. No I don't think it's a fair - I think it should be the company's
books, as I said earlier, should be open
S. Hm.
R. And let's see what everybody gets.
S. The Management salaries.
R. You see, although I'm saying my wages, it's not just in this company
I mean. There's wages paid for lawyers and for the work they do
and the money they get, I mean, I'm underpaid, grossly underpaid
O.K. Other. people might no see it like that but that's how I see
it, you know. In the same respect with directors in here. I see
som some guys in here that just waddle about. They don't appear to doanything. O.K. 1
1mmaybe ingorant of the facts. I don't know
what they actually do. They might work and the work they do
might involve quite a lot.
s. Hm.
R. It's out of sight. What you don't see - what you see is that they
are getting quite a lot and they appear to do nothing
S. Right
R. To me that causes unrest, dissatisfaction.
S. Right. You would like to see more opennesss?
R. Aye. I think you find people reasonable because it happens on
the shop floor. Youlve got Foremen, skilled men, semi-skilled
men, labourers, toilet attendants. At the end of the, day they
all accept that the s.killed man, if you like,
s. Hm.
R. Is due more money than them.
S. Hm.
R. There is that gap and they accept where the gap should be.
S. Right.
R. But there is a gap between the Director and the labourer.
s. Hm.
R. He doesn't know what the gao is. He doesn't know what the job
is that the director does. He doesn't know what is involved in it.
S. Right.
R. Just as an example, th.is is what I mean. We should know more
details of what the job is and what it entails.
s. What about the decisions themselves?
Who should be involved in that?
R. Well, I would think it should be the management and unions. They
are involved, if you liKe, at the shop floor level.
s. Ri~tR. The management and union are involved to get the proper level for
the job.
S. Hm.
R. They're no involving Tom. Dick and Harry up here.
S. Right.
R. As I said earlier. they're getting things that appear to be willy-
nilly for nothing and appear to be over and above what is stipulated
by law. This has been going on for years since these laws came
in.
S. Aye. There should be some sort of company.
R. Aye. They're getting them that way. that way. this way and that
way. It appears. I cannot prove it. but it appears that way on
the top. How the hell do they get it and there's getting a wee
bit unrest The people are always asking the question.Excerpt 5.9
S. What about deciding on pay rises - who do you think decides that?
R. I,think it's the shop stewards that do that here.
S. Hm
R. They go for the pay rise and give them a figure and then come back
to us to say what they've got.
S. Right
Who decides that thing that you go for - you know you go for so
much?
R. Mainly the shop stewards.
S. Is there any input from the people they represent - from the
membership?
R. They come back - I think they put in for what they think reasonable
you know.
RS Uhu
R. I don't think the workers have anything to do with it.
S. They just say at the end of the day whether it's acceptable?
R. Absolutely.
S. Do you think the management have enough control over that sort of
thing?
R. ·Eh. You mean with the unions?
S. Hm.
R. I think they do. I think they work well together in here.
S. Hm
Do you think it's a fair system or should it be changed in any way?
R. Well it could be changed for some jobs could be paid more.
S. Uhu
R. Not just a flat rate allover. Everybody getting the same money,
S. Who do you think should be paid more?R. Well the more experienced blokes maybe on machines and that.
Tending their own machines and even cranemen
s. Hm.
R. Afellow on an 80 ten crane and one on a ten ton crane getting the
same money
S. Hm.
R. But the one on the 80 ton crane he's doing a more technical job.
S. He's got more experience?
R. More to do
S. More resprnsibility?
R. Aye more responsibility
S. But tney don't recognise that on that?
R. No.
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s. What about Discipline? ", 'How do you see that?
R. Managers each control that in their own area.
S. Do you think other employers -below Management level -
should have more say?
R. No I don't think so. I don't think they need any more
than they have now. Their rights are well taken care of.
In practice, I would say, we probably go to the opposite
extreme. Things are maybe too lenient if anything.
S. Why do you say that?
R. Well, we treat people like adults, but sometimes certain things
are allowed to go too far, and they're not treated with the
proper respect by managers. Its maybe because of a fear of
the unions. In my own area, not just myself but other
managers in this area, things are pretty tightly controlled.
S. You've got things organised as they should be?
R. Well yes, the system is there to ensure that things work
properly, but there are a few deviations from it.
S. But employers rights are pretty well protected?
R. Yes, I would say so.
5/· .
Excerpt S.I!
S. What ,about discipline? What sort of problems does that pose?
R. Wel~, the new legislation is going to require additionally
specialised people to act in an advisory capacity.
S. Do Personnel not do that al~eaJy?
'R. Personnel should be more involved than they arw now. The
problem is that they're too theoretical rather than practical.
S. Why?
R. Oh to some extent because of their role~~.~•••but partly
because of the nature of the animal.E~cerpt'5~/2
R.
S.
s.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
Hm. Ah. What about discipline in the Company? What'is the
discipline in the Company like?
I don't know much about it.
It's not something that affects the staff.?
Oh yes. There was the bit in the boiler works. The
mariager level got the sack.
Hm. Ah. Does the disciplinary system seem to have more to do with
the shop floor, the hourly paid workers rather than the staff?
Could be. I don't know what goes on there neither.
Yea.
live seen the Works Mariager go round and pull up a lot of
people occasionally.
S. Hm.
R. For not wearing glasses on the shop floor.
s. Hm. But is this something that's intermittent? Is it
consistent
R. Very intermittent.
S. It's not consistent? Ah. Should it be consistent?
R. Well I think so. Every Union representative got a leaflet to
hand to his members.
S. Hm.
R. Saying the various stages of discipline that WQuld be taken
for people not wearing glasses.
s. Hm.
R. live never heard of one of them being implemented.
S. So there's no point?
R. There's warnings if their caught once, twice, three times.
Suspension of money for say a fortnight if they're'cuaght more
than three times without glasses.
53s. Hm. 'Doesn't work at all?
R. Never works at all.Excerpt 5.1~
s. What about discipline in. the Company? What is the discipline
in the Company like? IS"it Management who have most· influence
on that as well?
R. Oh aye, a great deal I would'say?
S. All of it, more or less?
R. Aye more or less all of it, I would say so.
S. Is that fair, do you think the individual or unions should
have more say?
R. I think its pretty fair as it is. I mean I think the individual
should act responsibly. It is a personal thing as well, but its
up to the Management to maintain it I suppose.
S. If someone steps out of line.
R. I don't suppose they could dismiss anybody without consulting
the unions. I suppose they've got to give the individual a
warning, maybe several warnings about his future conduct.
S. Is that fair? Or should they be able to sack you without
warning like they could a few years ago?
R. No, I wouldn't say that was fair. I would say its a pretty
reasonable system they've got just now, giving a man warnings
like the system they operate just now.--Excerpt 5'~'1!
s. What about discipline in the Company? What's it like?
R. That'-ll vary from one manager to another. In (my area) its
fairly slack compared to other jobs live been in.
S. What do you look for from a Manager in this respect then?
R. Oh well I mean there's things going on in there which shou1dn't
be allowed to go any further, that shou1d've been hit on the
head 2 years ago. 1
1mjust talking about a Manager being
reasonable and expecting his work-force to toe the line. There
are people coming in late, people taking time off, people
supposed to be ill and they're no ill and people know they're
no ill, and the Manager does nothing about it.
S. What is a strict Manager then?
R. I wou1dn't care if a Manager is trict as long as he's fair.
s. How do you see fairness?
R. If he's strict with one section and no with the other two. He
has to be strict right across the board. If your'e a worker
and youlre doing your job you don't have to worry what kind of
manager youlve got, because he can't find fault with you. But
he would find fault with the ones who werelnt doing the work
properly, and that would be an insult.Excerpt 5.t~
'5. How:is discipline contrQlled in the Company?
R. That's completely up to the Manager you have. Oficially he's
only got a little authority. .Officially I could 'get away
with murder, but the personality of the Manager could intimidate
you into being disciplined. If you get an easy-going guy you
could walk right .over the top of him. It is entirely up to the
kind of Manager you've got. It's a fight between personalities.
If you let him just shove you about, it just your tough luck.
But if you stand up for your rights, you're well on the way to
enjoying your work. Like I said officially you can get away
with murder, but it might not be to the advantage of your
career.
S. What about your Manager?
R. My Manager is a strict disciplinarian in the Office. At times
he's a wee bit rough, but he gets the work out, he does his
job. Other offices are sadly lacking in that, because the
wrong man is in the supervisory job. That kind of man should
be changed.
, .Excerpt 5..,!.
s. Righ~, Do you think there.is a problem of discipline,in the
Company?
R. There's always a problem of discipline. I would 'say there's
a minor problem in this Company.
S. Hm. In what sort of respect?
R. Och. you have your problems with men, I would 'agree, with rules
and their to abuse the 'rules to the extent that they overdo
it. Eh, is this the sort of line you were talking about?
S. Hm.
R. O.K. these men, there is a procedure and eh it's this man who's
for whatever reason, reported by the Forman, the Union's brought
in it and it's proved to be satisfactory - the man is out of order -
then he's given a warning. He's then given a written warning
and if it happens 'again, a suspension and then, if it happens
again and the Unions agree that the man is out of line and out of
order, then the man is paid off.
S. Right.
R. I think that's right. I think - I don't think the Unions should
support men like that - the likes of a man that is maybe going to
come in maybe two days a week or three days a week and has got
a job outside and he's reported about it, brought up about it
and the Union - as far as I was concerned, why should he be in
a bloody job?
S. Right.
R. Because he's doing somebody else out of a job but if this
continues he's given a, as I say he goes through the procedure.
At the end of the day that man should be given his lot.
S. Right. Would you represent him?
R. I would represent him, 'aye •'5. But you would accept the fact that he was really doing wrong?
R. If he persisted, aye. If ~ man struck a Foreman.' ,
'5. Right.
R. And he continually abused the Foreman and struck the Foreman,
although I think we was wrong I would still ,plead that he
should get his job
S. Right.
R. And give him another chan~e'but at the end of the day, if it is
that he's been given all warnings and went through the proper
procedure, and I know for a fact within myself that the man is
wrong, then that man we would be better rid of him.
S. Right. The potentially gives you that sort of procedure
to go through. Some people feel that it allows the Unions to
be unreasonable. Companies cannot sack anybody in the Union.
R. That's right - to put it bluntly. The Foreman cannot - it used
to be that the if the Foreman didn't like your face~ get rid of
him. He'd just say 'Your for the ba'g' for some wee stupid job
that he maybe wasn't satisfied with but which maybe was satisfactory
but he just used it as an excuse to bag the man, and he was just
simply bagged.
S. Hm.
R. And there was no - that was it and the man was out of the door
the minute the Foreman said he was out of the door.
S. Aye.
R. But id doesn't happen in that fashion. AForeman hasn't got
the right to bag you.
S. RightR. The Foreman has only got the right to report the man. It is
then.brought up in.front of the Stewards and the man and the
case.is talked over and~:if the case is proved, the man isn't
sacked, .obviously it'depends if it's stealing or something
serious - he could.be .sacked - but it's got to .be discussed
with the Steward,or the Convenor or the Union.
S. Right.
R. And the man - and the Management. So an individual cannot
bag the man. I think that's right.
S. Right. Are the Unions reasonable over it?
R. Oh aye. I think the Unions should be reasonable in every case.
S. Hm.
R. What do you mean by reasonable?
S. That's what I was going to ask you? What do you mean by
reasonable? What would you mean by reasonable?
R. Well, I don't think it's right that a Foreman, or a Manager, or
somebody in authority should just be able to say to a chap "You're
bagged for that".
S. Hm.
R. In other words, it's just his opinion and his opinion only. I
think the Union should have a say or the man should be properly
represented. Why shouldn't he be?
S. At the end of the day though, I mean it's up to the Management
to decide whether or not the guy goes that's went through the
procedure.
R. That's right.
S. Ah, if they take it right through the procedure and the Management
still decided to sack him, would you go'against that?
R. Well it depends on, you know, depends on the case, it would
depend on what the Union in the factory thought about it. You
see if it was a case that I thought the man was unfairly dismissed
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at the end of the day I would say "I'll take the case to the
Works Committee" and if even,the Works Committee 'agree, even
take it to the.District and national level and get.him represented
in that fashion. But you could take it further, .a1though at
the end of the day the man'might be out of the 'door momentarily.
You could, if you and the Union representative in the factory
thought it was a justifiable case, you could take it further.
'5. Hm.
R. But if the Union representative in the factory feels that the
man is out of order and a .b100dy nuisance
S. Hm.
R. They would agree with the Management then.
s. The procedure in itself isn't all, it is how it is operated
that really matters?
R. Oh aye. I mean if there is a procedure there and people are
just going to roughshod over it and not represent the man
properly, then the man's in for a war deal. So it depends
on who's implementing the procedure. If you've got to
support him. If you've got a properly organised Union that
the man's in to represent him, I don't see that the man's got
a problem if'the man has not done wrong.
~IS.
, 'E~t~rpt·5.1J
S. What about the development of financial policy?'How'much '
has this developed within the finance 'department itself? How
much has it taken into account the interest and 'concerns of
other departments? '
'R. ' Well, if you come back, if 'you come back to what 'is the'
financial policy of the Company, the financial policy of the
Company, if one is to be brutal about it, 'must 'be to improve
and develop the return of capital value of the Company,. and
the return of capital value of the Company is 'dependent on
the performance of the department.
S. Aye.
R, And it is all one big massive plan to create that return
capital value.
S. Aye.
R. So therefore in fact, if you are going to improve it, the only
way you cando it is in fact by talking to, and involving every
department.
S. Aye, that sounds right.
R. Fine. Effectively at the beginning of every year when we make
up a COmpany plan, every department is 'involved in it at that
stage. Every department's plans are assessed and if in fact
the final answer is not acceptable then in fact we go back
down and say look you do that can you change that? So,
therefore, in fact they have a very free hand in developing
Company policy. .
What would happen if, as you say when you,'don't get the right
answer~ you go back to the department and say'can you do such
and such, what would happen if they say no we can',t?R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
Wel), nobody can ever say no. It is an impossibility to.say
no. They will say nO.unless you do this, so then'the respon-
sibility is with the Board to say "Am I prepared ,or am I not
prepared to do X"? If in fact the Board is not prepared to
do Xthe department is off'~he hook because.it says "I can do,
I can ,make my target, I can improve my performance, if you
allow me to do this, if you give me these amounts of people,
or if you give me these amounts of money". It is then up to
the Board to say "I am prepared to do.", or "I am not prepared
to do it". The Departmental Manager has made his case, said
thatls what I want. Hels in the clear.
Is there ever, what I mean therels a fairly obvious strategy
there that you ask for the impossible.
No, you donlt, you canlt ask for the impossible.
Well, the very difficult.
No. No. Itls not as black and what as that, Alistair.
Nobody is going to say "Right, next year chaps we are going to
double our profits and youlve all got ·to work to double the
profits". Life in Companies is not as black and white as
that.
Right.
What you say in O.K. weill try and improve our business. Weill
try to develop into new areas; weIll try to become abetter
Company. It might very well be that, urn, therels an
investment of £100,000 which wonlt payoff for 5 years. But,
if you went down to your Manager~, and said talking in terms
of impossible target~, what chance to do you .all have with the
number of people in your department to make a hell of a good
profi~; people would just laugh at me. No credibility what-
soever.s.
R.
R.
s.
R.
Obviollsly everybody in ·'the··Company has got tOt .has a part
to:play in achieving the ..profitability of the 'Company. ' Who
wQuld be involved in drawing up this plan? Obviollsly the
Managers would. Would' the staff or would the shop floor
be involved in that, in actually drawing up the .plan rather
than implementing it?
. .
The shop ,floor wouldnlt be involved in drawing.it 'up. They
are not employed to draw it up.
Hm. Given the bare interests of the Company in your existence,
and that means given'the present arrangements, some sort of
return of capital, ah, would you say that it would be arguable
that they should be involved in drawing it up? Do they have
a contribution to make?
They have a contribution to make but, when you say drawing
it up, what you mean by saying drawing it up is in effect
that. It is computation of figures, calculation of forms t
filling in of pieces of paper which the work force, the shop
floor isnlt qualified or employed to do that.
Well, for instance, the sort of thing I had in mind is part
of the plan might be to introduce Xnew machines on the floor.
There are a large number of guys in this Company with very
long service who have possibly developed a considerable amount
of expertise in this particular job.
If you take that particular example they in fact would be. I
wouldnlt like to say that they are consulted. I can't give
you the answer to that. The proposal for capital expansion
comes up to us from the manufacturing division. You would
have to ask the manufacturing division how far they consulted
with the individual workmen who have been working that same
type of machine for the last twenty years. I don't know the
answer to that but I can say to you in fact decisions, forexample, about the Rank Xerox - we've just spent over £15,000
for the Rank.Xerox - the operators played a part in.that.
W~ll they.say "this is a h~11ish thing to use and this is a
good thing to use" so they would playa part in that.
S. Aye.
R. Their views would be taken into account. I 'don't know how
far in that situation.
S. Right. How WQuld they be taken into account? Would you
have a formal meeting with them or just go and ?
R. Just chat.
S. Chat.
R. Formal meetings are a pain in the foot for everybody's
embarrassed to begin with.
S. Right.
R. So you just go up and say "which would you suggest?".
S. Right.
R. What do you want to do?
S. Right.
R. Formality of it puts everybody, puts everybody under pressure,
puts everybody in a situation where they are reluctant to express
his views. (Thank you very much). I mean you talk about
brain-storming. One of the reasons why brainstorming, I would
suggest, has failed in the past, is the fact that what happens
is "We are going to have a brainstorming session so would you
please all come into my room at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning and
all sit round the table. It's so bloody artificial. It's
unbelievable. To get effective brainstorming, the only
effective brainstorming you get is where five guys would have
to be sitting round the table and we say "O.K. let's look at
this particular point".'S. Hm.'
R. Then you really get a'contribution.
S. Do you ,ever feel that the 'people below you might 'have ideas that
they don't pass on up?
R. Yes.
S. What would you say was the source of ~hat and why?
R. Why do they not pass it on up?
S. Yes, why do they not pass it on up?
R. Ahm. For the same reasons as I wouldn't pass it on 'up because
in fact they may not be absolutely certain if it is a valid idea
and are reluctant to put it forward until 'such times as they
really feel confident about it.
S. They don't want to look stupid?
R. That's right. I'm exactly the same way, with 'my Managing
Director. I've got a few ideas which I'm not willing to put
forward to him at the moment because lim not sure that they are
right, and I'm not going to put forward a half-baked idea at the
moment.
S. With your subordinates do you ever get the impressior, do you
ever feel that there's anything in the idea that they think well
it's his bloody job, I'm not employed to do it?
'R. live, never got that impression. live never encountered that.
S. To go back to financial policy and drawing it up, ah, if there is
some sort of participation by employees going on the Board, at
some point your'e going to get guys from the shop floor coming
up and talking about your financial, the Companyl~ financial
plan. What sort of contribution do you think they could make?
R. I donlt know because I haven't seen ,them make it yet, so I
really donlt know•
... ~.-._------------------------------S.
S. What 'sort of contribution 'do you think they could 'potentially
make?'
R. (not'jusy now thank you)•. I really don't know.
S. Given their lack of ,expertise' in financial matters, ah, WQuld you
say that that.might make them a liability?
R. Not necessarily.
S. Why do you say, not necessarily?
R. Well, when you say a lack of expertise, I mean a lack of
expertise is because one is dealing with it on a day to day
basis.
S. Hm.
R. That is how you develop expertise.
S. Hm.
R. But, if somebody, I mean, you reverse the situation. I'm
talking about an engineering problem. I just say, from a
common sense point of view, why do we use a stainless steel
piping instead of ordinary piping because it seems to me much
more expensive to use stainless steel piping, can we not use that?
An engineer will then talk in terms of tolerances and densities
and so on and so forth but my contribution is worth while.
S. Hm.
R. But it is not as well expressed as an engineer's. It doesn't
necessarily mean it is not worthwhile.
Hm. Ah. what about communications of information from your
department. Purely communications outwith the department to
the shop floor and to the staff in other departments, are they
as satisfactory as they shQuld be?
R.
S.
.... ----
Well, what do you mean by communications?
Communications about.profit and'loss wel~, talking or'putting
out "bumph" for want of a better word. Ah. is that as
t,=fsatisfactory as it should be? Or, do you feel ,that you shQuld
be telling them more -.or less?
R. In fact if we were telling them more Or less .it wQuld change
what ,we are doing so obviously Il~e got to say no to that
question.
S. Hm. Ah. If there was a ,demand for that sort of information
would it be accessible to employees?
R. Yea.
S. If they wanted it?
R. When I held this thing with 75 Managers at the end of every
session I said "0.K. there is what the Company produces at the
momen~, not all of you get these pieces of paper, em, what piece
of paper do you want?
S. Hem.
R. As a result of that two things happened. One, a guy who
wasn1t getting part of the basic set said "0h I would like
that piece and that piece" so we arranged that next morning,
and equally, somebody said, "Look instead of, in addition to
those five pieces the Company produces could you also produce
a sixth piece about X". We started to arrange for Xto be
produced. So we are open to suggestions on these sorts of
things., We don1t know all the answers.
S. Is there any information that would be almost subject to the
Official Secrets Act?
R. Yes. Profitability at this time of the year would be
inclined to have a dramatic effect on the share price of
the Company.
S. Hm. Ah.
'R.
~.
Which if we were to release at the moment - if 'people were to
know at the moment what the profit and loss of the Company
wSwas that would depres~, if that were to leak 'ou~~ it would
have had a bad effect on the Stock Market,it wQuld affect
all 'sorts of things. 'S~, obviously, one would 'have to be
extremely discreet about using that information.
S. How does that
R. I mean if I were at a party and a chap says 'to me "How's the
Firm doing?" I'm not going to say they are making huge profits
or huge losses.
S. Aye.
'R. Because it would affect, it could go on to someone, and
equally therefore that one should not spread this sort of
information around because it could be used in a fashion,
unconsciously, which was to the detriment of the Company.
S. Hm. How much security would you have to impose on that
sort of information? You know, would you feel that you would
be able to release it to the Shop Stewards on condition that they
don't leak it themselves? Or to Staff Union people?
R. It depends, it depends, how far they want the information
and what they are going to use it for.
S. Hm.
R. If a guy says to me "I want to know the profits of the
Company for a, band c reasons" and those reasons are valid,
he would be told them.
S. Hm.
R. But if in fact there is no real reason for it, why do it?
Why run the risk of exposure?
S. Hm. In protection of the member's interest~, what's a valid
reason?
lit. •
R. Wel~, in protection of the members' interests what.is in the
employment of a Company'is in fact Managers'have been appointed
in that Company to be responsible for certain aspects of it,
~q.
hopefully of running the Company in the interest' of the
members.
s. Aye.
R. So I don't,see,in fa~t'how ah disclosure of information or
a desire to .obtain ,it'necessarily means that if that desire
or that request be denied it wasn't in the interest of the
members of the Company. It could be the right thing to be
done at a particular point of time.
S. Aye. Ah. As I understand Company law at the moment, the onus
on the Directors is to safeguard the interest of the share-
holders, it doesn't make any mention of the employees. Ah.
How much regard, what sort of distribution of regard is there
for the shareholders and for the employees? I mean at certain
points there may be that an action, a legal action to safeguard
. the interests of the shareholders may be in conflict with the
interests of the employees.
R. Well
s. Obviously with
R. Well, if you look at the Companies' Act, there is a copy of it
there, it's written in black and white, and, you know, when
you discuss these sort of issues you turn to that piece of
paper and say under Section 192 it says'".~••••••••". We
are all human beings.
S. Hm.
R. The last thing anybody would want to do is to deprive another
human being of his livelihood.
S. Hm.
R. youlre not going to take.decisions and say '"Great, 11mgoing to
be .able to sack somebody. Grea~, 1
1mgoing 'to be able to declare
~.
redundancies.- The last thing you want to do.
70's. Hm.'
R. What do you want to do :is develop a viable CompanY-which in
fact is keeping people in 'employment. You know; if you
start looking at the woods and wood you would never do anything.
It's ,all human beings in a Company.
S. Hm. What I was getting at was not so much Managers wanting
to sack people, I'm quite 'sure that that sort of animal is these
days very rare, if not extinct.
R. Well, I hope so.
S. What I was thinking about where there was conflict between
possibly laying off 200 guys and maintaining some level of
profitability or keeping them on and perhaps no making a
profit in a particular year.
R. I would think that because all Managers and Directors are
human beings they would always be pre-disposed towards keeping
people on.
S. Hm.
R. They would only be really, in the final analysis, pushed to do
anything other than that.
S. What sort of circumstances would push them to that point? How
serious would things have to be?
R. Where in fact the Company can no longer afford to keep them
employed.
S. How do mean by afford?
R. The morning Banks wont give you any more money.
S. Aye. When the Banks have said "No more"?
'R. Uhu. When that happens you can't keep them on.
S. Aye. What if the Company is actually making a loss but the
Bank was still prepared to carry?
:t-IR.
5.
R.
5.
R.
5.
R.
I can't answer that question.
Hm. '
Because it is a hypothetiGal 'question. If you gave me what
would happen - if you gave me a particular situation with ,all
the pros and cons and so on and so forth - let me try and give
you a simple answer to that. If in fact we felt that the
business was going to improve we would try and struggle on
through.
Hm.
If in fact the market had gone away, as it has done with the
off-shore, there are just no off-shore orders, it would be
crazy to keep it going. But if in fact you just said "I've got
to sell things at a loss at the moment".
Right.
D,K. you say "Let's struggle through" because you know that in
two years time we are going to start making profits again. We
are going to start to be viable again. 50, we'll suffer for
a couple of years, we'll lose money for a couple of years but, if the
market's gone, the Company's gone.Excerpt' 5. J-~
S.' What about investment 'policy? ' Is that the same 'sort of
thing? Investing in Machines?
R. Well seeing with their cash flow at the moment they are
investing a heck of a lot.
S. Hm.
R. New machines - some of them in our 'eyes are bad.
S. But do they need that sort of decision as well?
R. Oh they've got to do that.
S. Do you think you should be involved in that?
R. I think some of the people in the workshop area should be.
S. Hm.
R. That have experience on the type of machines.
S. Hm.
R. These two new Cincinnatti machines they got in - a waste of
money.
S. Universal borers?
R. Oh they do everything.
S. Hm.
R. No they're horizontal borers. Top of Bay 10.
S. Aye.
R. Numerous troubles on them.
S.
R.
S.
Hm.
There's one like the capstan head that does numerous jobs by
tape control. They never work. They've had trouble with
them since ever they got them.
But if you were represented at Board level ,it would just be
mainly to inform the Board about things that they 'ought'R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S•
.....
to know about or getting to know about?
, Yea.
But should they, the representatives at Board leve)~ should
they nave any sort of'say? .
Well it could be say a rep, say two or three people from the
Union side going on a Board meeting.
Hm.
And they could opt one say, or even two to go with them.
Hm.
For backup.
Hm.
Somebody that's got the right idea of what's required at
that meeting.
Hm.
It could be a help to everyone.
Yea.Excerpt· 51~
s. What.about confidential information?
R. Well, 'O~K. then, we work in the factory. Wha't's' in the
factory is to our interests.
S. Right.
R. Confidential information could be that Vickers Armstrong is going
to have a take~over bid and that could possible 'be 'against 'our
interests and we would be fighting against that if it seemed to
be against our interests, or we would be wanting certain
assurances that if they did take over the place what would not
happen.
S. What about, I mean an example that was given to me the other
day there, was if you hold the responsibility of the Company
as of time of moment you would results, this could have
serious effects for the Company on the Stock Market, if that
information
R. Somebody would have to know that we work in this factory and
we're no, for whatever information they've got at hand, we're
not out to turn round and stab ourselves or the Company in the
back, but if you're talking about if we're going into wage
negotiations and we know the profitability of the Company well
it puts us in a better position. I think we should know that.
At least it puts us on a start knowing what kind of money might
be available, but, at the same time, I have also got to say that
the Company, when doing that, could also put forward their
reasons of what they are doing with the money. You see what
I'm getting at? Now we are talking about an expansionist
situation in this factory. This is what we'are looking for.
That ,kind of ~hing should'be getting put across'tO:us. The
facts. It is when they hide the facts that they might be doing
=1-5'5. '
R. '
S?
R.
them~elves ,harm.
The ..argument that they could not pass on confidential information
to 'you, the Shop Stewards, isn't because you wQuld' shoot your
mouth off.
All I'm saying is that a Board of ten or'twelve.Directors, or
'twenty or thirty Directors are more honest than twenty or thirty
shop stewards or more liable to keep quiet. Well I think it
would be the other way about as has been proved ,time after time
after time.
Why do you say that?
Well you've got a Board for instance, yesterday·S.U~I.T~S. just
to give you an example. There's two Directors they're wanting
to keep the shares and there's another twenty Directors or ten
Directors they're wanting a profit out of it, they're wanting
to sell it. Whatever suits them moves down to England and goes
out of Scotland altogether, of no moment to them. That's
what I'm saying..Excerpt·· 5·~2..0
S.· Urn. 'What about decisions that affect the Company ·as a
whol~, such ·as affect the Company. for next year? .' Major
policy and such·like, Ma~agement policy, basic'profit?
. get orders or for obtaining new
customers. How do you think control'~ distributed there?
R. That's a decision that's handled 'by the Board of Directors.
I don't see any way in which that - in which that could 'be
changed really.
S. Should there be some sort of participation by employees in
these decisions? I mean in you think it's desirable?
R. I think it would be desirable, to some extent.
S. To what extent?
R. The fact that eh perhaps there should be some representation.
S. What sort of benefits would this bring?
R. I think the Board would generally be more feeling that
class would level. There are certain problems,
there.are certain area~, certain ways in which a few improvements
could be made withir. the Company which er I would find very
difficult to put it over perhaps to a person who could reasonably
be expected to have any influence.
S. So you would say that mainly there is a
information to the hierarchy - the Board Room?
R. Yes, I think that urn within this Comapny there are one or
two things which could happen which wQuld make for a more
profitable firm.Excerpt·Sl..l
s. What ,about decisions on the Company's financial"policy? Who
dO'you'think decides on that?
R. Oh top Management.
S. Why do you think that? '
R. Well they'~~ got the brains 'again.
S: They've got the expertise to do it. 'Urn. Do you think it's
fair that they should make that decision?
R. I think so y~s. They're qualified people. 'You don't get any
workers qualified
S. Should guys - should 'employees have any sort of input into it
or should it' just be left up to the Management?
R.
S.
Left to the Management?
Left to the Management, because of their experience.,'Excerpt" 5:12
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
What about 'such as financtal policy and investment ~ who do
you think makes these decisions?
Managerrent.
Why do you think they do i.t?
Because they're people that are managing it.
Hm.
It's up to them.
They're the guys.with the responsibility? Do you think it's a
fair 'system that they are allowed to make that 'decision entirely
on their own?
Hm.
Why would you say that? '
Because that's their job to and see how things are going.
Do you think anybody else could make some sort of contribution?
Not really unless they knew the way things were working.
Hm. That nobody ,else knows the way things ?
No.
Work.
We only know what the Management tell us.
If you had the information do you think it would be best still
be left up to the Management?
Aye.
Why do you think it would be best?
Well it's just a Management decision I think. I mean personally
I wouldn't know anything about that at all."e
Excerpt ..5.2.3
s. What.about the decisions about financial policy? Who makes
these decisions?
R. I don't know anything about finances. I never hear anything
about that.
S. Who is it in the Company that you think makes the decisions?
R. It would be the Management really. I think the"Management
would be used to the money thing I would imagine. To say
how the money ~ould be spent.
S. Why would you say that? .
R. Because they are the ones, well the first thing, they've
S. Th~y control it?
R. They control the money •
S. Do you think it's a fair system that they hold control of the
money of the Company?
R. They're more in a position to really know how much they've
got. We don't know how much they've got. They know how much
they've got and how much to spend.
S. Right.
R. And the way to spend it.
S. If you had that information about how much money the Company
had then you'd be able to help them make their decisions?
R. Oh yea. You could, if it was a workshop decision, you could
ask them for new machines - better conditions and that.
S. Do you think you should get the information to help make that
sort of decision.
R. Well I would like to know.
I think it would Though I don't really
know.'s. Urn.' 'How they
R. The 'Management needs ~ lot of money to expand it.
S. Your'e not told that ~ how they make that sort of:decision?
Do you think, some people might say that the shop ,floor lack
sort of expertise to make that sort of decision - do you think
that's' true?
R. I think in some respects I do 'but then again when I think, we
got'two machines in there and I was told that it was higher
Management that decided to 'buy them. They machines 'were hardly
worked at all.
S. Hm.
R. You know and it \las higher Management that bought them in.
S. Right.
R. They made the decision to get them.
S. Hm.
R. What I mean if they asked, if they had just went and consulted
the head Foreman and that what kind of machines would be best.
S. Hm.
R. Instead they went out and bought these machines without saying
to anybody.
S. Hm.
R. And they're a white elephant.
S. And they don't work?
R. No much. Well they're working the now and that's the first
time in the last They've been in, they've been lying
round the factory since thE'y come in and that's before the 1ast
Clydebank fair.
S. Hm.
R. They've been in about a year and a half they've been in and thr
mens. Trying to get the work off, them?
R. Aye.'EXCERPT 5.5l~
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
Ho~ is it, do you think, that policy is set in this company?
You know, financial policy, how to try to win orders and so on.
My impression of the whole concept here is that it's extremely
well organised. The sales and marketing side seem to be well
organised, with people all round the world looking for orders,
chasing up orders, whatever it might be. It does seem to be well
organisation, and the bigger the company gets, the more experienced
the people get.
Do you think the Management - people like you - have enough say
in that?
Well it's the directors who determine what the policy will be,
and the managers are told what to do, rather than allowing us to
have some sort of feed back to them.
You mean there should be some sort of dialogue?
Yes, so as to determine what the policy should be
What about your side of the Company?
Yeh - the set up is we have a director, a ,
myself and 2 or 3 other managers. We all have our own jobs to do
and various projects are delegated and you can see from their
projects what the directors are trying to do. I would say things
seem to be quite tightly controlled.
They don't delegate at the policy-making stage?
Yes, they come up with the ideas and we're told what is required
and on the basis of that they make the decisions.
They don't pick your brains?
Oh yes •• but it's only right that they make the decisions. But it
would be interesting to talk the whole thing oyer before they're
left to maKe the decision, just for a feeling of more involvement.
Ho~far down the company would you take that? To the ~anagement
level or to the Employee Representatives as well?R.
s.
R.
S.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
The sort of thing we've been talking about, I don't see any reason
for the employees to be involved.
So it would only be the management?
Yes.
How would you structure that?
I don't see any, as far as (our) side is concerned, change to the
hierarchy. But what I would like to see are regular meetings
with the managers and the director to sit down and discuss various
things. He could tell us where the company is going and we'd
get the chance to come back with various ideas about how we see it.
Ho~often would you do this? Once a month or something like that?
Yes something like that, but certainly on a regular basis with some
carry-forward from previous meetings.
With the whole Board.
No, even just with (our director) and he can tell us what's being
said at board meetings and where the company's going ••• well
certain things that are said at Board meetings. Obviously he can't
tell us everything. But he should tell us where he sees us g01ng,
what he wants us to do, and give each of the managers a chance to
discuss that and put forward their ideas.
Shoul~ consultation like that go all the way down the line, or be
restricted to Management?
Uh, Yeh, I'm not for a minute suggesting the guys on the shop floor
have no good ideas to come forward. But if the directors were to
spend all their time discussing things with the guys on the shop
floor, they wouldn't get any work done. I'd certainly think the
place would be then for the Managers to have a,discussion with their
guys and have some feed baCK and to maKe sure the information gets
5acK to the Director level.
What a50ut Employee Reps. on the Board.R. Yes, I think that's a good idea when you're talking about the
nationalised sector, but if you're talking about a small concern
which the majority of companies in this country are, then it's the
entrepreneur whose interest is in the Company. It's his Company
it's his money, so therefore it's up to him what he wants to do.
Where it's a rationalised concern, then the guy on the shop floor
has'as much interest in the Company as the Directors, who are all
government appointed men, then by all means employees should have
some reps at board level.
S. But in a private company where the directors own or represent the
owners
R. Normally the directors are shareholders.
S. That would normally exclude employee representatives?
R. I think the owners should be allowed to decide who should be on
the board, who should represent them. If they' want somebody from
the shop floor that's fair enough.
R. What if an Act was introduced, would it be justifiable?
S. I think it would be ••• I haven't read Bullock thoroughly ••• but
I don't disagree with the idea, provided it's restricted to a
certain size of company. If it's nationalised, fair enough.
If it's ICI level, which is more or less nationalised, once again
that's fair enough. But when you get down to the small private
Company then I don't think there should be involvement at all.
S. How small is small? Is (this Company) small?
R. Yes I would include it as small though the ( ) Group is a large
organisation. You couldn't just answer that question though. You
would have to sit down and look at each Company, at each organisation
and decide which one would qualify and which one would npt. It
could be done by number of employees. II mean the whole point
of worker representatives is the communications thing. The bigger
the Company the more remote the guy on the shop floor is from theguy who is making the decisions at the top level. The whole thing
is to short-circuit that and make sure the guy on the shop floor
is being kept up to date. But a smaller company shouldn't have
that problem. It's only the big companies, where guys are
turning up for work, and they don't know who the hell they're
working for, so they've got no interest. The whole idea of
nationalised industries is economies of scale - that's the basis
of the whole thing - but in actual practice they're making colossal
losses and I'm sure it's because of this attitude by the emp10ees -
by everybody. They're working for the government - but they don't
know who the hell they are working for.
S. You don't see worker participation as a means for employers to
influence decisions as they are taken. For you it's more a
communications thing?
R. No ••• OK there should be some dialogue, a chance for the guy
on the Shop Floor to put forward his sort of idea, which again
would give the guy on the shop floor some sort of satisfaction. w
S. But this would only be in larger companies?
R. No, that sort of situation should exist in smaller companies as
well but I don't think we need anybody on the Board. But again
someone on the shop floor should be able to come to a Director or
a Manager and put his ideas forward. We're all equal after all.
We shouldn't be classifying some people as Shop Floor and others
as Directors.
S. In a company as small as this one, would a guy from the shop- floor
or a number of them be able to influence a decision.
R. I think this company is still small enough for that to happen,
for somebody's voice on the shop floor to be heard.
S. But does that happen?
R. Yes, I think it does happen in some areas. An awful lot of people
aren't interested in (the Company), even though they're working here.Others are very interested in (the Company's} future. Those
who are, can be heard.
S. Why do you think some people arentt interested?
R. I dontt khow. I suppose itts just human nature. Theyt re prepared
to turn up for work, but they're not interested in the Company's
future prospects. Theyt re only interested in their own
S. Thatts not restricted to here, though, they'd be the same wherever
they worked?
R. On, yes.EXCERPT 5.~
s. What·s your view on employees being represented at Board level -
do you think it's a good thing or not?
R. Oh well now, I have no objection to employee representatives on the
board, as long as he is a Company Director and all that means,
and not just an employee representative. He cannot have it both
ways. He would have a legal obligation to see that the Company is
run properly. He must join in all aspects ,of the business. If
he was on the Board he would have to act in a responsible way.
But if he was only an employee representative he would be biased
towards them. Obviously that would always happen to some extent,
but he must never take it to excess. He must always behave in
light of the company position.
S. What sort of representative would you like to see? Would it be a
Trade Union official, or a Company employee?
R. I would prefer it if he was a company employee He would be an
insider and have more appreciate of the company.
S. What type of employee would you like to see on the Board then?
R. So one could overnight become Management. Indeed it would be a
bad thing if that was ever to happen as he must keep the respect
of his members, or he would be branded as a Management man.
Obviously he would have to be of intelligence, but not necessarily
academic. We would have to look for the opportunity to find the
right people. Alack of education doesn't mean a person would not
be a good director. Qualifications are fine, but experience and a
balanced view are also required.
S. Where do you think you'll get people like that?
R. Well, even at the lower end there are still leaders, and some of
them portentially could be directors. For instance Jimmy Reid
could go on the Doard of any company and be a success.s. How many employee directors should there be, or what sort of
proportion of the Board should they constitute?
R. No, I don't want to get involved in numbers and in voting,
cecause in this Company we either agree unanimously, or else
those who disagree respect the consensus. If we had a situation
of equal number of employee directors, and existing directors,
there could be a confrontation, which would mean we would have
to start putting things to the vote and that would lead to
disharmony. No, I would rather prefer to see a small board with
2 employee representatives whose views would be respected.
s.· Yes, I see. That sounds very well, but suppose there was a
difficult decision to make - say making x hundred redundant.
R. Well, if it was necessary that there should be a redundancy, if
we take the experience of (an associated company), the facts were
put to the unions that there was no market left, and they accepted
the inevitable. If we had employees on our board, I think they
would probably behave in the same way. They may have their own
views on delaying the redundancy, or trying to retrieve the
situation. But Management would try to hang on as long as
poss1b1e anyway. Thus Management is recognised for having as its
first objective security of employment. Redundancy would always
be our last resort.EXCERPT 5.~
S. Urn. What about decisions that affect the company as a whole,
such as affect the company for next year? Major policy and such
like, Management policy, basic profit?
get orders or for obtaining new customers. How do you think
controlts distributed there?
R. That's a decision that's handled by the Board of Directors.
I don't see any way in which that - in which that could be
changed really.
S. Should there be some sort of participation by employees in these
decisions? I mean do you think it's desirable.
R. I think it would be desirable, to some extent.
S. To what extent?
R. The fact that eh perhaps there should be some representation.
S. What sort of benefits would this bring?
R. I think the board would generally be more feeling that
class would level. There are certain problems, there
are certain areas, certain ways in which a few improvements could
be made within the Company which er I would find very difficult
to put it over perhaps to a person who could reasonably be
expected to have any influence.
5. 50 you would say that mainly there is a
information to the hierarchy - the board room?
R. Yes,I think that urn within this company there are one or two things
which could happen which would make for a more profitable (the
Compa~') urn.
qO• S. What about decisions that'affect the Company as a whole? How
much 'do Management influence them?
R. Management ,here has no control over the 'future, because of the
nature of the Company, because welre ,selling a product with
a definite end-life. All the ,time now, more efficient
m~ch~nes are being 'developed, and the line the Company will take
them will be determined by those lines. There's no way the
, ,
work-force have any influence on what we make.
S. What about other things, like Investment 'decisions, or about
Financial Policy?
R. The Shop-Floor have little say. The only say I think the
Shop-Floor would have is, say, on a very sophisticated machine
which would cut-back on manpower. The Shop-Floor might raise
it through their union if it was keeping their bonus, or cutting
their bonus. Other than that I can't see them having much say.
We haven't done anything.
S. Should they have more input since they have expertise?
R. Yes, if they have expertise. If a man with expertise comes
along and says, live read about this new machine in a trade
journal and if I had one I could turn out 3 times as much, then
1
1msure the Management will listen to him. Whether they will
buy it is another question, after the suggestion has been made
the question of cost is opened up - can we afford it, and we be
using that machine. I don't think the man on the Shop Floor
has an awful lot to say.
S.Should there be a formal mechanism so that they could communicate
their views, t~·y tJ exert influence on 'decisions?R. No I don't think so. I could understand a fo,rmal 'mechanism
in a~car plant wherf there is working aldrg :~rtijin,lines
and'parametets. But iri (this Company) the peo~le',nr~'guided
by conmon-sense. Very often Management find they"re actually
, .
made an improvement 'but ,never said anything about it. 'The
guys h~ve gone ahead and dont it
S. Shouldn't they get something for that?
R. Shouldn't the manb~ given a ~eward? Yes 'he should b~ given a
reward. 'but he probably hasn't even asked for it. He's done
something more efficient and he's quite proud of it.
S. What do you think of this idea that workers should elect the
Board?
R. I quite agree? Especially if the workers put as 'much into the
Company in the way of pounds. shilling ans pence as the share-
holders do.
S. Do the Employees not invest their lives in the Comapny1
R. No they haven't put their lives into the Company. They've
depended on the Company for part of their lives. They're
dependant on somebody who's invested in the Company for their
lives.
S. Would worker directors make any difference to things?
R. Not a little but this Company is run from London and I don't
see how you're going to get workers from here on to (The Group)
meeting down at Westminster. The Business of (the Group) is
conducted by investment and there's a fair amount of political
lobbying. so the only thing they could do to themselves up here
would be to cut their own throats.
s. If the company was hired off from the Group then?
R. This Company.would only 'be hired off from.the Group if it joined
another Company. because ,it is not big enough to exist on its own
next year though it could have last year.
q~s. " If there were workers on the Board, what sort'of,representation
should they have?
R. ' The'Board makes 'decisions with 'regard to Investment. The London
Board ,qllows the ,Directors' of this Company a certain 'amount of
freedo~,~bJt still keeps financial control of Investment. The
money from this Comapny is ploughed back into the 'large group
and dispersed. You can't'buy shares in (the 'research site
Company)., If you can't 'buy shares in this Company then we're
talking about conditions 'again. Aliything they want to change
they can change locally, and therefore we're going back to
conditions and they can charge anything locally with regard to
conditions at the present moment the machinery's there. Its
probably better machinery than if you start at the Board-room.
Suppose an Hourly-Paid worker wants a change in his conditions,
he'll find it easier by going to his shop convenor who can do it
by going straight-through (the Personnel Manager), who can make
a straight yes or none and it would go straight back to that
worker. If it wasn't improved it could get through to the
Board, but I think it is far easier to get an answer straight out
at the beginning. I don't really see workers making a great
difference in contribution if they're on the Board. No way.
Find me a Shop-Floor worker who could come up and make a
suggestio~, or an improvement, and go to EGCD to get credit to
make a sale. They haven't got a clue. The same workmen could
certainly make a·contribution to getting more efficiency out of
a machine. But not a big decision on the Board.
S. What if they got a Boarq-level experience?
R. Yes, I would go ,along with that. Except what do we ask the
Workmen to do on the Board? Are we going to,ask them to make a
decision and vote outwith their mutual capabilities. If you have
q3an Hourly-Paid worker, or Staff who ,is capableof,~hat'type
of thought ,he can get on the Board anyhow.
S. If joti've got the ~alent jo~'ll rise to the top?
R. Yes.
S. Some people say there are 'deliberate obstacles"to that
happening
R. That isn't' true. Three years after I joined the company (S)
joined as Senior Staff and riow he'~ a Director. (P) is a
director - (P) happened to be there - but there's no reason why
a person from the shop~floor who becomes an installation engineer
or a station manager shouldn't take over (P'~) suit. There's nothing
to stop them.
S. Should Management consult with other employees, before taking
decisions?
R. No, because what kind of decision should they consult on. Look
at investment, there are very few chances to invest - about
£1 million a year over the last 5 years. Management will only
invest if it has a purpose and that purpose must be clearly
defined before they invest the money. Only the directors
can see the purpose which is to build different (the produced)
or more (the product) or bigger (the product) and that decision
doesn't really come from Management, it comes from the customer
who wants something. If the customer says to us 'we want some
(the product)', there's no point in us going to the Shop-FLoor
and saying 'werle going to build some (the product), what do you
think? We only make. something to sell something. If the
customer says he want3 them by such and such a date, we've got
tp say we need them by such and 'such a date. If you',re $aying
do we say to the workmen 'are jou willing to work Monday,
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday nights so we can get
q4b
this out.and sell the customer that', then you can go to the
Shop ,Floor and ask them'if ~hey're getting to do that 'much work,
and Management know that.
S. Should Management be able to take decisions on their own
then?
R. The Board only makes a decision. It can get an idea from
the Shop Floor and if it goes all the way through then the
Board can make a decision. Because the Company runs
reasonably well, it doesn't signify there's a decision that
we'll do such and such tomorrow. The directors talk about
things to each other, and to their Departments right down into
the nitty gritty, and then come back and feed it into the
decision which is made.
S. Management make the decisions only on what they think, not on
what the employees think?
R. The Director of Electricity in Mexico tells Mr. (C) he would
like so many machines, and Mr. (C) does his best to provide
these machines. The Director of Electricity in Mexico doesn't
fly over here and call a mass meeting of hourly-paid workers and
say 'I want some machines, what do you think of that lads?' It's
a chicken and egg situation.
s. Well, what about something like redundancy then?
R Redundancy would only be taken in consultation with the workers,
and even then the Board can't make that decision. If you're
talking about (this Company) and the Directors say 'right we
want 300 direct redundancies', no way can they make' 300 direct
redundant.•
EXCERPT 5.2.'6
s. What about important decisions - who do you think take them?
R. That's mainly Management.
S. Why do you think that? Cbuld the unions not exert more control?
Why do they accept so much?
R. Well, as I said, there is a certain amount of that - the unions
do exert some influence on some things. There is influence from
the union side regarding working practices, staffing levels and
things like that, but mainly I would say it's a management thing.
S. So on the kind of thing you've mentioned, the unions might set
parametres, but the final decision would be taken by Management?
R. Yeh.
S. Do you think you as employees should have a bigger input to that?
R. I think there should be a certain amount of, not individual but
perhaps union say into it. But I think it is still a management
prerogative.
s. More a case that Management ought to consult rather than employees
having a final say?
R. Yes.
s. What about the idea of having workers on the board? Do you
think that would be a good thing?
R. I think it would have a certain amount of advtanges. We would
possibly get more information on what's going on than we have
at the moment. Though we do get a certain amount now, but we
don't have it totally.
s. Any other advantages - or disadvantages.
R. I don't think there would be any disadvantages.
s. Some might say that the Staff and the Shop Floor aren't scaled
to taking decisions at board level, because they lack experience,
and the education needed•R. Well, of course, there is only one way to get the experience,
and that's to get the experience.
s. What about the members? Should the workers have a majority
on the board?
R. I don't know if that would be a totally acceptable thing.
s. Why not?
R. They could run riot in my opinion. You could maybe get some right
hot-heads and end up running the place on to the rocks as it were.
s. So that Management would have to acet sort of like an anchor?
R. Yes, that's about it.
S. Do you think Management have got the right to make decisions on
their own?
R. They should always do some consulting with the unions or the
individuals concerned. I think there should be some consultation
along the line. Especially where it comes to redundancies or
wage increases.
S. • What about higher level matters - you know, like Investment, or
getting Orders? Would they have to consult them, or should they
be allowed to act as they want.
R. I suppose if it comes to orders if they're getting them, the work-
force doesn't really bother who does it.EXCERPT 5.~q
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R
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.What about decisions which affect the whole company then?
Who takes them?
That's all with top Management, isn't it? I don't think even
the unions have much say in. that, although possibly they should
have
Why?
Because the unions are here to represent the men's interests
and it's in the men's interests to make sure these people are
doing their job correctly. If they have the ability to know
that the men are doing their job correctly.
Should decision-making structures be changed?
Well let's take a top union man's there - a convenor or somebody
like that - he should be able to sit with these people, and listen.
Should he have a watching brief say?
I don't know if even the.convenor would have the ability••• but
if he could hear what they have to say he could take it to
people. After all there are people in the union who are fairly
well up. But I'm talking about district or national level.
They're in a position to decide about this •••
They would have to have the knowledge to know.
••• but he would have to have the ability to absorb what these
people are taking about.
If he had this ability, should people like this be in the
majority on the board?
No, I don't think so
or equal representation
You must have the Board
Or should there just be people there to watch and listen?
Uh Huh
Would that be effective?R. There's a possibility it would stop any rumours going around.
You begin to say things to the horse's mouth, I mean he's
actually sat in at the board meeting. As you pointed out earlier
the management can say whatever they like because there's only
Management at the meeting
s. You don't think the board would arrive at decisions before the
board meeting
R. Oh aye this could well happen. I mean this is all politics in
management isn't it.
s. Would something like this be effective? Would Management want to
make it work? Or would it be a charade?
R. It could well turn out like that
s. Would Management behave like that, from what you know of the
Management here?
R. I don't know a great deal about the Management right enough. We
only know what's on the ( ) side.
s. From what you see of them
R. No, I think they're fairly straight here.
s. If they decided to do something like that they would try to make
it work?
R. They're pretty genuine. Uh huh.-
EXCERPT 5-3.9
S Do you think er there should be representatives of the employees
sitting on the Board? Do you think that would be right?
R. I would think they should be able to know what's going on.
s. Uhu.
R. And tell us the story about the decisions they make.
S. They would keep you informed?
R. Informed, yea.
s. On what was happening? Do you think they should have a sort of
say in the decisions that are made? Should they have a vote?
R. Oh I think they should have a vote.
S. Do you think there should be as mant of them as there are of the
Directors?
R. No. I don't think so. I mean no as many.
S. Less than?
R. Less.
S. Than them? Urn. Do you think it would pay the Company to do that?
To have that sort of representation?
R. Ah. I'm no sure about that. I mean it's possible that what they
would hear would upset everybody else.
S. Hm.
R. Then that causes a wee bit of animosity an that.
S. How do you mean?
R. Well, around about here just
now possibly a lot wouldn't like then we would be hearing them.
S. Right.
R. And it could
S. Cause some animosity?
R. Aye.
s. To the Board?
10 0R. No, towards the Shop Stewards aye against us the Board
and maybe ignore it?
S. The Board aye. Do you think this is a better system than say the
Management just consulting wit~ their employees?
R. Yea I think it would be.
S. What sort of advantages would it have over consultation?
R. They're in there and they're in the discussion.
S. Uhu.
R. Well when the Management come to them it's usually only maybe
just the one man that comes and says they've decided on this.
S. Uhu. That with consultation they would listen to what you have
to say then go and
R. Yes.
S. Urn. Would the guys that represent you on the Board would they be
able to keep up with the Board of Directors?
R. Well I think the Union would watch who they'd pick for the job.
S. Do you think it would be somebody from within the Company? You
know say a Convenor or a Shop Steward or would it be someone from
the Union hierarchy, a Union delegate or somebody?
R. I think it should be somebody within the Company.
S. Uhu.
R. Oh well if you let the Management bring someone it. You know they
would be on their side right away.
.,
S. Right, but I mean should it be a Delegate say of the Union?
R. Oh aye.
S. An appropriate official?
R. That's brought in? Aye.
S. Would that be better than someone from within the Company?
R. Aye. He would be representing the men.
S. Hm. Would he do as good a job as somebody that was actually from
the Company like a Convenor, somebody like that?
R. I dontt know.
,-a IS. You doubt it?
R. I doubt it. Yea.
s. Why?
R. Well you sit with the higher Management and that he's up with
the crust. If he got a higher job himself he would be seeing
their point of view more than
S. Differing?
R. Differing yea
S.
R. Yea
S. What about the idea of the workers controlling the Company
themselves, you know that of employees ought to
control the Company themselves?
R. Yea.
S. Do you think that's workable possibility?
R. Uhu. Maybe in a very small firm it would be no' bad but I don't
think that for a firm this size, too much, too many men and too
much at stake.
S. Aye. What sort of do you think there would be.
R. Well the decisions that would have to get made I think. Idon't
think there are men, on the 'shop floor I mean, to make the decisions
that would need to be made.
S. Hm. You would - there would be too much talking going on about
the decisions being made?
R. Aye, a lot of talk.
/0 ~EXCERPT 5•.,-,
s. What about Management consulting employees - do you think that
would be a - that would be a desirable thing?
R. I think it could be. It has advantages.
S. Would it have as many advantages as sitting up on the Board?
R. No. I think you would have the best advantage in the Board Room!
S. If-you got people in the Board Room they should have - should
there be as many people representing the employees as there are
Directors just?
R. No. Not so many.
S. Just one or two?
R. Three anYWaY.
S. Ah. Urn. Why would you say consultation would be less good than
actually being represented on the Board?
R. Well when you're around a board table and arguments crop up and
that then I think you're better round the table.
S. That you're in a better - the employees are in a better position?
R. I think so.
s. Hm. Do you think the Management have any rights to make decisions
on their own without consulting employees?
R. I think so.
S. In what sort of area?
R. Well it depends on eh - what was that question again?
S. Do you think the Management have any rights to make decisions on
their own without consulting employees?
R. I think id the decisions have got to do with the Company I think
the Management is the best way to do it.
s. Where decisions depend on their expertise - they've got the right
to make it on their own, but if it affects you
R. Well they'd need to bring the snop floor into it.
s. They've got a right to and you direct them.
ro.~EXCERPT 5.32..
what sort
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s.
R.
s.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
What about workers sitting on tne Board with the Board of
Directors? I mean employees not just the guys from the shop
floor but staff as well. Would any use come from that.
Could be
What sort of use?
Well you'd know how financially how
of things
Hm.
Do you think it would give you any more information than the
information you get just now? In what sort of way?
Well, financially how it's placed. How the orders are going and
when they are getting them.
Are you not getting this information just now?
Well we do but not - only when they're getting them.
Not on a regular basis?
Well, they give you it when they've got orders.
Hm.
They usually give you it when they're looking for orders. They
actually can withhold information which might not be suitable.
Hm.
To put out at the present time.
That they have people sitting on the board here
You've to to them for the information - to issue a
statement.
Um how many do you think - do you think the employees should be
represented equally with the shareholder Directors or just a
minority of employee Directors?
It depends on how many shareholders there are.
104S. Well, I mean you could say there was 10 Directors on the Board
at the moment
R. They could have a proportion of men 2 men on the Board of Directors
S. Which would be in the minority. Should they have any say in
making decisions, which is when the Company is going to take a
vote should they make a vote.
R. Yes, I think they should be able to make votes.
S. Able to make their voice heard. Do you think it would be
reasonable given that they are the minority?
R. They could always give their opinion.
S. Yea. At least they'd have written down what they had said even
if they'd made their point. What if their motion reached dis-
agreement at that level how would it be resolved?
R. Well, you would get information and you could always, as I said,
make your point there.
S. Hm.
R. It's the way a lot of people feel the same way.
S. Hm. If there was a dispute would you want to take it through
the Board and resolve it there or would you want to take it through
the normal sort of employee department channels?
R. Through the Board.EXCERPT 5.33
S. What about workers sitting on the Board? Do you think that·s a
good idea?
R. Aye. I think it's an extremely good idea.
S. What sort of advantages do you think it would have.
R. Not to take decisions. Not to take decisions at this stage.
For the obvious reasons we have just been talking about. Eh.
We would be knowledgeable, we would know all the runnings of the
Company.
S. Aye.
R. Eh. Everything would be - theinformation would be there at our
fingertips if we required it.
S. Right.
R. Eh. We'd be in at the nitty gritty when the decisions are made
and we could be there to put the membership point of view.
S. Mm
R. I.e. of your Union representatives point of view, and how they
feel about certain things and how you think they would feel
about certain things and eh you could always come back to get
really back to the membership and bring it back to the Board
Meeting, and before they make decisions which might be, at the
end of the day, silly decisions or decisions that are going to-
bring unrest to the work force, they could be brought to the table
and then could be ironed out and when the decision is made, they
are taking into consideration what might be the outcome on the
shop floor.
S. What about a failure to agree?
R. Aye, but what rm saying I wouldn·t, at this stage, being ignorant
of how the company is run, the ins and outs of it, I don't think we
should have a say at this stage. I think we should be involved in
and our thoughts taken into consideration.
10 ~S. You listen to them?
R. That~s right.
S. But they may possibly listen to you and
R. That's right.
S. But as far as your suggestion, if they chose to ignore them that's
up to them?
R. Yes, that's right. At the end of the day. But then we are in a
position to give a true picture and a factual picture to the
membership.
S. In the communications line?
R. Aye.
S. As far as you're concerned.
R. Communications is the Personnel at the moment. They sit up here.
There's the Personnel and there's us and the communication goes to
Personnel who then relays it to us.
S. Hm.
R. I feel that we should be more in with more information eh and, if
you like, involve ourselves in decisions in the Company and be
participating in decisions of the Company although we are not
actually making their decisions.
I() -=rEXCERPT 5.~
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If there was to be a plan to give you all the information you
want do you think that would be better or worse than having some
sort of participation at Board level?
We're-going to have participation in work. We should have
participation with Boards and Management at work level.
How should that be organised?
Dh. it would take better brains than me to organise it but it
should come down. you know. just along the same way they've got.
Are you talking about the organisation or the information? _
The organisation.
Well. it would take better brains than me but surely industry is
in such a manner. nationalised and private. in such a manner
that it wouldn't be too difficult to organise that. I mean. I
wouldn't know how to go about it or anything like that. I
imagine there are better people. better people, better trained.
In the Union. by the way. People in the Union can do these
things.
Full-time officials and so on.
Yes. that's right. They've got a deeper knowledge of it.
If there was to be a at floor level. would you want
equality with the present Directors. equality of numbers?
I would say yes.
Why would you say that?
Equality in everything gives you a fair say on the Board. Afair
chance.
For this equality, would you want equality of the shop floor vis
a vis the present Directors or equality of yourself plus the staff?
Well, I'd say that I count the staff the same as other workers and
if the workers had to get a thingummy, well the staff would be on it
JD~as well. I would say yes to that, on that basis.
S. Would you say that boys, as employees, should be on the Board
of Directors.
R. Yes that's right.
S. Should they have voting rights?
R. I would say yes to that. We are going away ahead you know.
We're looking away ahead in the future, aren't we?
S. If you had voting rights,do you think the average trade unionist
would be able to survive in that sort of atmosphere?
R. They wouldn't know. I agree with you there. I've got to come
back again to the education and information situation and we are
talking about fulltime Union officials. Say you've got a work.
of 2000 or 3000 men and you were going to start, it would be a
gradual buildup. People would have to go in and be absorbed
in that type of atmosphere and get absorbed in that type of thought
and to gain a knowledge of what they are dealing in and what they're
doing. You know, that's going to take a long time. But, the
ultimate situation must be a 50/50 basis.
s. The employee representatives would have to learn how to get by
at Board level.
R. Oh aye, there's no doubt about that. Then that's already, I
think there are some sort of schools being arranged for that.
S. Oh aye.
R. I'm not going to say to you that. I've got to say that our
Unions as far as we're concerned, you're talking really about the
S. Bullock report.
R. The Bullock report, Our Union is not too favourably looking
at the Bullock report just now because, again we've got to come
back to the society that we're in, which isn't going to change
tomorrow.
S. Once these guys, your employee representatives, go to get this
loq...
experience working with Management, do you think they might
start to grow away from their members?
R. No doubt about that. That's the fear in our Union. I think it
is a credible fear. I think it's a distinct possibility.
S. How do you think you could avoid that?
R. I don't know. I don't know You're going to have to try and pick
out real, true, honest people and even then you're still going to
hope and trust. You're not going to - I couldn't answer that, you
know. It is a difficult one. But then,'at the end of the day,
with Convenors and Shop Stewards you've always got to come back
down and get support for what you want to do. I mean, a Convenor,
people talk about Convenors having a lot of 'yesmen', it's just
not true, this doesn't happen and somebody can say that that's your
scheme. Like we get holidays and somebody says that's your
holidays that you're choosing. But no it's a matter of voting
and then after the Shop Stewards talk about it and decide, you
still have to go to the men and convince the men that this would
be in their best interests so you're going to get no one man that
can, but they can obviously help influence the situation especially
if they are the ones that are on the Board.
S. If you were either being represented at Board level or receiving
much more information from the Company than you are at the moment
and they changed their word or policy or they took evasive policy
you did not agree on, how then would you find it easy to convince
the membership to, in the 'last resort, to come out on strike over
it.
R. I think you would find it very, very, very difficult, very
difficult. You would need to have a real change of climate,
everything before you could get to that stage. You are talking
away years ahead. But that's the position people are working to.
Not necessarily to 'come out on strike but to have the say so and
/10influence to be able to show the men that such and such 1S not
going to be helpful. That change of policy.is not going to be
helpful to the men in this area.
S. What do you think the obstacles to that are?
R. Well the obstacles are always profit. Multi-nationals. The
shifting their jobs down from here to England because, and no
argument about it. It's better suited. But then life cannot be
like that. You know, you cannot have - you all cannot be - it's
all suitable the way Britain is going just now for every industry
to be located in the south east of England but it cannot happen
so people are going to have to have social works and social
situations. We are already beginning to talk about them and people
are going to have to realise that that's how life is going to be.
Either that you're just going to have your four or five million
unemployed. There is no doubt about it because they way things
are going just now in the world, everything is being automated.
Everything is being classed in such a manner that you're either
going to have to go down to the 35 and 39 hour week or going to
have the million unemployed.
S. Right. What do you think the obstacles are in getting the guys
to come out and support you in that sort of policy.
R. Well it would depend on your previous actions and your previous
way of working whether the men trusted you. Are you talking about
a Convenor or a Shop Steward?
s. Shop Stewards.
R. Shop Stewards as a body trying to get men to come out on strike
because of a situation that there has been a change of policy on
the work on the Board.
S. Yes.
R. I think it would be very, very difficult but I think, at the end
of the day, you might just manage it because the men trust the
IIIShop Stewards but then how long that trust, how long that's going
to remain.
S. More difficult say than .getting them to come out on strike for a
wage rise?
R. No. It would be easier to get them out on strike for a wage rise
for thatts in front of their faces and it's easily arguable.
It's there in front of them.
S. They understand.
R. It's more easily understood and with the information that you've
got you can explain it away. It is going to be very difficult
for somebody say that's had five or six years teaching under Trade
Union or wherever. night school or day school to sit on a Board and
then he comes down and tries to explain how the situation, by the
change of policy on the Board, reflects on the men and get the men
to come out on strike because of his thoughts. It's going to be
a hard job getting Shop Stewards never mind getting the men.
S. It's going to be hard because it is not easily understood?
R. I think that's an acceptable situation.
S. Somebody will need to work towards with the Union.
R. Dh you're going away years ahead. I think the Bullock report is
years ahead.R. We only know what the Management tell us.
S. If you had the information do you think it would best still be
left up to the Management?
R. Aye.
S. Why do you think it would be best?
R. Well itls just a Management decision I think. I mean personally
I wouldntt know anything about that at all because
S. You lack the knowledge and the information to take that sort of
decision. What about the idea of urn people representing the
employees at Board level? Do you think that would be more
favourable?
R. I think somebody should be up there to see whatls happening.
S. Hm. Who do you think this somebody should be? Should it be
Shop Stewards or
R. Shop Stewards.
S. A fu11time delegate. say?
R. Well a full time kind of Shop Steward.
s. It should be somebody who actually works in the Company or somebody?
R. Somebody from the shop floor.
s. Hm. Urn. Should there be as many of them as'there are of the
present Directors or should they be in the minority?
R. I think they should be in the minority because itls a Management
thing again.
s. Should they have any say in the decisions that are taken?
R. I think they should be able to give their opinion and
s. Hm.
R. Say what they think about the problem.
S. They should havectvote say?
R. Hm.
_1'...LJ....L3 _s. If it comes to a vote they should be able to say that's
what we think?
R. Hm.
S. But you mean that since they're a minority they could be out-
voted? Urn. What would the main sort of function be? Would
it be to make sure that there's information going in both
directors or that you were
R. They'd be information as well
s. Yea. You would
R. You'd be able to express the workers' opinion on the Board.
How the workers feel.
,
S. Right. That you would know what they were doing and they
would know what you were feeling.' Urn. Do you think this would
be better than a consultation? Management asking you what
you think?
R. No really.
S. It wouldn't-be a better system than consultation?
R. What do you mean?
s. Well instead of having people actually representing you on the
Board Management would just and ask what you
think about such and such a change and then they would go away
and make the decisions entirely on their own?
R. I think it would be their decision really but they could let us
know what they are doing.
S. Hm. That the two are really kind of similar to your mind.
Uh. What about the idea that the workers ought to have some
control of the'Company? That they ought to own it and run it
in their interests? Do you think that would work?
R. I suppose ,it would as well.
s. What sort of benefits would it bring?
R. Well you'd be working for, if you reap the profits as well,
1/4you'd be working more or less for yourself wouldn't you?
S. Hm. What change is that going to bring?
R. It might make some people get a wee bit more industrious.
S. They would work harder say?
R. Could aye. If you're reaping the profits.
S. Urn.
R. If you're getting larger wages.
S. Do you think there would be any problems in running the Company
.
that way?
R. I suppose there would be because eh lack of knowledge.
You need the Management to
S. You need the Management to make certain decisions for you?
Do you think the Management and the workers would be able to
work together? If they owned the Company rather than someone
else getting the profits?
R. I think they could.
S. Why do you think they would work together in these circumstances?
R. For you're working for each other then aren't you? It's not one
against the other.
s. You're working profitably?
R. Working profitably yes.
S. Do you think the Management have any right to make decisions on
their own?
R. Hm. Some decisions.
s. What decisions?
R. Well the running of the Company because they're Management, we
are the workers as it is just now.
S. Right.
R. So managerial decisions are up to them isn't it?
S. They're the ones that have been educated?
R. I wouldn't say that but they're the Management and we are the
workers and that's the way it is.EXFERPT 5.3ft
s. What about profit sharing - do you think that sharing at least
some of the Company's profits with your employees would be a
good idea?
R. Yes, I think it would. The work-force should have a share in
profits. There should be high earnings in manufacturing if
the company is prosperous.
S. How would you arrange this? How would you distribute the
profits, by giving them shares, or by bonus payments, or what?
R. Either of these ways would be acceptable as far as I am
concernedEXCERPT 5.,l
s. What about distribution of profits to employees? How do you
think that should operate?
R. Again, I think that's ideal. Again with a small company.
Well the whole cycle starts off with a small company, the company
grows, when it gets to a certain size it can be rationalised
That should really be what happens in the long run. What I would
like to see is the original shareholders being gradually bought
out by the employees so that the employees own the company.
In these circumstances the larger the company the more the employees
benefit, the more interest they take. They're the shareholders
they're the directors, they take all the decisions. They don't
have the capital to origi~ate the concern but they will have
eventually through time.
s. Would something like that work?
R. I don't see why not. I think it would be the answer to a hell
of a lot of problems.
s. What would happen to the shareholders' money?
R. That would move on to other businesses.
S. How would this company raise money?
R. Well there would be no reason why we couldn't go out again to
the Stock Market, issue more shares. Or go to a bank or
wherever we could raise the cash
S What would happen to shareholders in a minority position? Would
the shareholders not just leave?
R. No, there would have to be guarantees written into the thing.
s. Protected, the way minority shareholders are now?
R. Yes.
s. Would employees be interested in shares? Or would they rather
be in a position they are now where they get paid?
1/1R. I don't think they'd be interested in the Company if its
future was in doubt. I think a Company of the nature of (this
one) would prosper, because you'd come in in the morning and
get your jacket off and get on with work rather than sitting
around gaffing to people. There must be a hell of a lot of time
lost through that. I get involved in it as well. Everybody does.
But if you were working for yourself, as I'm sure most people
would want to, to get some satisfaction, the Company would benefit
in the long run. We could take 1/4 of the costs off in the
manufacturing of our machines. We'd be a hell of a bit more
competitive and that would just help the circle. More orders
just get healthier as time goes one. That's what's wrong with
nationa1isation. It's lovely. We've got capital investment
which the government can provide. But we seem to have lost
something on the employee relationship side of it. We just don't
seem to be producing the stuff as competitively as we should.
Mainly because of this lack of enthusiasm.
/,enEXCERPT 5:,8
S. We were talking about profit sharing as one part of improvement
R. Well
S. In the Company.
R. It depends on the point of view. We{ve obviously got to find
some sort of meaningful adequare appropriate
S. Hm.
R. System of wage and salary payments have the next two or three
years.
S. Hm.
R. I donlt think we have one at the moment - messed around by the
Government of course and have to more or less ad hoc each and
every year
S. Hm.
R. From our point of view, what we would like to do, we would like
to be able to negotiate something meaningful, that would be
meaningful and relevant over two or three years
and that's what welre trying to find out. Whether profit sharing
or whatever we{re keeping an open mind to it.
s. How much is the freerider problem?
R. How much is the?
s. The freerider problem in your ideas on profit sharing in the works?
R. The which problem?
S. Freerider.
R. Sorry 1
1mnot following you. 1
1mnot getting the drift.
S. Well the idea of your profit sharing scheme is that everybody
works a bit harder because if they work harder the Company makes
more profits and if the Company makes more profits, they get
more money.
R. Oh aye. Ah.5. So the freerider problem suggests that certain guys would say
well if I don't work any harder the Company will still make more
profits for everybody else will be working harder to try and get
more money for the same amount of work.
R. Hm. I don't really know incentive from profit sharing is all
that direct immediate or relevant. I think it's all part and
parcel of the bigger picture. Urn. 1 think the actual incentive
is too remote from the point of view of individual motivation.
I think for most individuals, obviously for some it would. No
I think it's part and parcel of the bigger picture - the bigger
picture that I talked about earlier on - the sort of people
equating their wellbeing with the Company wellbeing. It follows
from that I think that if it's reflected in more money when the
Company is doing better it always fits this particular picture.
I think you would be a bit naive to think it starts people
working harder I don't think it does.
s. Hm.
R. But I think it could perhaps help more along the road to having
people work more positively with you.
s. Hm.
R. That's the object of the exercise.
S. How much do you think you've already got that?
R. I think it's beginning to emerge in this particular Company.
I think we got this by virtue of a few other Companies in the
region were foing well, they were expanding - I think we got
credit for this. I think there's some measure of this at the
moment•.
S. I How much does it rely on the fact that you are doing well?
R. Almost toally, I think. I think if urn I think that's the first
and major breakthrough. I think it's got to be consolidated and
got to be worked at a good deal harder against the time when we
J~Omay have periods when it is difficult.
s. When things - if things do get difficult do you think things
would move back?
R. Itts difficult. The rate of progression would obviously be
decreased. I don't know whether we would actually move back but
certainly I think it would be very difficult to progress effectively
against that sort of background. I don't know that it would
definitely go back. You see I think it's the sort of thing that
takes quite a long time to develop for all sorts of special
a bad history, not particularly in this
Company but in general terms.
S. Hm.
R. I think it takes - no I think one's talking about a· considerable
number of years to get a break even situation where people are
really prepared to think in terms of the Company
S. Do you think this emanates from the experience they've had in
this Company or in other Companies?
R. No I can only talk for this Company. I would have thought it
was largely in this Company.
I ~ JEXCERPT 5.;q
s. What about profit sharing? What's your feelings about that?
R. r think itts a good idea. It gives us more money. But if I was
a manager ltd fight against it.
s. Why do you say that?
R. Well as I said it suits me, but it's not right, because you're
paid to do a job. Being paid out of profits is OK, but what
happens if the company was to make a loss. Are they going to
ask us for the money?
s. If there was to be a bonus paid, how would the size of bonus be
decided?
R. Oh it's up to them to decide on the size of bonus. The unions
would have to negotiate on this point. But this would involve
the union in the affairs of the Company. That wouldn't be a good
thing.
S. Why not?
R. I believe in the capitalist system Management might make a decision
to put more money into the Firm, but as they do that they give
us a more secure job.EXCERPT 5.4.0
S. What about distribution of profits? What do you feel about that?
R. That seems quite acceptable to me.
S. What if there were to be loss.
R. You mean would we take a drop in wages. Oh no I don't think they
would have much job with that.
S. What benefits would come from profit distribution, to the Company?
R. I suppose the production rate would go up if there was a carrot
as well as a stick.
S. Would wage demands be moderated?
R. If it was guaranteed, I think it could possibly. But if it was
up and down - one year a bonus, the next year there's not - I don't
think it would have a great deal of effect.
S. Would it affect how you see the Company. Would it be seen as
less exploitable?
R. I would say so ••• yes ••• mm mm ••• I think it would do workerl
management relations a bit of good if there was such ascheme.
S. Would workers trust the Management profit figure?
R. I don't know if this is true, but is there not some kind of scheme
whereby the Company have got to let the unions see the books.
I think in the light of that they would trust it. In the fact that
somebody else could see the books. But if it was all hush-hush,
I think they would be suspicious.EXCERPT 5.4 t
S. What about profit sharing? Do you think that's a good thing?
R. Yes, I think it's a good thing, but it's a hard thing really
because it could cause a certain amount of unrest. It's quite
a fair and simple way they've implemented it in this Company.
Right across the board one gets 8% of salary. Where it's based
on output the dangers here are where the bottlenecks are happening.
Where someone may feel he has put in his pound of flesh and he's
relying on someone else to take it that but further and in the end
you have a bottleneck.
S. How does it seem to work here?
R. Here it seems to be taken well. The proof of the whole thing
will be at the end of the financial year when we get the final
part of the bonus that's been witt~eld. At the moment we're slightly
down on the target figure because of bottlenecks.
s. Generally though - taking it wider than this scheme - do you
think profit sharing is good?
R. If a company is profitable, viable in all respects, it is a good
thing to share out part of the profits. It's a good thing
rather than being labelled an engineer and that you work in
Scotland and that the rate for an engineer in Scotland is £x.
I believe in a good compan~, and if it's run well, people should
be paid as part of it, and not be influenced by outside nor cause
any resentment to outside. Only that Company, if it's doing
badly, can answer for itself. But if a Company is doing very
well then people should be recognised and be part of it.EXCERPT 5A<J-
s. What about profit distribution? Would that affect the relation-
ship of employees to the firm?
R. They've already done that with the productivity bonus, but that
was more or less a hand-out.
S. I mean if they made say £10 million next year, some of that would
be distributed amongst. the employees. Would that make any
difference to the attitude of employee toward the Company.
R. You think, would the employees look more kindly on the Company?
5. Yeh right, we're working for ourselves.
R. Money opens doors always. If they start to hand out money
without anybody having to work harder to get it they're going
to look at it as a handout. They're going to be quite appreciative.
5. Hould they work harder for it?
R. I don't think they'd be asked to work harder for it.
5. Would they be prepared to work harder for it, since at the end of
the day they would see the results of it?
R. You. mean to increase the profits the following year. Oh yes,
that's always .an incentive isnlt it.
s. How should the profits be distributed amongst the employees?
R. This would be the problem~ The difficulty is in this organisation
we've got so many grades of staff. You've got junior staff, you've
got senior staff. Well the senior staff is a complete conglomera-
tion. It goes from blokes who are sitting next to you, he's
senior staff, to top management. 50 there must be grades within
that surely. But every time something like this comes out,
like that productivity bonus, it was based on your salary.
We would rather have seen it as a thingummy right across the board
because the bloke at the next desk to me, he's no working any
harder, but he's going to get more money because he's classifiedas a senior staff man. Supposing they had agreed on £500 to
every employee. But the way it's worked out some of the men on
the Shop Floor who are doing most to increase productivity are
getting less than some of the Staff. The higher your salary,
the higher your productivity bonus, and that's all wrong.
If you were entitled to a productivity bonus they should have
made it a straight figure right across the board.
S. Some might say white collar workers should get less than Shop
Floor who are the ones who make the product.
R. I would say that too, even against myself.
S. How would you justify it?
R. I think the men on the shop Floor are the ones that are actually
producing. We assist them, but the assistance is not all that
desperate. They would still get on with the job. There are some
staff down there who do assist them, progress clerks and that,
but we seem awful far removed from productivity bonus. We're
only (respondent's job) we're only ( ) something that's
happened.
S. How would white collar staff react if they got a smaller
bonus than the Shop Floor?
R. Personally I think that would be fair
s. How would others react?
R. I don't know. I don't think they would accept this at all. But
I would think it is fair. But it depends on who we're talking
about on the Shop Floor. I would suggest only the tradesmen like -
skilled men - but labourers would be classified the same as we are.
They're only assisting. We're only a service.
s. What about Staff engineers?
R. That's a bit tricky. But I think the fairest way is a single
figure right across the board. OK the men at the top's going to
equal, but what are they doing extra to earn more than I'm doingto get a productivity bonus. There must be some guys are the top
whp earn more than £1,000 on the productivity bonus. But they
didn't do a~y more to earn that than I did, or even somebody
whots even lower paid than me. I think in a case like that
TASS slipped up. TASS shouldn't have accepted a percentage.
They should have went for a payment right across the board.
Those senior grades are getting all this extra money and doing
nothing to earn it. Half of them don't even earn the money they're
getting in senior grades. That's only my opinion.EXCERPT 5.~
S. What about profit distribution? Do you think it would be a good
idea if the Company were to distribute its profit amongst its
employees or some of its profits?
R. I think so.
S. How do you think this should be done?
R. Through a bonus just to show
S. Uhu. Should that be a percentage of everybody's payor a lump
sum for everybody, you know.
R. Alump sum. Same for everybody I think, you know.
S. Should it be that the Managers get more than the shop floor
should?
R. No. I don't think so. Well.
S. Some people might say that they've got more responsibility.
R. Well everybody on the shop floor, you know.
s. Hm.
R. Maybe engineers, cranemen and labourers.
s. Right. They should all get the same.
R. There should be no differential the same as the last time. They
should be the same I think, because it's the one effort, I think.
s. Right. What about the Management should they get more than
anybody?
R. I think they do expect to get more.
s. Why?
R. They've earned it.
s. What way did they earn - in what sort of way?
R. Well a worker earns it but they're supervisory.
s. Hm.
R. But they show good prospects of chasing jobs on and that and
getting them done.s. Right. What do you, do you think this would make any difference
to the way people look at the Company, you know, employees regard
the Company?
R. Aye it would make a difference I think.
S. In what sort of way?
R. Well a Company that gives the workers good wages or bonuses will
You talk to your mates outside about
it and they
S. Would they work harder?
R. Oh you work harder if you knew there was a bonus at the end of
the day.
S. Hm. If you knew you were going to get part of the profits, you
would work that much harder?
R. OK...
EXCERPT 5.44
s. What about the idea of all profits being distributed?
How do you think the profit should be distributed to co this?
R. I think they should be distributed equally.
S. Everybody should get £50 or, hopefully, more than that?
R. Hopefully more.
S. Hm. Do you think everybody deserves as much as everybody else?
R. Yes.
S. There aren't some people who do more for the Company? Would
you say the Managing Director does more than the guy who sweeps
floors?
R. Well, if they guy didn't sweep the floors there would be that
amount of dirt.
s. Hm. But would that make a contribution to the Company?
R. Everybody makes a contribution.
s. Well OK. That's fine.
/30EXCERPT 5.4{
s. Do you think. - what about the idea of the profits being
distributed amongst the employees? Do you think that's a good
idea?
...
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
S.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
Oh aye I always think it's a good idea to get money in.
How do you think it should be distributed?
I think everybody should get the same you know, even staff and
that. There shouldn't be any
Everybody should get a hundred quid?
Everybody should get£100.
Or something like that. Do you think you should get the cash
in your hand or should you get shares in the Company?
No I think it would, well I'd like the cash in my hand and then
I would know I've got it.
Hm. Would it make any difference to the way you feel about the
Company if you had shares in it?
Oh you would be worried out of your blooming wits if you
but you would be worried even if you
Hm. Do you think you would work harder if you owned them?
No, I don't think so. It wouldn't make any difference.
Why do you think no?
I don't think it would even though you've got the shares.
I mean actually if you own the Company you're working for
yourself.
I don't -
How do you think the rate of bonus should be negotiated then?
just for example.
I think they should be going with what obviously the Company have
got, you know financially.
Right. How much is the main problem?
Yes
131s. Who should decide the size of the bonus you get out of the
profits? Is it the Management themselves, the owner or should
it be open to the Unions?
R. I think it's up to the Union to discuss it. They know how
S. Uhu.
R. How
S. How much the Company's got?
R. Got, aye.
S. What if the Management said well we don't want to distribute these
profits we want to keep it to re-invest next year, say?
R. Em. As long as they did re-invest and they were
s. to what the Unions say?
R. Yea.
s. OK then we've got £50,OOO,and we're going to invest
R. So much.
s. So much. OK thanks very much.EXCERPT 5.~~
S. Right. Urn. What about if the profits were distributed - do you
think that would make any difference to the way people regard
the Company, their relationship with the Company?
R. I think it would
S. Why?
R. Well instead of them getting all the profits and us getting a
small share, if it was evenly distributed.
S. Hm.
R. It would make a better relationship I think.
S. You mean you would be working for yourself to some extent.
R. You'd be bettering your own profits instead of bettering their
profits.
S. Right. How should the profits be distributed if there was - how
do you think they should be distributed - what sort of system?
R. Eh. well evenly.
S. Everybody should get
R. So much. We're all just doing a job aren't we?
S. Some people might say that the Management have more responsibility
than you. You know, if the worst comes to the worst right you've
just jiggered (a job) ah but if (the M.D.) or somebody makes a
mistake it could the firm, does that justify
him getting more of a bonus.
R. If we were working together it wouldn't just be (the M.D.'s)
decision. It would be
S. Everybody's decision?
R. It would be more or less everybody's decision.
S. What about if the Company was just run exactly the same only the
guys got profits - share of the profits? no change
in the bonus scheme.
/33R. Ah I suppose the Management would need to get a wee bit more
than use. That way.
S. It still makes a differential as at the moment. Urn. How do you
think profits should be paid? Should you have to have cash t
cheque in your hand or should it be used to buy shares - they
can issue - everybody gets five shares in the Company?
R. I would say cash and itls up to yourself what you do.
S. Right. What would happen if they did give you shares? Would
you sell them?
R. 1
1mnot sure.
S. Cash in your stake? What would you do?
R. lId hang on to them I suppose. I have no knowledge of
shares. I suppose lId hang on and see how they were going.
S. Right. If it was going quite well yould hold on to them?
R. Hold on to them for a while.
S. Well OK. Thanks very much.
/34EXCERPT 5.4""
s. What about profit sharing? What do you think are your profits
sharing drawbacks?
R. Well, again you've got to come back to the situation where your -
the establishment that you're in. What do you mean by profit
sharing? Do you mean that someone says that there's £2,000,000
profit for John Browns. £1,000,000 is going to go for betterment
in the factory, more jobs, etc. etc. and another £1,000,000 on
wages. Half a million on extra wages and half a million going
to go to the shareholders. Is that the kind of thing?
s. What would your alternative be?
R. Well the alternative sou1d be you're going to have to go into a
non-profit making society; the word 'profit' runs through every
strata of society. You're going to have to go into a non-profit
making society, if there is one exists.
s. The Company should aim just to break even?
R. No. The Company is there to give a service. No, I'll give you
an example. When is it ever the ambulances that fly from the
Orkneys and the Shet1ands to bring people down to G1asgow"for
operations and that, that is never going to make a profit but you
cannot do without that service. Years ago it had to be done
by boat and by trains and things like that but by they are the
kind of services, that's what I mean. Just services and that's
what you are going to have to get people to work for to get an
equality and unification. You are going away into another society
when you are talking like that.
s. Right what about guys owning shares in the Company?
R. That's happening just now in that sort of society we're in.
It will be years and years before that but changed it will be but
I don't expect we'll be here to see it. It must come.s. Including me?
R. Including you. I don't think you'll be here to see it either
but it· must come. Everything is forcing in the world as it is
today, everything is forcing goin gthat way. Everything is
going.that way today. I think we've got a Government that is the
only alternative. There is no alternative just now. The
Government that we've got in just now and any other Government
just now would create a lot more unemployment.
S. If employees were given shareho1dings either on an
basic or given shares, do you think it would change their attitude
to the Company?
R. It might. I couldn't answer it all the same. I've never been
involved. There is a lot of bonus sharing in I.C.I. and quite a
number of other Chemical Unions and that. They were the first
ones along with one or two engineering places but I have never
been involved and I've no idea how it would work.
S. Some people seem toth"ink that they would go along with it so far,
the idea being that if you had shares in the Company you would
work harder to make more profits.
R. The idea being just the same as the blokes who have spent £15,000
and £20,000 on a house on a mortgage will be less liable to listen
to strike action or stoppages or anything like that purely on the
basis, and rightly so, that they've got interest to keep up.
When I say rightly so that's their special interest and that's
how you get the profit sharing ideas that's coming in. Well, I'd
just rather have it higher wages.
s. Right. Do you think that profit sharing is anti-Union more or less?
R. It's another method. It's another method of winning their point
another way. That's all. Amore relaxed democratic way, if you
like. Just another method.
S. Not as ruthless as a big stick.R. They've. got away from that to a certain extent but that can
always come back any time they feel like it. You've had examples
of that.
I., -:rappendix 6-
~~J~ JOB EXPECTATION
At the end of Chapter Vwe stated that hierarchy could' be regarded as
being at least partly self-supporting i.e. that the power (in the
sense of the 3rd dimension) which surrounded it was an important
factor in its persistence. We suggested, tentatively, that failure
by the hierarchy to provide sufficient rewards to fulfill employees·
expectations could undermine the power of hierarchy - conversely
providing these rewards could be regarded as reinforcing the power
of the hierarchy. It is this latter voice which we shall
consider in this AfftUlJix
We shall consider this issue from the perspective of a set of job-
related items which have traditionally been used in job satisfaction
surveys. The set comprises 9 items - wages/salary: job security:
job variety: supervision: working conditions: trade union organisation
and activity: promotion: control of own working environment:
workmates. This set of items was selected after a comprehensive
review of the relevant literature.
The extent to which employees express satisfaction with these items
indicates the extent to which the Firm as a hierarchical form of
organization has been successful in fulfilling their expectations.
First of all, however, we considered the rank ordering of
importance of these 9 items for our respondents. The average
position of each item is shown'in TableA6.l.In administering this part of the questionnaire respondents were
allowed to Itie
l 2 or more items. if they found it impossible to
differentiate between them. but this was only accepted after attempts
by the respondents to break the deadlock. It was. therefore. very
much a final option. in the face of some discouragement from
ourselves.
J ?>'fFrom table~.l the importance of money is made fairly clear. being
most important for Staff. Hourly Paid and Shop Stewards. and second
for Management and Union Reps. This has clear connotations of the
instrumental view of the 'Affluent Worker' studies of 20 years ago.
(J. Goldthorpe et al "Affluent Worker" 3 Vols). In this work
instrumentalism is described as being an attitude whereby "work is
regarded as a means of acquiring the income necessary to support
a valued way of life of which work itself'is not an integral part •••
their involvement in the organisation which employs them is
primarily a calculative one •• (hence) the ego-involvement of
workers in their jobs - in either the narrower or wider sense of
the term - is weak •• ~ Consequently workers lives are sharply
dichotomised between work and non-work. Work experiences
and relationships are not likely to be carried into 'out-plant'
life". Given the relative importance of money throughout all
categories, it may appear that these relative orderings represent
such an instrumental attitude, whereby work is" not in itself an end.
but only a means to some other. non-work, end. We shall, however.
argue that this is nat in fact the case - that such an interpretation
would be grossly aver-simplified to such an extent as to produce
considerable distortion. What we shall argue is that while income
is important (a) that it is not of such importance. either to the
extent that employees will accept whatever the Company hands down.
or (b) that, in the minds of our respondents the level of importance
they do place an income is not unreasonable. but fits in with their
other. complex aspirations. and should be seen as pragmatic. rather
than instrumental. in so far as we cannot. simple-mindedly. say
that their aims are of work, or non-work, but cannot be both. Rather
we must take account of their perception of thelr situation. and
"in that we shall see that they take account of their social position.
14-0and, observing that they must work to earn a living, aim to satisfice
on a range of expectations of which income is only one expectation
and that they have other expectations of work. That this should be
so is not altogether surprising since, on reflection, while the
results reported by Go1dthorpe may be an accurate reflection of the
situation which prevailed in Luton, though we would question this,
there is no good, convincing reason why the mid 1960's attitude of
Luton should be reflected in the late 1970's attitudes of West
Scotland. Nor is there any good reason why workers, and managers,
should not shop around for a job which provides a mixture of rewards
which matches most closely an ordered set of priorities, as Go1dthorpe
1',1
;
: ;
et a1 point out themselves in their stud·~. The crucial 'I
point here is that there is no reason why these priorities should be
exclusively non-work, so that work becomes in itself merely a means
to secure these non-work priorities.
We do not, therefore, seek to deny the importance of money - to do so
would be completely unreasonable, both in terms of consistency with
our data, as well as in presenting a reasoned explanation - but it is
only one of a range of aims. This is made completely clear in the
ExcerptA6.1 from a Staff ,respondent.
This respondent is fairly typical of the oritentation to work found
in this Firm at all levels which certainly places money in'an
important position, but also looks for a measure of personal satisfaction
from working for the Firm. We cannot, thereofre, as Daniel reminds us,
regard the workers' life as coming to a halt at the entrance to
the factory (i.e. that only work experience is relevant). Rather the
worker has a life to lead both within and outwith work, and may trade
one off against the other (e.g. less satisfaction within work, for
/4 ,more satisfaction outwith work - as the Luton study showed), but (1)
they will only do this so far - our sample, as we suggested, will not
take whatever Management, had down purely for money (2) the law of
diminishing returns may well apply to such a process of adjustment
i.e. if we imagine 'units of dissatisfaction', £1 may compensate
for the first unit, but it may take £2 to compensate for the next .
unit, till a point is reached where money simply will not
compensate for further discomfort.
We must, however, have regard for the situation which the respondent
perceives himself to be in. It may be that this satisficing
(B. Cyert and J. March "Behavioural Theory of the Firm") takes
place at a lower. level than is perceived as ideal e.g. the
respondent in Excerp~6.l suggests that he is apathetic about his
job because he does not own the Firm, in a co-ownership sense.
Recognising this, however, he still seeks to derive other fo.rms
of satisfaction from his job than merely his salarly. It may be,
as Goldthorpe et al suggests that their sample took as the solution
of their problem of downward mobility, the highest paying job they
could find, virtually irrespective of all else, but we find little
or no trace of this in our sample. Instead what we have are
sets of not altogethr simple priorities, in which money is important -
but so are other aism. These sets of priorities, we shall argue,
reflect their perception of their social situation and its
possibilities (and lack of them). It is against such a background
that we must understand the orderings of TableA6.l.
From TableAQ.l it is clear that Salary/Wages is an important item
in all 5 categories. In Excerp~6.l we saw the importance of .
interest in his job for that member of Staff. The item 'Job
Varierty &Interest' is for Management, the most important item, for,
Staff it is second most important, for Staff Union Reps. and Shop
Stewards it is third most important, and for the Hourly-Paid it is
fourth. From, for instance, Fox's 'Beyond Contract' it should
hardly surprise us that job interest is important to Management, nor
even that is is important as it appears to be for the Staff and
their Union Reps. It is, however, somewhat more surprising when
we find it to be so important among the Hourly-Paid. This,
we shall suggest, is consistent with our view of a pragmatic
orientation adopted by our respondents.
By a pragmatic orientation towards work we are thinking of an
attitude of mond which is essnetially practical, and puts first
those items which are (l) most important and (2) perceived as
attainable and therefore subject to powor considerations - both
concious (i.e. what can be won or neglected) and unconscious
(i.e. what is not seen as a legitimate or attainable objective -
or not even considered at all). Hence Managemen~ do not
value trade union organisation, because it is not perceived as
important. Promotion, on the'other hand, is not important to
the Hourly-Paid because, as we shall show, they frequently
regard it as something which is out of their reach, and by
definition not relevant for them.
In relation to 'Job Variety and Interest' it is not necessarily
that Hourly-Paid do not regard it as important. It is, in part,
the recongition that, given their situation, other items
are more accessible (e.g. Wages). It is not that it is
unimportant - it is, for instance more important to them than
their trade union {which is 7th, compared to 4th for Job Variety
and Interest}.
14, ...._---------------------It would, therefore, be wrong to argue that 'Job Variety and Interest'
is important only to Staff/Management in the same way that it would
be wrong to argue that money is only important to the Hourly-Paid.
Indeed below we shall argue that differences in job satisfaction between
white and blue collar workers in this sample are not of significant
size. Consider for instance the fact that 3 items appear in the
first 3 places in 4 of the 5 categories - Job Variety and Interest:
Salarly: Job Security. Only Hourly-Paid exclude Job Variety and
Interest from their 'top 3' - and in their "case it is 4th.
There is, in other words a remarkable similarity in the ranking
of the most important items.
This_ is a position which poses more problems than merely saying
that all those items whic~ appear low down on each listing are not
important. In certain cases this is probably the case, e.g. Union
Organisation and Activity for the Management. We cannot, however,
presume that this will always be so, e.g. Supervision is something
which Hourly-Paid except to have as part of their work, and that
they shall never be free of it, so consequently it is reasonable
that they should place it low on their system of priorities.
Our findings from TableA6Jare, therefore, that these orderings are
essentially (l) pragmatic in that what is not attainable i.s not
highly rated, nor is whatever can be taken for granted, or is
deemed irrelevant, and (2) maximisation of a multi-item satisfaction
function i.e. no one item is the sole key to understanding our
respondents in the way money was used in 'The Affluent Worker'
studies.
14-1-Let us condier each item in the light of this, and the figures shown
in Tab1el~.~..~
(1) Wages This item, as we have already suggested, is on considerable
importance to all categoies - the highest average ranking being 1.71
(Union Reps), the lowest being 2.56 (Management). In relative
....
rankings (Table 6) this item is never lower than second (Management
and Union Reps.), and first for all other groups. We have, however, argued
that this, although an important motivator and means of attachement,
cannot be said to have the overpowering influence suggested by
'instrumental orientation'. As well as money, therefore, our
respondents seek other forms of satisfaction from their work
i.e. they have expecations other than money.
(2) Job Security There is much less agreement across the groups
on this item than on Wages/Salary. The highest average ranking
is 1.29 - among Staff Union Reps - and lowest for Management (4.03).
Why should there be this degree of difference among employees of
the same firm? Part of the answer can be seen in tables 6.3 and 6.4
which show the expe~ience of redundancy and unemployment among the
sample.
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Table~6.2 Rank Averages and Standard Deviations
-.Management Staff Union Rep_~ Hourly-Paid Shop Stewards
Average. Standard Average Standard Average Standard Average Standard Average Standard
. Deviation Deviation Deviation· Deviation Deviation
Wages/Sa1ary 2.56 (2.84) 2.85 (4.87) 1.71 (0.83) 2.1 (3.96) 2.18 (2.66)
Job Security 4.03 (4.42) 3.48 (7.17) 1.29 (0.83) 2.96 (5.42) 2.41 (2.75)
Job Variety
&Interest 2.09 (3.28) 3.35 (5.84) 4 (1.52) 4.52 (5.45) 4.29 (2.77)
Freedom from
Supervision 5.78 (3.59) 5.73 (5.85) 6.43 (2.62) 6.69 (4.67) 7.18 (2.36)
Working
Conditions 6.34 (3.53) 5.37 (4.99) 5.86 (2.86) 3.67 (4.48) 4.35 (2.99)
Union Org'n
(5.23) (3.27) (6.06) (2.45) &Activity 8.56 (2) 7.93 5.86 6.38 5.35
Promotion
Prospects 4.31 (3.46) 5.7 (7.94) 7.57 (1.67) 7.44 (5.99) 8.29 (2.56)
Control Own
Work Environment 4.34 (4.64) 5.1 (5.41) 6.29 (1.55) 6.1 (3.84) 5.88 (2.61)
Workmates 6.81 (3.19) 6.07 (5.43) 6 (2.24) 5.15 (3.98) 5.06 (3.15)Tab1eA£.3 How often have you been made redundant?
Shop
Union Reps Hourly-Paid Stewards
Never
1 - 5 times
Management Staff
26 (81%) 43 (61%)
6 (19%) 28 (39%)
6 (86%)
1 (14%)
33 (69%)
14 (31%)
12 (70%)
4 (24%)
More than 5
times o o o o 1
Tab1eA6.4 What experience do you have of Unemployment?
Shop
Management Staff Union Reps Hourly-Paid Stewards
None
Less than 5%
of Working Life
Less than 10%
of Working Life
27 (84%) 48 (68%)
5 (15%) 22 (31%)
o 1 (1%)
4 (57%)
3 (43%)
o
26 (54%)
21 (44%)
1 (2%)
8 (47%)
5 (29%)
4 (24%)
....
Experience of unemployment was defined as the proportion of working
life the respondent had spent in unemployment (e.g. if 1 year of
a 20 year working life had in total been spent as unemployed,
that would be 5%).
Tab1~6.4 suggests an almost hierarchical experience of unemployment
- Management have least, Staff have rather more, and Hourly-Paid most
of all - and, interestingly the Shop Stewards and Stafff Union Reps.
have more experience of unemployment than those they represent
(Precisely why this is we have no really clear idea). We cannot,
however, say the same of redundancy. TableA6.3 again shows that
experience of redundancy varies across the groups, but the group
with least experience of redundancy are the Staff Union Reps. Among
this group 86% have never been made redundant - a figure lower than
that for. Staff (in contrast to their relative experience of
unemployment) and lower even than that ofManagement.(though only just).
The Staff experience of redundancy is perhaps surprisingly high,
J4 {,as 39% had been made redundant between 1-5 times during their working
lives. This figure is higher even than for the Hourly-Paid. Why should
Staff ~e the most affect group? Some reason for this can be found
in the biographical data presented in Chapter VII.
In Tab1ef3.3 it can be seen that rather more Staff have less service
with the Firm than other groups do. The modal length of service of
Staff is less than 5 years (58% of Staff) while for Management it is
6 - 10 years. The Hourly-Paid samp1e
1s modal length of service
is also less than 5 years, but is less pronounced than among
Staff (40% have less than 5 years, 33% beteen 6 - 10 years).
In Table 3.4 we also found that Staff were much less likely
to have worked for the Firm when it was still part of the larger
enterprise - only 27% of Staff, compared to 56% of Management,
and 58% of Hourly-Paid, 57% of Staff Union Reps, and 65% of
Shop Stewards had worked for the Firm at that time.
As we explained in Chapter III the Firm has a number of qualities
which are important to us in considering the level of redundancy
among Staff relative to other-groups.
A) it began to produce and sell a new product in 1967 - they
required new skills in the Company, in areas other than
Manufacturing. The skills required of Staff would therefore
change after 1967, requiring recruitment of new/additional
Staff. Hence the fact that proportionately fewer Staff had
worked for the Firm as part of the larger enterprise.
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B) The Firm had a remarkable history of stable employment. As we
discussed in Chapter 111 the Firm. adopted a del iberately hi.gh wage
policy relative to other local firms to attract and retain the
high quality labour necessary to produce to product. An
implication of this is that the Firm would as far as
possible a redunancy which would involve giving up its high
quality labour. Indeed between 1967 and the time of our
research there had not been a redundancy in the Firm. This
all has 2 implications.
(i) Those with. least service would, by definition, have worked
at one time for other companies who would perhaps have adopted a ,
different employment policy. These would disproportionately be
Staff.
(ii) Given the stability of employment, which existed at the time
of our research, those with long service with the firm would
have little experience of redundancy/unemployment. These would
mainly be Management and Hourly-Paid. Furthermore that stability
(the remote chance of redundancy), plus the fact the Company paid
well, would obviously make the firm attractive in the labour
market i.e. joining this firm would be very much a conscious
decision, reflecting the importance of job security and high
wages (See for instance G. Ingham - Size of Industrial Organisation
and Worker Behaviour).
Job security is, therefore, important not because the respondents
saw their jobs as insecure - but because this was a quality which
they valued.(3) Job Variety &Interest. This item declines in order of
importance as we move down the hierarchy - being most important
for the Management, only second to Staff, third to Union Reps.
and Shop Stewards, and fourth for the Hourly-Paid. Clearly, therefore,
it is something which is important to all categories, but more so to
the former than the latter. If we examine the data in Tab1eA6.2
we can see just how much more important it is for Management than
for any of the others, and excluding Union Reps. and Shop Stewards,
there is greater unanimity (as measured by the size of Standard
Deviation) among Management, than among Staff and Hourly-Paid.
Job Variety &Interest, therefore, is of greatest importance
to the Management in the work they do, but we cannot move from saying
that because Management have an average score of 2.09 that they
value Job Variety, to saying that because Hourly-Paid have an
average of only 4.52 they do not value Job Variety. What we would
rather say is that Hourly-Paid in particular (as well as the
other categories) would value variety and interest',in their work,
if they could get it. Indeed we shall present data subsequently
which shows that the Hourly-Paid perceive the lack of freedom and
variety in their work, and that, given the opportunity to achieve
this would do so - the problem is in so far as they perceive the
lack of realism of such an aspiration.
(4) Freedom from Supervision. This item is not particularly
highly valued by any category, varying from 5.73 for Staff. to
7.18 for Shop Stewards. Amongst white collar workers generally
there is a greater degree of freedom in work, in so far as
one is not subject to constant checking to ensure vigilant
performance or dertai1ed instruction (as Hourly Paid are by
Work Study), but even the Managing Director of our Finn was
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monitored in respect of his performance. The hierarchical principle,
therefore, applies to all in the hierarchy, but to different degrees.
To expect no supervision at all, therefore, is, in the present
context, an aim which is not attainable. At the same time, however,
the different levels of employee are not subject to equal amounts
of supervision, and it is, therefore,. not unreasonable that we
should find that this item is not equally valued by all categories,
since these differing levels of supervision are effectively
institutionalised, with 'normal' levels being established for
various categories - and even within categories (e.g. the semi-
skilled on piece-work may be more closely supervised than the
craftsmen on measured day work).
(5) Working Conditions. This item is of most importance to
the Hourly Paid, whose average is 3.67, while it ranks rather
lower for Shop Stewards (4.35), Staff (5.27), Union Reps (5.86)
and Management (6.34). At the same time we should remember
that in relative terms it is third, fourth, fifth, fourth and
seventh respectively, so that difference in importance to each
category shows clearly that conditions have less relative
importance as we ascend the hierarchy. We cannot take from this
that..:.the further one ascends the hierarchy that working conditions
become increasingly less important, as to say this would imply that
a senior Manager would be prepared, for instance, to work in
conditions which are extremely unpleasant. To suggest that
would clearly be absurd. Rather what this indicates is that there
are certain working conditions which a Manager feels able to take
for granted (e.g. that he will have an office, adequate staff
for his work needs, a secretary etc.). The implication of ,this
is that he feels so secure in this expectation that Working
f50Conditions simply cease to be problematic for the Manager. In
contrast to this among the Hourly-Paid, Working Conditions are
still an item of quite considerable importance, in that Working
Conditions are still a margainal item. By this we mean that
conditions for the Hourly-Paid in Firms in which they may work
vary over a considerable range of acceptability and non-acceptabi'lity.
The Manager in contrast to this has an expectation of more uniform
conditions as he moves between Firms, and thus has security in this
score, which is denied to the Hourly-Paid in that
(1) if they change firms, they have lesser certainty than
Management of acceptable conditions, ..
and/or
(2) their conditions in their present Firm are on the margin
of acceptability but in their perception, they see that
they may be able to change this (i.e. it is a matter
where there is a consciousness of power to be exercised)
Both points are expressed by a Shop Steward in ExcerptA6.2.in
that the importance of other firms is emphasised, and the need
to improve conditions in the Firm is made clear.
In Excerpt46.2, the respondent makes clear a number of points
1) conditions inthe Firm are not satisfactory. He suggests this
in relation to 2 particular aspects - the canteen facilities,
price of meals.
2) it is clear that conditions elsewhere are a point of reference
fo~ this comparison. By elsewhere we mean 2 things and other
(similar) factories (b) conditions enjoyed by other grades in
this firm. The firm used 5 canteens (canteen' facilities were
supplied by another neighbouring firm) - Directors: Management:
I S ISenior Staff: Junior Staff~ Hourly-Paid - with conditions being
hierarchically graded (e.g. in each of the first 3 canteens
there was waitress service).
It could be argued that this represents an optimistic orientation
toward the future - in the sense that the respondent is looking to
improvements taking place. In that sense it is ture that it
is optimistic. More importantly, however, it can be said to be
determined orientation toward the future, i.e. the awareness
that these were issues on which power can reasonably be applied
with a chance of success, and is therefore another example of what
we have described as a pragmatic oritentation toward work.
This view in ExcerptAG.2, therefore, is a function of the
perception of the situation of the entire finn and the place
of the Hourly-Paid in that. It is related, therefore, to
their views on other aspects of this work, as well as their views
on the position of the firm. Their aspirations with respect to
their working conditions represent not only what they want (and as
we shall see later in this Chapter, Hourly-Paid are dis-satisfied
with their working conditions), but what they can realistically
expect (i~e. what can the finn 'deliver,' and what can we negotiate
from the firm?). Their attitude is, therefore a combination of
what the Firm can do, what they have the power to negotiate from
the Firm, as well as the conditions they would actually like.
Another important point in all of this is that the Shop Stewards
orientation is"also collective (i.e. better conditions will
be won by union members working together). In Excerpt 6.3 we
discuss with a Management respondent, the same question of
satisfaction with" Working Conditions.
/59-An apparent feature of ExcerptR6.3 is that the' respondent has
working conditions which he r~g~rds as satisfactory, and that
furthermore he expects that in the future his conditions wi 11
continue to be satisfactory. Especially important, from our
point of view, is the difference in strategy to be pursued
in the event that conditions were unsatisfactory.
While the Shop Steward in ExcerptQ6.2 puts his strategy in
collective terms, the Manager in Excerpvq6.3 puts his strategy
in absolutely individual terms. Such things are, for him,
a matter between the Managing Director and himself, not the
Managing Director and others in a similar position to
himself. Furthermore the criterion against which he estimates
his worth to the Firm (and thus what he should be paid, what
his conditions should be) depends on how effectively he is doing
his job for the Firm. There is, in his mind, a clear exchange
relationship between himself and the Firm - he should not expect
more than his worth, and similarly they should not pay him less than
his worth. In the event of the latter coming about the matter would
be one for him to take up as an individual, not through a collective
organisation. This is clearly in distinction to the Shop Steward
in Excerp~6.2, whose criteria are rather. less well defined, but
seem to include comparisons to other similar companies and other
errployees of the Firm. The perspectives of the 2 respondents are
clearly very different.
This does give further support to our argument about the 'pragmatic'
orientation of respondents. Managers, as can be seen in TableA6.l,
put IWorking Conditions' relatively low in their rank order (7th).
This should not be taken to mean they are unimportant (the respondent
in ExcerptAG.3 stated he would leave if they became unacceptable),
IS 3but rather that Managers expeat acceptable conditions. They
are simply 'taken-for-granted
l
, unlike, say, promotion which -
even for Manager - is an uncertainty. Staff and Hourly-Paid do
not, however, have the same degree of certainty about their
Working Conditions. Hence its higher rank ordering (5 and 3
respectively)•
6. Union Organisation and Activity. The low ranking of this by
Management can hardly be regarded as a surprise, since unionisation
of management grades is only in its earliest stages, and has not as
yet penetrated our own Firm, though some Managers who have worked
as Hourly-Paid, at the outset of their career, have kept on union
cards secretly. It would, however, be very unlikely that they
should use this membership, and for the Manager in this firm unions
are organisations to which their employees belong, which they must
accept and respect (although they do this to varying d~grees).
For the Manager, therefore, from their own point of view, unions
are not relevant when they judge whether a job will be good or
bad. Given the lack of Management unionisation, for them, unions
are simply not seen as relevant.
Amongst the Staff, however, unions again are not rated very highly.
This is rather more of a surprise since at the time of our field-
work Staff unionisation was increasing, with the senior Staff grades
in Finance joining A.S.T.M.S. Among Staff Union Reps. its
rating is equal 4th with Working Condition~ (5.84) - its highest
relative ranking. Among Shop Stewards it is given its highest
score - 5.35 - but this only puts it 6th in their ordering. Among
Hourly-Paid it is rated 7th (6.38). Can we take from this that
the "Clydeside Reds" have been de-radicalised to such an extent that
15"4their attachement to trade unions has been severely weakened? This
would be a conclusion which would be as far from the truth as
could possibly be.
We saw that on the previous item Mana~ement took "Working
Conditions" for granted. This, we shall argue, is equally true
of the attitude taken toward Trade Unions by the categories other
than Management. Trade unionis, in this Firm, is not an end
in itself - rather it is a/the means to the end of improved
conditions, higher wages etc. Among the Hourly-Paid this is
overlaid by a sense of solidarity, and awareness of collective
action as a tradition and not mearly as a means to an end, which
is much more pronounced that among the Staff. Especially
among those Staff who had no'shop-floor experience (e.g. Clerks
in Finance) the sense of tradition in their unionism was clearly
lacking.
The orientation toward trade unionism, therefore, is not to devalue
it but instead to regard it as a means to an end - but a means,
which given its power and acceptance by all parts of the Firm
(however caused, and however genuine), gives it a sense of taken-
for-grantedness, in that its existence need no longer be questioned
or subject to doubt. Rather it is now part of the social setting
within which actionplace by right, and need no longer fight to be
recognised. Even amongst Management this much is clear, as
ExcerptR6.4 from a Senior Manager shows.
Excerpth6.4 indicates that even among Senior Management trade
unionsims was simply taken-for-granted. It was something ,which was
there, about which they could do little even if they wanted to.The indication from ExcerptP6.4 is that they did not want to be
rid of trade unions. Indeed the respondent is very positive
"absolutely necessary and legitimate
ll
• This, however, is quite
indeperident of his personal views - as we shall see later trade .
unionism is. not a solution for Managers (this is implicit in
the discussion of ExcerptR6.3). By 'taken-for-granted", for
the avoidance of doubt, we mean that trade unions are accepted
as part of the administrative structure of the Firm e.g. if
the ~agement wanted to have a redundancy they woul d (and
after our research was completed, did) consult the unions as
a matter of course. This is quite independent of Managers'
personal views about trade unions.
Similarly among Staff and Hourly-Paid this 'taken-for-grantedness'
should only be taken to imply that trade unions are something
which are just 'there' - they are part of the landscape.
Certainly the trade unionism of Hourly:-Paid and Staff will not
always be the same· (e.g. among the latter the sense of tradition
in particular, and of solidarity appeared to be less well
developed than among. the former). Certainly some individuals
or groups may exhibit some degree of hostility toward trade
unionism, a particular trade union (e.g. among Staff TASS
was not especially popular among members ofother Staff unions), or
a particular trade union official. None of that, however,
undermines. the ,argument that trade unionism was apart of life
in this Firm - in the same way as supervisors, or pay-day on
a Thursday - it was, as we said 'taken-for-granted.' It is
perhaps ironic that trade unionism too has a form of 3rd dimension
power.7} Promotion Prospects. This is an issue we have raised already
in the previous Chapter, on decision-making. That indicated that
Management were firmly in control, which was a situation respondents
felt ought to persits. In this Chapter we shall consider
promotion from the perspective of a work need and the degree to
which this is satisfied by the Firm.
Among Management it is clear that this is an item of some
importance. Tab1eA 6.1 shows that among Managers it is 4th
in their average rank order of importance, with an average
of 4.31 (see Tab1eA6.2). This indicates that promption is a
much more important issue for Management than for any other
group. Among Staff it is 6th, the average being 5.7, but
with a standard'deviation of 7.94, which suggests it is of
valuable importance across the Staff sample. Among Hourly-Paid,
Shop Stewards and Staff Union Reps. it is last in their rank
orderings. Atypica1y attitude, particularly on the part of
Hour1y-Paid, on bei ng ~.asked about promoti on, prospects was
"we11, I've not got any". It was common to fi nd among the
Hourly-Paid a well developed sense of ,rqtqJjj~ about
promotion as being something they could not aspire to. Such
an attitude also existed in pockets of the Staff sample - as we
suggested above the attitude to promotion among Staff can be seen,
from the standard duration, to be highly variable. Thus many
Quality Control Staff promotion was marked 8th, among Foremen and
Prod'n. Control staff it was marked 7th. Away from the shop-floor,
among Finance staff and Sales staff it was ranked at 4th - the
same as Management.
Why then do those at or close to the shop-floor (i.e. Hourly-Paid,
and Staff close to the point of prod'n.) put each little emphasis
15 =1-on promotion, compared to Management, and Staff at a distance from
production? We would argue there are several reasons for this
1) the sense of hopelessness we referred to above. This is more
than a circular argument. Certainly it does not explain why the
attitude to promotion originated, but once it does originate
it does give some explanation as to why those close to the shop-floor
devalue, or avoid, promotion. Once one feels that a cause is
hopeless (in this case being promoted) avoidance becomes a much more
likely strategy.
2) Associated with this sense of hopelessness-- perhaps a variation
on this - was a perception that if one did a job particularly well
the Firm would deliberately refuse promotion in order to retain
that employee in that job. One Hourly-Paid respondent had worked
at the same machine for 10 years. IHe put his failure to be
promoted to a Staff job down to the 'fact' he was too good at his
present job, so that is he was promoted they would, in effect,
lose him. Asimilar view was expressed by Staff. One respondent,
being asked about. his promotion prospects, said "In my job, nil.
Anybody who does their job all right they stay in. But what chance
have you got. We feel of promption, if you do the job wrong you're
promoted out of it. It-seems to be the policy here."
3) Particularly among the Hourly-Paid, there is a view that to
seek promotion, especially to Foreman, is to turn against your mates.
This view is expressed by an Hourly-Paid respondent "You see to be
a gaffer I think you have to be a kind of a bad one, you know to
get respect. You need to-be kind of bad.to get respect if you're
a gaffer. You know, kind of-frighten the men." .
1554) As we saw in Affe()·Jr>'~~"3·-'- especially among Staff the
decision on promotion is sometimes seen as arbitrary and unfair
- that there were no procedures, no trained interviewers, no
use of standard interviewing techniques. . . ~: _. . '., ..
In a not dis-similar vein- Hourly-Paid indicated their sense of
perceived unfairness about the promotion outwith any apparently
rational or just system - "if the chap's no got qualifications
it looks like as if somebody's spoke for him."
Thus there are these 4 specific criticisms against the promotion
system, which gives us insight as to why it is so unimportant
to Hourly-Paid, and (to a lesser and more variable extent) to
Staff. What they seem to come down to is - that promotion is
something which for many of our respondents is not for them.
It is not something which they regard as being attainable by
them - thus they categorise it as being less important to
them that it is to Management. For Management (and Sales and
Finance Staff) on the other hand it does appear to be attainable.
Afinal issue, speciically with Staff, is why attitudes to promotion
should vary depending on the proximity to production. A
tentative explanation can be suggested by developing an argument
raised in discussing recruitment in the previous Chapter. There
we saw that gaining employment in the Firm was relatively easier
if one had a friend or relative already in employment there i.e.
through personal contacts. This can be seen as a simple extension
of the traditional shipyard hiring practice of foremen taking
men on in pubs, or through existing employees i.e. through
the foreman's personal contacts, as hiring agent. This practice now
continues through an existing employee going to the personnel
159office and 'speaking for' a friend/relative seeking employment.
If the role of personal contacts extends into promotion· and
given the tradition it is more likely to do so on the
production side - then promotion may be determined not through
a rational sytem of roles/procedures, but through personal
contacts. This would be consistent with a view that
promotion depended less on "what you know, rather than who
you know."
(8) Control of Own Work Environment. As is apparent from TableSl16.1
andA6.2 this is relatively more important for Management and Staff
than for Hourly-Paid. Management rank this as 5th, with an
average ranking of 4.3.4; while Staff rank it as 4th, with an
average ranking of 5.11. (Thus role that this item is relatively
ranked more important by Staff, but Management give it a numerically
higher average). Hourly-Paid rank it as 6th, with an average
of 6.1.
It is interesting that Hourly-Paid should rate this less highly
than Staff and Management, in view of the fact that the Firm was
sel~cted because the work it did was generally interesting to its
employees. Given that we may be surprised that Hourly-Paid should
rank the Control of their Work Environment. as low as 6th, when
in an interesting job one may anticipate resentment at outside
interference (i.e. loss of control of one's own work environment).
We would, however, suggest that this is indicative of the pragmatic
orientation we have referred to above. It is intrinsic to
hierarchy that one cannot control one's work environment - there
will always be, at least, the 'loss' to 'interfere' • Thus
control of one's own work environment is not attainable, other
I ~ 0than a limited sense. Given the skill level of employees
of this firm they could exercise some control within the boundaries
of their job but not of what enters in across these boundaries.
Even within the boundaries of the jobs they do there is sti11
loss of control from Work Study, bonus systems etc. (This
proo1em was indicated in the previous Chapter when we discussed
Work Standards). Generally speaking Nanagement and Staff were
not subject to practices like Work Study. Thus, that they
rated the Control of their Work Environment more highly than
Hourly-Paid indicates only that they could expect to be able
to exercise more control than Hourly-Paid. The rating of this
factor therefore reflects the extent to which it was perceived
as being attainable. It, therefore, reflects the
hierarchical distributtmof power within the organisation. Both
in the sense of consious power - in the judgement one makes
about how much one can expect - and unconsious power - in
the view one has about what one can and cannot expect (i.e.
that power structures one's expectatins, and also power will be
used to negotiate on the distribution of resources to fulfill
these expectations.
(9) Workmates. This item is of more importance to the Hourly-Paid
and their Shop Stewards, both of whom give it a relative rating
of 5th and relative ratings of 5.15 and 5.06 respectively. The
item is, therefore, more important than for Management and Staff
who rate it only 8th, with average ratings of 6.81 and 6.07
respectively, while the Union Reps. rate it as 6th with an
average rating of 6. In discussing trade unionism we discussed
the greater sense of solidarity among the Hourly-Paid, than
amongst either Staff or Management. This tradition of solidarity,
I ~ Ias opposed to white collar individualism is the source of
the variation in the importance of this item to the separate
categories.
It is. however. arguable that agreeable workmates are an
important source of satisfaction to the Hourly-Paid workers
generally because of the restricted satisfaction which they
can attain from their work which. some would argue. is
intrinsically disinteresting and alienating so that one can
only survive with the support of one's mates. Eynon's study in
Ford Hailwood reveals such a situation on the 'Wet-Deck' where the
Hourly-Paid made their work bearable by their social activities
within and outwich work. In other functions the task is of
sufficient interest to make this unnecessary, e.g. Management are
expected to have a higher interest in their work than their
subordinates. If we examine the data by dept. then we find this
itesm to be rated least in Finance. Production Control and Works
dept. (8th in each case), then by Board of Directors and Sales (7th).
then by Foremen &Quality Control (6th). It is, however, rated
less highly by the Skilled Hourly-Paid. than by Labourers (5th
and 4th respectively). Hence amongst the white collar (non-Hourly-
Paid) respondents the picture is not entirely clear, but if we look
at the Hourly-Paid we find the Skilled sample rate Workmates as an
item lower than Job Variety and Interest (5th to 3rd). while the
Labourers rated them in reverse (4th for Workmates and 6th for Job
Variety &Interest). Given that we selected the Firm precisely
because the extent to which the work done was disinteresting was
minimised we should perhaps be less surprised that there is little
difference in rating between the Skilled and Staff &Management
categories on Job Variety &Interest (Skilled rate Job Variety as3rd, while Staff &Management categories rate it first once, second
three times,. third three times, and fourth once), but there is a
pronounced difference when we consider the Labourers (who rate
it only sixth). Hence for the Labourers, there does seem to be
reason to believe that Workmates.are a compensation for lack of
interest in the job itself. Given the structure of a labourer's
work in basically boring occupations - cleaning up, assisting
skilled men by fetching tools etc., moving semi-finished products
around - we should not be altogether surprised by this.
The orientation to work which we have suggested that these results
indicate is one which we have described as pragmatic. It is
pragmatic in that the rank ordering of items reflect 3 things.
(a) those items which are 'out-of-reach', are ranked low e.g.
we have argued that Hourly-Paid rank 'Promotion Prospects' last
because they can see no practical possibility of achieving promotion.
Hence they avoid promotion - it is not important to them
(b) those items which are 'taken-for-granted' also tend to be
ranked fairly low. For instance in the case of Management
'Working Conditions' were ranked lower than for other groups
in the Company. It could not be said that their working conditions
were particularly luxurious. Equally it could not be said they
were not an improvement on the conditions of other employees.
Management expect ,a cetain standard of working conditions. It is
not a matter they expect to have to expand a great deal of effort
in 'getting right'. We have made,a similar argument above the
Hourly-Paid attitude to their trade union. They take it for
granated - they expect it to be there. It is not an issue.
Ik3(c) Those items which were an issue - those items which were
attainable, but could not be taken-for-granted. The most obvious
example of this among the items we have looked at are Wages/
Salary. The real value of wages over time cannot be taken
for granted - they have to be negotiated, and thus a certain
standard of living is attainable. Promotion Prospects was an
item which was attainable for Management (but not for Hourly
Paid) but again it was not something which could be taken for
granted. It is items like these which are the more important
items.
This, however, does not involve denial of theihtrinsic importance
of certain items (e.g. Wages/Sa1ar1y is clearly important in
itself). What we seek to do here is to draw attention to the extent
to which work expectations can be influenced by power, and thus,
for instance, why Promotion has an importantce which re1fects
hierarchical structure.
At certain points we have in passing been critical of Go1dthorpe
and Lockwood's instrumental orietnation, but the ordering shown on
Tab1~6.1, we have argued, does not represent an instrumental
oritentation to work, despite the emphasis laid on salary/wages.
On the contrary, we have argued, it is part of a perfectly
reasonable strategy given that money can be used to achieve
satisfaction outwith work, as Go1dthorpe et a1 suggests. We
cannot, and have not, gone on to imply that this means that
employees will do anything, and suffer every sort of deprivation,
to this end. Rather this ordering represents a pragmatic
orientation to work in which (1) the highest rated items are those
which are important and perceived as attainable, and (2) the lowest
rated items are those which are regarded as unimportant, or unattainable,
I ~ 4or can simply be taken-for-granted. 'Salary/Wages' clearly fulfils
the former category, while 'Union Organisation &Activity' fulfills
the latter for Management as unimportant, and for Hourly-Paid
as taken-for-granted, while 'Freedom from Supervision' is unttainable
(to varying degrees) for all categories, as we have suggested.
We can, however, go further in our critique of the notion of an
instrumental orientation to work, since Goldthorpe et al extend their
argument to say "it may be assumed that under conditions of full or
near-full employment, the taking or retaining of industrial jobs
will regularly involve some form of choice as between different
patterns of reward. Thus is is likely that there is a fairly general
tendency in operation for the labour forces of particular enterprises
to become to some degree homogenous, in terms of their members'
orientation to work, as a result simply of processes of self-
selection. Men with a certain order of priorities in regard to work
will tend to be found together in employments which offer the best
opportunities for achieving the returns ot which they have given
the highest value. It may then be argued that in any attempt
at explaining and understanding attitudes and behaviour within
modern industry, the probability at least must be recognised that
oritentations to work which employees hold in common will need to
be treated as an important indPendent variable releative to the
in-plant situation.
1I (a) Our point of disagreement with this can
be seen by inspecting the standard deviation figures on Table 6.2
which for each category vary as follows.
(l) Management - from 2 (Union Organisation and Activity) to 4.64
(Control of Own Work Environment).(2) Staff - from 4.87 (Wages/Salary) to 7.94 (Promotion Prospects).
(3) Union Rep. - from 0.83 (Wages/Salary and Job Security) to 3.27
(Union Org'n and Activity).
(4) Hourly-Paid - from 3.84 (Control of Own Work Environment) to
6.06 (Union Org'n and Activity)
(5) Shop Stewards - from 2.36 (Freedom from Supervision) to 3.15
(Workmates).
Given standard deviations of these orders of magnitude of a 9 point
scale, it should be apparent that even within each category
respondents work for the Firm for widely differing reasons, and
to argue for homogeneity, even within categories, is simply not
tenable in the light of these figures. This data shows instead
that respondents from the same category work for the Firm for
widely differing reasons, and that in consequence (a) any con-
clusion of homogeneity would be mis-placed, (b) the Firm, given
that our respondents retain their employment with the Firm, is
capable of offering a variety of rewards to its employees. This
is consistent with our view that our respondents seek to maximise
a complex subjective expectations function which includes not one
item, but.a number of items, which they seek to simultaneously
satisfice. In so doing they may recognise the possibility of a
trade-off of one item against another, but in so doing the law
of dimishing returns applies in so far as increasing
satisfaction on one item will only be chosen for decreasing items
of satisfaction on other items. Thus, for instance, we should not
expect our respondents to suffer any depreviation as long as they are
paid for it.
It~This variability within categories has the further important
implication that we can expect on an individual basis a good deal of
overlap between indiciduals among Management, Staff and Hourly-Paid.
In other words within the sample we will find examples which are
deviant from the above general discussion where we took each
sample as a whole. Hourly-Paid were siad to place a greater
emphasis on Wages/Salary than Management, who emphasised their
Job Variety and Interest. Given the magnitude of the standard
deviations it is clearly possible to find Managers who put
Wages/Salary above Job Variety and Interest (and thus be typically
Hourly-Paid) and Hourly-Paid who put Job Variety and Interest above
Wages/Salary (and thus be typically Management).
The 'typical' Management/Staff/Hourly-Paid employee is therefore
purely a figment of a statistical imagination. The details of Table
~6.l andAG.2 point to a general trend. The standard deviations
in Tabl~6.2 suggest that the extent of deviation are so large
that to go beyond discussion at the level of a general trend
would be to exagerate beyond what is sustainable.
Thus unlike Goldthorpe and Lockwood's Affluent Worker and his
instumental orientation, we are not suggesting,'a pragmatic! Worker in
the sense of a single set of qualities (e.g. an emphasis on Wages/
Salary). Rather we have suggested that the Pragmatic Orientation
of our sample reflects the attempt to assess the social situations
within which they establish and try to achieve their expectations.
We have shown'that the categogies do this differently - each has
. .
its own unique ordering~ Furthermore even within each category
orderings will vary from one to another, as we pointed out. (Overtime
we may expect orderings to vary as well).What this section has shown is
(1) that different people work for this Firm for different reasons
even in the same cateogy and (2) most importantly that the orderings
between categories vary as well, if we remove individual differences
by the mans of an arithmetic average.
Job Satisfaction
This section is concerned with the expressed degree of satisfaction
by our sample with these 9 aspects of their i.e. whether their
expectation of the firm are being frustrated or fulfilled. We argued
in Chapter 1 that the more expectations are frustrated, the more
likely is a challenge to the hierarchical principle of the
organisation1s structure. We argued in Chapter 5 that a failure
by Management to provide sufficient resources could undermine
the 1egitamised, and un-challenged authority of Management.
The objective of this section will be to consider the degree
of satisfaction among the firm1s employees, and thus to explain
the absence of challenge to hierarchy which we detected in Chapter 5.
Thus we may provide empirical support for the theoretical model
in Chapter 1.
First, however, there is a methodological point which has to be
discussed. items, and consider the implications of this knowledge
and pattern of use.
To measure satisfaction requires that it be referred to something.
To say lare you satisfied with your sa1ary?1 has no meaning, as one
can only be satisfied relative to some measure, which can only
remain implicit in this question. Given our concern with hierarchy
we made use of the 3 main hierarchical categories - Management,Staff and Shop-floor (i.e. the Hourly-Paid - this title was used
less often in the Firm) - and each respondent was asked to assess
his satisfaction on each item relative to what he perceived as
the provision of that item to each category. In this way we
sought to bring out those items on which there was strong internal
conflict on provision of resources to meet expections e.g.
the Hourly-Paid dissatsfied with their conditions of work.
compared to those provided for Management may create doubts about
knowledge which implies the accepabi1ity of hierarchy.
We also measured satisfaction of .each respondent on each item,
without the constraint of remaining within the existing Firm.
At the same time to ask for the degree of satisfaction creates
2 problems
1) it lacks defintition, as we argued earlier
2) to relate satisfaction to anything within the present system
ties the respondent to the rpesent system, and we ended the
first Chapter by stating that our analysis would start out
from a position wherein hierarchy was assumed, theoretically,
not to exist in order to develop our understanding of how
hierarchy is sustatined in the minds of our respondents. Given
this we need to employ a measure which does not entail this
implication. By using the question "how much would this item
have to be improved to make your job idea1?" we avoid problems
such as the fact of broadly similar treatment for particular
grades of employee (e.g. 'the going rate' will be very similar
in a particular trade especially within an area, and even
throughout the country,) so that the respondent by using this
form of questioning is free to express his degree of satisfaction
outwith the system i.e. to suspend his belief in hierarchyand hierarchical reward. Hence, as well as the interview information
from the second-stage interview, there shall be for each items a
measure of satisfaction.
1) relative to the existing hierarchical system
2) relative to the ideal of each respondent
The first aspect we shall consider is (1) Wages and Salary
(1) Wages and Salary
We measured satisfaction in relation to Hourly-Paid, Staff and
Management. The results are shown in Tables 6.5 - 6.7.
Tab1eA6.5 - How satisfied are you with your wages/salary in
relation 'to the Shop-floor?
~hOP
Management Staff Union Reps Hourly-Paid tewards
Very
7 (10%) 1 (14%) 10 (21%) Satisfied 3 (9%) 0
Satisfied 15 (47%) 37 (52%) 2 (29%) 28 (58%) 13 (77%)
Dissatisfied 9 (28%) 21 (30%) 4 (57%) 6 (13%) 3 (18%)
Very
(9%) 4 (6%) 4 (8%) 1 (6%) Dissatisfied 3 0
Tab1e46.6 - How satisfied are you with your wages/salary in relation
to the Staff?
Management Staff
Very
Satisfied 3 (9%) 8 (11%)
Satisfied 16(50%) 39 (55%)
Dissatisfied 8 (25%) 20 (28%)
Very
Dissatisfied 3 (9%) 2 (3%)
§hOp
Union Reps Hourly-Paid tewards
2 (29%) 4 (8%) 0
1 .(14%) 26 (54%) 6 (35%)
4 (57%) 10' (21%) 9 (53%)
0 5 (10%) 0
1=7-0Tab1~6.7 - How satisfied are you ,with your wages/salary in relation
to the Management?
Management Staff Union Reps Hourly-Paid
Shop
Stewards
Very
0 2 (3%) 0 4 (8%) satisfied 0
Satisfied 16 (50%) 39 (55%) 3 (43%) 24 (50%) 9 (53%)
Dissatisfied 5 (16%) 15 (21%) 2 (29%) 8 (17%) 4 (24%)
Very
(6%) (4%) 1 (14%) 8 (17%) 1 .(6%) Dissatisfied 2 3
If we examine each category separately, we find the following
(ll Management. While a majority of Management say they are satisfied/
very satisfied in relation to others, there are not insubstantial
numbers who say they are not satisfied - 37% say they are dis-satisfied·
compared to the Shop Floor workers, 34% compared to Staff and 22% compared
to othe~ Managers. That level of dis-satisfaction among Managers is
perhaps surprising. Why should about 1/3 of Managers say that compared
to others in the Company they are not satisfied with their salaries?
ExcerptA6.5, from a Director, is instructive in a number of ways.
A. In the latter part of the Excerpt there is a clear emphasis on the
squeezing of differentials since 1970, and the loss of real earnings for
Managers. Much of the cause of this is clearly the successive periods of
incomes policy during the 1970s - 1972-1974: 1975-1979, as well as the
greater success of trade unions during this period. The focus of dis-
content was, however, clearly on incomes policy and the labour government.
Many management respondents in answering these questions said they were
satisfied with their sslary, but on the proviso that it was under
existing circumstances (i.e. of incomes policy) and that they would
never tolerate such a situation under normal circumstances. The clear
I =t- Iimplication of this was that this was not a free choice by the Company,
but rather that the Company was constrained by the legislation. Indeed
the Company was trying to find ways round this, by offering 'reward
packages' which did not fall within the scope of incomes policy e.g.
in 6 cases, Managers were appointed to the Company board (in fairly
junior capacities), given company cars (Austin Princess), and fairly
substantial wage rises (since they had been promoted). This strategy -
which was extended to other managers - would go some way to resolving
the problem discussed in the middle of ExcerptA6.5 i.e. to retain
capable managers without creating wage anomalies. It would also be
seen, at least by Managers, as a reward for loyalty to the Company.
Asmall diversion on this point is to consider the reaction of other
groups in the Company to this development of reward packages for
Management. For Staff and Hourly-Paid such activities must provoke
emotion. Amanager getting a Company car or a seat on the Board must
raise, in their minds, the issue of whether Management don't get enough
already, given what they do (this emerges fairly clearly in Excerpt
5.8 by a Shop Steward, who suggests that some Managers 'just waddle
about' -. others aren't aware of their function - and that salaries
should be no more of a secret than wages - something we drew attention
to in Chapter 4 from our experience of drawing a sample of Staff and
Management, since we could not be shown pension records). To some
extent, given the "confidentiality' of their salaries, Management
are caught in a problem of their own construction. The fact is that
Hourly Paid and Staff can only guess at what Management are paid. To
the extent that their guess is an overestimate, the Company 'giving
Managers cars' can only induce a sense of resentment (see Excerpt~.ll
on this point). Yet it is unlikely that Hourly Paid/Staff workers would
be aware of the problem the Company has in retaining its most able
Managers. The emphasis on confidentiality therefore, creates a 'Catch 22'for the Company - as long as there is confidentiality there is ignorance
and lack of understanding, but if they abandon confidentiality they
offered a strong ar.m amongst Managers in the Company.
B. The second important point in Excerptn6.5 is the emphasis on
conditions of employment being essentially an individual matter i.e. that
it is a matter of negotiation between himself and the Group Chainman.
He makes clear that if the deal on offer was not to his satisfaction,
then he would try to negotiate an increase, or leave the Company and go
elsewhere. This point is raised also in ExcerptA6.6. with a Director.
The emphasis in ExcerptA6.6. is clearly intensely individual - that at
his level (Board) one ought to be able to look after oneself. This
stands contrast with the much more collectivist attitude held by Hourly
Paid in particular. The Director, in ExcerptAG.6, quite clearly rejects
any question og negotiation - it is a matter of discussion - as well
as any question of industrial action - if one does not like it one gets
out. This is clearly distinct from the view on wage negotiations which
are held by Hourly ~aid workers, and increasingly by Staff, i.e. that it
is a collective matter, involving if necessary collective action.
The issue here is not that one is right and the other wrong, but rather
the observation that Management occupy, in this respect at least, a
different 'life-world', particularly 1n relation to Hourly Paid workers.
The implications for meaningful communication - and the consequences
of distortion - are fairly obvious once Management perception is so
different from that of other employees.
(2) Staff. Among this group there are only minor variations in expressed
·satisfaction, as the comparison moves from one group to another. The
largest variation is the increase in non-responses as we make a
comparison with Management {2% for Hourly Paid, 3% for Staff, 17% for
If3~-
Management non-responses). This reflects again the emphasis on
confidentiality of Management salaries, referred to above.
There are, however, a number of observations which can be made about
Staff perceptions of their salaries. First of all, on any comparison
about 60% say they are satisfied/very satisfied with their salaries,
compared to others in the Company.
On the other hand their Union Reps do appear to be slightly less satisfied,
as 57% say they are dis-satisfied compared to Hourly Paid, and to other
Staff, which one half of those responding to the question, in relation
to Management, say they are dis-satisfied. The number of Staff Union
Reps is, however, fairly small (7), so too much weight. should not be
placed on their. On the other hand this more critical stance by Union
Reps is fairly consistent on ~ther matters besides pay.
Another important aspect of Staff perception of pay is one which is not
clear from TablesA6.5 -~.7, is their concern at the erosion of their
differential with respect to Hourly Paud workers.' In this they clearly
are similar to Management. This point is made very clearly in ExcerptA6.7
from a Staff Union Rep. There are a number of important points made here.
(i) The erosion of differentials - and the expressed fear that in 'a few
more years they will go ahead'.
(ii) The defence of a Staff differential by reference to qualities which
Staff possess - qualifications (HNC etc.), responsibility (its Staff
who give Hourly Paid instructions). The issue taken up with this
respondent is one, which as we shall see, is put forward by Hourly Paid
workers. In particular Workly Paid workers would argue that they have
qualifications (they have served an apprenticeship), they have
responsibilities (often doing work of considerable value) - and that in
I =t- 4any case some Staff don't have qualifications or all that much
responsibility (typists and clerks come in for particular attention).
The Union Reps' response to this is 2-fold (a) not all skilled men are
all that good i.e. just as there are variations among Staff, there are
variations among skilled men, (b) that the payment of skilled men ought
to reflect that - at least it ought to reflect the level of experience
of a skilled man. Whether or not a 'solution' of this type would resolve
the Staff:Hourly Paud differential is not a question we want to address
ourselves too, as it would be conjecture on a very complex pr.oblem.
The point we wish to make here is that the perception of Staff and
Hourly Paid is drawn on the same 'life-world'. The 2 groups develop
their different perceptions on fundamentally the same 'life-world'
(or "the total of all circumstances to be selected and defined by our
autobiographical situations" - Alfred Schutt 'Reflect10nson the Problems
of Relevance', p.136). Staff, in contrast to Management, approach this
on a collectivist basis - unlike Management for whom any difficulty is for
the individual to sort out. Indeed we could argue that the unionisation
of staff. has involved their migration from the individualist world of
Management, to the collectivist world of the Hourly Paid. This point
shall become more apparent if we discuss the role of trade unions.
The role of trade unions on wages is discussed with a Staff respondent
in ExcerptAG.]. Underlying this is the realisation by Staff that their
differential with Hourly Paid workers had been diminished - some Foremen
told of realising that they were being paid less than those they
supervised. This led to a gradual unionisation of Staff in the Company _
a process which also happened in other Companies at much the same time.
During our field work union density rose to about 80% of Staff - the
major area of Staff which had not been unionised was the level
immediately below Management (e.g. Section Leaders).
115In effect, therefore, Staff have adopted'the strategy of the Hourly
Paid in securing wage increases - "l don't think I would have got the
rises I did get if it hadn't been for the union pushing for results".
(ExcerptA 6.8). Aclosely related issue, however, is the extent to
which Staff have also adopted Hourly Paid attitudes. The solidarity
of the manual union and its members is traditionally very strong
(i.e. that union advice is seldom ignored), and we shall see below
that the role of the Union among Hourly Paid workers in this Company
is very significant. The independence of Staff - their individualism -
surfaces in ExcerptsAG.9 andAG.10.
In Excerptn6.9 from a Staff member it is"made clear that while the union
plays a role - it provides 'guide-lines' - the final decision on what
to do is very much for the individual. Even in ExcerptI16.10, from a
Staff Union Rep, the main function of the Union is the information which
it provides. There is, in other words, an important distancing from their
Union by Staff, which would not be typical of Hourly Paid workers
generally and is dis-similar to the relationship of Hourly Paid workers
to their trade union in this Company.
ThUi, while Staff may have moved in the direction of Hourly Paid
workers on this matter, and may share certain strategic practices which
are collectivist, there remains a strongly individualist element in
their attitude.
This point is emphasised in Excerp~6.1l where we discuss with a
member of Staff, the comparisons he makes to assess his salary. For
this respondent the most important comparison is what somebody else
1n another Company would get for doing the same sort of work he does'
(on this case, an accountant). His comparison is, therefore, market-
based i.e. what the labour market offers for his type of labour.There is an interesting contrast which can be drawn between this and
what is said in Excerptn6.5 by a Director. Our Staff member in ExcerptA6.10
has a comparison in relation to the market, while the Director in
Excerp~6.5 compares his salary to 'what (he) had done in the past'
(ExcerptAG.5). In other words the Staff member justifies his worth
by what the market thinks he is worth as an accountant, whereas the
Director justifies his worthy by what he has done for the Company. The
view of the Director is, therefore, more individual (more personal),
whereas the view of the Staff member is more market-hand (and thus more
impersonal).
Another problem which arose with Staff is their frustration with govern-
ment incomes policy - a matter discussed also with Management. The
problems Staff encounter are identical to those discussed with Management
(a) the rises they get are less than they feel they deserve, (b) when
a new member of Staff joins the Company to replace someone who has left
it will be at a higher rate of pay, to attract the right calibre of person.
This creates resentment for those who remain, who find themselves
working for less than the new entrant. One informant claimed he was
doing the same job as a newly recruited member of Staff, but for £800
per year less. Even if the story is untrue, it does indicate a
strength of feeling.
Thus Staff occupy a kind of ambivalent position on this issue. In
certain respects there are very clear echoes of the Management
attitude. of individualism, yet strategoically they have moved clearly
in the direction of Hourly Paid by becoming unionised.
3. Hourly Paid. There is among Hourly Paid a distinction between their
comparison internally (i.e.-with other Hourly Paid) which shows 79%
to be satisfied very satisfied (Tabl~.5), and their comparison withStaff and with Management which shows 62% and 58% respectiyely to be
satisfied/very satisfied (TablesA6.6 andn6.1) - or put another way
38% and 42% respectively say they are dis-satisfied, or very dis-
satisfied. What is the nature of this dis-satisfaction?
First of all let us look at,Management. ExcerptA6.l2 discusses the
relative pay of Management and Hourly Paid workers, with a Shop Steward.
For this respondent an important comparison is with the Directors and
top Management - or 'the man in the top seats' as he puts it.
His dis-satisfaction is not so simple as that Management get more than
Hourly Paid workers, but rather the size of the gap between the 2 groups,
and in particular that given what Hourly Paud workers like himself put
in to the Company, and what Management put it, the difference in his
wages and their salaries is too great. There is also an expressed
resentment at 2 issues we have raised earlier on in this Chapter:
(a) the secrecy about Management salaries.
(b) evasion of incomes policy by prOViding Management with rewards
not available to others (e.g. company cars).
Clearly, therefore, there would be difficulty for Management and Hourly
Paid. to maintain a dialogue on this issue since they start from
fundamentally. different precepts. For instance we took up the issue
of confidentiality of. Management salaries and the provision of company
cars with some of the Managers who had received cars from the Firm.
The cars remained the proper~of the Company, but were for the
exclusive use of the particular Manager. This Use is taxable, and
in the view of this ~anager.he was paying for it this way. In any
case, in his view, the Company ought to'supply him with a car as he
had to travel on behalf of the Company. The most important point,
17~however, was that he re9arded this as purely something between himself
and the Company, and certainly nothing to do with any other employees
of the Company. This directly contraidcts the view expressed by the
Shop Steward that he would only assume or guesswhat a Manager earned -
a Manager would argue that no employee has a right to know what he
earns. But, the Shop Steward would retort, you know our rates, you know
our hours so you know everything about us that we don't know about you.
The motivation to have equality of opinions is to ensure that the affairs
of the Company are carried on fairly and with equity.
Thus as we have argued above, in this respect Management and Hourly Paid
occupy fundamentally different 'life-worlds', making assessments of
relative worth on different criteria.
TablesA6.6 andAS.7 do, however, illustrate another point which has to be
discussed, namely that Shop Stewards are apparently less dis-satisfied
with their wages compared to Management salaries than compared to Staff
salaries (30% and 53%) respectively - though both are distorted by
non-responses}. Why should Shop Stewards take this attitude? An
expJ1anation is apparent in ExcerptA6.l3 from a Shop Steward. There
are several reasons put forward by the Shop Steward as to why the
differential between Staff and Hourly Paid is unfair - but they all come
down to the fundamental assertion that Staff and Hourly Paid ought
to have the same conditions. The example of the 'young lady who has
just been a year and a half in the place should get a week more
holiday··•• than a man who has been 49 years in the place' mayor may
not be true, but has reached almost the status of.a legend and may as
well be true (a week after this interview a B.L. steward told the same
story on a BBC current affairs programme, except she had been with the
Company 6 months, it was sick pay rather than holidays, and the man
was her father who had been with BL 35 years). There is, however, animportant distinction between Staff and Hourly Paid, and Management and
Hourly Paid - namely that in the former a dialogue is possible. In the
case of Management and Hourly Paid each approaches this issue in such a
different way that a dialogue is, at best, unlikely.
The possibility of a dialogue between Staff and Hourly Paid is made clear
in the latter part of this Excerpt. where we take up with the Shop
Steward some of the issues which emerged in Excerptn6.7 with a Staff
Union Rep. In ExcerptR6.7 it was argued by the respondent that Staff
being paid more was justified, among other things, by the experience
of Staff being reflected in their higher wages. The response of the
Shop Steward in ExcerptA6.l3 is to question the extent to which doing
a job for a long time makes one a better worker (though that is rather
at odds with the legend of the girl in the Company a year and a half
and the man with 49 years service). In the view of the Shop Steward,
when an apprentice has finished his time, he is a skilled man and
is not necessarily any better/worse than a man with 49 years experience.
In his view there are only 'skilled men(. who are worthy of reward
as 'skilled men'. Experience is not a measure of ability.
The major issue for the Shop Steward is. however, not with Staff
generally. The extra pay of draughtsmen and foremen is not the
major issue - it {s other Staff conditions they aspire to. Clearly,
therefore, there is a conflict - but the important point we want to
make here is that dialogue is possible between Staff and Hourly-Paid,
in contrast to Hourly-Paid and Management. In the former it is
a conflict of criteria - to use the analogy of the ideal speech
thesis, it is question of the better argument. In the latter, however,
dialogue is not possible because (a) of confidentiality/secrecy of
Management salaries (b) the fact that Management assessment isindividualistic, while Hourly-Paid make a collective assessment,
thus there is a fundamental incompatability. Differentials are
not, however, the only issue raised about wages.
As we have seen Management assess their worth by how much they feel
they are due as individuals and their contribution to the Company.
Staff make the same assessment by looking at job adverts in
newspapers. There is evidence of Hourly-Paid behaving similarly
to Staff, though somewhat less formally. This point is discussed
in E~~ptQ6.l4 with an Hourly-Paid respondent.
This Excerpt indicates that rather than using the (relatively) formal
means of looking at papers, Hourly-Paid do make a similar assessment
of their wages to that done by Staff, but through social interaction -
"word gets around ••• just talking to people in other actories." The
consequential perspection that they are well-paid, relative to
other similar companies in the area, is likely to induce the relatively
high degree of satisfaction in tableA5.5, which shows that 79% of Hourly
Paid are satisfied/very satisfied, while 77% of Shop Stewards say
they are satisfied (both relative to other Shop-Floor workers). In fact
the Comapny, as a matter of policy, does pay well, relative to other
firms in the area.
As we have seen it is knowledge (albeit of an uncertain truth) of what
others in the Firm receive which induces dissatisfaction. This knowledge
of internal differentials is used more widely by the Shop Stewards than
by their members, who tended to emphasise the less formal knowledge
gained by interaction with friends in social gatherings. (Indeed among
the very small numbers of Managers who had made their through the
Firm from the Shop-floor this was still done e.g. for one Manager
the crucial-place for such a judgement was the golf-course - or,
t S'Imore accurately, the club bar). This differential use of knowledge
is reflected in the results for Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards,
especially Tab1eA6.6.
It has to be kept in mind that this data was gathered at the end
of the 1970's - after 6 years of nearly continuous incomes policy of
one kind or another. The main surprise is, therefore that as many
as 23 people said that their jobs gave them wages/salaries that
were right as they are. This, it has to be kept in mind, is a fairly
severe comparison we are using - what would make your job ideate
On the other side it is not surprising that the great majority over all
categories wanted some degree of improvement in their wages to make
their job ideal. At the same time it is suggestive that the Company
does pay relatively well, that the modal consumer in all cases
other than the Shop Stewards, is that wages/salary would have to
be improved a bit to make the job ideal. There would appear,
therefore, to be relatively little dis-satisfaction with wages/salaries.
That, however, has to be understood against the background of the
following points
(i) the comparisons which are routinely made tend most often to be
like-with-like (e.g. Hourly Paid compare themselves with Hourly Paid
in other Co~ppnies). There could be difficulties if comparisons cometo be routinely made across groups e.g. if Hourly-Paid began to
compare themselves to Management. The difficulties between Hourly-
Paid and Staff to a significant· extent originate in Hourly-
Paid aspiring to Staff conditions. The present situation of material,
like-with-like comparison is therefore consistent with the present
hierarchical system of reward. The possibility of change in that
reward system has been considered most by Shop Stewards. Development
of this, both in terms of outwards to Hourly Paid generally, and in
the sense of developing'a rationale for an alternative non-hierarchical,
or rational (in the sense used by Kaberences as emerging from an
ideal speech situation) is likely to produce a crisis of hierarchy as
a system of organisations.
(ii) In addition the point should be understood that these levels of
satisfaction/dissatisfaction are not in any sense permanent, but
can only be understood as contingent on existing circumstances.
The level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction is dependent on the
knowledge available to the respondent and the manner in which this
is used. Should this knowledge change (e.g. that our Firm maintains
its wage while others surge ahead) then we may expect a change in the
judgement expressed. This much should be readily apparent. What
may be less obvious is that if we presume the knowledge of each
individual to be less than complete, then by using additional
knowledge (i.e. additional to what is used at present) the
judement may equally cahange because of the use of this additional
knowledge and/or a change in the manner of the use of existing
knowledge which the additioanl knowledge brings about (most
obviously if Management salaries were more widely known, they may
be a change on the part of the rank-and-file Hourly-Paid in the direction
of the attitude expressed by Shop Stewards).It is implicit in the Staff use of 'media advertsing' knowledge
and Hourly-Paid use of 'social interaction' knowledge that these
judgements, enshrined in table~6.5-6.8 can never be final and
that they will be subject to constant checking in the ways we
have described. This does not express any form of conflict, it
merely expresses the 'form of life' led our respondents. Excerpt
~ 6.15 illustrates that while there is satisfaction at the moment,
there is constant monitoring of the situation with respect to their
wages - in terms of other Firms and their standard of living. It can
not be assumed that this satisfaction is any way constant.
Job Security
As we point out in Chapter 3, the area where the Company is located
has a long history of relatively high unemployment. Given this
socio-economic context one might be led to expect that there
would be a strong emphasis on Job Security on the part of our
respondents. Responses to the questions on this item appear in
Tab1esA6.9 -A6.ll
J84Tab1eQ6.9 - How satisfied are you with your Job Security in relation
to the Job Security of (other) Shop-Floor workers?
~hOp Management Staff Union Reps Hourly-Paid tewards
Very
13 (18%) Satisfied 3 (9%) 1 (14%) 9 (19%) 3 (18%)
Satisfied 28 (88%) 55 (78%) 6 (86%) 36 (75%) 11 (65%)
Dissatisfied 0 2 (3%) 0 3 (6%) 3 (18%)
Very
1 (1%) Dissatisfied 0 0 0 0
Tab1ea6.10 - How satisfied are you with your Job Security in relation to
the Job Security of (other) Staff?
~hOp
Management Staff Union Reps Hourly-Paid tewards
Very
1 (14%) 5 (10%) 2 (12%) Satisfied 5 (16%), 15 (21%)
Satisfied 26 (81%) 52 (73%) 5 (71%) 34 (71%) 13 (77%)
Dissatisfied 0 4 (6%) 1 (14%) 9 (19%) 2 (12%)
Very
Dissatisfied 0 0 0 0 0TablesA6.9 -nG.ll show a high degree of Management satisfaction
with their Job Security, relative to any other group in the Company.
There are, it is true, variations across the Tables but these are
fairly minor. The important observation is that no Manager who
responded to this question, said that he was dis-satisfied with
his Job Security. What we have to consider is why Management feel
they have this degree of perceived Job Security? There are a variety
of reasons for this
(i) the order book of the Company was at a very high level. At the
time of our field'work employees were being recruited, there was no
question of redundancy.
(ii) Management felt, as a result of their impression of redundances
taking place elsewhere, that they had relatively greater security
than other groups in the Compan- i.e. in the event of a redundancy
they would be little affected if at all.
(iii) the Company had a reputation for not declaring redundancies
recklessly. Many respondents when they were asked about redundancy
said they could not re-call such an event in the Company, while
those who could remember were talking about events 25 years earlier.
Indeed Management policy was to avoid redundnacy until absolutely
necessary. Exerp~6.l6, from a Director, makes this point clear.
The Director makes clear the position of the Company right from
the start by stating that redudancies is the last thing the Company
wants. Perhaps more significant, however, is the passage which
follows where we put to him the conflict of maintaining profitability
and avoiding 200 redundancies. His initial response is to repeat
the view expressed at the beginning of the Excerpt - that the Company -
or more particularly the Managers and Directors - are all human beings
and would prefer to keep people on. It is only after this that we
establish at what point a reducancy would be declared - when the Company
ISScould no longer afford to keep them on, or more particularly liThe
morning the Banks won't give you any more money.1I Thus while
the Company may be composed of human beings, in the final analysis
it is technical rationality which is dominant. It still does, however,
have to be emphasised that, as he makes clear at the end of the
Excerpt, for this Director this would only be in the Finat analysis,
IIIf in fact the market had gone awayll, otherwise they would carry the
losses until the market for their product improved, or the Banks said
I No more money. II
Clearly, however, the 'Bottom Line' of Job Security is technical
rationality. This appears only to be common sense. If there
is no money (because the Banks wont lend any more) to pay the
wages, what else can Management do? Clearly, not much. The
importance of his point is highlighted by the following quote
from Theory and Practice
IIYet even a civilization that has been rendered scientify
is not granted dispensation from practical questions:
therefore a peculiar danger arises when the process
of scientification trangresses the limit of technical
questions without, however, departing from the level of
reflection of a rationality confined to the technological
horizon. For them no attempt at all is made to attain a
rational concensus on the part of the citizens concerned
with the practical control of their destiny. Its place
is taken by the attempt to attain technical control over
history by perfecting the administration of society, an
attempt that is just as impractical as it is unhistorical"
{"Theory and Practice" - ;n H4blf.tDQSf<1': pg. 255. Quotedin IIRestructuring of Social and Political Theoryll -
Richard Bernstein pg. 187). In other words while
for the Director in this Excerpt the technical rationality
of the banks saying 'No more money' is the 'Bottom Line',
as Hakermas points out here this involves transporting
what is a technical rationality uncritically into the
social and political issue of control of human destiny.
Only where there is either
(i) a national consensus on such an act, would this be
stable. For a national consenses the dialogue must
allow for consisting with the theses of what speech
(ii)a less than rational consensus because of distorted
communication would be inevitably unstable as it
would not reflect 'truth'
Given that the former condition does not apply in present
circumstances we are, therefore, led to argue that
(a) whatever consensus exists over redudancies at the moment
(even if only in the sense of those made redundant going
along with it, even if attitudina11y they dissent) is
the result of the same distorted communication we identified
in the previous Chapter, and in this case the uncritical
acceptance of what is a technical rationality into what
is also a social and political question.
(b) that the apparent concensus is ultimately unstable,
such that if the intrusion of technical rationality is
understood as such, rather than as inevitable, the instability
may become manifest rather than theoretical.Finally, on the issue of Management perceptions of
job security, we pointed out that job security is perceived
to depend on the order situation of the Company. We
identified in Chapter 5 that Management were perceived
as having most influence on decisions which affected the
Company's order situation, and that in Chapter 4 Management
were consistently the least informed group in the Company.
Two implications follow from this
(i) given that they are least informed, Management are
least placed to assess their job security
(ii) to the extent that their decisions really do influence
the ability of the Company to win orders, they can
act in a significant way on their job security
(2) Staff and Union Reps
From Tables46.9 -~.ll it is clear that Staff attitudes
on this are very similar to those of Management i.e. they
see themselves as:satisfactorily secure compared to
others in the Company. While it is true that some Staff
express dis-satisfaction, whereas us Managers did this,
the numbers are very small - 9 compared to Managers,
6% compared to other Staff and 5% compared to Hourly-Paid.
On the other hand, relatively more Staff than Managers say they
are very satisfied with their Job Security. The distribution,
therefore, differs slightly, but as with Management, Staff
appear to feel their Job Security is satisfactory. The same
view is apparent on the part of their Union Reps.
It does, however, have to be kept in mind that Staff do not
occupy as stratigaically important a position as Management(1) they are not, in terms' of their individual positions in the
organisation hierarchy, , as well placed to comprehensively assess
the position of the Company as Management are. This point comes
out clearly in ExcerptRS.t7 from a Staff Respondant. In this
Excerpt the connection between his Job Security and the ability
of the Company to win orders is explicitly made at the oeginning
of the Excerpt. His insight into the 'system of winning orders
is, however, rather vague - lithe firm has, I think, a fair record
of expansion of success
u
• This respondant is senior Staff, in a
dept. quite apart from Sales/Marketing. He has a deep knowledge
. "
and understanding of his own dept - but the activities of other
dept. are quite foreign to him. Certainly he can come to his own
view - but that will be based on, as he confesses, what has
already happened. The whole process trseem to be on a fairly
disjointed fashion". This stands comparison to Management, who being
closer to the top of the hierarchy, and as we saw in Chapter 4 better
informed, can make an on-going assessment. Staff are consequently
in a position of relatively greater unce~tainty in assessing
their Job Security. The lack of security for Staff - indeed for
anybody in the Company - is apparent in Excerpt"S.18, "again from a
Staff respondant.
For this respondant the connection between orders &Job 'Security is
quite clear - as is the possibility that no orders means no jobs.
For this respondant, therefore, the logic of the Director in Excerpt
A6.16 is probably technically acceptable. Nevertheless the end of
ExcerptAS.18 is significan~, because at the time of our field-work,
the Company was doing well ~ it was winning orders. The acceptability
of the Director's logic may have been reduced "by a heightened Job
Insecurity.
J £'9(2) Staff ~o not have the same degree of influence over decision-
making, as we saw in Chapter 5 .'..' '.. ~,:<"".~ . ..... '-' -.., Thus
they are obliged, in this sense, to adopt a passive view toward their
Job Security - it is something which just happens, over which they
have relatively little influence. Management, in contrast do take
tje decisions which affect orders won or lost (or they are perceived
to do so), thus Management can directly influence their Job Security -
for Staff their Job Security in an implication of-these Management
decisions.
We raised earlier the issue of how Staff might respond if their
Job Security was reduced because the Company was unable to win orders.
Given the preceding analysis there would seem to be 2 possible
Staff response. One response might'be to adopt a critical attitude
toward Management and to call into question their legitimacy to take
these decisions, since they weren't working out. From what we have
seen this seems unlikely, so the alternative response - to accept
reduced Job Security &Redundancies if times get bad - seems more
probable. This is apparent in Excerpt~.19 from a Staff respondent
who makes clear that he is 'reasonably happy (that he) could get
another job elsewhere? This attitude ~ the ability to find
alternative work in the area - was more often expressed by the
professional people in the Firm e.g. Staff engineers, accountants,
etc. There was a noticably greater confidence in these people
that if it did come to the point'where the Firm was to make them
redundant they could find work elsewhere. Thus, apart from purely
personal/emotional ties to the Firm, the importance of the
security of one's job becomes that much less. The less certain
one is that an alternative will be available the more important
it becomes to keep the job one has. The spirit of the Staff is
sUlTlT1ed up in this respect by this "They're quite human in here -
I~Owe're about the best paid; and there had only been one pay-off in
25 years
ll
•
(3) Hburly~Paid'&'Shbp'Stewards
There is again an apparently high degree of satisfaction on the part
of Hourly-Paid workers with their Job Security. Tables~6.9 -A6.11
show that about 80% of them at least say they are satisfied/very
satisfied with their Job Security. Their Shop Stewards have a
similarly high degree of satisfaction. It is, however, interesting
that the dis-satisfaction which is expressed is hierarchial - only
6% say they are dissatisfied in relation to other Shop Floor workers,
but in relation to Staff the figure is 19%, and in relation to
Management it is 21%. On the other hand among Shop Stewards the
change is apparently in reverse as 18% of them say they are dis-
satisfied with their Job Security in relation to other Shop Floor
workers, but in relation to Staff &Management the figure is 12%. The
figures among the Stewards certainly are small (e.g. the change among
the Shop Stewards represents 1 person), and the only explanation which
we can suggest is a feeling that in the event of a redundancy, it would
be them (the Shop Stewards) who would be dealt with more heavily than
their numbers. We are, however, unable to put forward any additional
evidence to support this. It is only an inference.
Returning to the Hourly-Paid dat~, we can see that they do see
themselves at greater risk than other groups, though they do express
satisfaction overall. It does, however, still have to be observed
that
(a) the comparison ascends the hierarchy, the degree of satisfaction
does decline
(b) Hourly-Paid are less satisfied than Staff &Management with their
Job Decurity Iq IWhy should this be?, We ,asked respondants 2 questions about their
labour market history. First of all we asked them,' lhow often they
had been made redundant. The results of this are shown below in
Table.46.12.
Table 6.12' What experience have you'had'of'being'made'redOndant?
12(71%)
4(24%)
33(69%)
15(31%)
43(61%) 6(86%)
28(39%) 1(14%)
26(81%)
6(19%)
Never
1-5 times
More than
5 times 0 0 0 0 t(6%)
Thus only 1 person - a shop steward - had been made redundant more than
5 times, and more than 60% of every category had never been made
redundant. While Management had had less experience of redundancy than
either Staff or Hourly-Paid~ there was little difference between
Staff &Hourly-Paid in their experience of redundancy. Indeed Staff
had slightly more experience~ though their Union Reps were comparable
to Management in experience of Redundancy. The consumer we seek is
clearly not in TableA6.12.
We also asked respondents about their experience of unemployment.
They were asked how long in total, over their working life, they had
been unemployed. This was then expressed as a proportion of their
working life, since someone of 60 has had more opportunity of unem-
ployment than someone of 20. The results of this question are shown
in TableA6.13
/9 '--Tab1eR6.13 How long in total have you been unemployed, except
for those times you have been outside the labour market?
Mgt. Staff Union
Reps
Hourly
Paid
Shop
Steward
Never 27(84%) 48(68%) 4(57%) 26(54%) 8(47%)
Less than 5%
of working life 5(16%) 22(31%) 3(43%) 21(44%) 5(29%)
Less than 10%
of working
1ife 0 1( 1%) 0 1(2%) 4(24%)
There are 2 points to note about this Table
1) no one had been unemployed more than 10% of their working lives
2) This table is not wholly consistent with Table~.12 since
unemployment is not necessarily preceded by redundancy'e~g. school
1eavers, leaving armed forces, leaving previous employment voluntarily.
We would, however, argue that this Tables does demonstrate why Hourly
Paid are more concerned about their job security, since (i) they have
been unemployed more often than Staff or Management - 54% of Hourly
Paid have never been unemployed, for Staff 68% have never been unemployed
and 54% of Management.
(ii) as a group - partly as an implication of ,the above - Hourly-Paid
have more experience of unemployment than Staff or Management.
This insecurity is illustrated in Excerpt46.2~, from an Hourlt Paid
respondent. For this respondent his Job Security is quite clearly
/93associated with' 'the amount of work coming through'. In this respect
he is clearly similar to the Staff respondent in ExcerptAG.18 who
draws the similar comparison between Job Security and the through-put of
work. Indeed this is the basis of the logic of what the Director
says in ExcerptA6.16. There are, however, important differences
between this Hourly-Paid respondent, and Starr of Management.
Ca) neither Staff nor Management refer to a redundancy of the magnitude
referred to by this Hourly-Paid respondent - from 26 in his trade, down
to 4.
(b) a sense that there should be a 'better way' than redundancy -
'they should have more job security - but at the same time attached to
fatalism - 'but its a way of life'
Given the greater biographical experience of unemployment, the somewhat
greater awareness of Job security among Hourly-paid is, therefore, not
surprising. It is furthermore compounded by the fact that, as we
pointed out in Chapter 3, this area has been one of relatively high
unemployment for many years. The workers in this Company, while
only a minority have experience of redundancy and unemployment are
part of a wider social structure where these things are not uncommon.
This can be seen in ExcerptA6.2,1, again.from an Hourly-Paid respondent.
This respondent is clearly aware of the hazards to his job security, and the
importance of continuing to win orders. In this,respect he is no
different from all the other respondents we have quoted on Job Security.
At the end of the Excerpt we ask how he would,assess his job security.
For him an important factor is his perceived Job Security'against that
of his father in another Company. In other words~ given that this
company operates in one area of high unemployment, workers could come
~ lq4 _to take up on attitude of concern that that should not happen to them,
since if they lose their present jobs they may find difficulty in
getting another job. In contrast Staff appear to take a fairly optimistic
view of getting alternative work.
This, however. can cut both ways. As employees of a Company with
a strong order book, and which does not declare redundancies readily,
one could draw a favourable comparison between this company, and
others in the area. This would lead to an attitude of satisfaction
with one's Job Security. An a~lt~Jt of this type is apparent in
ExcerptR6.22 from an Hourly-Paid respondent.
For this respondent insecurity is simply not on issue, because
'they're quite secure with their orders' • It is however, also
apparent that he has been given no reason to feel insecure in the
past, and has no reason to be as far into the future as he wants to
see. The point at the end where he says IYou see I served my time
in here. I've been here all my life' is also significant, since
as we saw in Chapter 3 in Table 3.3, 28% of Hourly-Paid had been with
the Company mote than 10 years, and 60% more than 5. There is, on
other words, a fairly high degree of stability in the Company, which will
clearly contribute positively toward attitudes on Job Security. As
we see n yhe dominant view coming Hourly-Paid is of satisfaction with
their Job Security - though less so than for Staff or Management.
This is not to say~ however, that a critical attitude is not
possibl~~ even amongst those who are apparently satisfied with their
Job Security. This is apparent from ExcerptR6.23 from an Hourly Paid
respondent.This respondent is satisfied with his present level of Job Security.
He is satisfied with 'how (the Company) ave progressed in
marketing, selling them? He does, however, identify one area of
concern - the fact they are a one-product Company. The problems
of a single product are widely discussed in Business ~trategy
textbooks so his argument is not orgina1. What is significant is
that this is an Hourly-Paid respondent talking, and his argument
is critical of Management's propfessiona1 decision-making - precisely
the source of their legitimacy we identified in the previous Chapter.
What appears, therefore, to be quite mundane (especially given a
fami1arity with renewed wisdom in business strategy) is in fact a
very dangerous attitude for Management were it to become widespread,
is it would challenge a fundamental aspect of their legitimacy -
their role as professional decision-makers.
Given what has gone before, we should expect that Hourly-Paid
and Shop Stewards would seek a greater improvement in their
Job Security than the other categories. Table 6.14 confirms this.
Tab1el}6.14 - How ,much would your Job Security have to be
improved to make your job ideal?
~hOp
Management Staff Union Reps Hourly-Paid tewards
Very much
·3 (4%) 7 (15%) Improved 2 (6%) 0 6 (35%)
Improved
12 (38%) (31%) (43%) 13 (27%) a Bit 22 3 4 (24%)
About Right
NoW 18 (56%) 46 (65%) 4 (57%) 28 (58%) 7 (41%)
It is amongst Hourly-Paid, and in particular the Shop Stewards, that we
find the largest percentage of those who wish their Job Security to be
'Very Much Improved' (they constitute 72% of those giving this'response, but only 36% of the total sample). The Hourly-Paid are,
however, less concerned than their Shop Stewards on this evidence,
as only Shop Stewards deviate sign~ficant1y from the proportion
in each category who say their Job Security is about right. We
should remember that the Shop Stewards tend to be older than the
average for the sample, and in consequence for them the hiring
and firing practices of many of the firms in the west of Scotland
(particularly, as we said, in the shipyeards) and real experience,
and not just something in books or old newspapers.
(3) Job Variety and Interest
This has been an area of considerable effort by academic researchers,
and the surveyors of consultancy techniques, over the last 20 years.
From one direction has come a group emphasising the importance
of job satisfaction for employees in the sense of actually liking
what they do. Anotable form of this has been the 'Quality of Working
Life' movement in the U.S. which emphasises the need to re-design jobs
to improve job satisfaction (see for instance Lawler, Hackman and
Kaufman "Effects of Job Redesign: AField Experiment" in Journal of
Applied Social Psychology 1973). Coming in the other direction is
the work inspired by' '" Braverman; 'Labor and Monopoly Capital'
which argues that the relentless search for greater efficiency in
capitalism means that work is being increasingly fragmented
and rationalised.
To ensure a forcus on the organizational structure in
as a hierarchy~ rather than on the immediate situation of the
employee, we excluded, as explained in Chapter 3, any Company which
used a technology which would have innevitably produced the effects
described in the Braverman inspired literature (e.g. even though therewas only one car plant in the area when the initial approaches were
made. we did not approach it). The type of Company we looked for was
one which and a technology which could potentially provide an interesting
and varied job for its employees. Whether the job was seen in this way
by the employees was. of course. the open question. but the
technology. as described in Chapter 3. did have a potential for providing
interesting and varied work.
To what extent their jobs were seen as providing interesting and varied
jobs. comparied to the jobs of others. is shown below in Tables 6.15
toA6.17.
Tab1en6.15 - How satisfied are you with the Variety and Interest in your
job compared to that of (other) Shop-Floor?
§hOP
Management Staff Union Reps. Hourly-Paid tewards
Very
20 (63%) 31 (44%) 1 (14%) 7 (15%) 2 (12%) Satisfied
Satisfied 9 (28%) 32 (45%) 4 (57%) 32 (67%) 14 (83%)
Dissatisfied 1 (3%) 7 (10%) 1 (14%) 9 (19%) 1 (6%)
Very
1 (1%) 1 (14%) Dissatisfied 0 0 0
Tab1ens.16 - How satisfied are you with your Variety and Interest in
your job compared to that of (other) Staff?
~hOP Management Staff Union Reps. Hourly-Paid tewards
Very
15 (47%) 20 (28%) 1 (14%) 5 (10%) Satisfied 2 (12%)
Satisfied 16 (50%) 44 (62%) 4 (57%) 38 (79%) 11 (65%)
Dissatisfied 0 5 (7%) 1 (14%) 5 (10%) 4 (24%)
Very
2 (3%) Dissatisfied 0 1 (14%) 0 0TableA6.l7 - How satisfied are you with your Variety and Interest
(A) Management
From these tables it is clear that there is little dissatisfaction for
Management. with respect to the Variety and Interest in the work which
they do. In relation to Hourly-Paid , and other Management, only
3% say they are dissatisfied in each case - which is, as the
Tables show, only 1 respondent of the Managers who replied to these
questions. The remaining 97% say they are Satisfied/Very Satisfied.
It is, howver, noteworthy that the distribution does vary between
Management and Staff on one hand, and Hourly-Paid on the other. In
the former case there is, more or less, an equal plit between those who
are satisfied, and those who are very satisfied. In the latter, the
modal reply (about 0/3 ~f those who say they are satisfied/very satisfied)
is 'very satisfied. This suggests that Management and Staff jobs are
perceived by Managers to offer more variety and interest than jobs
done by the Hourly-Paid.
Thus we can say of Managers that (a) they find their jobs offer
them the sort of variety and interest they expect (b) they·
perceive themselves as doing better in this respect, with Staff,
than the Hourly-Paid.How, therefore, do Managers perceive their work. An interesting
view is given by a Director in ExcerptA6.24.
These 2 particularly important points to observe of this Excerpt
(1) the relationship between his work and his leisure activities
clearly put this Respondent in the category discribed by Parker as
'Extension' ('Work and Non-Work in Three~ Occupations' ~ S.R. Parker
Sociological Review 1965). For the Respondent there is no clear
demarcation in his work interests and leisure interests - he
states that the latter led him into the former. It is equally
clear that he is involved with his work to a high degree. This
indeed was a fairly common feature of Management in the Company -'
there did appear to be a signficant commitment to the Company
among Management. (It did, however, appear to extend into
Staff and Hourly-Paid - but we shall deal with that later). The
difficulty with Parker's model is that some jobs do not give a readi.ly
apparent extension into leisure (e.g. the Sales Director did not run
a market stall as a hobby on the side).
(2) The relative importance of the job satisfaction of employees is
aslo relevant. Having discussed the relationship of his work and
leisure he moves on to discuss the satisfaction to be had from
being 'part and parcel of Senior Management of a successful Company'.
, -
Toward the end of the. Excerpt we raise with him directly whether
the Company does enough to ensure the job satisfaction of its employees.
His response to that is no - but this is underwritten by the need to
'get one's priorities right'. By this he means (i) the economic
condition generally - 'one has to work very hard to provide jobs
at all' (ii) the 'load' on the Company (at this time the order book
, ,
was at an all-time high). Employee satisfaction, therefore, has to take
'-..00its place in the order of priorities. Two points in turn have
to be noted about this (a) it is Management who decide on the order
of priorities - it is Management who decide whether the load on
the Company, or economic conditions generally, mean that attention
to employee satisfaction has to be delayed (b) taking just the two
conditions referred to by the Director - general'economic conditions,
and the 'load' on the Company - we would argue that there are
2 things which can never be achieved in a final sense. They
will always precede job satisfaction for employees in the
Management order of priorities. (We shall elaborate on this point,
below, when we discuss Working Conditions).
(b) Staff and Union Reps
While there is a higher level of dissatisfaction than among Management -
11% say they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied in relation to
Shop-Floor workers, and 10% in relation to other Staff, and 15%
in relation to Management - there is, on the whole a high level
of satisfaction expressed by Staff. In all cases, more than 80%
say they are satisfied/very satisfied. Among Union Reps. the
level of satisfaction is only slightly less than among their
members - 71% say they are satisfied/very satisfied over all
categories.
staff do derive a form of satisfaction from their work, which is
similar to that of Management. This point is made clear by the
respondent in ExcerptA6.25.
It is clear at the outset that this respondent is satisfied with
the type of work he is do'ing. From his point of view the mostimportant aspect is clearly the variety of job to be done -
there's something happening all the time and it's interesting."
It does, however, have to be said that no Staff made the connection
between work and leisure, in the way of the Director in ExcerptA6.24.
The discussion of Job Variety and Interest.with Staff did not
stray into leisure as it die in that case.
CDntrary to the view of the need for variety expressed in Excerpt
A6.25 is that expressed in ExcerptAG.26. This Excerpt focuses on
something of a blind-spot of the Q.W.L. movement, which seems
to imply that employrees need variety in their jobs to develop
as individuals. As we have tried to show in this Chapter employee
needs do vary, even with a well-defined group of employees. The main
point of ExcerptAG.26 is that not all employees seek variety, rather
they may look for order as in this case. The reasoning underlying
this is quite clear - his previous job, as a junior, had taught him
to be methodical, and that had been brought forward by him into
his work as a clerk. Thus 'Job Variety and Interest' may mean
different things to different people - for one member of Staff,
it may mean 'something happening all the time', while for someone
else it may mean 'a routine'.
It is also noticable in Excerpt~.26 that the Respondent h~s been
able to impose himself on the job - he has introduced a method
to a job which, at first sight, appeared 'topsy turvy'. This
ability to impose oneself is revealed more strikingly in Excerpt
A6.27, again from a Staff respondent.
This Excerpt illustrates how an employee can take a job 'which
initially appear to be uninteresting, and transfonn it to becomea job which does interest him. It does, however, have to
observed that he must have the necessary discretion - the degree of
freedom - to accomplish that. In the case described in ExcerptA6.27
his 'strategy' was to develop as his own areas in the Company's
business which nobody else was doing but which (a) interested
him (b) gave him a unique expertise in the Company. It is, therefore,
important to observe that the perception of variety and interest
in their job, is not necessarily a passive process i.e. of the
Staff giving their opinion of the amount of variety and interest
which is structured into a job. Rather, as Excerp~6.27 shows
the variety and interest there is in a job depends on how much
variety and interest the individual is able to bring into it -
or is allowed to bring into it. The content of his job~ this
reflects a degree of self for this member of Staff, as was true
also for the Director in Excerp~6.24. As we shall see, however,
the ability of Hourly-Paid to acoomplish this is much more
re.sfricJ::eJ . In r,tanagers" and, to a lesser extent, for Staff
the degree of variety and interest in theirjob is an active process
(i.e. the job is what they make it), but for Hourly Paid the degree
of variety and interest is passive (i.e. the job depends on the
decisions/needs of others).
This need to be personnaly creative is repeated in ExcerptA6.28
which is again from a Staff respondent.
In this Excerpt the need to feel personally creative - "I don't
want to come in at'8.30 and leave at 10 to 5 and feel I've done
nothing" - is clearly central. At the same time 3 paints have
to be understood in relation to this(a) Not all Staff felt this way. This is shown by ExcerptA6.29
where the Staff respondent makes clear that'· the fundamentally
interesting factor in his job is that it pays better than any other
he thinks he is likely to get. (In this sense, a sort of white-
collar Affluent Worker).
(b) The ability to develop interest and variety in their work by
Staff would clearly increase levels of satisfaction by them on this
item. We have seen at various points (e.g. ExcerptsA5.26 -A6.28)
their ability to do so. As we shall see in the next section this was
a much more uncertain possibility for Hourly-Paid.
(c) This assessment is much more intensely personal than the
assessment of Wages/Salary, or even Job Security. In the former
one can make comparisons to the Wages/Salary of friends, while
in the latter case cost of judgement can be made in relation to
the number of orders the Company was working on. Job Variety and
Interest depends much more heavily on the individual and his
needs. As we have seen, the needs of individuals even within a
well-defined group, can vary. Thus the fact that one's friends
(for instance) say a particular job is good/bad in this respect,
is not necessarily a guide for the individual in the same way as
being told it pays £x per week, and that there is 3 years work in
the Company. . ,
(1) Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards
It can be seen from Tables~.15 -Q6.l7 that Hourly-Paid
do have a lesser degree of satisfaction thatn staff or Management.
The evidence of this is not in the number who are dissatisfied, though
that proportion is greater than among:Managers and comparable to theproportion of Staff who are dissatisfied~ The difference between
Hourly-Paid on one hand, and Staff and Management on the other, is
the consistently lower proportion of Hourly-Paid who say they are
Ivery satisfiedl compared to Staff or Management (See TablesR6.1S -
~6.l7). Shop Stewards appear to be even less satisfied than their
members on this issue. Why should this be?
One reason, which we discussed in the previous Chapters, is
lack of control on the part of Hourly-Paid workers. We can see this
in ExcerptA6.30 from an Hourly-Paid worker, who operates a C.N.C.
machine.
It can be seen in this that the satisfaction he derives from his
job varies from time-to-time - perhaps not from one day to the next,
rather from one fortnight to the next. The same variability is
apparent from ExcerptA6.3l, which is again from an Hourly-Paid
worker. This respondentls variability is clearly over a lesser time
period - but he shares the common feature of varying satisfaction
with his job over time.
These 2 Excerpts can be comparied with ExcerptsA6.26 andA6.27 from
Staff respondents with interesting results. In both cases these
Staff respondents had moved into jobs which gave them little
interest and variety. Their solution was to impose themselves
on the job - to create their own, work-based interest and variety.
In the former fG.26) it was by creating a routine, to give order,
where there had seem to be chaos, while in the latter, the
respondent searched out interesting tasks. This route is not
pursued by either Hourly-Paid respondent. For their
satisfaction depends on others - on whether the Foreman gives
you algood jobl to do, for the respondent in Excerp~6.30. or
~D~the part of the Shop-Floor the respondent in ExcerptA6.3l is
working in. In both cases satisfaction is, as we suggested above,
a passive process - it depends on decisions made by somebody else.
In neither case is there any apparent attempt - or desire - to
impose oneself on the job and to exercise control over ti, as
Staff have been able to do.
This inability to exercise control over the work they do can,
however, have other effects on satisfaction, as ExcerptA6.32
shows. For this respondent, who is a Shop Steward, there is
dis-satisfaction with the work he has to do. The dissatisfaction
is, however, rooted in the fact that the work he has to do is not,
in his eyes, properly organised. This respondent works as a
patternmaker - making wooden 'patterns' for metal castings. His
complaint is that the work they do is not co-ordinated properly -
that patterns are not repai.red so that they have to be replaced,
or they have to be repaired very quickly, so that a costing can be
made. In his view this is a Management problem - it is for
Management to co-ordinate with the foundry, so that his work can
be organised properly.
This has certain similarities to 'The Joiner's Tale' in Stewart
Clegg's 'Power, Rule and Domination', where the joiner criticises
the Management for their failure to organise work properly.
In that case, the point being made by the joiner was that production
was being adversely affected by Management inadequacy. This point
comes out clearly in ExcerptA6.32 as well. There is, however,
another dimension, namely that the inadequacy of Management is
perceived as affecting the respondent - their inability to organise
work effectively is diminishing the satisfaction he derives from his
work. There are 2 important points from this, which we· have made in otherl
contexts elsewhere in this Chapter.
i) given what we have seen of ~tafY, they may have taken action to
QUt;I/VIfJ ,,) ~ this on their won initiative (see especially Excerpth6.26).
This however, would be a difficult thing for Hourly-Paid to accomplish.
If we stay with the context of ExcerptOS.32, it is hardly in the
power of the respondent to take himself off to the foundry to see what needs
to be done. The position of Hourly-?aid is, as we have said, passive,
i.e. they must re~pond to the decisions of others.
ii) the respondent in Excerpt~.32 does clearly attach the cause of this
inadequacy to Management - it is their fault that the work is not
organised properly and that in consequence he finds he is frustrated
in his work. This, as we have pointed out before, is dangerous for
the Management role for 2 reasons.
a) it is not just that the respondent is dis-satisfied, but that
he traces this dissatisfaction back to Management in his perception.
b) the fact he traces this back to Management may begin to cast doubt
on their role as legitimate decision-makers.
The role of Management in the interest Hourly-Paid take in their
job is absolutely central to Excerptll6.33
The respondent, who is a Shop Steward, makes clear his interest in his
work, but goes on to describe how he was discouraged from his interest
by Management. Clearly in terms of what, for instance, the QWL '
movement is trying to accomplish there is room for improvement. It
is equally clear, however, that the nature of his discouragement is
consistent with the role played by the Hourly-Paid. If Hourly-Paid
ft.o 1did 'take an interest'as he and others may have tried to do then they
are no longer 'passive' - they would begin to adopt an 'active' role
in the structuring of their work role. One also recalls the views
of the Director, quoted at the beginning of this section (Excerpt A
6.24) who says that employee job satisfaction is a priority, but only
once the economic situations has improved and 'the load had come off'
the Company. We questioned at that point the degree of commitment
that that Director had to enhancing the satisfaction of his employees
in the work they do. In many ways what we have seen since then tends
to be consistent with that - Staff have enhanced their job satisfaction,
while Hourly-Paid are unable to, and indeed are discouraged from doing
so.
In understanding this it may help to consider variety and interest
within the Firm as a zero sum concept. If we look at what the
Director had to say about the variety and interest he derived from his
job (Excerp~6) we can see that, given the existing structure of the
Firm, this satisfaction he derives, must implicitly depend on the
control of subordinate others. If variety and interest at work is
to mean more than the introduction of novelities, or more extension
of a still highly routinised task so that it takes longer to get bored
but still bored all the same, it must mean a slackening of control- in
the Firm. This, however, represents a basic threat to the hierarchial
principle, but if we look at tablesR6.15 -A6.17 satisfaction among the
Hourly-Paid relative to any group is never less than 82% (to 'themselves),
85% to Management and 89% to Staff. In general the Hourly-Paid, as
well as the Staff, and the Management are satisfied with the variety
and interest they have in their work. There is boredom from time-to-
time, but this, it is felt, is balanced 'by the interesting jobs, or
is neutralised by some otherfacto~, 'e~g. pleasure in seeing the
finished product (Hourly-Paid), 'or money (Staff). " It is amongst theunion officials - both Hourly-Paid and Staff, that there arw wider
ideas about variety and interest at work, and as we saw from the
previous Shop Steward, an awareness of a need to take an initiative
in the job, and to impose oneself on the job, to be involved in it,
as the Management, and certain Staff do.
This is reflected in TableAs.18 which reports responses to how much
their Job Variety &Interest would have to be improved to make their
job ideal.
Table~6~18 - How much would your job Variety and Interest have to be
improved to make your job ideal?
.......... Shop Management Staff, ' Union' Reps ' "Hourly,:,paid. Stewards
Very much
12(17%) 2(29%) 8( 17%) 2(12%) improved 0
Improved a
5(16%) 19(27%) 2(29%) 19(40%) 7(41%) bit
About right
27(84%) 40(56%) 3(43%) 21(44%) 8(47%) noW
From the point'of view of Management, this is quite clear cut - some
84% say the variety and interest in their jobs is 'about right now'.
The level of satisfaction then follows a hierarchial pattern, with
staff having rather less satisfaction that Management. and Hourly-
Paid less than Staff. This is consistent with the preceding
analysis.
Further anaylsis of the data does, howeveri reveal another aspect of
this issue - that the degree of satisfaction'can vary within a
particular group. For instanc~, 12 Staff respondents say the variety
and interest in their jobs would have to be 'very much improved' to
iO Ofmake their jobs ideal. Of this 1,2,' 7 are from the Sales Dept.• ~ which
is a heavy over-representation. The same tendancy is 'apparent
among Hourly-Paid workers. Among the skilled workers' 38% say their
variety and interest is about right, and 48% say it should be improved
a bit. Among the unskilled the figures are 57% and 26% respectively
i.e. it appears the unskilled are slightly more satisfied in this
respect than skilled Hourly-Paid workers. Why should this be?
It is perhaps surprising that the figures should work out like this,
when after all it is the skilled man who does the (whatever)
investing work there is to do, while the unskilled man cleans up,
fetches parts and materials, drives and loads cranes etc. It may however,
reflect a stronger expectation for variety and interest among skilled
workers, and a correspondingly weaker expectation among the unskilled.
This tends to be vonfirmed by Excerpt~6.34 from an unskilled, Hourly-
Paid respondent.
At the outset, it is made clear that the work he actually does is
'pretty boring at times·, but that one of his greatest interests is
in seeing the finished article going out of the factory (this particular
respondent operates in the ·Bay· where the product goes through its
final tests). Hence, as well as using his skill, he finds interest
in activities which are not specifically related to his task. In
contrast to this, all the other respondents we have looked at in this
section have emphasised only the particular task which they perform.
other Labourers to whom we talked similarly brought in non-specicif
aspects of the work situations e.g. the support and friendship of
workmates was an item which was frequently mentioned. In other
words since there is little or no interest in the work they do,
unskilled workers transfer their attentions to their work situation.This is not a strategy which has proved necessary in any other
category.
Even among skilled manual workers there was the opportunity for
variety and interest in their work, which was something they
looked for, and appreciated. Nevertheless, it has also been
apparent that different occupations have differentially structured
opportunities for variety and interest. For instance within the
Hourly-Paid category there is a difference between skilled and
unskilled work such that those who do the latter have
apparently given up on the work itself yielding satisfaction and
have instead transferred their attention to their work situation
(i.e. the contact in which they do a boring job). More importantly,
however, it is clear that these differences are to a large extent
systematic rather than random. Management, as we might have
expected, have greatest satisfaction from the variety and interest
in their work. Next came Staff - but as we saw they did have to work
at it - they had to make an effort to make their job as interesting
as they might like. The distinction between Staff and Hourly-Paid
is that Staff appear to have the discretion to do this, whereas
Hourly-Paid do not. Indeed, following ExcerptA6.33 it would
appear they are positively discouraged from doing so.
Thus we can see that the apparently subjective issue of Job
Variety and Interest cannot be divorced 'from the hierarchical
structure of the Company, since the degree of variety and interest
in one's work, and the opportunity to seek and develop this, depends
to a large extent of the position one occupies in this
structure.
~II(4) Working Conditions
In this respect the Firm faced two particular difficulties (A) the
Firm had inherited premises which had been designed for the production
of another (though not dissimilar) product, (8) extension of their
existing premises was made difficult by having the River Clyde on
one side, and the main road in the area on the other~ As we shall
see, however, attitudes to the Firm's provision of working facilities
were not entirely uniform.
The data on this item are shown in tablesA6.19 -As.21.
Tab1e~6.19 - How satisfied are you with your Working Conditions compared
to those for (other) Shop-Floor?
§hOp
Management Staff Union Reps. Hourly-Paid tewards
Very
7 (22%) 17 (24%) 1 (14%) 4 (8%) Satisfied 0
Satisfied 18 (56%) 46 (65%) . 6 (86%) 30 (63%) 12 (71%)
Dissatisfied 5 (16%) 7 (10%) 0 8 (17%) 4 (24%
Very
1 (3%) 1 (1%) 6 (13%) 1 (6%) Dissatisfied 0
Tab1eA6.20 - How satisfied are you with your Working Conditions in
relation to those of (other) Staff?
§~op Management Staff Union Reps. Hourly-Paid ewards
Very
8 (11%) 1 (14%) Satisfied 4 (13%) 1 (2%) 0
Satisfied 22 (69%) 47 (66%) 4 (57%) 20 (42%) 7 (41%)
Dissatisfied 4 (13%) 12 (17%) 2 (29%) 18 (38%) 8 (47%)
Very
1 (3%) 4 (6%) Dissatisfied 0 9 (19%) 2 (12%)Tab1eA6.21 - How satisfied are you with your Working Conditions in
relation to (other) Management?
~hOP Management Staff Union Reps. Hourly-Paid tewards
Very
3 (9%) 7 (10%) Satisfied 1 (14%) 1 (2%) 0
Satisfied 24 (75%) 41 (58%) 4 (57%) 22 (46%) 9 (53%)
Dissatisfied 2 (6%) 18 (25%) 1 (14%) 12 (25%) 5 (29%)
Very
2 (6%) 4 (6%) (14%) 13 (27%) 3 (18%) Dissatisfied 1
CA) Management
It is clear from these Tables that Management are in general satisfied
with their Working Conditions. About 80% say they are satisfied/
very satisfied with their Working Conditions in relation to others
in the Company. This was, hwoever, in certain respects surprising
since Management conditions were not always all that goad. An
example of this was the office of the Managing Director which
Ca) had no carpet (b) had a small window which looked out on to
the Wages Office. Disgruntled employees would occasionally rap
this window on their way out of the Wages Office, in order to distract
him from his work and remind him of their prescence. Other Managers
did point out, however, that this was how the Managing Director
chose to have his office, so that they could not complain about
the 'luxury' of his office compared to their own. Other Managers
had ventilation shafts going through their office, while for some
an 'office' was a partition between one desk and another. This
was not, howevr, universal - other Managers did have the trappings
one associates with the successful Manager. It does, however,
have to be understood that ~anagement conditions generally were
not what one may have expected. Much of the cuase of this goes
back to the premises they occupied, and in recognition of this Managers
did accept these conditions. This attitude is well expressed by theManager in Excerp~6.35.
Dissatisfaction in this Excerpt is quite clearly submerged by
his recognition that in the circumstances which face the Company
the conditions he has are the best he is likely to get. In this
respect the data is similar to that for Wages and Salaries. In that
case there was dissatisfaction, but it was directed at incomes
policy, rather than at the Company - the Company was perceived
as helpless, or doing what it could in the circumstances. In
the same way, while they may see their conditions as less than
satisfactory, the responsibility is on the premises, rather
than on the Company which since it is building a new office
block.
(B) Staff and Union Reps
Staff and Union Reps are clearly satisfied with their working
conditions in relation to those of Hourly-Paid workers - only
11% say they are dissatisfied/very dissatisfied. It is in
relation to Management and other Staff that there appears
to be more significant dissatisfaction - 31% and 23% say .
they are dissatisfied in relation to each of these groups
respectively. Further analysis shows 'that this dissatisfaction
is concentrated in 2 areas
(i) Sales - 16% say they are dissatisfied, and 18% are very
dissatisfied with their conditions in relation to other Staff.
In relation to Management, 21% are dissatisfied, 13% who are
very dissatisfied.
(ii) Quality Control - 33% say they are dissatisfied in relation
to other Staff, none were very dissatisfied. In relation to
~14Management, 25% are dissatisfied and 8% very dissatisfi.ed.
Sales and Quality Control did indicate a more critical attitude
than other Staff toward their condition - in particular in
relation to other Staff conditions. Why should this be? We
shall have to look at each group separte1y.
First of all Quality Control. They were located in a single
storey wooden building, located in the'midd1e of the shop-floor
(it was knwon as 'The Ponderosa' because it-'did resemble a
ranch house). The majority of Staff, it is true, were located
away from the shop-floor - but on the other hand, Quality Control
were by no means unique e.g. Work Study, the Govt Dept., the
Works Management office were all located on the shop-floor. One
distinction between those other Staff groups and Quality Control is
that in Quality Control there 'was a high proportion of clerical
staff,. whereas in Work Study etc., staff tended to be almost
entirely of a technical nature. It may be that the dissatisfaction
of Quality Control Staff reflects the dissatisfaction of non-
technical Staff at being located on the Shop-Floor.
Among Sales Staff there were two dominant themes - one from each of
the groups which constituted the Sales Department. This, as
we saw in Chapter III provided a full sales and marketing service
to customers - this involved selling the product and to do so
required showing that this Firm could do better (or cheaper) than
any other and resolve any technical problems he may have. This
meant two different types of Staff being in the same department -
(1) design engineers and draughtsmen whose job it was'to resolve
the problems introduced by the customer (2) Sales Staff - mostly
ex-engineers - whose job it was to' convince the customer the orderought to go to his Firm. Both groups brought out two different
problems. The former were concerned with physical problems in
themselves. ExcerptR6.36 from a Sales Staff respondent is
typical.
In fact we missed an interview with this respondent in February
because his union had decided to stay out because the heating had
broken down during the night. This interest is purely in the
physical conditions offered by the Firm, and their effect on
his person. The latter group - while discussing this - went
further, to condemn the Firm for its own inadequacies and
failure to see the effectof this on their employees and
consequently on the performance on the Firm. The following is
typical of this.
This group did not only condemn the Firm and its inadequate
provision of conditions. but in contrast to the former group,
who used personal knowledge (the effect of the conditions upon
themselves). they chose to emphasise the effect of these
inadequate conditions upon the performance ofthe Firm.
This relates back to the analysis of Redundancy, at the end of
the Hourly-Paid section, and Excerpt46.23 in particular, where an
Hourly-Paid respondent ~s critical of Management policy. We
suggested then that for Management this could be a dangerous
attitude since it focuses on a,significant source of their legitimacy.
The Sales Staff respondent in Excerpt 6.37 is saying something rather
similar to this. What he is saying 1s not just that he does'not
like his working condtions (e.g. that he dislikes the colour the
walls have been painted), but that the conditions he must work in _those conditions he has been given by Management - operate to the
detriment of his efficiency and therefore to the efficiency
of the Company as a whole. This goes right to the heart of
Management legitimacy - that they deal with the efficiency of
the Company through their skills as professional decision-
makers. If it becomes apparent that their professional
decisions do not produce efficiency, then the Management role
may be subject to a degree of threat.
This is not to say, however, that Staff are generally dissatisfied.
As the data in TablesA6.19 -As.21 show they vary from a low of
68% satisfied/very satisfied (in relation to Management TableA6.21)
to a high of 89% (in relation to Shop-Floor workers TableA6.19).
What we have done is to draw attention to the problem areas which
exist, and to suggest how they could develop. On the whole,
however, there is a high degree of satisfaction - even if it is
under - written by a realisation of the physcial constraints of
the Company premises, as with the Management respondent in ExcerptA
6.35. Asimilar view is expressed in ExcerptA6.38 by a Staff
respondent, which is fairly typical of the satisfied majority.
(cl Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards
Among this group there is much more evidence of dissatisfaction
than among Staff and Management. Only in relation to other Hourly-
Paid is there a majority who say they are satisfied or very
satisfied (71% - TableA6.19). In relation to Staff 57% say they
are dissatisfied/very dissatisfied, and 52% in relation to
Management.
The dissatisfaction which Hourly Paid, and their Shop Stewards
feel is clearly seen in ExcerptA6.39.For this Hourly-Paid respondent there are a whole list of
complaints - nowhere to leave their own clothes, nowhere to wash
up, powdered soap. In his case the comparison is quite clearly
with Staff who, in his view, do aless dirty job but have better
washing facilities, and somewhere to put their own clothes while
they work. He, however, sees no prospect of remedying this.
In this respect he is unlike the Shop Steward we quoted in
ExcerptR6.2, who while he identified similar problems to those
discussed in ExcerptA 6.39 was quite determined that there would
be - would have to be - the type of improvements which were
required.
In that they both idetnify Staff conditions as the target, both
the respondents in ExcerptR6.2 and~.39 hold similar views.
In this respect they re-call the discussions on Pay (above), where
Hourly-Paid suggested that the distribution of rewards -
the differnetial - between Staff and themselves was not equitable.
(See, for instance ExcerptR6.l2). The discussion on Working Conditions
simply echoes this. In effect Hourly-Paid are saying ILook, we
all make a contribution to the Company, why are they (Staff)
systematically better treated than we are?
Hourly-Paid do, however, face 2 difficulties in this
(a) as we saw in dealing with Pay, Hourly Paid are not fully aware
of Staff conditions. Staff salaries are Iconfi~entiall. Similarly
about 50% of Staff are located in a part of the,Company Hourly-Paid
seldom see as it is apart from the Shop-Floor. Thus any assessment
Hourly-Paid make of Staff conditions is to that extent conjective
(b) Staff are likely to resist attempts by Hourly-Paid to equalise
different conditions.' This was seen above in discussing Pay, andthe condition~ of this conflict will be discussed more fully
shortly when we examine the role of trade unions in the Company.
In ExcerptA6.40 there is a discussion with a Director about the
relationship of Staff and Hourly-Paid conditions.
In this Excerpt, the Director makes clear his awareness -
and indeed sympathy for - the aspiration of Hourly-Paid in this
respect, IIthere will have to be differentials but it shouldn't
automatically be staff and manual ••• It's got to be based on the
"
skills, the contribution to the Company.1I This is, of course,
substantially what Hourly-Paid would argue. The Director does,
however, identify some of the difficultires in moving to such a
position -most obviously that having equalised holiday entitlement
for Staff and Hourly-Paid, the former are now seeking restoration of
their differential in this respect.
The major point, however, is to observe the" sympathy which there is
for the views of Hourly-Paid. Nor was this an atypical view.
Managers often used descriptions like 'disgusting' and 'quite
ridiculous in this day andage' in discussing Hourly-Paid conditions.
Management, therefore, are aware of the problem. So why not do
something about it?
Anumber of answers could be given to that, some of which we have
already observed
(a) Practical difficulties - the size, location and structure of the
premises
(b) 'Political' difficulties - Staff would resist any such movement
Amore fundamental answer concerns the place this problem occupies
in the priority list of Management. We saw in ExcerptA6.24 that theCompany realised that more could be done to enhance the job
satisfaction of their employees, but that this could not be done
until lithe load came off" the Company'. This, it has to be
appreciated is a completely open statement - when will the load
ever come off? At this time the Company has a full order-book - if there
are few', orders is the 'load off', or is it now redundnacy that takes
priority? Similarly with Working Conditions - the Director is
clearly aware of the problem, he sympathises with the argument concerning
the relative Working Conditions of Staff and Hourly-Paid - but the time
scale is no more detenninate than "a number of years'.
This is, without doubt, a difficult situation for any Management to deal
with, but the most important aspect to observe is the structure of
the dispute. Neither Staff nor Hourly-Paid can do more than try to
exert influence via their trade unions and try to negotiate over time
a solution to this problem. Only Management can made a decision - only
their position in the hierarchy gives them access to the possibility
of directly resolving this.
This is observed by a Shop Steward in Excerp~6.4l. We raise
with him certain Management's problem in dealing with this, in
that the premises pose difficulties. His argument concentrates
on 2 things
(1) a trade-off between the needs of the Company (to have machines
in the premises) and the needs of their manual employees (showers,
lockers, conditions, etc.).
(2) his observation that Management are "dragging their heels
ll
•
It is additionally, interesting to observe that part of the
frustration he experiences orginates in Management's failure to
keep their employees informed - if Hourly-Paid were involved,
and shown the specific difficulties they may adopt a more understandingattitude.
Given what we have said about Working Conditions it would perhaps
be surprising if respondents were not seeking significant
improvements in their Working Conditions. This is confirmed by
Tab1eA6.22 which concerns how far Working Conditions would have
to be improved to make the job ideal.
Tab1e~6.22 - How much would your Working Conditions have to be
changed to make your job ideal?
Management Union Reps. Hourly-Paid
Shop
Staff Stewards
Very
Much
Improved 9 (28%) 14 (20%) 2 (29%) 21 (44%) 8 (47%)
Improved
13 (41%) (29%) 12 (25%) A Bit 31 (44%) 2 7 (41%)
About
Right Now 10 (31%) 26 (37%) 3 (43%) 15 (31%) 2 (12%)
There is clearly some dissatisfaction on this issue - about as much as
with Pay (Tab1eAG.8) - but more than on Job Security (Tab1eAs.14).
It can be seen that, as we might expect from our discssion, Hour1y-
Paid and Shop Stewards are looking for the greatest improvement -
nearly i say thattheir Working Conditions would have to be 'Very
Much Improved'. Even among Management, Staff and-Union Reps. there
is, however, a degree - though to a lesser extent than among Shop
Stewards - of dissatisfaction, as 41% of Management and 44%
of Staff say their Working Conditions would have to be improved
a bit.Basically, therefore, the results on Table~.22 are pretty much
- what we would have expected from the preceeding discussion. It is,
however,.perhaps a little surprising that so many should say
their Working Conditions are labout right nowl• Leaving the
union officials to one side, about 1/3 of each category say
thsi. This is particularly surporsing for Hourly-Paid. Why
should 31% of Hourly-Paid say their working conditions are
about right now? Aclue to this is given in ExcerptnS.42 from
a Shop Steward.
This respondent is apparently satisfied with his Working Conditions -
when asked this question directly he says they are livery good". Why
should he say this? There are a number of reasons. One important
reason is that if they find something wrong, the Management are usually
quite happy to resolve that and get something done about it". More
important, however, is the fact that the respondent in Excerptn6.42
predicates his view on present conditions and making them workable.
Others we have considered (e.g. ExcerptsA6.39 andA6.41) are predicated
on a future of improved conditions i.e.their view is based on
an alternative more desirable Working Conditions to be achieved in
the future. This ability to think on. the basis of alternative
possibilities to. the present are important for the development of an
alternative to hierarchy.
The ends are, however, less siginficant than the means•. For instance
in all cases improved conditions are perceived as something to be
negotiated - in other words Management will take the decision.
Even the critical stance of ExcerptAS.41 does not challenge hierarchical
principal. Only when the legitimate right.of Management to take
decisions is challenged - as in ExcerptA6.23 which concerned Job
Security and the need for an alternative product - is hierarchy subjectto challenge.
It may be, of course, that if those aspirations are frustrated
then there may be a 'feed-back' process (i.e. if Management
refuse to grant the Working Conditions Hourly Paid seek, then
Hourly-Paid may beging to question the legitimacy of the Management
role). We have little evidence of this happening.(3) Promotion
We saw on the first section of this Chapter, where we p.xnmincJ
the ordering of these items, that Promotion was of a widely
varying degree of importance. For Management it was fourth,
for Staff it was 6th, while for all other groups it was last.
The arithmetic averages tend to reinvofrce this - for
Management the average was 4.31, for Staff 5.7, for Union
Reps it was 7.57, for Hourly Paid 7.44 and for Shop Stewards
8.29. There is, however, variability within the groups, as
we discussed above e.g. the Standard Deviation among Staff is
7.94, and among Hourly-Paid it is 5.99. There is within these
2 groups, therefore, widely differing opinions on the importance
of Promotion, though ·the dominant opinion is that is is not
important - espeica11y among Hourly-Paid.
Among those groups where Promotion is not perceived to be
a significant aspiration, we may, therefore expect a high
degree of satisfaction since if expectations ar~ low they
are that much more easily satisfied. The following Tables
seem to confirm that view.
Tab1eG6.2t How satisfied are you with your Promotion Prospects
in relation to those of (other) Shop-Floor?
§hOp
Management Staff Union Reps. Hourly-paid tewards
Very
(19%) 8 (l1%) Satisfied 6 0 2 (4%) 0
Satisfied 20 (63%) 49 (69%) 5 (71%) . 35 (73%) 12 (71%)
Dissatisfied 4 (13%) 10 (14%) 1 (14%) 9 (l9%) 4 (24%)
Very
1 (1%) 1 (14%) Dissatisfied 0 2" (4%) 1 (6%)Tab1eA6.23 - How satisfied are you with your Promotion Prospects
in relation to those of (other) Staff?
~hOP Management Staff Union Reps Hourly-Paid tewards
Very
Satisfied 5 (16%) 5 (7%) 0 1 (2%) 0
Satisfied 22 (69%) 53 (75%) 5 (71%) 34 (71%) 13 (77%)
Dissatisfied 3 (9%) 11 (16%) 1 (14%) 10 (21%) 3 (18%)
Very
(14%) Dissatisfied 0 2 (3%) 1 3 (6%) 1 (6%)
Tab1eA6.24 - How satisfied are you with your Promotion Prospects in
relation to those of (other) Management?
~hOp
.Management Staff Union Reps Hourly-Paid tewards
Very
3 (9%) Satisfied 6 (9%) 0 1 (2%) 0
Satisfied 22 (69%) 52 (73%) 5 (71%) 34 (71%) 14 (8~%)
Dissatisfied 5 (16%) 11 (16%) 1 (14%) 9 (19%) 2 (1 Z%)
Very
(14%) . 4 (8%) Dissatisfied 0 2 (3%) 1 1 (6%)
(4) Management
Among Management, while there is a small pocket of dissatisfaction
(between 9 and 16%) Management do predominantly say they are
satisfied with their Promotion prospects. On what basis are
Managers judged when seeking Promotion? We discuss this with a
Director in Excerptq6.43.
For him Promotion is largely a.matter of development of the
individual employee - of identifying those who are already doing
well in what they do, and moving them on to another, higher level.Thus the criteria which he emphasies are (i) doing an outstanding
job already (ii) qualifications and eXPertence (iii) how he
fits in. These are probably fairly general criteria for promotion
in any organisation. There are, however, a number of problems
associatied with them in this organisation.
(1) What does 'doing an outstanding job already' mean? How
outstanding? How do you measure this? It is a matter of
personal judgement, which indeed the Respondent recognises.
There are, however, 2 affects of this (a) the subjective aspect
leads to the system of promotion being viewed as involving
favouratism (b) as we shall see among Staff &Hourly-Paid, there
is a feeling that if you do an outstanding job then you will not
be promoted since the Company would then have lost your skills
in that position.
(2) while qualifications and experience appear to be objective
criteria - 'has an HND and 10 years with the Company', that sort
of thing. There is however, a subjective element to it, in that
to do a particular job what qualification is n~~ded (e.g. an
ONC or an HND or a degree) and how much experience in what
particular areas, and how far can experience be substituted
by qualifications (or vice versa). In other words, if one suggests
that the promotion game is less than fair to all in it, this
subjective element may lead one to suspect that the requirements
for a job are adjusted as required to suit the successful candidate
i.e. first select the successful candidate, them look for the
criteria that will justify his promotion. That is perhaps more
cynical than the view held by Managers in the Company, but those
views which were critical of the promotion system did appear to
be in that direction. Managers, for instance, suggest that one
had no chance of a seat on the board without a Degree, and that
that was merely a device to benefit those who were favoured.
~~~As becomes evident in the Excerpt, all the existing board were
graduates, but it is the Director's rationale for this that first
of all any young manager (less than 30) ought to have a Degree
as there is no longer any bar to this other than ability. For
the older managers, he suggests, not having a degree is not an
automatic disqual ification, and if they are "doing a crac~.ing
good job
U then they will be rewarded. The attitude of certain
Managers towards this was extremely critical, and supported by
the composition of the existing Board.
(3) What does 'how will he fit in' mean? We raise this with
the Respondent when we discuss 'social bars to promotion? In
this section his argument rests on the possession of certain
skills being necessary in certain senior positions (e.g. not
eating all one's food with a spoon, if one has to mix with
top-level people in maRing sales). It is, however, not a
problem if these social skills are not necessary to do the job.
Managers also took a critical view of this criterion. This-
and to some extent the preceding problem of qualifications - is
taken up in ExcerptA6.44 from a senior Manager. The board was
clearly largely made up of the 'older type of manager' referred
to in this Excerpt. Thus the Promotion system is employed to
maintain the dominance of a certain type of Manager on the
Board of Directors, tn his vtew-. '
As we have seen previously in this Chapter, and in earlier
Chapters, the board of directors were not alw~vs fully informed
about what was happening in the Company. Their senior Managers
suggested this was because they did not want to be involved in
'nitty-gritty', failing to appreciate that this ,'nitty-gritty'
adds up to the 'big picture' they are interested in. This ledManagers to maintain the board's collective fantasy, by telling
them wha~ they wanted to hear- and avoid telling them what they
didn't want to hear. In return they anticipate 'reward' - in
terms of promotion as a reward there was a feeling that the
stated criteria were manipulated to sustain the dominance of
the type of Manager and consequently frustrate their ambitions
e.g. that the requirement to have a Degree (which did have currency
among Managers, whether accurate or not), was simply being used as
a device to keep them off the board. Similarly the criterion
of having to 'fitr in would be used to secure the same ends.
Two final points are necessary in the section
i) Management are, on the whole, satisfied with their promotion
prospects. What we have done here is to analyse the ways in
which the promotion system could be manipulated - and was
manipulated in the views of Management below board level. The
major conclusion is, however, of their awareness and understanding
of this manipulation - not that it has led:to dissatisfaction,
when quite clearly it has not
ii) As we shall see, similar complaints are made by Staff, and to
a lesser extent by Hourly-Paid.
I b) Staff &'Union Reps
Table~S.22 toOS.24 show that among Staff there is a comparable
level of satisfaction to that of Management - though perhaps
marginally lower. Their,Union Reps do express a lower degree of
satisfaction, but again as with Staff generally there is an apparentsatisfaction with Promotion prospects. Once again~ however~
we do have to take into account their expectations in assessing
their level of satisfaction. Excerp~6.45 is indicative of
this.
We discussed above 3 promotion criteria - how well the candidate
is doing his existing job/qualifcation and experience/fitting in.
The first two of these are flatly contradicted by this Staff
respondent. The first one, he suggests, is not applied - indeed
the reverse is true, if you do a job well you stay· in, because as
he points out later, they don't want to lose you. The second
is contradicted because while his health qualifcations were the
justification for turning him down for promotion (he is a diabetic)
he claims to know of 2 others working in the same area, both of
whom are in even worse health.
Thus for this repondent it is not a matter of understanding
the promotion system. His difficulty - and the cause of his
resentment - is that he does understand it, and perceives
it as a game which is less than fair - played with a loaded dice,
or marked cards~ or whatever. In other words he sees it as
a process which systematically favours some and acts to the detriment
of others, including himself.
This concept of promotion as being like a gam~~ but a systematically
unfair one is repeated in ExcerptA6.46~again from a Staff respondent.
Promotion, he says, is not for him, because of his age, so he
would appear to be a disinterested ~pect~tor. For him promotion
is largely a question of, as he puts it "shifting job titles and bodiesand shuffling them round
ll
, and as a means to achieve some other
end e.g. there had recently been a member of promotions on
to the board, and the respondent suggests that this wasonly
to give these Managers other jobs to do (Another explanation
was that it was a means round incomes policy). Clearly
for this respondent, promotion lacks the objective qualities
attributed to it by the Director quoted at the beginning of this
dicussion. The more we look, therefore, the less it appears
that the views expressed by him are supported by other Managers
or Staff. FOr them it appears to be about something else. Most
importantly, from the point of view of those hoping to be promoted
it does not appear to be concerned with personal development.
Clearly for Staff, where there is dissattsfaction) the s~stem is
perceived as not working as it should.. Not in the sense that it
only works properly if one is promoted, but in the more general
sense that the criteria of an objective promotion system do not
appear to be working - indeed the criteria set out by the Director
do not appear to be used, having been contradicted by the
experiences set out in the above Excerpts.'
We have, it should be re-called , observed this before. In Excerpt
A).~5 a Staff respondent describes the selection system as lIarbitary",
which in many respects summarises the criticisms which Staff have
made of it. The problem with promotion for disaffected Staff is
that they see the whole system of promotion as loaded against ,them.
It is not simply that the rules appear to be variable - but that
the rules operate to the benefit of some and against others
(e.g. in favour of those with a degree and against those who have
not) to achieve some objective which they do not percieve as
9.:30legitimate (e.g. to maintain the dominance of the 'old type of
manager')
Again, however, it is important to appreciate that the majority
of Staff said they were satisfied with their Promotion Prospects.
ExcerptA6.47 illustrates the view of one member of Staff who
appears satisfied with his promotion prospects.
This repondent clearly does not see promotiion as in any way
guaranteed, but it is clear that his view of the system of promotion
is very similar to that of the Director, since he states at the end,
that he belives his chance of promotion depends on (i) his
performance in his existing job (ii) his length of service and his
qualifcations - in other words he follows the first 2 criteria
laid down by the Director for determining promotion. Those whom
we have seen to be dissatisfied however, have always found their
view on attitudes or experience which contradict one or more of
the Directors 3 criteria.
The satisfaction of the repondent in ExcerptR6.47 would, therefore,
seem to originate in him sharing the same perception as the
Director. The dissatisfaction of other respondents on the
other hand originates in their view of the system being different.
In particular that the rules either are not what they are formally
supposed to be - the need to be doing one's job well is seen as
'a kiss of death' as it is believed to keep one in that job. Or
that the rules serve some other objective e.g. using qualifications
to keep certain people off the board. In particular there appears
to be criticism based on the rules being flexible - the respondent
in Excerpt~6.46 spoke of it being like 'electing a Pope' in that
the successful candidate just appeared, which was beyond theunderstanding of other Staff. This gave rise to the feeling
that the procedure was, in effect a 'Right of Passage' for the
successful candidate who had been, more or less, pre-selected,
to give it some form of rationalisation. Precisely how or why
things happened like this they were not very sure. They, were
however, sure that this was a procedure they could not control,
and which was not perceived as fair and equal for all.
1) Hourly-Paid &Shop Stewards
It is apparent from tablesA6.22 andA6.24 that there is rather
more dissatisfaction among the Hourly-Paid than among Staff - about
1/4 of Hourly-Paid are dissatisified/very dissatisfied, compared
to less than 1/5 of Staff. There is, therefore, slightly more
dissatisfcation among Hourly-Paid, but once again we have to
appreciate that the great majority say they are satisfied - over
70% on any comparison.
Where dissatisfaction was expressed the reasons tended ·to be
very similar to those given by Staff. Monitored particularly
frequently was a denial of the view that doing ajob well led to
promotion. One Shop Steward echoed almost word for word the
view of the Staff respondent in ExcerptA6.45. This Shop Steward
had worked on the same machine for 10 years, and during that time
had applied for 3 Staff jobs. He was unsuccessful each time,
because, he claimed, he was too good at the job he was doing.
Even amongst those whose expressed attitude is satisfaction, the
reasoning is not entirely positive, since many of those who saidthey were satisfied with their Promotion Prospects had in effect
opted out. This could be seen by the number of respondents who
when asked about their Promotion Prospects said "well, live not
got any" , and declaring themselves to be satisfied. Promotion
was simply not objective for many Hourly-Paid workers. The reason
why can be seen in ExcerptA6.48 from an Hourly-Paid respondent.
This respondent worked in agroup of about 2 dozen highly skilled
workers. The only viable prospect of promotion for him - and
his fellow workers - is for their foreman to 1eave and in his view
that seems unlikely. This may appear to be rather restricted, but
in fact in this Excerpt he mentions the 2 main forms of promotion
for an Hourly-Paid worker - to become a Foreman, or got into the
drawing office. in both cases the chances of either were rated
as fairly slim since there were relativelyfew openings for the
former, and competition from better qualified people for the
latter. Thus, given the absence of a serious prospect of promotion
they opt out, and, as he puts it at the end, "just accept it"•
So for many Hourly-Paid who say they are satisfied with their
Promotion Prospects it is because they believe they have none.
This orientation was not, however, much in evidence other than
among the Hourly-Paid.
We have seen, so far that the promotion system discussed with the
Director in Excerpt46.43 is perceived by Management, Staff and
Hourly-Paid to be a fiction - that doing well can be a bar to
promotion, that having a degree is really a question of Ifitting in l •
The system is not perceived as fair. Among Management and Staff
this has led to resentment. Among Hourly-Paid the response has
been to simply opt out. For this group promotion is simply notan objectiv~, though there are those Hourly Paid for whom it is
an ambition and for them there is resentment as for Staff and
Managers. The distinction between Hourly-Paid and the other
groups is that for them there are relatively few avenues to
promotion - becoming a foreman or a draughtsman are the 2 main
ones. Indeed in certain Staff areas these are limited promotion
prospects (Groups for whom this would be true would be typists,
and people in data prep in the computing dept., whic~ could
explain the large standard deviation among Staff in Tabl~6.2).
Otherwise resentment was an important reaction to the promotion
system. This is reflected in TableA6.25, which shows the
results of the question IHow much would your Promotion Prospects
have to be improved to make your job ideal
l ?
Tabl~6.25 - "How much would your Promotion Prospects have to be
improved to made your job ideal?
Shop
Management Staff Union Reps. Hourly-Paid .Stewards
Very Much
10 (14%) (29%) 7 (15%) Improved 0 2 4 (24%)
Improved
15 (47%) 22 (31%) (29%) 12 (25%) 1 (6%) a Bit 2
About
Right Now 17 (53%) 39 (55%) 3 (43%) 29 (60%) 12 (71%)
~
It is true that for the majority in each category, excerpt Staff
Unions Reps, Promotion Prospects are about right. It does,
however, have to be observed that these figures do show high
proportions who suggest that their Promotion Prospects would
have to be improved. The implication of this Table would appe~r
to be therefore, that while there is a high degree of satisfaction,there is a high degree of ~issasatisfaction which.is nearly as
great. This discussion has revealed at least some of the reasons
behind that dissatisfaction.
6) Trade'Union'Organisation&'Attivity
The questions we posed so far have all concerned satisfaction with
particular areas of employment (e.g. 'how satisfied are you with
your wages/salary compared to shop-floor workers?) Since all of
the Management, and about 20% of Staff were not union members it
did not seem to make much sense to ask questions about the trade
unions in this way i.e. to ask somebody who is not a union member
whether they are satisfied with their trade union. It became
apparent at an early stage in our field-work that the primary
function of the track union was perceived to be the protection of
members against inequitable treatment. For instance when staff
first began to become unionised in the late 1960s much of their
motivation had been to protect themselves from losing what they
saw as their justified differential relative to Hourly-Paid wor~ers.
Consequently questions in this section will be around the issue of
protection, viz Do you feel you need the protection of a union
more/about the same/less than Hour1y-Paid/Staff/Management? The
following talks give the results of these questions.
Tab1eA6.26 - "00 you feel you need the protection of a onion morel
about the same/less than (other) Hour1y-Paid?"
Management Staff Union'Reps.
Shop
'Hourly-Paid .Stewards
More 1 (3%) 9 (13%) 1 (14%) 9 (19%) 3 (18%)
About the
2 (6%) 38 (54%) (86%) Same 6 36 (75%) 13 (77%)
Less 28 (88%) 24 (34%) 0 3 (6%) 1 (6%)
~~5l
TableA6~27 - "00 you feel you need the protection of a union more/about
the same/less than (other) Staff?"
'Management" 'Staff 'Union'Reps Hourly';'Paid
Shop
Stewards
More a 4 (6%) a 22 (46%) 4 (24%)
About the
Same 2 (6%) 57 (80%) 7 (100%) 24 (50%) 13 (77%)
Less 29 (91%) 10 (14%) a 2 (4%) a
TabletJi.28 - "00 you feel you need the protection of a union more/about
the same/less than (other) Management?"
Shop
Management Staff 'Union Reps Hourly-Paid Stewards
More a 30 (42%) 4 (57%) 32 (67%) 11 (65%)
About the
15 (31%) Same 20 (63%) 33 (47%) 3 (43%) 5 (29%)
Less 11 (34%) 8 (11%) a "1 (2%) 1 (6%)
(a) Management. It is clear from the first 2 tables dealing with
Hourly-Paid, and Staff that Management see themselves as not
requiring the protection of a track union - 88% say they need
protection of a union less than the Hourly-Paid do, and 91% say
they need the protection of a union less than Staff. The protection
of a trade union was not something which Management felt they
needed. This raises the question of why they felt this.
We approached this by asking why they were not union members. The
answers are shown in the following table:TableA6.29 - Why are you not a member of a trade union?
...
..Number .,Percentage
1) Could not be bothered 2 6%
2} See no need to join 14 44%
3} Have never been approached 1 3%
4} No union available 2 6%
5} Not applicable for a Manager 3 '9%
6} Not representative of Managers 5 16%
7} Political objection 3 9%
8} Do not trust unions 1 3%
9} No response 1 3%
Some 8 reasons are given, but nearly half (44%) are because the
manager could see no need, and indeed the first 5 which between
them are 68% of the reasons are not 'negative toward trade unions.
Only in the last 3 is there a positive objection to trade
unionism (political/not representative/do not trust unions). It
would not, therefore, be wholly true to say that managers objected
to trade unionism - rather they saw it as unnecessary for them. In
par~icular, as we have seen already, management felt they should
be able to look after themselves as individuals without having to rely
on collective strength. We have shown that in relation to wage
negotiations, management felt thet their salaries ought to reflect
their worth to the company and that if they disagreed with that
assessment, the only path open was to leave. Their attitude on
trade unions is logically related to this.
This, however, was perceived as not necessarily holding good in
every single case into the future. Some managers - especiallythe younger ones - expressed the view that at some point in the
future Management might have to get unionised. This view is
shown in ExcerptAS.49.
The trend within the Company is cert.ainlyin this direction. since
during our field-work Senior Staff in Finance joined ASTMS. having
been non-union previously. Breaking into Management would. however.
be a significant development for unionisation in this Company.
Thus Management not being in a trade union reflects more a
perception that their existing means of dealing with the Company is
satisfactory. rather than political objection.
The two other issues also emerged in our discussion with Managers
about trade unions.
a) the perception by Managers of the ultimate identity of interest
between the company and the trade union.
b) the role of trade unionism in their daily activity
The general issue of trade unionism in ,this company is discussed
with a senior manager in ExcerptAG.50. The opening statement by the
respondent could even have come from a Shop Steward - Ito represent
the interests of their memebers
l
• The following development does.
however. point to a rather different image of trade unionism than we
shall find among Hourly-Paid workers. as for this respondent there
is no conflict between the interests of the employers (as union
memebers) and the interests of the Ccmpany. It is clear that for
this respondent the interests are s~monymous since if the company
ceased to exist there would be no jobs and the issue of relative interestswould be of no consequence.
There are, therefore, important points to observe in this excerpt,
in particular that (i) the r.ole of the union is unambiguously ,to
represent the interests of its members (i'i) that the interests of
Company and union members are synonymous. Consequently any
disagreements are around what is in the best interests of all.
[This evokes echoes of Alan Fox's discussion of 'high trust' jobs
in 'Beyond Contact' in which negotiation on the basis of differing
interests is rul~d out, and instead any difference ,is a matter for
mutual problem-solving. For this Senior Manager it is clear that
Company Union relations are high, trust in this sense]
At a more day-to-day level the same issue is discussed with another
manager in ExcerptR6.51. This manager had come into the company
as a draughtsman, and over the years had been promoted to his
present position, managing his own department. Consequently his
background was a union background. . "ore important
than that however, is that for him dealing with a
union means dealing with a collectivity, rather than a collection
on individuals. Once again the issue of identity of interest is
raised. For him 'good union people' work for the 'good of their,
numbers of the good of us all - me and their members', the
'idiotunion people' can be shown up. Clearly the distinction
between 'good' and' idiot union people' is to some extent a
matter of judgement. The important point in this Excerpt is
that for this Manager trade unionism is a positively accepted
(indeed wanted) part of his daily work.
A similar point is made by a Director in ExcerptA6.52. It isclear from this that the unions are quite positively part of the
Company for this respondent as their role in representi.ng
their members is not only seen as legitimate. but also as
necessary. To this extent, therefore, the views expressed here
are similar to those expressed in ExcerptA6.5l. His view does
become rather more critical in the second half of the Excerpt.
It is, however, interesting to observe that his criticism is
still consistent with what we found in ExcerptA6.5l, since
there one of the union roles was to make the Management role
easier. Essentially the criticism expressed in ExcerptA6.52
is that because of the out-of-date union structure (as he sees
it) which has led to a proliferation of unions in this Company,
the Management role is made rather more difficult, rather than
easier as it would be with say.4 unions rather than the 12 they
have to deal with.
It i~, however, clear that Management in this Company have come
to terms with trade unionism, regarding it as 'necessary and
legitimate' ~6.52), rather than being overtly hostile toward it.
Trade unions appear, therefore, to be an accepted part of the
landscape for Management in this Company - indeed positively
accepted. The reasoning behind this - its cognitive foundation -
is that the interests of the Company and of the unions are
I
snonymous. This point is well made in Excerp~6.50.
The two issues, of identity of interest, and the role of the union
in the Ccrnpany, while being con~eptually distinct are as we have
seen cognitively linked for management since the former is the
basis of the latter. In terms of long term strategy this
~40cognitive link is interesting. The development of ·company
unions· has been noted by, for instance W" . Brown, in that
Union members and officials, it is argued; now owe more loyalty
to fellow employees and Company than to other members of their
union employed by other companies. It is argued that this
development goes back at least as far as the 1960·s when Joint
Shop Stewards Committees became more common. This perceived
identity of interest between the Company union and the Company
is clearly a similar development. Whether one is caused of
the other (i.e. does management perception of identity of intenest
cause them to foster 'a company union·, or does the development
of a ·company union· lead to a perceived identity of interest)
is not a matter we can take on here as we simply do not have the
data. It is clear, however, that (i) the two processes do have
much in common, and (ii) the perception of trade unions as
'legitimate and necessary· with identical interests does give
Management a motivation to try to draw the unions within Company
more closely into the Company - in short to attempt to create a
company union.
It is important to note, however, that this positive acceptance
of trade unionism by the Management has not always existed. During
the late 1960·s, when Staff first became unionised in the Company,
the Management response was one of considerable hostility. Acceptance
has, therefore, taken time.
One final point to be observed about Management attitude towards
trade unionism. On the one hand Management have, as we have
seen~ placed some emphasis on their oWn individuality. In
MIdiscussing trade unionism for their subordinates it ,is conformity
which is emphasised. This sur.ely re-makes the point shown in the
Tables at the beginning of this section'i.e. that trade unionism
was something reqquired by other groups - but quite definately
was not a Management requirement.
(b) Staff and Union Reps
This group have much more variation in their responses to this
question than did Management. It would seem from Tables46.26
teA6.28 that Staff believe they have more need than Management
to be in a union, but less need Hourly-Paid. The distribution
of responses does, however, vary between ,departments. For instance
in those areas closest to Hourly-Paid the proportion who think they
have more need of union protection than Hourly-Paid is greatest.
Thus, 40% Foremen, 27% of Works Staff and 22% of Production
Control, say they have more need of union protection than Hourly-Paid.
On the other hand, nobody in Quality Control, 5% of Sales Staff,
\
and 11% of Finance Staff say they have more need of union protection
than Hourly-Paid. In relation to Management, however, there is
muc~ more similarity as most depts. vary by a maximum of 7% from
the overall staff average of 42% who said they reached more union
protection than Management. The only exception to this is Works
Staff as only 9% of them say they need more union protection than
Management.
Thus the perceived need for union protection is greater than
among Managers (as we would have expected given 80% unionisation
of Staff) but less than Hourly-Paid (which 'again we may have
expected given the role played by hierarchy). It is, howeverinteresting to observe that there .is a variation among Staff,
and that the greatest perceived need for union protection is
amongst those Staff groups physically closest to Hourly-Paid.
As we shall see this proximity to Hourly-Paid is important in
understanding the development of unionism amongst Staff (e.g. why
Finance were among the last group of Staff to become unionised).
We do, however, have to consider 2 groups of Staff - those who
have not joined a union, and those who have. We shall deal with
the former first.
In fact, in our sample there were 14 of 71 Staff respondents who
were not union members. They were asked why they had not joined
a union. Their responses are given in the following Table.
Table66.30 - Why Are You Not AMember of a Trade Union
Could not be bothered
See no need
Not appropriate
Political objection
Other
Total
Number
2
8
1
2
14
This, in many respec~s, echoes the earlier Table on Management
reasons for not joining a Trade Union. In particular it is
clear here that the motivation for not being a union member is
not fundamentally political. It is, rather, one might say
pragmatic in that rather than being motiviated not to join. they
perceive no motivation to join a trade union. i.e. there is nol
particular obstacle. but neither is there any particular need to
be a union member.
Any need to be a union member appears to be dissolved by 2
factors. as we shall show. (i) a belief in their ability to
protect themselves as individuals (ii) that any difficulties can
be resolved by using the purely internal Staff Association.
The former point is succintly put by the respondent in Excerptn
6.53. For this Staff respondent he does not need to become a
union member because of his own perceived worth i.e. that given
his qualification. ability and experience etc his position with
respect to the Company is. as he puts it 'reasonably secure'. Thus
given the power which his pettor-al qualities. he feels. creates he
does not require the power of a trade union behind him.
This point is made in a rather more detailed way by the respondent
in ExcerptA6.54. Toward the end of this Excerpt we see much the same
reasoning as in Excerpt~6.53 i.e. that.given his work performance and
abilities he has not required to have a union behind him. There is.
however, another dimension to the reasoning in ExcerptA6.54.
The additional reasoning concerns the nature of trade unionism.
About half-way through this Excerpt we discuss with the respondent
his reaction to being forced to join a trade union. His response to
this is to say that he would not object as long as "they're clean
cut •.•• moderate.~ At the end of the Excerpt we reach another
aspect of this argument which is rather more negative toward trade
unions. fn the last 3 sentences the role of the indtvidua1 is
emphasised, and it ts clear also that for this respondent that one'ssalaryjwages ought to be a reflection of one's worth to the company
These two things are quite antithetical to trade union membership
which philosophically depends on acceptance of collectivisms and the
collective negotiation of wages and conditions - or as the respondent
puts it lithe thing about being in a union ••• is that there must
be levelling."
Consequently despite his view that whether or not he would join a
trade union would depend on "w hat kind of union", we would suggest
that other elements of his thinking are logically inconsistent with
trade union membership.in that there are severe difficulties in re-
conciling individualisnfand collectivism. ExcerptA6.54 therefore is
an important illustration of non-membership of trade unions.
The role of the individual is emphasised again' in ExcerptA6.55, but
this time in a way rather more overly hostile toward trade unionism,
and in particular the closed shop. The objection to the closed
shop is basically that expressed previously in ExcerptA6.54 - the
problem of 'levelling', though in Excerpt~6.55 the argument is in
terms of "he's got to become a sheep and join in". It becomes clear
during our discussion with this respondent that his objection is not
fundamentally to the political persuasion of any trade union. His
objection is to individuals being refused the choice of trade union
membership, since in a closed shop membership is obligatory.
Thus once again ~he individualism is apparent, since in this
respondent's view the objection to the closed shop is that individual
choice is removed thus, in his view, reducing everyone to lithe
mental ity of a sheep".Thus the objection to trade union membership .is no~•.as we have seen
fundamentally because of the political stance of trade unions. The
objection appeats to be due to the philosophical conflict of
collectivism and the indiv1~~~'1sm and free choice whtch'tthey
prize. Political objections may be a consequence of this
philosophical conflict i~e. I as an individual may not choose to
become a member of a trade union becau5e I think the leadership
is too left wing. It does have to be understoo~. however. that
in the perception of our respondents that would be a consequence of
their individualistic philosophy.
The second relevant factor we referred to was the Company Staff
Association. This body had existed in the Company for some time
but as Staff had become progressively unionised over a perdiod of
10-15 years (from the late 1960's early 1980's) it had become too
small to play what Management regarded as a worthwhile role in the
Company and had been formally disbanded. though informally what was
in effect 'a rump' were consulted by Management as 'non-aligned
staff'. The role of the Staff Association as discussed with a
leading member of the Staff Association in ExcerptA6.56.
The 2 factors we have discussed up to now - belief in individual
ability. and resolution of problems through the Staff Association -
are both apparent in this Excerpt. In the second half of the
Excerpt. the question of his ability and contribution to the
Company is raised as justification for his salary. and tncreases in
salary. It is quite clear from this that it is the respondents
view that his salary is a reflection of his own merits - or as he
puts it limy salary level is perhaps more determined by qualification.
experience and scarcit¥ value". For him. therefor~. his income isis not a matter of collective strength but of individual ability
and merit.
We also discuss with this respondent the role of the Staff
Association t and we shall return to that directly. At this point
we shall consider another issue arising from ExcerptA5.56 - the
Closed Shop. This issue arises in 2 parts of this Excerpt. It
arises firstly toward the beginning of the Excerpt. At this stage
there are 2 objectives for this respondent - i) the lack of
flexibility which it creates t in that wage increases etc are
'across the board' rather than being a reflection of merit t
ii) the loss of self determination t in that employees would be
obliged to join a union in a closed shop rather than being able to
freely chose (a point graphically made in ExcerptA6.55). At the
end of the Excerpt this issue arises again t this time in the context
of the respondent being obliged to join a trade union because of a
closed shop agreement. It is clear from this that his views on trade
unions are not as negative that they would out-weigh his joining a
trade union to protect the standard of living of his wife and family.
This point is reinforced at the very end of the Excerpt where he
ind)cates that he would join a trade union - even without the
compulsion of a Union Membership Agreement - if he felt his salary
etc was falling behind those to whom he compares himself. As we
shall see it is precisely this view which has led Staff into trade
unions already.
The other issue raised in this Excerpt is the role of the Staff
Association. The views expressed here are hardly surprising t given
the prominent role played by the respondent in the Staff Association.What is interesting is to consider his views on its role in relation
to the views of Staff union members on the role of their trade union.
His justification of the Staff Association is on 2 grounds - a)
flexibility - this really goes back to the issue of wages/salaries
reflecting individual differences of merit, which we have already
discussed. This, he argues, is lost when trade unionism enters in,
with lacross the board' wages increases, b) his second argument is
that the Staff trade unions do nothing which the Staff Association
did not already do, in the way of 'ironing out any prob1ems ' •
Given this, the awareness of 'externa1 pressurel is perceived as not
being worth the cost. We discuss this with the respondent at the
beginning of the Excerpt and he makes clear there his concern about
being drawn into disputes between the Company and other groups in the
Company (eg the Company and Foremen), and the pressure exercised
from without to follow national union policy. As we shall see
shortly, this latter concern is also shared by Staff union members.
Before going on to this, however, we wish to re-emphasise that this
non-union group are not trade union members for reasons which are not
entirely based on 'deep1y-he1d personal conviction' , though they are
closest to this in arguing against the closed shop on grounds of
freedom of choice. Their perception is, however, to a large extent
pragmatic,. for instance most clearly when the respondent in ExcerptA
6.56 argues that the unions do little which the Staff Association did
not do in the past, and that bringing in the trade unions was at the
expense of losing flexibility.
The unionised group is, as we have pointed out, by far the largest -
about 80% of Staff are union members. Why has the majority group
become union members? One straight-forward reason is given in
ExcerptA6.57.This is very much the typical image of trade unionism in popular
culture - that one must be organised with one's fellow workers to be
able to resist the Management which is itself organisedt ie in order
that Staff can be organised to face organised Management. This
clearly involves a relationship much more strongly based on actions
of conflict than we have seen amongst Management and Staff so far.
In this view the role of trade unionism is to raise the chances of
success on the (innevitable?) conflict with Management. Previously
the emphasis has been on 'ironing out any problems'. We shall
return to this point shortly.'
Asimilart but more detailed justification is given by the respondent
in Excerpt~.58t who is now a clerk with Staff statust but previously
had worked on the shop-floor.
In certain respects this is almost the 'mirror image' of Excerpt A
6.56t as his opening discussion of 'you're getting 5/- but don't tell
anybody' is part of the flexibility of the respondent in Excerpt~.56.
For the respondent in ExcerptA6.58 howevert a group of individuals is
not viable to resist management - it is only through collective means
that Staff can get justice from Management~ It is this type of view
which is reflected in TablesA6.26 -AG.28t as they show quite clearly
that Staff perceive themselves to be in more need of union protection
than do the Management. Some 42% feel they need the protection of a
union more than Managementt while 47% feel they have the same need.
This contrasts when the comparison is to Stafft as 80% say have the
same need as other Staff of union protection. This group has clearly
more or less divided in two when the comparison is to Management.Staff, who have joined trade unions have done so partly because of the
disadvantage they perceive themselves to be at in their individual
relationship to Management. The attitude we have considered up to
now is based on the view that the relationship of Staff and Management
cannot be carried on any longer on an individual basis. This,
however, is by no means the whole story, as is clearly shown in
ExcerptA6.59.
This is a discussion with a Staff Union Representative. The initial
discussion dwells largely on the issue we have already discussed,
ie the Staff relationship with Management, which he discusses in the
context of the level of premium payments and time-off for working on
public holidays. Another crucial issue enters in, however, toward
the end of the first half of this Excerpt, when the respondent makes
clear his unhappiness at the hourly-paid AUEW convenor wishing to be
present at every meeting of TASS (then a section of the AUEW),
because he represents "different areas altogether". In what
follows we can see quite clearly the fears of Staff being over-taken
by Hourly-Paid in terms of pay and conditions. This, however goes
much deeper than the issue of differential conditions between Staff
and Hourly-Paid. The issue of the differences in conditions was
extremely complex once each group held the other to have an
advantage (eg in ExcerptA6.59 the Staff respondent suggests that
Hourly-Paid have .got ahead in holidays - as we have seen already,
.Hourly-Paid feel at a disadvantage on sick pay etc). Since each
group has different conditions, which one is ahead depends on how
their separate conditions are weighed up against each other. The
major difficulty, though is that the two groups have fundamentallydifferent perceptions. This is shown very clearly in Excerpt 6.59
in discussing votes on when a holiday should be taken. For the
Staff respondent the votes of each group for each alternative should
have been added together, to establish which was more attractive to
both groups collectively, eg if for Athere were 50 votes and for B
35 votes among Staff, and 40 and 50 respectively among Hourly-Paid,
then alternative Awould have been chosen. Hourly-Paid unions,
however, preferred to use the 'block-vote' method, which meant that
since they voted for Bby 40 to 50, then all their 90 votes would go
for B, while all the Staff's 85 votes would go for A.
There are well-rehearsed arguments to be made for either method, but
2 important points have to be noted from this -
a) each group - Staff and Hourly-Paid - have adopted perceptual
positions which fundamentally differ, but where each can be given a
justification
b) we have to be aware that in the Works area Staff are out-numbered
by Hourly-Paid. Thus, using the 'block vote"Staff will always be
outvoted - only by bringing both groups together can Staff reasonably
expect their chosen alternative to succeed.
It could be argued that these 2 points are not un-related, ie that
staff and Hourly-Paid hold their views on voting because of the
power it potentially creates for them. The inference is clearly
there, but we have no direct proof of this.
Thus, for Staff, unionisation is a solution to the problem they
perceive of the erosion of their advantage in conditions by manual
workers and their trade unions. The solution to this problem (at
least for 80% of Staff) has been to join a trade union and tonegotiate as a collective body with Managementt rather than as
individuals.
Two general points have been implicit in our discussion so fart
which have to be emphasised.
1) There is a distinction to be drawn between non-union Staff and
unionised Stafft which is very similar to the distinctions drawn by
Allan Fox in 'Beyond Contract'. There he discusses the
distinction between high and low trust relations. One of the
elements of these 2 types of relationships is the approach to
differences between the parties. In a high trust relationship a
difference is a mutual problem to be solved by the partiest but in
a low trust relationship it is a matter to be negotiated by the
parties. The former is clearly the position of the non-union Staff
- see for instance Excerpt 6.56 where the respondent refers to
'ironing out any problems'. The Staff Union Rep's position in
ExcerptA6.59 is much more one of negotiation as a means of resolving
problems t and consequently he is much closer to a low trust
relationshipt in Fox's terms.
2) Despite the fact 80% of Staff are members of national unions t
their orientation was remarkably internalised to the Company.
This point is made very clearly in Excerpt 6.60. His membership of
the union is not in doubtt since forhim it is primarily for
protection of his job security. Equally it is very clear that any
thing outwith the company is irrelevant to this Staff respondent.
The union - in this case TASS - is relevant only for what it does
within the company. Indeed it almost appears that for this
respondent the national union is almost a nuisance t and thatprocedurally the Staff Association would have done almost as good a
job as the national union. Equally it is clear that Staff have left
the Staff Association for membership of trade unions. It may be
that the decline of trust between Staff and Management indicated in
the differences in approach to resolution of problems, which we
discussed above, may have been partly responsible for the demise of
the Staff Association. It is, however, interesting that the
emphasis on the internal working of the trade union which we have
found amond Staff, does have an echo with Hourly-Paid, as we shall
see.
Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards
Trade unionism, is, of course, more deeply rooted among Hourly-Paid
workers. Indeed it is among the highly skilled type of manual
worker employed by the Company that trade unionism, in the form we
know it today, began, eg engineers. The deep-seatedness of their
trade unionism was very well exemplified in an informal conversation
with a convenor of a manual union in the Company. We were
discussing the (then) increasing unionisation of Staff employees.
During the conversation the Respondent said
"I don't know how these people in the Staff can bear to work beside
non-union people."
To avoid any misunderstanding of this statement, it is important to
appreciate that the respondent was not making a 'political' statement.
He was not, for instance, saying that Staff ought not to work beside
non-union people - though he may have believed that. The point he
was making was that, given his perception, he really could not
understand - he was genuinely bewildered - that anyone could work
253beside somebody else who was not in the union movement.
More specifically. however. besides the aspect of tradition referred
to. why do Hourly-Paid become trade union members? One reason is
that there is a closed shop in force among Hourly-Paid workers.
While it is a post-entry shop it is still the case that to be
employed as an Hourly-Paid worker. one mu~t be a member of the
appropriate union - AUEW. Boilermakers (as was). EEPTU. UCATT etc.
On an individual level. however. why do they become union members.
What does the individual member of the union see in union
membership? This is discussed with an Hourly-Paid respondent in
ExcerptA6.6l.
For this respondent being a union member is a matter of. as he puts
it. 'protection' against management in order to maintain and improve
his working conditions. wages etc. For him. being in a collective
group is more of an advantage in dealing with management than trying
to negotiate individually. This notion of collectivism runs
through this Excerpt from start to finish. and it is quite clear that
for this respondent the collective. and the protection which it gives
to the individual. is much more salient than the concept of
individual merit and worth which were emphasised by Staff. The need
for individual protection - rather than the need to promote individual
advancement - is clearly more significant for Hourly-Paid. which is
consistent with our observations about promotion. Generalising
somewhat. the orientation of Hourly-Paid to the future is more
collectively ~Qfensive than we find among Staff. while the orientation
to the future among Staff is more individually proactive than is true
~54of Hourly-Paid.
Hourly-Paid, therefore, appear to be ready to submerge the interests
of the individual, in favour of collective security.
The process by which the union protects its members is discussed
with a Shop Steward in ExcerptA6.62. The notion of protection is
widened in this Excerpt, as it is clear from the outset that for
this Shop Steward the union is more than a fire service, ie that the
union does more than simply take up difficulties which have arisen,
but that they also take up a positive attitude on how things ought
to be within the Company. This is discussed within the context of
health and safety. Since the Health and Safety at Work Act came
into force, the law has sought to emphasise that health and safety
hazards ought to be identified in advance. The Shop Steward
suggests in this Excerpt that lithe workers are getting very
interested and very serious about the safety situation". There is,
therefore, a sense of becoming proactive - which, we said above, is
more true of Staff. It does, however, have to be observed that this
increasing interest in safety among Hourly-Paid workers, is clearly in
a collective, and not an individual, context.
The work of the unions within the Company is, therefore, two-fold.
Firstly to deal with difficulties and problems as they arise, but
also to participate in the policy-making of the Company with the
objective of enhancing the working lives of their members.
This latter point is extremely important, but it is crucial not to
read too much into what.the Shop Steward is saying here. He
identifies at the end of the Excerpt that Managements authority hashas been eroded, but this situation is much too complex to be dealt
with by saying that management are powerless, and unions and workers
are powerful. What we are discussing here are significant, but
nonetheless small changes in the structure of power.
As we observed in the previous Chapter, there is a desire among
Hourly-Paid workers to exercise more influence on policy-making in
the Company. It was, however, quite clear that there was no
significant desire to replace managerial authority, ie while Hourly-
Paid to exercise more influence on policy, making policy was
perceived to be a function which ought to be performed by Management.
This comes out again in ExcerptA6.63, again with a Shop Steward.
In this we discuss the difficulties there would be in getting union
members to take industrial action over company policy. It is quite
clear for the respondent that this would be much more difficult than
getting them to come out for a wage rise, because "that's (the wage
rise) there in front of their faces and it's easily arguable."
Indeed, he suggests later on, to get Shop Stewards to try to take
action of policy-making at board level, because as this Shop Steward
points out, what happens at the level of the-Company board is beyond
the limits of their knowledgeability, as we saw in Chapter 5. Only
if the issue is clearly and directly going to affect them (eg a wage
rise or a redundancy) is there sufficient understanding to support
action. Their proactiveness is, therefore, limited not only by
their perception of how decisions ought to be taken, but also by
their awareness of how decisions are taken.
Their awareness is, therefore, an important constraint for the union
in influencing their working lives.Another important influence, however, is the limit of support of the
union by its members. This becomes apparent in Excerp~6.64.
For this HOurly-Paid respondent his union membership dues have
perceived limits - "I'm no a union man". Indeed his principal
reason for being a union member is the closed shop.
Given perceptions of this type one can well appreciate the
difficulties referred to by the Shop Steward in Excerpt46.63.
ExcerptA6.64 illustrates quite clearly the perceptual limits of
union membership.· Earlier Excerpts have demonstrated the reasons
for union membership (eg security, wages, conditions etc), but
what we want to explore here is the boundary of union membership
(ie the extent to which the union can call on the loyalty of its
members). We have already established some of the limits from
ExcerptP6.63 as the Shop Steward made clear there that issues of
no immediately apparent relevance (eg financial policy) would not
exert such a strong call on the loyalty of his members than another
issue of immediately apparent relevance (eg a wage increase) -
though he did feel he would be successful even in the former case,
though with much more difficulty. From Excerpt~.63 it is,
therefore, clear that the role of the union is contingent on the
nature of the issue concerned. In the case of issues on which the
union has been traditionally involved (wages, redundancies,
discipline etc), which are immediately apparent, the role of the
union is significant in the perception of its members. This point
is made again, in a general way, by an Hourly-Paid respondent, in
ExcerptA6.65.For this respondent the union has been t1 earned I - it has, over time,
entered into his stock of knowledge, such that it is now perceived by
him as an organisation which is more capable of bargaining than he is
for himself.
It has, however, been apparent that this is limited to certain
immediately apparent issues. Indeed this is consistent with our
findings in the last Chapter, as there we showed that on issues like
financial policy, investment etc - those whose relevance is least
immediately apparent - it was perceived to be particularly
appropriate that decisions on these issues should be a matter for
Management. The perceived influence on issues like wages etc. by
Hourly-Paid was much greater.
Thus the role of the union is primarily to bargain on day-to-day
issues like wages. The difficulty of this is, of course, that
decisions of long term strategy (eg investment) can eventually
determine decisions at a more immediate level (eg redundancy).
That is a much more complex issue which is not central to this
discussion. In the longer term, however, it is important to be
aware of this connection.
Even at a day-to-day level though, what is the limit of union
membership? We can get some measure of this by the degree of
involvement of members in union affairs. We took two measures of
involvement - i) frequency of attendance at union meetings,
ii) time devoted to discussion of union matters.First of all let us consider attendance at union meetings
Table~.31 How often do you attend meetings of your Union?
(Union Union Reps Hourly-Paid Stop Stewards Staff "Members)
Very Often 22 (39%) 7 (100%) 31 (65%) 16 (94%)
Often 15 (26%) 0 9 (19%) 1 (6%)
Half of Them 2 (3%) 0 0 0
Seldom 12 (21%) 0 5 (10%) 0
Never 6 (ll%) 0 3 (6%) 0
This shows clearly that Hourly Paid attend union meetings more
frequently than do Staff who are union members, though the tradition
of unionisation amongst the former is, of course, much longer so
habit of attendance is more likely to have developed among them.
Nevertheless attendance does not of itself necessarily indicate great
interest in the affairs of the Union. For instance one day we met one
of the convenors of an Hourly Paid union, who was extremely angry about
the conduct of a recent meeting he had just organised to elect a Shop Steward
fur one section.- In particular he was upset as r.lore votes \'lere cast (on
a show of hands) than the number of people present~ His view was that
"these bastards down there'll no take it seriou~ly. Well they've
just elected a right bam-pot and they're going to get what they
deserve. II
This lack of deep ir.terest in the Union is indicated further by the
following table:
9.5'1Tab1eA6.32 How much time do you spend discussing union matters
with your co11eagues/workmates?
, (Union Staff Members) Union Reps. Hourly-Paid Shop Stewards
'" M
[
GreatDea1 0 3 (43%) 7 (15%) 6 (35%)
~:
A Lot 10 (18%) 4 (57%) 13 (27%) 4 (24%)
,~
ALittle 27 (47%) 0 21 (44%) 7 (41%)
Hardly Ever 20 (35%) 0 7 (15%) 0
This table shows that 59% of Hourly-Paid talk about union matters
'a little/hardly ever', while for Staff the comparable figure is
82%. Neither is indicative of a very high level of interest -
indeed even among Shop Stewards some 41% su£~est that they talk
about union matters only a little.
From all this it would appear that there are a number of conclusions
which can be drawn from this
i) the union plays a significant role for its members in
negotiating their relationship with the Company
ii) the role of'the union in doing so is widely accepted in the
Company generally, including Management. Perhaps one of the
penalties of this is that the union appears to have gone into the
background of Company affairs. It is accepted generally, and
consequently appears to have slipped from the fore-ground of the
perception of its members, eg one of the complaints of a number of
Shop Stewards is that while they would like to stand down, they
cannot as no one would take their ,place. In one case, a Shop
Steward did refuse re-election but when, after three months, no
one came forward to fill the post he agreed to be put forward.Membership of trade unions does, therefore, have defined
boundaries even among Hourly-Paid workers. The evidence we
have collected does tend to support the view that leaders af
unions do have to persuade and act within acceptable limits, rather
than simply lead expecting to be followed.
We have shown in previous Chapters, however, that it is felt that the
influence of those below Management ought to be increased. The
following table, which reports resonses to a question on whether
the unions ought to be stronger or less strong, does tend to
support that.
Tab1eA6.33 - How much stronger would you like to see the unions
in this Firm?
§hOP
r~anagement Staff .. Union Reps• Hourly-Paid tewards
Much 1 (3%) 7 (10%) 1 (14%) 6 (13%) 4 (24%)
Stronger
Stronger 3 (9%) 13 (18%) 3 (43%) 15 (31%) 3 ("18%)
Right
~2 (69%) (62%) (43%) 27 (56%) 10 (59%) Now 44 3
Less Strong 5 (16%) 5 (7%) 0 0 0
Much Less 1 (3%) 2 (3%) 0 0 0
Strong
This table shows clearly that the union is an accepted part of this
Company, as no more than 19% of any group (in this case ~Ianagement)
wanted to see the unions weakened. In general the implication of
this table is that, if anything, the role of the unions ought to be
stronger. Among Staff "and Management this is less emphasised than
for the other 3 groups in the Table. These figures are consistent
with our argument of the previous Chapter i.e. that those below
Management ought to exercise more influence, but that this wasnot to mean that they would take decisi.ans as this was. a Management
role.
Finally, we considered the role of the Shop Steward or Union Rep. in
respect of the effect these officials had on the role of Management.
As the following Table shows very clearly, it was strongly felt that
a 'good' Shop Steward would make Management's easier. Indeed it is,
perhaps, notable that the groups who felt this most strongly were
(a) Shop Stewards, and (b) Management.
Tab1eA6.34 (a) - Does a good Shop Stewart/Staff Union Rep. make
Management's job easier or more difficult?
§hOP
i~anagement Staff Union Reps. Hourly-Paid tewards
Easier 30 (94%) 55 (78%) 6 (86%) 41 (85%) 17 (100%)
More Difficult 2 (6%) 16 (23%) 1 (14%) 7 (15%) 0
Thus within this Company we have what is, perhaps a remarkable
degree of agreement about the role of trade unions. While Management
do not appear to feel that they require to be union members, they
do seem to positively accept the role of trade unions for Hour1y-
Paid, and for Staff. Between these two groups, however, there is,
as we have seen, a degree of friction concerning appropriate
relativities between them, as well as the nature of any relationship
between the 2 groups.
A notable feature of perceptions of trade unionism which appears to' be
common across Management, Staff &Hourly-paid, is its emphasis on
the internal ·union structure. It is not surpr~sing that internal
union affairs should be given more emphasis than national union affairs,
given the immediacy of the former. What is notable, however, is'the degree of emphasis. For Management, acceptance of the role
of trade unions is on the contribution the unions can make to
the running of the Company. Not greatly surprising perhaps that
Management should think thisway. For Staff,. however, i.t was clear
that the union nationally was in many respects more a nuisance than
a help. Even among Hourly-Paid workers the national union was very
~eavily written down in comparison to the emphasis on its role on
internal matters to the Company. All of this tends to support the
view of, for instance, ..:.. ~. Brown of a trend toward, in effect,
company unions (in Brown, W. (Ed) Changing Contours on British
Industrial Relations).
(7) Supervision
This function in a firm involves monitoring what is done by
than of whom one has charge. Frequently, in previous research, this
has been a control variable, but this assumes that only the constant,
day-to~day personal supervision is relevant for the respondent.
It does not take into account the possibility that while the
supervisory function has attained an equilibrium, the hierarchical
function has not i.e. that while the function and role of the
superivisor is adequate within the existing (hierarchical) form of
organisation, it is contingent on this form of organisation
continuing - as we shall show that we found in the Firm. In general,
the orientation toward supervision was one of acceptability, with
diverse individyals having diverse reasons for disliking their
supervisor. This extended from the Labourers to rivalry on
the Board. While the great majority found their supervisors acceptable,
however, this, as we suggested, is contingent upon the existing
hierarchical structure, which, as we have shown in preceding Chapters
is in need not of structural alteration, but of proceedural alteration,and a widening of its communication channels. Far the mQ~ent, .. .
however, we shall be concerned with structural perceptions of
supervision in the Firm.
Tab1e~6.35 - How satisfied are you with your Supervision compared
to that of (other) Shop-Floor?
§hOp Management 'Staff Union Reps. Hourly-Paid tewards
Very
9 (28%) 16 (23%) 3 (43%) 4 (8%) 2 (12%) Satisfied
.Satisfied 20 (63%) 46 (65%) 3 (43%) 34 (71%) 12 (71%)
Dissatisfied 2 (6%) 8 (11%) 0 8 (16%) 1 (6%)
Very
1 (1%) (14%) 2 (4%) 2 (12%) Dissatisfied 0 1
Tab1eAG.36 - How satisfied are you with your Supervision compared to that
of (other) Staff?
§hOp
Management Staff Union Reps. Hourly-Paid tewards
Very
9 (28%) 15 (21%) 3 (43%) 3 (6%) 2 (12%) Satisfied
Satisfied 19 (59%) 46 (65%) 3 (43%) 35 (73%) 10 (59%)
Dissatisfied . 2 (6%) 9 (13%) 0 6 (13%) 3 (18%)
Very
1 (1%) 1 (14%) 4 (8%) 2 (12%) Dissatisfied 0
Tab1eA6.37 - How satisfied are you with your Supervision compared to that
of (other) Management?
§hOp Management Staff Union Reps. Hourly-Paid . tewards
Very
6 (19%) 9 (13%) 2 (29%) Satisfied 2 (4%) 1
11 (6%)
Satisfied 19 (59%) 54 (76%) 4 (57%) 38 (79%) 12 (71%)
Dissatisfied 5 (16%) 5 (7%) . 0 5 (10%) 2 (12%)
Very
1 (1%) Dissatisfied 0 1 (14%) 3 (6%) 2 (12%)(a) Management. Among Management the distribution of ,responses in
respect of both Hourly-Paid and Staff is almost identical, with only
6% being 'Dissatisfied.' The least satisfied response is, in fact,
in respect of other Management'- but even here the level of lDissatisfied
l
is only 16%. It is, however, interesting that the lowest level af
satisfaction should be expressed in comparision to other Managers.
Much of this is due to frustration by some senior Managers with
the Board; as ExcerptA6.66 from a senior Manager illustrates.
This Manager expresses dissatisfaction with his superior on 2 grounds -
(1) failure to be interested in the nitty-gritty (i.e. his problems);
(2) failure to take his advice as a professional Manager - for which
he paid by effective demotion. Those Managers ,who did express
dissatisfaction did so 6n the basis that their superior does not
exhibit adequate ability - it is clear from the above that the
failure of this respondent's supervisor to do so, resulted in his
disenchantment with his superior.
Few Managers suggested that in this respect they were dissatisfied -
but as we have seen there is a strong tendency for Managers to say
that if they are dissatisfied and can do nothing to resolve this
then their option is to leave. The Manager in Excerpt46.67
appears to look for the same qualtities - and to have found them
for now. He does, however, add to this the view that he would leave
if he no longer got this from his superior.
Hence we should not be surprised at the level of dissatisfaction
expressed by Management. This is consistent with what we have
seen up to now, which can likewise be explained by theManagement strategy of leaving if'a particular aspects af their
job is unsatisfactory. Furthermore senior Managers whose direct
inter-face was with the Board"remedied any'incapacity by the
Board by their own professionalism. This was particularly true
in one dept. where the junior Managers'admired their direct
Manager very much indeed, but had scarecely disguised contempt
for the Board.
(b) Staff and Union Reps. The Staff responses reveal a considerable
~easure of satisfaction with their supervi~ion"- and as we can see
the same holds true for their Union Reps. The level of dissatisfaction
for Staff is at its peak - 14% either 'dissatisfied'/'very dissatisfied' -
but making the comparision to Hourly-Paid the figure is 12%, and to
Management it is 8%. Hence, there is little dissatisfaction, in
these comparisions, expressed by Staff to their Supervisors.
The same argument can be applied to the Union Reps. only 14% of whom
are 'very dissatisfied' with their supervisor in comparision to
Hourly-Paid, Staff and Management.
What, therefore, do Staff expect from their supervisors? This is
dicussed in ExcerptA6.68~
This is very similar to what we found amongst Management i.e.,that
what was important was the professional managerial relationship,
and in particular, how well it worked. We found among a small number
of seni6r Managers that there was frustration (see excerptAG.66),
but for the majority this' was not so (see excerp~.67). For this
Staff respondent he has achieved what he regards"as an adequate
professional relationship with those who supervise his work. This,however, can only be a means to an end i.e. this professional
relationship is the means by which he is :able to exerci.se
his professional skills. If he were kept less well informed,
for instance, his ability to operate would be that much more
restricted. In excerpt 6.66 for instance, the Manager complained
his director had not taken action in 1976 - hence his own
ability to perform was restricted, and his response was to transfer
all of the responsibility for any inadequacy on to the Director, thus
protecting his own professionalism.
Even where the supervisory relationship is over - laid with a
personal basis this need to exercise onels skills - even of a
relatively low order - is still important, as is illustrated in
ExcerptA6.69.
The emphasis here has shifted slightly is so far as the need for
the Iboss l to be technically competent is mentioned. The
difference is, however, only of emphasis. In this excerpt
the respondent looked to his boss to handle any problems which may
arise. His job is of a routine nature, and his skill is to operate
this routine. The supervisor is, for him, ,the means to ensure the
routine continues unobstructed. In excerpt 6.68, on the other hand,
this was largely left unsaid - but all the same the rapport which
he valued with his supervisors was to exercise his professional
skill in the same way as the respondent in excerpuq6.69, only at
a higher level, involving, for instance, more uncertainty. In
excerptA6.68 the respondent emphasised his rapport with his
supervisor - but this was on a professional basis so if the supervisor
was not technically competent then the relationship could not besatisfactory. We have seen in excerptA6.69 that the professionalism
of the supervisor was accepted. This did not always happen, as
excerptA6.70 from a Staff respondent illustrates.
The inadequacy, for the respondent, is fairly easily seen - he is
an electrical engineer, and his supervisor is a mechanical engineer.
In excerptA6.68 we saw that the respondant had a relationship with
his superior which was adequate professionally. The different skills
of the respondent in excerptR6.70 makes this virtually impossible.
Hence he is left pretty much to himself - in terms of any difficulties
he finds with the equipment and with other departments. His supervisor,
it is clear from this, fulfills for him no function at all.
other Staff find their supervisors inadequate in some respect, but
none as comprehensively as the example we have just considered. The
following is an instance of a member if the Staff whose problem lies
in the different perception of the job held by him and his supervisor.
Unlike the respondent in excerptA6.70, this respondent does not
explicitly deny the professionalism of his supervisor, it is his
particularly inefficient, uncommunicative and old fashioned form
of professionalism which causes him frustration. Clearly, unlike
the respondent in excerp~.68 there is no adequate relationship2
on the basis of profession, because,in the view of this respondent
(1) their perceptions of the profession are fundamentally different
(2) his supervisor allows avoidable inefficiency to continue.
The most important quality for the Staff is, therefore, the
professionalism of the supervisor, in order that he may facilitate
the work of his subordinates, and in order that they may communicateabout work, and those problems which they may have with it. We
saw that this was not always so - both from the table~6.35 -~.37,
and frcm excerpts~.69 andAG.70 leading to expressions of dissatisfaction.
(e) Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards. The level of dissatisfaction in
these categories is rather higher, and the level of satisfaction
correspondingly lower than for either Management or for Staff. The
lower level of satisfaction is seen in the much lower proportion of
Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewards who say they are 'very satisfied' than
Staff or Manegment. The number who say they are dissatisfied or
'very dissatisfied' is also higher among the Hourly-Paid and the
Shop Stewards than for any other category or any comparison.
Despite their relatively lower level of satisfaction the Hourly-Paid
and the Shop Stewards are, on the whole, satisfied in comparison to
any other groups - 79% and 83% respectively compared to (other)
Shop Floor : 79% and 71% compared to Staff 83% and 77% compared
to Management.
What, therefore, did the Hourly-Paid look for from their supervisors?
Excerptn6.72 is illustrative.
The respondent refers to his previous Companies where, he suggests,
the supervision is bad, because "they're actually breathing on
top of you". This is unsatisfactory beccause of the state of
anxiety it induces in the respondent, and the lack of trust being
put in him by supervision being as close as he felt it was - llYou've
got to have trust in the persqn who is doing the job or you'll never
get it done right." This contrasts with his present Firm whereIIthey leave you 'to get on wtth the jobu•
Hence for this respondent what is important is that he is left to
get on with his job, and as we saw among Management, and among Staff,
to exercise the skills which he has. The following respondent, also
from the Hourly-Paid,seeks the same qualities, as the respondent in
, ,
excerptA6.72 i.e. to be 1eft to get on with the job, and exercise his
particular skill. He also wishes to be able to go to his supervisor
if he has any problems - just as the Staff respondent 'did in excerpt~
6.69.
At the same time however, thi superv~sor'is not seen as absolutely
good - "You need to be kind of bad to get respect if you're a gaffer
you know kind of frighten the menu: I think there's a lot of gaffe~
chancers." This, however, in his view is justified, as he sees that
not all those around hum are Uwilling to do a wee bit like I do".
Leaving aside the question of whether the respondent is as willing
to work as he appears to suggest, it is interesting to note that the
random justice which in many ways was typical of the ClydeCin the
past should still be seen as justified to get the employees to work.
Amongst the older respondents a previous Works Manager, who merely
had to appear on the Shop Floor - complete with his white gloves -
to strike terror into those there, is still remembered with a feeling
which is not so far distant from fondness.
Certainly senior Shop Stewards in particular, but even among
the works management" recognise that the dismissal procedures of
the Employment Protection Act are no bad thing. This owes its
origins'to those ttmes when it was not unheard'that a certain
foreman would dismiss men merely to 'ginger up the rest of the
squad'. As we have suggested those practices have more or less
!l. +'0gone, but as we have seen in ExcerptA6.73 they,are still suggested
by the behaviour of Foremen.
In the view of the respondent in ExcerptA6.74 this historical
behaviour has not in fact disappeared. '
His view is that the supervision is generally poor because foremen
spend too little time facilitating the work which his men have got
to do - as a source of advice, ensuring parts and tools are where
they should be etc - and too much time on paper-work and 'trying to
get at people they don't think 'are 'doing their job' ietrying to
exercise disciplinary powers they no longer have, unofficially.
Since they no longer have the powers to discipline employees - this
power resides with Works Management and Personnel - the Foremen are
occasionally put in the position of at least stretching the truth or
telling a selection of the facts, or of losing face by not backing up
a threat. Occasionally they simply lose face through lack of
Management support. Near the beginning of our field-work an Hour1y-
Paid employee on night -shift was caught (for the third time)
sleeping. His union did not dispute that he was sleeping, and
,initially were not going to dispute his dismissal - after 3
warnings for misconduct the penalty is dismissal. The Foreman
involved was told this would be the penalty imposed. Yet within 24
hours it was reduced to one week~s suspension and being brought back
to day-shift (and losing his night-shift payment).· In the eyes of
the Foreman in'this part of the Firm this was typical lack of
Management support. The union's change of stance is, however,
interesting in this respect, as the employee was regarded by the
Foreman and' certain Managers as "a right nui sance", and the vi ew of
the union was that as he had finished his work for the shift he was
1"':/-',entitled to sleep if he wanted to - and as others were doing as well.
This is the problem for the Foreman, as his role has been
progressively reduced. Not only has he lost most of his
disciplinary power, but much of the technical side of his job has
been removed, eg by Work Study. The Foreman, therefore, is trying
to sustain an illusion of long ago. As one senior Manager put it.
IIForemen fail to realise their position in the world has changed.
1I
The Hourly-Paid view is that they look for technical assistance from
their supervisors, and to be enabled to get on with' their jobs. We
have found this to be true for Management and Staff as well. It
may be that this role represents a point for development for the
role of Foreman in the future, but the important point for our
purposes is that the supervisory role is, on the whole, accepted in
its existing entirety, and where it is rejected it's rejec~ed not in
total but in terms of remaining disciplinary practices, and it is not
a rejection of hierarchy based on technical knowledge, but is a
rejection of hierarchy based on arbitrary authority.
In all categories we have found, therefore, that the supervisory
role is accepted. Amongst Management the qualities sought from a
supervisor that (1) they should be able to communicate effectively
(2) be able to learn from the supervisor (3) be able to exercise
their skills. Amongst Staff we found the qualities of a supervisor
which were valued most were (1) that the supervisor be professional
ie capable of assisting those who work for him (2) that the
individual Staff be able to exercise their particular skill (s).
Among the Hourly-Paid a supervisor was expected (1) to leave his men
to get on with their work and exercise thetr skill (2) to ensure thatthey are able to do so by, for instance, ensuring that all the
parts are available.
In all categories, therefore, there was stress laid on the need to
allow the employee - whoever he was - to exercise the skill he had.
This, in general, was done by the Firm. Amongst Staff and Hourly-
Paid there was also an expectation that the supervisor was the person
one expected to go to if there was a prob1em~ and who would facilitate
the work which one was doing. Hence there was still a dependence on
the supervisor - his superiority was to this extent still respected.
The clearest objection to the classical supervisory role was the use of
arbitrary authority - though as we saw in Excerpt 6.73 it could be felt
that this. was a necessary part in the relationship with those who
worked for him.
The most important point of this section are the similarities of the
different categories in what qualities they look for from their
supervisors. At the same time we found most satisfaction with the
existing role among the Management, and least among the Hourly-Paid -
as we have found in all other items. This is reiterated in the
following table which gives the results from the question "How much
would your supervision have to be improved to make your job idea1?"
Tab1eft6.35 - "How much would your supervision have to be improved to
make your job idea11"
Management Staff Union Reps.
Shop
Hourly-Paid Stewards
Very Much
1 (3%) 4 (6%) 1 (14%) Improved 6 (13%) 2 (12%)
Improved
4 (13%) 19 (27%) 3 (43%) a Bit 10 (21%) 4 (24%)
~~ 3Right Now 27 (84%) 48 (68%) 3 C43%} 32 (67%) 11 (65%)
Among Management there is easily the largest proportion who say their
supervision is alright as it is - 84%. The Staff, Hourly-Paid and
Shop Stewards have broadly similar distributions of responses of this
question, with Staff being marginally more satisfied with existing
supervisory practices. The Union Reps. are least satisfied, on the
basis of these figures, but excluding them about 2/3 or more of each
category says that their supervision is "right now". This table
shows, therefore, that supervision is meeting the expectations of the
Firm's employees inmost cases - though as we have seen in the various
excerpts by no means all.
We went on to ask more detailed questions about supervision, which
appear in-the following tab1esA6.35 ~A'.4l anr. which as we shall see
generally reveal satisfaction with various aspects of the
supervisory role. -
Tab1eA6.36 - Generally speaking is your superior as a supervisor?
Union Hourly Shop
Management Staff Reps Paid Stewards
Very Good 12 (38%) 20 (28%) 1 (1,4%) 8 (17%) 3 (18%)
Good 15 (47%) 34 (48%) 1 (14%) 25 (52%) 6 (35%)
Neither
Good nor Bad 4 (13%) 15 (21%) 3 (43%) 13 (27%) 6 (35%)
Bad 1 (3%) 1 (1 %) 1 (14%) 0 1 (6%)
Very Bad 0 1 (1 %) 1 (14%) 2 (4%) 1 (6%)
From this table it is clear that, as we would have expected from the
previous data, the Management are most satisfied - 85% saying theirsupervisor was 'very good'/good' . Among Staff this figure is 76%.
" ,
69% among Hourly-Paid and 53% among the Shop Stewards. For the
Union Reps. it is 28% who say their supervisor is either 'very good/
good'. and for this category the median response tneither good nor
bad' is modal. as it is for Shop Stewards with the response 'good'.
Only among these two sub-categories is there more than a very small
percentage who say their supervisor is 'bad/very bad'. Among
Union Reps. this figure is 28%. and 12% for Shop Stewards - it is 3%
for Management. 2% for Staff and 4% for Hourly-Paid.
For the major categories supervision does appear to be satisfactory
in this respect. marginally less so for Shop Stewards and rather more
so for the Union Reps., so that again we see that the union officials
are mor critical than their members - especially among the Staff
rather than Hourly-Paid.
Next we asked a series of questions concerning the technical side of
the supervisory role. First of all -
Tab1eA6.37 - Does your supervisor give you enough freedom to do your
job?
Union Hourly Shop
Management Staff Reps. Paid Stewards
Too Much 3 (9%) 3 (4%) 1 (14%) 3 (6%) 0
About Right 25 (78%) 64 (90%) 5 (71%) 42 (88%) 16 (94%)
Too Little 4 (13%) 2 (3%) 1 (14%) 3 (6%) 0
Far too
Little 0 2 (3%) 0 0 1 (6%)For most of the sample it is clear that the freedom their
supervisor gives them to do their jobs - which was a feature
important in all categories - is 'About Right'. It is, however,
interesting that the category in which there is the largest
proportion who say 'they have 'too little' freedom is Management.
We did, however, point to a failure by the Board to operate efficiently
with their Senior Managers on occasions, producing frustration for
Management. With the exception of Management, and of the Staff
Union Reps., there is no other category in which the proportion who
use the response 'Too Little' or 'Far too little' exceeds 6%. ~
This should not be a surprise, as the Firm was selected on the
basis that its technology permitted considerable freedom to its
employees. Supervision, is, however~ about 'the provision of
guidance to subordinates when this is necessary. This came up
frequently in the excerpts we have presented (see, for instance
1}6.69,q6.73 - of for a situation in which guidance is perceived
to be missing, seeAG.70): The data in tablenG.38 shows the
extent of satisfaction in this respect.
Tab1eA§.38 - Is your supervisor a good source of gUidance when
you need it?
Managemen~ Staff Union Reps.' Hourly-Paid Shop
Stewards
Always 11 (34%) 32 (45%) 2 (29%) 14 (29%) 3 (18%)
Usually 13 (41%) 22 (31%) 0 17 (35%) 6 (35%)
sometimes 6 (19%) 14 (20%) 3 (43%) 14 (29%) 6 (35%)
Seldom 2 (6%) 2 (3%) 2 (29%) 2 (4%) 0
Never 0 1 (1%) 1 (2%) 2(12%)Only among the Union Reps. is there a sizeable minority who say
their supervisors are seldom sources of good advice - 29% - though
12% of Shop Stewards say their supervisors are never sources of
good advice. Among the major categories, however, the proportions
who use the 2 lower responses -, 'Seldom' and 'Never' are extremely
low - Management 6%, Staff 4%, Hourly-Paid 6%. There is a minor
difference in the distributions, as for Staff 'Always' is modal,
while for Management .and Hourly-Paid it is 'Usually' which is modal.
Concerning those last 2 groups, the Management is skewed toward
'Always', while among the Hourly-Paid there is no skewing. This
would indicate Staff, on the whole, to be more satisfied than
Management,and,Management, on the whole to be just more satisfied
than the Hourly-Paid. Any difference, is, however, marginal, though
ex~ected on the basis of what we have ,shown already. Namely
(1) there is a measure of frustration among Management, concerning
their relationship with the Board
(2) the Hourly-Paid have cqnsistent1y been least satisfied of the
major categories in the items we have considered. The difference
has seldom, however, been major, and again, in this case, is not
major.
Another side of being a good source of guidance, for a supervisor
is to appreciate any problems which one's subordinates may have.
The data from this is in tab1e~6.39.On this item, with the exception of'Staff, all categories are modal on
the 'Quite Well' response. For Staff the modal response is 'Very Well',
which was chosen by 47% of Staff respondents. This table seems to
indicate, in this respect that there is little dissatisfaction with
supervision, though a few more selected the negative responses than was
true of the previous table - Management 9% -6% : Staff 14% - 4% :
Hourly-Paid 8% - 6% : Shop Stewards 18% - 12%. The only exception to
this was the Staff Union Reps. among whom 28% said their supervisor
appreciated their problems with their jobs 'Quite Badly'/'Very Badly',
and in the previous table the same number (2 - difference due to rounding
up) said their supervisor was seldom a source of guidance - the
distribution does indicate rather less satisfaction on the former than
on the latter, however.
Nevertheless the levels of dissatisfaction with supervision in there,
basically technical aspects, were not strongly pronounced at all. The
next table explores how supervision was perceived on a personal basis.
We have already seen that supervision is assessed on its technicalmerits, and indeed it has been suggested that it was a disadvantage
for supervision to be Itoo nice' • (See excerptA6.€3, for instance).
At the same time, there must be a personal relationship though it need
not extend as far as friendship - indeed it is not likely to - but if
there is a personal conflict this can be as disruptive as a technical
conflict. The responses 'to this question are shown in table~6.40.
This table reveals a considerable amount of satisfaction, as in no
category do fewer than 70% say.their supervisor considers them as a
person as well as how they do their job 'Always'/'Usual1y' - 75% of
Management, 76% of Staff, 71% of Union Reps., 73% of Hourly-Paid,
70% of ShqrStewards.
TableR6.40 - Does your superior consider you as a person as well as
how you do your job?
Hourly Shop
Management Staff Union Reps. Paid Stewards
Always 7 (22%) 28 (39%) 1 (14%) 13 (27%) 6 (35%)
Usually 17 (53%) 26 (37%) 4 (57%) 22 (46%) 6 (35%)
Some of
the Time 8 (25%) 9 (13%) 0 9 (19%) 3 (18%)
Seldom 0 5 (7%) 1 (14%) 2 (4%) 0
Never 0 3 (4%) 1 (14%) 2 (4%) 2 (12%)
Correspondingly the negative responses are chosen'on1y by a minority -
no Manager uses 'Seldom'/'Never' : 11% of Staff: 8% of Hourly-Paid:
12% of Shop Stewards : only among the Union Reps. are these responses
and more than this, as 28% of this category use these responses.Despite this it seems clear that supervisors in the Firm meet the
expectations of their subordinates. Indeed we have seen up to now
that the supervisors for the majority of our respondents in all aspects
of their job, meet the expectations of those who work for them.
We have, however, only examined the relationship with the respondent
as essentially passive, but if the respondent takes the initiative,
and breaches the hierarchy, by putting ideas to the supervisor, who is
supposed to supervise the respondent. This ,is broken if the respondent
puts an idea up to the supervisor. Such a question was put to our
respondents, and is shown in tab1eA6.41.
Tab1eA6.41 - Will your supervisor listen to what you think about a job?
Management Staff Union Reps.
Hourly Shop
Paid Stewards
Yes. He listens .
and takes it into
consideration
Yes. He listens
but does not take
it into consider-
ation
Doesn't listen
28 (88%) 59 (83%)
4 (13%) 10 (14%)
o 2 (3%)
3 (43%)
4 (57%)
o
35 (73%)
12 (25%)
1 (2%)
9 (53%)
7 (41%)
1 (6%)
The first response - what we could call 'the true-team response' in
which the respondent and his supervisor both contribute to solutions to
problems - is modal in all categories, except Union Reps. For Union
Reps. what we could call 'the pseudo- team response' is modal, but
it should be noted that a significant number of Shop Stewards selected
~~o
---this response as we11~-" On this qtiestion the union officials are
more critical than their members. It'· should, however, a1 so be" noted
that in the major categories the 'true-team response' diminishes as we
descend the hierarchy, being chosen most by Management (88%), then
Staff (83%), then by Hourly-Paid (73%). If we look at this more
closely we can see that even within the Hourly-Paid this trend
continues, as the following table shows.
Tab1eA6.42 -'Will your superior listen to what you think about a job?
Skilled Labourers
Yes, he listens and takes it "
into consideration 31 (74%) 13 (57%)
Yes, he listens but doesn't
take it into consideration 9 (21%) 10 (44%)
He doesn't listen 2 (5%) a
On this item it is clear that the Skilled are more satisfied than the
Labourers, as in the former the 'true-team response' is modal, but in
the latter it is the' 'pseudo-team response', indicating that in this,
albeit limited ~rea,~the Skilled believe their'inf1uence is real, but
the Labourers believe their views' to count for very little. .
Two departments revealed a'degree of deviance from the Staff and'
Management score, as Quality Control and Production Control accounted
for 7 of the 14 Staff and Management who selected the'pseudo-team
response', despite both departments being less than 20% of the Staff and.
Management samples. Both departments had 33% of respondents
selecting this response - the Skilled Hourly-Paid had only 21% - and
.;,the next Staff department was Sales who had 16%. In one department
the cause of this may have been the personality of the Manager, who
was known throughout the Firm for his dominating manner. In the other
case the cause may have been lack of leadership as at this time the
department had no Manager.
In this respect, therefore, we see in a·more pronounced way the
diminution of satisfaction as we descent the hierarchy, since most
satisfaction is found at the peak of the hierarchy - amongst the
Management - and this declines as we descend the hierarchy, being
lowest among the Labourers, though as we saw Production and Quality
Control, both were exceptions to this. At the same time, however,
even on this item, on the whole there was satisfaction with supervision
in this respect, with the exception of the union officials, and in
particular the Union Reps.
Hence, it appears that supervision, with the exceptions we have
looked at does satisfy the expectations of their subordinates. This,
however, does not show this conclusively, as these questions, for their
validity, require implicit acceptance of the authority structure of the
supervisory relationship ie that the respondent's satisfaction could
not be increased by extending the control the individual has over his
own work - and conversely reducing the control of the supervisor.
The extent of satisfaction with existing control, and the desire for
change in this respect, is the subject of the next section.
(8) Control of WorkThis section to some extent goes over the ground covered in the
previous Chapter, but on a much more restricted basis. In this
section we are only dealing with the preceived control which the
respondent has over the job he himself does, ie his own work.
This section followed the same pattern as those which have gone before.
We began by asking respondents to gauge their satisfaction in re1aation
to that of other categories.
Tab1eA6.43 - How satisfied are you with your control of your work
environment compared to (other) Shop-Floor?
Union Hourly- Shop
Management Staff Reps. Paid Stewards
Very
1 (14%) (8%) Satisfied 11 (34%) 15 (21 %) 4 0
Satisfied 17 (53%) 45 (63%) 4 (57%) 37 (77%) 13 (77%)
Dissatisfied 3 (9%) 9 (13%) 2 (29%) 6 (13%) 4 (24%)
Very
2 (3%) 0 1 (2%) Dissatisfied 0 0
, '
Table~.44 - How satisfied are you with your control of your work
environment compared to (other) Staff?(a) MANAGEMENT. In this category, on the basis distribution, they are
most satisfied comparing themselves to the Hourly-Paid - only just more
than when compared to Staff. They are least satisfied when making the
comparison to other Managers, but as we can see from the table the
difference between table~.45 and tablesa6.43 andR5.44 is not extreme,
and the category is, in'general 'Satisfied'/'Very Satisfied' (87%,87%
and 82%).
(b) STAFF. This category are most satisfied compared to other Staff,
and least satisfied compared to Management, but in the former comparison86% say they are 'Satisfied'/'Very Satisfied', and in the latter, 86%.
Hence the difference between the two is not very great at all, and over
,
all the comparisons the relative stability is the most striking feature.
Among the Union Reps. there is rather less satisfaction shown - most
obviously compared to Management. This, however, is not inconsistent
with what has gone before, as this sub- category has been most
critical of the Firm.
(c) HOURLY-PAID. This cate'gory is least satisfied in relation to
Staff, and most satisfied in relation to other Hourly-Paid. The
difference in the number who say they are either 'Satisfied'/'Very
Satisfied' between the former and the latter is 75% to 85%, so that
once again we can see that satisfaction is similarly distributed in
each comparison. Of the main categories, however, it is again, this
one which has the greatest number who are 'Dissatisfied'/'Very
Dissatisfied', which has been typical on every item in this Chapter.
At the same time, as we have seen the majority of the category are
satisfied with the Firm in this respect. This is not really
surprising as it was an important reason for selecting the Firm.
NOr is there a difference between Skilled Hourly-Paid and Labourers.
Among the Shop Stewards, there is a greater level of dissatisfaction -
24% in relation to other Hourly-Paid, 35% in relation to Staff, 30% in
relation to Management, say they are 'Dissatisfied'/'Very Dissatisfied'.
This, again (1) is not a typical as Shop Stewards do tend to be more
critical of the Firm than their members, but
(2) the majority of Shop Stewards still describe themselves as'satisfied'.
Respondents were also asked how the control they had of their work would
have to be improved to make their job ideal?
TableR6.46 - How much would your control of your work environmnet have
to be improved to make your job ideal?
Union Hourly Shop
Management Staff Reps. Paid Stewards
Very much
(3%) 1 (14%) 5 (10%) Improved 1 3 (4%) 3 (18%)
Improved
11 (34%) 34 (48%) 2 (29%) 13 (27%) 7 (41%) a Bit
About Right
Now 20 (63%) 34 (48%) 4 (57%) 30(63%) 7 (41%)
Clearly in all categories, therefore, greater control over work is
sought in all categoriei. Fox, on the other hand, in 'Beyond Contract'
suggests that Management and Staff roles are high discretion - but the
implication of this table is that it is those with the most discretion
already in their work role who seek more. We find this to be true on
the Shop-Floor as well, as the following table shows.TableA6.47 - How much would your contra' of your work envtronment
have to be i'mproved to make your job ideal?
Labourers Skilled
Very Much Improved . 2 (9%) 6 (14%)
Improved a Bit 4 (17%) 16 (38%)
About Right Now 17 (74%) 20 (48%)
Hence it is those with the relatively high discretion roles who seek
more control of their work, since the Staff in particular seek more
control of their work - relatively more than do Management, and much
more than Hourly-Paid as a whole. In the Hourly-Paid category,
however, we find that it is the Skilled worker, who has more discretion
than the Labourers, who seek more control of their work - a proportion
twice as large as that of the Labourers seeking more control of their
work. It seems to be the case, from this data, that those who have not
experienced control of their own work situation do not value such
control - and conversely those who have this experience do place value
on it. This confirms the finding earlier that Skilled Hourly-Paid put
'Job Variety and Interest' higher in their ordering of items than
Labourers did.
The final questions in this Chapter were concerned with task choice as
a component of controlling one's work, ie that the ability to choose
which task will do is an exercise of power over one's work environment.
Table~.48 which shows how much say respondents felt they had in task
choice, and how much they would ideally have, shows how perceived
powerlessness in this respect increases as we descend the hierarchy -
only 6% of Management say they have no say, 23% of Staff, and 44% of
Hourly-Paid. Furthermore if we compare the 2 parts of each group'sreplies we see that the demand to have more say is much more powerful
outwith the Management category - particularly amond the Hourly-Paid
and the Shop Stewards.
There are, two particular points which we can make about this table
(1) of the major categories - Management, Staff and Hourly-Paid - the
modal category in 'How much influence (on choosing the task you are
involved in) would you ideally have' the modal category, for
Management, is 'Great Deal', but for Staff and Hourly-Paid it is
'Some', ie the next point down on the response scale. This, as we
have seen is quite consistent with the data in the preceding Chapters.
(2) despite the fact that there is clearly greater say required in
selecting one's task (lithe gaffer just gives you the job, and you get
on with it") the supervisory role is, as we have seen, apparently quite
acceptable.
Tablell6.48 -Tabl~6.48 -
How much say do you have in choosing the task you are involved in?
How much would you ideally have?
Union Hourly Shop
Management Staff Reps. Paid , Stewards
None 2 (6%), 16 (23%) 0 21 (44%), 10 (59%t -
1 (3%) 2 (3%) 0 5 (10%) 2 (12%)
"
Very 2 (6%) 19 (27%) 3 (43%) ~ .iJilll
Little 0 3 (4%) 0 2 (4%) 0
Some 10 (31%)
10 (31%)
24 (34%)
41 (58%)
1 (l4%)
3 (43%)
9 (l9%)
26 (54%)
2 (l2%)
8 (47%)
Great
Deal
18 (56%)
20 (63%)
12 (17%) 3 (43%)
25 (35%) ,.4 (57%)
6 (13%)
15 (31%)
1 (6%)
7 (41%)CONCLUSIONS
T, "
This Chapter has led to 3 important categories of finding, which we
shall briefly'draw to the attention of the reader.
First of all it should be observed that for different categories of
employee, different'aspects of work had different levels of importance.
For instance for Management &Staff, Promotion was more important than
it was for Hourly-Paid workers. On the other hand trade unionism was
more important forH0urly-Paid workers than for Management or Staff.
We suggested that variations of this type represented different
perceptions' of their power by different groups. Thus, for many
Hourly-Paid workers,' Promotion was not perceived as a viable prospect
so it was not emphasised. On the other hand being a trade union member
was not perceived as'being necessary by Managers for their position in
the Company, so it was not emphasised. The relatively low ranking
given by Staff reflects their rather ambivalent attitude on trade
unions which we discussed above, in that while being a majority trade
union group their orientation was still strongly internal to the
Company, and more individualist than was true of Hourly-Paid workers.
At the same time, it is important not' to over-state the difference
between groups, since as we showed at the beginning of this Chapter the
standard deviations within groups are so large that the group responses
overlap, ie that among Hourly-Paid, 'for instance, there are individuals
whose orderings are more typical of Management, and vice versa. It
is, therefore, important to observe that groups' are not homogeneous.If we consider Promotion as an example then we can see the importance
of this. If all Hourly-Paid did not perceive Promotion as important
to them, then there may be insufficient 'volunteers' for promotion
into roles like Foremen.
Similarly, while we have emphasised the differences between groups it
is important to remember that there were similarities, eg for all
groups Wages/Salaries, Job Security and Job Variety were important
aspects of work, though the precise order did vary.
Secondly it is significant that on every aspect except Wages/Salary,
satisfaction varied hierarchically, ie Management were most satisfied,
then Staff, then Hourly-Paid. Only on the one issue of Wages/Salary
were Hourly-Paid more satisfied relative to other groups. It does.
however. have to be remembered that the research was carried out during
a period of incomes policy, which appeared to create greater frustration
on the part of Staff, and Management in particular. Or every other
aspect of work there was a systematic difference in satisfaction which
reflected the hierarchical structure of the organisation.'
Thirdly it is important to observe the sources of the information used
by respondents to make their judgements~ Two sources appeared to
dominate-
(i) their past experience - it appears that the level of satisfaction
in the past is a sort of base-line for respondents. ie if conditions
became worse than before they would express dis-satisfaction - or
conversely if conditions improve over time they are satisfied.(ii) information from similar others, ie information from those whom
they perceive to be sufficiently like them for a comparison to be drawn.
Thus, for instance, an electrician may compare his-wages etc., to a
friend who works as an electrician in another firm. If his wages are
at least as good as these of his friend, then he is likely to express
satisfaction.
An important common feature of both of these sources of information is
that both are of hierarchical origin - his past experience are of
hierarchies, and are also likely to work in hierarchies. It is
unlikely, therefore, that either source would lead to a challenge to
hierarchy. On the other hand it is also apparent that there is an
expectation of improvements in the future. This was particularly
clear on working conditions which it was quite conciously anticipated
would be improved in the future. Failure to satisfy these expectations
in the future could pose a greater difficulty in the future than current
information.
The final issue we wish to consider here, is whether all this could
support a challenge to the hierarchical organisation of the Company.
We discussed in the last Chapter, Ha~ermas's ideas on the development
of crisis tendencies in advanced capitalism. We saw there that
~conflict concerning action orientated to institutionalised norms
arises only when the consensus governing the distribution of
opportunities for satisfying needs breaks down" (0 Held - Introduction
to Critical Theory pg 346).' It is apparent from'the data we have
presented in this Chapter that there is not a significant level of suchconflict. It would appear from our data that our respondents are, on
the whole fairly satisfied with their jobs. Indeed, as we have
mentioned already, the Firm saw itself as a 'good-paying' employer.
On this basis, therefore, no challenge to hierarchy appears imminent.
On the other hand, Habermas suggests that at such a time (ie when the
consensus about the distribution of opportunities breaks down) that
strategic action is likely to be initiated. We have seen, it should be
re-called, an extension of union-membership among Staff in this Company.
The nature of the relationship between Company and employee has therefore
increasingly moved on to a collective, and bargaining basis. Thus, it
could be argued, there is an element of strategic action proceeding to
develop between the Company and its employees, which reflects a decline
in consensus, and correspondingly a move toward crisis.
In the same section of 'Legitimation Crisis'(pp 113 - 114) Habermas
points to a third requirement for the development of such a crisis - an
appropriate conciousness within which these events are interpreted.
It is apparent from what we have said in this and the preceding Chapters
that the conciousness of the Company's employees is not appropriate for
a challenge to the existing system of hierarchy. Why is this so?
We would suggest several reasons for this. One reason concerns the
. word Iconsensusl itself. Very often consensus is discussed as an
'either/or' concept, ie there is consensus or there is conflict. As we
duscussed in the previous Chapter. this is not necessary in our view,
.ie there is a gap between perfect consensus and conflict. We wouldsuggest that while there may not be perfect or absolute consensus on the
distribution of opportunities, the imperfections are not so great that
conflict has developed to a level where system crises is immanent.
Indeed the degree of consensus is probably such (ie the level of
satisfaction with their jobs is such) that the system is if anything
supported ~y the distribution of opportunities.
Other reasons for the failure to challenge hierarchy were discussed in
the previous Chapter. One other reason was, however, suggested in the
theoretical model presented in Chapter 1 - the role of the media (ie
that TV etc, so manipulate their conciousness that any challenge to
hierarchy is ruled out). It is to this question that we turn in
~fre~di¥7.Excerptll6.43
S. "What about promotion within the Company? Does the Company have
a policy on promotion? Other than, you know, you advertise
internally in the first instance and externally afterwards.
R. Well apparently there is a policy that we use internal talent
whenever we can.
s. Hm.
R. That's paramount.
$. Yea.
R. Am. We try to identify talent, we try to identify urn probable
urn eh (what's the word I'm looking for) probable end points you
know end jobs, appropriate situation~
S. Hm.
R. But I think we can do a great deal more about this. I think we
could structure careers rather more urn of the facts.
S. Hm.
R. I think as one gets higher up the organisation then of course
you've got a much more definitive pattern of, likely pattern, for
promotion, career developments, this sort of thing but I think
we've got to extend it down the way a bit.
s. Hm.
R. Got to formalise.
S. What sort of criteria do you use in promoting people?
R. Well I probably think the first one is that he's got to be
outstanding in his current jub. I think that's the first thing
that draws attention to him.
s. Hm.
R. That in itself then leads and one looks at his qualifications, his
background, his general experience um that's probably number two.
~q4 ..'Then number three is his character, his personality.
s. Hm.
R. How he fits into proposed organisations. These, three are the
three major sort of factors.
s. How much is that see to the
decision?
sort of
R. At the end of the day it is 90% qualities of judgment. See to
the if you 1ike
s. H(TJ.
R. But I think that's de-rating it a wee bit.
S. Hm.
R. There's a good deal of consideration and thought goes into this.
S. Hm.
R. Because everyone's acutely aware ,now of how vital it is that you
place the right people in the right jobs., It's so inflexible an
arrangement that you can't undo,it.
S. How about the sort of social aspects to promotion?
R. Do you mean are., there any social bars to promotion?
S. If you like.
R. I t~ink.
S. Or social.advantages?
R. I think, for example, in certain areas the social acts of a
person are important. For example you take the sales , ,
marketing· side. If you get a guy who eats all his food with a
spoon, for example, he's scarcely an appropriate. candidate for
mixing with top level people you're trying to sell them a
multi-million pound order. That sort of thing.
s. Hm.R. That's the extreme example.
s. Hm.
R. But if you take something like engineering and so on, if the
bloke's a very talented engineer and can do his work, it's
difficult to see anything else being an impediment to this.
. ,
S. Well if we took the case of promotion to the Board - there's a
feeling that you don't get on the Board unless you've got a
degree.
R. Well I think ah this in fact - you've got to relate it to age.
I think in this day and age urn there is nothing preventing a
youngster taking a degree.
s. Hm.
R. Ten or fifteen years ago, it was a different matter altogether.
Family pressures and economic pressures could prevent this. I
think in this day and age a youngster coming up should have a
degree if he's got the potential and the capability. There's
nothing in my view that prevents him from doing so. If in fact
he hasn't done so.
s. Hm.
R. Then it generates in my mind a question mark.
S.. What do you mean by young - less than 30?
R. Yea.
s. What about Senior M- fairly Senior Managers of say about 40/45
age group?
R. I don't think a degree is an automatic disbarment. I mean if you
get the guy who is extremely good at his job and doing a crashing
good job.
s. Hm.R. Urn He obviously would be considered for the Board or any other
appointment. It's not a total debar. It is a general
proposition so I think that unless you have just reason for not
having taken a degree, you should have it.
s. Aye.
R. Our particular Board certainly they're all Board people, they're
all professional qualified - or professional qualification. I
really think that's how it should be.
S. Hm.
R. Hm. And as I say, I think the younger people coming up I don't
think this is an unfair screening requirement, if you like.
1IExcerpt~6.44
liThe professional managers differs from the older type of manager
because the older type of manager is there because of his father.
The professional manager is there because of his ability" - Senior
Manager.ExcerptA6.45
s. "What about promotion in your job?
R. In my job •• Nil. Anybody who does the job all right they stay
in it.
s. Hm.
R. But what chance have you got. We feel of promotion. If you do
the job wrong, you're promoted out of the job.
s. Hm.
R. Hm. It seems to be the policy here.
S. Ah.
R. I've applied for a few other jobs in this Company.
S. Hm.
R. For various reasons we got none of them.
S. What sort of reasons do they give?
R. Well, I was asked by the Installation to go on to their group,
who are generally on commission.
s. Yea.
R. I was turned down because "medically unfit".
S. Hm.
R.
S. Hm.
R. The Manager across there has two men in a worse condition than me
working for him on site as workmen. I've had a lot of
experience ••••••••••• nearly thirty years now.
S. But ah.
R. I mean in the department where I am at the moment no one leaves
unless they got out of the Company.
S. Right. They don't want to lose you so to speak,unless they
absolutely have to - take your cards and g01R. Hm.
s. Ah.
R. The chance of promotion, as I say, are practically nil.
s. I mean there are guys who are promoted within the Company if you
take
R. That's one of the bad parts of it."ExcerptpE).46
s. "How important are your prospects of getting promoted?
R. I've got no interest in that whatsoever. I'm too old.
s. How does it seem to you that they promote people here?
R. Well, it's a bit'like when they have to elect a new Pope •••
you know the bloke that's going to get the job just sort of
appears. We don't know how or why it should be him, and not
somebody else. In any case the only real promotion that takes
in this company is in shifting job titles and bodies and
shuffling them round in the sales and marketing division.
S. What about making (A) a director?
R. They were bound to have been there anyhow - these directors have
been created to give them other jobs. The real directors of
the Company are still (M), (T), (C), (5) and (0), mustn't forget
dear old '(0). One gets the opinion they still regard the
others as sub-directors."
3D IExcerpt4'6 .47
S. "What about promotion? What's your prime
R. Again urn at my own level there is' no guarantee. I cannot say,
I cannot expect other people to say that if you do a fair job
for 18 months say you will be considered for something else.
It doesn't really work that way.
S. Hm.
R. Em. Again I must relate future promotion prospects to success
or otherwise in the Company. If the Company continue to
expand, then there is a reasonable chance that my department
will expand
S. Hm.
R. In which case I would like to think about
S. Hm.
R. Promotion. In view of the fact
S. What sort of criteria would you use
in terms of promotion.
R. Urn. Possibly I think urn by the sort of job I do in relation to
the work and the to handle.
S. You mean how well you do the job?
R. How well I do it and how em how much of it there is to do.
S. Hm.
R. Em I wouldn't - if I were only having one or two purchase
requisitions every day I would
obviously perhaps spend more time, perhaps even do a better job
in progressing those requisitions
S. Hm.
R. So, you know, my performance must be measured against my
requirement - what I'm asked to do per day or per week soobviously my performance depends on
S. Do you have any sort of idea how well you've done in
R. Yea. Yea my performance is in the "Company number one, number
two and possibly my - my length of service with the Company,
perhaps in some small way, perhaps my qualifications
might again have some small bearing.
1IExcerptR6.48
S. "What about the promotion? What satisfaction is there to that
on the shop floor, you know, the prospects of promotion?
R. Oh there doesn't seem to be any prospects.
S. Is that something that bothers people or do they just accept it?
R. Just accept it. Granted the Mana, the Foreman that's in just
now, he was taken from the shop floor so you can't really tell.
He would maybe need to take up a new post or retire and he's got
a long way to go.
s.
R. Uhu you've got to apply for the ~~nagement jobs and it's up to
your qualifications whether you got it.
s. Right. Do you think there's enough openings in the Company for
promotion? Do you see it?
R. Well, as far as people in my trade are concerned, there's no
really much chance of promotion unless they're promoted to the
building shop.
s. Astaff job.
R. There's no really many staff situations in here
s. Uhu.
R. Other than up in the drawing office.
s. Aye.
R. Because mostly people in my trade are experienced at either
reading engineering drawings or, being at day release when they
were apprentices, doing engineering drawings.
s. Aye. Urn.
R. But you'll find out that there are more engineers because eh it's
part of their job.
S. So there aren't enough opportunities for promotion. Is that a
source of concern to people or do they just accept it?
304R. They just accept it."ExcerptR6.49
R. "Senior Managers may join unions at some point in the future.
Indeed I've had my chaps in here and told them privately that
they ought to join. That it's the coming thing, because it is
the best way to protect our position in the future. In any case
Managers are natural leaders, the trade unions are losing their
best leaders because Managers aren't in,unions.
S. Do you not think there would be a conflict of loyalty if
Management were to get involved?
R. There's no conflict in Germany, though we would need to have
some practice in Britain, they've been doing it longer than us."ExcerptA6 .50
s. "What do you think is the place of the Trade Unions in the
Company?
R. To represent the interests of their numbers.
S. Do you think there's ever a conflict between that and the
interests of the Company?
R. No, there is no conflict with the Company. Because their
interests are always those of the Company.
s. What about a redundancy? . Are the interests of the Company
and those of the union members the same then?
R. Even in a redundancy the interests are the same, because
without the redundancy, without shedding labour the Company
would close.and everybody would lose their jobs, and those who
leave first get first redundancy payments."Excerpt,96.51
S. "What sort of place is there for unions in your department?
I mean it's not a traditional union area.
R. Well, be careful there"because I came up through the drawing
offices and I ran an engineering department •••• and by the way
I came up through the drawing offices and I was a member of
TASS. I only gave up TASS when I got into Management, so I've
always been used to unions, and from where I sit I would rather
deal with union members than non-union people.
S. Why do you say, that?
R. Well •••• niggers in the wood-pile, you know. I think the way
things are going, industry in general would be better dealing
with unions.
S. Why are you happier to deal with unions?
R. Well you either get the good union people, or the idiot union
people heading them •••• right •••• OK. Well good union people
you can gauge them, you know how to take them. You know they
are either coming for the good of their members, or for the
good of us all - me and their members. The idiots you can
show up, given time. You know who they are, and you know how
to get them.
1IExcerptJ)6.52
S. "What sort of place do you see the Trade Unions having in the
Company? What sort of role do· you see them playing?
R. Oh an absolutely vital role representing the workforce.
S. Hm.
R. No doubts about it whatsoever ahm
S. 00 you think that's a legitimate role?
R. I think it's absolutely necessary and quite legitimate, yes.
S. Hm. 00 you think they play it as much as poss - as much as
they should do? 00 you think it's as fully developed as it
ought to be or should it
R. Trade Unions?
S. Yes.
R. No I don't think so. 1 think this is one of the fundamental
problems. I think eh, particularly this last year or two, a
lot of the legislation ahm has dragged most companies into
S. You mean
R. What?
S.
R. All these sort of things I think has made fairly effective
progress there. I think a lot of companies have been dragged,
some of them' struggling and screaming.
S. Hm.
R. Into the last quarter of the twentieth century and 1 think
that's a good thing because if you look at most of the
legislation it makes it a bit more difficult, some of it is
overdone, but by and large, by and large it's merely bringing
the worst of the sort of cowboys up to the sort of best company
sort of practice.s. Hm
R. And I'm for it. What worries me very much is that I don't
see any corresponding matching movement in the Trade Unions but
it's got to come internally, I don't think it can be externally
applied. I think they've got far too much fragmentation. I
think there's far too much living in the past. I think they've
still got 19th century ideas in some measure in the whole
operation. I think they've got certain fundamental internal
problems with robber barons, if you will.
S. Hm.
R. They've got vested interests in their own organisation
structure and authority.
S. Hm.
R. Urn. This can only be resolved internally. I'm sure of that.
I see no movement here and it worries me.
S. You mean that the
R. No it's not even as simple as that. It's so fragmented it's
not appropriate I think for the - say the tail end of the
tilth century.
S. Hm.
R. It's got to be infinitely more effective, infinitely more
streamlined I'm not suggesting for one minute that the
fundamental role changes, it shouldn't.
S. Hm.
R. That's not the point but the point is the way they go about it.
The way they are organised. The way they're set up urn it's a
most unholy industrial mess if you like. The whole structure.
S. What do you mean by the way they're organised? Do you mean the
fact that there is a proliferation of Unions that you
?,IO=
R. Yes.
S. Can't see ten or eleven Unions being organised?
R. Yes, and I think these'very fragments often poses a lot of
difficulty in industry. One problem causes a lot of needless
strife for a needless problem."
3/1ExcerptAG.53
S. "Why do you feel you don I t need to be in a union?
R. I don't feel I need the security of a union behind me. I've
got reasonable qualifications and I can use that too •••• if
things come to it here where I'm out of a job, I feel
reasonably secure. II
3/i.Excerpt:JJ6.54
S. "Why do you feel you don't need to be in a unton?
R. I tend to be an individual, and if I have to fight for anything
I fight it myself.
S. Have you ever felt it might be to your advantage to join a
union?
R. Well, I have never had to be in the position of having to join
a union. Although that's not to say I haven't been asked.
S. Did you resist when you were asked?
R. Resisting is really too strong a word - there has never been
any arm-twisting.
S. What if there was?
R. Then I would resist it. But it all depends on what kind of
union •••• I've nothing wrong to find with them, providing
they're clean cut •••• moderate.
S. Have you ever felt you've lost out by not being in a union?
You know in the way of pay rises and that?
R. I've been fortunate in that as an individual, I've always
received rises rather than having to ask for them. In the
drawing office days, I did have to ask, and it was a question
of looking up my time-keeping, what was my behaviour like, and
all this carryon •••• I've never had to battle for an increase.
No, I wouldn't say there's been any disadvantage. The most
important thing to me is that I'm an indiviudal, actually.
The thing about being in a union in an office is that there
must be levelling, and that may warp my mind in as far as there
is collective bargaining. And I've always been a section
1eader or a Manager.
1I
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S. 'IDo you think it's fair Management should control the pace at
which people work?
R. They'll be hanged for worse, because once there's a closed shop
the unions can dictate what sort of person you're going to get
in here. You won't get a person of independent mind who'll
say 'No, I don't want to join' - he's got to become a sheep
and join in. You get the wrong type straight away. Then
Management carryon and say /IWell you can't employ him, because
he won't join TASS. It doesn't matter whether it's joining
TASS or joining MATSA.
S. Is this anything to do with trying to halt any trend toward
independence by the Shop-Floor?
R. No, the Shop-Floor have their independence already. Where I
can see the changes coming are in the dictatorial attitudes
against the Staff. The Staff will lose its independence and
become dependent on the union and union policy. It's a bad
thing that if you run a closed shop. If I'm looking with
somebody who can be trained to do his job, my job and my
bosses' job, I'm looking for somebody of a'certain quality.
I don't want somebody coming down and saying he's got to join
such-and-such a union. You might not want to join a union -
but he has to Join, and if he does join then he's reduced to
the mentality. of a sheep.
S. Is it the political persuasion of the unions that turns you
against them?
R. I don't care if TASS is right or left wing. Aunion has to do
a job for its people. What I'm saying is that once you say to
someone, you've got to join a union, or you don't get a Job inthis factory, once you say that youlre reducing him to he's
got to join, a norm ••••••• I don't want everybody to conform
and youtve forced him to conform to that rule.· Nobody can
show his independence, except within the union.
s. Well a lot of people are in unions? Are they all sheep?
R. Yes •• OK •••;. when the Duke of Edinburgh and the First Sea
lord join ASTMS, 1
111 go along with that argument. Are you
going to suggest that lovell of Jodrell Bank should join a
union? If you say nobody can join the AUEW without having
done a craft apprenticeship - that youtre protecting your
craft - 1
111 go along with that, but if you say anybody can
join the AUEW then you've sacrificed the craft part. If
youlve got a CA youlve got somebody who belongs to a
professional body. They won't let anybody in. letts talk
about TASS - technical and supervisory. They go out
recruiting, and they've got all the draughtsmen in. Are
they really technical ••• are they supervisory? No way.
S. Well TASS was the draughtsman's union.
R. So they recruited typists is she technical? - never - doubt it.
Is she supervisory? - certainly not. ASTMS - Association of
Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staff - there's not a
Manager (in here) who's in that. Does away with one letter
Foreman yes, but not one Manager. If they say right welre
only going to have Managers in ASTMS, they would join ASTMS.
Theyt re not going to join with anybody who really ought to be
in the GMWU - the floor-sweepers union.
S. Is the union not a means to equalise the power relationships to
the employer?R. Yes I would go along with that. But the thing about this
closed shop is that it brings in 2 nullifying things - once
you've got to join, what was once an individual choice has
been made a condition, and that is something I don't like.
If a man joins and somebody has persuaded him to join TASS, let
him join TASS, but don't let him join if someone has said
persuade him by saying if you don't join TASS then we won't
work with you. They ought to be able to persuade people.
S. You'd be in favour of them having a choice?
R. You must have and if you're employing somebody, then you want
that somebody to have a choice. II
3/6ExcerptA6.56
s. IIWhat distrinction do you see between being a member of a
Senior Staff Association and being in a Union?
R. Well I feel that the Senior Staff Association had some of,
most of the advantages, I felt it was able to talk to
Management urn to discuss things in a reasonable manner without
having to to have Union backing urn official Union backing, I
felt that we got on well enough with the Senior Staff
Association.
S. Is it the external interference of the Union that you object
to, say for instance if you were a member of the Senior Staff
section of ASTMS that you would feel dictated to by Clive by
Clive Jenkins?
R. To some extent, yes, I feel that there's always a chance of
some sort of external pressure which I don't think I would
welcome. Plus also em (what was I going to say)
S. How do you mean external pressure? Do you mean external to
the Firm or do you mean external to the senior staff of the
Firm? Because there are a lot of people in say ASTMS like
Foremen or junior staff. Is it becoming involved in their
disputes with the Management that urn puts you off?
R. Yes I would, I would say, I would say both actually. I also
feel that em to be in a Union to negotiate as one body would
tend to lose some flexibility urn. I feel that this isn't
necessarilY.the fault of the Unions but I feel that present
Company, eh present Government policy means that wage levels
are negotiated between the Government and Union.
S. Hm.
R. And there is absolutely no room under the present system forflexibility urn for example for merit increases.
S. Hm. That - for the individual?
R. For the individual. Obviously if I consider I've done a
better job than others there's no way this can be reflected
by increased emolument. In fact I think the same would
extend to buyers. And then again I think there are people in
the Company in Senior Staff positions urn in other divisions of
the Company who do much less than my Department.
S. Who do you think in terms of volume of work
in terms of contribution to the Company?
R. Well. generally?
S. Generally.
R. Well generally in terms of contribution to the Company and I
feel that there's very little - once we all become part of the
Union. Senior Staff whatever but you know there is
no way we can say look we know that other people in other
parts of the Company are being paid more for doing what we can
gather is roughly the same sort of supervising job urn we can't
say to them we think perhaps our job should be regarded if you
like.
S. Urn.
R. I think that once we're all in one Union we'd tend to lose
some felxibility.
S. Do you think
R. Urn. Going back I'm not explaining myself very well. two
reasons. That basically is the first reason - lack of
flexibility. and the second reason is that I think we had
adequate machinery beforehand through the Senior Staff
Association.s. You had this flexibility before?
R. Yes. Well we had more flexibility and it seemed to work to me
without too many problems then and I didn't see the necessity to
disband.
S. How would you feel if the Company operated a
R. Closed shop? Closed shop for staff? I think it would be a
very. very bad thing. I think it would be a very. very. sad
reflection. the way things are going generally if this in
fact happened.
S. For the reasons that you have given?
R. For the reasons I've given also perhaps em I think. you know.
to continue the conversation on a higher I think to ban
someone because he hoesn't want to belong to a Union would be
the same thing as banning someone through a religious belief or
something like that. I think you get involved in a very. very
discrimination here. Of course I really think
that once you become as inflexible as that then this is where
you find yourself in trouble.
S. Hm.
R. Of course um there's also self determination which you would
lose. I think.
S. People who are in a Union might say that people out the. the
Unions exists to carryon the collective struggle. if you like.
R. Hm.
S. Of the employee vis a vis Management and that people who aren't
members of a Union um are opting out of the struggle but still
reap the benefits of it. At the end of the day they still get
the wage rise whether they are members of a Union or not.R. Yes. OK but again it's freedom of choice. I don't object to
people being in Unions ahm and so I don't think people should
object to my not being in a Union. As regards salary, I can
only say that the Company pays me for doing a job of work which
is going to get done whether or not I am in a Union, therefore
the Company would find it very. very difficult to
discriminate on that basis.
S. Yea but I think that
R. I think not to my belief in Union or otherwise.
S. Right my argument is that urn non-Union members get the
benefits of Union activities without bearing the cost. Direct
costs by paying Union subscriptions, the less frequent costs
some sort of industrial action, in order to
get the benefits without bearing the cost.
R. I don't think this is the benefit of being or not being
in a Union. I think this is for the benefit of urn increased
productivity or certain vital profit which enables the Company
to grant a wage increase. There are - I know they don't I
don't equate the work that's being part of a Union.
S. Hm.
R. Also perhaps ah another point is that we do have still, a
Senior Staff Association if you like. consisting of a body of
what they call non-aligned members and the non-aligned members
can approach Personnel Department and iron out any problems.
S. Hm.
R. As I have personally done on one or two occasions.
S. Hm.
R. So that er I really don't think that they have negotiated if
you like anything that I might have negotiated myself.-
s. ~.
R. Can I say this one other point? Am. Again I think that
rises at the moment, OK my last increase was 10%, um which
was in line with um Government guide lines and I think it was
something that would probably been offered irrespective of
Union membership.
s. ~. Do you think that you would have got what you have got
whether you were a member of a Union or not?
R. Yes I do. Although, I must be fair. I think perhaps a
productivity agreement was
s. ~.
R. Perhaps negotiated between Union and Management.
S. Hm.
R. Which mayor may not have arisen in its present form.
S. Ahm. Do you think that the conditions in the Company would
be as they are today without the activity of the Trade Unions?
Or do you think they would be less good - or better?
R. I think the salary levels
S. ~.
R. Particularly of the engineering workers.
S. You mean shop floor workers?
R. Shop floor people. boiler makers. fitters etc. These are
negotiated at national levels and I think these national levels
have been reached by Trade Union involvement. and I think
rightly so.
S. Hm.
R. And I think, in my position. my salary level is perhaps more
determined by qualifications. experience and scarcity value.
you could put it that way.
3~1and I would
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s. So you would think that whether the Union has probably
benefitted the shop floor, the staff
R. To a much lesser extent.
S. They would accomplish more or less what they have accomplished
in the Unions?
R. Yes, I think so.
S. Um.
R.
S.
R. No I understand and frankly it's a subject that I don't feel too
strongly about. If, at the end of the day, someone came along
and said to me "You have to be in the Union otherwise you can't
work for the Firm" well there is no way that my wife and family
would suffer because of some sort of
S. Hm.
R.
join the Union.
S. You're not going to martyr yourself?
R. I'm not going to martyr myself for something I don't believe
in. I would join the Union but, at the same time, I would
like to think there would always exist some freedom of choice.
S. Hm.
R. Which I could exercise.
S. Hm.
R. Also I - if· the Company offered me terms which were less than
equivalent to non-Union members or if I thought I was being
particularly hard done to then I would think again, but at the
moment this hasn't happened, and I've no reason to."ExcerptA6.57
S. "Why do you feel you need to be in a Trade Union?
R. I think that as an individual you've got to organise yourself
against organised Management."
,2.3s.
R.
s.
R.
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S. "Why do you feel you need to be in a union?
R. Well, the clerical side of industry has always been
unprotected. If you were on the Shop-Floor and you had a
trade, then you knew how much the man beside you makes. But
that's impossible for Staff - even if you Ire in the TASS union.
But at least it safeguards you a bit. I mean live worked in
offices where there's been no union, and I can see the
difference here. live worked in offices where the boss would
come up and say Iyou're getting 5/- but don't tell anybody'.
How important is the union to you?
Well, 1
1m57 now, but I always felt that if youlre in a union,
youlre going to get a certain amount of justice. Aunion is
about the most important thing you can get. If youlre a
member, youlre a member and that's about it.
Do you feel the Management ignore you?
If it's just a collection of individuals youlre just no going
to bother so much about them, it's only the fact youlve got so
many, and the fact that recently our members have swelled.
We must be in the region of 85% union membership.ExcerptA6.59
S. "Why do you feel that you need to be in a Union?
R. Because too much between people. Some people are very forward
in getting rises
S. Hm.
R. Like
S. Hm.
R. People don't understand work. The operators want one
collective bargain to knock back the works as well as the
individuals.
S. Should there be differentiation between
R. Large differentiation
S. the same thing. Is that the
principal reason for coming into the Union?
R. Well it also covers you in the various backings.
S. Uhu.
R. I mean to ask for references. Right
methods and wrong methods to do.
S. Hm. How ,important is the Union to you?
R. Well at the moment they've got everything we have been trying
to get.
S. Hm.
R. We have to go to a Union level to negotiate.'
S. Right.
R. Some of the things the Management have argued will have to go to
higher levels.
S. Right. Right you've got to use the Union to resist the
Management?R. Yea.
S. Urn. How does the how does the Union operate for you?
What does it do for you?
R. The last thing we had to grumble at was working Easter
Monday.
S. Hm.
R. The works turned round and said they would pay us time and a
half and a day off. Agreement between TUe and CBI is double
time and a day off.
S. Hm.
R. Well Christmas Day in England, New Year's Day in Scotland and
Easter Monday. The awkward part here is that the works have
decided not to take Easter Monday as a bank holiday.
They're going to take it later in the month.
S. Hm.
R. Which makes the staff out on a limb.
S. Right. So what did the Union do? How did the Union. as a
body, help you?
R. It started about three years ago. We've had arguments every
year but this time and a half from the Management. we could
not argue direct with them with nothing for backing so we
went to the Branch level. found out a copy of the document.
to present to the Management. The Chairman of this Company •
and also the Chairman of the CBI.
S. Hm.
R. So, if they had agreed on one thing and weren't applying it in
their own works.
S. Hm.R. rt would r think have been detrimental to the CBr side.
S. Right. So the Union gave you the information?
R. They gave us the information and the backing.
S. Hm.
R. Because the TUe side of it made the agreement. Not just one
Union.
S. Right.
R. So, if they weren't going to pay the proper rates, it
wouldn't just be one Union it would be all Unions affected.
S. Hm. So the Management knew that you had outside backing?
R. Oh yes. And inside. All the Unions inside would back as
well.
S. Hm. What about do they get time and half
or double time?
R. They were told the same - time and a half.
S. And how were they paid?
R. They were paid double time.
S. Paid double time. Ah
R. Just by that push.
S. From your'Union or from their Union as well?
R. Yes, we instigated it
S. Hm.
R. But we've got the joint Staff Union who have meetings now and
again.
S. Right.
R. To eh go through the normal procedures.
S. Hm.
R. As soon as we threaten them with the CBr instructions.
S. Hm.R. They just turn round and say right then it's double time.
S. Hm. What sort of relationship does your Union have as regards
traditional Union what sort of
relationship do you have with each other?
R.
S. Well what
R. At the moment the area Union representative for TASS which
is part of the AUEW is who is an hourly paid
man, he wants to get in on every meeting where a union
representative of TASS is taking place in a meeting. We don't
want him.
S. Why?
R. How can an hourly paid man fight for senior staff positions?
Different areas altogether.
S. Hm. Some people might say that you're all employees, that
you all contribute to the Company.
R. Yes. I agree with that.
S. It's just a fact that you get paid, you get a salary and he is
hourly paid?
R. Yes, we get a standing wage, they don't. It's different
contracts.
S. Hm.
R. Of employment.
S. Hm. Should you not be moving towards the same contract?
R. Well we have. We agreed for the same holidays.
S. But at different times?
R. Yes but that wasn't supposed to be implemented until next
year. .But the works have now, with a separate agreement
with the works Management got
318s. Yea
R. So it's this year the thing works.
S. Hm.
R. Now works, being the majority of people in the factory, is
taking more holidays than staff already have.
S. Hm.
R. Which is one of the differentials we had before. You know
taking, statutory holidays, the fixed, say at the fair, and
then we could have discretionary holidays when we liked.
S. Right. Would it not be feasible for the staff Unions and
the shop floor'Unions to sit down and agree among themselves
what holidays they take then present the situation to the
Management?
R. Because the works won't agree.
S. How do you know that? .
R. We've already tried, for the September week.
S. Hm.
R. What happened was we, each Union was told to take a ballot
vote by it's own members for which weeks we put forward.
S. Hm.
R. Four or five weeks.
S. Hm.
R. The majority of the works they said voted for the September
week. Well it was allocated last year.
S. Uhu.
R. But all the staff, the majority went against that week, because
their children weren't on holiday. They were on holiday the
following week.
S. Hm.to see the
The works wouldn't have it. They said, our's is a block vote
so many counts all for that one week.
Hm.
We approached various people on the shop floor who said we
don't want that week.
Hm. Ah. What about your Union - how much has it improved
conditions in the - for you?
For us? Quite a bit. It arrowheads quite a few of
the staff increases in here.
Hm.
And then the ways of getting me again 7p per hour for glasses.
Right. You are getting paid that as well?
Yes. Everybody who works in the works gets the 7p an hour.
Hm. Ah. In terms of salary say, how much has the Union
helped? Before Government legislation came in.
I'm going quite a while back in thoughts. They gave us quite
a few advisory sessions.
Yea they get - their main function really for you has been the
information that they give you?
Yea. At the moment they are still fighting for a few of us on
the test side of things because of the noise.
Hm.
The works were against the noise.
Hm.
In their fight they have had the whole end of the far end of
Bay 12 there blocked off.
R. So we wanted
difference between people
Hm. S.
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Yea.
But what about all the people working inside?
Hm.
The noise level inside has increased because it is reflected.
Hm. So what's the ?
There's no dispensation given to anybody working in that area.
If we get something, the workmen working in that area will be
bound to get it.
Hm.
But their Union's not following up at all.
Hm. It's urn - what sort of waul d you term
Bay 13? Is it extra payments or
Well something like differential.
~ou're looking for money rather than protection?
No. First of all more protection for the ears.
Just these muffs?
Those muffs - they're not much good.
Hm. They stop you going completely deaf? They're not much
use?
They stop a bit, but we are talking about 120-130 decibels.
Hm. True
You should hear when we are firing 2 shafts that's the noise
monger.
I wouldn't know if you were firing two shafts.
You'd know by the noise.
Or whether it was three.
Urn.
Well put it like this they've had 90 odd decibels in Woolworths
when one of these is running."
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S. "Why do you feel you need to be in a union?
R. Oh, for job security. That's number one. But I don't think
the union I'm in just now, TASS, does anything an internal
union couldn't do. I mean, I think the subs we pay don't do
any good for me at all. It's all national and external stuff
that our money goes for.
S. Is the union not really important to you then?
R. Yes, the union certainly is important to my working life.
Though that's not the national union, it's not done a great
deal for me. But the union internally it has done a lot.
Wages, conditions, holidays - it's improved all of these
without too much bother. You know, without too much strike
action. By going about it in a reasonable manner."
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s. IIWhy do you feel that you need to be in a Union?
R. I think it safeguards you.
s. Protection?
R. Protection wise aye.
S. Against who or against what?
R. Against conditions, against money, everything.
S. How do you mean against - against bad conditions?
R. Bad conditions. If you're all together and if you're
fighting for something, you've got a better chance if you're
all together than if you were just singular.
S. Right. Who would you be fighting against?
R. Management I suppose.
S. ~. Urn.
R. And working conditions.
S. You would be fighting against the conditions and they would,
they would for you?
R. laid down, uhu.
S. They'd try to minimise them?
R. Well, if you weren't happy with the conditions
S. Yea.
R. And there was a few of you that wasn't happy with the
conditions you could do something about it if you were all
more or less together.
S. Right. That
R. But if you were just singular
S. That you need the collective strength to give you this
protection against, against the Management?
333R. Uhu.
S. Am. Now how important is it to you to be in a Union?
R. Just personally do you mean?
S. Hm.
R. Just that they can do the things I said.
S. Yea. How important is it?
R. Very important.
S. Very important. Is it something you just accept?
R. I suppose you do just accept it.
S. Is it something
R. Well for a start - you son't get a job in here unless you
are in the Union.
S. Yes it's a closed shop. Yea. To that extent it's a fact
of life. It's something that you've
R. Aye well it's a good thing as well, because
S. Yes.
R. If you've served your time and
S. It gives you protection?
R. It gives you protection for a job.
S. Right. Is it to you more a means to an end rather than an
end in itself? You don't value the Trade Union Movement in
itself it's something that will accomplish something for you?
R. I suppose it is that'll accomplish something.
S. It's more that than something you feel you ought to belong to?
R. I think it's a good thing to belong to it.
S. Right. Because of the because of what it will achieve for
you?
R. Because we're the workers and we need to belong to something.
Something that will some kind of committee or
)31 _something, you know.
S. You need to belong to some sort of working class movement?
What is it that the Union does for you? I mean I know that
you say that it protects you against conditions and so on but
how does it actually do this?
R. Just safety in numbers. This is it as far as I'm concerned.
S. It's collective strength?
R. It's collective strength. If you don't like something you
could get your Shop Steward to do something about it.
s. Hm. Is it as effective as it might be?
R. I suppose it is.
S. Do you feel it is too effective? Some people might say that
the Unions are too strong - that they run the country and not
the Government. Do you feel that they're that strong?
R. No I think they're pretty strong but I don't think they need
any more for the working man.
S. Hm.
R. The workers need support.
S. You mean that they're only strong if they need to be?
R. Well see I personally don't bother too much about it but
S. Hm.
R. You see well if there's any trouble I can go to my Shop
Steward and he can see what he can do about it you know.
S. It's not something you think about every day it's just that
you like to know that it's there?
R. Well I know it's there you know
S. For you to use if you need to use it?
R. Yes.
S. Um."Excerpt46.62
S. "What sort of function do you think the Union plays in here?
R. What sort of function do 1 think the Union plays in here?
S. Yes, what sort of role does it play?
R. I think it plays an important role in respect of looking after
the men's welfare and working conditions, hourly rate of wages,
looking after any - how would you put it - injustices that may
occur to the men, investigating circumstances and also playing
a role where we see possible trouble arising from failings of
Management or, on occasion, failings of men, we try and
intervene and make it right.
S. How much does the Management appreciate this?
R. Well they don't pay us enough, let me put it that way.
S. 1 mean the function of the Union, .1 don't mean it that other
way.
R. Well, 1 think that the Management, by way of the Government
and by way of general outside pressures, everybody is
beginning to realise that the Unions have a place, and a big
place, in industry and should be playing a more important part
than what they are and 1 think over the last few years they are
beginning to playa more important part.
S. What sort of Unions would interest you? Would you alter them?
R. Well I would say in the area of the working conditions that
workers and works fancy. Look, just to give you an example of
a recent, this is over the last year or so, a couple of years,
the safety angle, the workers are getting very interested and
very serious about the safety situation which I think 1s good.
But, their basic interest is to better their working
conditions and their working wages and they are even goingbeyond that because there are policies being laid down and I
think the Unions are beginning to playa full part as they
should be.
S. How much has the increased interest helped the health and
safety of workers? How much by the Unions themselves?
R. Well I think we are trying our best. I think we are doing not
too bad but it is in its infancy just now. I think it is
something that has only started and will take a couple of years
before anyone really sees the fruits of their results - or their
efforts I should say.
S. Do you ever feel that the Management would like to do without
you.
R. Do without Unions? ;That's always the feeling there's no doubt
about that. No doubt about that at all but then you would have
to go back. I would have to add a rider to that. I would
have to go back to ten, fifteen, twenty'and thirty years ago,
they would not mind it so now but they might be on a stickier
wicket because I think that men are a wee bit more sensible, if
you like, and they would never get away with the things they
got away with ten, fifteen years ago over the last eight or nine
years. What they got away with then prior to Unions really
taking a grip on society.
S. Do you think there has been a reduction in Managerial authority?
R. I think there has been a reduction in Managerial authority. I
think there has been a reduction in Managerial authority.N-ExcerptA6.63
S. "If you were either being represented at Board level or
receiving much more information from the Company than you are
at the moment and they changed their word or policy or they took
evasive policy you did not agree on, how then would you find it
easy to convince the membership to, in the last resort, to come
out on strike over it.
R. I think you would find it very, very, very difficult, very
difficult. You would need to have a real change of climate,
everything before you could get to that stage. You are
talking away years ahead. But that's the position people are
working to. Not necessarily to come out on strike but to have
the say so and influence to be able to show the men that such
and such is not going to be helpful. That change of policy is
not going to be helpful to the men in this area.
S. What do you think the obstacles to that are?
R. Well the obstacles are always profit. Multi-nationals. The
shifting their jobs down from here to England because, and no
argument about it. It's better suited. But then life
cannot be like that. You know, you cannot have - you all
cannot be - it's all suitable the way Britain is going just
now for every industry to be located in the south east of
England but,it cannot happen so people are going to have to
have social works and social situations. We are already
beginning to talk about them and people are going to have to
realise that that's how life is going to be. Either that
you're just going to-have your four or five million unemployed.
There is no doubt about it because the way things are going
just now in the world, everything is being automated.n
S.
R.
S.
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R.
Everything is being classed in such a manner that you're either
going to have the millions unemployed.
Right. What do you think the obstacles are in getting the
guys to come out and support you in that sort of policy?
Well it would depend on your previous actions and your
previous way of working whether the men trusted you. Are
you talking about a Convenor or a Shop Steward?
Shop Stewards.
Shop Stewards as a body trying to get men to come out on
strike because of a situation that there has been a change of
policy on the work on the Board?
Yes.
I think it would be very, very difficult but I think, at the
end of day, you might just manage it because the men trust the
Shop Stewards but then how long ,that trust, how long that's
going to remain.
More difficult say than getting them to come out on strike for
a wage rise?
No. It would be easier to get them out on strike for a wage
rise for that's in front of their faces and it's easily
arguable. It's there in front of them.
They understand.
It's more easily understood and with the information that
you've got you can explain it away. It is going to be very
difficult for somebody, say that's had five or six years
teaching under Traee Union or whereever night school or day
school, to sit on a Board and then he comes down and tries to
explain how the situation, by the change of policy on the
Board, reflects on the men and get the men to come out onstrike because of his thoughts. It's going to be a hard job
getting Shop Stewards never mind getting the men."Now you're in a Union?
Why do you feel that you need to be in a Union?
Well eh it's the policy of the Company that you've got to be
in a Union.
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S. "Urn.
R. Yes.
S.
R.
s. Hm. Do you think you get any advantages by being in the
Union?
R. Just the advantage of ah negotiating for rises or that.
there's nothing else bar if you go on strike you get a bit of
strike benefit.
S. Hm. Now you feel the main thing is that they negotiate on
your behalf?
R. Aye.
S. Urn. Could you negotiate yourself if there wasn't a Union?
Do you think you could do
R. Well some people could you know. I suppose I could.
S. Hm. How important is it to you being in a Union?
R. How do you mean important?
S. Well is it something that's important to you in your work?
R. No it's no. It's just I'm in the Union and that's it.
S. It's there
R. I'm no a Union man. I don't go to meetings
S. Hm.
R. Take part in anything."
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s. IIWhy do you feel you need to be in a Union?
R. Well, when you're all together, er more people, you know one
voice isn't much good. I think you need
s.
R. Yes.
S. At what point did you feel that you needed to be in a Union?
R. When I came out at first I didn't see much real need for it.
you know. but as time goes on I see what they can do for you.
you know speak for you and the men know all about it. other
Shop Stewards and that.
S. Uhu they've got knowledge that
R. They know
S. You don't
R. Yea.
S. That you don't have?
R. I don't have.
S. So what sort of thing is it that the Union does for you?
R. Doing in the most part you know bargaining and things like
that. II
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S. "Are the Board really as badly informed as it seems to me,
sometimes?
R. Probably its even worse than it seems to you. You see they've
got no interest in the nitty-gritty - what goes on down here,
with what I've got to do. They're too busy with their big
pictures, but they haven't got the inclination to see that mY
nitty-gritty affects this, and what its going to mean for them.
S. But do you tell them as much as you should?
R. No, probably if I'm being honest we don't inform them
effectively, because it doesn't suit us - or else they don't
want to know if its a problem.
S. Are the lines of communication in the Firm too long?
R. Well that all depends. Sometimes yes, sometimes no. We
talk a lot about communication in here, but we don't do much
about it. You know there's anything up to 6 levels of
communication in this place. But I don't think everything
should be passed on up. Authority ought to be delegated to the
proper level. It ought to be, but it's not properly
established in this Company. You'll get a problem dumped on
you by your Director, and he'll make it clear it's up to you to
solve it - but if it suits him he'll be nosing around,
interfering. And that's all the worse because some of the
Board don't know what's going on in this place - often because
they simply don't want to know.
S. Why?
R. I don't know - can't be bothered, frightened to get involved.
I mean look at (a Director). He didn't take the action he
should have in 1976, and now he's paid for it. I mean-
(another Senior Manager) used to go and tell him regularly at
that time that'weneeded to do this and that. But he would
never listen, and eventually we just shrugged our shoulders
and said 'it's up to you, you're the boss.'
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s. "What sort of things do you look for the Company you work for?
R. I look for interest in a particular job and I look for respect.
S. That you respect them and they respect you in return?
R. I'm not so much worried about their respecting me. Ahm.
We all think in fact that if we do our job properly that the
guy above will respect us. We don't go about consciously
thinking he. must have respect forme but I find it important.
as far as I am concerned, that in my history I have left
Companies immediately I feel that I'm not learning from the
guy above. II
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S. "What do you look for in your supervisor? ~lhat qualities do
you look for?
R. The guys in charge of me are my immediate boss, ( )
and (a director), and I have quite a lot of communication with
them. They pass on staff to me, to delegate and so on.
That's the criteria I use. The communications I have with
them, and the manner in which I get on with them. ,.
S. How do you get on with them?
R. Hm. Very well.
s. On a personal basis?
R. Well, not socially - just personally in here. We don't visit
each other's houses, or meet socially or anything like that,
but we get along while we're at work.
S. So there's a difference between the personal and the
professional. What is 'important to you is how you get on with
them professionally?
R. Yes, there's'a good feed-back. There's a good rapport.""What's the supervision like in here?
In my situation it's good, because I know the bloke I work
with. I knew him from a previous jub. I know that he knew
his work.
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s. What sort of qualities do you look for from him?
R. This job can be fairly complicated: especially in the first
few months, and you need somebody that can watch over you.
It's all up to the supervisor. If he can train his squad to
a fairly high degree he's got no problems after that. You
always look for the man to assist you if you hit something
that's completely foreign to you, or completely new to you.
On the costs side there's always something that's going to
crop up which no one has ever seen before and you look for
higher-up to to get you out of that. And to do it in the
simplest way. Everybody can get out in a very complicated
way. You're always looking for the man to have the
experience to get you out in the simplest way.
S. What about the personal basis?
R. Yes, it's good in here. But it has to be a mixture of this
and of experience. It's no use having an easy-going boss if
he can't get you out of difficulties."
•
. .
7Excerptl}6.70
S. "What kind of supervision do you get then? What's the
supervision like?
R. None.
S. Why? Why is that?
R. Well there's two of us working on electrical panels.
S. Hm.
R. The Manager for our department is mechanical, who supervises
the test results and mechanical problems with one of the
mechanical test engineers.
S. Hm.
R. As far as electrical work is concerned he is lost.
S. What happens if you hit a problem that you yourself can't?
R. We've got to go for outside assistance. Outside the
department.
S. Right. What about
R. Design, things like that.
S. Hm.
R. Or go to the vendors.
S. Right. What sort of thing would you be looking for from
your Supervisor to be a good supervisor?
R. Somebody that knew the job.
S. That would
R. Vis a vis electrical.
S. That would be the only, the basic thing you would be looking
for?
R. It would be the major thing. Somebody that could describe
something in terms you would understand.
S. Hm. Ah. What else would you .look for from him or would
r'" .,that be that - the fact that he knows the job?
R. Well somebody that would back you if you found the fault and
started arguing with people in other departments.
S. Right. Do you ever feel too closely supervised?
R. No. We're never supervised.
S. Hm.
R. We're well aware of the fact that nobody would ever say a word.,
S. Do you feel - have you ever felt too closely supervised in the
Company?
R. No. It has always been the same.
S. Ah. Is it the same in every - all departments.
R. On the staff side no.' There are one or two departments' where
they are watched quite closely.
s. Uhu.
R. The most of their jobs relate to a desk or drawing board.
Well ours is anywhere in the factory or outside the works at
different places.
S. Uhu.
R. We have the use of private 'phones - we're always following
•
up panel procedures.
S. Hm.
R. So it's more or less up to yourself."
',',
" 'n
Ex.cerptfl6.71
S. "How do you judge your supervisor?
R. Mostly that I've got an easy work-flow, and I get good results.
S. Is it inadequate in any way?
R. I like to think that when I do a job and do it correctly and
send it out, then that's it done. But seemingly it's not,
because 2 days later somebody tells me it's all changed and I've
got to re-call it, and re-do it, and send it out again. This
can go on three or four or five times. You see we do drawing
> •
we call 'reving' them - that's when you alter it. We find
.jobs that are only a month old and there's five or six 'revs'
on it. Not through mistakes, through alterations. This
might not be our management - it might be the management of our
suppliers changing their goods. .1 judge that as bad
. supervision somewhere when it's happening to such an extent•
.S. What about the personal side of supervision? ..'
R. On the personal side - relationships are fair.
S. .Are there any problems?
R. Well, there's no real communication between me and mY
supervisor. He doesn't seem to want to know what we think and
to a certain extent we don't want to know what he thinks•. 1
think there's quite a wall there. Another thing is that at
college I've been taught newer techniques, but when I come in
.here I'm forced to.go back to older techniques which are quite
visibly not as efficient. But we're not allowed to use the
techniques we've learned. The CompanY spends all that money
sending me to college. I come in. here with ~ll I've.been..
taught and 1
1mtold to throw it all out the window and start
again. They want to keep it to the old ways."•
Excerptt16. 72
S. "What about the supervision you've got? How satisfied are you
with that?
R. I'm satisfied.
S. What do you judge that against? What do you think a good
Supervisor is?
R. A good Supervisor - well I've been in places that supervision
is terrible. You know, they're actually breathing on top of
you. Now I don't know how you feel, you know, about somebody
leaning over you while you're working.
S. Hm.
R. As far as I'm concerned, it annoys you, because you've always
got that feeling in case you do something wrong.
S. Hm. They're going to jump on you?
R. Aye they're going to jump on you.
S. Urn. Do you ever feel that when that happens that they don't
trust you?
R. Well it is the way I look at it. There's no trust in your,
you know, capabilities.
S. Urn.
R. You've got to have trust in the person who is doing the job or
you'll never get the job done right.
S. Yea. Urn. What is the supervision like in here? They
supervise to what extent?
R. Well, they leave you to get on with the job.
S.. Hm.
R. They give you a chargehand who tells you what to do and leaves
you to get on with it.
S. Yea•R. Which is good.
S. And they just come and check it at the end?
R. Check it. IIExcerptA6.73
S. "What about the supervision you get? How's that?
R. It's all right, you know.
S., What do you get?
R. The gaffer just gives me the job and you just get ahead and do
it the best you can•.
S.,
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
S.
R.
Hm.
If you come up against any problems you go and see him.
Right. And he'll tell you what to do? "
Well you'll say to him maybe the best way you think to do it
and he'll say to you.
Hm.
Or else he'll just tell you what to do.
Right. If you've got no
If you've got no problems you just carryon and the job gets
done.
• • ~ < ,
S. What sort of qualities do you look for in a Supervisor?
R. I think somebody that's kind of fair - somebody that's fair to
me.
S.
R.
S.
R.
s.
R.
s.
R.
In what sort of respects? '. :'
Well he's not on your back all the time, he knows that if he
gives you a job you'll do it.
That you want to be trusted?
Aye you can, be trusted aye you ,want him to give you ..~ ljo~ and
then that's it done, you know.
Right. And do you feel that you get that?
Some gaffers you do and some you don't. <,'
Am. In general. ' : . ,>-
You see to be a gaffer I think you have to.be a kind of bad oneYou know, you know what I mean?
.Aye, aye, sort of dancing about on one leg after
:Are most of them like that?
;you know to get respect. You need to be kind of bad to get
;respect if you're a gaffer you know kind of frighten the men•
.s. 'Hm. Hm.
-R. ,They let them think they can but they don't.
S.· Hm. Hm.
R.
S.
R. I think there's a lot of gaffers chancers. Alot of'them are
chancers you know. '. . " i
S. 'Are there any ones that are more like that than others? Is
it the older ones that are like that more than the younger ones
or the other way round?
R. No I wouldn't say so I think it's just about even.
S. Just a random sort of thing? It depends on the bloke.
R. Just depends on the bloke and depends on yourself as well.
S. Hm. What does it depend on?
R. Well a lot of guys aren't willing to do a wee bit like I do.
S. Hm.
R. It's up to individuals but, if the gaffer treats you all right.
well I think you should treat him OK.
S. Hm. Urn. What about the variety in your job? The work
that you've got to do - do you find it interesting?
R. Aye it's quite interesting but at times it can be boring
depending where you're working at the time.
S. Right.
R. I mean when we're doing welding down the shop - in the shop~
the pipes just come off the table and we build them up
S. Right.
354
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R. . ~ell you're standing at a bench all day and you're welding
these pipes all day.
S. Hm.
R. And you're just welding.
S. Right.
R.. You know all the time
S. Uhu.
R. But if you're out on the assembly you only go to one job and
you're maybe giving somebody a weld and then somebody over the
other end of the shop wants a weld so you're away down there
S. Moving about?
R. In a different position you know that's
S. Makes it more interesting?
R. Abit of variety there.
1I
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S. "What about the Supervisors in the Company?, What is your
,impression of the supervision? Here. in general.
R. In general. very poor.
S. In what sort of respect?
R. Well. I think they concentrate all their time. most of their
time. on paperwork and trying to do some of the workers down.
trying to get at people. using their own particular position
for getting people they don't think are doing their job.
Well some of them could be doing a good job. I don't think
they are - they're not progressing the work the way they ,
should be. Their time doesn't seem to be spent going to
groups of men that are working on jobs. seeing how they are
getting on with their job and progressing their job from
there.
S. 'How much is that a throwback to the bowler hat days?
R.I think it is a continuation of the bowler hat days. You
know it hasn't really changed a great deal in here.
S. How much has the fact that since then. with the development
,of Management Services and Work Study and so on. ,to some
extent has reduced their lowly foremen? How much has that·
R. I would agree that the Work Study, and that kind of development
has reduced the role of the foreman sometimes to a1negative
role. sometimes to a disciplinary role. which is all wrong.
'The man should be'in there for his ability in the job and his
knowledge of the job and his knowledge and helping people
progress jobs through the factory. They are not being used
and applied in that manner in here.
S. What sort of role should a foreman have?R. Aforeman should have the role of getting out, being able to go
to groups of men or individual men who are working on groups of
jobs or individual jobs and helping them, advising them on their
job, seeing how they are getting on in their job, checking on
their job, seeing if they are, for instance we have a situation
in here where we are getting what is known as kit marshalling
and we find that you could go round there just now and send a
man for a kit he wouldn't get a complete kit. These kind of
situations he's losing time in having to go and hunt up certain
parts of that kit and I think these things should be done by
the foreman seeing that the kit is there fully and delegating
other people whose job it is to get the kit there to do their
jobs and then to see that the man gets the full kit and goes and
does his job.
S. The role of the foreman ought to be to facilitate the guy's
production?
R. Aye, that's right.
S. How does that relate to the role of the Shop Steward then?
R. The role of the Shop Steward isn't to stop the bloke producing
or to help him produce, one way or the other. All the
inter-man is to make sure that the man doesn't get put upon or
the man is fully aware of his rights and that there is nothing
untoward occurring that would go against the principals of,the
Trade Union or the principals or the dignity of the person doing
the job."
3J7appendix 7fJpfenJ;xseven ,~ . .
ThiS~f~iX is composed of 4 sections, whose main relationship is
that none of them fitted well into any of the preceding 3 Chapters of
empirical data. The issues we shall raise are as follows.
1) The role of the media on the perceptions of respondents, in
particular the role of TV'news and current affairs, as well as
newspapers in forming opinion.
2) The perceived nature and experience of the locality.
3) Reported interaction by respondents both within and between
categories.
4) ,Aseries of questions, which explore in a general way much of the
ground covered up to'now, but this time using the Semantic'Differential
method. This is to establish to what extent our earlier results are
accurate.
By the end of this"rf'ltJiX we shall have explored all'the' elements of
the model presented in Chapter 1. ' ,
i .-f I j
Role of the Media
We :'. h4v~. c1f!Jued. alre.atiJ:-'· that there is a
sufficiently high level of consensus in the Company that the type of
system crisis, referred to by Habermas, has not developed here.
During the 1970's the failure of such tendencies to manifest them~
selves led some researchers, and theorists, to consider the role of
. .
the media ie that crisis in the capitalist system was being
restrained by the influence of the structure of the information
presented by.the media but for the influence of TV news and
current affairs programmes, the working class would be more likely to
rise up and overthrow capitalism as a whole. For our purposes. it
~ould be argued, that it is the role of the media which. in part alsoIt would be useful, at this stage, to briefly re,,:,ca11 the theoretical
argument which underlies this approach. Probab1y;among the best ,
known researchers in this tradition are the Glasgow Univer~it~ Media
Group, in 'Bad News' and 'More Bad News' who examined the presentat-
ion,of TV news over a 6 month period (January - June 1975), and in
particular the presentation of strikes.
They begin by pointing to,ev1dence which suggests that TV news is
regarded as more objective than news in the press, by most people
eg they qupte BBC audience research which shows that,75% of those
for,whom BBC news was their main source of news, regarded the BBC
as the most accurate and trustworthy source of news. Similarly
59%:of those for whom lTN was their main source of news"reg~rded
ITN as the most accurate and trustworthy source. ,For those who, took.
most of their news from newspapers, the corresponding,figure ~as 27%
(Bad News pg 3). As the Media Group point out, however, ,trust is
not'impartia1ity, and this appears to have diminished. t :',;They quote,
figures which show that whi1e-62% regarded the BBC as impartial in
1962, only 47% took the same view in 1970. - ,
TV news is, therefore, clearly a potent instrument... ,Tha~, however,
is·already well known, and is well established,and recognised,in the
legislation which governs the operation of the,BBC, and-the IBA•.:.
Both are required to ensure that there is a balanced presentation of
news. It is, ~owever, argued. by the 2 authorities that toac~1eve
this balance for everyone in every broadcast is probably impos~1ble.
given the differentiation of society.
This is a significant point in the Media Group's argument. becausewhat they seek to analyse out of the presentation of TV news is not
overt_bias, but rather the effect of routine (and apparently neutral)
news.practices. Their conclusion was that "routine news practices;
1ed f to the production of bad news" (More Bad News I pg xiH)• Why
do ,they come to this conclusion? " ,.,
They came to this conclusion for 2 main reasons. ",:
a) 'r,the presentation of news involves, inevitably, the selection of
facts, and their news cannot be a perfect mirror image of reality.
Since certain facts are given more prominence,thanotherssome
distortion is inevitable. L,
b) ,: their analysis indica~es that the selection of facts consistently
follows a code which supports the status quo - for instance in
lOne-Dimensional News I (in 'Trade Unions and the Medial) Beharrel~
Philo,& Hewitt illustrate this by pointing to the assumptions. they
suggest, are employed to put together a news story eg,tha~ ~normal
production' in a car plant is strike free, that production stoppages
are caused generally by strikes. They also point,:to,.the consistent
argument that inflation is caused by high wage set~lement~.a~cording
to:the presentation of news on TV about inflation. Their argument
1s not necessarily that these views are necessarily false. but
rather that no alternative was presented. or not presented with the
same,force or,frequency (eg that Britain economic difficulties could
be, due to inadequate investment, rather than just!to hig~,wage, ""
settlements and inflation). They argue that a domi~ant ~essage
preva11sin the presentation of TV news or as they quote '~The, content
of news and the manner in which it is organised thus embodies a
specific way of understanding the social and industrial, worl~",: "The problem, therefore, is not one of simple bias - or to take an
analogy with discrimination - it is not a matter of direct
discrimination, whereby the perpetrator is quite conscious and clear
of what he is doing. Rather it is a matter of indirect discrimin-
ation whereby the process is largely unconscious, both en the part
of the journalists and the viewer. It is, however, no less'
important for that since "communicative power is about the right to
define and demarcate situations. When we look at cultural· power •••
we mean the power to typefy, transmit and define the 'normal', to
act agendas ••• one must see the news as reflecting not the events
in the world 'out there', but as the manifestation of the collective
cultural codes of those employed to do this selective and judgemental
work for society" (Bad News pp 13-14). '\
This point is also made by Cohen &Young (The Manufacture 'of News).
"Just as the slogans on the Paris wa11s(in 1968) represent a created
.. ~"
image of society, so the mass media are in the business of
manufacturing and reproducing images. They provide the guiding
myths which shape our conception of the world and serve as :'important
instruments of social control" (pg 12).
: i:
~ • ~' >., r I ,. •
Thus, ,from our perspective, the significance of the media generally -
TV and newspapers - is its role as an 'instrument of social control'
involved in the maintenance of hierarchical organisations. The role
of the media, therefore, is to act as a source of meanings' which
serve to support and maintain hierarchy, from this perspective:
There is, however, a caution in 'Power, Class &the Media' by John
Westergaard (in J Curran et a1 'Mass Communication &Society'). "The
~1.. Iimpact of the media cannot be read straight off from the co~tent of
output. People read, hear and see selectively. They pick out,
adapt and translate from what is before them, to fit in with
orientations set in their minds beforehand: they 'decode',messages
of.television, radio and press by codes which,will differ in some
!
respects and may well differ in many, from those used by the
broadcasters and journalists who first 'encode' the messages., ":
So there can be, and is, resistance to media 'persuasionl;yet,the
truth of that in no way rules out media influence" (pg)ll)~i .~,: "
Westergaard, therefore draws our attention to an ~mpo~~a~t
distinction which we must be aware of - that the production and
f' • ;:, , '
reception of news are separate processes conducted by separate
groups. Thus the 'message' put in the news by t~e,journalist may
not be the 'message' received by the reader/viewer. ,Reflecting
this our research addressed itself to 3 issues. '. '
1),:";' to what media did respondents expose themselves, and how
often? . ~ , . '.'; .'
ii), what was their perception of those media, and in particula~
was there any perceived idiological bias? ',:,' ' .'
iii) . how extensively does this information appear to be used, and
if so, how is it used by respondents to interpret events around
them.
I . . I
'. ,
TJ1.ere are clearly theoretical issues outstandi~g,~ut this seems an
,opp.ortune point to begin to introduce our empiric.al ~a.~a, and we
shall return to theory subsequently.
, I ,
'- .;, ~
We began by asking respondents about their viewing habits.
•Responses to questions on TV news are presented in tablesA7.l and
A7.2.'" '
From tableA7.l it is clear that at least 70% watched one or both of
.. ' . ~
the'news broadcasts 'most days' (more than 5 days per week). It 1s
\0, i'
perhaps, interesting to observe that
. _ ,', i r·
aL Staff respondents had more tntensive viewing habits than Manage-
" j t,
ment,or Hourly-Paid. The latter, however, had a particularly
I ,~.; ~ ' <
difficult problem in that when they worked overtime - Tuesday and
Thur~~ay nights till 7.30 - this ruled out 2 TV news broadcasts.
T~u~ the 33% of Hourly-Paid who say they watch both broadcasts most
days, must do so every day they can. (ie those days,w~en they do not
work overtime) ",;,.1
b) Staff Union Reps and Shop Stewards have more intensive viewing
habits than their members. Since they may act as 'idiological
,( P-
leaders' of their members, their consumption of TV news raises 2
possibilities, either (i) they have been incorporated into the
dominant idiology reproduced by the media, or (ii) they have
resisted this idiology. If the former, their 'leadership' of their
members may be another form of social control. The data in Table
A1.2, however, does tend to suggest the latter.
In ,this table we report the responses to questions on the perceived
political bias of TV news. From this it is clear that Shop
Stewards and Union Reps have a more critical attitude toward ,TV
news than other groups - 44% and 43% perceive it to have a right-
wing bias. On the other hand more than 50% of every group perceive
the news to be politically neutral - especially Staff &Management.
Very few indeed perceive news to have a left bias.'TableA7.1
How often do you watch TV news'
Manage Union
ment Staff Reps
, ~, ~ ;~, t ~ '. ~ ~, '
Hourly'" Shop
Paid Stewards , ' . '.
Do you feel it adopts a Political stance ,
" , . ~ ~
TablEA7.2 ,
<
Evening &Late News
Most'Days 31% 42%
Evening or Late News
Most Days 47% 27%
Evening or Late News
" at least 4 days week 13% ' 18%
Evening or Late News
between 1-3 days week 9% 10%
Nev~r/Hardly Ever 0 3%
, '"
t1anage
ment Staff
86%, . ,;33%; " 59%
0 44% 12%
14%, '10% < ·12%
0
: 10%· ; ',12%
0 2% 6%
't' ' ' ~, , ,
, ' .. '
"
- , ':',"' ~ >,
" .
r r
Union Hourly Shop
Reps ' Paid, 'Stewards
0 ' 'i '9% , 0
43% 28% 44%
57% 58% 56%
0 5% 0
0 0 0
," ,,"< 'i, I - ,,3 '~ : :
~< '
", j
',..,
, "
o
23%
74%
3%
o
o
15%
81%
3%
o
- . , ,
~. ~.
Far Right
Right
Not il~nted politically
Left
Far LeftThus especially for Staff &Management, but less so for Hourly-Paid,
, ,
Union Reps and Shop Stewards, the argument of the sort presented by
the Media Group woul~ thus far appear to be supported,since most of
our respondents appear to regard TV news in the terms:which,it,sets
for itself - that its presentation of news is neutral,and"balanced.
,: "
We supplemented this with questions about their viewinghabits:of the
regular news 'magazines' on TV at that time (1977) in TableA7.3.
The last 2 programmes - Newsday and Tonight - were watched by
relatively small numbers, especially the former, and the' 2'local "
news',programmes - Scotland Today and Nationwide - had,rather .
,variable.viewing figures, with between 20-40% watching one,of them at
least 4:days per week. Quite clearly, however, these, programmes-are
watched less often than the main news broadcasts,whicry emphasises
its 'significance yet again.
In,TableA7.4 amongst those who watch these programmes at:least 1 day
per'week, ,we explore their perceived political bias.' ··Themain,con':"i
elusion to be drawn from this table is that while the.tendency~is,still
predominantly to perceive the presentation as neutral thisJs, ~ess "
pronounced than for TV news eg if we take Nationwide nearly 1/3 ~f
them who watch, regard it as having a right-way bias, which, again. >
i!
!
reinforces the importance of TV news.
Tabl~7 .5.gives responses to questions on hOi" often responde~ts ,.: ; ~,
watched certain weekly current affairs progranrnes. As in .TablEA7.3,
viewing is variable eg 'World in Action' appears to be watched rather'
more often than average while 'Ways and Means' is,watched, rather, less
often•. \, It is again observable from this Table that Staff uni,on Repsand Shop Stewards watch more intensively than other groups.
TableA7.6 reports responses on perceived political bias in these
programmes. Once again the dominant response is that there is no
political bias. though there appears to be slightly more perceived
bias in these programmes than in news broadcasts. This is especially
true of Panorama. which had a clearly perceived right wing bias, even
amongst Management.
Thus. if we look at consumption of news and current affairs broad-
casting it appears (i) TV news is more important than current affairsl
local news programmes (ii) TV news is predominantly perceived to be
politically neutral. and to a greater extent than current affairs
programmes. Current affairs programmes are, however, still
predominantly perceived to be politically neutral.
The dominant perception of news and current affairs as politically
neutral is significant since it is consistent with the claim ~de by
those who make TV news and current affairs programmes. At the same
time it is consistent with the thesis that TV news by appearing to be
neutral supports the maintenance of hierarchical organisations by
re-inforcing the dominant code through which our respondents perceivo
reality. On the other hand the more widespread perception of some
respondents that there is bias in certain current affairs programmes
is consistent with Westergaard's argument that 'there can be, and ts,
resistance to media persuasion'.
We shall attend to these issues shortly. but the final piece of media
data are Tables47.7 andA7.8. The former asks respondents how oftenTableA7.3
How often do you watch TV News
Manage Union Hourly Shop
ment Staff Reps Paid Stewards
Scotland Today
Every day 13% 24% 43% 29% 29S
4 days a week 3% 10% 0 lOS 6S
1-3 days a week 6% 14% 14% 19% 29S
never/Hardly ever 78% 52% 43% 42% 35%
Nationwide
Every day 13% 18% 29% 17% 24S
4 days a week 13% 16% 0 6S 12S
1-3 days a week 53% 30% 29% 23% 291
Never/Hardly Ever 22% 37% 43% 54% 35%
ffewsday
Every day 0% 0% 0% 2% OS
4 Days a week 0 0 0 0 0
1-3 Days a week 16% 6% 0 13% 12%
Never/Hardly Ever 84% 94% 10C% 85% 881
Tonight
Every Day 9% 10% 0% 4% 18%
1-2 Days a Week 28% 28% 29% 251 18%
never/Hardly Ever 63% 62% 71% 71% 65%TableA7.4
Do You Feel It Adopts a Riitical Stance? (Absolute Numbers)
Scotland Today Manage Union Hourly Shop
ment Staff Reps Paid Stewards
Far Right 0 0 0 1 0
Right 1 4 1 7 3
Not Slanted Politically 5 25 3 15 8
Left 1 5 0 5 0
Far Left 0 0 0 0 0
never Watch 25 37 3 20 6
Nationwide
Far Right 0 0 0 2 0
Right 3 14 0 7 5
Not Slanted Politically 21 28 4 13 6
Left 1 3 0 0 0
Far Left 0 0 0 0 0
Never Watch 7 26 3 26 6
Uewsday 0 0 Far Right 0 0 0
Right 1 2 0 4 1
Not Slanted Politically 4 2 0 3 1
Left 0 0 0 a 0
Far Left 0 0 a 0 0
Never Watch 27 67 7 41 15
Tonight a 1 0
Far Right 0 0
Right 3 6 0 6 4
Not Slanted Politically 8 21 2 7 2
Left 1 0 0 0 0
Far Left 0 0 0 a 0
Never Watch 20 44 5 34 11TableA7.5
How Often Do You Watch These TV Current Affair Programmes?
Weekend World Every Week Most Weeks Seldom Never
Manage!Went 3% 3% 25% 69%
Staff 4% 10% 25% 61%
Union Reps 14% 0% 29% 57%
Hourly Paid 4% 15% 27% 54%
Shop Stewards 18% 12% 35% 35%
World in Action
Management 0% 19% 59% 22%
Staff 7% 21% 49% 23%
Union Reps 43% 14% 29% 14%
Hourly Paid 6% 40% 33% 21%
Shop Stewards 18% 18% 47% 18%
This Week
Management 0% 9% 41% 50%
Staff 6% 10% 49% 35%
Union Reps 0% 29% 29% 43%
Hourly Paid 6% 17% 27% 50%
Shop Stewards 12% 0% 59% 29%
Ways &Means 59% Management 0% 9% 31%
Staff 1% 7% 16% 76%
Union Reps 14% 0% 14% 71%
Hourly Paid 2% 4% 15% 79%
Shop Stewards 6% 6% 12% 76%
Panorama
Management 0% 31% 53% 16%
Staff 1% 14% 39% 45%
Union Reps 14% 14% 29% 43%
Hourly Paid 2% 10% 29% 58%
Shop Stewards 6% 12% 29% 53%TableA7.6
00 You Feel It Adopts a Political Stance? (Absolute Numbers)
Weekend World Manage Staff Union Hourly Shop
ment Reps Paid Stewards
far Right 0 0 0 2 0
Right 0 6 1 5 4
not Slanted Politically 8 17 2 13 7
left 2 5 0 2 0
far left 0 0 0 0 0
never Watch 22 43 4 26 6
World in Action
far Right 0 0 0 0 0
Right 3 8 1 8 6
not Slanted Politically 17 40 4 86 8
left 5 7 1 4 0
far left 0 0 0 0 0
never Watch 7 16 1 10 3
This Week 0 far Right 0 0 0 1
Right 2 12 1 7 4
Not Slanted Politically 12 31 3 10 8
left 2 3 0 6 0
far Left 0 0 0 0 a
never Watch 16 25 3 24 5
Ways &Means a a far Right 0 0 0
Right 1 3 1 2 3
Hot Slanted Politically 10 14 1 8 1
left 2 0 0 0 0
far Left 0 0 0 0 0
never Watch 19 54 5 38 13
Panorama 4 a
far Right 0 0 0
Right 11 12 1 5 7
Not Slanted Politically 15 24 2 9 1
left 1 3 1 2 a
far Left 0 0 0 0 a
Never Watch 5 32 3 28 9often they read particular newspapers. From this it is clear that the
Daily Record is the most wfdely read newspaper by Hourly-Paid(81S read
it eve~ day), while for Management the most widely read paper is the
Glasgow Herald(53% read it every day). For Staff the most widely
read paper is also 'the Daily Record', but only 41% read it every day.
while 11% read the Herald. and 18% read the Daily Express.
There are. therefore, 2 dominant papers - The Daily Record. and the
Glasgow Herald the former is predominantly a paper for them at the
lower end of the Anarchy. while the latter is more significant for
them at the upper end of the hierarchy.
In tableA1.8 we consider the political stance of these newspapers.
If we take the Daily Record first. we can see that for Management and
Staff it is perceived as left politically - which is probably how the
Daily Record perceives itself. since it fairly consistantly supports
the labout Party(usually its right wing). More surprisingly perhaps.
as many Hourly-Paid perceive the Daily Record to be' Right/far Right.
as perceive it to be left. Equally surprising is that as many per-
ceive the Sun to be left or Far Left. as perceive it to be Right or
far Right. There does appear. therefore. to be a surprisingly wida
variation of perception of these 2 papers by Hourly-Paid respondents.
The Glasgow Herald and Daily Express are. however. more insistently
perceived to be Right politically. though more so by Management and
Staff than by Hourly-Paid. While this is rather surprising. tho Hourly-
Paid sample is small(only 6).
We can draw 2 conclusions from these tables :-
f) newspapers appear to represent an important source of news. withTableA7.7
How often do you read
1) Daily Record
More than Between Neverl
Management
Every Day 4 days/week 1-3 days/week Hardly Ever
13% 3% 3% 81S
Staff 41% 10% 16% 34S
Hourly Paid 81% 6% 0 13%
2) Glasgow Herald
Management 53% 6% 28~ I3S
SUff 17% 9% 20~ 55S
Hourly Paid 4% 6% 2S 88S
3) Daily Express
Management 6% 3% 13S 78%
SUff 18% 7% 10S 65%
Hourly Paid 21% 2% 2% 7SS
4) Sun
Management 0 0 6S 94%
SUff 4% a IDS 86%
Hourly Paid 17% 6% In 60S
19 (3 Daily Hatl
4 Datly Mirror
2 Scotsman
2 Guardian
3 Times
4 D.Te1egraph
1 Momlng SUr)
8 (1Datly M.1n
3 Datly Mirror
I Guardian
3 Moming Sur)
Between 1/3
days/week
3 (All Daily Telegraph)
2 (Daily Mirror) 4 (2 Daily Mail
t Daily Mfrror
1 Morning Star)
5) Others 'In Absolute Numbers)
Every Day More than 4
days/week
Management 8 (Scotsman a
3 Times
4 Daily Telegraph)
6 (2 Daily Mail 2(lD.Telegraph
2 Daily Mirror 1 Morning Star)
1 Daily Telegra~h
1 Morning ritaf'
Hourly Paid
SUffTableA7.8
00 You Feel This Newspaper Adopts a Political Stance?
Far Not Slanted far·
Right· Right politically Left Left
1) Oafly Record
Management 0 0 0 6 0
Staff 1 8 9 28 1
Hourly Paid 3 t3 10 16 0
2) Glasgow Herald
1 0 Management 0 2t 6
Staff 3 20 8 1 0
Hourly Paid 0 2 4 0 0
3) Daily Express 1 0 Management 0 5 1
Staff 1 20 1 3 0
Hourly Paid 2 6 4 0 0
4) Sun 0 0 Management 0 1 1
Staff 0 1 6 2 1
Hourly Paid 1 6 5 6 1
, .with the great majority reading a newspaper every day.
ii) The bias in newspapers is more clearly perceived than in TV. news
and current affairs programmes.
The question we have to proceed to now. is what all this means for the
theory we considered alreadY.
The influence of the media can but be considered by recognising that
its influence depends on 2 factors.
1. The Production of News. This aspect has been considered from 2
perspectived (a) by SUbjecting the product to detailed analysis. We
have already considered the analysis of the Glasgow University Media
Group. Beharrel. Phi19 &Hewitt etc•• who argue that the media purv~y
a dominant message through the way in which news stories are prcs~nt~d.
This point is made clear by Walton &Davis in 'Bad News for Trade
Unionists'(in Beharrel.& Phfl~ eta/- 'Trade Unions &the Media') ~o
argue, "we believe there is no simple conspiracy at work-. The media
is too complex and medfa personnel too varied for the notion of a
'right wing plot' or deliberate manipulation to hold water as a compl-
ete theory of how the media works' (pg.125). Rather it is the process
F ,,"
and rules used by TV journalists which give rise to the distortion
,-
which the Glasgow group claim to have identified, as bne-sided int~r-
pretations of events (Which) constitute a dominant view'. The domin-
ant view, with its unspoken assumptions, encloses the professional
i ~ ~ ,
view of the journalist reporting a story. Thus a journalist doing
his/her job is acting as a support of the status quo by reinforcing
this dominant view. There is, however, an alternative form or analysis
- to analyse the production of news and not just the news itselr.
(b) the analysis of production. We shall consider 2 writers on this
matter - Philip Schlessengir 'Putting Realisty Together' and Tom Burns
, , ,
'The BBC'
,U 7-Schlessinger's study 'examines the practices and idealogy which lie
behind the making of the news by Britain~s most prominent broadcasting
organisation (the BBC)' (pgll) as an observer of the newsroom this is
a completely different nethodolagy from that employed by the Media
Group et al whose approcah is 'from the outside looking in', whereas
Schlessinger (and the others whom we'll consider here) are 'insiders
looking out'. From this. the criticism of Schlessinger in 'More Bad
News' appears rather misplaced. They suggest "these works (like
Schlessinger) do little but regurgitate professional notions of pro-
duction "(footnote pg.479) and that their 'failure ••• has in their
inability to relate their conclusions regarding the nature of broad-
cast institutions to what those institutions actually produce
W(pg.409)
This seems somewhat harsh when one considers what Schlessinger actually
does say.
One of the aspects of BBC news he investigates is the corporate ideol-
ogy of BBC news. He suggests that central to this ideology is Its
claim to be impartial. in that it is 'institutionally detached from tho
conflicts of British society and•••• is independent of all interests'
(pg.163). and that production of news st~ries Is only Wa set of ttch-
nlcal routines••• to secure an undistorted picture of reaHtyW(pg.,&4)
He concludes lithe BBC's news is legitimated (as) the product of a coea-
unity of disinterested and honest -.(pg.164).
Schlessinger. however find this view - which in many respects Is the
image of news production elaborated in other works-wanting in several
respects. First of all that the impartiality it·lays claim to wcan
only have a meaning in the context of an existing act of values
W(pg.164)
In the case of BBC news. he argues, that set of values is 'the consen-
sus'. Thus the BBC in its news broadcast does not, as It claims,
simply present the facts - rather it also works In such a way as to-
assist in maintaining the level of consensus in society. The commit-
ment to consumers, he poi.nts out, has important implications. In part-
icular it leads to "a depreciation of radical fonns of action, their
characterixation as violent and irrational and obscures any understand-
ing of why these should occur. "(pg.168), and he then proceeds to Nke
similar points to those made by the Media Group - that the BBC is com-
mitted to a particular view of society which it reinforces through the
way in which views is structured and presented.
This he argues, is largely inevitable since ~ews does not select it-
self, but is rather the product of judgements concerning the social
relevance of given events and situations ba~ed on assumptions concern-
ing their interest and importance'(pg.164). Thus news cannot si~~ly
be a collection of facts, but instead must be facts or~ered by a par-
ticular point of view. News, as Schlessinger points out. is Ma cultural
product which embodies journalistic, social and political values. It
cannot be, and certainly is not, a neutral, unpolitical or. totally ob-
Jective perception of the real world" (pg.165). What are these values?
According to a 'young radio reporter' he quotes 'The Corporation's
view is middle class liberalisation. Strikes. Communists. Black Po~r,
fascists are all bad. Social Democrats and Tories are good M(Schless-
inger pg.166).
Essentially therefore, Schlessinger makes similar points to those ~de
by the Glasgow University Media, that the BBC(on Schlessinger's case)
1s biased in favour of consensus and the status quo. SchlessingQr,
however, makes more transparent that this bias,is not concious bias,
but is a product of working assumptions t.e•.tt is .the product or tho
value system of the broadcasting institutions, and the~r obligation in
law, to be impartial, once by being impartial they support the existingexisting social and economic order.
This view is echoed by Tom Burns in 'The BBC: Public Institutions and
Private World' He suggests that 'the distortion(identified by the
Glasgow Media Group) arises not from 'media stereotypes' of trade
unionists and car workers, but from a coherant set of attitueds. ex-
pectations, truisms and commonplaces which television journalists must
e~pti~ to ~heir audience in order to communicate with i~ M(pg.203).
Thus in terms of production of news, whether analysed from the perspect-
ive of producing news (Schlessinger, and Tom Burns) or from the pers-
pective of the product (Glasgow University Media Group) the conclusions
appears to be the same i.e. that there is a bias in the presentation or
TV. news in favour of ,,,,,se,,slcS and the status quo. Ther:e h. however.
• ." <
a difference in the causal mechanism behind this. For Schlessinger and
; ,
.BurAs the reasons are to be found in the kind of institution which tho
BBC is, its role in society, and in routine journalistic practices. Tho
, '
reasoning of the Media Group often seems precheated on something =ore . , ~
sinister, though the Media Group in their writings often come to simil-
ar conclusions to these of Schlessinger and Burns.
The crucial point, for our purposes, is that TV news also appear to
biased in favour of the status quo(and therefore in favour of hierarchy)
What effect does this seem likely to have? "
., - ~" '"
We must first of all re-call the caution of Westergaards. referred to
'\ "- ~ .
above, and not simply assume that our respondants. perceptions will
likewise be distorted by the distorted news which they consume. It
does, however, appear on the basis of our data that this Is largely
't \ '
what has happened since for most of them, TV news and most currentcurrent affairs programmes were perceived as politically neutral. It
would seem therefore. that the bias of TV presentation goes largely
unnoticed - certainly to a greater extent than the bias of newspapers.
The problem of the effect of media bias has been concluded in an in-
teresting way by Stuart Hall. with his concepts of 'Encoding and De-
coding'('Encoding/Decoding' in 'Culture. Media, Language', S.Hall et
al ects.) Like Westergaard. Hall argues that the message interpreted
by the received of the media message may not be identical to the
message sent by the originator of the message(e.g. a Journalist).
Hall suggests 3 positions' from which the process of de-coding media
messages can be accomplished.
Hall discusses the following 3 positions (pP!t36~t38).
(a) Dominant-Hogemonic Position. where the viewer in effect does read
the message "straight off from the content of the output-, to go back
to Westergaard. The viewer. as Hall puts it, 'operates inside the
cominant code' (pg.t36); the viewer interprets the message 4S intend- , .
ed by the hournalists and therefore swallows the message ~ole and un-
critically.
(b) Negotiated Code or Position. In this case while there is a re-
cognition of the legitemacy of the dominant code, there are also wIth-
in the negotiated code 'adaptive and oppositional elements?(Ual1 pg.
137). The dominant code, Hall argues, is allowed to define wider and
more abstract matters, but the more immaculate matters which Ire of
direct influence to the individual are negotiated within this dominant
code. The example given by Hall is that while the dominant code se-
cures legitemacy for wage restraint generally, 'In the national inter-
est', this 'may have little no relation to his/her willingness to go
on strike for further pay'(pg.t37)ec) Oppositional Code. Here the viewer is fully aware Qf the
dominant coding of the nedia message. and is able to re-define it to
an alternative code of his/her own e.g.Hall suggests re-defining
'national interest' as 'class interest' (pg.t38).
We would suggest that the evidence of previous Chapters points clearly
to respondents having a 'Negotiated Code or Position'. 'for instance
while the incomes policy then applying was generally accepted. we have
seen in these earlier Chapters(especially five and six) that there
were oppositional elements to this attitude.
It is clear that there is no well developed Oppositional Code in this
Company. The credence of earlier chapters and of this Chapter both
point to that. While the evidence is less clear. we would argue that
the complete acceptance of the legitimacy of the prevailing order is
lacking in too many respects for us to be able to argue that there is
a 'dominant-hegemonic position'. Rather the evidence of earlier Chap-
ters points consistantly to an on-going effort to find an accommodat-
ion within a dominant value system to which they accord legitimacy
generally. but for which in certain situations and in may respects they
have significant reservations.
It is our contention. therefore. that the data of tables47.1 -Al.7 in
particular. but the tables of this Chapter so far in general. point to
a 'Negotiated Code' being employed by our respondants in their consum-
ption of media information. Given this. the effect of the media is
reduced since its effect would be to reinforce a general social con-
sensus - for instance that 'wage claims should be moderated as part of
the fight against inflation r - but that. within their own situation they
may behave in a way inconsistent with this consensus - for instance
go on strike fQr a rise above ~he norm'(It is perhaps ironic. that if-
if we refer back to(Chapter 5'ysecti.on on ~Wages/Salaries~, this
would apparently be most true of Managementl) Corresponding to this,
there may be a legitimacy accorded to the right of Management to manage
generally, but a challenge to this within particular situations. Thus,
if we take the evidence of' the Glasgow Media Group, the support given
to Management by the presentation of industrial relations news may
sustain the legitimacy of Management in general, but not necessarily
in the position of this Company, or at least not in every respect.
The role of the media is to some extent developed by this since we
cannot, as Westergaard says, 'read straight off from the content of
output'. There is a process of negotiation before implications are
drawn from media information, whill have the effect of the media mess-
age being modified in certain respect by respondants.
t I. .
How will this happen? A c.1,,~ is given by McQuadffn "The influen-
ce and effects of the Mass Media' (in J.Curren et al.etc. - 'Mass Comu-
unication and Society') He points out that when the media reports'
'sensational' or very significant news (e.g~'the assassination of
Kennedy in 1963) that people do not just mutely accept what the media
tells them - but rather look for indepentdent
1'confirmation from other
media or other trusted personal sources'(pg.86)
One sourse of modification may, therefore, be as McQua~points out
'other trusted personal sources', among whom we can probably include
workmates. This is confinned by exerptA7.1.· t.
This Exerpt is relevant for two main reasons. First of all
the respondent draws attention to the role of discussion of media
infonnation. From the discussion of the Vietnam story, it is clearclear that information is not pa,ssh:el,y recei.ved, but t~ discussed by
his members in the workplace. Indeed later on tn the Excerpt he sugg-
ests that in fact the bias in ntpresentation may be counter-productive
since, he suggests that their awareness of presentational bias makes
his bembers more likely to cha.l1enge the type of society we live in.
Equally, at the end of the Excerpt, he argues that when his members
are aware of the bias in the presentation of industrial relations news.
All of this excerpt tends to further support our intent~on of a
Inegotiated code' being employed to interpret RV news.
The excerpt is also relevant because this is the onlyrespondant who
in the 55 uni-structured interviews we carried out ever referred to . .'
media information directly. In conducting these interv~ews. as we
said in Chapter 2, our intention was to elaborate withrespondants
their views on certain matters. While one objective of this was to
" .
establish the supporting information of these views, to prompt counces
of information would have been invalid. We .followed the policy of an
open-ended 'Why do you say that' rather than a directive 100 you say
that because of what you see on TV'.) To choose the latter may lead
the respondant to expouse ideas which he does not have., Basically we
,~i '" T, •
have to avoid the charge that we have ~rimed' the respondant.
, :
This failure of respondants generally to mention TV news or newspapers
as Sources of information or ideas is consistant with some anecdotal,
/ t", ..."
evidence we collated at an early stage in the research. As part of
," "' '" ~ ' '" ,~
our access to the Company, we agreed to submit the questionnaire to
the union representatives, as well as Senior Managers in the Company.
When we met with the 2 Shop Stewards who had examine~ thequestionn-
aires, they had no objection to any of the que~tions., They did. however
want to know why we wanted to know how often people watched TV news.
-news. read certain newspapers. and whether the presentations appeared
to be biased? We ran through a quick presentation of the ideas of the
Glasgow Media Group. They looked thoughtful for a moment. then one of
them said 'Aye that's all very interesting. but the problem with it is
that the most of the guys here don't get past the racing section'. In
other words. if somebo~ reads a particular newspaper or watches
a particular news broadcast. they may do so for what appears to be
. ,
pretty~mportant reasons for our purposes(e.g. to get a good racing
tip. or watch Anna Ford).
This point is also made - previously - by Gouldner (The Dialectic of
. "
Ichology &Technology') whome he argues that 'the mode of concious-
, -
ness likely to compete with ichology among the masses may not be more
rationalism but less. not a higher rationalism but a lower( •••). The
critics of ichology overlooked the fact that. when ichology faded. it
need not be replaced by something more rati~nal. b~t by'~omething that
they - as Enlighteners - might regard as regressive and irrational
(pg.170)
In other words the role of the media may be largely trivial. and its
real function may at first be to act as a di~ersiona~'sid~ show.
This may be either unintentional or - as in the case of media like
, T '~ ,
'the Sun' and 'the Daily Star' - quite deliverate.' -In any case it
would appear to be important not to take th~ me'dta"tooseriouSly. We
shall. sUbsequently. emphasise the importance'~f media info~tion.
but it is important not to over-emphasise'th~' role of t.he media.
" ,
This lesson is hardly new. Gouldner quotes a study by Lazarsfeld et al.
from 1944. which paints out that ~he effect of'the media(is) rather small.
People appeared to be much more influenced in their political decisions-
decisions by face-to-face cOntact••• than by the mass media generally·
(pg.150) This classic ffnding is consistant with wh~t we have argued
up to now i~e. that while the media is fmportant,'others ~re more
significant. These include the role of experience in the work-place,
the role of one's fellow workers and their ideas. Following on from
Hall's idea of a negotiated code, we have to keep in mind that the co-
des operate through a logic of the individual's particular situation
i.e. the media messages are interpreted through the individuals ex-
perience. Rather than the message being read off directly and then
defining reality, the message is compared to and clarified by reality.
Nonetheless, it has been the clear lesson of the ~lier chapters that
our respondants are firmly rooted in the status quo and persistance
of hierarchy. They may not like this state of affairs, and may wish
to modify it, or at least ""oJ,·~ certain of·its effects. They do
not, as we have seen, wish to challenge or to fundamentally undermine
it. Given this tha role of the media is clear. It is, as Gouldner
points. out, that 'To a large extent, the media operate by strengthen-
ing dispositions ~lrea~.de~lQpedby other soci~l forces·(pg. 150).
Their role lies, therefore, not in causing individuals to have certain
ideas - rather it is the role of the media to support individuals 1n
holding these ideas. From the point of view of why hierarchy persists
therefore, the significance of the media is that its information is so
structured as to be consistant with and thus support. the experience
of hierarchy of our respondants. Their attitude towards hierarchy
and the associated 1egitimacy of management is primarily. structured
by their experience of the Company and of work - but the role of the
media is to confirm the correctness of this for them. This like their
acceptance of hierarchy, their concentrations toward the media is an
excercise of unconscious power. While we have the strong vers-
ionversion of media bias, the findings of Schlessinger and of Burns, both
within the BBC., point to bias as a natural function of the institution
and journalistic practices. Our evidence suggests, however"that re-
spondants are often (but not always) unaware of this - and thus un-
aware of the power exercised over them.
Hence even if the role of the media is supportive rather than casual
it is still in that se~s~ a matter of power. Like the maintenance
of hierarchy itself therefore, it is consistant with our theoretical
discussion of power, and in particular of unconscious power.
Experience of the locality
The company operates in west central Scotland, which is an area with
its own distinctive history. The fnhabitantsof the area are as
distinct as the Brummie. or the Geordie. or the Cockney. Thus while
it shares many qual iUes wfth other parts of the UK. this area has
particular differences.
Expecially notable of the area is the historically high level of un-
employment. McPhail points out in 'A Short History of Dunbartonshire'
.. '
,. l I'
that the industries of Clydeside and particularly Dunbartonshire -
, , ,>: ".
ship-buildings, coal mining, textiles - were heavily hit by the De-
" ',1. v
pressionll•••Shipyards closed down never to re-open. Beardmore's at
Dalmuir(which at one time employed as many as 10,000 workers) shut
down in 1930 and McMillan's at Dumbarton in 1931. In the same year
work on a new giant Cunarder (No.534 on the books of John Brown's
shipyard) was stopped: and for 3 years the half built ship rested on
, ,
the stocks, while thousands of Clydebank men and women remained dile
••••In December 1932,37 per cent of them registered at the Alexandria
Labour Exchange were unemployed lI(pg.1t5). While since 1945. thisthis situation has improved, the area has persistantly been one of
high unemployment relative to the rest of .the country. Checkland
points out in the Upqj 1;ree that while unemployment in Britain as
a whole, immediately after 1945 averaged 2%, in the west of Scotland
it averaged 3-3.5%(pg.46)
Given the significance of unemployment for the area, we focussed on
the extent of this experience for our respondants. First of all.
however, how long have they lived in this area? To what extent are
they native, or newcomers? The answer to these questions is in
TableA7.9.
Table17.9
How long have you lived on Clydeside
o
14S
8%
6%
6%
6%
6%
6%
50%
19%
6%
25%
Management Staff Union e' Hourly Shop
Reps. Paid Stewards
66% .. 77% . 65% 86S
23% 12% 21% 0
All your 1ife
More than half your life
More than one quarter of your
life
Less than - do -
This shows clearly that for the majority of respondants - 65S of the
whole sample - Clydeside has been their home for the whole of our
lives. 'Immigrants' are, therefore, a statistical minority. Though
it is clear (1) that they are more represented amo~g Manage~s than tn
'", .' '
any other group (2) Union Reps and Shop Stewards are slightly morc . .
likely to come from Clydeside than their numbers. Staff and Hourly
.,
paid are, however, largely from this are. For only abo~t 10% of the
sample as a whole, therefore, Clydeside has been' their home for at
least 1/4 of their lives of this 10%, nearly one half are Managers.
which does distinquish this group.
Moving on to unemployment itself, we took 2 measures (i) how much of
their working lives had been spent in unemployment?
(ii) How often they had been made redundant
The answers to the first question are shown in Table~7.10. ThisThis question expresses their unemployment as a proportion of their
working lives. We fo.llowed this practice since 2 years unployed in a
working life of 3 years is more significant than in a working life
of 30 years. This required us to exclude time spent out of the
normal labour market(e.g. in the armed forces as conscripts, or
during 1939-45).
There are two things clear from this table.
(1) Experience of unemploYment is distributed hierarchically. Man-
agement have least experience, than Staff, then Hourly-Paid.
(2) given the level of unemployment in the area, the experiences of
unemployment is perhaps rather less then we might have expected. It
does, however, have to be re-called that this company is, as a matter
of policy 'good payers' to attract the most skilled workers. These
are workers whom we would expect to find alternative employment relat-
ively easily.
Table~7.10
How long in total have you been unemployed(except for those times you
were outside the Labour Market)
Management Staff Union Hourly Shop
Reps. Paid Stewards
Never 84% 68% 57% 54% 47%
<5; of working life 16% 31% 43% 44% 29%
<10% - do - a 1 a 2% 241
<25% - do - 0 a a a 0
<33% - do - a a o'. a 0
>33% - do - a a a 0 0
If we move on to TableA7.tt we can see that experience of redundancy
1s also limited, as nearly 70% of the sample as a whole have never
been made redundant. Unlike employment, this isnot distributed 1n a
hierarchical pattern, since staff appear to have more experience than
other groups - 39% have been made redundant during their working lives
Once again, however, Management are least affected of the 3 man groups
. .Table47.11
group~, but the experience 1S again, less than we might expect e.g.
Blackburn and Mann. in their Peterborough sample found nearly half
'Hdd'~perie~ced Ivo1untary moves'(pg.238 IThe Working Class &the
- -Labour Market').
What Experience Have you had of Being Made Redundant?
Never t-5 Times More Than 5 Times
Management 8t% 19% a
Staff 61% 39% a
Hourly-Paid 69% 31% a
Staff Union Reps. 86% 14% a
Shop Stewards 71% 24% 6%
Given the background of the area, therefore, our sample would appear
to be relatively privileged, having less experience of unemployment
and redundancy than we might have expected. There remains nonetheless,
the social milieux of the area. IRed Clydesidel,Is frequently used
to describe this area, a description which Checkland argues has
the area has lacquired a bad reputation in industrial relations'
(pg.S7). The dominant attitude we may expect from an area like this
is of conflict, and that this perception, based,on conflict, will -
colour attitudes on attitudes generally•.
We attempted to measure this by asking 2 questions - on~ on society
generally, the other on the company - which asked them to say whether
their perception was based on class(and on conflict) or was more har-
monious. The results of these 2 questions is shown in TableA7.12 and
A7.13. In each case the 1st response is found on class and on conflict
- found pro
Taking TableR7.t2 we can see that for most of Management and staffstaff their perception af society ,i~ based on the rel~ttvely harmon-
ious image of 'people doing various jobs', but among the other groups,
the class found proportion is endorsed more often. In tableA7.t3,
however, Staff endorse the conflict-band perception-that they re-
ceive the company as Managers, Staff and Shop-Floor workers. They are
joined in this by their Union Reps, and by Hourly-Paid(though only
just). Management aga 1'n emphasise the mare harmonious option - and
interestingly so do Shop Stewards.
This issue has been received by Ramsay in 'Firms and Football Teams'
(British Journal at Industrial Relations 1975). He points out that
answers to this type of questions have varied considerably from one
stUdy to another e.g. Willmers study of French steel workers ('Pay-
ment System in the French Steel &Iron Mining Industry') showed 2a~
of the sample held a hormonistfc attutude, while 69~ held a conflict
attitude. Goldthorpe & Lockwood 'The ft((I..c,,! Worker) on the other
hand, find results which are more or less the reverse, as 671 of their
sample agreed the firm was like a football side, while 2as felt 'em-
ployers and IUl/tt"were on opposite sides? They also found variation
of attitude from one group to another, a finding repeated by Welder-
burn &Crompton(Workers' Attitudes &Technology). Ramsay, however,
casts doubt on the whole approach in a nummber of grounds.
(A) that a respondant may hold differing views depending on the con-
text of the question e.g. he may hold a consensual view in the control
of society generally, but a conflict view in the contract of his own
workplace.
B) Arespondant may endorse an apparent consensual view (e.g. 'that
goad teamwork is to everyone's advantage)" which could be interpreted
as an endorsement of consensus - but as Ramsay points out it Is not
altogether clear that the respondant is endorsing consensus, or is .is simply endorsing the need far the firm to be co-ordtnated to get
things done in ather wards if a respondant says that the finn fs like
a football team does he mean that it is internally unified (a strong
version) or only that it is co-ordfnated to accomplish its activities
(a weak version). He cauUons that 'we need to distinguish between
acceptance of a consensus idealogy expresses as a generalised state-
ment. and its more frequent rejection in the'concrete circumstances of
an actor's awn experience" (Ramsay pg.397). : I,
To deal with this objection. our two questions make the context clear.
The first question is in the context of society in general (a social
image). while the second question is in the'context of the Company
(the company's name was used in asking questions).
Tablen7.12 has a number of noteworthy features
CA) that as many Managers - 44% - see society in class turns, slightly
more than for Staff. This may reflect origins. since we knew, in-
fonnally. that many of the Managers had reached their present position
- even on the Board - by ascending the hierarchy (e.g. at least 3 had
started as apprentice draughtsmen)
(B) as many Hourly-Paid - and their shop Stewards - the dominant view
is one of a class structured society. ' ,
Tabl~7.13 is even more surporising. To repeat, the context of'this
question was quite clearly the Company and not; for instance, 'Industry
in General' (as in Goldthorpe &lockwood et al) This ,table suggests
only 2 groups take a pronounced view. To Managers'the'document view
was that the Company was thought of by them in turn simply of people
with contributions to make to the Company. This is a relati~y
consensual view. imaging the Company in such a way that everybody's
contribution was important in that if a job 'is not done - or not done
properly - the Company as a whole suffers.' It'implies. therefore. anan attitude of amorphous equality within the Company with an emphasis
on co-ordination (after Ramsay). The alternative v{ew - that the
Company is divided into 3 identified groups - is, one which implies'
conflict rather than consensus. It was the dominant view of Staff
Union Reps.
It is probably not surprising that these 2 groups should hold the
d~minant views. What is, perhaps, surprising is that the other 3
groups - Staff, Hourly-Paid and Shop Stewar~s,- should all be divided
nearly equally on these 2 alternative views of the Company. This re-
presents a very real parallel set of attitudes on the one hand, as we
have suggested in previous chapters, there was an awareness of inter-
group differences, especially between Staff and Hourly-Paid. At the
same time, given the emphasis on the high levels of skills possessed
and unexercised at all parts of the Company"i~ is not surprising
that included contributions should also be stressed.,
, '
Our conclusion on this state of affairs echoes ,that of Blackburn & , "c "~
Hann, "it seems clear that pragmatism (•••) far outweighs ideology
for our sample"('Ichology in the Non-Skilled Working Class' pg. 148).
While it goes too far to say that in our samplepregmatism has out-,
weighed ichology, among Staff, Hourly-Pai~ and,Shop Stewards, it is
clear there is a real division between on the one hand a prop1at1c
~ < " ,
alternative, which emphasises specific contributions to the Company,
and on the other hand, the more echoloti~al ~Manager, Staff and Hourly-
Paid?
Most importantly, however, our sample do not tn general appear to be
typical of the image of Red Cycle. Their experience of Redundancy and
Unemployment is less than we might have expec~ed,.g{ve~ this level ofof ~nemployment in the area, and their images of ~heir Company are
less ichological than we might have expected of .'Red Clydesiders'.
Indeed even their image of society is less oriented to conflict than
could have been anticipated.
Interaction & Communi'catfo~ ~
The fundamental basis of the 'ideal speach'thesis is that there
should be communication, since the thesis describes a discourse of
such perfect equality that its result is truth. In ..this section we
report on questions we asked respondants about the pattern of their
cOlTll1unication
In particular we asked them how often they 'saw ans spoke to in a
typical week' a manager, or someone from the Staff or someone from the
Shop-Floor? The responses to these questions are ~eported in Table
A7.14 (Management responses), Table 7.15 (Staff Responses) and Table
A7.16 (hourly-Paid responses). (By spoke to', for guidance, we meant
more than 'hello or a trivial conversation, but I would not necessar-
ily be about work).
It is most noticable that individuals interact most often with others
of their own group i.e. Managers with other Managers, Staff with other
Staff, Hourly-Paid with other Hourly-Paid. This is probably not sur-
prising given the nature of the work which people did. The pattern
was given further emphasis by the eating arrangements tn the Company
since each group had it own dining room (one for Managers, ove for
'Senior Staff', one for 'Junior Staff') or canteen(for Hourly-Paid).
There are, however, certain more notable features
(A) the number of Hourly-Paid who hardly ever speak to a MAnager isTABlEA 7.14
MANAGEMENT
How Often in a Typical Week Do You See and Talk To
(a) Another Manager Someone on Staff Someone
(b) {e)from Shop flool
At least 20 times/Week 88% 66% 16%
15-19 Times/Week 6% 13% 0
10-14 - do - 3% 9% 16%
5- 9 - do - 3% 13% 16%
Less than 5 - do - 0 0 53%
TableA7.15
STAFF
How Often in a Typical Week Do You See and Talk To
(a) AManager Someone elso on Staff Someone from
(b) (e) Shop Floor
At least 20 Times/week 37% 92% 38%
15-19 - do - 9% 0 4%
10-14 - do - 13% 6% 3%
5- 9 - do - 9% 1% 17%
Less Than 5 - do - 34% 1% 38%
TableM.16
HOURLY-PAID
How Often in a Typical Week Do You See and Talk to
(a) AManager Someone on Staff Someone else
(b) (e)from Shop-floor,
At 1east 20 Times/Week 0 67% . 77%
15-19 Times/Week 0 6% 6%
10-14 - do - 0 8% 8%
5- 9 - do - 8% 10% 4%
Less Than 5 - do - 92% 8% 4%is perhaps surprisingly large, since 92% say they speak to a Manager
less than 5 times per week~ The data in Tabl~1.14 to Some extent
disputes this, since 16% of Managers say they speak to 'someone from
the Shop-Floor~ at least 20 times per week, but since this could be a
Shop Steward it would still mean very limited communications between
Managers and the great majority of Hourly-Paid workers given
the lesser 'social (and physical) di.stance' from Management it is a
little surprising that Staff report such little interactions with Man-
agement (34% say they speak to a Manager less than 5 times per week -
Table~7.15). The pattern of Staff interaction with Management 1s ver,y
similar to that of the pattern of Staff interaction with Hourly-Paid.
(b) Among Staff and Hourly-Paid 'out-group' communication is limited.
Even though 67% of Hourly-Paid say they speak to somebody from the
Staff at least 20 times per week, this would usually be their Foreman.
Uut-Groups' communication was relatively more common among Management.
This is probably because of (i) their wider range of contacts, given
their role in the Company e.g. the role of Works Manager, inevitably
involved interaction with Staff and Hourly-Paid (ii) regular interact-
ion with a limited range of Staff or Hour1y-Paid(e.g. the Personnel
Manager) would regularly see the convenor of Shop Stewards.
The picture which emerges, therefore, is one of little out-group comm-
unication. People communicated only seldom with others from Qutwith
their group. It is certainly the case that much of this is structural
(e.g. job demands, eating arrangements) and that the physical struct-
ures of the Company was also partly responsible (e.g. as we explain in
Chapter 3 many Staff - Finance, Design, Marketing etc - are located in
offices at a 'distance from the Shop Floor such that interactfons was
improbable unless demanded for work reasons). On the other hand the
physical structure facflfted interaction in other respects (e~g.;tho
structure of the Shop-Floor was' such that there wa~ a commonpassagopassage for access to all areas of .this part of the Company) - but our
impression was that this did not encourage interactions. Thfs is con-
firmed by the data in TableA7.16, especially interaction with Manage-
ment.
We must conclude, therefore, that interactions and communication was
limited in the Co~pany.
Somantic Differential Data.
This data is directed into 4 sections -
(1) Perceptions of the Company TableA7.17
(2) Perceptions of Management TableA7.18 ~
(3) Perceptions of Staff Table47.19
(4) Perceptions of Shop-Floor Workers -TableA7.20
Taking the Company first (TableAS.t7), we deal with several issues,
but on all of them there are variations from one group to another.
'.
Thus, while the Cpmpany is generally perceived as efficient (or at
least more efficient than inefficient), Hourly-Paid tend to emphasise
this more than Staff who emphasi.sej~ore strongly than Management.'.
This is in one sense surrr,'s'-"J because. Management are, after all,
the group with formal responsibility for ensuring the Comapny's effic-
iency. One may have expected them to overstate this et:t:·~·in~jbut
in fact they rate this less than either of the other 2 groups. This
way reflect (i) the greater professional training of managers, such
that they have more stringent lists of ef(icienc9 than other Staff or
Hourly-Paid, and (ii) the more comprehensive information possessed by
Management, as well as the wider view available to the.
Assessments of the future security of the Company likewise vary between .
groups, in the way referred to above. This m~ be for the reasons a1-Table'l7.18
Management
Honest with 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Dishonest
Employees with Emp1o)1.'es
Management 10% 53% 25% 6% 0 0 0
Staff 17% 27% 27% 18% 8% n: 1%
Hourly-Paid 23% 27% 15% 19% 4% 6% 6%
Management
Fair to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfair to
Employees Employees
Management 22% 56% 19% 3% 0 0 0
Staff 16% 32% 27% 18% 6% 1% 0
Hourly-Paid 27% 23% 21% 10% 10% 4% 4%
Management
Hard on 2 3 4 5 '6 ,7 Soft on
Employees Employees
Management a a 6% 53% 38% 3% 0
Staff 0 7 18% 37% 24% 13% 1%
Hourly-Paid 8% 13% 15% 46% 13% 4% 2%
Management
Authori tarian 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Liberal
Management 0 3% 9% 28% 44% 13% 3%
Staff 0 6% 20% 45% 17% 13% 0
Hourly-Paid 17% 19% 17% 25% 21% 2% 0
Management
Should be prepared Should only do
to do Whatever is wha.tever isstrict-
needed By the ly Necessary in
Company Their Jobs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Management 34% 50% 16% 0 0 0 0
Staff 23% 28% 31% 10% 7% 1% 0
Hourly-Paid 35% 19% 19% 15% 10% 0 2%
Management
Conmitted to Unconmttted to
Company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Compa.ny
Management 28% 50% 13% 6% 3% 0 0
Staff 24% 41% 20% 10% 3% 3% 0
Hourly-Paid 40% 31% 19% 4% 2% 2% 2%
Table 7.18 Contd•••A 1.18 Contd.
Management
United 1 2 6
Divided among-
3 4 5 7 st themselves
Management 3% 15% 44% 25% 9% 0% 3%
Staff 16% 20% 20% 23% 13% 4% 6%
Hourly-Paid 29% 23% 21% 6% 6% 10% 4%
Management
Hard Working 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Lazy
Management 19% 41% 25% 13% 3% 0 a
Staff 24% 29% 25% 14% 6% 1% a
Hourly-Paid 21% 40% 19% 13% 6% 2% a
Management
Efficient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Inefficient, .
Management 0 25% 38% 34% 3% 0 0
Staff 13% 24% 35% 18% 6% . 3% .. 1%
Hourly-Paid 21% 27% 27% 15% ' 6% . 6% . : 2%,',
Management
Well-Paid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Management 0 19% 31% 28% , 16% 6% ,~~ a
Staff 18% 32% 30% 10% 4% 1% 01
Hourly-Paid 31% 27% 27% 8% 2% " 2% 0Tab1e~7.19
Staff
Hard-Working 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Lazy
Management 9% 25% 34% 28% 3% 0 0
Staff 11% 23% 44% 16% 6% 1% 0
Hour1y-Paid 19% 23% 21% 27% 2% 6% 2%
Staff
Efficient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Inefficient
Management 3% 22% 31% 38% 6% 0 0
Staff 10% 20% 48% 13% 10% 0 0
Hourly-Paid 23% 17% 29% 15% 10% 6% 0
Staff
Well Paid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Badly-Paid
Management 6% 38% 31% 16% 9% 0 0
Staff 7% 28% 30% 25% 9% 0 1%
Hourly-Paid 21% 23% 35% 13% 4% 2% 2%
Staff
Well Treated Badly Treated
by Management 1 2 3 5 5 6 7 by Management
Management 16% 34% 41% 9% 0 0 0
Staff 10% 31% 34% 17% 7% 1% 0
Hourly-Paid 21% ;~% 35% 8% 4% 0 2%
Staff
Honest with
~ Dishonest with
.. -
Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Management
Management 13% 19% 41% 22% 6% 0 0
Staff 13% 24% 34% 27% 1% 1% 0
Hour1y-Paid 17% 25% 23% 25% 6% 2% 2%
Staff
Honest with
Dishonest wilh
Shop-Floor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Shop-Floor
Management 13% 34% 31% 19% 3% 0 0
Staff 13% 41% 23% 20% 4% 0 0
Hourly-Paid 17% 17% 33% 10% 15% 4% 4%
Staff
Should be Prepared Should Only Do
to do Whatever Whatever They
the Company Needs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Have to Do In
Management 22% 31% 31% 13% 3% 0 0 Their Jobs
Staff 27% 30% 27% 10% 3% 4% 0
Hourly-Paid 31% 2U 17% 8% 10% 2% 10%A7.19 Cantd.
Staff
Conmitted To UncOCI1I\ttted to
Company 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 the Company
Management 6% 16% 47% 19% 13% a a
Staff 10% 27% 3% 20% 4% 4% 0
Hourly-Paid 27% 29% 19% 13% 10% 2% a
Staff
Have Excessive Have Too
Authority to do 7
Little Author1ty
their Jobs 1 2 3 4 5 6 to do their Job
Management 0 9% 19% 59% 9% 3% a
Staff 1% 9% 18% 42% 20% 9% 1%
Hourly-Paid 13% 15% 27% 29% 10% 2% 4%
Staff Divided Among
United 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Themselves
Management 6% 22% 19% 28% 13% 13% a
Staff 11% 20% 25% 16% 20% 7% 1%
Hour1y-Paid 19% 21% 27% 10% 10% 8% 4%
Staff
Trusting to . Suspicious of
Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Managment
Management 0 13% 34% 16% 31% 6% a
Staff 7% 6% 28% 21% 20% 17% 1%
Hourly-Paid 15% 17% 27% 21% 13% 4% 4%Tab1~7.20
" ,-
Shop-Floor
United 1 2 3 4 5 6 1
Divided Among
Themselves
Management 13% 41% 19% 13% 9% 3% 3%
Staff 18% 30% 17% 11% 13% 9% 0
Hourly-Paid 31% 27% 19% 10% 10% 2% 0
Shop-Floor
Well Paid 1 2" 3 4 5 6 1 Badly Paid
Management 3% 59% 25% 13% 0 0 0
Staff 20% 37% 28% 9% a 3% 0
Hourly-Paid 13% 25% 31% 10% 2% 2% 6%
Shop-Floor
Efficient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Inefficient
Management 3% 25% 38% 31% 0 0 0
Staff 11% 23% 38% 16% 11% 0 1%
Hourly-Paid 27% 25% 33% 10% 2% 0 2%
Shop-Floor
Hard-Working 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Lazy
Management 3% 19% 44% 25% 3% 3% 0
Staff 11% 11% 44% 24% 4% 3% 1%
Hourly-Paid 25% 29% 29% 13% 4% 0 0
Shop-Floor
Should be Should Only Do
Prepared to Whatever Is
Do Whatever' the Necessary for.
Company Needs Them to Do In
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 thefr Jobs
Management 16% 16% 34% 19% 13% 3% 0
Staff 17% 24% 30% 16% 6% 9% 0
Hourly-Paid 33% 27% 15% 4% 13% 4% 4%
Shop-Floor UncOlm\tted to Comitted to
Company .1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Company
Management 3% 9% 50% 19% 16% 3% 0
Staff 9% 7% 28% 32% 11% 11% a
Hourly-Paid 23% 21% 23% 10% 10% 6% 6%
Shop-Floor
Honest to ofshones t to
Managers &Staff 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 l-tanagers & SLtrr
Management 3% 31% 25% 31% 3% 3% 0
Staff 9% 11% 31% 30% 16% 3% 0
Hourly-Paid 23% 25% 2% 13% 6% 2% 2%Tab1~7.20 Contd.
Shop-Floor
Trusting to Suspicious of"
Management &Staff 1 2 3 4' 5 6 7 Management &
Management 0% 16%: 25% 28% 22~ 6l 0 Staff
Staff 1% 7% 14% 25% 28% 17% 6%
Hourly-Paid 6% 17% 23% 15% 19% 13% 8%
Shop-Floor
Well Treated Badly Treat~d
by Supervisors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 by Supervho~
Management 6% 25% 28% 38% 0 0 o.
Staff 13% 23% 32% 20~ 7% 3% 0
Hourly-Paid 19% 27% 23% 17% 8% 0 6%
Shop-Floor
Well-Treated Badly Trea t~d
by Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 by Management
Management 6% 28% 41% 19% 3% 0 O. ',_
Staff 13% 24% 32% 18% 3% 4% 3%
Hourly-Paid 17% 25% 21% 10% 15% 4% 8%
. ,Paid, and (ii) the more comprehensive information pos~essed by
Management, as well as the wider view available to them.
Assessments of the future security of the Company likewise vary
between groups, in the way referred to above. This may be for
th ereasons already discussed, in particular the lattr. We have
referred in Chapter rv to the Company's inability to keep its
employees informed. In that respect while employees were aware
that the Company had a record order book at this time, they were
unaware that much of this had come about as a result of record
world demand for the product such that competitors were unwilling
to compete for the orders won by the Company. (We learned this
informally from a contact in the Sales division). This infonmation -
obviously - was only available to a restricted number of (Management)
people. Therefore, the assessment of the Company's security into
the future, was made on the basis of different infonmation.
We next raised ~he question of the Company'~ relationship to the parent
group. While the view oftManagement in particular is that the Company
is relatively free of Parent Company Domination, Hourly-Paid are
. '.' ',,-, "
rather more sceptical. Staff tend more toward Management's view
that that of the Hourly-Paid. Why should Hourly-Paid ddifer? One
reason may again be relatf.~e ignorance - this is the least well infonmcd
group as Chapter IV makes clear. It may also be (thoughthfs is
conjecture) that Management may'hide behind' the, Pa.~ent C~pany ,
e.g. 'Yes, we would like to do this, but the group ~on't
let us.'
___JThe next 2 sections can be usefully taken as one. It is clear that
all groups regard the finn as a good one to work for. If we
compare these responses to a similar question in 'the Affluent Worker'
studies, they are remarkably good. The Affluent Workers regard
their Companies as
'Better than Most' 41 (of 101)
'About Average
t 56 (" ")
'Worse than Most' 4 ( " 101)
(Source 'Affluent Worker' Studies Vol. 1, pg. 72. Table 28).
If we equate our responses 1-2 as Better, 3-5 as 'Average' and 6-7
as 'Worse' then the comparative figures are
Better 78% (Management) 45% (Staff) 75% (Hourly Paid)
Average 22% ( " ) 35% ( " ) 20% (
II II )
Worse 0 ( " ) 0 ( " ) 4% (
II II )
Clearly, therefore, our respondents take a very good attitude.
toward the Company. While neither our respondents. nor the
'Affluent Worker' respondents regard their Company as 'Worse than
Average'. our respondnets much more often regard ,their Company as
better than average. Certainly the 2 sets of data are not directly
transformable. but the comparison does indicate the strength of
feeling among our respondents.
Why do they regard it as a 'good firm to work for'? We have seen
in Chapter VI that in terms of the jobs they do, their conditions,
wages etc. there is quite a high level of satisfaction. The previous
section of Tableq1.l7 taps into another dimension of their
relationship to the Company. In this section we are trying to ..
establish for how many of the respondents. their relationship Isan emotional one (they have an affection for the Company), Qr
the relationship 'is more pragmatic - in effect a cash nexus (only
important as a source of income). From this section it is clear
that among Hourly Paid there is a real difference of opinion,
with a fairly even spread of responses - 42~ take responses 1-3
(emphasising an emotional element), while 36~ take responses 5-7
(emphasising a cash nexus), with the remaining 23~ taking the
'neutral ' response 4. Probably not surprisingly, therefore,
the nature of the relationship varies from' one person/group to
another.
The size of the group which on the whole has an affection for
the Company may be explained by the stability of employment
in the Company, as indicated by Chapter 3, since for a proportion
of Hourly-Paid, this Company has been their wo~king lives.
. .
Asimilar situation applies to Staff - 40% take responses 1-3,
, -
36% responses 5-7 and 25% response 4. Among Management affection
appears more significant than for Staff or Hourly-Paid, as 57~
take responses 1-3, but 19% still take the income oriented
responses 5-7, and 25% the neutral response 4.
Thus while about 25% in each group take the neutral response
4, rather more Managers (57%) say the Company is looked on
with affection by its employees, than do Staff or Hourly-Paid
(40 and 42%), for whom the income oriented responses are more"
powerful than for Managers.
There are, therefore, significant numbers taking each view
in all 3 groups {though Management do understate the income
"
I
"I,
~; : .
t~
~
~----------oriented view), suggesting an inter-personal, rather than inter-
group variation in vie~on this matter. It is clear that the
hierarchical element is limited on this issue, in that the vfews
of Staff and Hourly-Paid are very similar.
Moving on to Tables~7.18 -A7.20, many of the questions. were
repeated for each group. Before we consider these Icommon
questions I weill chat with some of the specialised
questions.
In TableQ7.18 we deal with ho~Management treat their employees
in the first 4 sectors. focussing on the first 2 these raise '
the questions of how 'honest' and 'fair' Management are to their
employees. While, not surprisingly, Management rate themselves more
highly than Staff and Hourly-Paid rate them, it is still true to say that
Staff and Hourly-Paid do mostly regard them as both honest and fair.
For instance, 5% and 71% of Hourly-Paid see them as Honest and
Fiar (takin- responses 1-3), while the comparative figures for
Staff are 71% and 75%. Clearly this is a well-disposed assessment
of Management.
It stands contrast to a similar question reported by~,n~~
Blackburn (in 'Perceptions of Work'). They asked their production
workers given the chance the Management at Gourmets would put one
over on the workers ' • Agree 176 (of 297), Disagree 107 (of 297),
Don't Know 14 (of 297). Thus approximately 60% of thfs sample
recockoned their Management 'would put one over ani them, given
the chance. This suggests they would not be regarded as fair,
and certainly not as honest, by their employers.
jClearly, therefore, Management in our Company are well regarded in
this respect.
We also posed questions about the exercise of discipline in the
Company - whether Management are Hard or Soft on their Employees,
and are Authoritatfan or liberal. Amongst Managers themselves,
their view is that, if anything they are probably 'Soft on Employees'
though the model response is 4 (i.e. neither hard nor soft), and
that they are 'Liberal' rather than 'Authoritarian'. Staff on the
Whole agree with this assessment, though not to the same degree
(25% reckon Management are hard, and 26% reckon they are authoritarian).
HourlY-Paid are even more different since 36% say they think Management
are hard rather than soft and 53% think Management are authoritarian.
There is, therefore, a hierarchical element in this, with Management taking
the most favourable attitude toward themselves, with Staff being,less
favourable and Hourly-Paid still ess favourable suggesting that
Management are authoritarian in particular, and regard them as
harder than Management see themselves.
The remaining questions we posed of Management we also asked of
other groups, as we shall discuss them too as we proceed.
We asked about the limits of obligation to the Company by,
asking Whether Management/Staff/Hourly-Paid 'should be
prepared to do whatever is needed by the Company' or 'should
only do Whatever is strictly necessar,y in their jobs?' The
former implies a much more open obligation to the Company than
the latter. If we take Management first, their view of themselves,
is that their obligation is ver,y open as all their responses are in
1-3. This is a much more demanding assessment of ~nagement.
Obligation than the assessment made by Staff or Hourly-Paid. While
3Cfl...
for both these groups it is clear that they think that Manageme'nt
'should do whatever the Company needs', their assessment is less
demanding than that of Management. This, however, is a matter of
degree, and it is certain that Management are perceived as a group
who should do whatever the Company requires of them.
The same question posed of Staff and Hourly-Paid reveal similar
resPonses. For Staff and for Hourly-Paid there is a clear
expectation that they will 'do whatever is needed by the Company'.
This is true irrespective of which group is doing the as~essment
or being assessed. Further, interestingly, each group tends to
overstate its obligation to the Company i.e. Management's obligation
is aSsessed as greater by them than Staff and Hourly Paid, Staff's
obligation is assessed as greater by them than by Manag~~e~t and
Hourly Paid, and Hourly-Paid's obligation is assessed as great~r
< 1 ~
by them by Management and Staff._ ..
Then commitment in this case to'the Company is certainly more open
than closed by all groups. Not surprisingly when we l~~k ~t ;-, .'
COl!lllitment directly, we find that the're is a high 'ie~el : '~f
,1.-,
CO~itment to the Company by all groups. irrespective of who is doing
th '. " e assessment. Management, however. are perceived by all groups
to be most committed to the Company. This serves to confirm our
. " fi d .
n ings on to what extent employees should be prepared to do
Whatever the Company requires.
PerCeption of Unity and Divisfon within groups tended to'''suggest
that groups were seen by others as fairly unfted~ 'ce~tainly'more
united than divided. Staff unfty was perhaps re~a~ded '~s~~st ',;' (\
fr . ,' ' ' " . . ,._ )" ..
ag11e (Tab1e47.19) as about 25f of a11 groups saw- them as .
" ., ,,
! idivided, which is rather more than for Management and Hourly-Paid
(though 22% of Staff sa~ Hourly-Paid as divided). On the whole,
however, groups are seen as fairly united.
Perception of how hard working and efficient each grup is suggest
1) that all groups are seen as hard working; with only very small
percentages (never more than 10%) saying any group is latt. This
is true irrespective of who makes the assessment
2) assessments of efficiency are, however, relatively more critical.
While, again, only very small percentages actually say any group
is inefficient, the distribution of responses for all 3 groups,
suggest that efficiency is less than effort in these assessments.
It is, nevertheless, true to say that groups are perceived as
~fficient and hard working. The former assessments ~re consistent
with the assessmnt of the Company's efficiency (see TableAf.17).
Finally, for Management, we asked respondents to assess whether
each group was well/badly paid. From Chapter VI it ~ill be recalled
that while, on the whole, there was satisfaction ~ith wages and
salaries, this was subject to an understanding by the respondents
of the constraint on the Company incomes poli,cy•. If w~ look at
Table 5.18 we can see that Management believe they a:e,' ,on the
whole, 'well paid' - but Staff and Hourly-Paid suggest that
Management are even better paid than they think. Indeed
in each case a group's assessment of its wages/salaries, is more
critical than the assessment of the goup by th~,ot~~r groups
i.e. groups think of themselves as less we1lpa,idthan ,others
think of them. Indeed this is especially true of Management, who . .
it will be recalled fromAffl/fJi~vr were mostexe~fsed abo~t fncomespolicy.
We asked whether Staff and Hourly-Paid are well or badly treated
by Management? Not surprisingly Management reckoned they treated
each group well. While the responses of Staff and Hourly Paid
are slighly more critical (e.g. 27% of Hourly-Paid take responses
5-7, suggesting they are badly treated, but only 3% of Management
take this response), it is clear that both groups believe they
are well treated by Management.
We also asked whether Shop-Floor workers are well or badly treated
by supervisors. This question showed that, as for ~anagement,
Supervisors were perceived as treating Shop Floor workers well.
While Hourly-Paid workers are more critical than Staff or Management,
the numbers are fairly small (especially relative to the fonmer).
These 2 sections, therefore, suggest that authority is exercised on
the whole, in an acceptable way in the Company. This is consistent
with the evidence on whether Management are authoritarian and
- . .'.
on how they exercise discipline. Indeed, if we recall the
evidence from Chapter Von control, this may help to explain w~
even 'what control' did not subvert Management autho~ity, since if it
is pe~ceived to be exercised in an acceptable way it removes one
cause of its potential demise.
Associated with this is whether Staff have enough, or too little . \ ~,~ ,
authority to do their jobs. In this case there is a division of - -
view. On the whole Management take the view, that_ the authority ,
of Staff is about right (not surprising since tt,~s.~nagement who
give them their formal authority). While the modal response or starr -and Hourly Paid is that Staff authority is neither tao much nor too
little, there is a significant view by Hourly-Paid that they, have too
much authority (55% give responses 1-3). This emphas{~es again the
question of context since for Hourly-Paid workers, .the exercise '. ,
of Staff authority (in the person of the foreman) will be more
direct and visible - and frequent - that the exercise of
Management authority. This, however, flies in the face of other
research which suggests that one of the difficulties of the
supervisory role is that they feel they have too little authority
(see for instance J. Child and B. Partrid,~'The ~st Managers').
We also questioned the honesty of Staff and Hourly-Paid•. It will
be recalled that Management were perceived as honest and ~his 1s general 1
held to be the cas~ for Staff and Hourly-Paid. Staff are seen by
at least 65% as honest to Management and to Hourly-Paid - though Hourly-
Paid take a more critical view than Management of Staff honesty.
Shop-Floor honesty toward Management and Staff is, ,however, perceived
rather more critically. While 77% of Shop-Floor workers th~nk they
are honest to Staff and Management, only 51% and 59% respectively
" " " "
share that view.
Finally we deal with trust and suspicion. Staff. see themselves,
and are seen by Management, as generally neither trust)ng nor
suspicious. Hourly-Paid workers, on the other hand,ra.th~r ,tend
to see Staff as ~rusting Management rather than being suspicious
of them. This may reflect the historical closeness of Staff
and Management relative to Hourly-Paid and f1anagement. The ~athe~
ambiguous view by Staff and Management may reflect the disintegration of
this since the late 1960's, with white co11a~.~ryiQn~satfon. :.Shop-Floor workers - like Staff - are seen by ~nagement and Staff as
neither trusting nor suspicious of Management and Staff. The responses
of Hourly-Paid workers are. howeve,r. rather indefinite. with no
clear view being apparent. which suggewts a strong personal or
disparate dimension on this attitude. rather than agroup view being
taken.
The picture of 'trust' in the company is. therefore. rather
indefinite. which may reflect difficulty with the whole concept
of trust. On the other hand. given its centralit~ to ~he
definition of 'ideal speech' it does suggest and reflect the
, ~ r •
existence of difficulties with communication in the Company -
, -
especially the ambiguity of Staff's trust in Management, since
if there is an inadequacy of trust it creates obstacles to force
communication in the Company.
What sort of image does this data develop? W~ile in c~rtain respects
.' ~
the image has negative. or critical qualities (for instance, the
" ,.' ': "', ;'
trust which hourly-paid workers have in Management 0\ Staff) it
has more positive qualities. Thus, the Company is see~ as quite
',1 t, 'i' "' ..
efficient. with a secure future. and is seen as a good company to
.' ~'¥ ;
work for (to a remarkably high degree). While for a, sign.i,f.i~ant
-, .
proportion this is a 'cash nexus'. for a larger proportion their
• " J '
involvement with the Company appears to be emotional rather than
, '., ' ~ ,~
cash passed.
Management are seen as honest and fair; it ~as f~lt ,Management should
, .,; "; " '
do whatever the Company required - and likewise for Staff and
Hourly-Paid. While there will clearly be conditionality and limits
to this. which the question does not assess. it is still an indicative--
of a high level of commitment to the Company, which t~ cQnft~~d
by a sUbsequent question which measures commitment itself. The
Management, Staff and Hour1y-Pafd groups are perceived as united.
as hard working (though assessed efficiency is more critical•.
slightly) and well paid (though groups overstated how well paid
other groups felt they were).
Staff and Hourly-Paid felt they were well-treated by Management.
and Hourly-Paid by their supervisors.
The only remaining negative aspects are that (i) the perceived
levels of trust are rather indefinite (ii) there ~re reservations
about the exercise of discipline by Management, and the authority
of Staff was felt to be, if anything, excessive by Hourly Paid.
On the whole, however, the image is remarkably positive. both as
, ., ..
an assessment of the Company, and in terms of inter-group asses~nts.
This data tends to confirm the message of Chapter VI i.e. that the
employees of the Company are generally satisfied with their emplo~nt.
It also tends to suggest that inter-personal relations are soon as
good - Management are honest and fiiir, people a~e ~ell treated etc.
On the other hand it is significant - in view of what we have had
to say in Chapter IV, and espeically Chapter Vthat the major
r ""
reservations expressed in this section concern 'the exercise of
authority by Staff (by Hourly Paid) as well as the Managerial exercise
of discipline, and reservation about trust.
We would argue, therefore, that this data supports. and lends weight
to analysis of previous Chapters.-
Conclusion
The data presented in this Idffe.'<1;y. like the data. ofhff.~rJi}oVr have
in common that their role has been explanatory of the data in Chapter V
(actual and ideal control) and Chapter IV (perceptions of communication).
Both of these Chapters revelaed criticism of the Company - control
was not perceived as ideal, and there were clear implications
that it should be re-structured: communication was perceived as
really very bad in certain respects. Yet this criticism was
constrained. Even though control was not ideal, even under ideal
control there would still be an inequality of power. Management
would retain control - even if only in the last analysis.
We suggested in Chapter V that this reflected a perc~ived - a,nd
deeply rooted - division of labour i.e. we join pipes together,
they take decisions. In this sense Management occupy a privileged
position in the Company i.e. there is an unconcious,exerc{se of power
on-going which is perceived as largely natural and is,not perceived
as power in any sense by them. Management are perceived to possess
a speical skill (decision-making) which justifies and legitamises
the position they occupy in the Company.
The subsequent data ofIlfF"Ji)r VI' lends weight to·this, by indictatfng
why this situation is not subject to challenge., This hf~~~ndlcltos
high levels of satisfaction with their employment by our respondents.
Add to this (i) the econometric differential data we have Just conslde~d.
which indicates a generally positive image of the Company (if) tholr
experience of redundancy and unemployment, which is relatfvely less
that could be expected in this area (iii) the roleplayed by the
media, which we argued tends to reinforce the frames of meaning=
· '
worked out in the work-place. We would argue, for \nstanc~, that it
is going too far to say, as Howard Davis does in IBeyond Class Images'
(see page 109) that perceptives of .the Company'and of Management
are dominated by the media. rt is too easy to suggest that because
people employ 'dominant media themes' that this only reflects the
media. It must also reflect the reality of the work-place which,
as we have indicated in earlier Chapters, it does.
Given all this, therefore, the question could be argued, to have
changed from 'Why no challenge?' to 'Why bother?1 While it may
be argued that under different circumstances (e.g. of equality) that
employees could achieve a higher level of job satisfaction (undid
Map10w's concept of self actualization would suggest that they would)
our data indicates that under present arrangements they are, on
the whole satisfied, and are supported and maintained in this by
(i) their on-going experience of satisfaction (ii) the structure of
the media information they consume. The question of a challenge
to hierarchy therefore has to consider why - in the perceptions of
over respondents - they should challenge hierarchy?
Our data suggests few reasons. This is not to say, however, that
they are none. We have seen an uneasiness about the distribution
of control in the Company, a dissatisfaction about how well (badly
really) they are informed by the Company, as well as reservations
about discipline and authority in the Company. Added to this, fnter-
group interactions is restructured in the Company to an extent and
in a way which cannot be explained fully by structure above. There
are, therfore, criticisms made - there are negative aspects.
Development of these could produce a challenge to hierarchy. Further.I
I
I
I
i
r
»
the uneasiness with contral is consistent with the.challenge to
authority of all types which has developed since, 1945. We may,
therefore, expect this to develop, even independently of events
in the Company. Similarly even the commercial environment may act
against hierarchy e.g. Tof~er argues in 'the Adaptive Corporation'
that 'effective decisions today must be taken at lower and lower
levels within the organization. Demands for participation thus do
not flow from political idealogy, but from a recognition that the
system, as structured today, cannot respond efficiently to the
Post-changing environment' (pg. 122).
Thus while we have shown a situation which on the whole is
favourable to the persistence of hierarchy - even the criticism
of it is, as we have said, constrained - there are negative
elements. There are 'the seeds of its own destruction.'
4tJO»
with current affairs and watching. I think there is a number of
people keep interested in them. More than you would have got if
there had been no and it's also on the shop floor as well.
S. Do you think the current affairs programmes put bias on them?
R. I would say the answer to that is yes. for obvious reasons. You
are living in a society just now that the,media is controlled by
a capitalist society so it must be biased and the nature of the
establishment is such that people don't. even know that they are
presenting a biased programme at times•..They think it is an
actual programme. You've got. for instance - could I go on on
that one?
S. Sure.
R. You had a situation last night on TV where a fellow defending.
telling teachers to leave the Queen's photograph alone. They
had spent £4.000. But they are people that talk about other
places spending £4.000 to go and see how the sewers work in
Japan or the sewers work in the Soviet Union which is at least
educational. What can be educational £4.000 worth of
photographs of the Queen. This is what you get.
S. When the guys on the shop floor watch. these biased programmes.
whether consciously baised or unconsciously bi~sed. it doesn't
really matter. when they watch them what sort of reaction does it
have? I mean. does it confirm their view that this sort of ...
society is right and real and so on. or does it make them challenge
it?
R. I think it helps make them challenge it•., Ithelps .make them
challenge it. You get the occasional programme. and, I am only
quoting from recent times again. that stirs me up whether it be
for a period of time or f2r all time I don't know. I feel 'as ifI
t
I
j
I
....
I always had the attitude. The progranrne a fortnight ago on .
the National Health Service and the Health ,Service in America -
,it made me - the Daily Express put it in a very nice light. the
Daily Express correspondent the next day. after he ~ad seen the'
two of them, says "When I go into my doctor~ s tonight. I'll, not
count the number of people that's waiting' in·the waiting room in
front of me, I'll count my blessings that we have a National '
Health Service. II That while it is not 'perfect by any means. my
God it's a million times better than any you will ever get 1n
America. No doubt about that and that's the kind of programme
that makes people think. That kind of.programme sticks. I
think that kind of programme sticks the same,as .the Vietnamese
one stuck a bit for everyone.
S. What about programmes that take down the Union movement? I
mean these programmes appear from time to time•.'
R. Oh, aye, OK. They also delude people and you are 'talking about
the establishment putting over anti-Union progranrnes. They also
delude people but then again you are getting th~ biased attitude
coming over to the thinggummy. You get the people presenting
cases from Unions what they think are the bare situations of
that case which. outwardly, people would think was stupid but.
when you look into the situation, there is a lot more in it.
You know, but people don't look into it, they are just presented
with the bare facts. We've had situations of that in here.
When you look at the bare facts of the situation, you say to
yourself there's something wrong there but then only Union
officials would go into it deeper. But they are only
presenting the frontage and then it gets taken away.
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